Ignacio vs.

Director of Lands
Topic: Alluvion, requisites and riparian owner
FACTS

Faustino Ignacio, on 25 January 1950, filed an application for

the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove), adjoining a
parcel of land that Ignacio has previously acquired from the
Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936, situated in
barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 sqm.

Later, he amended his application by alleging among others

that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion; the
parcel being formed by accretion and alluvial deposits
caused by the action of the Manila Bay which borders it on
the southwest. He also claims that he had occupied the land
since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that his
possession has been continuous, adverse and public for a
period of 20 years until said possession was disturbed by
Valeriano.

To the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano

and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later
withdrew his opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the
parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain, being a
foreshore land covered by the ebb and flow of the tide. In his
turn, Valeriano alleged that he was holding the land by virtue
of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on
13 January 1947, and approved by the President.

After hearing, the CFI Rizal dismissed Ignacios application for

the registration of the parcel of land, holding it to form part of
the public domain.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accretion and alluvial deposits caused by

the action of Manila Bay be registered under the name of
Faustino Ignacio.
RULING:

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with

costs.

Article 457 NCC does not apply as it covers accretion on

banks of rivers

Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil
Code), which provides that to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters. This is inapplicable as it refers
to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while
the accretion in the present case was caused by action
of the Manila Bay.
Article 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters apply (accretion
formed by the sea) as bay is part of the sea
o Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are applicable,
referring to accretions formed by the sea. Manila Bay is
a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the
same. As defined, bay is an opening into the land
where the water is shut in on all sides except at the
entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea,
distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore
of the sea or of a lake.
Application of Law of Waters on lands bordering Manila
Bay; cases
o The Supreme Court has in some cases applied the Law
of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay; such as the
cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a
parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay,
where it was held that such land formed by the action
of the sea is property of the State; Francisco vs.
Government of P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land
claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and
flow of the tides of the Manila Bay.
Interpretation of Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866;
Declaration that land is not necessary for purposes of
public utility, etc., lies with the executive and possibly
the legislative departments
o Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that
when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of
public utility, or for the establishment of special
o

industries, or for coastguard service, the government

shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.
We believe that only the executive and possibly the
legislative departments have the authority and the
power to make the declaration that any land so gained
by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or
for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has
been made by said departments, the lot in question
forms part of the public domain. (Natividad vs.
Director of Lands [CA], 37 OG 2905)

Court are not in position to determine if land are used as

specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters
o The courts are neither primarily called upon, nor
indeed in a position to determine whether any public
De Buyser v. Director of Lands [G.R. No. L-22763. March 18,
1983.]
Topic: Alluvion, Requisites and Riparian owner
FACTS:

De Buyser is the registered owner of Lot 4217 of the Surigao

Cadastre, which borders the Surigao Strait. Contiguous to said
lot is a parcel of land which was formed by accretion from the
sea, the subject matter of this controversy.

Spouses Ignacio and Candida Tandayag have been occupying

this foreshore land through a Revocable Permit issued by the
Director of Lands. For the use and occupation thereof, said
spouses paid the Bureau of Lands the amount of P6.50
annually.

They have a house on said lot, which De Buyser alleged had

been purchased by the Tandayags from one Francisco
Macalinao, a former lessee of the De Buyser.

Claiming ownership of the said land, De Buyser filed an action

against the Tandayags in the CFI Surigao to recover possession
of this land as well as rents in arrears for a period of 6 years.

land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article

4 of the Law of Waters (Vicente Joven y Monteverde v.
Director of Lands (93 Phil. 134).
Public domain not subject to ordinary prescription
o Land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary
prescription. The occupation or material possession of
any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without
previous permission from the proper authorities,
although the occupant may have held the same as
owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on
the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as
such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it
pertains to the national domain; it is intended for
public uses and for the benefit of those who live
nearby. (Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19
Phil., 505)
The complaint was subsequently amended to implead the
Director of Land as defendant, allegedly for having illegally
issued a revocable permit to the Tandayags.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing
the complaint; holding said land in question to be formed
along the shore by action of the sea and thus part of public
domain, and ordering de Buyser to pay P250.00 to the
Tandayags as damages; and to pay the costs as well. From the
judgment, de Buyser appealed directly to the Supreme Court
on a pure question of law; such being perfected before the
effectivity of RA 5440.

ISSUE:

WON De Buyser can claim ownership over the parcel of land

formed by accretion from the sea.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from;

with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

Alluvial formation along seashore is part of public

domain
o Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the
public domain and, therefore, not open to acquisition
by adverse possession by private persons. It is outside
the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by
either the executive or legislative branch of the
government.
Construction of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
(3 August 1866)
o Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 3 August
1866 provides that the lands added to the shore by
accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain, when they are
no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and are
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the
coastguard service, the Government shall declare
them to be the property of the owners of the estate
adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. The
true construction of the provision is that the State shall
grant these lands to the adjoining owners only when
they are no longer needed for the purposes mentioned
therein. In the present case, de Buysers evidence
failed to prove that the land in question is no longer
needed by the government, or that the essential
conditions for such grant under Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters, exists.
Revocable Permit application does not relinquish States
ownership over the land
o In approving the Revocable Permit Application of the
Tandayags, the Director of Lands did not declare the
land as no longer needed for public use. It merely
allowed them to continue their temporary occupation
and provisional use of the premises under revocable
permit renewable every year in the meantime the land
is not actually needed by the government for public

improvements (Boulevard and seawall protection

purposes). It is clear thus that the State never
relinquished ownership over the land.
Disposition of property of public domain under Bureau
of Lands; Failure to submit to its jurisdiction does not
entitle one to protection of the courts on the matter of
right to foreshore land
o The land being property of public dominion, its
disposition falls under the exclusive supervision and
control of the Bureau of Lands . Under the Public Land
Act, an application for the sale or lease of lands
enumerated under Section 59 thereof, should be filed
with the Bureau of Lands. Like any other private party,
one must apply for a permit to use the land. Not
having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands which has administration and control over the
area in question, by filing the corresponding
application for permit, one has no right whatsoever in
the foreshore land as to be entitled to protection in the
courts of justice.
Occupation or possession of land formed along the
shore by action of the sea mere detainer if without
authority from the Government to occupy said land
o The occupation or possession held, without the records
disclosing whether the requisite authorization to
occupy the parcel of land formed along the shore by
the action of the sea from the Spanish Government of
the Philippines, is a mere detainer that can merit from
the law no protection such as is afforded only to the
person legally in possession (Aldecoa v. Insular
Government).
Grant of revocable permit allowed by the passing of Act
2570, amending Section 5 of Act 1654
o The lease of reclaimed lands and of the foreshore was
formerly provided by Act 1654; under which.
o Lands could only be leased in the manner and under
the conditions provided by the said law in a manner

that no revocable permits were allowed. Act 2570,

amended Section 5 of Act 1654 so as to authorize the
temporary use of the foreshore under a revocable
permit. This measure was apparently deemed
necessary as well as expedient in order to legalize the
habitual use of the coast and shores of these islands
by the people, who had erected thereon light material
houses and dwellings, temporary structures used in
connection with fishing, salt and other maritime
industries, as well as to authorize the provisional
occupation and use contemplated by the law providing
for its formal lease. Such circumstance evidently
prompted the legislature to all the temporary use of
the foreshore in this manner by means of revocable
permit.

Bureau of land acting for and in behalf of Secretary of

Agricultural and Natural Resources in granting the
revocable permit
Grande vs.CA
Topic: Alluvion
FACTS:

Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande are the owners of a

parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at
barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini),
province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother
Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui
and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered,
as shown by OCT 2982, issued on 9 June 1934). Said property
is identified as Lot 1, Plan PSU-83342.

When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in

1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the
same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many
years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side
took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so
much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a
distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an

The grant of a Revocable Permit for the temporary use

and occupation of the disputed land is valid, having
been legally issued by the Bureau of Lands, acting for
and in behalf of the Secretary (now Minister) of
Agriculture and Natural Resources who is empowered
to grant revocable permits under Section 68 of the
Public Land Act which provides that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources may grant to
qualified persons temporary permission upon the
payment of a reasonable charge, for the use of any
portion of the lands covered by this chapter for any
lawful private purpose, subject to revocation, at any
time when, in his judgment the public interest shall
require.

CA AFFIRMED.

alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares),

more or less, had been added to the registered area.
On 25 January 1958, the Grandes instituted an action in the
CFI Isabela against Domingo and Esteban Calalung to quiet
title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by
accretion, alleging in their complaint (Civil Case 1171) that
they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in
peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September,
1948, when the Calalungs entered upon the land under claim
of ownership.

The Grandes also asked for damages corresponding to the

value of the fruits of the land as well as attorneys fe es and
costs. In their answer, dated 18 February 1958, the Calalungs
claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been
in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said
portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the CFI Isabela, on 4 May 1959, rendered a decision

adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to the
Grandes, and ordering the Calalungs to vacate the premises

and deliver possession thereof to the Grandes, and to pay to

the latter P250.00 as damages and costs.
Unsatisfied, the Calalungs appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which rendered, on 14 September 1960, adecision (CA-GR
25169-R) reversing that of the CFI Isabela, and dismissing the
Grandes action against the Calalungs, to quiet title to and
recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by
the latter without the Grandes consent. Thus, the appeal by
the Grandes to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents have acquired the alluvial property in

question through prescription
RULE & APPLICATION:

Alluvium belongs to riparian owner

By law, unless some superior title has supervened, alluvium

should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that to
the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the water.
o The area in controversy has been formed through a
gradual process of alluvion, which started in the early
thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the
evidence for both parties. There can be no dispute that
both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and
Article 366 of the old, the Grandes are the lawful
owners of said alluvial property, as they are the
registered owners of the land to which it adjoins.

Accretion to registered land does not ipso jure becomes

entitled
to
the
protection
of
the
rule
of
imprescriptability of title under Land Registration Act

An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific

provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land
as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become
entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title

established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does

not extend beyond the area given and described in the
certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical
description of the land given therein, of their character of
conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is
registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative
manner, has stated that registration does not protect the
riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land
through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream
(Payatas Estate Development Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so
registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by
the Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by
accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by
said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession;
and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the
additional area by another person through prescription. (See
Galindez, et al. vs. Baguisa, et al., CA-GR 19249-R, 17 July
1959).
Ownership of a piece of land and registration under
Torrens system are different; Imprescriptibility of
registered land under land registration law; Accretion
not
registered
subject
to
acquisition
through
prescription by third persons
Accretion does not automatically become registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by aTorrens title
thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible; just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto
registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the
land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but
merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already

possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by

occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the
land must be placed under the operation of the registration
laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
o The fact remains that the Grandes never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed
sometime after the Grandes property covered by OCT
2982 was registered on 9 June 1934) up to the time
they instituted the action in the CFI Isabela in 1958.
The increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the
protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered
property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it
was subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.4. Calalungs in possession of land since 1934,
not 1948 Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied
the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in
1948 as claimed by the Grandes. The area under
occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In
1946, hedeclared the land for purposes of taxation, the
tax declaration of which was superseded in 1948 by
another, after the name of the municipality wherein it
is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay.
Calalungs testimony is corroborated by two witnesses,
both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72
years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini
for three terms (recollection of the Calalungs peaceful
possession since 1940 or 1941), and Vicente C. Bacani
(Calalungs possession started sometime in 1933 or
1934. The area thereof was then less than one
hectare). The testimony of the said witnesses entitled
to much greater weight and credence than that of
Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez.
Grandes relinquished possession of lot occupied by the
Calalungs

The Grandes did not file an action until 1958, because

it was only then that they were able to obtain the
certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan;
and that they never declared the land in question for
taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. The
excuse they gave for not immediately taken steps to
recover possession of the lot was that they did not
receive their copy of the certificate of title to their
property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of
the surveyor Domingo Parlan. When the Calalungs had
their land surveyed in April 1958, Pedro Grande tried
to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for
himself and for the other Grandes, but because the
survey included a portion of the property covered by
their title. Thus, the Grandes relinquished their
possession to the part thus included, containing an
area of some 458 sq. ms.
Finding of Court of Appeals conclusive; Prescription
supervened in favor of Calalungs
o The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the
evidence, was convinced that the Calalungs were really
in possession openly, continuously and adversely,
under a claim of ownership since 1933 or 1934,
immediately after the process of alluvion started up to
the filing of the action in 1958; and that the Grandes
woke up to their rights only when they received their
copy of the title in 1958. By then, however,
prescription had already supervened in favor of the
Calalungs. This finding of the existence of these facts,
arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination
of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive
as to them and can not be reviewed by the Supreme
Court.
Applicable law on prescription: Act 190 not Civil Code,
since possession started in 1933 or 1934
o The law on prescription applicable to the case is that
provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
o

Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934

when the pertinent articles of the Old Civil Code were
not in force and before the effectivity of the New Civil
Code in 1950. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals
Republic v Court of Appeals
(GR No. L-61647. October 12, 1984.)
Topic: Alluvion
Facts:
Private respondents Tancinco et al are registered owners of a land
bordering the Meycauyan and Bulacan Rivers. On June 24, 1973, they
filed an application for registration of three lots adjacent to their
fishpond property.
The Bureau of Lands, through the Prov. Prosecutor, opposed the
application.
Of the three lots applied for, the private respondents withdrawn their
application with respect to Lot No. 3. The court granted their
application finding that Lot Nos. 1 and 2 are accretions to private
respondents fishponds in which they are the registered owners.
Subsequently, Republic appealed the decision. However, the CA
affirmed the lower courts decision.
Issue #1: Whether the land subject of the application for registration
are accretions
Ruling:
The concurrence of three requisites is required before an accretion is
said to have taken place: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of
the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the
current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the
New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature.
Application:

that the Calalungs acquired the alluvial lot in question

by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of

Appeals, with costs against the Grandes.
In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the
addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects
of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the
observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe
that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the
effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the
private respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose
husband was first cousin of their father noticed the four hectare
accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents
claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If
so, their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and
imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939. However,
the witness testified that in that year, she observed an increase in the
area of the original fishpond which is now the land in question. If she
was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden.
However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were
artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of
the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came
into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but
as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and
encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry
land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the
fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private
respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two
meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one
meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river
Ruling:
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any
land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the
danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If
estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils

produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of

lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and various
kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may
prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of
accretion.
Application:
Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land
caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about
accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes
towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes
and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the
waters of the river.
Conclusion: What private respondents claim as accretion is really an
encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in
the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the
bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of
the public domain. The adjudication of the lands in question as private
property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.

Bagaipo vs. CA
Topic: Avulsion, Change of River bed, Formation of Islands
Principle of Law: The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a
riparian owner when the following requisites are present: 1) That the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the
effects of the current of the water; and 3) That the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
FACTS:

Petitioner Dionisia Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot no.

415, a 146,900 square meter agricultural land in Davao
Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel
of land located across and opposite the southeast portion of
petitioners lot facing the Davao River.
Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Mandatory writ of preliminary injunction and damages against
Lozano for the (1) surrender of possession by Lozano of a
certain portion of land measuring 29K sqm which is supposedly
included in the area belonging to Bagaipo; and (2) the
recovery of a land measuring 37,901 sqm which Bagaipo had
lost when the Davao river had traversed her property.
Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in the course
of the said river, her property became divided into three lots,
namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B and 415-C (calling for the
application of Art 461). For his part, Lozano insisted that the

land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled

property (Art 457). He asserted that the Davao River did not
change its course and that the reduction in Bagaipo's domain
was caused by gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao
River.
On April 5, 1991, the trial court conducted an ocular
inspection. It concluded that the applicable law is Article 457 of
the New Civil Code and not Art. 461. The reduction in the land
area of plaintiff was caused by erosion and not by a change in
course of the Davao River. Conformably then, the trial court
dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed the trial Court. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE/S:

Was there a change in the court of the Davao River such that
petitioner owns the abandoned river bed pursuant to Article
461 of the Civil Code?
Did respondent own Lot 415 c in accordance with the
principle of accretion under Article 457?

RULING:

On the first issue

The decrease in petitioners land area and the corresponding
expansion of respondents property were the combined effect
of erosion and accretion respectively. Article 461 is
inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old
abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The
riverbed's former location cannot even be pinpointed with
particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place
gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the present.
Article 457: The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a
riparian owner when the following requisites are present:
o 1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
o 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of
the water; and

3) That the land where accretion takes place is

adjacent to the bank of the river.
These requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of
respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in the
course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through
avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and
was caused by alluvium and erosion.
On the 2nd issue Petitioner did not demonstrate that Lot 415 C was within the
boundaries of her titled property. In fact, the surveyplan
commissioned by petitioner was not approved by the Director
of Lands which was properly discounted by the appellate court.
o A survey plan not verified and approved by said
Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due
execution and authenticity of which must be proven in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
o

CONCLUSION: Assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

affirmed.

SPOUSES FELIX BAES AND RAFAELA BAES, petitioners, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Later on, Baes resurveyed and subdivided his land. On January

12, 1968, he submitted a petition for the approval of his
resurvey and subdivision plans, claiming that after the said lots
were plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found that there
were errors in respect of their bearings and distances. The CFI
of Pasay City approved the resurvey and subdivision plan and
the old TCTs of the Sps. Baes were canceled and new ones
were issued.
The Republic of the Philippines later on discovered that Lot B,
where petitioners erected an apartment building, was
unlawfully enlarged by the resurvey.
The Republic moved for the cancellation of the new TCTs.
Petitioners argue that they are the owner of the enlarged
property by virtue of Article 461 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Principle of Law: If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for
the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is
all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course
of the river is effected through artificial means. The loss to the
petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the result of a
deliberate act on the part of the government when it sought to
improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore
obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.
Facts:

The controversy began in 1962, when the government dug a

canal on a private parcel of land, covering an area of 33,902
sq., to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek.
This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes, who registered it in
his name and subdivided it into three lots, Lot 2958-A, Lot
2958-B and Lot 2958-C
In exchange for Lot A, which was totally occupied by the canal,
the government gave Baes a lot with exactly the same area
through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20,
1970. The property was later registered in the name of Felix
Baes.

If riparian owner is entitled to compensation for damages for

loss of his property due to either artificial or natural means.
Ruling:
Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to
the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands
adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same
by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the
value of the area occupied by the new bed.
YES. If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the
damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there
is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in
the course of the river is effected through artificial means. The
loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the
result of a deliberate act on the part of the government when
it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It
was therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their
loss. However, the petitioners have already been so

compensated by virtue of the Deed of Exchange of Real

property. This was a fair exchange because the two lots were
of the same area and value and the agreement was freely
entered into by the parties. The petitioners cannot now claim
Siari Valley Estates, Inc. vs. Lucasan
Facts:
Siari Valley estate started raising livestock in 1921. Such livestock was
well kept in an enclosure of plaintiffs pasture. However, in 1943, a
portion thereof was destroyed resulting to some cattle straying
into the adjoining unfenced range of defendant Lucasan. Taking
advantage of the situation, several men in the employ of
defendant willfully and deliberately rounded up and drive many
animals from the Siari pasture towards Lucasans grazing land.
Admittedly, Lucasan informed plaintiff and various witnesses that there
were still about 200 head of the companys cattle in his ranch mixed
with his herd. Being good friends, Lucasan and plaintiff then came to
an agreement permitting Lucasan to round up and drive plaintiffs
cattle. However, the wife of Lucasan protested thus defendant refused
to admit that there were still 250 head of Siari cattle in his ranch.
Thus, this action to recover 200 heads of cattle that were driven
or wandered from plaintiffs pasture into the adjoining ranch of
defendant Filemon Lucasan.
Defendant, however, alleges that
plaintiff had taken away from his pasture 105 head of cattle through
force and intimidation. The case was amended and re-amended a
couple of times. However, after trial was held, Judge Ceniza
rendered judgment adjudicating to Siari Valley ALL the cattle
that may be found in the cattle ranch of Filemon, specifically the
321 heads that had been entrusted to his care. Upon computation of
the court, it calculated that 823 head of cattle from plaintiffs ranch
had been missing.
Issue:

additional compensation because that would amount to double

compensation and unjust enrichment.

WON plaintiffs cattle were commingled with defendants and whether

the commixtion was made in bad faith.
Ruling:
Art. 473 (2) in NCC: If the one who caused the mixture or
confusion acted in bad faith, he shall lose the things belonging
to him thus mixed or confused, besides being obliged to pay
indemnity for the damages caused to the owner of the other
thing with which his own was mixed.
Application:
There is no doubt that hundreds of cattle belonging to the plaintiff
have been driven into or wandered into defendants land. No actual
evidence exists that all these missing animals were taken by defendant
or his men; but in view of proof that his men on two occasions drove
away more than 30 heads of cattle, it is not erroneous to believe that
the others must have also been driven away on subsequent or prior
occasions, applying, by analogy, the principle that one who stole a part
of the stolen money must have taken also the larger sum lost by the
offended party. Thus, Lucasan is held liable for all the missing
head of cattle missing from Siaris ranch.
Since Filemon had been actuated by bad faith in retaining,
despite demand from plaintiff, in his ranch the various cattle, to
multiply and increase there for his own benefit, the cattle belonging
to the Siari Valley Estate, he loses the things belonging to him
thus mixed or confused.
Conclusion:
AFFIRMED.

JULIANA CARAGAY-LAYNO, assisted by her husband, BENITO

LAYNO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS and SALVADOR
ESTRADA as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased,
MARIANO DE VERA, respondents.
Topic: Quieting of Title;
Principle of Law: An action to quiet title to property in ones own
possession is imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance may be filed
to quiet title to the property.
Facts:

Petitioner Juliana Layno and respondent (decedent) Mariano de

Vera are first cousins who grew up together.
When Mariano died in 1951, his wife and later his nephew
Salvador Estrada administered Marianos estate. They filed a
Special Proceeding before the CFI of Pangasinan for an
inventory of all properties of the deceased Mariano, which
included a parcel of land in Calasiao, Pangasinan containing an
area of 5,417 sqm.
Respondents found that the Calasiao property was registered
in the name of Mariano De Vera in 1947 under OCT No. 63
which was for 8,752 sqm and that there was a discrepancy
between the property in the Inventory and that in the OCT.
Juliana Layno occupied and had in her possession 3,732 sqm,
which is part of OCT No. 63. She said that she has owned the
property and before her, her father (Juan Caragay) owned the
property. Together they have a total of 45 years of actual,

open, continuous and uninterrupted possession over the

disputed portion of OCT No. 63.
Respondents then filed a suit against the Laynos for recovery
of the disputed portion.
Juliana Layno answered that her land was fraudulently or
mistakenly included in OCT No. 63 and that an implied or
constructive trust existed in her favor. She then filed a
counter-claim of reconveyance of property.

CFI and Court of Appeals:

The CFI ordered the Layno spouses to vacate the disputed portion.
Aggrieved, they interposed an appeal before the CA, which
affirmed the lower courts decision in toto. Hence, the appeal to
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Juliana Laynos claim for reconveyance filed in
1967 has prescribed given that a claim for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes after 10 years from
registration of the land in 1947?
Ruling:

No, an action for reconveyance, which seeks to quiet title

to the property does not prescribe when subject property
is in ones possession.
Juliana, an illiterate woman, declared that Mariano De Vera
borrowed her tax declaration of her land purportedly to be
used as collateral for his loan and sugar quota application.
Because of her ignorance, she signed some documents
given to her by her cousin. She only found out that her
land was included in OCT No. 63 when the respondents
informed her and tried to eject her from her own property
in 1966.
The Court also noted that respondents failure to possess
the disputed lot from the time of registration in 1947 up to

the institution of the case for recovery of possession

constitutes laches.
Further, the inclusion of property in the registration is void
because the land registration court had no jurisdiction to
decree a lot to persons who had no claim over it.
Mere possession of a certificate of title is not conclusive as
to the holders true ownership of all the property described
therein, especially if land was illegally included in the
registration.
Julianas right to quiet title, to seek reconveyance to annul
OCT No. 63 came about in 1966 when Juliana found out
about the false registration. Thus, the statutory period of
prescription commenced to run against her from date of
service of the copy of complaint for Recovery of Possession
filed by the respondents.
There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof

may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is

attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the
reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the
adverse claim of third party and its effect on his own title,
which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession. (Faja vs. CA, cited in the Decision)|
The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision and ordered
Salvador Estrada as administrator of Mariano De Veras
estate to cause the segregation of 3,732 sqm from OCT
No. 63 and to reconvey the same to Juliana Layno. The SC
further directed the Register of Deeds to issue two
certificates of title in the name of the parties in this case
over their respective properties.