THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE VIETNAM WAR

The American influence on Vietnam, though indirect, began in the early 20th century during the
French colonial rule at a time when the U.S. was largely ignorant about the societies and peoples
of Indochina. Although the French in Indochina kept the American businesses and missionaries
away from the region1, the Vietnamese elites and intellectuals were deeply moved and influenced
by the American Revolution. What particularly appealed to them, because of their subservient
position under the French, was the US declared opposition to European colonialism. In 1919,
when President Woodrow Wilson supported the strive for nations to gain self-determination and
also during the World War II when President Roosevelt eloquently declared the rights of the
colonial people to their independence, the nationalists in Vietnam found a ray of hope in these
messages. The most important leader of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh was influenced by the US stance
against imperialism, hoping that it would extend support to their struggle for independence.
Initially, Ho Chi Minh tried to gain political rights for the Vietnamese based on the principle of
Wilsons self-determination, but since his letter to U.S. in1919 urging for Vietnamese rights
remained unanswered, he started to look for other ways to independence. Thus in 1920,
influenced by the anti-colonial and anti-capitalist concepts of the Russian Revolution, he was
quickly drawn to communism. This led to the establishment of the Vietnamese Communist Party
in 1930. The role of this party is crucial in the independence movement and its communist
ideology is also a driving force in its growing animosity with the U.S.
1 Marilyn B. Young et al. The Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 14.

In the 1920s and 1930s, repression of the French colonial power increased and with the Japanese
occupation of Vietnam during the World War II, the struggle for independence was doubled since
the Vietnamese now had to defeat two colonial powers. In their struggle for independence against
the Japanese, the U.S. assisted Ho Chi Minh to establish a small armed force known as the
Revolutionary League for the Independence of Vietnam (or Viet Minh). With the Japanese defeat
in August 1945, Minh announced the independence of the government and later in 2 September
1945 establishing himself as the president, he declared Hanoi as the capital of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRV). This was done to prevent the French colonial power from returning
which they eventually did in 1946 with the help of U.S.
Though initially the U.S. helped the Vietnamese to gain independence from Japan- the latter
being a common enemy; after the end of the Second World War it became imperative for the US
to establish strong ties with the European countries in order to prevent further outbreak of a war
and also for the revitalization of Europe2. Thus in spite of its strong anti-colonial policy,
initially the U.S. reluctantly aided the French in their armed struggle to reclaim Vietnam.
However with the outbreak of Cold War, the containment policy of the U.S. came into effect in
Vietnam- the aim of which was to stop the spread of communism. Although the US gave due
importance to nationalism and independence, it took stringent measures against countries
influenced by communism. As a result of this containment policy, U.S. soon found itself at war
with Vietnam and though it directly participated in assisting Philippines and Indonesia to gain
their independence, because of the communist Viet Minh involvement in the nationalist
movement, it did not put pressure on the French to grant them independence3.
2 Ibid., 26.
3 MIchael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 108.

As mentioned earlier, though the First Indochina War (1946-1954) was aided by US with some
reluctance, the Chinese Communist Partys victory in 1949 changed the scenario. In order to
prevent Chinese military assistance to Vietnam, not only was the Sino-Vietnamese border sealed,
but US in an attempt to stop the spread of Communism started financing the entire cost of the
French war by 1950. Faced with successive defeats from Viet Minh, the US began to fear that
should Vietnam fall to Communism, so would the rest of Southeast Asia. As the Cold War
deepened, the US policies towards communist allies also hardened. In spite of the massive US
aid and support, the French were clearly losing in their armed struggle against the Vietnamese
and the disillusioned French under public pressure from the government wanted to negotiate with
the Viet Minh4. The United States however, deterred the French from taking any such step since
they urgently needed to dispel communism in Vietnam.
Despite the joint efforts, the French-American troops met a crushing defeat in May 1954 which
marked the end of the First Indochina War. Later at the Geneva Conference in June the following
year, a cease-fire agreement was signed and also a partition of Vietnam was arranged, with the
southern side retaining French hegemony and the northern side establishing its own government
known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Although the south administration or the
State of Vietnam was under the political domination of the French since 1950, with the end of the
First Indochina War, the US decided to maneuver a southern Vietnam as part of a worldwide
strategy to contain Communism5. In spite the war having officially ended, the political issues
still remained unresolved since the Communists, despite their convincing victory, were denied
the right to control entire Vietnam which paved the way for the Second Indochina War.
4 Marvin E. Gettleman et al., eds., Vietnam and America (New York: Grove Press, 1995), 39.
5 Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 149.

Like the Viet Minh, the United States and the US sponsored State of Vietnam opposed the
partition since they resented the idea of a Communist North. The United States in its endeavor to
drive away the communist forces decided to create a strong base in Southern Vietnam, from
where it would carry out its operation against the North and also introduced the counterinsurgency program to contain communism in the affected areas. Thus in June 1954, Ngo Dinh
Diem, a staunch anti Communist nationalist, was handpicked by the US as the President of the
South, hoping he would serve the US policy of containment in Vietnam. Diem also a fervent
Catholic was willing to do anything to secure his rule and thus crushed all opposition (be it
Communism or non-Communism) to his government. Also his policies were not designed to
enhance his popularity as he installed people in the government positions based solely on their
loyalty to him. Consequently Diem alienated the Buddhists who comprised 85% of the
Vietnamese population by favouring the Christians and also neglected the plight of the peasants
who was the majority of the populace. Although US pressurized Diem to introduce land reform
as President Eisenhower called for indispensable reform6, they were never seriously
implemented and Diems unpopularity continued to soar. The founding of the American Friends
of Vietnam in 1955 was to assist Diem during his reign through a massive aid program that
would provide economic development and political stability to the north7. However Diems
growing unpopularity because of his policies and partisanship prevented the US from getting the
support they aspired from the local, as Communist and non-Communist alike started to resist the
Diem government. This unpopularity of Diem reached a climax when he unleashed a ferocious
6 Marvin E. Gettleman et al., 142.
7Ibid., 125.

attack on the Buddhist church which resulted in a series of Buddhist uprisings. Realizing that
Diem was doing more harm than good, the United States decided to depose him, consequently
leading to his assassination in 2 November 1963.
Starting with the Diem regime, the US got more deeply involved in the Vietnamese affairs. The
US took upon itself the task of molding South Vietnam so that it would be loyal to it and be its
ally in the Cold War. This was achieved in a number of ways such as international recognition of
the Southern government, significant US funds, appointing US advisors for everything starting
from military support to even constitution writing, and carrying out covert operations against the
communists in the North. The US also established an organization called the Saigon Military
Mission (SMM) as early as 1954 and a CIA operative Colonel Edward Lansdale was in charge of
it. The SMM was a clandestine organization and its mission was to undertake paramilitary
operations against the Communists and wage political-psychological warfare against them. Later,
however it became more aggressive in its policies which even included sabotaging Communist
areas.8
Ironically this extreme resistance and oppression against the Communists led to the collapse of
the southern government. There were about 10,000 Viet Minh in southern Vietnam, though many
left to the north after the Geneva partition; not only were these Viet Minh oppressed and
persecuted but some tens of thousands were arrested, tortured and even executed for harboring
anti-Diem sentiments. Those perceived as active Viet Minh agents were either jailed or shot and
prizes were offered for turning in Viet Minh activists or supporters. When the Viet Minh
survivors pleaded for help from Hanoi, the DRV was hoping to resolve the matter politically
through the 1956 election for a unified Vietnam, promised by the Geneva Agreement. However
8 Marilyn B. Young et al., 50

with the intensifying of Diems oppression against the Viet Minh and the US undertaking a series
of operations against DRV, it became apparent that unification of Vietnam could only be possible
through armed military struggle.
The National Liberation Front (NLF) established in the south had its base and headquarters in
Hanoi and its membership included the Viet Minh who decided to stay back and also southern
opponents to Diem, communist and noncommunist alike. Thus Diems hostility against the
majority led to a wider membership of NLF the main objective being to oust Diem and his
American backers. It is also believed that the disgruntled peasants, because of the failed land
reforms, contributed to the growth of Communist power in South Vietnam. Thus Diem who was
initially hailed by the US as the Miracle of Vietnam9 in containing the spread of communism,
turned out in quite the contrary. As a result of all this, by summer 1963 the US-led Diem
government started to face strong opposition from all sides. However US only took the decisive
step of deposing Diem when rumors started to spread that the latter was thinking of negotiating
with the North; and this was done without even considering its authenticity, so much the US was
alarmed by even its likelihood. However the situation did not improve for US since ten different
army generals were installed in a twenty-month period by Pentagon after the coup and these
generals were not mere obedient puppets as they endlessly plotted against each other for power.
The political unrest and tension in the Southern government started to escalate, further
exacerbated by the opposition it faced from NLF and the DRV government in the North.
President Eisenhower came to the office in January 1953 with the slogan that unlike the
previous Truman government which had lost China to Communism, the Republicans were
determined to prevent any other Asian countries from turning communist. However as the events
9 Ibid., 136.

in Indochina started to unfold, it turned out to be quite an embarrassment for the Eisenhower
administration. His justification of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was based on the falling
domino principle that if Vietnam were to come under Communist rule, so would the entire
Southeast Asia. Despite this from the very onset of the First Indochina War, Eisenhower was
aware of the popularity of the Communist insurgents and its influence In Vietnam and this is
clearly highlighted in his memoirs:
I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who
did not agree that had elections been held at the time of fighting, possibly 80 percent of the
population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of
[Southern] State Bao Dai. 10

Thus Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed in a desperate attempt to turn back the tide of Ho Chi
Minhs popularity and the USs reason for ignoring its pledge to Geneva to hold elections for a
unified Vietnam also becomes apparent from Eisenhowers statement. Massive U.S. aid also
started to flow during Eisenhower administration and apart from paying the entire cost of the
South Vietnamese army the U.S. also provided economic assistance to its government. In 1959
the United States paid for 75 percent of the imports and in 1960 it increased to 84 percent.11
Nevertheless despite the military and economic backups, the Southern government struggled in
its effort not only to contain communism but in establishing a strong institution that would unite
people under nationalism.

10 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956 (New York: Double
day, 1963), 372.
11 Marvin E. Gettleman et al., 145.

In 1961 when President Kennedy took office, the political situation had gone from bad to worse.
The CIA agent Edward Lansdale was sent to Vietnam to provide an over-all study of the situation
and he returned with the report that the situation was near total collapse and if the policies of the
Diem government are not changed any sooner, then the country would be lost. Although this
report created a stir in the White House, it is interesting how Kennedy responded to it; he
congratulated Lansdale on the report and even suggested that a portion of it be published in the
Saturday Evening Post. It is possible that Kennedy wanted to make the most of this dire situation
through publicizing it, hoping it would give him a pretext for strengthening more forces in
Vietnam. Thus instead of taking heed of Lansdales advice to reform the Diem policies, the size
of the Vietnamese Army was increased from 150,000 to 250,000 and a group of 100 trained in
U.S. Army Special Forces was sent to Vietnam. Although there were some planning for social
reforms, they were not given due importance and Diems inability to get popular support was
also overlooked as U.S. considered all these factors as negotiable, focusing predominantly in
strengthening the Vietnam forces.
One social reform was the Agroville program initiated by Diem in 1959- the purpose of which
was to protect the Vietnamese peasants from the Viet Minh by relocating them in areas,
controlled by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)of the southern state. Although
services were provided in these areas, such as schools, medical clinics and electricity, the
financial incentives were inadequate for the peasants and also there was insufficient room for
their accommodation. This resulted in bitter resentment among the peasants who were, in many
cases, forcibly moved to these Agroville communities by ARVN. Consequently the program was
abandoned in 1961 and the Strategic Hamlet Program was introduced by the U.S. to isolate the
guerillas from the local people whereby they would be placed in fortified villages, surrounded by

barbed wire or bamboo spear and also guarded by local troops. The peasants would also be given
weapons and trained in self-defense and these strategic hamlets would not be isolated; it was
held that these hamlets would improve the lives of the peasants and thus the tie between the
locals and the Southern government would be strengthened12. This was implemented on the
conviction that though the peasants would be transferred against their will, once security is
ensured they will eventually come to support the government, while the Viet Minh in the
meantime would lose their source of men, accommodation and food supplies. This program was
one part of a task force known as Taylor Mission. The other part involved making the U.S.
military equipment more efficient and stepping up the counter-insurgency program by employing
thousands of American advisers in the combat units. Although the Taylor Mission was intended
to restrict and subdue the Viet Minh forces from all quarters, it only led to the waning of the
support for Southern government and an increase in sympathy for the Viet Minh.
During the presidential rule of Eisenhower, financial backing to Ngo Dinh Diems rule was given
to assist the government in undertaking the needed reforms13, as pointed out by Eisenhower in
his letter to Diem, but following the ascension of Kennedy the emphasis on internal reform had
been largely downplayed by the Cold War considerations. In his inaugural speech, Kennedy talks
of his mission to reach out to those in need of help and free people from Communism or any
kind of oppression. Later in 13 May 1961 his Vice-president Johnson in a declaration narrows
down this mission to Vietnam and the U.S. wish to assist in the defense of its liberties against
unprovoked subversion and Communist terror14. However it was a lot more than just preventing
12 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), 435.
13 Marilyn B. Young et al., 50.
14 Marvin et al., 161.

the spread of Communism that led to U.S. involvement since Kennedy from the onset of his
presidential rule wanted to heighten Americas prestige and secure its position as a world power
by crushing the guerilla forces. This conclusion was drawn by George Herring from his analysis
of The Pentagon Papers who held that President Kennedy and many of his advisers adopted this
perspective- South Vietnam would become a test case of Americas determination to uphold its
commitments in a menacing world and of its capacity to meet the new challenges posed by
guerilla warfare in the emerging nations15.
The highlight of Kennedy administration in Vietnam was the counterinsurgency program. The
program initially began to combat NLF battalions and provide more manpower to ARVN.
Ironically with every increase of military technology and deploying U.S. troops, the program met
a crushing defeat from the NLF which was growing ever-stronger. The failing of the
counterinsurgency was owing to the fact that U.S. was only taking into consideration the military
aspects, completely ignoring the massive political support of the Viet Minh which dictated the
entire situation of Vietnam. Issues such as psychological loyalties which could have been
manipulated through social change was also disregarded- the U.S. being predominantly engaged
in improving and consolidating its military tactics and troops; in1961, South Vietnam had less
than 1,000 military personnel and by 1963, the number rose to more than 16,000. However in
this also the U.S. miscalculated the NLF potentials whose strength was considered only in terms
of soldiers and weapons, and not as a mass revolutionary movement which had a constant influx
of weaponries and man power from the North. A program was initiated by Diem in the late 50s
known as the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, where thousands were arrested, jailed

15 George C. Herring, Americas Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1979), 75.

and executed. Ironically, this too backfired and instead of subduing the Communists, it led to the
emergence of NLF in South Vietnam.
The NLF on the other hand was primarily devoted to establishing peace and unity between the
North and South and aimed to achieve this objective through social changes. It did not aspire for
any political gains and its only purpose was to gain independence. Unlike the U.S. policy, its aim
was to stabilize the unrest situation in South Vietnam through education, development of
economy, science and technology and free the region from U.S. dominion and the dictatorial
powers of Ngo Dinh Diem through peaceful means and negotiations. Hence far from seeing the
South as an enemy, it strove to liberate them and it is believed that this non-confrontational
approach is what led to the success, popularity and mass membership of NLF- Buddhists being
the majority, it appealed to their psyche. In contrast to this the U.S. failure during the Kennedy
presidency and before could be attributed to the fact that instead of aiming for the goodwill of
the people, it completely relied on the autocratic Diem regime, whose main agenda was to
remove all his opponents to secure his rule.
It is held that full-scale Americanization of the war began during the presidential rule of Lyndon
Baines Johnson and during this time the U.S. got so involved that only a crushing defeat could
steer it away from Vietnam. Throughout the Kennedy administration, Johnson was a supporter of
the war and one of his first acts upon assuming office was to send his Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara to Vietnam to report on it. McNamaras assessment echoes Edward Lansdale
report to Kennedy as the former brings little hope for winning the war: The situation is very
disturbing. Current trends, unless revered in the net 2-3 months, will leave to neutralization at
best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.16 Despite McNamaras misgivings,
16 Marilyn et al. 67.

Johnson remained undeterred in his decision to continue and step up the attacks on Vietnam.
Following the assassination of Diem, the White House was in a dilemma regarding their stance
to the war and there was never any consensus among them on how to approach and proceed in
Vietnam with the policies. While some suggested withdrawal of troops and peace agreements,
others advocated forcefully and decisively pursuing the war by referring to Eisenhowers domino
theory.
It is important to note that these contrasting opinions took a toll on Johnson who inwardly
remained indecisive in his position towards the Vietnam issue. This is clearly seen in one of his
recorded conversation with Senate leader Richard Russell where he states that he is acting out of
compulsion and does not want U.S. to commit to a war, but since the American people does not
want him to back out on Vietnam and the war being more of an issue of prestige and securing the
U.S. image of a world power, he has to act regardless of his better judgments. The position of the
U.S. people is worth noting here, since the war was largely kept a secret and both Eisenhower
and Kennedy gave the mass an impression that they were only assisting Vietnam in its resistance
of the oppressive, dictatorial Communist regime in a bid to secure its independence. Thus the
American people remained oblivious of all U.S. military participation and even Diems
assassination was thought to be carried out by his own men, urged by the lust for power. A
bubble was created around the American public by Johnsons predecessors that America was
selflessly providing aid to a people in a remote region striving for their independence which he
had to live up to.
Taking all these into consideration, four days after his inauguration as President, Johnson
initiated a plan for covert military actions on the government of Hanoi and once again the
American people remained oblivious of it. Johnsons secret plan was to proceed into the war by

employing the South Vietnamese troops and mercenaries though it would be masterminded and
financed by the U.S. ; hence the aim was to make it appear less of an American involvement.
These covert attacks were to be escalated over time by enlarging the military bases and
increasing the number of U.S. military troops; also any form of retaliation from the North would
be used as pretext to use air attacks on Hanoi, deploying more U.S. troops and consequently
occupying Hanoi. The intricate nature of these attacks is seen as plans for retaliatory bombing
of North Vietnam were drawn even before the covert operations were carried out. These covert
operations began in February 1, 1964, under the code name Operation Plan 34A (Oplan 34A).
The strategy of provoking the North to engage them in an armed struggle was believed by
Pentagon to result in obtaining a resolution from Congress granting carte blanche to wage war.
This was necessary since it would then give U.S. a provision for deploying ground forces, ships
and air power on the pretext of self-defense, without fear of public criticism. Like Kennedys
administration, Johnsons presidency also suffered from the illusion that employing more
military troops and increasing its attacks would result in a U.S. victory.
On August 2, Oplan 34A launched attacks on three North Vietnamese ships on the coastal
defenses of North Vietnam and on August 4, it was reported that U.S. destroyer Maddox along
with another U.S. destroyer Turner Joy claimed that they were under attack from North
Vietnam. These events which took place in Gulf of Tonkin were important in sanctioning the
Americanization of the Vietnam War. [What actually took place on the 4th is beyond the scope of
this study but President Johnsons televised speech that US ships were attacked without
provocation is a fallacy since U.S. was the first to attack and that too on North Vietnamese naval
forts.] Following this, on August 7, Congress passed the resolution which gave the President the

right to take all necessary steps in Southeast Asia, including the use of armed force17. The
Gulf of Tonkin marked the first admitted participation of the US in war against the DRV and it
also led to USs more direct involvement in the War. Nevertheless covert ground, air and
maritime operations still continued as the Oplan 34A in its September schedule listed 94 targeted
areas in North Vietnam and plans on how the attacks would be carried out. The Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara approved these proposed actions but at the same time expressed his
anxiety questioning if it were to fail, would it be possible to come up with backup plans such as
adding more targets or continuing attack on the 94 targets.
In early February 1965, using a guerilla attack on a U.S. base in Pleiku as a pretext to
implement a planned escalation 18 more air strikes were ordered that turned into a regular
campaign of aerial bombardment, as bombs not only started dropping in Vietnam but also on
other Viet Cong bases in Laos and Cambodia; this operation known as Rolling Thunder was
inaugurated by Johnson in February 13. The event however was reported to the Americans as
retaliatory air raids and in order to further justify their action the State Department issued its
White Paper on February 27 whereby the governments intervention on Vietnam was justified.
It stated that the South Vietnam was struggling for its life against the brutal attacks of the North
which had established a wide network in the South through infiltration of Viet Minh and
weapons from the North. The White Paper even mentions that U.S. was providing military
assistance only at the request of the South government and that it has no motive other than
securing peace for the South. The very next day on February 28 after the papers issuing,
17 Department of State Bulletin, 51 (August 24, 1964).C: From The Pentagon Papers
, 3: 553-556
18 Walter L. Hixson, ed., The United States and the Vietnam War (New York: Garland
Publishing, 2000), ix.

Washington and Saigon jointly announced that they would begin continuous air raids against the
North. The White Paper was issued following McGeorge Bundys policy of sustained reprisal
whereby it was believed that success in Vietnam could be ensured by justifying the air and naval
operations as a response to the Viet Cong campaign of terror and violence against the South.
Bundy believed that this policy would not only allow them to escalate the attacks but would also
show the Americans and their allies that U.S. did not leave any stone unturned in its attempt to
help the State of Vietnam.
Despite the escalation of U.S. intervention, it was clearly losing the battle with the North in spite
of having tried every possible military strategy in the book. Bombing of North Vietnam only
resulted in the Viet Cong becoming more determined in their struggle. Also unlike previous
times, U.S. policy makers could not vouch any more that deploying more troops would result in
victory. One of the main reasons for the set back was that both U.S. and the Saigon Government
failed to win the allegiance and trust of the peasants, which comprised the majority Vietnam
being an agricultural based society. Although material aid was provided to the peasants, it was
received with pleasure, but not political gratitude19 Though American aid facilitated better
seeds, fertilizers, water pumps and tractors, as the war progressed these material prosperity was
soon overshadowed by concern for survival and a strong desire for peace. As U.S. started to face
defeat from all sectors, in June 1965, General Westmoreland was asking for more troops- though
there were already 82,000 combat troops in Vietnam, he petitioned for 175,000 by the end of the
year and an additional 100,000 by 1966. This created great alarm in the White House and the
Under Secretary of State George Ball started to question the pragmatism of continuing the war.
In a 67-page memorandum addressed to US policy makers, he talks of the futility of fighting and
19 David W.P. Elliot, The Vietnamese War ( New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 788.

that compromise is the best they can make out of the current situation, since the ground force,
regardless of size, is incapable of defeating the guerilla Viet Cong, which is receiving support
and assistance from the civilians. Because of this cooperation, covert operations were leaked to
the Viet Cong before being executed, which not only put the U.S. troops out of their dept, but
also made them susceptible to attacks. Ball in his lengthy opposition to the war was supported by
other White House staff and officials, though a large majority still believed that victory was
feasible through escalating the troops.
Despite the growing debate over Vietnam- both in the political arena as well as the public
domain- President Johnson remained adamant in his decision to pursue the war with more fervor
as 535,000 troops were deployed by early 1968 and expenditures and military assistance to be
used against the insurgent were drastically increased. He also authorized the US troops to launch
search and destroy missions whereby the guerillas on being identified will be killed. At the
same time air bombardment continued which is believed to have exceeded the total tonnage of
bombs used in the World War II. Not only that, lethal herbicides such as Agent Orange and other
defoliants as well as bulldozers running through paddies and fields, were employed by US in an
effort to destroy the natural vegetation under which the guerillas camouflaged themselves and
also to deprive them of the food supply. Another objective of this was to destroy the ability of the
peasants to support themselves in the countryside, forcing them to move to the U.S. dominated
areas, hence depriving the guerillas of their rural support base. As the war intensified, by 1966, a
large proportion of the South Vietnam area became free-fire zones meaning all civilians being
evacuated the region became a battle-field, where anybody could be killed. Not only that, these
zones were enlarged to several square miles within which bombs were dropped to clear the land
and make it uninhabitable by NLF and even the local peasantry. As a result of the air raids and

the decimation of the land, people were forced to flee to refugee camps near Saigon and other
cities.
Because of these measures, by 1967 the Viet Cong and the NLF who had control over large areas
in South Vietnam were driven away from the populated areas, compelled to disperse and this was
seen by many U.S. as a prospect of victory. Thus President Johnson and General Westmoreland
termed this as military victory, having succeeded in driving the NLF combat troops away from
their establishment in Saigon and also having managed to reoccupy Hue in central Vietnam. It is
possible that what U.S. termed as military feat, for the guerillas and the NLF it was nothing but a
reorganization of their troops for the most decisive and comprehensive attack on U.S. troops up
to date in the Second Indochina War. This attack came to be known as the Tet Offensive which
started in January 30, 1968 and continued for four weeks. Much to the surprise of General
Westmoreland who thought the army had a firm grip over South Vietnam, combined NLF and
North Vietnamese troops attacked no fewer than 34 provincial centers, 64 district towns and
every major city in the south, including over one hundred U.S. military installations from the
North to the South. The NLF also broke into the prisons and thousands of political prisoners
were freed and major GVN (Government of the Republic of Vietnam or South Vietnam)
headquarters were either occupied or burned down. Panic-stricken, the US-GVN forces hastily
withdrew to escape the assaults.

The Tet Offensive which involved simultaneous coordinated attacks by a large number of small
units, spread all across South Vietnam and also in the central regions where some areas were
controlled by the U.S. The success of this attack was particularly owing to the fact that U.S.
troops were caught off guard and being attacked at the same time in all areas of their
establishment, even the troops could not be replenished by mobilizing. Also the Americans over
the years have gotten accustomed to an enemy which made a policy of avoiding military
confrontation and thus were shaken to the core when continuous attacks with shocking power
were launched on them. The U.S. leaders, though clearly at a loss, were unwilling to admit

defeat so early and termed these attacks as a desperation tactic and a final death throe before
the end of guerilla resistance20.
The impact of Tet Offensive was monumental since it shifted the position of U.S. from offensive
to defensive almost overnight. On the part of the rebels, it was not an operation aimed at seizing
and controlling some areas of land, but it was to mount pressure on the Americans and
undermine their determination to pursue the war. Apart from suffering military defeat, they were
also morally crushed because of the number of casualties which amounted to 3895 between
January 30 and March 31; also the NLF claimed to have wrecked over 1,800 U.S. aircrafts as a
result of the fighting. This lowered the U.S. military efficiency and there was a lack of
coordination between the American and Saigon forces and also between the ground units and the
air support which weakened the defense. Also there was a growing antagonism between the U.S.
troops and the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) which escalated as the latter realizing
the inevitability of U.S. defeat, sided with the NLF troops.
Politically, the impact was even greater, since having drained all their resources in Vietnam, U.S.
realized that in the event of a crisis elsewhere in the world, its options would be limited. The Tet
Offensive was also crucial in crushing the illusion of the American leaders that victory could be
ensured through escalation of military tactics; it was a huge blow to their morale as it highlighted
their massive incompetence and brought into open the futility of the sacrifices, forcibly imposed
on the U.S. troops. However, U.S. was still not prepared to give in and in a desperate attempt, the
policy makers recommended a deployment of 22,000 troops and replacing the Premier of South
Vietnam to turn the tide. President Johnson was also facing trouble at home as Eugene
McCarthy, running on an anti-Vietnam war platform in the 1968 presidential election, achieved
20 New York Times, January 21, 1968.

an unexpected vote total in the New Hampshire and Wisconsin primary. Thus it was becoming
evident on the part of Johnson that he was facing not only military but also political defeat as a
result of Vietnam War and in a last attempt to resolve the matter, whichever way it might turn
out, he decided to consult a group of policy makers who were engaged in designing the means of
global confrontation with communism and also shaping the U.S. foreign policies regarding
Vietnam. These men unanimously decided that U.S. should not expand its forces on Vietnam and
should withdraw its troops and take all measures for de-escalating the war. Realizing that the
battle is lost, both home and abroad, President Johnson in a televised speech on 31 March, 1968
took a defensive stance, declaring that he would devote the remainder of his presidential term
seeking peace and that he would not seek re-election.
On the part of the insurgents, apart from the nature of the surprise attacks of the Tet Offensive,
victory was ensured through peaceful cooperation with the locals. It is important to note that a
mass influx of Viet Cong from North to the South had begun much earlier as mentioned in the
White Paper and therefore mobilization of troops was not an issue since they were already
stationed in various regions in the south. In certain cities, the guerilla forces broke into laundries
and stole ARVN uniforms which were worn during the attacks, causing great confusion in the
enemy lines. Guns and machineries were removed and U.S. bases and headquarters were
attacked, destroying millions of dollars worth of equipment. Also as the relations between the
ARVN and U.S. troops deteriorated, the ARVN were less inclined to put up a fight with the
guerillas and thus NLF occupation of most cities were swift and peaceful. Far from putting any
resistance, a number of local officials of GVN switched sides and started working for the
guerillas. Every aspect of this revolutionary campaign was dependent on civilian cooperation as
tens of thousands of people, both in the villages and cities, assisted them in smuggling food and

weapons and also gave them refuge. It was believed that they were accepted into the
neighborhoods without any force and this not only gave the guerillas a firm ground whereby they
could launch attacks but also gave them the much needed moral and psychological support. This
provides a stark contrast to the U.S. troops who were fighting a war in a far away land only
because they were compelled to. Because of the atrocities and attacks they carried out on the
whims of their superiors, they were regarded with contempt and disdain by the locals as one
American officer remarks: If looks could kill, very few marines would still be alive21. Thus
they suffered from disillusionment, unwillingly fighting a war that had no purpose for them and
this loss of spirits was a huge setback for the U.S. forces which no foreign policy could mend.
Also it is reported that the massacre carried out in villages by U.S. troops as a response to the Tet
Offensive was deliberately leaked to the American public by an army personnel leading to the GI
anti-war movement within the army which was one of the decisive factors for ending the war.
Prior to the Tet Offensive, NLF suffered high casualties and was also shaken to the core at the
U.S. escalation of attacks. The villagers too grew disheartened as they endlessly pursued the task
of maintaining underground tunnel system, tending the wounded, cultivating crops and
contributing food to the troops as U.S. bombs and shells rained on them. Leaders of the Front
organizations played a major role in keeping the people and the troops in high spirits as villagers
remained steadfast in their role to assist the guerillas despite the resistance. Even in the most
difficult times, NLF managed to strive based on its objective which still had a purpose and
meaning to the people. The GVN on the other hand, had no real ties with the population and
survived on the basis of U.S. money and military support and as the war continued the morale of
the US-GVN troops declined, especially at the growing determination of the enemy troops. The
21 Marvin E. Gettleman et al., 367.

NLF was also strategic in its initiation of the Tet Offensive since prior to it in 1967, it laid low in
many regions, which U.S. considered to be a military defeat on the part of the former and thus
when it least expected, all force units, from one end of the country to another, attacked
simultaneously.
Another quarter from where the government received considerable pressure to end the war was
the American public. When the bombing of North Vietnam started periodically in February 1965,
following the Tonkin incident, the antiwar movement began as a national phenomenon. However
campaign began earlier in December 1964 when a student group organization issued a call for
people to go to Washington and march against the war. By 1969, it had far reaching impact as
millions participated in the antiwar Moratorium. Also Martin Luther Kings Declaration of
Independence from the War in Vietnam in April 1967 had a profound impact on the people as it
strengthened antiwar campaigns and consciousness in all social spheres. The African-American
Civil Rights Movement (1954-1968) overlapped with the antiwar movement and people were
quick to connect the two. The war with Vietnam diverted funds and energy from President
Johnsons campaign to alleviate poverty and this proved more lethal when young African
Americans, against their will, were made to join the army, often resulting in their death for a
cause which had no purpose for them. As a result of his growing unpopularity and running out of
political and military strategies to counter the Communist North, President Johnson after calling
a bombing halt on March 31, decided to seek peaceful negotiations.
What seemed like the end of the war, by the time President Nixon took office however turned out
to be its continuation and further development. Nixons campaign for presidential election was to
make peace in Vietnam, and though he took office on January 20, 1969, saying he has a secret
plan to end the war, it later became apparent that his only plan was to continue the war. In

November 1969, Nixon introduced his plan for Vietnamization whereby, American troops
would be withdrawn and more ARVN troops would be employed to replace them and this
withdrawal of troops would be compensated by increasing artillery and aerial bombardment.
However at the same time Nixon was also conducting the peace negotiations with DRV that was
initiated by Johnson prior to the end of his presidential rule. This was done because Nixon
believed that a sharp escalation of the war would force the NLF to make peace on terms that
would be favourable to the U.S. He was also aware of the public pressure back home which not
only wanted the troops to return but also wanted its leaders to stop the killing of the Vietnamese,
who because of the antiwar movement gained significant sympathy. In order to turn the popular
support away from Vietnam and justify the cause for continuing the war, Nixon gave a distorted
account of his dealings with the DRV to the people. For instance when he demanded the
immediate release of American prisoners from the North, the DRV stated that any discussion of
prisoner exchange must be accompanied by cease-fire agreement and this was presented to the
public as evidence that war continued only because Hanoi remained reluctant to release
American prisoners.
Although Nixon promised the American people the truth during presidential campaign, covert
activities still continued as attacks on Laos and Cambodia were launched which were the bases
of DRV and also the bombing of North Vietnam was resumed, in gross violation of Johnsons
bombing halt. The invasion of Laos was carried out on the pretext of carrying out a test on
Vietnamization, but in actuality it was to see if the ARVN troops could successfully invade a
country being military aided by U.S. However this led to a disastrous military defeat as 9,000
ARVN troops and several hundred Americans were dead or wounded, and the rest were forced to
retreat. President Kennedy also had to face stiff opposition from VVAW (Vietnam Veterans

Against the War) who demanded immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. With the failure to
popularize Vietnamization, Kennedy began to support the Nguyen Van Thieus regime of the
South Government and the U.S. policy towards neutralization (established during the early
presidency of Johnson) remained the same whereby it strongly opposed and strove to uproot any
attempt aimed at bring the North and South in reconciliatory terms, with the latter recognizing
the Communist rule of the former. The DRV realizing that the war was yet to be won, prepared
their spring offensive in 1972 to which Nixon responded with heavy aerial bombardment of the
North, along with a naval blockade- in a last attempt to bomb the Vietnamese into submission, he
launched this which came to be known as Operation Linebacker. However once again the U.S.
operation failed and the ground ARVN forces suffered high casualties and were forced to retreat.
This had severe impact in the South as corruption and inflation increased, and also in the U.S. as
antiwar movement intensified its campaigns.
Facing opposition from the public as well as Congress, the politicians began to feel the growing
anger against the Nixon administration and the Congress also sought to limit Nixons power to
expand the war. As the peace talks continued between the DRV and the U.S., a cease-fire
agreement was reached between the two sides in October 1972. One of the difficulties arising
from this agreement was how to get the South to agree to it, since as long as U.S. remained
engaged in the war, the South could not lose, though it could not win either. President of South
Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu threatened to reject the agreement and particularly objected to its
failure to mention the withdrawal of NLF troops from the South. Although President Kennedy
approved of the peace agreements, he did not sign on the agreed-upon date of cease-fire and
thus in a bid to reassure Thieu that U.S. was on his side and would extend support to his rule,
Kennedy ordered a last, massive bombing of Hanoi and the port city Haiphong, from December

18-29, which came to be known as the Christmas Bombing. However the Vietnamese were
prepared that U.S. would make one last attempt to crush their spirits and as a response to it many
U.S. airmen were killed and captured. Consequently in December 30, Nixon called a bombing
halt and sent a general to Thieu, saying South Vietnam had little choice but to accept the
agreement or continue the war on its own and that U.S. would respond with full force if Hanoi
violates any term of the agreement. However at the same time, the Nixon administration also
entered into a secret agreement with Hanoi whereby Nixon promised $2.5 million as
compensation for the bombings. The utter state of confusion of the U.S. is further seen as it
moved into reconciliation with Communist China, as President Kennedy and his Secretary
General Henry Kissinger visited China to convince its leaders to persuade North Vietnam to
settle the war on terms favorable to U.S. In January 1973, the cease-fire agreement was finally
signed and although the last U.S. troops were withdrawn in March 1973, the United States
continued to support the Thieu government military and economically. This was brought to an
end on July 1, 1973 when Congress passed a law forbidding the use of funds for combat in
Cambodia, Laos and North and South Vietnam. Any further possibility of U.S. intervention in
Vietnam ended with the Watergate scandal leading to Nixons resignation on August 1974 and
with no U.S. backup the Southern government succumbed to the final offensive launched by the
North in 1975 and in April 30, the war finally ended in a decisive communist victory for Hanoi
and the National Liberation Front (NLF)
While the U.S. viewed Vietnam as an emerging Communist country which had to be subdued,
for the Vietnamese it was not an issue of Communism that resulted in their resistance; instead it
was an endeavour to gain independence. The 1,000 year Chinese rule in Vietnam since 111 B.C.
testimonies this that it is a country whose urge for freedom cannot be suppressed since in spite of

adopting the Chinese custom, culture and even political model in the Vietnamese society and
administration, they resented the Chinese rule and taking advantage of its military weakness in
939 A.D., the Vietnamese were able to gain independence. The countrys leaning towards
communism was only because its ideology supported self-determination and communism as a
concept never gained precedence over the countrys independence as seen in the membership of
Ho Chi Minhs party which comprised of Buddhists, non-communists, peasants and people from
all rank and class. On the part of the U.S., the war was also not all about containing Communism
since it feared, as elucidated by the U.S. Secretary State Dean Rusk in 1965, that if it lost to a
small and underdeveloped like Vietnam, all its commitments and credibility would be
questioned; hence the stubborn pursuing of an American victory in Vietnam.

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, Second edition, Michael Yahuda, 2004, pg 117)