ARTICLE VII - Section 18

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular
or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

41. Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out
power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . .
may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power]
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members
of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest
and unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5
have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed
forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the
decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap
2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is

harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is
more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely
on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and
business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power
by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declarea state of
national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII
grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.
But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor
of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly,
a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet
of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that
the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business

affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not
the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to
him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In
short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of
terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
See full text here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.
%20171396.htm

42. IBP vs Zamora (G.R. No. 171396, August 15, 2000)

CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period
only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist
the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUES:
1. The President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject
to judicial review.
2. The calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to
wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence
of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising
the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets
for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage
the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment
to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it
cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.
See full text here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/aug2000/141284.htm