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INHERENCY
US military operates in Somalia and continues to grow
Stewart 14
Phil Stewart, 7-3-2014, "Exclusive: U.S. discloses secret Somalia military presence, up to 120
troops," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/03/us-usa-somaliaidUSKBN0F72A820140703
U.S. military advisors have secretly operated in Somalia since around 2007 and
Washington plans to deepen its security assistance to help the country fend of threats
by Islamist militant group al Shabaab, U.S. officials said. The comments are the first detailed public
acknowledgement of a U.S. military presence in Somalia dating back since the U.S. administration of George W. Bush and
add to other signs of a deepening U.S. commitment to Somalia's government, which the Obama administration
recognized last year. The deployments, consisting of up to 120 troops on the ground, go beyond
the Pentagon's January announcement that it had sent a handful of advisors in October. That was seen at the time as the
first assignment of U.S. troops to Somalia since 1993 when two U.S. helicopters were shot down and 18 American troops
killed in the "Black Hawk Down" disaster. The plans to further expand U.S. military assistance coincide with increasing
efforts by the Somali government and African Union peacekeepers to counter a bloody seven-year insurgent campaign by
the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab to impose strict Islamic law inside Somalia. Those U.S. plans include greater

military engagement and new funds for training and assistance for the Somali National
Army (SNA), after years of working with the African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, which has about 22,000
troops in the country from Uganda, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Djibouti and Ethiopia. "What youll see with this
upcoming fiscal year is the beginning of engagement with the SNA proper," said a U.S. defense official, who declined to
be identified. The next fiscal year starts in October. An Obama administration official told Reuters there were currently up
to 120 U.S. military personnel on the ground throughout Somalia and described them as trainers and advisors. "They're
not involved in combat," the official told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity, adding that until last year, U.S.
military advisors had been working with AMISOM troop contributors, as opposed to Somali forces. President Barack
Obama last year determined that Somalia could receive U.S. military assistance. Another official said American forces
over the years had provided advice and assistance in areas related to mission planning, small unit tactics, medical care,
human rights and communications. The official said U.S. forces in Somalia have also facilitated coordination, planning and
communication between AMISOM troop contributors and Somali security forces. SPECIAL OPS The comments expand
upon a little noticed section of a speech given early in June by Wendy Sherman, under secretary of state for political
affairs. She publicly acknowledged that a "small contingent of U.S. military personnel" including special operations forces
had been present in parts of Somalia for several years. Still, it was not immediately clear from her remarks the extent to
which U.S. personnel had been operating. U.S. special operations forces have staged high-profile raids in the past in
Somalia, including an aborted attempt in October to capture an al Shabaab operative in the militant group's stronghold of
Barawe. U.S. officials have acknowledged Washington's support for AMISOM and Somalia's struggle against al Shabaab.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency officials have been known to operate in the country. U.S. troop numbers on the

ground in Somalia vary over time, the officials told Reuters. Deployments are "staggered"
and "short-term," one official said. But the Obama administration official added that there was
overlap in the deployments to allow for a persistent presence on the ground. Asked about
where U.S. forces were deployed, the administration official said they were "in locations throughout
Somalia" but declined to elaborate further for security reasons. The official declined to say
precisely when the first U.S. military forces went back into Somalia, saying: "It was around 2007"
and in support of AMISOM.

Action in Somalia key because part of a greater trend of increased


presence in the GHOA
Ty McCormick, 7/2/2015
(Exclusive: US Operates Drones From Secret Bases in Somalia Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/02/exclusive-u-s-operates-drones-from-secret-bases-in-somaliaspecial-operations-jsoc-black-hawk-down/)

The expanded U.S. footprint in Somalia is part of a broader trend toward deeper covert
military engagement in the volatile Horn of Africa region. That engagement has taken the
form of ramped-up intelligence and special operations activities, as well as military assistance
programs that have grown dramatically in recent years without much in the way of public
debate or congressional oversight. As the U.S. Defense Department draws down its presence in
Afghanistan and shutters bases across Europe, and as the threat of terrorism surges in East Africa,
the quiet accumulation of military installations in this part of the world has been easy to miss. In
addition to its main hub in Djibouti, where some 4,000 American service members and civilians are
stationed, the U.S. military has established smaller outposts inEthiopia, Kenya, and the Seychelles,
a tropical archipelago located roughly 800 miles off the Somali coast. It has also indirectly
financed the training of thousands of AMISOM troops.

PLAN: The United States should significantly reduce its military presence
in the Greater Horn of Africa through removing the US African Command
(AFRICOM) and its contractors from the Federal Republic of Somalia.

Advantage 1: Neomedievalism
US military presence in Somalia causes Neomedievalism
Stanger 15
Stanger, Allison. "Hired Guns."Foreign Affairs. July/Aug. 2015. Web. 16 Aug. 2015.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2015-06-16/hired-guns>.

McFate, however, trains his eye on a bigger-picture problem posed by private military
contractors: the havoc they are wreaking on world order. For the moment, he writes, the
market for force is a monopsony, where there is a predominant buyerthe United
Statesand many sellers. But that will no doubt change, especially because the U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq has only increased the importance of security contractors in
those countries. And as other countries, including China and Russia, get into the privatecontracting game, the world will start to see a freer market for force . The result, McFate
predicts, will be a return to the Middle Ages, when private warriors determined the
outcomes of conflicts and states stood at the sidelines of international politics. This
neo-medieval world will be characterized by a non-state-centric, multipolar
international system of overlapping authorities and allegiances within the same
territory. Yet it need not be chaotic, he reassures readers, since the global system will
persist in a durable disorder that contains, rather than solves, problems. How can the
world avoid replicating the problems generated by hired guns in the medieval era? The answer, according to
McFate, is to rely less on mere mercenaries and instead foster military enterprisers. The former sell their
skills to the highest bidder; the latter raise armies rather than command them and thus contribute to
stability. During the Thirty Years War, military enterprisers included such figures as Ernst von Mansfeld, who
raised an army for the elector palatine, and Albrecht von Wallenstein, who offered his services to Ferdinand II,
the Holy Roman emperor. But in sketching out a strategy for dealing with a world of privatized power, McFate
is too quick to jettison the state-centric principles that have served the world so well since the end of the
Thirty Years War. The biggest challenges to U.S. security in the years ahead, from climate

change to terrorism to cybersecurity, will require more state-to-state collaboration, not


less. And U.S. support, tacit or otherwise, for a free market for force will only serve to
exacerbate these problems.

Somalia Reaching Neomedieval Point of No Return, Action now is critical


Stanger 15
Stanger, Allison. "Hired Guns."Foreign Affairs. July/Aug. 2015. Web. 16 Aug. 2015.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2015-06-16/hired-guns>.

In contrast, the use of contractors in the failed state of Somalia provides a tragic
example of neomedievalism. After the UN withdrew all peacekeeping forces from the
country in 1995, politics became radically localized. Puntland and Somaliland,
semiautonomous regions within Somalia, hired private security companies to help fight
piracy on their coastlines, as did Somalias weak central government. (According to
McFate, at least one of these firms, the South Africabased Saracen International, also started
secretly shipping military equipment on cargo planes into Somalia, in violation of arms
embargoes.) The United States entered the fray, too. As McFate explains, the State Department
hired DynCorp to train, equip, and deploy peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi and
indirectly financed Bancroft Global Development to train African troops to fight the
Islamist terrorist group al Shababall without leaving an obvious U.S. footprint. In Somalia, the
problem was that no real state existed, so the United States and other countries were
unable to raise a legitimate national military, as they had in Liberia. Puzzlingly, McFate
simultaneously praises and condemns U.S. policy in Somalia. On the one hand, he writes that

Somalias free market with mercenaries contributed to instability rather than resolving
it. On the other, he finds a durable disorder in the country that might hold insights for
stabilizing other failed states. But surely, the victims of al Shababs April 2015 deadly attack on a
university in neighboring Kenya would find nothing durable about the disorder in Somalia.
Surveying the world, McFate sees an emergent neomedieval order that must be channeled in the
right direction.

Neomedievalism in Somalia will engulf the Horn of Africa threatens


genocide and global spillover
Ward, 7 Olivia Ward, Toronto Star, April 29,2007
Starved and terrified civilians fleeing their homes. The stench of death hovering over the
steaming streets. Tanks and missiles blasting through the night. Cholera victims dying in
the dust. A plague of war has descended on the Somali capital, Mogadishu, claiming more
than a thousand lives and displacing an estimates 300,000 people, as the country's
transitional government, backed by Ethiopian troops, continues to battle for power
with supporters of an ousted Islamist regime. It's one of those complex regional
wars that attract little international attention - but this conflict is closely watched in Toronto and other
centres of the Somali diaspora. What much of the world doesn't realize is that this little war
threatens a humanitarian catastrophe that could have spillover efects in the
region, and the West, for years to come. "It's a genocide in the making," says Mohamad
Elmi, an Ottawa-based partner in Mogadishu's independent HornAfrik broadcasting
network. "People are fleeing in every direction, but they're being wounded and killed and there's
nobody to help them. Now, all the political agendas are merging, and everything we've
feared is happening. If it continues this way the whole Horn of Africa will be in
flames."

Genocide Threatens To Wipe Out The Human Race


Diamond, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, 1992, p. 277

While our first association to the world genocide is likely to be the killings in Nazi concentration camps, those
were not even the largest-scale genocide of this century. The Tasmanians and hundreds of other peoples were
modern targets of successful smaller extermination campaigns. Numerous peoples scattered throughout the world
are potential targets in the near future. Yet genocide is such a painful subject that either wed rather not think
about it at all, or else wed like to believe that nice people dont commit genocide only Nazis do. But our
refusal to think about it has consequences weve done little to halt the numerous episodes of genocide since
World War II, and were not alert to where it may happen next. Together with our destruction of our own
environmental resources, our genocidal tendencies coupled to nuclear weapons now constitute the two most
likely means by which the human species may reverse all its progress virtually overnight.

And We have a moral obligation to stop genocidemass murder of


civilians and cultures cannot go unnoticed.
Card '03 [Claudia, Winter, prof. of philo, Ph.D from Harvard, Sr. Fellow @ the Institute for Research in the
Humanities, Hypatia, "Genocide and Social Death,", vol. 18 # 1]

Genocide is not simply unjust (although it certainly is unjust); it is also evil. It characteristically includes the
one-sided killing of defenseless civilians babies, children, the elderly, the sick, the disabled, and the injured
of both genders along with their usually female caretakerssimply on the basis of their national, religious,
ethnic, or other political identity. It targets people on the basis of who they are rather than on the basis of what
they have done, what they might do, even what they are capable of doing. (One commentator says genocide
kills people on the basis of what they are, not even who they are). Genocide is a paradigm of what Israeli
philosopher Avishai Margalit (1996) calls "indecent" in that it not only destroys victims but first humiliates
them by deliberately inflicting an "utter loss of freedom and control over one's vital interests" (115). Vital
interests can be transgenerational and thus survive one's death. Before death, genocide victims are ordinarily

deprived of control over vital transgenerational interests and more immediate vital interests. They may be literally
stripped naked, robbed of their last possessions, lied to about the most vital matters, witness to the murder of
family, friends, and neighbors, made to participate in their own murder, and if female, they are likely to be also
violated sexually.7 Victims of genocide are commonly killed with no regard for lingering suffering or exposure.
They, and their corpses, are routinely treated with utter disrespect. These historical facts, not simply mass murder,
account for much of the moral opprobrium attaching to the concept of genocide. Yet such atrocities, it may be
argued, are already war crimes, if conducted during wartime, and they can otherwise or also be prosecuted
as crimes against humanity. Why, then, add the specific crime of genocide? What, if anything, is not already
captured by laws that prohibit such things as the rape, enslavement, torture, forced deportation, and the
degradation of individuals? Is any ethically distinct harm done to members of the targeted group that would
not have been done had they been targeted simply as individuals rather than because of their group
membership? This is the question that I find central in arguing that genocide is not simply reducible to mass
death, to any of the other war crimes, or to the crimes against humanity just enumerated. I believe the answer is
affirmative: the harm is ethically distinct, although on the question of whether it is worse, I wish only to
question the assumption that it is not. Specific to genocide is the harm inflicted on its victims' social vitality. It
is not just that one's group membership is the occasion for harms that are definable independently of one's
identity as a member of the group. When a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose
their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational connections. To use Orlando Patterson's
terminology, in that event, they may become "socially dead" and their descendants "natally alienated," no
longer able to pass along and build upon the traditions, cultural developments (including languages), and
projects of earlier generations (1982, 59). The harm of social death is not necessarily less extreme than that of

physical death. Social death can even aggravate physical death by making it indecent, removing all respectful and
caring ritual, social connections, and social contexts that are capable of making dying bearable and even of
making one's death meaningful. In my view, the special evil of genocide lies in its infliction of not just physical
death (when it does that) but social death, producing a consequent meaninglessness of one's life and even of its
termination.

Neomedievalism creates an Economic Incentive for endless War


Stanger 15
Stanger, Allison. "Hired Guns."Foreign Affairs. July/Aug. 2015. Web. 16 Aug. 2015.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2015-06-16/hired-guns>.

the United States start relying so heavily on privatized warfare? In part, it did so because
of policymakers faith in the power of free markets. Indeed, maintaining a standing army is
an expensive proposition, and letting contractors provide surge capacity can significantly lower
costs. But Washington was also in some sense forced to outsource its fighting. The move to an allvolunteer force and Americans aversion to a draft made security contractors an attractive way to

plug the gap between the demand for soldiers and their supplywith the added benefit of
providing plausible deniability when things went wrong. Yet even though security contractors
may save money in the short run, the long-term costs are significant. On-demand
military services make it easier and more tempting to go to war in the first place, as the
American people do not have to be mobilized in support of private ventures.

This causes endless war


Stanger 15
Stanger, Allison. "Hired Guns."Foreign Affairs. July/Aug. 2015. Web. 16 Aug. 2015.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2015-06-16/hired-guns>.

A laissez-faire approach to the private military industry is likely to encourage the worst
outcome: a free market for force, akin to the situation in Somalia or the predatory
mercenarism of medieval Italy, which prompted Machiavelli to urge the prince to always
rely on his own arms. An unmediated market for force is a recipe for unending conflict,
since war pays. More war means more mercenaries, which gives private armies more
resources to ply their trade, fostering more war, McFate writes. The desired outcome is a
mediated market for force, where military enterprisers dominate the market. But McFate provides
no blueprint for how such a market might be encouraged, except to say that military enterprisers
must predominate. As he himself acknowledges, any military enterpriser is just one step away from
doubling as a mercenary, since knowing how to raise and train an army is not far from knowing
how to deploy one. And so he never answers the question of which factors might foster a mediated
market for force and which might undermine it. A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE Perhaps an answer can be
found by reconsidering why private armies were abandoned at the close of the medieval era.

Nuclear, Chemical, Biological War Becomes Possible

Starobin 6MS, London School of Economics


[Paul, MS, London School of Economics, The National Journal, Beyond Hegemony, 12.2.2006, p.
lexis]
The grimmest possibility is a 21st-century global version of the Dark Ages that afflicted
Christian Europe after the fall of Rome in the 5th century. In The Coming Anarchy, a 1994
Atlantic Monthly essay, the writer Robert D. Kaplan held out West Africa as a premonition of the
future -- the "symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which
criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger." It will be a world of "disease,
overpopulation ... the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders,
and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug
cartels," as already characterizes West Africa. And a world of 21st-century chaos, it can be
added, is one in which 21st-century barbarians might have access to chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons.

Use of bioweapons will destroy life on the planet the impact outweighs
nuclear war
Ochs 02

MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University and Naturalist at Grand Teton
National Park [Richard, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY, Jun 9,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html]
biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme
danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered

these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories.

While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life
they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control

on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations,

very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated.

There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally

released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions.

The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in

comparison to the potential damage bioweapons

could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of

people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future
generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will

bio-engineered agents by the


wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small

probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that,
hundreds with no known cure could

example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues?

HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW

POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies

by conventional weapons. The past


doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nations survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this

"patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanitys survival


primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is
life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for
tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction,

sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design
or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious
gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers?
Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now

that extinction is possible,


our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no
political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over.
If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes.

Bioweapons outweigh Nuclear


Steinbruner 98 Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution
[John D., Biological weapons: A plague upon all houses, Foreign Policy, Dec 22, LN]
More than 70 years later, revulsion persists and the Geneva Protocol has been strengthened, but the sense of

intensified.

It is

widely recognized that,

threat of biological warfare has

as potential instruments of destruction, biological agents are inexpensive,

readily accessible, and unusually dangerous . Of the thousands of pathogens that prey upon human beings, a few are now known to have
the potential for causing truly massive devastation, with mortality levels conceivably exceeding what chemical or even
nuclear weapons could produce. Nature provides the prototypes without requiring any design bureau or manufacturing facility. Medical science provides
increasingly useful information, which by its very nature is conveyed in open literature. A small home-brewery is all that would be required to produce a potent threat of major proportions.

At least 17 countries are suspected of conducting biological weapons research - including several, such as Iran and Iraq, that are especially hostile
to the United States. It is a considerable comfort and undoubtedly a key to our survival that, so far, the main lines of defense against this threat have not depended on explicit policies
or organized efforts. In the long course of evolution, the human body has developed physical barriers and a biochemical immune system whose sophistication and effectiveness exceed

New diseases emerge, while old diseases mutate and adapt.


Throughout history, there have been epidemics during which human immunity has broken down on an epic scale.
anything we could design or as yet even fully understand. But evolution is a sword that cuts both ways:

An infectious agent believed to have been the plague bacterium killed an estimated 20 million
people over a four-year period in the fourteenth century, including nearly one-quarter of Western
Europe's population at the time. Since its recognized appearance in 1981, some 20 variations of
the HIV virus have infected an estimated 29.4 million worldwide, with 1.5 million people currently
dying of AIDS each year. Malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera - once thought to be under control are now making a comeback. As we enter the twenty-first century, changing conditions have
enhanced the potential for widespread contagion. The rapid growth rate of the total world population, the
unprecedented freedom of movement across international borders, and scientific advances that expand the
capability for the deliberate manipulation of pathogens are all cause for worry that the problem might be

The threat of infectious


pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security
problem for the species as a whole. In recent years, this realization has
greater in the future than it has ever been in the past.

begun to seep into international security deliberations. An unintended outbreak of a virus


resembling ebola among monkeys at a research installation in Reston, Virginia, in 1989 raised
awareness of the natural threat, and several authoritative reports have since called for substantial
improvements in global disease surveillance. Concern about the use of biological weapons rose with
revelations that Iraq had deployed anthrax weapons during the Gulf War and that the Aum Shinrikyo sect
apparently had attempted to attack the Imperial Palace in Tokyo with botulinum toxin , the first putative

episode of actual use since World War II. In reaction to these events, the United States has
strengthened legal authority to preempt terrorist threats, has established more extensive
regulations for handling hazardous biological agents, and has created for the first time special
military units continuously prepared to respond to domestic incidents. Internationally, negotiations
are under way to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 - now
the central international legal instrument for preventing the hostile use of pathogens - and
President Bill Clinton has pledged to complete an agreement by 1998. But these efforts are merely
tentative first steps toward dealing with a problem that vitally affects the entire human population.
Ultimately the world's military, medical, and business establishments will have to work together to
an unprecedented degree if the international community is to succeed in containing the threat of
biological weapons. Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and
lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally
important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not

reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these
things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured
weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may
be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear
warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and

the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical
military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing
cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that
they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens
- ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated
for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could
efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade
of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza
epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer
limit

US military must disengage completely to allow Somalia to recover


Bronwyn E. Bruton, 2010
(Somalia: A New Approach Council on Foreign Relations 52)

The United States needs to chart a different courseone that deliberately lessens American
involvement in Somalia without giving up on the objective of undermining the Shabaab and denying al-Qaeda a sanctuary. What can be termed constructive
disengagement may appear to be a counterintuitive approach, but doing less is better than doing harm, and there are good reasons to believe that the results will be more
successful. The Shabaab is an alliance of convenience and its hold over territory is weaker than it appears. Under the right
conditions, it will fragment. Somali fundamentalistswhose ambitions are mostly localare likely
to break ranks with al-Qaeda and other foreign operatives as the utility of cooperation diminishes.
The United States and its allies must encourage these fissures to expand. They can do that most
quickly and easily by disengaging from any efort to pick a winner in Somalia , and by
signaling a willingness to coexist with any Islamist group or government that emerges, as long as it
refrains from acts of regional aggression, rejects global jihadi ambitions, and agrees to tolerate the
efforts of Western humanitarian relief agencies in Somalia. Over the long term, Somalia is likely to
slowly return to its pre-2006 configuration of clan territories. As anti-Western sentiment
subsides, the United States and its allies can then reengage to help resolve the deeper
causes of state failure in Somalia. Rather than pursue centralized state-building and
governance eforts, localized economic development initiatives should be encouraged.
Simultaneously, regional and international partners should be enlisted to reduce simmering regional animosities, undermine the support for extremist groups, and address the piracy problem that has worsened on the

A strategy of constructive disengagement entails risk, but the


alternatives are far more dangerous. Unless there is a decisive change in U.S., UN, and regional policy, ineffective external
meddling threatens to prolong and worsen the conflict, further radicalize the population, and
increase the odds that al-Qaeda and other extremist groups will eventually find a safe haven in
Somalia. Eventually, as anti-Western sentiment subsides, the opportunity will grow for the United
States and its partners to reengage and address some of the fundamental causes of state failure
in Somalia. Doing so will require accepting that there is a crippling lack of consensus in Somalia over fundamental questions about whether a Somali government should be unitary, federal, or confederal;
margins of the larger Somalia conflict.

Islamist, or a mixture of secular and Islamic law; and whether the northern territory of Somaliland should be granted independence.21 These large issues only obscure more fundamental conflicts over the distribution of

International
efforts to catalyze a political reconciliation via internationally sponsored peace conferences and
parliamentary ethnic quota systems will also continue to be futile. Ultimately, reconciliation and
governance are in Somali hands. New development initiatives, therefore, should be pursued in a
decentralized fashion that involves collaboration with the informal and traditional authorities that
are already in place on the groundwithout attempting to formalize or empower them. That
approach will also allow for more extensive development support of the Somaliland and Puntland territories, without requiring the
United States to explicitly recognize either territory as a sovereign nation . Somaliland has a
relatively impressive record of democratic governance, and it has held a series of national
democratic elections. But because it is not recognized as a legitimate government, Somaliland is
largely ineligible to receive multilateral funding and development assistance. That is a source of
increasing frustration to Somalilanders eager for growth and development. An increase in donor
assistance could help boost Somalilands economy, which may in turn help assuage Somalilanders
impatience for international recognition.22 As it pursues a decentralized approach, the United States,
in cooperation with its international partners, should be mindful of several existing communitybased development models. For example, the United States could, via the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UNDP,
assist local communities to organize community meetings or even a local development council
(LDC) of clan elders and religious leaders responsible for identifying local development and
infrastructure projects. Another model is provided by a local womens organization called SAACID (meaning to help in Somali), which has successfully implemented a variety of programs
land and resources among various clans. Until there is a meaningful political reconciliation between the clans, attempts to construct governance arrangements will be a recipe for conflict.

The international
community should study and apply these locally developed strategies to a broader effort to
promote development and trade across Somalia. For now, however, the United States and its partners should avoid the
temptation to engage in institution-building at the community level. Traditional governance tends to depend on fluid, community-wide processes of dialogue, and the institutionalization of power
ranging from garbage collection to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Somalias dangerous capital city using a cross-clan community dialogue model.

can quickly lead to abuse. Development funding is often diverted, for example, to buy vehicles or to build offices for community officials. Such ostentatious and unnecessary purchases create an air of corruption,
especially when they precede any visible program outputs to benefit the community. In the case of Somalia, form should follow function. It may not initially be possible to support development initiatives in the

A positive demonstration effect, however, is likely to create strong community


demand for international assistance programs, and it would put pressure on recalcitrant or radical
leaders to cooperate with international peace and development efforts. Development initiatives
have the potential to rapidly separate pragmatic, locally oriented fundamentalists from their
international jihadi counterparts. And by providing youths with alternatives to becoming recruited by militias (something that is actually heavily stigmatized in Somali society
and considered a last resort) the goal of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating them will be advanced . The
United States does not want to own the Somali crisis, and it must lead a robust diplomatic effort to
harness European and Middle Eastern assistance to support stabilization of the conflict and to address Somalias extensive
humanitarian and development needs. Such diplomatic efforts are critical to ensure that various
international efforts do not work at cross-purposes. Direct U.S. diplomatic involvement in Somalia is unlikely to be constructive, and the UN should continue
to take the lead in all local negotiations and programs. Persuading the UN and Europe to abandon state-building efforts may be
difficult, but the European consensus on supporting the TFG has already begun to fray, providing
a window of opportunity for renewed, more constructive U.S. leadership on international policy on
Somalia. As it seeks to govern Somalia, the Shabaab will face near-insurmountable challenges, ranging from its own internal divisions to the Somali populations profound distaste for restrictive foreign
ideologies. History suggests that these challenges will be fatal. But it will take time. The best-case scenario for Somalia is a gradual
diminishment in the intensity of the conflict, with open warfare giving way to stability
and piecemeal improvements in the economy and the rule of law . Though indigenous
governance movements can emerge in Somalia with surprising speed, national governance is
probably still a decade away, and if history is any guide, the Somali processes of reconciliation and
political compromise leading up to it will be largely imperceptible to Western eyes. The United
States should remain vigilantand realisticin assessing the terror threat, and should be poised to
support Somalias reconstruction in the years to come. At some point, the Somalis desire for peace
will certainly reassert itself, and new opportunities for development, governance, and growth will
emerge.
most conflict-ridden areas of Somalia.

The plan allows self-determination most likely outcome is Al Shabaab


transitions to a legitimate state, solves Neomedievalism
Clos 11
Clos, Ryne. Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding. Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute, 2011.
2011. Web.

Al-Shabaab was instrumental in removing Ethiopian forces from their various strongholds in the South-Central region and captured
the key port city of Kismaayo.28 Even as it battles for control of Mogadishu with the TFG, it maintains six bases as training grounds in

has stabilized its area of control via negotiations with local elders and
newfound tolerance for venerated Sufi shrines. 29 Though it imposed its own, sometimes draconian30 version
of law and order, it is trying to govern,31 showing itself to be pragmatic and capable of multiple
approaches to the same problem. The leadership is not unified in its diagnoses and proclamations and many of the
the hinterlands, it

smaller cells operate with autonomy in adapting to local conditions.32 Further, the leadership and the smaller units sometimes make

al-Shabaab is making the transition from an


ideological, dogmatic court militia consisting of a hardened core of true believers
backed by mercenary guns to a widespread political organism, hydra-headed and willing
to negotiate a power-sharing agreement to maintain territory without wastefully deploying its
opposing statements on an issue. From this, we can see that

resources.33 It may be that in the coming months, it will become an inaccuracy to depict al-Shabaab as a single movement at all.

al-Shabaab
appears a much more state-like body with a greater chance of imposing a statist order
Instead, it could become a youth-based, anti-clannish avalanche of multiple voices and manifold visions.34 For now,

over Somalia35 than the fledgling TFG. But the international community, particularly the USdominated North, alienates it via the frame of international terrorism and refuses to
acknowledge the shifting reality of al-Shabaabs eforts to transition .36

US military presence prevents Al Shabaab transition and destabilizes


Somalia
Clos 11
Clos, Ryne. Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding. Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute, 2011.
2011. Web.

The US, by adopting an equally stark frame of friends and enemies that makes Ethiopia the
paragon of purity in the Horn of Africa and any violent challenges to it illegitimate religious
extremism, has magnified the truly dangerous aspects of the al-Shabaab organization
and alienated the positive efects of it that present a model for the solution to
Somalias problems. The terror designation is actually preventing the transformation of
al-Shabaab away from hardened dogmatism and toward more pragmatic deal brokering,
with consequences that seem dire for peacebuilders within Somalia.

Advantage 2: China Soft Power


China is engaging in Somalia set to take over the US
Wallance 12
Corey Wallace, 3-30-2012, "Chinese troops in Somalia?," Asia Security Watch,
http://asw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10778
If such a policy came to fruition it would certainly represent a big change in worldview for the PRC, bearing in mind that it was only 20

China
admits to be a wearisome defensive strategy, in favour of a more offensive
strategy aimed at resolving the issue of the failed Somali state b eing a haven for transnational
criminal operators. Needless to say the US own experience in Somalia, and in the counterinsurgency
domain in general in the Middle East, would be instructive for any Chinese thought process around
sending an expeditionary force to Somalia. Holmes argues: Chens ambitious vision of completely eradicating pirate
years ago that it was suspicious about the legitimacy of even UNPKOs. James R. Holmes at The Diplomat however cautions
against hastily throwing off what he

bases is more problematic. Putting a permanent end to this scourge would seemingly require Chinese soldiers or marines to go ashore
and stay there. Coastal raids would do little good. Villages could be cleared readily enough, but would they stay cleared? In all likelihood
the brigands, already a dispersed lot, would simply scatter at the approach of foreign troops and return later. History has been unkind to
the come-and-go approach. On the other hand, establishing a sustained presence along the coast would start to resemble a

The implementation of such a


plan would certainly be further, and perhaps clinching, evidence of the CCPs formerly Dengist
approach to foreign policy being displaced in modern China. Holmes however suggests that a circumspect China
counterinsurgency campaign, with all the hardships and perils that mode of warfare entails.

would/should give up on such a plan as, in simple terms, piracy at the current level is not just that much of a drag on Chinas strategic
interests to justify the expense of blood and treasure. In the sole context of international piracy, in which Holmes is an expert, this would
certainly be true. However when placed in the broader international relations context of a rising power trying to broaden its military
capabilities and gain operational experience in a constrained and sensitive security environment, Chens statement becomes more

China has had little significant expeditionary experience in the last 65 (or really, 200 years) with all conflict
involving Chinese troops being limited to civil wars and border disputes, with perhaps the semiexception of the Korean war. The PRCs coming late into the great power game is likely seen as a burden in that its military
explicable. After all

development and particularly any power projection capabilities will inevitably be viewed with much scepticism. Without a legitimating
excuse for the development of this capability then it will only add to the China threat narrative. Indeed already the Somali piracy
threat has been used by countries like Japan to expand security roles and give experience to its MSDF beyond East Asia. As we all know
Japan has also set up its first post-WWII overseas base in Djibouti. The broader implication of this was certainly not lost on the Chinese,
who admitted that while Japan had legitimate interests in combating piracy, also claimed that observers say that by establishing the
base, the Japanese government is also exploring how far it can go in increasing its military clout in the world. While that might be an

Chinese are going to take a leaf out of the Japanese


playbook in order to develop sensitive capabilities that it believes it may need in the future to
protect its growing global interests.
oversimplification, it is worth bearing in mind whether the

Chinese development projects in the GHA are key to Chinese soft power
Cooke 2009
Jennifer G. Cooke, director of the CSIS Africa Program, where she manages a range of projects on political, economic, and security
dynamics in Africa, chinas soft power in africa, in Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States, March 10 2009,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090310_chinesesoftpower__chap3.pdf

The principal source of Chinas soft power in Africa is the strength of its economy and its economic
engagement. Chinas expanding trade and investment with the continent and the proliferation of
Chinese-led infrastructure projects reflect a fundamentally more optimistic view of Africas future
than Western engagement, which remains driven primarily by humanitarian programs and, to an
increasing extent, security interests. Many Africans see Chinas economic engagement in their countries as more pragmatic
and in line with African priorities for the continent, and that gives China an important stake in seeing the continent take off economically.

Beyond the sticky power of actual trade and investment, the cachet of China as a rising global
superpower is profoundly appealing and drives a desire to tie African economies more closely to

Chinas ascension to global economic preeminence. The U.S. financial crisis is seen in many quarters as a powerful
indictment of the Washington consensus and may continue to seriously undermine the inspirational power of the U.S. economic model.

Chinse soft power solves every scenario for extinction


Zhang 12
Zhang Weiwei is a professor of international relations at Fudan University and a senior research
fellow at the Chunqiu Institute, China, September 4, 2012, "The rise of China's political soft power",
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both
domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty,
international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has
not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can
make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated
global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of
resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of
the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to
consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path
of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually
eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against
global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has
produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In
contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system
argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of
terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying .
"In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western
countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard
University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?".
China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and
learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the
reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling
cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument.
Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global
warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although
Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to
change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal,
but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model
The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues
grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing
modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens
demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has
not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In
essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China
deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As
the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

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