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Experts
see
rising
risk
of
nuclear
war:
survey
Leading
national
security
experts
see
a
rising
risk
of
a
nuclear
conflict,
a
survey
conducted
by
the
Project
for
Study
of
the
21st
Century
shows.
A
poll
of
50
national
security
experts
from
around
the
world
showed
60
percent
concluding
the
risk
had
grown
over
the
last
decade.
Overall,
they
predicted
a
6.8
percent
probability
of
a
major
nuclear
conflict
in
the
next
25
years
killing
more
people
than
the
Second
World
War
(roughly
80,000,000
at
upper
estimates).
The
survey
featured
50
individuals
including
leading
international
relations
academics,
former
senior
military
officials
and
private
sector
political
risk
specialists.
Participants
came
from
the
UK,
US,
India,
Pakistan,
South
Africa,
the
Middle
East,
Russia,
France
and
elsewhere.
The
poll
showed
52
percent
saying
the
risk
of
great
power
nuclear
conflict
would
grow
further
over
the
coming
10
years.
In
addition,
80
percent
said
they
expected
proxy
confrontations
and
other
forms
of
"ambiguous
warfare"
to
also
increase.
"This
is
the
first
survey
we
know
of
like
this,"
said
Peter
Apps,
executive
director
at
the
Project
for
Study
of
the
21st
Century
(PS21).
"There
has
been
plenty
of
talk
of
rising
tensions
with
Russia
and
China
in
particular
but
it's
very
rare
to
try
and
put
numbers
on
that.
The
responses
we
received
were,
frankly,
very
varied.
The
aggregate
figures
show
that
most
major
potential
nuclear
or
conventional
wars
seen
broadly
unlikely
--
but
the
numbers
are
still
high
enough
to be worrying. Clearly this is a risk that cannot be entirely
discounted."
Mean
Median
Average
8.53%
5%
6.8%
20%
4%
4.72%
4%
US
versus
China
(Conventional,
with
or
without
nuclear
exchange).
10%
18.46%
14%
22.64%
21%
US
versus
China.
(Nuclear
exchange).
1%
3.93%
2%
15%
22.48%
19%
Japan
versus
China
(Nuclear
exchange
from
one
or
both
sides)
1%
2.54%
2%
5%
8.79%
7%
1%
1.88%
1%
12.5%
18.54%
16%
1%
3.94%
2%
40%
40.70%
40%
6.5%
12.30%
9%
25%
28.54%
27%
5%
6.87%
6%
15%
19%
17%
5%
6.79%
6%
12.5%
21.85%
17%
50%
45.20%
48%
39.5%
37.20%
38%
Mark
Fitzpatrick,
former
Deputy
Assistant
Secretary
for
Nonproliferation
at
the
US
State
Department
and
now
director
of
the
nonproliferation
and
disarmament
programme
at
the
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies.
The
survey
accurately
captures
the
Zeitgeist
of
renewed
concern
about
the
potential
for
great
power
conflict.
While
the
prospect
for
major
war
is
considered
to
be
less
than
50-50
over
the
next
two
decades,
there
is
a
significant
chance
of
it
happening.
The
survey
also
reflects
the
sense
of
unease
about
the
potential
for
a
nuclear
exchange
--
not
that
it
is
likely
but
that
there
is
a
finite
chance
of
it
happening.
I
agree
with
the
view
that
if
there
is
to
be
a
nuclear
war,
it
is
mostly
likely
to
occur
between
India
and
Pakistan.
The
scenario
might
be
one
that
starts
with
a
sub-conventional
attack
in
India
by
Pakistani-
based
terrorists
on
the
order
of
the
2008
Mumbai
attacks,
which
may
spark
an
Indian
military
reprisal
this
time.
Pakistan's
stated
nuclear-use
policy
could
see
a
response
with
tactical
nuclear
weapons.
India's
nuclear
doctrine
in
turn
calls
for
massive
retaliation
on
any
attack
on
Indian
forces,
even
outside
Indian
territory.
The
ensuring
nuclear
exchange
would
kills
tens
of
million
people
in
the
sub-continent
directly
and
spark
a
nuclear-winter
dust
cloud
encircling
the
globe
that
could
put
two
billion
people
at
risk
of
starvation.
Taking
that
scenario
seriously,
India
and
Pakistan
should
engage
in
talks
spanning
the
sub-conventional,
conventional
and
strategic
realm
to
mitigate
the
risk
of
nuclear
war.
They
and
the
other
nuclear
powers
should
also
cap
and
reduce
their
nuclear
arsenals
and
to
take
other
steps
toward
the
goal
to
which
they
have
ascribed
of
nuclear-weapons-free
world.
Nikolas
Gvosdev,
professor
of
national
security
studies,
US
Naval
War
College
These
results
mark
a
shift
from
the
prevailing
mood
a
decade
ago,
when
the
emphasis
was
on
the
threat
posed
by
non-state
actors
inside
failed
or
failing
states
to
the
fabric
of
the
global
order.
Now,
we
see
a
return
to
a
focus
on
state-on-state
conflict,
and
a
corresponding
erosion
of
confidence
that
globalization
and
the
prosperity
it
has
engendered
has
dis-incentivized
clashes
among
the
leading
global
and
regional
powers.
It
is
the
puncturing
of
the
21-st
century
version
of
The
Grand
Illusion.
They
also
reflect
a
growing
pessimism
that
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
had
fundamentally
reshaped
global
politics
in
a
more
peaceful
and
cooperative
direction.
Over
the
last
twenty-five
years,
ever
since
the
Indian
and
Pakistani
nuclear
tests,
the
minute
hand
of
the
"Doomsday
Clock"
have
ever
more
steadily
crept
towards
midnight,
now
resting
at
a
perilous
three
minutes
to
12.
Countries
are
becoming
more
unpredictable,
while
the
areas
in
which
even
an
unintended
or
accidental
clash
could
occur
are
growing.
Bernie
de
Haldevang,
founder
of
the
Cross
Border
Risk
Agency
and
former
head
of
financial
and
political
risk
at
a
major
global
insurance
firm
This
is
a
credible
study
and
the
methodology
used
to
arrive
at
its
conclusions
makes
logical
sense.
It
is
important
to
remember
what
it
is;
the
product
of
individuals'
assessments
of
geopolitical
reality
as
they
see
it
from
where
they
are.
As
with
all
surveys
that
seek
to
make
scientific
sense
of
personal
opinions,
even
when
from
well
informed
professionals,
the
end
result
is
more
of
a
scientific
art
than
a
science,
though
nonetheless
valid
as
that.
Participants
were
asked
to
look
25
years
ahead;
the
results
seem
to
reflect
the
unsettled
mood
that
prevails.
The
world
has
not
yet
found
a
new
equilibrium
nor
the
inherent
stability
that
existed
when
the
then
two
superpowers
were
locked
together
in
a
mutual
armlock.
Thus
one
might
extrapolate
that
these
findings
speak
more
to
the
fear
of
uncertainty
rather
than
genuinely
reflecting
fear.
There
are
also
other
risks,
of
course,
not
least
that
of
dirty
bombs
and
generally
more
widespread
terrorist
activity.
These
may
present
less
risk
to
the
wider
public
than
war
given
their
localised
impact
but
would
undoubtedly
have
resulted
in
much
higher
scores.
Peter
Apps,
executive
director,
PS21
The
sheer
range
of
answers
from
participants
was
interesting.
Many
remain
convinced
that
the
overall
risk
remains
low,
perhaps
percent
or
less
while
others
put
it
much
higher
--
10
to
20
percent.
The
highest
estimate
we
had
of
the
possibility
of
a
conflict
killing
more
than
80
million
was
40
percent.
That
means
everyone
believed
that
on
balance
this
probably
won't
happen
--
but
then
again,
it
just
might.
There
was
also
broad
agreement
that
the
prospect
had
probably
increased
over
the
last
decade
although
a
small
minority
felt
it
had
actually
fallen.
In
general,
though,
there's
no
doubt
that
news
flow
over
the
last
two
years
in
particular
has
pointed
to
growing
between
the
US
and
its
principal
potential
adversaries
Russia
and
China.
We've
seen
that
in
Ukraine,
we've
seen
it
in
the
South
China
Sea
--
particularly
in
recent
weeks.
And,
of
course,
we've
seen
the
war
in
Syria
become
much
more
internationalised
with
the
beginning
of
Russian
air
strikes.
NOTES
ON
METHODOLOGY
PS21
surveyed
50
national
security,
international
relations
and
political
risk
experts
from
around
the
world
with
a
basic
survey
asking
them
to
assess
the
risk
of
a
range
of
potential
conventional
and
nuclear
conflict
over
the
next
20
years.
For
the
purpose
of
the
definition,
an
armed
conflict
was
described
as
a
conflict
between
uniformed
military
forces
taking
place
over
several
days
with
at
least
100
casualties.
For
each
measure,
we
then
calculated
both
the
median
and
the
mean
before
taking
an
average
of
the
two.
For
all
questions
except
the
last
(or
the
likelihood
of
cyber
attacks
killing
more
than
100
people)
the
median
was
generally
the
lower
of
the
two
numbers.
Two
respondents
only
answered
the
first
four
questions
(on
the
risk
of
a
conflict
killing
more
than
80
million
people,
whether
the
risk
had
grown
over
the
last
decade,
whether
it
would
grow
over
the
next
and
whether
the
risk
of
ambiguous
confrontation
would
also
rise).
A
number
of
respondents
requested
anonymity.
The
rest
are
named
below.
Alex
Ward
Alexey Dolinskiy
Ali Wyne
Adjunct
Staff
at
the
Rand
Corporation;
former
Special
Assistant
to
Samantha
Power,
US
State
Department
Alastair Newton
Amjad Saleem
Andrea Berger
Deputy
Director,
Proliferation
and
Nuclear
Policy
and
Senior
Research
Fellow
at
RUSI
Ari Ratner
Asha Castleberry
Bernie
de
Haldevang
Chris
Mackmurdo
Director
at
Contest
Global;
former
Head
of
Counterterrorism
Analysis
at
FCO
Colonel
Hariharan
Retired
Colonel
in
the
Indian
Armed
Forces;
former
head
of
intelligence
of
Indian
Peace
Keeping
Force
in
Sri
Lanka
David
A.
Glancy,
Ph.D.
Derek S. Reveron
Faculty
Affiliate
at
the
Belfer
Center
for
Science
and
International
Affairs,
Harvard
University
Erik
Lin-
Greenberg
Frida Wallnor
Gareth Price
Gwenn Laine
Harry Kazianis
Executive
Editor
for
TNI
and
Senior
Fellow
for
Defense
Policy
at
The
Center
for
the
National
Interest
Jacob Stokes
James Bergeron
Jonathan Wood
Katherine Floyd
Mark Fitzpatrick
Mark Galeotti
Michael
Harwood
retired
Royal
Air
Force;
former
UK
Defence
Attach
(US)
Milena
Rodban
Nigel Inkster
Nikolas Gvosdev
Nora Bensahel
Petr
Topychkanov
Associate
Researcher
at
Carnegie
Moscow
Center,
and
Senior
Researcher
at
Center
for
International
Security
of
the
Institute
of
World
Economy
and
International
Relations,
Russian
Academy
of
Sciences.
Philip
Thicknesse
Rachel Rizzo
Scott
Cheney-
Peters
Shannon Tiezzi
Steve Killelea
TS Allen
Lawrence
Freedman
--
Lead
researcher:
Anne
Shannon
Baxter