Panay

Railways vs Heva Management

Facts:

Panay railways contracted real estate mortgage covering several parcels of land to Trade Royal Bank (TRB) for 20 million pesos. Subsequently Panay railways
failed to pay the amount mentioned and thus the mortgage was extrajudicially forclosed by the TRB. Subsequently a Certificate of sale was issued to TRB being
the highest bidder and the sales was registered in the Registry of Deeds and was annotated at the back of the transfer certificate of title. Panay railways failed
to redeem the property promting the TRB to move for consolidation of title and there after a new TCT was issued in their name. Later on TRB filed for writ of
possesion againts the petitioner of the subject property which petitioner did not contest in fact the petitioner guaranteed the peaceful possesion of TRB of the
subject property.

The problem arrosed when the petitioner discovered that some of the properties were forclosed that were not covered with the mortgage contract. Which in
turn led to them filing a complaint for partial annulment of the sale and reconveyance of the property with damages. Respondent on the other hand avvered
in its motion to dismiss that petitioner (1) petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a waiver, an abandonment and an extinguishment of
petitioners claim or demand; (3) petitioner failed to state a cause of action; and (4) an indispensable party, namely TRB, was not impleaded.

[6]
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of respondents. It held that the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner was a
judicial admission of TRBs ownership of the disputed properties. This admission thus operated as a waiver barring petitioner from claiming otherwise. On 11
August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.
[7]
In its Opposition, petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar with the revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective only on 1 July 1997. Its
representative was likewise not informed by the court personnel that docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, it
contended that the requirement for the payment of docket fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation of the procedural
rules on appeals.

[8]
[9]
On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner thereafter moved for
[10]
a reconsideration of the Order alleging that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also
alleged that the court erred in failing to relax procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice.

[11]
On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion.

On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied procedural rules.

On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision

[12]

on the Petition. It held that while the failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful

fees within the reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to
do so belonged to the CA and not the trial court. Thus, appellate court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and set
aside the latters assailed Order dated 29 September 1997.
Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.
It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CAs Decision, this Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1
May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial courts may, motu
proprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000

[13]

was issued on 29 August 2000 and was addressed to all lower courts.

By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned Orders of the trial court by issuing the assailed Amended Decision

[14]

in the

present Petition granting respondents Motion for Reconsideration.

The CAs action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive effect. It
also alleged that the CA should consider the case as exceptionally meritorious. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he was yet to
familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court, which became effective a little over a month before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He was thus not aware
that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the dismissal of the case. Eventually the CA issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
Issue:
Did CA committed grave abuse of discretion sustaining the RTCs dismissal of the notice of appeal alleging that the CA has exclusive jurisidiction of the notice
of appeal and that while dismissible it should be relaxed for the substance of justice.

Principle and Discussion:

The Supreme Court held that the petition was not of merit

Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws
and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that a person has no
vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure
The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal has no merit. When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41
through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs dismissal of the action may be considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA committed no
reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal, taking note of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of its Decision.
As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,

[17]

we have held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the
[18]

perfection of an appeal.The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with
the law
Ruling: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit