THIRD DIVISION

RAFAEL ARSENIO S. DIZON, in his capacity as the Judicial

Administrator of the Estate of the deceased JOSE P.
FERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus COURT OF TAX APPEALS andCOMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 140944

Present:
Promulgated:
April 30, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated April 30, 1999 which affirmed the Decision[3] of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
dated June 17, 1997.[4]
The Facts
On November 7, 1987, Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a petition for the probate of his will [5] was filed with Branch
51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (probate court).[6] The probate court then appointed retired Supreme Court
Justice Arsenio P. Dizon (Justice Dizon) and petitioner, Atty. Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon (petitioner) as Special and Assistant Special
Administrator, respectively, of the Estate of Jose (Estate). In a letter [7] dated October 13, 1988, Justice Dizon informed
respondent Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of the special proceedings for the Estate.
Petitioner alleged that several requests for extension of the period to file the required estate tax return were granted by the
BIR since the assets of the estate, as well as the claims against it, had yet to be collated, determined and identified. Thus, in a
letter[8] dated March 14, 1990, Justice Dizon authorized Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf of
the Estate the required estate tax return and to represent the same in securing a Certificate of Tax Clearance. Eventually,
on April 17, 1990, Atty. Gonzales wrote a letter [9] addressed to the BIR Regional Director for San Pablo City and filed the estate
tax return[10] with the same BIR Regional Office, showing therein a NIL estate tax liability, computed as follows:

COMPUTATION OF TAX
Conjugal Real Property (Sch. 1) P10,855,020.00
Conjugal Personal Property (Sch.2) 3,460,591.34
Taxable Transfer (Sch. 3)
Gross Conjugal Estate 14,315,611.34
Less: Deductions (Sch. 4) 187,822,576.06
Net Conjugal Estate NIL
Less: Share of Surviving Spouse NIL .
Net Share in Conjugal Estate NIL
xxx
Net Taxable Estate NIL .
Estate Tax Due NIL .[11]
On April 27, 1990, BIR Regional Director for San Pablo City, Osmundo G. Umali issued Certification Nos. 2052 [12] and
2053[13] stating that the taxes due on the transfer of real and personal properties [14] of Jose had been fully paid and said
properties may be transferred to his heirs. Sometime in August 1990, Justice Dizon passed away. Thus, on October 22, 1990,
the probate court appointed petitioner as the administrator of the Estate. [15]
Petitioner requested the probate court's authority to sell several properties forming part of the Estate, for the purpose of
paying its creditors, namely: Equitable Banking Corporation (P19,756,428.31), Banque de L'Indochine et. de Suez
(US$4,828,905.90 as of January 31, 1988), Manila Banking Corporation (P84,199,160.46 as of February 28, 1989) and State
Investment House, Inc. (P6,280,006.21). Petitioner manifested that Manila Bank, a major creditor of the Estate was not
included, as it did not file a claim with the probate court since it had security over several real estate properties forming part
of the Estate.[16]

However, on November 26, 1991, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection of the BIR, Themistocles Montalban,
issued Estate Tax Assessment Notice No. FAS-E-87-91-003269, [17] demanding the payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency
estate tax, itemized as follows:
Deficiency Estate Tax- 1987
Estate tax P31,868,414.48
25% surcharge- late filing 7,967,103.62
late payment 7,967,103.62
Interest 19,121,048.68
Compromise-non filing 25,000.00
non payment 25,000.00
no notice of death 15.00
no CPA Certificate 300.00
Total amount due & collectible P66,973,985.40[18]
In his letter[19] dated December 12, 1991, Atty. Gonzales moved for the reconsideration of the said estate tax
assessment. However, in her letter[20] dated April 12, 1994, the BIR Commissioner denied the request and reiterated that the
estate is liable for the payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax. On May 3, 1994, petitioner received the letter of
denial. On June 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for review [21] before respondent CTA. Trial on the merits ensued.

As found by the CTA, the respective parties presented the following pieces of evidence, to wit:
In the hearings conducted, petitioner did not present testimonial evidence but merely documentary evidence
consisting of the following:
Nature of Document (sic) Exhibits
1. Letter dated October 13, 1988
from Arsenio P. Dizon addressed
to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue informing the latter of
the special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate (p. 126,
BIR records); "A"
2. Petition for the probate of the
will and issuance of letter of
administration filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 87-42980 (pp. 107-108, BIR
records); "B" & "B-1
3. Pleading entitled "Compliance"
filed with the probate Court
submitting the final inventory
of all the properties of the
deceased (p. 106, BIR records); "C"
4. Attachment to Exh. "C" which
is the detailed and complete
listing of the properties of
the deceased (pp. 89-105, BIR rec.); "C-1" to "C-17"
5. Claims against the estate filed
by Equitable Banking Corp. with
the probate Court in the amount
of P19,756,428.31 as of March 31,
1988, together with the Annexes
to the claim (pp. 64-88, BIR records); "D" to "D-24"
6. Claim filed by Banque de L'
Indochine et de Suez with the
probate Court in the amount of
US $4,828,905.90 as of January 31,
1988 (pp. 262-265, BIR records); "E" to "E-3"

7. Claim of the Manila Banking

Corporation (MBC) which as of
November 7, 1987 amounts to
P65,158,023.54, but recomputed
as of February 28, 1989 at a
total amount of P84,199,160.46;
together with the demand letter
from MBC's lawyer (pp. 194-197,
BIR records); "F" to "F-3"
8. Demand letter of Manila Banking
Corporation prepared by Asedillo,
Ramos and Associates Law Offices
addressed to Fernandez Hermanos,
Inc., represented by Jose P.
Fernandez, as mortgagors, in the
total amount of P240,479,693.17
as of February 28, 1989
(pp. 186-187, BIR records); "G" & "G-1"
9. Claim of State Investment
House, Inc. filed with the
RTC, Branch VII of Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No.
86-38599 entitled "State
Investment House, Inc.,
Plaintiff, versus Maritime
Company Overseas, Inc. and/or
Jose P. Fernandez, Defendants,"
(pp. 200-215, BIR records); "H" to "H-16"
10. Letter dated March 14, 1990
of Arsenio P. Dizon addressed
to Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales,
(p. 184, BIR records); "I"
11. Letter dated April 17, 1990
from J.M. Gonzales addressed
to the Regional Director of
BIR in San Pablo City
(p. 183, BIR records); "J"
12. Estate Tax Return filed by
the estate of the late Jose P.
Fernandez through its authorized
representative, Atty. Jesus M.
Gonzales, for Arsenio P. Dizon,
with attachments (pp. 177-182,
BIR records); "K" to "K-5"

13. Certified true copy of the

Letter of Administration
issued by RTC Manila, Branch
51, in Sp. Proc. No. 87-42980
appointing Atty. Rafael S.
Dizon as Judicial Administrator
of the estate of Jose P.
Fernandez; (p. 102, CTA records)
and "L"
14. Certification of Payment of
estate taxes Nos. 2052 and
2053, both dated April 27, 1990,
issued by the Office of the
Regional Director, Revenue
Region No. 4-C, San Pablo
City, with attachments
(pp. 103-104, CTA records.). "M" to "M-5"
Respondent's [BIR] counsel presented on June 26, 1995 one witness in the person of Alberto
Enriquez, who was one of the revenue examiners who conducted the investigation on the estate
tax case of the late Jose P. Fernandez. In the course of the direct examination of the witness, he
identified the following:
Documents/
Signatures BIR Record
1. Estate Tax Return prepared by
the BIR; p. 138
2. Signatures of Ma. Anabella
Abuloc and Alberto Enriquez,
Jr. appearing at the lower
Portion of Exh. "1"; -do3. Memorandum for the Commissioner,
dated July 19, 1991, prepared by
revenue examiners, Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc, Alberto S. Enriquez and
Raymund S. Gallardo; Reviewed by
Maximino V. Tagle pp. 143-144
4. Signature of Alberto S.
Enriquez appearing at the
lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do5. Signature of Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc appearing at the
lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do6. Signature of Raymund S.
Gallardo appearing at the
Lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do7. Signature of Maximino V.
Tagle also appearing on
p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do8. Summary of revenue
Enforcement Officers Audit
Report, dated July 19, 1991; p. 139
9. Signature of Alberto
Enriquez at the lower
portion of Exh. "3"; -do10. Signature of Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc at the lower
portion of Exh. "3"; -do11. Signature of Raymond S.
Gallardo at the lower

portion of Exh. "3"; -do12. Signature of Maximino

V. Tagle at the lower
portion of Exh. "3"; -do13. Demand letter (FAS-E-87-91-00),
signed by the Asst. Commissioner
for Collection for the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, demanding
payment of the amount of
P66,973,985.40; and p. 169
14. Assessment Notice FAS-E-87-91-00 pp. 169-170[22]
The CTA's Ruling
On June 17, 1997, the CTA denied the said petition for review. Citing this Court's ruling in Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals,
[23]
the CTA opined that the aforementioned pieces of evidence introduced by the BIR were admissible in evidence.
The CTA ratiocinated:
Although the above-mentioned documents were not formally offered as evidence for respondent, considering
that respondent has been declared to have waived the presentation thereof during the hearing on March 20,
1996, still they could be considered as evidence for respondent since they were properly identified during
the presentation of respondent's witness, whose testimony was duly recorded as part of the records of this
case. Besides, the documents marked as respondent's exhibits formed part of the BIR records of the case. [24]
Nevertheless, the CTA did not fully adopt the assessment made by the BIR and it came up with its own
computation of the deficiency estate tax, to wit:
Conjugal Real Property P 5,062,016.00
Conjugal Personal Prop. 33,021,999.93
Gross Conjugal Estate 38,084,015.93
Less: Deductions 26,250,000.00
Net Conjugal Estate P 11,834,015.93
Less: Share of Surviving Spouse 5,917,007.96
Net Share in Conjugal Estate P 5,917,007.96
Add: Capital/Paraphernal
Properties P44,652,813.66
Less: Capital/Paraphernal
Deductions 44,652,813.66
Net Taxable Estate P 50,569,821.62
============
Estate Tax Due P 29,935,342.97
Add: 25% Surcharge for Late Filing 7,483,835.74
Add: Penalties for-No notice of death 15.00
No CPA certificate 300.00
Total deficiency estate tax P 37,419,493.71
=============
exclusive of 20% interest from due date of its payment until full payment thereof
[Sec. 283 (b), Tax Code of 1987].[25]
Thus, the CTA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds the petition unmeritorious and denies the same.
Petitioner and/or the heirs of Jose P. Fernandez are hereby ordered to pay to respondent the amount
of P37,419,493.71 plus 20% interest from the due date of its payment until full payment thereof as estate
tax liability of the estate of Jose P. Fernandez who died on November 7, 1987.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Aggrieved, petitioner, on March 2, 1998, went to the CA via a petition for review. [27]

The CA's Ruling

On April 30, 1999, the CA affirmed the CTA's ruling. Adopting in full the CTA's findings, the CA ruled that the petitioner's act of
filing an estate tax return with the BIR and the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the BIR
Commissioner of her authority to re-examine or re-assess the said return filed on behalf of the Estate. [28]
On May 31, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [29] which the CA denied in its Resolution[30] dated November 3,
1999.
Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issues:
1.

Whether or not the admission of evidence which were not formally offered by the respondent BIR by
the Court of Tax Appeals which was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals is contrary to the Rules
of Court and rulings of this Honorable Court;

2. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals erred in recognizing/considering the
estate tax return prepared and filed by respondent BIR knowing that the probate court appointed
administrator of the estate of Jose P. Fernandez had previously filed one as in fact, BIR Certification
Clearance Nos. 2052 and 2053 had been issued in the estate's favor;
3. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the valid and
enforceable claims of creditors against the estate, as lawful deductions despite clear and convincing
evidence thereof; and
4. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals erred in validating erroneous double
imputation of values on the very same estate properties in the estate tax return it prepared and filed
which effectively bloated the estate's assets. [31]
The petitioner claims that in as much as the valid claims of creditors against the Estate are in excess of the gross
estate, no estate tax was due; that the lack of a formal offer of evidence is fatal to BIR's cause; that the doctrine laid
down in Vda. de Oate has already been abandoned in a long line of cases in which the Court held that evidence not
formally offered is without any weight or value; that Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence requiring a
formal offer of evidence is mandatory in character; that, while BIR's witness Alberto Enriquez (Alberto) in his
testimony before the CTA identified the pieces of evidence aforementioned such that the same were marked, BIR's
failure to formally offer said pieces of evidence and depriving petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine Alberto,
render the same inadmissible in evidence; that assuming arguendo that the ruling in Vda. de Oate is still applicable,
BIR failed to comply with the doctrine's requisites because the documents herein remained simply part of the BIR
records and were not duly incorporated in the court records; that the BIR failed to consider that although the actual
payments made to the Estate creditors were lower than their respective claims, such were compromise agreements
reached long after the Estate's liability had been settled by the filing of its estate tax return and the issuance of
BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053; and that the reckoning date of the claims against the Estate and the settlement
of the estate tax due should be at the time the estate tax return was filed by the judicial administrator and the
issuance of said BIR Certifications and not at the time the aforementioned Compromise Agreements were entered
into with the Estate's creditors.[32]
On the other hand, respondent counters that the documents, being part of the records of the case and duly identified in a
duly recorded testimony are considered evidence even if the same were not formally offered; that the filing of the estate tax
return by the Estate and the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the BIR of its authority to
examine the return and assess the estate tax; and that the factual findings of the CTA as affirmed by the CA may no longer be
reviewed by this Court via a petition for review.[33]

The Issues

There are two ultimate issues which require resolution in this case:
First. Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of the pieces of evidence which
were not formally offered by the BIR; and
Second. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the CTA in the latter's determination of the deficiency estate tax
imposed against the Estate.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed before it are litigated de
novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces

of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally
offered before the CTA. [34] Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oate, which reiterated this Court's previous rulings in People v.
Napat-a[35] and People v. Mate[36] on the admission and consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered
during the trial. Although in a long line of cases many of which were decided after Vda. de Oate, we held that courts
cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered, [37] nevertheless, petitioner cannot validly assume that
the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oate has already been abandoned. Recently, in Ramos v. Dizon,[38] this Court,
applying the said doctrine, ruled that the trial court judge therein committed no error when he admitted and
considered the respondents' exhibits in the resolution of the case, notwithstanding the fact that the same were not
formally offered. Likewise, in Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[39] the Court made
reference to said doctrine in resolving the issues therein. Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. De Oate still
subsists in this jurisdiction. In Vda. de Oate, we held that:
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered.
Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we had
the occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit.
We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an
exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to
formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses
to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People v. Mate [103 SCRA 484], we relaxed the foregoing
rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court
provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case .
[40]

From the foregoing declaration, however, it is clear that Vda. de Oate is merely an exception to the general
rule. Being an exception, it may be applied only when there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned
therein; otherwise, the general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should prevail.
In this case, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. The assailed pieces of evidence were presented
and marked during the trial particularly when Alberto took the witness stand. Alberto identified these pieces of
evidence in his direct testimony. [41] He was also subjected to cross-examination and re-cross examination by
petitioner.[42] But Albertos account and the exchanges between Alberto and petitioner did not sufficiently describe the
contents of the said pieces of evidence presented by the BIR. In fact, petitioner sought that the lead examiner, one
Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc, be summoned to testify, inasmuch as Alberto was incompetent to answer questions relative
to the working papers.[43] The lead examiner never testified. Moreover, while Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's
evidence was duly recorded, the BIR documents themselves were not incorporated in the records of the case.
A common fact threads through Vda. de Oate and Ramos that does not exist at all in the instant case. In the
aforementioned cases, the exhibits were marked at the pre-trial proceedings to warrant the pronouncement that the
same were duly incorporated in the records of the case. Thus, we held in Ramos:
In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits in question were
presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been incorporated into the
records. Further, Elpidio himself explained the contents of these exhibits when he was interrogated by respondents'
counsel...
xxxx
But what further defeats petitioner's cause on this issue is that respondents' exhibits were marked and admitted
during the pre-trial stage as shown by the Pre-Trial Order quoted earlier. [44]
While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, [45] as rules of procedure are not ends in
themselves and are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the BIR's evidence
is not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the
CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of BIR's claims against the Estate. [46] The BIR's failure to formally offer these
pieces of evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause. [47] Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not
even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the BIR.

Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its evidence [48] in the hearing of February 21, 1996, but
BIR'scounsel failed to appear.[49] The CTA denied petitioner's motion to consider BIR's presentation of evidence as
waived, with a warning to BIR that such presentation would be considered waived if BIR's evidence would not be
presented at the next hearing. Again, in the hearing of March 20, 1996, BIR's counsel failed to appear. [50] Thus, in its
Resolution[51] dated March 21, 1996, the CTA considered the BIR to have waived presentation of its evidence. In the
same Resolution, the parties were directed to file their respective memorandum. Petitioner complied but BIR failed to
do so.[52] In all of these proceedings, BIR was duly notified. Hence, in this case, we are constrained to apply our ruling
in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha:[53]
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the
purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing
parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court
will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the
formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period of
time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3)
months because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order
which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable ground to consider that
petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several
extensions of time to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost
five months to lapse before finally submitting it.Petitioners' failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of
evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice.
Having disposed of the foregoing procedural issue, we proceed to discuss the merits of the case.
Ordinarily, the CTA's findings, as affirmed by the CA, are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is shown that the lower courts committed gross error in the appreciation of facts. [54] In this case,
however, we find the decision of the CA affirming that of the CTA tainted with palpable error.
It is admitted that the claims of the Estate's aforementioned creditors have been condoned. As a mode of
extinguishing an obligation,[55] condonation or remission of debt[56] is defined as:
an act of liberality, by virtue of which, without receiving any equivalent, the creditor renounces the enforcement of
the obligation, which is extinguished in its entirety or in that part or aspect of the same to which the remission refers.
It is an essential characteristic of remission that it be gratuitous, that there is no equivalent received for the benefit
given; once such equivalent exists, the nature of the act changes. It may become dation in payment when the
creditor receives a thing different from that stipulated; or novation, when the object or principal conditions of the
obligation should be changed; or compromise, when the matter renounced is in litigation or dispute and in exchange
of some concession which the creditor receives. [57]
Verily, the second issue in this case involves the construction of Section 79 [58] of the National Internal Revenue
Code[59] (Tax Code) which provides for the allowable deductions from the gross estate of the decedent. The specific
question is whether the actual claims of the aforementioned creditors may be fully allowed as deductions from the
gross estate of Jose despite the fact that the said claims were reduced or condoned through compromise agreements
entered into by the Estate with its creditors.
Claims against the estate, as allowable deductions from the gross estate under Section 79 of the Tax Code, are
basically a reproduction of the deductions allowed under Section 89 (a) (1) (C) and (E) of Commonwealth Act No. 466
(CA 466), otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and which was the first codification of
Philippine tax laws.Philippine tax laws were, in turn, based on the federal tax laws of the United States. Thus,
pursuant to established rules of statutory construction, the decisions of American courts construing the federal tax
code are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of our own tax laws. [60]
It is noteworthy that even in the United States, there is some dispute as to whether the deductible amount for a claim
against the estate is fixed as of the decedent's death which is the general rule, or the same should be adjusted to
reflect post-death developments, such as where a settlement between the parties results in the reduction of the
amount actually paid.[61] On one hand, the U.S. court ruled that the appropriate deduction is the value that the claim
had at the date of the decedent's death. [62] Also, as held in Propstra v. U.S., [63] where a lien claimed against the estate
was certain and enforceable on the date of the decedent's death, the fact that the claimant subsequently settled for
lesser amount did not preclude the estate from deducting the entire amount of the claim for estate tax
purposes. These pronouncements essentially confirm the general principle that post-death developments are not
material in determining the amount of the deduction.
On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) opines that post-death settlement should be taken into
consideration and the claim should be allowed as a deduction only to the extent of the amount actually paid. [64] Recognizing
the dispute, the Service released Proposed Regulations in 2007 mandating that the deduction would be limited to the actual
amount paid.[65]

In announcing its agreement with Propstra,[66] the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held:
We are persuaded that the Ninth Circuit's decision...in Propstra correctly apply the Ithaca Trust date-of-death
valuation principle to enforceable claims against the estate. As we interpret Ithaca Trust, when the Supreme Court
announced the date-of-death valuation principle, it was making a judgment about the nature of the federal estate tax
specifically, that it is a tax imposed on the act of transferring property by will or intestacy and, because the act on
which the tax is levied occurs at a discrete time, i.e., the instance of death, the net value of the property transferred
should be ascertained, as nearly as possible, as of that time. This analysis supports broad application of the date-ofdeath valuation rule.[67]
We express our agreement with the date-of-death valuation rule, made pursuant to the ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States.[68] First. There is no law, nor do we discern any legislative intent in our tax
laws, which disregards the date-of-death valuation principle and particularly provides that post-death developments
must be considered in determining the net value of the estate. It bears emphasis that tax burdens are not to be
imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statute expressly and clearly imports, tax statutes being
construed strictissimi juris against the government.[69] Any doubt on whether a person, article or activity is taxable is
generally resolved against taxation. [70] Second. Such construction finds relevance and consistency in our Rules on
Special Proceedings wherein the term "claims" required to be presented against a decedent's estate is generally
construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in
his lifetime, or liability contracted by the deceased before his death.[71] Therefore, the claims existing at the time of
death are significant to, and should be made the basis of, the determination of allowable deductions.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the Resolution
dated November 3, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 46947 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue's deficiency estate tax assessment against the Estate of Jose P. Fernandez is hereby NULLIFIED.No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Dated January 20, 2000, rollo, pp. 8-20.
Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46947; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Presiding Justice Jesus M.
Elbinias (now retired) and Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (now retired), concurring; id. at 22-31.
[3]
Particularly docketed as CTA Case No. 5116; penned by Associate Judge Ramon O. De Veyra and concurred in by Presiding
Judge Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Judge Amancio Q. Saga; id. at 33-61.
[4]
This case was decided before the CTA was elevated by law to the same level as the CA by virtue of Republic Act (RA) No.
9282 otherwise known as "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Elevating its Rank to the Level
of a Collegiate Court with Special Jurisdiction and Enlarging its Membership, Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as The Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, and for other purposes, "
which was approved on March 30, 2004. Hence, upon its effectivity, decisions of the CTA are now appealable directly to the
Supreme Court.
[5]
BIR Records, pp. 1-88.
[6]
The said petition is entitled: In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Jose P. Fernandez, Carlos P. Fernandez,
Petitioner, particularly docketed as Special Proceedings No. 87-42980; BIR Record, pp. 107-108.
[7]
Id. at 126.
[8]
Id. at 184.
[9]
Id. at 183.
[10]
Id. at 182.
[1]
[2]

Id.
Rollo, p. 68.
[13]
Id. at 69.
[14]
Lists of Personal and Real Properties of Jose; id. at 70-73.
[15]
CTA Record, p. 102.
[16]
Rollo, p. 10.
[17]
BIR Records, p. 169.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id. at 171.
[20]
By then BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato; id. at 277-278.
[21]
CTA Records, pp. 1-7.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 37-40 (Emphasis supplied).
[23]
G.R. No. 116149, November 23, 1995, 250 SCRA 283, 287, citing People v. Napat-a, 179 SCRA 403 (1989) and People v.
Mate, 103 SCRA 484 (1981).
[24]
CTA Records, p. 148.
[25]
Id. at 166-167.
[11]
[12]

[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]

Id. at 167.
CA rollo, pp. 3-17.
Citing Section 16 of the 1993 National Internal Revenue Code.
Rollo, pp. 22-31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 114-115.
Id.
Respondent BIR's Memorandum dated October 16, 2000; id. at 140-144.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 153204, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 571, 588589.
[35]
Supra note 23.
[36]
Supra note 23.
[37]
Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 149589, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA
87; Ala-Martin v. Sultan, G.R. No. 117512, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 316, citing Ong v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 391
(1999), which further cited Candido v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 78, 82-83 (1996); Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA
438, 456 (1996); People v. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218, 226 (1994); Vda. De Alvarez vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 309, 317-318
(1994); andPeople v. Cario, et al., 165 SCRA 664, 671 (1988); See also De los Reyes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No.74768, August 11, 1989, 176 SCRA 394, 401-402 (1989) and People v. Mate, supra note 23, at 493.
[38]
G.R. No. 137247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 17, 30-31.
[39]
Supra note 29, at 91.
[40]
Underscoring supplied.
[41]
TSN, June 26, 1995.
[42]
TSN, July 12, 1995.
[43]
Id. at 42-49.
[44]
Supra note 29, at 31 and 34, citing Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprises v. Guiang, 168 SCRA 373, 379-380 (1988).
[45]
Calamba Steel Center, Inc. (formerly JS Steel Corporation) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 151857, April 28,
2005, 457 SCRA 482, 494.
[46]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Mining Corporation, supra note 28, at 593-594.
[47]
Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra note 29, at 90.
[48]
CTA Resolution dated January 19, 1996; CTA Records, p. 113-114.
[49]
CTA Records, p. 117.
[50]
Id. at 119.
[51]
Id. at 120.
[52]
CTA Order dated June 17, 1996, CTA Records, p. 138.
[53]
G.R. No. 155483, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 410, 416, citing Constantino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116018, November
13, 1996, 264 SCRA 59 (Other citations omitted; Emphasis supplied ).
[54]
Filinvest Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 146941,
August 9, 2007, 529 SCRA 605, 609-610, citing Carrara Marble Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 372 Phil. 322,
333-334 (1999) and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 562, 584 (1998).
[55]
Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation. (Emphasis ours.)
[56]
Article 1270 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1270. Condonation or remission is essentially gratuitous, and requires the acceptance by the obligor. It may be made
expressly or impliedly.
One and the other kind shall be subject to the rules which govern inofficious donations. Express condonation shall,
furthermore, comply with the forms of donation.
[57]
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1991 ed., p. 353, citing 8 Manresa
365.
[58]
SEC. 79. Computation of net estate and estate tax. For the purpose of the tax imposed in this Chapter, the value of the net
estate shall be determined:
(a) In the case of a citizen or resident of the Philippines, by deducting from the value of the gross estate
(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. Such amounts
(A) For funeral expenses in an amount equal to five per centum of the gross estate but in no case to exceed P50,000.00;
(B) For judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings;
(C) For claims against the estate; Provided, That at the time the indebtedness was incurred the debt instrument was duly
notarized and, if the loan was contracted within three years before the death of the decedent, the administrator or executor
shall submit a statement showing the disposition of the proceeds of the loan. (As amended by PD No. 1994)
(D) For claims of the deceased against insolvent persons where the value of decedent's interest therein is included in the
value of the gross estate; and
(E) For unpaid mortgages upon, or any indebtedness in respect to property, where the value of decedent's interest therein,
undiminished by such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate, but not including any income
taxes upon income received after the death of the decedent, or property taxes not accrued before his death, or any estate
tax. The deduction herein allowed in the case of claims against the estate, unpaid mortgages, or any indebtedness, shall
when founded upon a promise or agreement, be limited to the extent that they were contracted bona fide and for an
adequate and full reconsideration in money or money's worth. There shall also be deducted losses incurred during the
[34]

settlement of the estate arising from fires, storms, shipwreck, or other casualties, or from robbery, theft, or embezzlement,
when such losses are not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, and if at the time of the filing of the return such losses
have not been claimed as a deduction for income tax purposes in an income tax return, and provided that such losses were
incurred not later than last day for the payment of the estate tax as prescribed in subsection (a) of Section 84.
[59]
This refers to the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code, as amended which was effective at the time of Jose's death on
November 7, 1987.
[60]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123206, March 22, 2000, 328 SCRA 666, 676-677 (citations
omitted).
[61]
47B Corpus Juris Secundum, Internal Revenue 533.
[62]
Smith v. C.I.R., 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 909 (2001), aff'd 54 Fed. Appx. 413.
[63]
680 F.2d 1248.
[64]
47B Corpus Juris Secundum, Internal Revenue 524.
[65]
Prop. Treas. Reg. . 20.2053-1 (b) (1), published as REG-143316-03.
[66]
Supra note 63.
[67]
`Smith's Est. v. CIR, 198 F3d 515, 525 (5th Cir. 1999). See also O'Neal's Est. v. US, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (ND Ala. 2002).
[68]
279 U.S. 151, 49 S. Ct. 291, 73 L.Ed. 647 (1929).
[69]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The Court of Appeals, Central Vegetable Manufacturing Co., Inc., and the Court of Tax
Appeals, G.R. No. 107135, February 23, 1999, 303 SCRA 508, 516-517, citing Province of Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 299
SCRA 442 (1998); Republic v. IAC, 196 SCRA 335 (1991); CIR v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 148 SCRA 315 (1987); and CIR v. CA,
204 SCRA 182 (1991).
[70]
Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 591, 619.
[71]
Quirino v. Grospe, G.R. No. 58797, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 702, 704-705, citing Gabin v. Melliza, 84 Phil. 794, 796
(1949).

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123206. March 22, 2000]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and
JOSEFINA P. PAJONAR, as Administratrix of the Estate of Pedro P. Pajonar, respondents.
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Supr-ema
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the December 21, 1995 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. Sp.
No. 34399 affirming the June 7, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 4381 granting private respondent
Josefina P. Pajonar, as administratrix of the estate of Pedro P. Pajonar, a tax refund in the amount of P76,502.42, representing
erroneously paid estate taxes for the year 1988.
Pedro Pajonar, a member of the Philippine Scout, Bataan Contingent, during the second World War, was a part of the infamous
Death March by reason of which he suffered shock and became insane. His sister Josefina Pajonar became the guardian over
his person, while his property was placed under the guardianship of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) by the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, in Special Proceedings No. 1254. He died on January 10, 1988. He was survived by his
two brothers Isidro P. Pajonar and Gregorio Pajonar, his sister Josefina Pajonar, nephews Concordio Jandog and Mario Jandog
and niece Conchita Jandog.
On May 11, 1988, the PNB filed an accounting of the decedent's property under guardianship valued at P3,037,672.09 in
Special Proceedings No. 1254. However, the PNB did not file an estate tax return, instead it advised Pedro Pajonar's heirs to
execute an extrajudicial settlement and to pay the taxes on his estate. On April 5, 1988, pursuant to the assessment by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the estate of Pedro Pajonar paid taxes in the amount of P2,557.
On May 19, 1988, Josefina Pajonar filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City for the issuance in her favor
of letters of administration of the estate of her brother. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2399. On July 18,
1988, the trial court appointed Josefina Pajonar as the regular administratrix of Pedro Pajonar's estate.
On December 19, 1988, pursuant to a second assessment by the BIR for deficiency estate tax, the estate of Pedro Pajonar
paid estate tax in the amount of P1,527,790.98. Josefina Pajonar, in her capacity as administratrix and heir of Pedro Pajonar's
estate, filed a protest on January 11, 1989 with the BIR praying that the estate tax payment in the amount of P1,527,790.98,
or at least some portion of it, be returned to the heirs. [3] Jur-is
However, on August 15, 1989, without waiting for her protest to be resolved by the BIR, Josefina Pajonar filed a petition for
review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), praying for the refund of P1,527,790.98, or in the alternative, P840,202.06, as
erroneously paid estate tax.[4] The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 4381.

On May 6, 1993, the CTA ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund Josefina Pajonar the amount of
P252,585.59, representing erroneously paid estate tax for the year 1988. [5]
Among the deductions from the gross estate allowed by the CTA were the amounts of P60,753 representing the notarial fee
for the Extrajudicial Settlement and the amount of P50,000 as the attorney's fees in Special Proceedings No. 1254 for
guardianship.[6]Juri-ssc
On June 15, 1993, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a motion for reconsideration [7] of the CTA's May 6, 1993
decision asserting, among others, that the notarial fee for the Extrajudicial Settlement and the attorney's fees in the
guardianship proceedings are not deductible expenses.
On June 7, 1994, the CTA issued the assailed Resolution [8] ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund Josefina
Pajonar, as administratrix of the estate of Pedro Pajonar, the amount of P76,502.42 representing erroneously paid estate tax
for the year 1988. Also, the CTA upheld the validity of the deduction of the notarial fee for the Extrajudicial Settlement and
the attorney's fees in the guardianship proceedings.
On July 5, 1994, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the CTA's May 6,
1993 Decision and its June 7, 1994 Resolution, questioning the validity of the abovementioned deductions. On December 21,
1995, the Court of Appeals denied the Commissioner's petition. [9]
Hence, the present appeal by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The sole issue in this case involves the construction of section 79 [10] of the National Internal Revenue Code[11] (Tax Code) which
provides for the allowable deductions from the gross estate of the decedent. More particularly, the question is whether the
notarial fee paid for the extrajudicial settlement in the amount of P60,753 and the attorney's fees in the guardianship
proceedings in the amount of P50,000 may be allowed as deductions from the gross estate of decedent in order to arrive at
the value of the net estate.
We answer this question in the affirmative, thereby upholding the decisions of the appellate courts. J-jlex
In its May 6, 1993 Decision, the Court of Tax Appeals ruled thus:
Respondent maintains that only judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings are allowed
as a deduction to the gross estate. The amount of P60,753.00 is quite extraordinary for a mere notarial fee.
This Court adopts the view under American jurisprudence that expenses incurred in the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate should be allowed as a deduction from the gross estate. "There is no requirement of
formal administration. It is sufficient that the expense be a necessary contribution toward the settlement of
the case." [ 34 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 765; Nolledo, Bar Reviewer in Taxation, 10th Ed. (1990), p. 481 ]
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
The attorney's fees of P50,000.00, which were already incurred but not yet paid, refers to the guardianship
proceeding filed by PNB, as guardian over the ward of Pedro Pajonar, docketed as Special Proceeding No.
1254 in the RTC (Branch XXXI) of Dumaguete City. x x x
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
The guardianship proceeding had been terminated upon delivery of the residuary estate to the heirs entitled
thereto. Thereafter, PNB was discharged of any further responsibility.
Attorney's fees in order to be deductible from the gross estate must be essential to the collection of assets,
payment of debts or the distribution of the property to the persons entitled to it. The services for which the
fees are charged must relate to the proper settlement of the estate. [ 34 Am. Jur. 2d 767. ] In this case, the
guardianship proceeding was necessary for the distribution of the property of the late Pedro Pajonar to his
rightful heirs. Sc-juris
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
PNB was appointed as guardian over the assets of the late Pedro Pajonar, who, even at the time of his death,
was incompetent by reason of insanity. The expenses incurred in the guardianship proceeding was but a
necessary expense in the settlement of the decedent's estate. Therefore, the attorney's fee incurred in the
guardianship proceedings amounting to P50,000.00 is a reasonable and necessary business expense
deductible from the gross estate of the decedent.[12]

Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court of Tax Appeals modified its
previous ruling by reducing the refundable amount to P76,502.43 since it found that a deficiency interest should be imposed
and the compromise penalty excluded. [13] However, the tax court upheld its previous ruling regarding the legality of the
deductions It is significant to note that the inclusion of the estate tax law in the codification of all our national internal
revenue laws with the enactment of the National Internal Revenue Code in 1939 were copied from the
Federal Law of the United States. [UMALI, Reviewer in Taxation (1985), p. 285 ] The 1977 Tax Code,
promulgated by Presidential Decree No. 1158, effective June 3, 1977, reenacted substantially all the
provisions of the old law on estate and gift taxes, except the sections relating to the meaning of gross estate
and gift. [ Ibid, p. 286. ] Nc-mmis
In the United States, [a]dministrative expenses, executor's commissions and attorney's fees are considered
allowable deductions from the Gross Estate. Administrative expenses are limited to such expenses as are
actually and necessarily incurred in the administration of a decedent's estate. [PRENTICE-HALL, Federal Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes (1936), p. 120, 533. ] Necessary expenses of administration are such expenses as are
entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and for its management for purposes of
liquidation, payment of debts and distribution of the residue among the persons entitled thereto. [Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil. 124. ] They must be incurred for the settlement of the estate as a whole. [34
Am. Jur. 2d, p. 765. ] Thus, where there were no substantial community debts and it was unnecessary to
convert community property to cash, the only practical purpose of administration being the payment of
estate taxes, full deduction was allowed for attorney's fees and miscellaneous expenses charged wholly to
decedent's estate. [ Ibid., citing Estate of Helis, 26 T .C. 143 (A). ]
Petitioner stated in her protest filed with the BIR that "upon the death of the ward, the PNB, which was still
the guardian of the estate, (Annex 'Z' ), did not file an estate tax return; however, it advised the heirs to
execute an extrajudicial settlement, to pay taxes and to post a bond equal to the value of the estate, for
which the estate paid P59,341.40 for the premiums. (See Annex 'K')." [p. 17, CTA record. ] Therefore, it would
appear from the records of the case that the only practical purpose of settling the estate by means of an
extrajudicial settlement pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court was for the payment of taxes
and the distribution of the estate to the heirs. A fortiori, since our estate tax laws are of American origin, the
interpretation adopted by American Courts has some persuasive effect on the interpretation of our own
estate tax laws on the subject.
Anent the contention of respondent that the attorney's fees of P50,000.00 incurred in the guardianship
proceeding should not be deducted from the Gross Estate, We consider the same unmeritorious. Attorneys'
and guardians' fees incurred in a trustee's accounting of a taxable inter vivos trust attributable to the usual
issues involved in such an accounting was held to be proper deductions because these are expenses incurred
in terminating an inter vivos trust that was includible in the decedent's estate. (Prentice Hall, Federal Taxes
on Estate and Gift, p.120, 861] Attorney's fees are allowable deductions if incurred for the settlement of the
estate. It is noteworthy to point that PNB was appointed the guardian over the assets of the deceased.
Necessarily the assets of the deceased formed part of his gross estate. Accordingly, all expenses incurred in
relation to the estate of the deceased will be deductible for estate tax purposes provided these are
necessary and ordinary expenses for administration of the settlement of the estate. [14]
In upholding the June 7, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Appeals held that: Newmiso
2. Although the Tax Code specifies "judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings," there is
no reason why expenses incurred in the administration and settlement of an estate in extrajudicial
proceedings should not be allowed. However, deduction is limited to such administration expenses as are
actually and necessarily incurred in the collection of the assets of the estate, payment of the debts, and
distribution of the remainder among those entitled thereto. Such expenses may include executor's or
administrator's fees, attorney's fees, court fees and charges, appraiser's fees, clerk hire, costs of preserving
and distributing the estate and storing or maintaining it, brokerage fees or commissions for selling or
disposing of the estate, and the like. Deductible attorney's fees are those incurred by the executor or
administrator in the settlement of the estate or in defending or prosecuting claims against or due the estate.
(Estate and Gift Taxation in the Philippines, T. P. Matic, Jr., 1981 Edition, p. 176 ).
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
It is clear then that the extrajudicial settlement was for the purpose of payment of taxes and the distribution
of the estate to the heirs. The execution of the extrajudicial settlement necessitated the notarization of the
same. Hence the Contract of Legal Services of March 28, 1988 entered into between respondent Josefina
Pajonar and counsel was presented in evidence for the purpose of showing that the amount of P60,753.00
was for the notarization of the Extrajudicial Settlement. It follows then that the notarial fee of P60,753.00
was incurred primarily to settle the estate of the deceased Pedro Pajonar. Said amount should then be
considered an administration expenses actually and necessarily incurred in the collection of the assets of the
estate, payment of debts and distribution of the remainder among those entitled thereto. Thus, the notarial

fee of P60,753 incurred for the Extrajudicial Settlement should be allowed as a deduction from the gross
estate.
3. Attorney's fees, on the other hand, in order to be deductible from the gross estate must be essential to the
settlement of the estate. Acctmis
The amount of P50,000.00 was incurred as attorney's fees in the guardianship proceedings in Spec. Proc. No.
1254. Petitioner contends that said amount are not expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings as
the guardianship proceeding was instituted during the lifetime of the decedent when there was yet no estate
to be settled.
Again , this contention must fail.
The guardianship proceeding in this case was necessary for the distribution of the property of the deceased
Pedro Pajonar. As correctly pointed out by respondent CTA, the PNB was appointed guardian over the assets
of the deceased, and that necessarily the assets of the deceased formed part of his gross estate. x x x
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
It is clear therefore that the attorney's fees incurred in the guardianship proceeding in Spec. Proc. No. 1254
were essential to the distribution of the property to the persons entitled thereto. Hence, the attorney's fees
incurred in the guardianship proceedings in the amount of P50,000.00 should be allowed as a deduction from
the gross estate of the decedent.[15]
The deductions from the gross estate permitted under section 79 of the Tax Code basically reproduced the deductions allowed
under Commonwealth Act No. 466 (CA 466), otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, [16] and which
was the first codification of Philippine tax laws. Section 89 (a) (1) (B) of CA 466 also provided for the deduction of the "judicial
expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings" for purposes of determining the value of the net estate. Philippine tax
laws were, in turn, based on the federal tax laws of the United States. [17] In accord with established rules of statutory
construction, the decisions of American courts construing the federal tax code are entitled to great weight in the
interpretation of our own tax laws.[18] Scc-alr
Judicial expenses are expenses of administration.[19] Administration expenses, as an allowable deduction from the gross estate
of the decedent for purposes of arriving at the value of the net estate, have been construed by the federal and state courts of
the United States to include all expenses "essential to the collection of the assets, payment of debts or the distribution of the
property to the persons entitled to it."[20] In other words, the expenses must be essential to the proper settlement of the
estate. Expenditures incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, devisees or legatees are not deductible. [21] This distinction
has been carried over to our jurisdiction. Thus, in Lorenzo v. Posadas[22] the Court construed the phrase "judicial expenses of
the testamentary or intestate proceedings" as not including the compensation paid to a trustee of the decedent's estate when
it appeared that such trustee was appointed for the purpose of managing the decedent's real estate for the benefit of the
testamentary heir. In another case, the Court disallowed the premiums paid on the bond filed by the administrator as an
expense of administration since the giving of a bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office, and not necessary in the
settlement of the estate. [23] Neither may attorney's fees incident to litigation incurred by the heirs in asserting their respective
rights be claimed as a deduction from the gross estate. [24]
Coming to the case at bar, the notarial fee paid for the extrajudicial settlement is clearly a deductible expense since such
settlement effected a distribution of Pedro Pajonar's estate to his lawful heirs. Similarly, the attorney's fees paid to PNB for
acting as the guardian of Pedro Pajonar's property during his lifetime should also be considered as a deductible administration
expense. PNB provided a detailed accounting of decedent's property and gave advice as to the proper settlement of the
latter's estate, acts which contributed towards the collection of decedent's assets and the subsequent settlement of the
estate.
We find that the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in affirming the questioned resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the December 21, 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The notarial fee for the extrajudicial
settlement and the attorney's fees in the guardianship proceedings are allowable deductions from the gross estate of Pedro
Pajonar.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur. Calrs-pped

Entitled "Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Josefina P. Pajonar, as Administratrix of the Estate of Pedro P. Pajonar, and
Court of Tax Appeals." Rollo, 35-46.
[2]
Eighth Division composed of J. Jaime M. Lantin, ponente; and JJ Eduardo G. Montenegro and Jose C. De la Rama, concurring.
[3]
CA Records, 45-53.
[4]
Ibid., 37-44.
[1]

[5]

The CTA made the following computations

Estate of Pedro P. Pajonar
Lagtangon, Siaton, Negros Oriental
Died January 10, 1998
I. Real
Properties
II.

P102,966.59
Personal Properties
a. Refrigerator

P7,500.00

b. Wall Clock, Esso Gasul Tables and

Chairs

3,090.00

c.Beddings, Stereo Cassette, TV,

Betamax

15,700.00

d. Karaoke, Electric Iron,

Fan,Transformer and Corner Set

7,400.00

e. Toyota Tamaraw

27,500.00

61,190.00

Additional Personal Properties:

f. Time Deposit-PNB

P200,000.00

g. Stocks and Bonds-PNB

201,232.37

h. Money Market

2,300,000.00

i. Cash Deposit

114,101.83

GROSS
ESTATE

P 2,979,490.79
Less: Deductions:

2,815,334.20

a. Funeral expenses

P50,000.00

b. Commission to Trustee (PNB)

18,335.93

c. Notarial Fee for the Extra-judicial

Settlement

60,753.00

d. Attorneys Fees in Special

Proceeding No. 1254 for guardianship 50,000.00
e.Filing Fees in Special Proceeding No.
2399
6,374.88
f.Publication of Notice to Creditors
September 7, 14 and 21, 1988 issues
of the Dumaguete Star Informer
600.00
g.Certification fee for Publication on
the Bulletin Board of the Municipal
Building of Siaton, Negros Oriental

2.00

h.Certification fee for Publication in

the Capitol

5.00

i.Certification fee for publication of

Notice to Creditors

5.00

186,075.81

NET ESTATE

2,793,414.98

Estate Tax Due

P1,277,762.39

Less: Estate Tax Paid:

CB Confirmation Receipt Nos.
.....B 14268064

P2,557.00

.....B 15517625

1,527,790.98

AMOUNT REFUNDABLE

1,530,347.98
P252,585.59

Rollo, 86-88.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

Ibid., 78-79, 81-83.

CA Records, 118-130.
Rollo, 47-56.
Ibid., 35-46.

SEC. 79 Computation of net estate and estate tax. For the purpose of the tax imposed in this Chapter, the value of the net
estate shall be determined:
[10]

(a).....In the case of a citizen or resident of the Philippines, by deducting from the value of the gross estate(1)..... Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. Such amounts(A).....For funeral expenses in an amount equal to five per centum of the gross estate but in no case to exceed P50,000.00;
(B).....For judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings;
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
[11]
This refers to the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. On the date of decedents death (January 10, 1988),
the latest amendment to the Tax Code was introduced by Executive Order No. 273, which became effective on January 1,
1988.
[12]
Rollo, 78-79, 81-83.
[13]

Estate tax Due

P1,277,762.39

Less : estate tax paid 04.05.88

........ [CBCR No. 14268054]

2,557.00

Deficiency estate tax

P1,275,205.39

Add: Additions to tax

........Interest on deficiency [Sec.
249 (b)]
........04.12.88 to 12.19.88
........(1,275,205.39 x 20% x
252/365)
176,083.16
Total deficiency tax

P1,451,288.55

Less: estate tax paid 12.19.88

........ (CBCR No. 15517625)

1,527,790.98

Amount Refundable

P76,502.43

Ibid., 54.
[14]
Ibid., 49-51.
[15]
Ibid., 43-45.
[16]
Approved on June 15, 1939.
[17]
Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil 655 (1947)
[18]
Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., 97 SCRA 734 (1980)

Lorenzo v. Posada, 64 Phil 353 (1937)

34A Am Jur 2d, Federal Taxation (1995), sec. 144, 288, citing Union Commerce Bank, trans, (1963) 39 TC 973, affd & revd
on other issues (1964, CA6) 339 F2d 163, 65-1 USTC p 12279, 15 AFTR 2d 1281.
[21]
Ibid., sec. 144,272, citing Bretzfelder, Charles, exr v. Com., (1936, CA2) 86 F2d 713, 36-2 USTC sec. 9548, 18 AFTR 653.
[22]
Lorenzo v. Posada, supra.
[23]
Sison vs. Teodoro, 100 Phil. 1055 (1957)
[24]
Johannes v. Imperial, 43 Phil 597 (1922)
[19]
[20]

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120880. June 5, 1997]

FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Government action is once again assailed as precipitate and unfair, suffering the
basic and oftly implored requisites of due process of law. Specifically, the petition assails the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31363, where the said court held:
"In view of all the foregoing, we rule that the deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment, are already final
and (u)nappealable -and- the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy resorted to by the government, sanctioned
by Section 213 and 218 of the National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and separate from the
other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not affected or precluded by the pendency of
any other tax remedies instituted by the government.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition for certiorari with prayer for
Restraining Order and Injunction.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, the matter of the settlement of his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are still unresolved, the
latter issue being now before this Court for resolution. Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the
decedent, questions the actuations of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue in assessing, and collecting through
the summary remedy of Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the estate and properties of his
father, despite the pendency of the proceedings on probate of the will of the late president, which is docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
10279 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156.
Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order on June 28, 1993, seeking to I. Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property dated February 22, 1993 and May 20, 1993, issued by respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
II. Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1993;
III. Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II (Collection Service), from proceeding with the Auction of the real
properties covered by Notices of Sale.
After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision [2] on November 29, 1994, ruling that
the deficiency assessments for estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and the estate of the deceased President
Marcos have already become final and unappealable, and may thus be enforced by the summary remedy of levying upon the
properties of the late President, as was done by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition for Certiorari with prayer for
Restraining Order and Injunction.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED."
Unperturbed, petitioner is now before us assailing the validity of the appellate court's decision, assigning the following as
errors:
A. RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SUMMARY TAX REMEDIES RESORTED TO BY THE
GOVERNMENT ARE NOT AFFECTED AND PRECLUDED BY THE PENDENCY OF THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE
OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WILL. TO THE CONTRARY, THIS PROBATE PROCEEDING PRECISELY PLACED ALL
PROPERTIES WHICH FORM PART OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ESTATE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS OF THE PROBATE COURT TO THE
EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
B. RESPONDENT COURT ARBITRARILY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY DECIDING THAT SINCE THE TAX ASSESSMENTS OF
PETITIONER AND HIS PARENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE, THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THE
MERITS OF THE GROUNDS CITED IN THE PETITION. INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE TAX ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY
BECOME FINAL, HOWEVER, PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO QUESTION THE UNLAWFUL MANNER AND METHOD IN WHICH TAX
COLLECTION IS SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED BY RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER AND DE GUZMAN. THUS, RESPONDENT COURT
SHOULD HAVE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED THE MERITS OF THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS IN THE PETITION:
(1) The Notices of Levy on Real Property were issued beyond the period provided in the Revenue Memorandum Circular
No. 38-68.
(2) [a] The numerous pending court cases questioning the late President's ownership or interests in several properties
(both personal and real) make the total value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due, incapable of exact
pecuniary determination at this time. Thus, respondents assessment of the estate tax and their issuance of the Notices
of Levy and Sale are premature, confiscatory and oppressive.
[b] Petitioner, as one of the late President's compulsory heirs, was never notified, much less served with copies of the
Notices of Levy, contrary to the mandate of Section 213 of the NIRC. As such, petitioner was never given an opportunity
to contest the Notices in violation of his right to due process of law.
C. ON ACCOUNT OF THE CLEAR MERIT OF THE PETITION, RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT IT
HAD NO POWER TO GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PETITIONER.SECTION 219 OF THE NIRC NOTWITHSTANDING, COURTS
POSSESS THE POWER TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER'S AND DE
GUZMAN'S ARBITRARY METHOD OF COLLECTING THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCY ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES BY MEANS OF LEVY.
The facts as found by the appellate court are undisputed, and are hereby adopted:
"On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.
On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities and
obligations of the late president, as well as that of his family, associates and "cronies". Said audit team concluded its
investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991. The investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written
notice of the death of the decedent, an estate tax returns [sic], as well as several income tax returns covering the years 1982
to 1986, -all in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos before the Regional Trial of Quezon City for violations
of Sections 82, 83 and 84 (has penalized under Sections 253 and 254 in relation to Section 252- a & b) of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the preparation and filing of the Estate Tax Return for the estate of the
late president, the Income Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos for the years 1985 to 1986, and the Income Tax Returns of
petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II for the years 1982 to 1985.
On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following: (1) Deficiency estate tax assessment no. FAC-2-89-91-002464 (against the
estate of the late president Ferdinand Marcos in the amount of P23,293,607,638.00 Pesos); (2) Deficiency income tax
assessment no. FAC-1-85-91-002452 and Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-86-91-002451 (against the Spouses
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the amounts of P149,551.70 and P184,009,737.40 representing deficiency income tax for the
years 1985 and 1986); (3) Deficiency income tax assessment nos. FAC-1-82-91-002460 to FAC-1-85-91-002463 (against
petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II in the amounts of P258.70 pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and P6,376.60
Pesos representing his deficiency income taxes for the years 1982 to 1985).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue avers that copies of the deficiency estate and income tax assessments were all
personally and constructively served on August 26, 1991 and September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos (through her

caretaker Mr. Martinez) at her last known address at No. 204 Ortega St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes 'D' and 'E' of the
Petition). Likewise, copies of the deficiency tax assessments issued against petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II were
also personally and constructively served upon him (through his caretaker) on September 12, 1991, at his last known address
at Don Mariano Marcos St. corner P. Guevarra St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes 'J' and 'J-1' of the Petition). Thereafter, Formal
Assessment notices were served on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs. Marcos c/o petitioner, at his office, House of
Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Quezon City. Moreover, a notice to Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her duly authorized
representative or counsel), to a conference, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean Antonio Coronel - but to no avail.
The deficiency tax assessments were not protested administratively, by Mrs. Marcos and the other heirs of the late president,
within 30 days from service of said assessments.
On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued twenty-two notices of levy on real property against certain parcels of
land owned by the Marcoses - to satisfy the alleged estate tax and deficiency income taxes of Spouses Marcos.
On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property were issued for the purpose of satisfying the deficiency income
taxes.
On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real property were again issued. The foregoing tax remedies were
resorted to pursuant to Sections 205 and 213 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty. Loreto Ata (counsel of herein petitioner) calling the attention of the
BIR and requesting that they be duly notified of any action taken by the BIR affecting the interest of their client Ferdinand
'Bongbong Marcos II, as well as the interest of the late president - copies of the aforesaid notices were served on April 7, 1993
and on June 10, 1993, upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and their counsel of record, 'De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello,
Guevarra and Serapio Law Office'.
Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26, 1993, at the lobby of the City Hall of Tacloban City. The public
auction for the sale of the eleven (11) parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993. There being no bidder, the lots were declared
forfeited in favor of the government.
On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction."
It has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the enforcement of tax laws and the collection of taxes, is
of paramount importance for the sustenance of government. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and should be
collected without unnecessary hindrance. However, such collection should be made in accordance with law as any
arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting
interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common
good, may be achieved."[3]
Whether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the said tax obligations were taken by the
respondent Bureau is now the subject of the Court's inquiry.
Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale of properties of the late President Marcos
effected by the BIR are null and void for disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due upon the
estate of the deceased. The case of Domingo vs. Garlitos [4] is specifically cited to bolster the argument that "the ordinary
procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased, person, as in an inheritance (estate)
tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the
amount therefor." This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and cannot be effected through any other means.
Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded from denying a request by the government for
the immediate payment of taxes, and should order the payment of the same only within the period fixed by the probate court
for the payment of all the debts of the decedent. In this regard, petitioner cites the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs.
The Administratrix of the Estate of Echarri (67 Phil 502), where it was held that:
"The case of Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Collector of Internal Revenue (52 Phil 803), relied upon by the
petitioner-appellant is good authority on the proposition that the court having control over the administration proceedings has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim presented by the government for taxes due and to order the administrator to pay the tax
should it find that the assessment was proper, and that the tax was legal, due and collectible. And the rule laid down in that
case must be understood in relation to the case of Collector of Customs vs. Haygood, supra., as to the procedure to be
followed in a given case by the government to effectuate the collection of the tax. Categorically stated, where during the
pendency of judicial administration over the estate of a deceased person a claim for taxes is presented by the government,
the court has the authority to order payment by the administrator; but, in the same way that it has authority to order
payment or satisfaction, it also has the negative authority to deny the same. While there are cases where courts are required
to perform certain duties mandatory and ministerial in character, the function of the court in a case of the present character
is not one of them; and here, the court cannot be an organism endowed withlatitude of judgment in one direction, and
converted into a mere mechanical contrivance in another direction."

On the other hand, it is argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to collect internal revenue taxes is paramount. Thus,
the pendency of probate proceedings over the estate of the deceased does not preclude the assessment and collection,
through summary remedies, of estate taxes over the same. According to the respondent, claims for payment of estate and
income taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be presented in the form of a claim against the
estate. These can and should be paid immediately. The probate court is not the government agency to decide whether an
estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes. Well-settled is the rule that the probate court is a court with special and
limited jurisdiction.
Concededly, the authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over
estate of deceased individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective, cannot be
treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by the very parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of
properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; [5]to determine who are the heirs of the
decedent;[6] the recognition of a natural child; [7] the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; [8] the
legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; [9] and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights. [10]
The pivotal question the court is tasked to resolve refers to the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect by
the summary remedy of levying upon, and sale of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies, without the
cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the supposed will of the deceased.
The nature of the process of estate tax collection has been described as follows:
"Strictly speaking, the assessment of an inheritance tax does not directly involve the administration of a decedent's estate,
although it may be viewed as an incident to the complete settlement of an estate, and, under some statutes, it is made the
duty of the probate court to make the amount of the inheritance tax a part of the final decree of distribution of the estate. It is
not against the property of decedent, nor is it a claim against the estate as such, but it is against the interest or property right
which the heir, legatee, devisee, etc., has in the property formerly held by decedent. Further, under some statutes, it has
been held that it is not a suit or controversy between the parties, nor is it an adversary proceeding between the state and the
person who owes the tax on the inheritance. However, under other statutes it has been held that the hearing and
determination of the cash value of the assets and the determination of the tax are adversary proceedings. The proceeding
has been held to be necessarily a proceeding in rem. [11]
In the Philippine experience, the enforcement and collection of estate tax, is executive in character, as the legislature
has seen it fit to ascribe this task to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Section 3 of the National Internal Revenue Code attests
to this:
"Sec. 3. Powers and duties of the Bureau.-The powers and duties of the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall comprehend the
assessment and collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures,
penalties, and fines connected therewith, including the execution of judgments in all cases decided in its favor by the Court of
Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts. Said Bureau shall also give effect to and administer the supervisory and police
power conferred to it by this Code or other laws."
Thus, it was in Vera vs. Fernandez [12] that the court recognized the liberal treatment of claims for taxes charged against
the estate of the decedent. Such taxes, we said, were exempted from the application of the statute of non-claims, and this is
justified by the necessity of government funding, immortalized in the maxim that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government. Vectigalia nervi sunt reipublicae - taxes are the sinews of the state.
"Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person, after administration is opened, need not be submitted to the
committee on claims in the ordinary course of administration. In the exercise of its control over the administrator, the court
may direct the payment of such taxes upon motion showing that the taxes have been assessed against the estate."
Such liberal treatment of internal revenue taxes in the probate proceedings extends so far, even to allowing the
enforcement of tax obligations against the heirs of the decedent, even after distribution of the estate's properties.
"Claims for taxes, whether assessed before or after the death of the deceased, can be collected from the heirs even after the
distribution of the properties of the decedent. They are exempted from the application of the statute of non-claims. The heirs
shall be liable therefor, in proportion to their share in the inheritance." [13]
"Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from
each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. Another remedy, pursuant to the lien
created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all property and rights to property belong to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax,
is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due the
estate. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)
From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the
deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes.It cannot therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau
erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it
was required to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws

that implies the necessity of the probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate taxes, before the
same can be enforced and collected.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement court which is bidden not to authorize the
executor or judicial administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested in the
estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This
provision disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which approves the assessment and collection of
the estate tax.
If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the estate taxes, this should have been pursued
through the proper administrative and judicial avenues provided for by law.
Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:
"Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment.-When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative finds
that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period to be prescribed by
implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the
Commissioner shall issue an assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and
manner as may be prescribed by implementing regulations within (30) days from receipt of the assessment; otherwise, the
assessment shall become final and unappealable.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or corporation adversely affected by the decision on the
protest may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision; otherwise, the decision
shall become final, executory and demandable. (As inserted by P.D. 1773)"
Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time required for the filing of the same, petitioner, and
the other heirs never questioned the assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse into finality, and prompting
the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon the properties left by President Marcos.
Petitioner submits, however, that "while the assessment of taxes may have been validly undertaken by the Government,
collection thereof may have been done in violation of the law. Thus, the manner and method in which the latter is enforced
may be questioned separately, and irrespective of the finality of the former, because the Government does not have the
unbridled discretion to enforce collection without regard to the clear provision of law." [14]
Petitioner specifically points out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-68, implementing Sections 318 and 324 of
the old tax code (Republic Act 5203), the BIR's Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties, were issued beyond the allowed
period, and are therefore null and void:
"...the Notices of Levy on Real Property (Annexes 0 to NN of Annex C of this Petition) in satisfaction of said assessments were
still issued by respondents well beyond the period mandated in Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68. These Notices of
Levy were issued only on 22 February 1993 and 20 May 1993 when at least seventeen (17) months had already lapsed from
the last service of tax assessment on 12 September 1991.As no notices of distraint of personal property were first issued by
respondents, the latter should have complied with Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68 and issued these Notices of Levy
not earlier than three (3) months nor later than six (6) months from 12 September 1991. In accordance with the Circular,
respondents only had until 12 March 1992 (the last day of the sixth month) within which to issue these Notices of Levy.The
Notices of Levy, having been issued beyond the period allowed by law, are thus void and of no effect." [15]
We hold otherwise. The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued within the prescriptive period and in accordance
with the provisions of the present Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become final, executory, and
demandable, the same can now be collected through the summary remedy of distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the
NIRC.
The applicable provision in regard to the prescriptive period for the assessment and collection of tax deficiency in this
instance is Article 223 of the NIRC, which pertinently provides:
"Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of assessment and collection of taxes.- (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent
return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the
collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity,
fraud, or omission: Provided, That, in a fraud assessment which has become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be
judicially taken cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof.
xxx
(c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of limitation above prescribed, may be collected by
distraint or levy or by a proceeding in court within three years following the assessment of the tax.
xxx

The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to contest or appeal the assessment made by the
BIR is fatal to the petitioner's cause, as under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return, the tax may be
assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and any tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real
property within three years following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment had become final and
unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is now no reason why
the BIR cannot continue with the collection of the said tax. Any objection against the assessment should have been pursued
following the avenue paved in Section 229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of internal revenue taxes.
Petitioner further argues that "the numerous pending court cases questioning the late president's ownership or interests
in several properties (both real and personal) make the total value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due,
incapable of exact pecuniary determination at this time. Thus, respondents' assessment of the estate tax and their issuance
of the Notices of Levy and sale are premature and oppressive." He points out the pendency of Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos.
0001-0034 and 0141, which were filed by the government to question the ownership and interests of the late President in real
and personal properties located within and outside the Philippines. Petitioner, however, omits to allege whether the properties
levied upon by the BIR in the collection of estate taxes upon the decedent's estate were among those involved in the said
cases pending in the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the court is at a loss as to how these cases are relevant to the matter at
issue. The mere fact that the decedent has pending cases involving ill-gotten wealth does not affect the enforcement of tax
assessments over the properties indubitably included in his estate.
Petitioner also expresses his reservation as to the propriety of the BIR's total assessment of P23,292,607,638.00, stating
that this amount deviates from the findings of the Department of Justice's Panel of Prosecutors as per its resolution of 20
September 1991. Allegedly, this is clear evidence of the uncertainty on the part of the Government as to the total value of the
estate of the late President.
This is, to our mind, the petitioner's last ditch effort to assail the assessment of estate tax which had already become
final and unappealable.
It is not the Department of Justice which is the government agency tasked to determine the amount of taxes due upon
the subject estate, but the Bureau of Internal Revenue [16] whose determinations and assessments are presumed correct and
made in good faith.[17] The taxpayer has the duty of proving otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the
performance of official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. Even an assessment based on estimates is prima
facie valid and lawful where it does not appear to have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously.The burden of proof is upon
the complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is erroneous. Failure to present proof of error in the assessment
will justify the judicial affirmance of said assessment. [18] In this instance, petitioner has not pointed out one single provision in
the Memorandum of the Special Audit Team which gave rise to the questioned assessment, which bears a trace of
falsity. Indeed, the petitioner's attack on the assessment bears mainly on the alleged improbable and unconscionable amount
of the taxes charged. But mere rhetoric cannot supply the basis for the charge of impropriety of the assessments made.
Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised, considering the ample remedies afforded the
taxpayer by the Tax Code, with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described earlier, and cannot
be raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the pretext of grave abuse of discretion. The course of action taken by the
petitioner reflects his disregard or even repugnance of the established institutions for governance in the scheme of a wellordered society. The subject tax assessments having become final, executory and enforceable, the same can no longer be
contested by means of a disguised protest. In the main, Certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a lost appeal or
remedy.[19] This judicial policy becomes more pronounced in view of the absence of sufficient attack against the actuations of
government.
On the matter of sufficiency of service of Notices of Assessment to the petitioner, we find the respondent appellate
court's pronouncements sound and resilient to petitioner's attacks.
"Anent grounds 3(b) and (B) - both alleging/claiming lack of notice - We find, after considering the facts and circumstances, as
well as evidences, that there was sufficient, constructive and/or actual notice of assessments, levy and sale, sent to herein
petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos as well as to his mother Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
Even if we are to rule out the notices of assessments personally given to the caretaker of Mrs. Marcos at the latter's last
known address, on August 26, 1991 and September 12, 1991, as well as the notices of assessmentpersonally given to the
caretaker of petitioner also at his last known address on September 12, 1991 - the subsequent notices given thereafter could
no longer be ignored as they were sent at a time when petitioner was already here in the Philippines, and at a place where
said notices would surely be called to petitioner's attention, and received by responsible persons of sufficient age and
discretion.
Thus, on October 20, 1992, formal assessment notices were served upon Mrs. Marcos c/o the petitioner, at his office, House of
Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Q.C. (Annexes "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-3"; pp. 207-210, Comment/Memorandum of
OSG). Moreover, a notice to taxpayer dated October 8, 1992 inviting Mrs. Marcos to a conference relative to her tax liabilities,
was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos - Dean Antonio Coronel (Annex "B", p. 211, ibid). Thereafter, copies of Notices were
also served upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner and their counsel "De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio
Law Office", on April 7, 1993 and June 10, 1993. Despite all of these Notices, petitioner never lifted a finger to protest the
assessments, (upon which the Levy and sale of properties were based), nor appealed the same to the Court of Tax Appeals.
There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner (and his mother) and it appearing that petitioner continuously
ignored said Notices despite several opportunities given him to file a protest and to thereafter appeal to the Court of Tax

Appeals, - the tax assessments subject of this case, upon which the levy and sale of properties were based, could no longer
be contested (directly or indirectly) via this instant petition for certiorari."[20]
Petitioner argues that all the questioned Notices of Levy, however, must be nullified for having been issued without
validly serving copies thereof to the petitioner. As a mandatory heir of the decedent, petitioner avers that he has an interest
in the subject estate, and notices of levy upon its properties should have been served upon him.
We do not agree. In the case of notices of levy issued to satisfy the delinquent estate tax, the delinquent taxpayer is the
Estate of the decedent, and not necessarily, and exclusively, the petitioner as heir of the deceased. In the same vein, in the
matter of income tax delinquency of the late president and his spouse, petitioner is not the taxpayer liable. Thus, it follows
that service of notices of levy in satisfaction of these tax delinquencies upon the petitioner is not required by law, as under
Section 213 of the NIRC, which pertinently states:
"xxx
...Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate a description of the property upon which levy is made. At the same
time, written notice of the levy shall be mailed to or served upon the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
property is located and upon the delinquent taxpayer, or if he be absent from the Philippines, to his agent or the manager of
the business in respect to which the liability arose, or if there be none, to the occupant of the property in question.
xxx"
The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants of distraint and levy of sale were furnished the
counsel of petitioner on April 7, 1993, and June 10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his office at the
Batasang Pambansa.[21] We cannot therefore, countenance petitioner's insistence that he was denied due process. Where
there was an opportunity to raise objections to government action, and such opportunity was disregarded, for no justifiable
reason, the party claiming oppression then becomes the oppressor of the orderly functions of government. He who comes to
court must come with clean hands. Otherwise, he not only taints his name, but ridicules the very structure of established
authority.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the present petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22734

September 15, 1967

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL B. PINEDA, as one of the heirs of deceased ATANASIO PINEDA, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Manuel B. Pineda for and in his own behalf as respondent.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

On May 23, 1945 Atanasio Pineda died, survived by his wife, Felicisima Bagtas, and 15 children, the eldest of whom is Manuel
B. Pineda, a lawyer. Estate proceedings were had in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 71129) wherein the
surviving widow was appointed administratrix. The estate was divided among and awarded to the heirs and the proceedings
terminated on June 8, 1948. Manuel B. Pineda's share amounted to about P2,500.00.
After the estate proceedings were closed, the Bureau of Internal Revenue investigated the income tax liability of the estate
for the years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 and it found that the corresponding income tax returns were not filed. Thereupon,
the representative of the Collector of Internal Revenue filed said returns for the estate on the basis of information and data
obtained from the aforesaid estate proceedings and issued an assessment for the following:
1. Deficiency income tax

194
P135.83
5
194
436.95
6
194
1,206.91
7
Add: 5% surcharge
1% monthly interest from
November 30, 1953 to April
15, 1957
Compromise for late filing
Compromise for late payment
Total amount due

2. Additional residence tax for 1945

3. Real Estate dealer's tax for the
fourth quarter of 1946 and the
whole year of 1947

P1,779.69
88.98

720.77
80.00
40.00
P2,707.44
========
===
P14.50
========
===
P207.50
========
===

Manuel B. Pineda, who received the assessment, contested the same. Subsequently, he appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals
alleging that he was appealing "only that proportionate part or portion pertaining to him as one of the heirs."
After hearing the parties, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Commissioner on the
ground that his right to assess and collect the tax has prescribed. The Commissioner appealed and this Court affirmed the
findings of the Tax Court in respect to the assessment for income tax for the year 1947 but held that the right to assess and
collect the taxes for 1945 and 1946 has not prescribed. For 1945 and 1946 the returns were filed on August 24, 1953;
assessments for both taxable years were made within five years therefrom or on October 19, 1953; and the action to collect
the tax was filed within five years from the latter date, on August 7, 1957. For taxable year 1947, however, the return was
filed on March 1, 1948; the assessment was made on October 19, 1953, more than five years from the date the return was
filed; hence, the right to assess income tax for 1947 had prescribed. Accordingly, We remanded the case to the Tax Court for
further appropriate proceedings.1
In the Tax Court, the parties submitted the case for decision without additional evidence.
On November 29, 1963 the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment
corresponding to his share of the following taxes:
Deficiency income tax
1945

P135.8
3
436.95

1946
Real estate dealer's fixed
tax 4th quarter of 1946 P187.5
and whole year of 1947 0

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has appealed to Us and has proposed to hold Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment
of all the taxes found by the Tax Court to be due from the estate in the total amount of P760.28 instead of only for the amount
of taxes corresponding to his share in the estate.1awphl.nt
Manuel B. Pineda opposes the proposition on the ground that as an heir he is liable for unpaid income tax due the estate only
up to the extent of and in proportion to any share he received. He relies on Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Pamintuan2 where We held that "after the partition of an estate, heirs and distributees are liable individually for the payment
of all lawful outstanding claims against the estate in proportion to the amount or value of the property they have respectively
received from the estate."
We hold that the Government can require Manuel B. Pineda to pay the full amount of the taxes assessed.
Pineda is liable for the assessment as an heir and as a holder-transferee of property belonging to the estate/taxpayer. As an
heir he is individually answerable for the part of the tax proportionate to the share he received from the inheritance. 3 His
liability, however, cannot exceed the amount of his share. 4

As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda is liable for he tax up to the amount of the property in his possession.
The reason is that the Government has a lien on the P2,500.00 received by him from the estate as his share in the
inheritance, for unpaid income taxes 4a for which said estate is liable, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 315 of the Tax
Code, which we quote hereunder:
If any person, corporation, partnership, joint-account (cuenta en participacion), association, or insurance company
liable to pay the income tax, neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in favor of
the Government of the Philippines from the time when the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue until paid with interest, penalties, and costs that may accrue in addition thereto upon all property and rights
to property belonging to the taxpayer: . . .
By virtue of such lien, the Government has the right to subject the property in Pineda's possession, i.e., the P2,500.00, to
satisfy the income tax assessment in the sum of P760.28. After such payment, Pineda will have a right of contribution from his
co-heirs,5 to achieve an adjustment of the proper share of each heir in the distributable estate.
All told, the Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from
each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. This remedy was adopted in Government
of the Philippine Islands v. Pamintuan, supra. In said case, the Government filed an action against all the heirs for the
collection of the tax. This action rests on the concept that hereditary property consists only of that part which remains after
the settlement of all lawful claims against the estate, for the settlement of which the entire estate is first liable. 6 The reason
why in case suit is filed against all the heirs the tax due from the estate is levied proportionately against them is to achieve
thereby two results: first, payment of the tax; and second, adjustment of the shares of each heir in the distributed estate
as lessened by the tax.
Another remedy, pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all property and rights to property
belonging to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir
or transferee to the payment of the tax due, the estate. This second remedy is the very avenue the Government took in this
case to collect the tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue should be given, in instances like the case at bar, the necessary
discretion to avail itself of the most expeditious way to collect the tax as may be envisioned in the particular provision of the
Tax Code above quoted, because taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability is an
imperious need.7 And as afore-stated in this case the suit seeks to achieve only one objective: payment of the tax. The
adjustment of the respective shares due to the heirs from the inheritance, as lessened by the tax, is left to await the suit for
contribution by the heir from whom the Government recovered said tax.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified. Manuel B. Pineda is hereby ordered to pay to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue the sum of P760.28 as deficiency income tax for 1945 and 1946, and real estate dealer's fixed tax for the
fourth quarter of 1946 and for the whole year 1947, without prejudice to his right of contribution for his co-heirs. No costs. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31364 March 30, 1979
MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and JAIME ARANETA, as Regional Director, Revenue
Region No. 14, Bureau of Internal Revenue, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, and FRANCIS A.
TONGOY, Administrator of the Estate of the late LUIS D. TONGOY respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Appeal from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V in Special Proceedings No. 7794, entitled:
"Intestate Estate of Luis D. Tongoy," the first dated July 29, 1969 dismissing the Motion for Allowance of Claim and for an
Order of Payment of Taxes by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines against the Estate of the late Luis D. Tongoy,
for deficiency income taxes for the years 1963 and 1964 of the decedent in the total amount of P3,254.80, inclusive 5%
surcharge, 1% monthly interest and compromise penalties, and the second, dated October 7, 1969, denying the Motion for
reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.

The Motion for allowance of claim and for payment of taxes dated May 28, 1969 was filed on June 3, 1969 in the
abovementioned special proceedings, (par. 3, Annex A, Petition, pp. 1920, Rollo). The claim represents the indebtedness to
the Government of the late Luis D. Tongoy for deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3,254.80 as above stated, covered
by Assessment Notices Nos. 11-50-29-1-11061-21-63 and 11-50-291-1 10875-64, to which motion was attached Proof of
Claim (Annex B, Petition, pp. 21-22, Rollo). The Administrator opposed the motion solely on the ground that the claim was
barred under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court (par. 4, Opposition to Motion for Allowance of Claim, pp. 23-24, Rollo).
Finding the opposition well-founded, the respondent Judge, Jose F. Fernandez, dismissed the motion for allowance of claim
filed by herein petitioner, Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in an order dated July 29, 1969 (Annex D,
Petition, p. 26, Rollo). On September 18, 1969, a motion for reconsideration was filed, of the order of July 29, 1969, but was
denied in an Order dated October 7, 1969.
Hence, this appeal on certiorari, petitioner assigning the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the claim for taxes by the government against the estate of Luis D.
Tongoy was filed beyond the period provided in Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the claim for taxes of the government was already barred under
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
which raise the sole issue of whether or not the statute of non-claims Section 5, Rule 86 of the New Rule of Court, bars claim
of the government for unpaid taxes, still within the period of limitation prescribed in Section 331 and 332 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Section 5, Rule 86, as invoked by the respondent Administrator in hid Oppositions to the Motion for Allowance of Claim, etc. of
the petitioners reads as follows:
All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in they
notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counter claims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where the executor or administrator
commence an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor
may set forth may answer the claims he has against the decedents, instead of presenting them
independently to the court has herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such
action; and in final judgment is rendered in favored of the decedent, the amount to determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim has been presented directly before the
court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent may be approved at their present
value.
A perusal of the aforequoted provisions shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligation of the decedent
created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of different character from the claims expressly enumerated therein, such as:
"all claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due or
contingent, all claim for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and judgment for money against
the decedent." Under the familiar rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to
operate, everything else must necessarily, and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, pp. 334-335).
In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Ilagan Electric & Ice Plant, et al., G.R. No. L-23081, December 30, 1969, it
was held that the assessment, collection and recovery of taxes, as well as the matter of prescription thereof are governed by
the provisions of the National Internal revenue Code, particularly Sections 331 and 332 thereof, and not by other provisions of
law. (See also Lim Tio, Dy Heng and Dee Jue vs. Court of Tax Appeals & Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-10681, March
29, 1958). Even without being specifically mentioned, the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court may
reasonably be presumed to have been also in the mind of the Court as not affecting the aforecited Section of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
In the case of Pineda vs. CFI of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, it was even more pointedly held that "taxes assessed against the estate
of a deceased person ... need not be submitted to the committee on claims in the ordinary course of administration. In the
exercise of its control over the administrator, the court may direct the payment of such taxes upon motion showing that the
taxes have been assessed against the estate." The abolition of the Committee on Claims does not alter the basic ruling laid
down giving exception to the claim for taxes from being filed as the other claims mentioned in the Rule should be filed before
the Court. Claims for taxes may be collected even after the distribution of the decedent's estate among his heirs who shall be
liable therefor in proportion of their share in the inheritance. (Government of the Philippines vs. Pamintuan, 55 Phil. 13).
The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from the
application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and
certain availability are imperious need. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, G. R. No. L-22734, September 15,
1967, 21 SCRA 105). Upon taxation depends the Government ability to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected.

To safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of government officials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be
allowed to bring harm or detriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons may be made to suffer individually
on account of his own negligence, the presumption being that they take good care of their personal affairs. This should not
hold true to government officials with respect to matters not of their own personal concern. This is the philosophy behind the
government's exception, as a general rule, from the operation of the principle of estoppel. (Republic vs. Caballero, L-27437,
September 30, 1977, 79 SCRA 177; Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, L-41001, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162; Sy vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, L-41480, April 30,1976, 70 SCRA
571; Balmaceda vs. Corominas & Co., Inc., 66 SCRA 553; Auyong Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110; Republic vs.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 66 SCRA 553; Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, L-18841, January
27, 1969, 26 SCRA 620; Zamora vs. Court of Tax Appeals, L-23272, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 77; E. Rodriguez, Inc. vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue, L- 23041, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 119.) As already shown, taxes may be collected even after the
distribution of the estate of the decedent among his heirs (Government of the Philippines vs. Pamintuan, supra; Pineda vs. CFI
of Tayabas,supra Clara Diluangco Palanca vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No. L-16661, January 31, 1962).
Furthermore, as held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, supra, citing the last paragraph of Section 315 of the
Tax Code payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the Government of the Philippines from the time the assessment
was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests, penalties, etc. By virtue of such lien, this court
held that the property of the estate already in the hands of an heir or transferee may be subject to the payment of the tax
due the estate. A fortiori before the inheritance has passed to the heirs, the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected,
even without its having been presented under Section 2 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It may truly be said that until the
property of the estate of the decedent has vested in the heirs, the decedent, represented by his estate, continues as if he
were still alive, subject to the payment of such taxes as would be collectible from the estate even after his death. Thus in the
case above cited, the income taxes sought to be collected were due from the estate, for the three years 1946, 1947 and 1948
following his death in May, 1945.
Even assuming arguendo that claims for taxes have to be filed within the time prescribed in Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, the claim in question may be filed even after the expiration of the time originally fixed therein, as may be gleaned from
the italicized portion of the Rule herein cited which reads:
Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. - In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court
shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor
less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an
order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time
previously limited the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be
flied within a time not exceeding one (1) month. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, petitioners filed an application (Motion for Allowance of Claim and for an Order of Payment of Taxes)
which, though filed after the expiration of the time previously limited but before an order of the distribution is entered, should
have been granted by the respondent court, in the absence of any valid ground, as none was shown, justifying denial of the
motion, specially considering that it was for allowance Of claim for taxes due from the estate, which in effect represents a
claim of the people at large, the only reason given for the denial that the claim was filed out of the previously limited period,
sustaining thereby private respondents' contention, erroneously as has been demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reverse. Since the Tax Commissioner's assessment in the total amount of P3,254.80
with 5 % surcharge and 1 % monthly interest as provided in the Tax Code is a final one and the respondent estate's sole
defense of prescription has been herein overruled, the Motion for Allowance of Claim is herein granted and respondent estate
is ordered to pay and discharge the same, subject only to the limitation of the interest collectible thereon as provided by the
Tax Code. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.