Narag

v. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, June 29, 1998

FACTS:Mrs. Julieta Nunag filed several cases against his husband, Atty. Dominador Nunag,
for his alleged affair with Gina Espita who happens to be a former studentof the respondent
back when Ms. Espita was a first-year college student. Finally, inthe most recent case filed
by Mrs. Nunag, the complainant had her seven childrensign the appeal for disbarment of
Atty. Nunag. Mrs. Nunag presented as evidencethe pictures of the respondent and Ms. Espita
together, love letters, testimony of Mr. Charlie Espita, the brother of Ms. Espita and the
source
of
the
mentioned pictures and love letters, and the testimony of the children of Atty. And Mrs Nun
ag. In the proceedings, Atty. Nunag has been engaged in an affair with Ms.Espita, and being
live-in partners, have had two children with the latter. Atty. Nunag denied the allegations by
presenting
Argumentum ad Misericordia

.ISSUE:
Should Atty. Nunag be disbarred even if he denied the allegations against him?

RULING: Atty. Nunag was not able to invalidate the authenticity of the pieces of
evidence presented
against him,
but instead,
presented an argument
to pity.
He is, by order of the honorable court, being disbarred by virtue of The Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects onhis fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession

Teves v COMELEC
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of
Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.

Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in
Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest
in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991.

Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he
was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office.

The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of
House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.

Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14
May 2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and academic.
Issue: Whether petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
Held:

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a
public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution
or by law.

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A.
3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction.
The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or
by law.

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having
pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife,
still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent
Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their
property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.

o Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section
89(2) of the LGC of 1991.

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same
involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of
the statute must be considered. Besides,moral turpitude does not include such acts as are
not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in
the instant case.

The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this
reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine."
In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that
crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable
by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently
immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral
turpitude.

Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioners conviction does
not involve moral turpitude.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all.
It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.

In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow
it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.

FACTS:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros
Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed
a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of
violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent
alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
from
public
office.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of
member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. It
appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the

position of member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby
rendering
the
instant
Motion
for
Reconsideration
moot
and
academic.
The

petitioner

filed

petition

which

the

court

found

to

have

merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
HELD:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless
he
has
been
given
plenary
pardon
or
granted
amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after
the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period
he
again
becomes
disqualified.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his
fellowmen,
or
to
society
in
general.
Section

3(h)

of

R.A.

3019

of

which

petitioner

was

convicted,

reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer
and
are
hereby
declared
to
be
unlawful:
x

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which
he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public
officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such
interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019.
The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The
second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government
official
or
employee,
directly
or
indirectly,
to:
x

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law,
which
is
possession
of
a
prohibited
interest.

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved
moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute
must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves
immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain
such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in
the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said
transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral
turpitude.