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Team:
Salomon Cojab
Patrick Fong
Kevin Jin
Deeprendra Mookim
Gurpreet Singh
Companies:
Grupo Bimbo - Buy
EMC - Buy
WAB Sell
Spark Networks - Buy
Monster - Buy
Forever
Growth Rate =
17.04%
3.88%
57.56%
30.00%
0.95
0.80
3.88%
3.88%
Risk Premium =
7.07%
7.07%
Cost of Debt =
6.13%
5.50%
19.28%
30.00%
30.00%
30.00%
Return on Capital =
14.20%
12.20%
Reinvestment Rate =
120.00%
31.81%
Bimbos expansionary goals are reflected in their reinvestment rate for the next six years. The
acquisition of a Canadian company, a market which is as of now untested, shows that the company
wishes to grow aggressively in the near-term. This, combined with their acquisition of Ecuadors
Supn, has helped Bimbos net profit rise from 429.8Mn Pesos to 906.8Mn Pesos year-on-year for
the first quarter. Bimbos positive momentum and growth prospects led us to a DCF value of 56.20
Pesos per share, compared to the share price of 41.96 Pesos as of May 11th, 2015.
3. Relative Valuation
Multiples Approach
Our comparable company analysis used 92 firms in the packaged foods sector, screened with Capital
IQ. We picked EV/EBITDA as our multiple for comparison because of the importance of sales and
gross margin in the sector. The median comparable company trades at 13.7 EV/EBITDA, while
Bimbo has a multiple of 11.8. Using the median EV/EBITDA, the enterprise value for Bimbo is
308,353.85 Pesos, yielding an equity value of 245,032.00 Pesos, or 52.10 Pesos/share, or 24.16%
higher than the current stock price of 41.60 Pesos.
Regression Approach
After trying multiple combinations of variables, the three that produced the highest significance and
R-squared when regressed on EV/EBITDA were the effective tax rate, Capital IQs predicted
forward P/E (NTM), and Price to Boov Value. The regression results were as follows:
Model Summary
S R-sq
R-sq(adj) R-sq(pred)
8.56184 57.11% 55.52%
39.60%
Coefficients
Term
Coef SE Coef T-Value P-Value VIF
Constant
1.30 2.78 0.47 0.642
Effective Tax Rate (%) -0.1617 0.0682 -2.37 0.020 1.03
Forward P/E - Capital IQ 0.7767 0.0838 9.27 0.000 1.15
Price to BV
0.232 0.240 0.97 0.336 1.15
Regression Equation
EV/EBITDA = 1.30 - 0.1617 Effective Tax Rate [LTM] (%)
+ 0.7767 Forward P/E - Capital IQ [NTM] + 0.232 Price to BV
Valuation Type
Bimbo Actual
DCF
Median EV/EBITDA
Regression
Market Regression
Result % Undervalued
41.60
56.20
35%
52.10
25%
82.48
98%
58.51
41%
Bimbos global growth prospects and strong ROC drive our conclusion that its undervalued. Given
the results of each type of valuation we ran, we see recommend a buy on the firm. Their entry into
the Canadian market as well as into other regions of Latin America shows promise and, given their
successful track record with acquisitions, we believe that Bimbo will continue to grow into a global
giant in the baked and package goods sector. For the next six years, we recommend watching the
reinvestment rate as it will be significant driver of growth in the near and medium term. Beyond an
intrinsic value, we see Bimbo as a relative bargain to its peers and the overall market, so we
recommend a buy on Bimbo.
Forever
Growth Rate =
8.09%
2.25%
11.97%
9.51%
1.06
1.00
Riskfree rate =
2.25%
2.25%
Risk Premium =
6.56%
6.56%
Cost of Debt =
3.25%
3.25%
22.80%
35.00%
35.00%
35.00%
Return on Capital =
15.74%
15.74%
Reinvestment Rate =
51.39%
14.30%
Cost of Captial
8.36%
8.17%
The key inputs that drive the DCF are the growth rates and the return on capital. We expect EMC
to grow with the overall economy after 5 years of strong grow as it is well positioned for new trends
in cloud computing and virtualization. Both of these markets are growing faster than GDP and we
expect EMC to grow share. Moreover, we expect ROC to continue forward at historical rates, given
the stickiness of the product and the large scale advantages it has over new entrants. Its incredibly
hard for new entrants to win significant share in the IT industrydata storage is mission critical and
IT employees are reluctant to change something that is working even if new entrants tout arguably
better applications.
Plugging these numbers into the model, we get an enterprise value of $54,583, which implies a
market value of $27.32 per share after making adjustments including net cash, options, and minority
interest. This compares to a closing price of 26.93.
Sensitivity Analysis:
Cost
of Capital
Stable Phase
$27.32
7%
7.50%
8%
8.50%
9%
1.00%
$26.96
$25.05
$23.41
$21.99
$20.74
2.50%
$35.28
$31.96
$29.25
$26.99
$25.07
3%
$39.43
$35.29
$31.97
$29.26
$27.00
3. Relative Valuation
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
0.508213
0.258281
0.236465
9.944816
71
Intercept
Est. Annual Revenue Growth - 2 Yr % - Capital IQ [Latest] (%)
Debt/Total Capital
Base
Enterprise Value
Cash
$87,701.7
13,472.0
$40,394.9
13,472.0
$135,008.5
13,472.0
Debt
Minority Interest
Options Value
Equity Value
Shares Outstanding
Share Price
5,495.0
7,384.0
426.7
$87,868.0
1,942.1
$45.24
5,495.0
7,384.0
426.7
$40,561.2
1,942.1
$20.89
5,495.0
7,384.0
426.7
$135,174.9
1,942.1
$69.60
Price
$26.9
$27.3
$20.7
$39.4
$45.2
$44.6
ROI
1.4%
(23.0%)
46.4%
68.0%
65.4%
Based on our DCF valuation, we believe that the market is appropriately valuing the company at $27
a share. When we sensitize our growth and cost of capital assumptions, we get an implied value of
between $20.74 and $39.43.
Looking at our relative valuation, if we are playing the pricing game, we think there is an asymmetric
risk reward profile in terms of what the company should trade at given its comparable firms and
given overall market valuations. Both the market regression and our relative regression imply a
valuation of about $45 a share.
With high-flying tech valuations especially in the software space, we remain weary in playing the
pricing game but we think that the game will last for the foreseeable future. Thus, we feel
comfortable putting a buy recommendation on EMC.
The two drivers for WAB are years in high growth and return on capital. We used 5 years of high
growth to reflect the $2.32 billion in sales backlog as well as growth from recent acquisitions, but we
do not expect these factors to create a sustained high return on capital. Thus, we cannot use 10 years
of high growth because the firm is large and mature and we cannot use 0 years of high growth
because of the backlog and acquisitions. The base case return on capital is the imputed one. The
bear case return on capital is based on the industry average and the bull case return on capital is
based on the top 10th percentile return on capital among comparable firms. We believe the imputed
return on capital during the high growth phase is most appropriate. Even in the most bullish of
scenarios in the sensitivity analysis, our estimated value is still below the current market price (as of
May 8, 2015).
8. Relative Valuation
Multiples Approach
27 firms were used in the comparable firm analysis. The chosen companies were primarily U.S.based firms in the railroad, railroad equipment, or road transportation of freight industry. Firms
were also screened by a minimum market cap of $100 million. A best subsets regression with
EV/EBITDA as the dependent variable and estimated 2-year revenue growth, debt/capital,
effective tax rate, and return on capital yielded the following model:
This regression fits an EV/EBITDA multiple of 11.43 for WAB, which yields a standardized
residual of 2.28 relative to its actual EV/EBITDA of 15.80 (CapIQ). In both residual plots, WAB is
in the top-right. The 11.43 EV/EBITDA multiple implies a stock price of $70.64.
9. Market Regression
The market regression equation for EV/EBITDA is:
EV/EBITDA = 19.09 + 9.59 (.0934) 5.00(.0499) 16.67(.3085) = 14.25
This implies a stock price of $88.78.
Wabtec is a large, stable firm in a mature industry that has recently been growing through
acquisitions. Its high backlog will provide a short period of high growth, but the firm does not have
sustainable competitive advantages that should generate a high excess return in perpetuity. Even
relative to its market peers and according to the market regression, the firm is overvalued. Using all
of our methods, we generate an implied value less than the current price. Accordingly, we
recommend a sell on WAB.
Key Assumptions
Sales Growth Rate
Current Operating Margin
Target Operating Margin
Sales to Capital Ratio
3.00%
6.20%
15.00%
3.30
Cost of Equity
Cost of Debt
Initial Cost of Capital
Terminal Cost of Capital
7.85%
1.66%
7.66%
6.65%
Rationale
The FCFF model implies 25% upside from LOVs stock price as of May 8, 2015. Spark Networks
reports direct marketing expenses per segment; this expense represents a higher percentage of sales
for the Christian Networks segment since the company was previously investing heavily to establish
ChristianMingle.com in the online dating space. As a result, Jewish Networks make up 59% of TTM
revenues less direct marketing expenses, while Christian Networks constitute 35%. The current
operating margins are depressed due to the prior management teams undisciplined execution of
ChristianMingle growth and inadequate investment in the highly profitable JDate platform. Activist
fund Osmium Partners has successfully replaced the Board and management team, with the new
CEO taking the helm in January 2015. The 15% target operating margin is conservative relative to
peers; IAC/InterActives Match segment, which also operates dating sites, runs at a 27% operating
margin.
3. Relative Valuation
Multiples Approach
31 companies were used in the comparable company analysis. The firms selected were primarily
consumer-facing Internet stocks with similar user acquisition economics, business model features, or
network effects. The multiple that produced the highest R-squared was the EV/Sales metric. The
median EV/Sales multiple implies a stock price of $3.76 (18% upside), and the average multiple
implies a price of $5.76 (81% upside).
Regression Approach
The regression that produced the highest R-squared with statistically significant independent
variables follows:
EV/Sales = -0.49 + 6.76 NTM Revenue Growth + 13.77 NTM EBITDA Margin
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.798364432
R Square
0.637385767
Adjusted R Square
0.61148475
Standard Error
1.493200254
Observations
31
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total
2
28
30
SS
109.7366393
62.430116
172.1667553
MS
F
Significance F
54.86831965 24.60852308
6.7956E-07
2.229647
Lower 95%
Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
-1.45760582 0.477682191 -1.45760582 0.477682191
3.696228015 9.813877076 3.696228015 9.813877076
9.13707264 18.3992032 9.13707264 18.3992032
Based off LOVs estimated NTM revenue growth of -3.47% and estimated NTM EBITDA margin
of 16.95%, the regression equation yields an EV/Sales multiple of 1.61. This implies a stock price of
$4.32 and upside of 36%.
4. Market Regression
The market regression equation for EV/Sales is:
EV/Sales = 1.17 + 1.40 g + 6.35 Operating Margin + 5.26 DFR - 0.10 Tax rate
Based off a g of -4.72%, operating margin of 10.70%, DFR of 0%, and a tax rate of 25%, the
EV/Sales is 1.76. This estimate implies a stock price of $4.67 and 47% upside.
5. Final Analysis
Current Price
DCF Model
Median EV/Sales
Average EV/Sales
Comps EV/Sales Regression
Market EV/Sales Regression
Price
Estimate
3.18
3.96
3.76
5.76
4.32
4.67
Implied
ROI
25%
18%
81%
36%
47%
Spark Networks represents a compelling turnaround story with strong core franchises in the form of
JDate and ChristianMingle. Having translated the qualitative story into the valuation, the stock
appears undervalued by the market based off the various valuation methodologies used. As a result,
I recommend a buy on LOV.
We assume that Monster Beverage Corporation will experience a high growth period for 7 years,
through 2018. Expansion to Asia offers tremendous upside for the global soft drinks industry as a
whole. Soft drink consumption in Asia has growth from 18% 10 years ago to 30% today. Also,
Asias per capita consumption is still only half of the international average, pointing to even stronger
future potential. We see Monster experiencing growth rates above 30% through 2018, at which
point Monster will have established a global presence and continue growing at a lesser pace till about
2021, thus having stable cash flows by 2022. The FCFF model used implies a share price of $149.48
and a16% upside from MNSTs stock price as of May 9, 2015.
3. Relative Valuation
Multiples Approach
18 corporations were used in our comparable company analysis. Firms were selected to match
Monster Beverage Corporation as closely as possible. The companies used in the valuation were
public companies, specifically in the Soft Drinks industry, located either in the United States,
Canada, European developed markets, or Asia developed markets. When comparing multiples, the
EV/EBITDA metric produced a high R-squared. The median EV/EBITDA multiple of the comp
set implies a stock price of $65.11, and the average multiple implies a price of $103.02. It is
important to note that Monsters EV/EBITDA is the second largest in the comp set and also that
Red Bull, their largest competitor, is not public and was not included in the comp set. MNST
currently trades at $128.47.
Regression Approach
A best subsets regression with EV/EBITDA showed that it would be best to control for estimated
annual revenue growth. The regression that produced the highest R-squared, solving for
EV/EBITDA, with statistically significant independent variables follows:
EV/EBITDA = 4.52 + 2.204 Est. Revenue Growth - 2
Based off of MNSTs estimated annual revenue growth of 15.7%, the regression equation results in
an EV/EBITDA multiple of 37.1228. This implies a stock price of $184.58, showing upside of 44%.
4. Market Regression
Implied
ROI
Current Price
128.47
DCF Model
149.48
16%
Median EV/EBITDA
65.11
-49%
Average EV/EBITDA
103.02
-20%
184.58
44%
74.54
-42%