Adm. Case No.

1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant, vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

+.wph!1

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by

Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso
B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or
grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the
bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was
working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation, he became acquainted with
Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that
she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He
begot with her a son who was born on November
27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D).
Generoso came to know that Natividad's

marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or

undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on
December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married
Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage
was ratified in a religious ceremony held on
December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993
Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than
one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when
his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan
asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave
the house and take a vacation in his hometown,
Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never
returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her
husband. After much patient investigation and
surveillance, she discovered that he was living
and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment
located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao,
Quezon City. He had brought his car to that
place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as

husband and wife was corroborated by Linda

Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios
Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a
plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix
Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits,
Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by
their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that
Obusan introduced himself as the head of the
family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at
the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H).
Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came
to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified
five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where
respondent Obusan appeared as the man
wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship
with Natividad was terminated when he married
Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he
went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the
purpose of giving financial assistance to his son,
Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of
Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the

laundress and the plumber. He claims that they

were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not
live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at
Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was
constrained to leave the conjugal home because
he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their
violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal
home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and
San Andres Street) and her interference with his
professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the
Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for
disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did
not answer the complaint. He waived the
presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer
did not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that
the complainant has sustained the burden of
proof. She has proven his abandonment of her
and his adulterous relations with a married
woman separated from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the

evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly
immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and
resuming carnal relations with a former
paramour, a married woman, fails within "that
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs.
Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14,
1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he
abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child. He
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar
(Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His
name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

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Makasiar, Actg. C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero,

Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la

Fuente, JJ., concur.

VILLASANTA

April 30, 1957

In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for

Immorality, vs.HILARION M. PERALTA,
respondent.
Ramon J. Diaz for respondent.
PARAS, C. J.:
G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the
present complaint. Said case originated from a
criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance
of Cagayan by the complainant against the
respondent for a violation of Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code of which the respondent
was found guilty. The verdict, when appealed to
the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The appeal
by certiorari taken to this Court by the
respondent was dismissed for lack of merit.
The complaint seeks to disqualify the
respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate,

from being admitted to the bar. The basic facts

are the same as those found by the Court of
Appeals, to wit: On April 16, 1939, the
respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in
Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951,
he courted the complainant who fell in love with
him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the
respondent procured the preparation of a fake
marriage contract which was then a blank
document. He made her sign it on March 8,
1951. A week after, the document was brought
back by the respondent to the complainant,
signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil
Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two
witnesses. Since then the complainant and the
respondent lived together as husband and wife.
Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a
religious ratification of their marriage and on July
7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was
performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said
municipality. The priest no longer required the
production of a marriage license because of the
civil marriage contract shown to him. After the
ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila
as husband and wife and lived with some friends.
The complainant then discovered that the

respondent was previously married to someone

else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for
a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan
and the present complaint for immorality in this
court..
Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L9513 and the complaint, this Court is of the
opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in
the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The
act of respondent in contracting the second
marriage (even his act in making love to another
woman while his first wife is still alive and their
marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency, and morality.
Thus lacking the good moral character required
by the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby
declared disqualified from being admitted to the
bar. So ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia, and Felix JJ., concur.

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE vs. JORDAN TERRE
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, vs.ATTY. JORDAN
TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24
December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged
respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar
with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting
a second marriage and living with another woman other
than complainant, while his prior marriage with
complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the
complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5)

attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution

and of the complaint by moving from one place to

another, such that he could not be found nor reached

in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2
On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a
half, with still no answer from the respondent, the
Court noted respondent's success in evading service
of the complaint and the Court's Resolution and
thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty.
Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he
appears and/or files his answer to the complaint
against him" in the instantcase. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an
Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension
Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had
contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on
14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was
single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was
married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in
1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior
marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her
private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the
child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the
son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his
marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he
contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol,
Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason
Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted

that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as

evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical
resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained
that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the
PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla,
she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid
risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be
in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she
had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan
Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for
the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her
pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift
the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed
investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set
the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both
parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared
and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent
did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor

scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August

1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the
complainant; respondent once again did not appear
despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered
her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set

still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying

respondent to present his evidence with a warning
that should he fail once more to appear, the case
would be deemed submitted for resolution.
Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The
Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered
respondent to have waived his right to present
evidence and declared the case submitted for
resolution. The parties were given time to submit
their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy
did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did
not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this
Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the
complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and
testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met
for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school
classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986,
p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while
respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her
marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the
courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent]
moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their
education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum
University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent

continued courting her, this time with more persistence

(ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since
she was married but he [respondent] explained to her
that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her
first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by
his explanation and having secured favorable advice
from her mother andex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him
[respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license,
despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent]
wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to
court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were
married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of
Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp.
16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25,
1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their
married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared
in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to
the allowance the latter was getting from his parents
(ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his
disappearance until she found out later that respondent
married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn,
July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for
abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City
(ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch
II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No.
816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise
filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina
Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to exist
(Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally,

complainant filed an administrative case against

respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed
for being moot and academic when respondent was
considered automatically separated from the service for
having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant
Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted
marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares.
There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May
1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem
in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having
been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to
the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with
complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by
claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and
void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration
of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent
Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as
to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended

defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled

complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio
(Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each
other), she was free to contract a second marriage with
the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a
lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this
Court which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that

respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently
displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member
of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the
purpose and responsibility of his gender" because
marriage is a basic social institution. 9

assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken

belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold
Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second
marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and
criminal in character.

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of

moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims,
or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it
does not speak well of respondent's moral values.
Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic
social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was

deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As
noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior
marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that
she was still legally single and free to marry him. When
complainant and respondent had contracted their
marriage, respondent went through law school while
being supported by complainant, with some assistance
from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished
his law course and gotten complainant pregnant,
respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child
safely in a hospital.

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a

petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member

of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said
through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent

there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he

made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty
and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities while dangling before her the
mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon
as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage
a secret while continuing to demand money from
complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts

"indicative of a character not worthy of a member of

the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent
Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him
and supported him through law school, leaving her
without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in
contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem
while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre
was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission
to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this
error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR
respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be
spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan
Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this
resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts
of the land.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,

Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Resolution, 16 June 1992. Rollo, p. 6.
2 Three (3) attempts were made by registered mail: the
first two (2), at respondent's address at Abelardo Street,
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, and the third, at
respondent's employment address at Commission on
Audit, Cadiz City. Another attempt was made at
respondent's address at Bliss Project Daga, Cadig City,
through the assistance of the P.C. Command at Bacolod
City; and another at Lumbunao Calinog Sugar Mill, Iloilo
(Court's Resolution dated 24 April 1985, Rollo, p. 47).
3 Resolution, 24 April 1985. Rollo, p. 52.
4 Rollo, p. 53.
5 Id., p. 70.
6 In his Answer with Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift
Suspension Order, respondent Jordan Terre stated his
address as "c/o 4th Floor, PAIC Building, 105 Paseo de
Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila." Court papers sent to him
at that address were, however, returned unserved with
the notation "not known at given address" (Rollo, p. 63).
It thus appears that Jordan Terre once more submerged
to evade service of legal papers on him.
7 Rollo, p. 73.

8 Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615 (1970); Vda. de

Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 37
SCRA 316 (1971); Wiegel v. Hon. Alicia Sempio-Diy, etc.,
et al, 143 SCRA 499 (1986). This rule has been cast into
statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code (Executive
Order No. 209, dated 6 July 1987).
9 Arroyo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 96602 and
96715, 19 November 1991.
10 133 SCRA 309 (1984).
11 133 SCRA at 316. See also Cordova v. Cordova, 179
SCRA 680 (1989) and Laguitan v. Tinio, 179 SCRA 837
(1989).
12 16 SCRA 623 (1966).
13 16 SCRA 630.

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES,
complainant, vs.JUSTICE ONOFRE A.
VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Doubly distressing as the subject of

administrative recourse to this Court is the
present case where the cause celebre is a starcrossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists
are an incumbent and a retired member of the
Judiciary.
In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this
Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge
Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged
respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of
the Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and
grave misconduct. 1
After an answer 2 and a reply 3 were respectively
filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in its
Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to
refer the administrative case to Associate Justice
Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted

his Report to this Court, with the following
recommendation:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and
without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid

Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is

respectfully recommended that the respondent,
former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty
of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on
removal or suspension of attorneys, and
therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years, commencing
from the finality of the Decision in this case, with
a warning that a repetition of the same or any
other misconduct will be dealt with more
severely.
On the bases of the evidence adduced by the
parties, Justice Purisima summarized the
antecedent facts in his aforestated Report and
which we feel should be reproduced hereunder
so that his disposition of this case may be duly
appreciated:
Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch
108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while
respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a
consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime
Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President
Joseph E. Estrada.

Widowed by the death of her first husband,

Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced
Special Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein
obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo
Mijares presumptively dead, after an absence of
sixteen (16) years.
Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994,
she got married to respondent in a civil wedding
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.
Their marriage was the culmination of a long
engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when
respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal
Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a
murder case involving the death of a son of
Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a
close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14;
April 10, 1996). After the wedding, they received
their guests at a German restaurant in Makati.
With the reception over, the newlywed(s)
resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon of the same day,
respondent fetched complainant from her house

in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the

condominium unit of respondent two hours later
at which time, she answered the phone. At the
other end of the line was a woman offending her
with insulting remarks. Consternated,
complainant confronted respondent on the
identity of such caller but respondent simply
remarked "it would have been just a call at the
wrong number". What followed was a heated
exchange of harsh words, one word led to
another, to a point when respondent called
complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang
ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong
sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that
marriage contract and have it burned." Such
unbearable utterances of respondent left
complainant no choice but to leave in haste the
place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then,
the complainant and respondent have been living
separately because as complainant rationalized,
contrary to her expectation respondent never got
in touch with her and did not even bother to
apologize for what happened (TSN, p. 13, April
10, 1996.
Several months after that fateful encounter of

January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the

complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge
Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group,
that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the
marriage between former Justice Onofre A.
Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated
and impelled by the disheartening news,
complainant lost no time in gathering evidence
against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995
she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment
against him (Exh. "A").
On August 7, 1995, when she discovered
another incriminatory document against
respondent, the complainant executed against
respondent her "Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").
Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and
Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered
by complainant to prove that respondent
immorally and bigamously entered into a
marriage, and to show that the respondent
distorted the truth by stating his civil status as
SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This,
the respondent did, to lead an immoral and
indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to

distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also

presented for complainant were: Marriage
Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B");
Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo
Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and
Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who
solemnized the marriage between her
(complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F1").
Respondent gave a different version. According
to him, what he inked with the complainant on
January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham
marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in
fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract
marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge
Mijares in the administrative case for immorality
filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty.
Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993.
Respondent theorized that when his marriage
with complainant took place before Judge Myrna
Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Pea, his
first wife, was subsisting because the Decision
declaring the annulment of such marriage had
not yet become final and executory, for the
reason that said Decision was not yet published

as required by the Rules, the service of

summons upon Librada Pea having been made
by publication, and subject Decision was not yet
published. To this effect was the Certification by
Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of
Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Exh. "4").
After a thorough review of the records, the Court
finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein
respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct. He has made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
of demanding respect and dignity. 4 He himself
asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein
complainant, the decision of the court annulling his
marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yet
attained finality. Worse, four months after his
marriage to petitioner, respondent married another
woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a
false statement in his application for marriage license
that his previous marriage had been annulled.

Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to

petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not
justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage

was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense

which amazes and befuddles but does not
convince, it does not speak well of respondent's
sense of social propriety and moral values. This
is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman
nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former
Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and,
thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals who
cannot but have been fully aware of the
consequences of a marriage celebrated with all
the necessary legal requisites. 5
On this score, we rely once again on the
perceptive findings and discussion of
Investigating Justice Purisima which we quote
with approval:
That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly
and voluntarily entered into and signed a
Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge
Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite,
competent under the law to solemnize a civil
marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath
by respondent himself, he could not be forced to
do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996,
p. 15a).

That what complainant and respondent

contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by
law and the evidence. To be sure, all the
essential and formal requisites of a valid
marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family
Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting
parties, who must be a male and a female;
consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer; authority of the solemnizing
officer; a valid marriage license except in the
cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on
marriage, Family Code; and a marriage
ceremony with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer, and their
personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife, in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied
and complied with.
The theory of respondent that what (was)
solemnized with complainant was nothing but a
"sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve
serious consideration. According to respondent,
he entered into subject marriage in an effort to
save the complainant from the charge of
immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless

of the intention of respondent in saying "I do"

with complainant before a competent authority,
all ingredients of a valid marriage were present.
His consent thereto was freely given. Judge
Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to
solemnize the civil marriage, and both
contracting parties had the legal capacity to
contract such marriage.
Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the
Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the
criminal case of Bigamy against herein
respondent, and even assuming for the sake of
argument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 9367048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage
between respondent and Librada Pena had not
attained complete finality due to non publication
of said judgment in a newspaper of general
circulation; that circumstance, alone, only made
subject marriage voidable and did not
necessarily render the marriage between
complainant and respondent void.
Besides, as stressed upon by complainant,
respondent stated under oath that his marriage
with Librada Pena had been annulled by a
decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took

Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and

therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of
estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein
complainant as his wife by a second marriage,
his first marriage with Librada Pea was
subsisting and unannulled.
But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a
definitive findings as to whether or not
respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy
under the attendant facts and circumstances, a
crucial issue pending determination in Criminal
Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila
Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo
that what respondent contracted with
complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham"
marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible
conclusion is that what respondent
perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part
as a member of the Philippine Bar and as former
appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the
immorality charge against herein complainant in
the administrative case instituted against her by
Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded,
respondent was not justified in resorting to a
"sham" marriage to protect her (complainant)

from said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the

respondent is surely conversant with the legal
maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another
wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair
with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and
therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in
ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the
truth, respondent could have testified in her favor
in said administrative case, to assure all and
sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr.
complained of in said administrative case was
without any factual and legal basis.
In this only Christian country of the Far East,
society cherishes and protects the sanctity of
marriage and the family as a social institution.
Consequently, no one can make a mockery
thereof and perform a sham marriage with
impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the
sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of
the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense
of respondent that what was entered into by him
and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing
but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or
absolve him from liability for his gross
misconduct, nay sacrilege.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent

dismally fails to meet the standard of moral
fitness for continued membership in the legal
profession. The nature of the office of an attorney
at law requires that he shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the practice
of law; its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law. 6 Under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of
grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for
suspension or disbarment of lawyers. 7

However, considering that respondent is in the

declining years of his life; that his impulsive
conduct during some episodes of the
investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive
behavior probably ascribable to advanced age;
and the undeniable fact that he has rendered
some years of commendable service in the
Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would
be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case.
Hence, a suspension of two years, as
recommended, would suffice as a punitive but
compassionate disciplinary measure.

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former

Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral
conduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
effective upon notice hereof, with the specific
WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be
imposed should he commit the same or a similar
offense hereafter.

4 Pangan v. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 1053,

August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 1.
5 See Pomperada vs. Jochico, Bar Matter No.
68, November 21, 1984, 133 SCRA 309.
6 People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360,
January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 682.
7 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., J.J., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.

A.C. No. 389

February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant, vs.ARMANDO
PUNO, respondent.

Footnotes

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.Armando

Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

1 Rollo, 1-2.

REGALA, J.:

2 Ibid., 15-16.

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this

Court a verified complaint charging Armando
Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality
and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent

3 Ibid., 19-20.

denied all the material allegations of the

complaint, and as a special defense averred that
the allegations therein do not constitute grounds
for disbarment or suspension under section 25,
Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on
June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the then
Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the
complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented
evidence both oral and documentary. The
respondent, as well as his counsel, crossexamined the complainant's witnesses. The
respondent likewise testified. He denied having
sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver
Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the
handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in
the hotel register, and disowned Armando
Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a
complaint, formally charging respondent with
immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when
complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent

Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the

said respondent invited the complainant to attend
a movie but on their way the respondent told the
complainant that they take refreshment before
going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to
the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that
while at the restaurant on the first floor of the
said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to
complainant that they go to one of the rooms
upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting
married; that with reluctance and a feeling of
doubt engendered by love of respondent and the
respondent's promise of marriage, complainant
acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel
room respondent registered and signed the
registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after
registering at the hotel, respondent shoved
complainant inside the room; that as soon as
they were inside the room, someone locked the
door from outside and respondent proceeded to
the bed and undressed himself; that complainant
begged respondent not to molest her but
respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have
promised to marry you'; and respondent, still
noticing the reluctance of complainant to his
overtures of love, again assured complainant that

'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will

marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled
complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and
then placed himself on top of her and held her
hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when
respondent was already on top of complainant
the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual
intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until
7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the
hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together;
that after the sexual act with complainant on
June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to
have some more but complainant refused telling
that they had better wait until they were married;
that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1,
1958 and feeling that she was already on the
family way, complainant repeatedly implored
respondent to comply with his promise of
marriage but respondent refused to comply; that
on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to
a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal
knowledge with the complainant through a
promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and

has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a

conduct which shows that respondent is devoid
of the highest degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of and must be
possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of
the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on
respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he
answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again
denying that he took complainant to the Silver
Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage,
succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse
with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in
June, 1955, he and the complainant became
sweethearts until November, 1955, when they
broke off, following a quarrel. He left for
Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law.
Without stating in his answer that he had the
intention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be
dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on
July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor

Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the

complainant submitted the case for decision
without oral argument. There was no appearance
for the respondents.

the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2)

shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that
hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed
at 7:00 P.M.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in

his answer his intention to present additional
evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the
right to present such evidence (Toledo vs.
Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the
evidence produced before the Solicitor General
in his investigation, where respondent had an
opportunity to object to the evidence and crossexamine the witnesses, may now be considered
by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of
the Rules of Court.

Complainant also testified that she last saw

respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went
to Zamboanga City. When she learned that
respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she
sent him a telegram sometime in August of that
year telling him that she was in trouble. Again
she wrote him a letter in September and another
one in October of the same year, telling him that
she was pregnant and she requested him to
come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she
went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958,
where she met the respondent and asked him to
comply with his promise to marry her.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced

that the facts are as stated in the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having
been a public school teacher for a number of
years. She testified that respondent took her to
the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing
the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her
on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of

1wph1.t

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga

City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant
met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The
fact that complainant sent him a telegram and
letters was likewise admitted in respondent's
letter to the complainant dated November 3,
1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the
respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on

February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and
Children's Hospital. This is supported by a
certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by
the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a
certificate of admission of complainant to the
Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the
medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between
the respondent and the complainant was, the
latter testified that she gave money to the
respondent whenever he asked from her. This
was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca
a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's
letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows
that he used to ask for money from the
complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which
complainant was subjected by the respondent
himself failed to discredit complainant's
testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor
General, the respondent averred that he and
complainant were sweethearts up to November,

1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were

sweethearts in 1958 is established by the
testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the
complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's
letter to the complainant dated November 3,
1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony
(pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for
sexual intercourse because of respondent's
promise of marriage and not because of a desire
for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and
mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966)
.
One of the requirements for all applicants for
admission to the Bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character (Section 2,
Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section
2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition
precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon
the practice of law, it is essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of
the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case
No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44

Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by

evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show
proofs that he still maintains the highest degree
of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him. Respondent denied that he took
complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had
sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but
he did not present evidence to show where he
was on that date. In the case of United States vs.
Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for
the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to
himself if not to the State. If he does not perform
that duty he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to
meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly
indeed if he demand and expect that same full
and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable
effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly
so when he not only declines to help himself but

actively conceals from the State the very means

by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the
respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint
do not fall under any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of
the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled
rule that the statutory enumeration of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to
be taken as a limitation on the general power of
courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The
inherent powers of the court over its officers can
not be restricted. Times without number, our
Supreme Court held that an attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty
in his profession, but also for gross misconduct,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743;
Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January
28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm.
Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G.

627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral

conduct" is now one of the grounds for
suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule
138, Rules of Court).

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,

Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that

the respondent has committed a grossly immoral
act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and
learned profession of law must conform
themselves in accordance with the highest
standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

Adm. Case No. 481

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar

against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient
in either moral character or education. He should
strive at all times to uphold the honor and to
maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but the administration of
justice.

Respondent Arturo P. Lopez is sought to be

disbarred upon the ground of immorality.
Complainant Virginia C. Almirez, assisted by her
father Agapito Almirez, charges him with having
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her,
under promise of marriage, which he failed and
refused to fulfill, despite a child begotten in
consequence thereof.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby

disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

In his answer, respondent denied having ever

had or solicited any sexual relation with the
complainant, but affirmed that they had agreed to

February 28, 1969

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AGAINST

ARTURO P. LOPEZ. VIRGINIA C. ALMIREZ
assisted by her father, AGAPITO ALMIREZ
complainants, vs.ARTURO P. LOPEZ,
respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

be married as soon as he became financially

stable; that he could not carry out his part of the
agreement having discovered, on April 4, 1961,
that complainant was pregnant by another man;
and that she filed the present charges out of
spite for him, in view of his refusal to marry her.
Upon investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General, to whom the matter was referred, the
latter submitted his report finding respondent
guilty as charged, and then filed the
corresponding complaint for his disbarment.
In his answer thereto, respondent reiterated, in
effect, the allegations and defenses made and
set up in his previous answer. He, moreover,
averred that, while the matter was being
investigated in the Office of the Solicitor General,
complainant had filed an affidavit stating that he
(respondent) is not the father of her child and a
motion withdrawing her complaint.
Respondent having, moreover, expressed the
wish to introduce additional evidence, the Court
dated its Legal Officer-Investigator for the
reception thereof, after which the latter submitted
his report concurring in the findings of the

Solicitor General, although recommending

merely the suspension of respondent herein.
After furnishing him with a copy of this report, the
case was set for hearing, at which a
representative of the Solicitor General and
counsel for respondent appeared and were given
a period to file their respective memoranda in lieu
of oral argument.
The record shows that respondent was admitted
to the Philippine Bar in 1957 and has been
engaged in the practice of law in Manila. After
meeting the complainant then about 23 years of
age in Mauban, Quezon of which their
families are residents sometime in December,
1958, respondent courted her by
correspondence. Presently, they became
sweethearts. Complainant having come to Manila
in November, 1960 and operated therein a store,
in partnership with others, respondent used to
visit her. Although he had told the complainant,
as early as May 1960, of his intent to marry her, it
was understood that the wedding would take
place upon consummation of a given deal in
which he expected to make a big amount of
money. From November, 1960 to April, 1961,

they had carnal knowledge of each other, several

times, in various hotels in Manila, particularly the
Palo Alto Hotel, the Springfield Hotel, and the
Shanghai Hotel. On December 31, 1960,
complainant informed respondent that her
menstruation was overdue, whereupon he
caused her to be examined by a lady physician,
who found that she was in the family way.
Thereupon, he gave her some pills, to be taken
three (3) times a day, for the alleged purpose of
hastening the flow of her menstruation. Then, he
called her up, day and night, to inquire about her
menses and, when the same did not eventually
come, he urged her to see another lady doctor,
who could perform an abortion. Complainant was
averse thereto, but, respondent was so insistent
that she went to the clinic of said physician. The
operation was not performed, however, for
neither the latter nor complainant were agreeable
thereto. On August 22, 1961, complainant gave
birth to a baby boy, Francisco Arnold, at the
Maternity and Children's Hospital in Manila.
Prior thereto, or late in February, 1961, their
respective applications for a marriage license
were filed and their marriage license was issued

on March 13, but, the wedding, scheduled for

March 18, 1961, did not take place, owing to the
absence of the Mayor who was to solemnize it.
On April 6, 1961, complainant learned, from her
sister-in-law, that respondent had confided to the
latter his unwillingness to marry her
(complainant). When, soon thereafter,
complainant asked him for his reason therefor,
respondent blamed her for refusing to undergo
an abortion. Thereupon, or on April 18, 1961, she
filed the complaint herein.
It further appears that on September 25, 1962,
while this case was pending in the Office of the
Solicitor General a motion signed by the
complainant, withdrawing her complaint, was
filed with said office. The reason given was that
the complaint was "a result of serious
misunderstanding" and had been filed "in the
heat of anger" and that it would be unjustified to
proceed further on account of complainant's
belief in his innocence. This motion was,
however, withdrawn by her, on November 25,
1963, for the reason that respondent had
secured her signature thereto upon the
assurance that he would thereupon marry her

and that he did not only fail to do so, but, also,

married another woman. In fact, respondent and
one Evelyn Orense were married in January,
1963.
Upon the other hand, respondent would have us
believe that complainant had freely and
voluntarily signed her aforesaid motion to
withdraw her complaint. In fact, he added, she
made the affidavit, Exhibit 34, stating that he is
not the father of her child. In rebuttal,
complainant testified, however, that she signed
said motion and a blank sheet of paper, which is
now the affidavit Exhibit 34, he having convinced
her that they would be married soon thereafter.
lawphi1.nt

He, likewise, tried to prove, through his testimony

that it was complainant who asked him to take
her nightclubbing in Manila, which he did; that it
was she who asked him, at the Bayside
Nightclub, on December 31, 1960, to marry her;
that she reiterated this request in January, 1961,
for fear that her father may call her back to
Mauban; that she having brought up the same
subject in February, 1961, they signed the
necessary applications late in February, 1961,
and got the corresponding marriage license

sometime later, although the wedding, scheduled

for March 18, had to be postponed indefinitely
because of the absence of the officer, who was
to solemnize it; that after a drinking spree in
Manila, in the evening of April 4, 1961, he felt it
would be unwise for him to drive his car home to
Quezon City, in view of which he decided to
spend the night at the Shanghai Hotel; that while
there, he remembered having an appointment
with complainant, whom he, accordingly, called
by telephone to apologize to her and informed
her of his condition and whereabouts; that soon
later, complainant arrived unexpectedly at the
hotel and asked permission to sleep with him
there, stating that she had quarreled with her
sister-in-law; that after switching off the light and
undressing herself, complainant started
massaging his head, for he had a slight
headache; that as complainant kissed him, he
noticed that she was pregnant and told her so;
that after saying that she merely had a stomach
ache, complainant eventually confessed that
another man had abused her; that angered by
this revelation, respondent dressed up and
prepared to step out, but, before he left the hotel,
she asked his forgiveness and promised to

behave thereafter; that she went to his office, the

next day, but he refused to talk to her; that as
she insisted upon talking with him privately, they
went to an ice cream parlor where she begged
him to marry her and save her honor, suggesting
that their marriage would be in name only and
that they need not live together, if he did not want
to; that complainant even said that her father 1
would give P5,000 if he married her, but he
rejected the offer and volunteered to prosecute
the man responsible for her condition, if she
would identify him; and that, when respondent
still refused to marry her, complainant threatened
to bring disbarment proceedings against him.
Upon a review of the record, we agree with the
solicitor, who first investigated this case, and the
Legal Officer-Investigator, before whom
additional evidence were introduced, that
respondent's version is unworthy of credence.
Indeed, despite the averments in his answers to
the effect that he had never solicited or had
carnal relations with the complainant, his very
testimony shows that they had met in a hotel
room under conditions attesting to a condition of
intimacy clearly revealing past extra-marital

relations between them. Then, too, respondent's

promise to marry complainant has been, not only
admitted by him, but, also, bolstered up by their
applications for a marriage license and the
marriage license actually secured by them.
The breach of such promise on his part is thus
patent. What is more, when her pregnancy was
confirmed by a physician, respondent firstly
persuaded the complainant to take some pills for
the avowed purpose of hastening the flow of her
"menstruation", and, eventually, urged her to
have an abortion, to which she did not agree.
Worse still, when this case was pending in the
office of the Solicitor General, respondent
prevailed upon her to sign a motion withdrawing
her complaint, under the false allegation that he
is innocent of the charges preferred against him,
as well as to sign a blank sheet of paper
which now appears to be her aforementioned
affidavit Exhibit 34 under promise to
thereupon marry her, without the slightest
intention to keep it, because, instead he married
another woman soon later.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arturo P. Lopez is
hereby found guilty of gross immoral conduct

rendering him unfit to continue a member of the

Bar, 2 for which reason he is hereby barred from
the practice of law, and his name ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez,
Castro,
Fernando,
Capistrano,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

Complainant's mother had died in 1955.

In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567; Mortel v. Aspiras, 100

Phil. 586; Sarmiento v. Cui, Adm. Case No. 141,
March 29, 1957; Cabrera v. Agustin, 106 Phil.
256; Quingwa v. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, Feb.
28, 1967; In re Avancea Adm. Case No. 407,
Aug. 15, 1967; In re Flores, Adm. Case No. 546
Dec. 18, 1967.
2

A.C. No. 377

April 29, 1966

CONCEPCION BOLIVAR, complainant, vs.

ABELARDO SIMBOL Y MANUEL, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General for the

complainant.Valentino Castro for the respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Disbarment proceedings on moral grounds. This
Court referred the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Complainant, the sole witness at said
investigation, wound up her testimony on
September 4, 1959. Then followed several
postponements of hearing. The last was on
August 4, 1960.
There is a vacuum in the record as to what
happened thereafter. But on October 28, 1963,
the Solicitor General filed his report stating, inter
alia, that complainant made a sworn withdrawal
and desistance. In view of the facts found,
however, he recommended that respondent be
disciplined and simultaneously filed the
corresponding complaint1 asking for his
suspension "for a period of at least five (5) years.
On October 31, 1963, the Clerk of this Court sent
by registered mail to respondent, thru Atty.
Valentino G. Castro, his counsel of record, a

letter, with a copy of the foregoing complaint,

requiring answer thereto in 15 days.
On November 27, 1963, Castro wrote this Court:
In connection with the transmittal letter dated
October 31, 1963, addressed to Mr. Abelardo
Simbol, c/o the undersigned, ... please be
informed that since sometime in September or
October, 1960, after Miss Concepcion Bolivar
and Atty. Abelardo Simbol had executed a
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 01700
of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, the
undersigned ceased to hear from Atty. A. Simbol.
Notwithstanding this, upon receiving your said
letter of transmittal, I tried to get in touch with
Atty. A. Simbol at 1877-A Tayuman Street, Tondo,
Manila, which is the address appearing in my
files. I was, however, informed that Atty. A.
Simbol reportedly resides at 232 Maria Cristina
Street, Dumaguete City.
It is, therefore, respectfully requested that copy
of the complaint filed by the Hon. Solicitor
General, against Atty. Abelardo Simbol in Adm.
Case No. 377 be sent directly to said respondent
at 232 Maria Cristina Street, Dumaguete City. . . .

.
On December 6, 1963, a copy of the complaint
was sent by registered mail direct to Simbol at
232 Maria Cristina St., Dumaguete City. It was
returned to this Court with the notation on the
envelope that said respondent was no longer in
that city.
At the hearing set by this Court for February 3,
1964, Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo and Atty.
Tomas Yumul for complainant appeared. They
submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for
respondent.
1. The problem that at once projects itself is: Can
we proceed further on the face of the facts that:
first, there is no answer to the complaint of the
Solicitor General; and, second, at the hearing
before this Court neither respondent nor counsel
appeared? The controlling statute, Section 30,
Rule 138, Rules of Court, reads:
SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or
suspension.No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession,

until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable

notice to answer the charges against him, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be
heard by himself or counsel. But if upon
reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer
the accusation, the court may proceed to
determine the matter ex parte.
The pattern of behaviour pursued by respondent
requires articulation. Complainant's testimony
was completed on September 4, 1959. Then
followed a series of postponements: November
13, 1959; January 15, 1960; February 24, 1960;
April 4, 1960; May 9, 1960; July 1, 1960; August
4, 1960. In the interim, negotiations were had.
Result amicable settlement and complainant's
withdrawal and desistance.
That respondent did not take the trouble to
answer the Solicitor General's complaint is now
unimportant. The directive for him to answer was
first served on his lawyer. Then it was sent to him
personally at his address in Dumaguete City; but
the registered mail was unclaimed. Neither will
he profit by non-appearance on the date of
hearing before this Court (February 3, 1964).
Because, notice of hearing was sent to him at

both his Manila and Dumaguete addresses; and

he did not bother to get it from the post-office.
Even his two attorneys of record, who received
said notice, did not appear before this Court.
Respondent knew that the disbarment
proceedings were pending. His right to practice
his profession was at stake. He could ill afford to
just stand by and wait. It was his duty to inquire
as to his fate. He was hide-bound by his
obligation to inform this Court of his
whereabouts, to the end that notices could reach
him. In all these, he failed. On the face of the
environmental facts, respondent gave this Court
ample reason to believe that he purposedly
stayed away.
1wph1.t

We, accordingly, hold that respondent has had

full opportunity to defend himself, and that he has
waived his right to be heard.
In a previous case2 this Court has had occasion
to pass upon a similar question. There,
respondent and counsel, after a series of nonappearances and postponements at their behest,
failed to finally appear before the investigating
fiscal in Pangasinan. The fiscal rendered the

report on the merits finding respondent guilty of

malpractice and recommending that disbarment
charges be filed. The Solicitor General thereafter
lodged a formal complaint before this Court.
Notices sent by this Court directing respondent to
answer were all returned because he could not
be located at his given address, San Vicente,
Alcala, Pangasinan. His attorney of record was
also required to answer; instead, he asked that
he be relieved as counsel for respondent.
Counsel, however, appeared in oral argument.
This Court there held:
The respondent avoided attending the hearings
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan. Even in this Court, his whereabouts
are totally unknown. His knowledge that a
disbarment proceeding had been filed or pending
against him imposes upon the duty to make
himself or his presence available to this Court for
a fair trial. That he could not be located at his
known address without asking his whereabouts
known implies that he had chosen to waive every
right and opportunity to put up his defense.
2. The next point that logically crops up is the
weight to be accorded complainant's withdrawal

and desistance, made long after her testimony in

full had been taken down at the Solicitor
General's office. Reasons given: first, they
threshed out their differences; and, second, the
irreconciliability of religious beliefs alleged
caused the marriage plans to miscarry. The first
is correct. The second is at war with the proven
facts. Religious differences never did mar the
relations between the two. As the Solicitor
General pointedly remarked, "It is unbelievable
for a Filipino woman to refuse to marry a man
she had lived with for 3 or 4 years trusting in the
man's promise to marry on the ground of
irreconcilable religious belief", else she "would
not have complained if this were so". Indeed,
settlement of the case and the consequent
withdrawal obviously were part of an overall plan
calculated to purge respondent from mischief
and to insulate him from disciplinary action. To
conform to this arrangement is to wink at
wrongdoing.
This Court had heretofore ruled 3 that, "Any
person may bring to this Court's attention the
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually
be taken regardless of interest or lack of interest

of the complainant, if the facts proven so

warrant". The power to discipline lawyers
officers of court may not be cut short by a
compound of compromise and withdrawal of
charges.4
3. The preliminaries out of the way, we now go to
the core of the case. Here are the facts5:
Concepcion Bolivar was 27 years old at the time
she took the stand. Her schooling ended in sixth
grade. She testified in Tagalog. She became
acquainted with respondent in April, 1952. By
December following, respondent started to court
her. Convinced by his promise to marry, she
accepted him in February, 1953. By April 7, 1953,
the two lived as husband and wife. Respondent
had been "telling his classmates" that she "was
his wife". On April 22, 1957, they bore a child
baptized Eduardo Bolivar Simbol.
Came November 12, 1957. The two separated.
For, complainant learned from respondent's
brother-in-law, one Turing Mendoza, and others,
that respondent married another girl, Lydia
Lingat. Complainant investigated. At the Iglesia ni
Kristo and in the Local Civil Register of Angeles,

Pampanga, her worst fears were confirmed.

Respondent and Lydia Lingat were really married
in Angeles on January 5, 1957.
When the two first met, respondent was a jobless
first year law student. He remained jobless
during his student days. Since June, 1953,
complainant helped respondent in his studies,
gave him money to buy his books and to pay his
matriculation fees and for "other things he
needed in his studies". At one point in her
testimony complainant stated, "I had been
working nights (ang gabi ay ginagawang araw)
and even on Sundays and then afterwards he
made me suffer all kinds of embarrassments and
shame". Respondent became a member of the
bar, and found work in a law office. Yet, she
continued giving him money. She gave
respondent a total of around P8,000.00.
All along, respondent fed complainant with
assurances that he would marry her. To ward off
celebration of marriage respondent offered
varied excuses. There was a time when they
travelled to Angeles, Pampanga, ostensibly to
get married. The marriage was put off, so
respondent gave complainant to understand,

because there was nobody to solemnize. And

then, dangling a piece of paper, he told her that
the license had already expired. In early 1954,
respondent told complainant "to wait until he
finished his studies", anyway, they were
"practically husband and wife". Then he asked
her to hold the marriage till after delivery,
because "it was shameful to appear in church"
when she was "on the family way". The child was
born. Now, marriage became conditioned on his
securing a job for he was ashamed as
complainant "was spending for him". Came June
of 1957.6 Respondent informed complainant that
he secured a job as an assistant attorney in the
Fernandez Law office and that he would start
earning money. Never running out of
explanations, this time it was: "cases take long to
finish, but as soon as he earns thousands of
pesos he was going to marry me". Again she
agreed. When on cross-examination, she was
quiried why she accepted all the excuses inspite
of the birth of the child, she answered: "...
because he told me that now [that] we have a
child I can no longer deceive you because the
child is more than a mere marriage".

These avowals notwithstanding, respondent

turned around and married another. Adding insult
to injury, he concealed the fact of his marriage
and continued to live with complainant for several
more months until the latter discovered the bitter
truth. Even then, respondent had the temerity to
deny his marriage and to appease complainant
with the palaver that "the woman was not his wife
but the wife of his cousin".
In January of 1958, respondent kept asking
complainant to live with him again because he
was going to marry her and "leave his wife"; that
he "did not really love the girl he married". He
also asked for money. This met with rebuff.
Respondent got angry and threatened her.
And now, to the appropriate action. We part with
the premise that this Court has inherent
jurisdiction to suspend or disbar an attorney for
sufficient cause.7 On this point, the Solicitor
General aptly observed.8
Undoubtedly, respondent's actuations in making
a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and
allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities while dangling before her

the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl

as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping
his marriage a secret while continuing to demand
money from complainant, and trying to sponge
on her and persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter's discovery of his
perfidy, are indicative of a character not worthy of
a member of the bar. The fact that complainant
has withdrawn her complaint against respondent
does not wipe out the grievous offense he had
committed, making complainant and her child
with him virtual outcasts of society. This,
respondent should not be allowed to do with
impunity.
Respondent, we are persuaded to say, "has
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar". 9
He is, indeed, guilty of "grossly immoral conduct"
within the meaning of Section 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court. 10
In the light of the entire record, we vote to
suspend respondent Abelardo Simbol y Manuel
from the practice of law for a period of five (5)
years. 11 So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal
and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 139, Rules of Court.

Agdoma, et al. vs. Celestino, Administrative

Case No. 289, November 29, 1962.
2

Katalbas vs. Tupas, Administrative Case No.

382, April 30, 1959.
3

In re Davies, 39 American Reports, 729, 731,

where, in spite of the settlement had with the
offended party, the Court declared: "It is
contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that
this settlement operated as an absolution and
remission of his offense. This view of the case
ignores the fact that the exercise of the power is
not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies
between parties, but to protect the court and the
public against an attorney guilty of unworthy
practices in his profession. He had acted in clear
disregard of his duty as an attorney at the bar,
and without "good fidelity" to his client. The
4

public had rights which Mrs. Curtis could not thus

settle or destroy. The unworthy act had been fully
consummated. . . .".

April 27, 1963, citing: Mortel vs. Aspiras,

Administrative Case No. 141, March 29, 1957.
This ground was added to the original grounds
suspension or disbarment in section 25, Rule
127 of the 1940 Rules of Court.
10

Section 6 of Rule 139 provides: "SEC. 6.

Evidence produced before Solicitor General
available.The evidence produced before the
Solicitor General in his investigation may be
considered by the Supreme Court in the final
decision of the case, if the respondent had an
opportunity to object and cross-examine. . . .".
5

Here, complainant testified on direct examination

and on lengthy cross-examination by
respondent's counsel.
At this time, respondent was already married to
Lydia Lingat.
6

VI Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,

1968 ed,. p. 236, citing: Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S.
265, 27 L. ed., 552; In re Robinson, 19 Wall. 505,
22 L. ed., 205.
7

Report, pp. 6-7.

Toledo vs. Toledo, Administrative Case No. 266,

Cf. Cabrera vs. Agustin, Administrative Case

No. 225, September 30, 1959.
11

A.C. No. 376

April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs.ATTY.

ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on
January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong
charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a
member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly
committed on her person in the manner
described therein. Upon requirement of this
Court, the respondent filed his answer denying
all the allegations in the complaint and praying

that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959,

this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted
his report on the case with the recommendation
that the respondent "be permanently removed
from his office lawyer and his name be stricken
from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of
the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on
August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster
mother, left her alone in their house and went
down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about
1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing
clothes on the second floor of the house the
respondent entered and read a newspaper at her
back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one
hand and with the other hand dragged her to one
of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to
lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help
because he threatened her and her family with
death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor,
then had sexual intercourse with her after he
removed her panties and gave her hard blows on

the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance.

After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not
to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he
would kill her and all the members of her family.
She resumed ironing clothes after he left until
5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her
foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a
result of the sexual intercourse she became
pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2,
1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of
Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she
would have been heard by the neighbors that
she did not report the outrage to anyone because
of the threat made by the respondent; that she
still frequented the respondent's house after
August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone,
ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and
received his mail for him. Once, on November
14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza,
she was left alone with him in his house while her
aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy
medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of
August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that

he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of

March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on
August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of
Civil Service to follow up his appointment as
technical assistant in the office of the mayor of
Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the
administrative case against Buenaventura Perez
(pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960,
Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had
illicit relations with the complainant from January,
1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine
affair was discovered by the complainant's foster
parents, but to avoid criminal liability for
seduction, according to him, he limited himself to
kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue before she completed her eighteenth
birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse
on May 11, 1958, after she had reached
eighteen, and the second one week later, on May
18. The last intercourse took place before
Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had
sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her
house and sometimes in his house whenever
they had the opportunity. He intended to marry

her when she could legally contract marriage

without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case
occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask
permission to marry, for her foster parents will
object and even my common-law wife, will
object.' After the discovery of their relationship by
the complainant's foster parents, he confessed
the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to
have a child, something she (Briccia) could not
give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960).
x x x x x x x x x
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had
carnal knowledge of the complainant. The
complainant claims she surrendered to him
under circumstances of violence and intimidation,
but the undersigned are convinced that the
sexual intercourse was performed not once but
repeatedly and with her consent. From her
behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she
appears to have been more a sweetheart than of
the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....

But the foregoing observations notwithstanding,

the undersigned cannot in conscience
recommend respondent's exoneration. The
respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live
maritally with him not long after she and her
husband parted, and it is not improbable that the
spouses never reconciled because of him. His
own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more
than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with
her and on the convenient excuse that she,
Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he
seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of
age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a
child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was
accomplished with grave abuse of confidence
and by means of promises of marriage which he
knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to
the woman who forsook her husband so that he,
respondent, could have all of her. He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From
childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an
uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly
because he is the paramour of a sister of her
mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18
years old then), it is not difficult to see why she
could not resist him.

The evidence further shows that on July 22,

1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated
May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of
good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that
the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar
examinations to be given on the first Saturday of
August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may
fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral
character he represented himself to be. From
1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an
adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine
is a married woman and that her marriage still
subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him
from taking the bar examinations, and had it
been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he
would not have been permitted to take the bar
examinations that year or thereafter, or to take
his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then
permanently disqualified from admission to the
Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous
relations with a married woman, it is submitted
that the same misconduct should be sufficient
ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we

recognize a double standard of morality, one for

membership to the Philippine Bar and another for
disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
x x x x x x x x x
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully
recommend that after due hearing, respondent
Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from
his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken
from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his
investigation, that even if respondent did not
commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was
guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General
formulated another complaint which he
appended to his report, charging the respondent
of falsely and deliberately alleging in his
application for admission to the bar that he is a
person of good moral character; of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same
time maintaining illicit relations with the
complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia,
thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence

and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal

business of others, and praying that this Court
render judgment ordering "the permanent
removal of the respondent ... from his office as a
lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the
roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint,
respondent alleged the special defense that "the
complaint does not merit action", since the
causes of action in the said complaint are
different and foreign from the original cause of
action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the
necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule
128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed
that after due notice and hearing for additional
evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated
the Court Investigators to receive the additional
evidence. Accordingly the case was set for
hearing of which the parties were duly notified.
On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave
to submit a memorandum which was granted,
and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed,
alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape
has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction

was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act

of perjury or fraudulent concealment was
committed by the respondent when he filed his
petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the
respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of
the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation
of facts.
1wph1.t

At the hearing on November 16, 1961,

respondent presented his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband
(t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on
December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n.
23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong
were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross
(t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro
Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are

from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24).

Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them
(t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked
her about her status she told him she was 'single'
(t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then
told to stay at respondent's house, respondent
courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if
she was married and she told him 'we will talk
about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told
respondent she was married (to Arines) when
she and respondent were already living together
as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26).
Respondent asked her to marry him, when they
were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her
sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their
arrival thereat, but she did not go with her
because she and respondent 'had already a
good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27].
Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown
in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was
already reluctant to live with her and he told her it
was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25).
Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband
(Arines), who told her he had already a wife,
named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She
then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her

father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29).

Respondent eventually agreed that she live with
him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living
with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to
submit an affidavit at a later date, which request
was also granted. The affidavit was filed on
December 16, 1961, the respondent averring,
among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of
seduction against the complainant, because the
latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his
first sexual intercourse with her took place on
May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18
years of age; that he had been living with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20
years, but from the time he began courting her,
he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her
husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of
adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16,
1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by
her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia
alone in his house, who told him that her sister,
Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other

evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to

the present, he and Briccia had been living
together as common-law husband and wife; that
2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to
marry him, but she confessed she was already
married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was
still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive
Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the
place, nor could he urge her to join her sister
Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in
1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to
return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him
again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia
returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that
Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again,
telling him that she cannot separate from him
anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's
father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines)
had agreed not to molest them as in fact he
(Arines) was already living with another woman;
that he had 'no choice but to live with her'
(Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to
take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not
have the slightest intention to hide' from this
Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a
married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not

state said fact in his petition, because he did not

see in the form of the petition being used in 1954
that the fact must be stated; and that since his
birth, he thought and believed he was a man of
good moral character, and it was only from the
Solicitor General that he first learned he was not
so; and that he did not commit perjury or
fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition
to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of
the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a
report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used
his knowledge of the law to take advantage by
having illicit relations with complainant, knowing
as he did, that by committing immoral acts on
her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2)
Respondent committed gross immorality by
continuously cohabiting with a married woman
even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the
present; and 3) That respondent falsified the
truth as to his moral character in his petition to
take the 1954 bar examinations, being then
immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married
woman. The investigators also recommended

that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively,

be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of
which was served on respondent, through his
counsel of record, the case was set for hearing
before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent
asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of
oral argument. This was granted and the
corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the
respondent had sexual relations with the
complainant several times, and as a
consequence she bore him a child on June 2,
1959; and that he likewise continuously
cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous
manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit
relations with the complainant Josefina Royong
the and the open cohabitation with Briccia
Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient
grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable

for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations

with the complainant and his open cohabitation
with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because
he has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has
not been convicted of rape, seduction, or
adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon
which the disbarment proceedings is based are
not among those enumerated by Section 25,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer
may be disbarred. But it has already been held
that this enumeration is not exclusive and that
the power of the courts to exclude unfit and
unworthy members of the profession is inherent;
it is a necessary incident to the proper
administration of justice; it may be exercised
without any special statutory authority, and in all
proper cases unless positively prohibited by
statute; and the power may be exercised in any
manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair
trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1
Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing
In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well
settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme
Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may
provide that certain acts or conduct shall require

disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes

and rules merely regulate the power to disbar
instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or
rules) do not restrict the general powers of the
court over attorneys, who are its officers, and
that they may be removed for other than
statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United
States, where from our system of legal ethics is
derived, "the continued possession of a fair
private and professional character or a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance in the practice of law for one
who has been admitted, and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the
statutes do not specify that as a ground of
disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an
attorney may be disbarred may consist of
misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The
tendency of the decisions of this Court has been
toward the conclusion that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from office as a
lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed,
the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to
cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In
Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the

moral depravity of the respondent is most

apparent. His pretension that before complainant
completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained
from having sexual intercourse with her, so as
not to incur criminal liability, as he himself
declared and that he limited himself merely to
kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which
together with his knowledge of the law, he took
advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable
considering that the complainant was the niece
of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a
moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him
as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed:
"He also took advantage of his moral influence
over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him
'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the
paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering
her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her
inexperience and his moral ascendency over her,
it is not difficult to see why she could not resist
him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his
illicit relations with the complainant reveals the

respondent to be a person who would suffer no

moral compunction for his acts if the same could
be done without fear of criminal liability. He has,
by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the
moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although
unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient
grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we
have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez,
44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with
approval the following portion of the decision of
the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of
Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which
exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory
rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person of
good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to
enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem
to be equally essential during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So
it is held that an attorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his

profession, but also for gross misconduct not

connected with his professional duties, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his
office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit
and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We
cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so
would be as the Solicitor General puts it
recognizing "a double standard of morality, one
for membership to the Philippine Bar, and
another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's
adulterous relations and his simultaneous
seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do
not disqualify him from continuing with his office
of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring
moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for
admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and
close its eyes to the moral depravity and
character degeneration of the members of the
bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in

justifying his stand that even if he admittedly

committed fornication, this is no ground for
disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if
committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to
shock common sense of decency, certainly may
justify positive action by the Court in protecting
the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
The reasons advanced by the respondent why
he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia
Angeles, in that she helped him in some way
finish his law studies, and that his "sense of
propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him
to abandon her after his admission to the bar
after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly
an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means
he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate
himself from the predicament he found himself in,
by courting the complainant and maintaining
sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another
immoral act. The noblest means he could have
employed was to have married the complainant
as he was then free to do so. But to continue
maintaining adulterous relations with a married
woman and simultaneously maintaining

promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is

moral perversion that can not be condoned.
Respondent's conduct therefore renders him
unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, he may be removed therefrom
whenever he ceases to possess such character
(7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the
Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing
the present complaint against him for seduction,
adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or
offenses different from those originally charged in
the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and
cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of
the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based
upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the
Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall submit
a report to the Supreme Court containing his
findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the
respondent shall be exonerated unless the court
orders differently.

SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General.

Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor
General finds sufficient ground to proceed
against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied with all
the evidence introduced in his investigation, with
the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be
served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a
copy of the complaint with direction to answer the
same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the
language of the foregoing rules requires the
Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the
same offense charged in the complaint originally
filed by the complainant for disbarment.
Precisely, the law provides that should the
Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied by the
evidence introduced in his investigation. The
Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any
case against the respondent he may be justified
by the evidence adduced during the
investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not

falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in

1954 since according to his own opinion and
estimation of himself at that time, he was a
person of good moral character. This contention
is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of
himself is not a gauge to his moral character.
Moral character is not a subjective term, but one
which corresponds to objective reality. Moral
character is what a person really is, and not what
he or other people think he is. As former Chief
Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license
to practice law is required to show good moral
character, or what he really is, as distinguished
from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. As has been said, ante the standard
of personal and professional integrity which
should be applied to persons admitted to practice
law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely
enables them to escape the penalties of criminal
law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re
Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v.
Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario,

52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E.

612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a
good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life
with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people
who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his
status, did not render him a person of good moral
character. It is of no moment that his immoral
state was discovered then or now as he is clearly
not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered
striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J.
Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ.,
took no part.
A.M. No. 145

December 28, 1956

JOSEFINA MORTEL, petitioner, vs.ANACLETO

F. ASPIRAS, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla,
First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E.

Torres and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner.

Anacleto F. Aspiras, in his own behalf.

BENGZON, J.:
On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained
before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F.
Aspiras, alleging substantially that:
1. Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent,
representing as single, courted her and
eventually won her affection; 2. on December 22,
1952, following his instructions, she came to
Manila so they could get married, and she stayed
with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3.
on and after December 31, 1952 upon being
assured of marriage she allowed him to live with
her as her husband; 4. on January 3, 1953, a
marriage license was applied for, with the son of
the respondent, Cesar Aspiras, as one of the
applicants; 5. upon suggestion of respondent,
she was married to said Cesar Aspiras, although
she was not in love with the latter; 6. after the
marriage, she and respondent continued
cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere

formality performed at the indication of

respondent, who was a married man and who
used his knowledge and education to abuse and
destroy her.
On April 9, 1953 the petitioner filed a motion to
"withdraw and/or dismiss" alleging the contents
of her complaint did not "represent her true
sentiments", the respondent acted in good faith,
and her marriage to respondent's son, Cesar
Aspiras, was "without any fraud or deceit
whatsoever".
Believing that the matter was not a mere private
affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal
profession 1, this Court denied the motion to
dismiss, and required the respondent to answer.
On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his
answer, asserting that petitioner had really
married his son Cesar Aspiras, and denying
having had any amorous or sexual relations with
her. He also said she knew all the time he was a
married man.
On May 13, 9153, the Court referred the case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and

recommendation.

and recommendation.

On November 2, 1953, the Solicitor General

reported that in view of the motion to withdraw
filed by the petitioner, he found no other
alternative but to recommend the dismissal of the
case.

After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on

the evidence adduced before him, the Solicitor
General filed in accordance with the Rules a
complaint against the respondent, praying for his
disbarment, on the ground that he seduced
Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to
cover up his illicit relations, he made his son,
Cesar, a minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel
on January 14, 1953; and, what it worse, after
the marriage, the respondent continued having
sexual relations with the spouse of his own son.

Of course, for lack of evidence, the complaint

was dismissed on November 5, 1953.
However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner
filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that
she had asked for dismissal before the office of
the Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable
settlement with the respondent; but that the truth
was, petitioner and respondent lived together as
husband and wife, from April to November, 1953
at No. 383 Int. 5 Tajeron, Sta. Ana, Manila and
that as a result she was on the family way. She
also charged the respondent with having ordered
his son, Cesar, to live with them for purpose of
"camouflaging their living together".
On January 5, 1954, this Court granted the
above petition to re-open and referred the papers
to the Solicitor General for re-investigation, report

On May 6, 1955, this Court ordered the

respondent to reply to the official charges of the
Government prosecutor.
He replied in due time repeating the same
denials he had previously made in this Court.
Then he asked for, and was granted, a chance to
introduce evidence in addition to the proofs
submitted to, and forwarded by, the Solicitor
General. Yet he failed to produce any.
At the oral argument he did not appear to defend
himself, but asked for permission to file a

memorandum--which he afterwards presented.

Therein he maintains that the complaint's
allegation were not supported by the evidence,
that the petitioner is in pari delicto and deserves
no remedy, and that the alleged misconduct is
not sufficient ground for disbarment.
In regard to the first point, the oral and
documentary evidence at hand establish beyond
reasonable doubt the following facts:
In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of
age, single, was a teacher residing with her
widowed mother in Sawang Barrio School,
Romblon, Romblon. Sometime in August, of that
year she met the respondent. Atty. Anacleto P.
Aspiras, an employee of the Cebu Portland
Cement Co., who represented himself as single,
although he was already married to Carolina
Bautista Aspiras with whom he had seven
children.
A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and
by correspondence until he finally conquered her
trusting heart. He visited her at her house and
must have charmed even the mother, because
without much ado she approved of him. The

climax came when on a certain night of

November, 1952, he was invited to stay and
spend the night at her house, due to a typhoon
which was raging. About 3 or 4 a.m., while the
mother was in the kitchen, he crept into
Josefina's room and after glibly promising
marriage, succeeded in seducing her. From that
time on, and without the benefit of marriage she
gave him the privileges of a husband. Thereafter
yielding to his invitation, Josefina came to Manila
in December, 1952, for the purpose of marrying
him, despite her mother's desire to have the
marriage celebrated the following month of April,
so as to enable he to continue teaching until the
end of the school term. She stayed with her
sister at 10 Espiritu Street, Pasay City.
Accompanied by the respondent, she went on
January 3, 1953 to the Manila City Hall, where
for the first time, she met his son Cesar, who was
introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and
her bridegroom-to-be. She says respondent
again told her to follow his "instructions", and left
the two of them (with Atty. Espino) at the City
Hall. He then departed for Cebu. She filled up the
application for marriage (Exhibit 7,8 Respondent)

and wrote the name of Cesar as her husband-tobe.

marriage, is confirmed by his love letters,

portions of which say:

In connection with the above "instructions", it is

probable that before filing the application
Josefina discovered or was told that respondent
was a married man. But she was persuaded by
respondent to enter into a sham marriage with
his "nephew" Cesar, so that she may rightfully
claim to be Mrs. Josefina Aspiras and save her
face before the relatives and acquaintances who
had known her amorous relations with Attorney
Aspiras.

. . . You are alone in my life till the end of my

years in this world . . . I will bring you along with
me before the altar of matrimony . (Exhibit A-6,
September 22, 1952.)

Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josefina and

Cesar were married 2 at the Manila City Hall
before Judge Aragon, with the respondent and
Rosario R. Veloso (Cesar's Aunt) as witnesses.
After the ceremony, the two contracting parties
separated, never to live together as husband and
wife. However, the respondent continued up to
November, 1953 his adulterous relations with
Josefina, as a result of which she gave birth to a
baby boy on January 24, 1954.

And her testimony that after her marriage to

Cesar she continued living, as wife, with herein
respondent is borne out by his letters to
Josefina's mother dated February 9, 1953 and
March 6, 1953 Exhibits A-19 and A-21.

Josefina's sworn testimony that herein

respondent pretended to be single and promised

lawphil.net

Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in

life or in death, my Josephine you will always be
the first, middle and the last in my life. In short,
you will be the only woman to me as I used to
say to you. (Exhibit A, November 2, 1952.)

Obviously the courtship and seduction by

respondent was morally wrong, and this obliquity
became worse when he made use of his minor
son Cesar to "redeem" his promise of marriage
and/or to cover up his illicit relations, as the
Solicitor General alleged. He corrupted his own
descendant by turning him into an accomplice of

his marital infidelities.

But he says, the marriage was a true marriage,
the contracting parties being actually in love with
each other. Granted. Then his moral deliquency
becomes all the more unpardonable: the
cohabited with the wife of his own son after the
marriage which he himself arranged and
witnessed.
It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the
complainant was also at fault in pari delicto,
respondent suggests -- because this is not a
proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge
the profession of unworthy members, to protect
the public and courts 3. So much so that even if
she should presently ask for dismissal, the
matter may not dropped, the evidence at hand
being sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.
Anyway, pari delicto is not always a complete
defense 4
Supposing that respondent's conduct is not one
of those mentioned in the Rules for which an
attorney may be disbarred 5, still, in this
jurisdiction, lawyers may be removed from office
on grounds other than those enumerated by the

statutes. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567.) And we

recently applied that principle in Balinon vs. De
Leon, 50 Off. Gaz., 583.
In the United States wherefrom our system of
legal ethics derives, "the continued possession . .
. of a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of the law . . . and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment, even though the
statutes do not specify that as a ground for
disbarment. (5 Am. Jur. 417.)
As stated by Mr. Justice Owen of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court,
One of the requisite qualifications for one who
holds the office of an attorney at law is that he or
she shall be good moral character, in so far as it
relates to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. This is a
continuing qualification necessary to entitle one
to admission to the bar, and the loss of such
qualification requires his suspension. The
respondent is a member of the bar of this court.
The charges preferred against him challenge his
moral integrity. Just as it was the duty of this

court to refuse him admission in the first instance

upon a showing that he lacked the necessary
qualification, so is its duty now to remove him
upon like proof." (Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602; 55 A.
L. R. 1361.)

Footnotes

Perhaps mere moral transgression not

amounting to crime will not disbar, as some
cases hold 6 and on this we do not decide. But
respondent's moral deliquency having been
aggravated by a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage, and by corrupting of his
minor son or destruction of the latter's honor, the
undersigned all agree he is unfit to continue
exercising the privileges and responsibilities of
members of the bar. 7

1 Proceeding may be taken for removal of

attorney by the Supreme Court on its own
motion. (Section 1, Rule 128.).

Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to

strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.
lawphil.net

1 Proceeding may be taken for removal of

attorney by the Supreme Court on its own
motion. (Section 1, Rule 128.).

2 Went through the motions of a marriage

ceremony.
3 That is why Solicitor General intervenes.
4 Cf. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209.
5 Concubinage is not considered now, because
his wife has not complained, and no criminal
conviction has been obtained.
6 See People vs. Smith, 9 A.L.R. 183 (Ill.) and
note at page 202.
7 See 7 C.J.S. p. 735

G.R. No. L-225

September 30, 1959

ANITA CABRERA, petitioner, vs.FRANCISCO

AGUSTIN Y GARCIA, respondent.
Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr. for petitioner.Francisco
Agustin y Garcia in his own behalf.Office of the
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor
Federico V. Sian for the Government.
PADILLA, J.:.
This is a complaint filed by Anita Cabrera
charging Francisco Agustin y Garcia, a member
of the bar, with immorality.
Something in April 1953 the respondent courted
the complainant and proposed marriage. In July
1954 she accepted his proposal. On 27
November 1954 the affianced couple proceeded
to Pasay City Hall of Manila to apply for a
marriage license and in the room of Mr. Leoncio
V. Aglubat both signed two sheets of paper
(Exhibits A and B). Mr. Aglubat asked them
whether they said they were. From the room of
Mr. Aglubat they entered another room and there

a lady doctor took blood from them. After coming

from the lady doctor's room, the respondent told
the complainant that as they were already
married they would go to Grace Park and call on
his uncle to introduce her to him. He called a taxi
to go there. In Grace Park they went to a house
which she later on learned was the Venus Hotel.
After the respondent had signed a book, he and
the complainant went inside a room the door of
which he closed. The respondent asked the
complainant to have sexual intercourse with him
for they were already married. Because of his
insistence and assurance that they were already
married, she gave in to his desire. From then on
they continued to have sexual intercourse in the
same place once a month for three consecutive
months and in another hotel near the Espiritu
Santo Church. Three days after the first contract,
the respondent showed to the fact that after the
printed word shows, according to him, that they
were already married (Exhibit C). Sometime in
January 1955 she asked the respondent why
despite their marriage they had not yet lived as
husband and wife. The respondent excused
himself by saying that he was still waiting for the
release of the result of the bar examinations.

After he passed the bar examination, the

respondent gave her his diploma issued by the
Clerk of the Supreme Court (Exhibit D) to show
his affection to her. She then told him to settle
down and he spoke to her father and the latter
told him that as they were Catholic Church. He
agreed. On 26 April 1955 both went to the office
of the Local Civil Registrar at the City Hall in
Manila to get the marriage license which they
had applied for previously (Exhibit E). The
respondent handed to the complainant the
original copies of their applications for marriage
license (Exhibit A and B); the marriage license
Exhibit E ); a copy of the notice of publication of
their applications for marriage license (Exhibit E1); and the official receipt for the marriage
license fee of P2.00 paid by the respondent
(Exhibit Santo Church after two weeks. On 2 May
1955 they went to the Espiritu Santo Church to
make arrangement for their wedding, where the
respondent filed out the blanks in a
mimeographed questionnaire (Exhibit F), and set
the date of the wedding on 15 May 1955, for
which the fee charged was P22 (Exhibit G.)
However, before the date set, the complainant
received a letter from the respondent

withdrawing from their agreement to marry. She

showed to her father the documents in her
possession and he found out that they had not
been married civilly. She confessed to him that
she was on the family way. On 4 August 1955
she delivered at the Saint Mary's Hospital a baby
girl whom she named Delia Agustin (Exhibit H).
On 9 June 1955 the respondent married
Asuncion Talan.
The respondent and acknowledges the child
Delia Agustin as his own. His defense in
breaching his promise to marry the complainant
was that her family insisted on a pompous
wedding, the expenses of which he had to
defray; and that he noticed she was mentally
deranged because she often smiled for no cause
at all. he denies that he deceived her into
believing that they had been married civilly to
satisfy his carnal desire and insist that she
submitted to his desire voluntarily.
The respondent's defense cannot be believed. If
it were true that the complainant's family was
insisting on a pompous wedding, then why
should she choose a wedding at the Espiritu
Santo Church for which the fee was P22?

Moreover, the complainant knew that she was on

the family way and any undue demand for a
pompous wedding would thwart their plans. For
that reason, she would be the first to oppose
such a demand and prevail upon her family not
to insist on it. Likewise, the respondent's claim
that when the complainant's family insisted on a
pompous wedding he suggested to her to elope
cannot be true. In the condition the complainant
found herself she would jump at the idea and
grab the opportunity to save her from
embarrassment.

first year of high school only, and does not have

the slightest idea of a legal and valid marriage.
Thus she fell an easy prey of a man like the
respondent, a lawyer who knows the intricacies
of the law and the way to extricate himself from
the mess that he has brought about.
The respondent has not maintained the highest
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times
is expected of and must be possessed by
members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred
from the practice of law and his name in the roll
of attorneys stricken out.
1wphl.nt

The respondent's suspicion that the complainant

was mentally deranged cannot withstand
scrutiny, because if it were true that he
suspected her to be so, why did he persist on
having sexual intercourse with her? The truth is
that all along he never intended to redeem the
complainant's honor. he had inveigled her into
believing that they had been married civilly to
satisfy his carnal desire. He himself admits that
what prompted him to effect and propose
marriage to her was to satisfy such desire. On
the other hand, the complainant has not gone far
in educational attainment, having reached the

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista

Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia,
Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

B.M. No. L-68 November 21, 1984

ANNABELLE J. POMPERADA, complainant, vs.
BENJAMIN JOCHICO y PAMA, respondent.
Romeo Perez and Mario Pomperada for
complainant.

Federico R. Agcaoili for respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Respondent Benjamin P. Jochico, a successful
Bar examinee in 1981, was disallowed by the
Court to join the mass oathtaking on May 4, 1982
because of a written formal complaint filed by
complainant, Annabelle J. Pomperada, with this
Court charging him of grossly immoral conduct
and actuations that make him unfit to become a
member of the Philippine Bar.
Specifically, the charges are:
(a) On February 20, 1979, complainant and
respondent agreed to get married and
respondent facilitated all the necessary papers
and documents for a marriage contract which
turned out to be fake;
(b) Respondent had complainant sign a prepared
marriage contract and when complainant

inquired whether it was necessary for them to

appear before the officiating judge, respondent
informed her that it was not necessary because
the judge knew personally both complainant and
respondent, and respondent assured
complainant that he would just take care of the
signing of the marriage contract by Judge Felino
Garcia of the City Court of Bacolod later
respondent gave complainant a copy of the
marriage contract which appeared to have been
signed already by Judge Garcia; a verification,
however, revealed that the marriage between
complainant and respondent was not registered
in the Local Civil Registrar's Office and in a
further confrontation with Judge Felino Garcia
the latter denied having signed the marriage
contract ... and denied as his own the signature
which purports to be the signature of Judge
Felino Garcia in the marriage contract;
(c) Respondent filed income tax returns jointly
with Nenita Martelino Ureta, the latter indicated
as his spouse for the years 1972, 1973, 1974,
1975 and 1976 and enumerated two children as
dependents. Then in the years 1979 and 1980 he
filed income tax returns but he indicated

complainant as his spouse.

In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances
which clearly point to the culpability of
respondent, it is respectfully submitted that
respondent is not fit to become a member of the
Philippine Bar because, instead of being a
trustworthy defender of the legal rights of
individuals, respondent will be a disgrace to the
legal profession as he has already shown to be
grossly dishonest, seriously immoral and
unhesitant in openly violating our laws.
Comment was required of respondent, who
vehemently denied the charges contending that
"he had always acted in an irreproachable
manner". Attached to his comment were
testimonials of his good moral character given by
some residents of Bacolod City (Annexes "A" to
"G"). His specific denials follow:
(a) Respondent vehemently denies the
allegations under paragraph 5 of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter is that the "marriage"
alleged by complainant was only a game
concocted during the celebration of
complainant's birthday on February 20, 1979

stemming from the suggestion of respondent's

secretary, Gina Porcel to enliven the
complainant's birthday party.
(b) Respondent specifically denies the
allegations under paragraph 6 of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter is that, complainant was
the one who cajoled respondent to sign the
marriage contract in front of the guests during the
birthday party as part of the planned game.
(c) Respondent specifically denies paragraph 7
of the Complaint, the truth of the matter is that,
the marriage contract attached to the Complaint
as Annex "A" and allegedly signed by Judge
Garcia is wanting and bereft of any validity and
can be considered as a mere scrap of paper and
complainant was and is fully aware of such fact.
(d) Respondent vehemently denies the
allegations co in paragraph 8 of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter is that dent's mother never
assured anybody of the status of her son for it is
of common knowledge to everyone, including
complainant, that respondent is an unmarried
person with two children.

(e) Respondent admits paragraph 9 of the

Complaint in so far as his being a Certified Public
Accountant and a law student in l979 and
presently a successful bar candidate, but
specifically denies the allegations that
complainant helped respondent financially during
his studies as well as during his review, the truth
of the matter is that, there was no need to
financially support respondent in his studies for
since 1967 he has been a CPA practitioner and
earning a modest income in the exercise of such
profession.
(f) Respondent specifically denies paragraph 10
of the Complaint for the reason that respondent
cannot abandon a marital abode which does not
exist, the truth of the matter is that respondent is
not married to complainant.
(g) Respondent vehemently denies the allegation
contained in paragraph 11 of the Complaint as
without factual basis and purely conjectural, the
truth of the matter is that, as already aforestated,
respondent is an unmarried person with two
children with a woman who is now married to a
certain Al Abueg in Kalibo, Aklan.

(h) Respondent vehemently denies the

allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the
Complaint, to wit: (a) as to the allegation that
complainant accidentally found among the
papers in a table drawer copies of income tax
returns filed by respondent jointly with Nenita
Utera, the truth of the matter is that, complainant
did not find said income tax returns accidentally
but, instead procured the same when she
illegally ransacked respondent's office and
removed all the things found in said Jochico
Accounting Office. ... and (b) as to the allegation
that respondent jointly filed income tax returns
with Nenita Ureta and indicated in said return as
his spouse with the names of the two children as
dependents, the same is admitted, respondent
stated that Nenita Ureta as his wife for the simple
reason that in accounting practice when children
are claimed as dependents in the income tax
return, then the name of the mother is, likewise,
stated in the return.
(i) Respondent vehemently and specifically
denies the allegation contained in paragraph 15
of the Complaint, the truth of the matter is that
respondent has never forged any signature,

much less that of Judge Felino Garcia, the City

Judge of Bacolod. As already stated, respondent
vigorously asserted that there was no judge
present on February 20, 1979 during her birthday
and the game and the document already cited
did not contain any name and signature of my
judge in a space specifically provided for the
name and signature of a judge in a marriage
contract. Respondent could not in any manner
assure complainant that he would just take care
of having the marriage contract signed by Judge
Garcia as the same was a mere game. Such
claimed assurance was a false allegation of
complainant to discredit respondent before the
Honorable Supreme Court.
(j) Respondent admits having filed his income tax
returns, as it is his duty to do so, just like other
good and law abiding citizens, but strongly
denies all other allegations, contained in
paragraph 16 of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter is respondent instructed one of his
secretaries to complete the income tax return
and to have the same filed. The income tax
returns in 1979 and 1980 were an completed by
Mary Ann Bais and filed exactly on the date of

the deadline.
(k) Respondent specifically denies the allegation
contained in paragraph 20 of the Complaint for
the reason that as already propounded in
paragraph 12 of this comment, the mere
inclusion of a person in the income tax return as
a spouse, does not, in truth and in fact, make a
person a legally married person. ... The inclusion
of Nenita Martelino Ureta as a spouse in the
income tax return was to indicate the mother of
the children who are listed as dependents in the
income tax return.
(l) Respondent specifically denies the allegation
contained in paragraph 21 of the Complaint. The
truth of the matter is, respondent has been filing
a complete and accurate income tax return
stating facts which he believes to be true. This is
evidenced by the fact that up to the present time,
no investigation, assessment or inspection of
books of accounts of respondent has been made
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or other
government agencies; neither is there any
pending investigation of tax fraud against
respondent.

(m) Respondent specifically denies the

allegations contained in paragraphs 22, 23 & 24
of the Complaint as self-serving and fabrication
of facts to unduly gain the sympathy of the
Honorable Supreme Court for the reasons
already stated in the preceeding premises.
After the issues had been joined, the case was
referred to the Chief Attorney of this Court for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were initially held in Manila. But upon
complainant's request, as both parties and their
witnesses were residents of Bacolod City, and
because she could not afford the expenses in
coming to Manila, the Court authorized the
transfer of venue of the hearings to Bacolod City.
Pending submission of memoranda and written
offer of exhibits, complainant filed a Motion,
dated June 14, 1984, to declare respondent in
contempt for engaging in the practice of law
despite the fact that he was disallowed to take
the lawyer's oath, and praying that he be
enjoined from doing so. Required to comment,
respondent has failed to do so.
On July 26, 1984, the Chief Attorney submitted

her Memorandum Report with the following

observations:
... As shown by the records of the case the
existence of the marriage contract in its original
and duplicate original forms Identified as Exhibits
"B","B-l", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-3-A" which were
intended to apprise the Honorable Court that a
marriage contract between the parties actually
took place were admitted and confirmed by the
respondent in all his pronouncements.
Respondent, however, is questioning the validity
of said contract, claiming that it was just a paper
bereft of validity because it was just a
manifestation wedding played in a birthday
celebration in honor of the latter knew that it was
such. On the other hand, complainant admittedly
did not exhibit the marriage contract form as a
valid document. She had declared consistently
that the alleged marriage contract was fake but
she wanted to show the same to the Court to
prove the extent of the moral depravity of
respondent because she had argued along that
by means of that same marriage contract
responded deceived her into believing that she
was really and legally married to him causing her

to request for a change of status in her office

record files at the 3M Phils., Inc. where she was
an executive based on the marriage contract
which was after all false and to show the
propensity of respondent of committing a
violation of the law by faking the signature of
Judge Felino Garcia as officiating officer of the
marriage celebration staged on February 20,
1979 to serve his selfish ends. It is her belief that
a person who could commit such deception, one
who was want only capable of flouting with any
other person's feelings and confidence, not to
mention the fact that she had lived as wife with
the man for almost nine (9) years, does not
deserve to become a member of the Philippine
Bar. The testimonials of respondent's witnesses,
namely Federico Fieldad, Jorge Abastillas and
respondent himself (t.s.n., pp. 15-46, Sept. 21,
1983, Tabligan; t.s.n., pp. 37-71, Sept. 22, 1983,
Ursal; t.s.n., pp. 47-86, Sept. 22, 1983; Ursal)
which were geared to destroy the credulity of
complainant's evidence. Respondent's efforts to
show that the lone and only piece of paper which
he claimed was signed by himself, his friends
Fieldad and Abastillas during a mock game of a
wedding staged during a drinking spree

boomeranged when complainant's counsel

produced the duplicate original of the document
before their very eyes in the course of their
respective cross-examinations and when asked
to Identify their signatures in said duplicate
original they were all caught flat footed and
exhibited confusion during the investigation.
Complainant's exhibits "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", and
"H", the contents of which and signatures were
admitted as true and correct by respondent,
except the alleged insertion in Exhibits "G" and
"H" of the name of Anabelle Pomperada in the
space reserved for spouse are clear and
unrebutted evidence to show that respondent
have had illicit liaison with Nenita Martelino Ureta
and had begotten illegitimate children with her;
and that respondent had falsified and untruthfully
filed up his income tax returns for the years
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976. His defense
that he had to write the name of Nenita Martelino
Ureta as wife in said income tax returns in
conformity with accounting practice because
when dependent children are claimed as
deductible items for income tax purposes the
name of their mother must also appear, did not
for a moment erase the established fact that said

income tax returns were not truthful accounts of

the data contained therein and, therefore,
punishable by penalties of perjury. The same
exhibits were mute yet unshakable proof that
respondent had for almost (9) years maintained
an illicit relationship with complainant. The
testimony of witness Mary Ann Bais for
respondent who testified before your investigator
after complainant and respondent were excluded
from the investigating room per her request, that
the insertion of Annabelle Pomperada's name as
spouse in the income tax returns of Benjamin
Jochico for the years 1979 and 1980 were
because of the insistent direction of Annabelle
fell flat upon witness' cross-examination. This
witness' testimony that only the name Annabelle
Pomperada was inserted in the income tax
returns mentioned, contrary to the direction of
Benjamin Jochico that she copied from a draft
prepared by the latter is belied completely when
she was asked to explain the categorical
discrepancies in her testimony and the data
written in the filer's copy or duplicate original of
the income tax returns where the wife's income,
taxes withheld from wife, standard deductions for
a working wife and status of the filer were data

computed together with those of Benjamin

Jochico in order to arrive at the amount of tax
payable to the government by the tax filer. While
on the witness stand this witness' demeanor and
behaviour were appraised as indicative of
untruthfulness and lying (t.s.n., pp. 7-45, Sept.
22, 1983, Bellocillo). Respondent's testimony
which consisted of answers to direct questions
propounded by his counsel were reiterations of
all his defense an denials in his Comment which
were characterized with elaborate verbosity and
were merely corroborative. it was a long and
clear admission of illicit liaison with complainant
for nine (9) years and filing of false income tax
returns that do not speak well of his standards of
decency and morality.
The Investigator's recommendation and
conclusion follow:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE exposition of the
facts and circumstances involved in BAR
MATTER No. 68 (Annabelle Pomperada vs.
Benjamin Jochico y Pama, a successful bar
examinee) it is humbly recommended that a
finding that respondent Benjamin Jochico y
Pama had committed gross immoral conduct as

charged and, therefore, should be disallowed to

take the oath as a member of the Philippine Bar
be made, to continue until such time when he
can show the Honorable Court that he has
amended his ways and has conformed to the
rules of conduct that are necessarily required as
accepted standards of members of the legal
profession in this Court.

norms of honesty, decency and moral conduct

required of an aspiring member of the legal
profession.

The Report is in order and the recommendation

is well taken.

The Court Administrator is directed to circularize

all Courts that the respondent has not been
allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar.
A copy of the circular should also be sent to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the

standard of moral fitness for membership in the
legal profession. Whether the marriage was a
joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on
her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak
well of respondent's moral values. Respondent
had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social
institution, which public policy cherishes and
protects (Article 216, Civil Code).
Respondent's testimony was a long and clear
admission of illicit liaison with Complainant for
nine years, and before that with another woman,
and of the filing of false Income Tax Returns.
Those actuations do not conform to the standard

ACCORDINGLY, the petition of respondent to be

allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar
and to sign the Roll of Attorneys is hereby
denied.

The Clerk of Court is directed to file with the City

Fiscal of Bacolod City the appropriate complaints
for Falsification of Public Document and Perjury.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the Board
of Accountancy of the Professional Regulatory
Commission for such action as it may deem
appropriate, respondent being a Certified Public
Accountant.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Abad

Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., and Aquino, J., took no part.

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant, vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION

her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose

B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had
carnal knowledge of her for several times under
threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject
if she would not submit to respondent's lustful
desires. Complainant further alleged that when
she became pregnant, respondent, through a
certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced
abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court
dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer
denying any personal knowledge of complainant
as well as all the allegations contained in the
complaint and by way of special defense,
averred that complainant is a woman of loose
morality.

PER CURIAM:

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to

refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against

respondent on the ground of gross immorality.

The findings of the Solicitor General is

summarized as follows:

Complainant, a second year medical student of

the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

1) she was a second year medical student of the
Southwestern University, the Chairman of the
Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar
(pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject
which prompted her to approach respondent in
the latter's house who assured her that she
would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33,
tsn, June 6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p.
33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told
her that she should go with him to Manila,
otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp.
42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and

complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A")
for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport,
they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the
Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three
days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June
6, 1 975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they
dined at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino,
Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp 56-57,
tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve
o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal
knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next
morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 &
157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires
of respondent because for her, she would
sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her
subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told
respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy
because she missed her menstruation (p. 76,

tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;

10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an
instructor in the college of medicine) that
respondent wanted that an abortion be
performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7,
1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of
respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her
boarding house on the pretext that she would be
examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July
17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she
was given an injection and an inhalation mask
was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90,
tsn, July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when
she woke up, an abortion had already been
performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding
and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn,
July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met
complainant and a man whom complainant

introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the

Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10,
1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco,
witnesses for the complainant, testified that
abdominal examinations and x-ray examination
of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant
showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by
the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar
stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and
children; respondent never came to Manila
except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov.
24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the
latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977;
Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the
respondent stated that:

1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador

Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male
companions at the hotel but he did not see any
woman companion of respondent Aznar;

conducted by the Solicitor General because

nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove
that respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant.

2. He usually slept with respondent at the

Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the
hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn,
Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor

General made a categorical finding to the effect
that respondent had carnal knowledge of
complainant, to wit:

The Court notes that throughout the period of the

investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
respondent Aznar was never presented to refute
the allegations made against him.

From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant

was compelled to go to Manila with respondent
upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to
do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she
would never become a medical intern (pp. 42,
50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was
Chairman of the College of Medicine,
complainant had every reason to believe him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he

does not have any knowledge of the allegations
in the complaint. As special defense, respondent
further alleged that the charge levelled against
him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to
wreck vengeance against respondent by reason
of the latter's approval of the recommendation of
the Board of Trustees barring complainant from
enrollment for the school year 1973-1974
because she failed in most of her subjects. It is
likewise contended that the defense did not
bother to present respondent in the investigation

It has been established also that complainant

was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel
in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had
carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if
she would not give in to his lustful desires, she
would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A",
"K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6,
1975);

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent did not bother to
appear during the hearing. It is true that he
presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar
Salangsang who testified that respondent usually
slept with them every time the latter came to
Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of
help. None of them mentioned during the hearing
that they stayed and slept with respondent on
February 12 to February 14, 1973 at
Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto
Caban testified that respondent stayed at
Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in
December, 1972. The dates in question,
however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive.
His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial
to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the
charge of immorality against respondent Aznar
has been substantiated by sufficient evidence
both testimonial and documentary; while finding
insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of
intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law for a period of not less than

three (3) years.

On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to
require the parties to Move in the premises to
determine whether any intervening event
occurred which would render the case moot and
academic (Rollo, p. 69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a
manifestation and motion praying that the case at
bar be considered submitted for decision on the
bases of the report and recommendation
previously submitted together with the record of
the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p.
75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court
agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General
that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated
in the Report of the investigation conducted in
the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct"
and may therefore be removed or suspended by
the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient

to engender doubt as to his culpability of the

offense imputed upon him. With the exception of
the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses
presented on respondent's behalf, the records
are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent
of the act complained of, much less contradict,
on material points, the testimonies of
complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken
complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there
had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not
present any evidence to show where he was at
that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding,
respondent would have done more than keep his
silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral
character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that
he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with
nor downgrade the high and exacting moral
standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy,
21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by
the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is

not enough that he denies the charges against

him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that
he still maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity, which at all times is expected of
him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17
Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the
Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to
himself if not to the State. If he does not perform
that duty, he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to
meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy
indeed if he demand and expect that same full
and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable
effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly
so when he not only declines to help himself but
actively conceals from the State the very means
by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439
[1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the
complainant is partly to blame for having gone

with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that

respondent is a married man ,with children,
respondent should merely be suspended from
the practice of law for not less than three (3)
years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his
manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989
alleges that since a period of about ten (10)
years had already elapsed from the time the
Solicitor General made his recommendation for a
three (3) years suspension and respondent is not
practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court
may now consider the respondent as having
been suspended during the said period and the
case dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment
not because respondent reneged on a promise to
marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More
importantly. complainant's knowledge of of
respondent's marital status is not at issue in the
case at bar. Complainant submitted to
respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse
not because of a desire for sexual gratification

but because of respondent's moral ascendancy

over her and fear that if she would not accede,
she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of
the college of medicine where complainant was
enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe
that respondent could make good his threats.
Moreover, as counsel for respondent would
deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that
the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a
very rich man in his own right and in fact is not
practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo,
p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per
se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose.
The fact that he is a rich man and does not
practice his profession as a lawyer, does not
render respondent a person of good moral
character. Evidence of good moral character
precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) and such requirement is not
dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good
moral character is a continuing qualification
necessary to entitle one to continue in the
practice of law. The ancient and learned
profession of law exacts from its members the
highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno,
supra).

Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the

bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to
practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA
591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define
the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an
inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral
conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which

is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the
community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing
the intellect of a child became pregnant by
reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who
was the father of six children, disbarment of the
attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of
respondent, a married man with children, to have
taken advantage of his position as chairman of
the college of medicine in asking complainant, a
student in said college, to go with him to Manila
where he had carnal knowledge of her under the
threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in
case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is
hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Padilla, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.

In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21

May 1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan charged
Atty. Salvador F. Tinio with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar.

Fernan (C.J.), took no part.

After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the

Court, in its Resolution dated 16 November
1987, referred the Petition to the Solicitor
General for Investigation, Report and
Recommendation.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989

PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant, vs.ATTY.
SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.
Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

During the initial hearing of this case by the

Solicitor General on 17 February 1988, only
respondent and his counsel appeared; it turned
out that complainant had not been duly served
with notice of the hearing. The hearing scheduled
for 24 March 1988 was likewise reset to 27 April
1988 upon motion of respondent and upon failure
of complainant to appear before the Office of the
Solicitor General.
This case was eventually transmitted by the
Solicitor General to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline
(Commission) for investigation and proper action.
Thus, in an order dated 18 August 1988, the
Commission set the case for hearing on 9

September 1988 and required both complainant

and respondent to submit additional copies of
their pleadings within ten (10) days from notice.
The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9
September 1988 was reset to 20 September
1988 because only complainant appeared,
respondent having failed to present himself
despite due notice to him. The hearing of 20
September 1988 was again reset to 20 October
1988 because neither complainant nor her
counsel appeared. The hearing for 20 October
1988 was once again reset to 14 November 1988
as only complainant appeared, Finally, the
hearing for 14 November 1988 was rescheduled
two (2) more times, first to 15 December 1988
and second to 17 January 1989.
In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the
Commission, upon the unexplained failure of
respondent to appear at the hearing on 17
January 1989, required petitioner to make a
formal offer of evidence ex parte, and thereafter
submit the case for resolution. The Order was
duly received by respondent's counsel on 31
January 1989.

On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered

her exhibits as follows:
1. Exh. 'A' Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila
Laguitan Tinio.
Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the
child as shown on the document;
2. Exh. 'B' Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict
Laguitan.
Purpose: To show and prove likewise the filiation
of the child as shown on the document:
3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' Receipts issued by the Mt.
Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital.
Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave
birth to a baby girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity
and Children's Hospital and for which respondent
paid the bills for the hospitalization, medicines
and professional fees of doctors;
4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' Receipts issued by the
Paulino Medical Clinic.

Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again

gave birth to a baby boy at said clinic and for
which respondent paid the bill for hospitalization,
medicines and professional fees of doctors;
5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' Baptismal certificates of
Sheila L. Tinio and Benedict L. Tinio, respectively
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent
admits his paternity of the children:
6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' The family pictures showing
respondent either singly or with the rest of the
family during happier times.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and
respondent really lived together as husband and
wife and begot two children and the respondent
admits these through the pictures:
7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' The school records of
Sheila L. Tinio at the St. Mary's Academy.
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent
was supporting the schooling of the children as
he himself signed the correspondence and was
marked as Exh. 'G-2-A'. 1

Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors submitted to us its findings and
recommendation, which may be summed up as
follows:
Sometime in June 1974, complainant and
respondent Tinio met each other and in time
became lovers. Beginning in 1976, the parties
lived together as husband and wife. As a result,
complainant bore respondent two (2) children:
Sheila, now about ten (10) years old and
Benedict, now approximately nine (9) years old.
In the course of this relationship, petitioner
discovered that respondent Tinio, before meeting
her, had contracted marriage with someone else
and that the prior marriage was subsisting.
Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with
respondent until eventually, ten (10) years later,
she and her children by respondent Tinio were
abandoned by the latter in November 1986.
Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she sought the
help of respondent's parents in supporting her
children who were then already in school.
Respondent's parents gave her P400.00 and
advised her not to see them again.

After examination of the record of this case and

noting that respondent Tinio appeared before the
IBP Investigating Commissioner and candidly
admitted his illicit relationship with complainant
and his having begotten two (2) children by her,
and promised the Commissioner that he would
support his illegitimate children but had not lived
to his promise, we agree with the findings of fact
of the IBP Board. The IBP Board recommends
that respondent Tinio be suspended from the
practice of law "not for having cohabited with the
complainant, but for refusal to support his
illegitimate children," the suspension to remain in
effect until respondent Tinio complies with his
obligation of support.
The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves
to be suspended from the practice of law but not
merely because he has failed in his obligation to
support the children complainant bore him but
also because for a prolonged period of time, he
lived in concubinage with complainant, a course
of conduct inconsistent with the requirement of
good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of
the Philippine Bar, 2 Concubinage imports moral
turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic

social institution of marriage.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to

SUSPEND respondent Salvador F. Tinio from the
practice of law until further orders from this
Court. The Court will consider lifting the
suspension upon evidence satisfactory to the
Commission and to this Court that respondent is
supporting or has made provision for the support
of his illegitimate children and that he has given
up his immoral course of conduct.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on Leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 28.
2 Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Royong
v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865 (1963); and Cordova v.
Cordovan Adm. Case No. 3249, promulgated 28
November 1989.

A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA,
respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April
1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo
charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D.
Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was
forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline
("Commission"), for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint,
required complainant to submit a verified
complaint within ten (10) days from notice.

Complainant complied and submitted to the

Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised
and verified version of her long and detailed
complaint against her husband charging him with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of
the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1
December 1988, respondent was declared in
default for failure to file an answer to the
complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
The same Order required complainant to submit
before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on
16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic
request of complainant for the resetting of the 16
December 1988 hearing, the Commission
scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989.
The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was
rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25
February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April
1989. The hearings never took place as
complainant failed to appear. Respondent
Cordova never moved to set aside the order of
default, even though notices of the hearings
scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989,

complainant informed the Commission that she

and her husband had already "reconciled". In an
order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission
required the parties (respondent and
complainant) to appear before it for confirmation
and explanation of the telegraphic message and
required them to file a formal motion to dismiss
the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Neither party responded and nothing was heard
from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence
ex parte before the Commission, the IBP Board
of Governors submitted to this Court its report
reprimanding respondent for his acts,
admonishing him that any further acts of
immorality in the future will be dealt with more
severely, and ordering him to support his
legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may
be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were
married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage,
two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple
lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that

year, respondent Cordova left his family as well

as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino
Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G.
Holgado was herself married and left her own
husband and children to stay with respondent.
Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived
together in Bislig as husband and wife, with
respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the
public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the
name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave
Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a
sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while
at the same time failing to support his legitimate
family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his
complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation.
Respondent promised that he would separate
from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate
family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent
would, however, frequently come home from
beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to
neglect the support of his legitimate family. In
February 1987, complainant found, upon

returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by

hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that
respondent Cordova was no longer living with
her (complainant's) children in their conjugal
home; that respondent Cordova was living with
another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and
had taken his younger daughter Melanie along
with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid
Melanie from the complinant, compelling
complainant to go to court and to take back her
daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial
Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.

to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the

misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily
adversely reflecting upon him as a member of
the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An
applicant for admission to membership in the bar
is required to show that he is possessed of good
moral character. That requirement is not
exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing.

Notwithstanding respondent's promises to

reform, he continued to live with Luisita
Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail
to give support to his legitimate family.

In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in

Finally the Commission received a telegram

message apparently from complainant, stating
that complainant and respondent had been
reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the
findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree
that the most recent reconciliation between
complainant and respondent, assuming the same

the United States, held that "the continued

possession ... of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of the law ... and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes
do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It
is important to note that the lack of moral character
that we here refer to as essential is not limited to
good moral character relating to the discharge of the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral

standards of the community, conduct for instance,

which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social
institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent
being already married, wooed and won the heart of a
single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently
cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because
respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly
morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his
mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting
with the wife of his own son after the marriage he
had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was

declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by
reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly
disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual
relations with the complainant who consequently
bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number
of years an adulterous relationship with another
woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova

maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in
full view of the general public, to the humiliation
and detriment of his legitimate family which he,
rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to
support. After a brief period of "reform"

respondent took up again with another woman

not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing
along his young daughter to live with them.
Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the
fundamental institution of marriage and its
elementary obligations before his own daughter
and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law indefinitely
and until farther orders from this Court. The
Court will consider lifting his suspension when
respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to
the Commission and this Court that he has and
continues to provide for the support of his
legitimate family and that he has given up the
immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Footnotes

l 100 Phil. 586 (1956).

2 100 Phil. at 592.
3 100 Phil. a, 593.
4 117 Phil. 865 (1963).
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant, vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.

the Court Resolved to refer the case to the

Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General
and for the convenience of the parties and their
witnesses who were residing in the province of
Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of
said province was authorized to conduct the
investigation and to submit a report, together with
transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits
submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).

On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor

General submitted its Report and
Recommendation, viz.:

PER CURIAM:

Evidence of the complainant:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on

August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C.
Barrientos seeks the disbarment of respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the
Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct.

. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single

and a resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that
when she was still a teenager and first year in
college she came to know respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go
to their house being a friend of her sister Norma;
that they also became friends, and she knew the
respondent as being single and living alone in

R E S O L U T I O N

After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12),

Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General

Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently
transferred his residence to the ZANECO
compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar St.,
Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30,
1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their
house and asked her to be one of the usherettes
in the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog
City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told
respondent to ask the permission of her parents,
which respondent did, and her father consented;
that for three whole days she served as
usherette in the convention and respondent
picked her up from her residence every morning
and took her home from the convention site at
the end of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent
came to complainant's house and invited her for
a joy ride with the permission of her mother who
was a former classmate of respondent; that
respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and
then they strolled along the beach, and in the
course of which respondent proposed his love to

her; that respondent told her that if she would

accept him, he would marry her within six (6)
months from her acceptance; complainant told
respondent that she would think it over first; that
from then on respondent used to visit her in their
house almost every night, and he kept on
courting her and pressed her to make her
decision on respondent's proposal; that on July
7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer
of love and respondent continued his usual
visitations almost every night thereafter; they
agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp.
115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973,
respondent invited her, with the consent of her
father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at
7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her
from her house and went to the Lopez Skyroom
(pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about 10:00 p.m. of
that evening they left the party at the Lopez
Skyroom, but before taking her home respondent
invited her for a joy ride and took her to the
airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent
parked the jeep by the beach where there were
no houses around; that in the course of their

conversation inside the jeep, respondent

reiterated his promise to marry her and then
started caressing her downward and his hand
kept on moving to her panty and down to her
private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then
said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered:
"Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you"
and reminded her also that "anyway, December
is very near, the month we have been waiting for"
([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day, just
give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and again
reiterated his promise and assurances, at the
same time pulling down her panty; that she told
him that she was afraid because they were not
yet married, but because she loved him she
finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with him
at the back seat of the jeep; that after the
intercourse she wept and respondent again
reiterated his promises and assurances not to
worry because anyway he would marry her; and
at about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.122124, tsn, id.).

twice or three times a week, after which he would

take her to the airport where they would have
sexual intercourse; that they had this sexual
intercourse from August to October 1973 at the
frequency of two or three times a week, and she
consented to all these things because she loved
him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125127, tsn, id.).

After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to

invite her to eat outside usually at the
Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about

On October 20, 1973, respondent came to

complainant's house and talked to her parents
about their marriage; it was agreed that the
marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not

Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973

complainant noticed that her menstruation which
usually occurred during the second week of each
month did not come; she waited until the end of
the month and still there was no menstruation;
she submitted to a pregnancy test and the result
was positive; she informed respondent and
respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted
but she objected and respondent did not insist;
respondent then told her not to worry because
they would get married within one month and he
would talk to her parents about their marriage
(pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).

to create a scandal as complainant was already

pregnant; complainant and her mother left for
Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while
respondent would follow by plane; and they
agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the
house of complainant's sister Delia who is
married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn,
id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to
see complainant and her mother at Singalong,
Manila, respondent told them that he could not
marry complainant because he was already
married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother
got mad and said: "Trans, so you fooled my
daughter and why did you let us come here in
Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however,
respondent reassured complainant not to worry
because respondent had been separated from
his wife for 16 years and he would work for the
annulment of his marriage and, subsequently
marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent
told complainant to deliver their child in Manila
and assured her of a monthly support of P250.00
(p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog
City and actually sent the promised support; he

came back to Manila in January 1974 and went

to see complainant; when asked about the
annulment of his previous marriage, he told
complainant that it would soon be approved (pp.
141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and
in March 1974 and told complainant the same
thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her
mother to come to Manila when she delivers the
child, but her mother answered her that she
cannot come as nobody would be left in their
house in Dipolog and instead suggested that
complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer;
complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and,
her sister Norma took her to the Good Shepherd
Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl
on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was
registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148,
tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came
to Dipolog City and tried to contact respondent
by phone and, thru her brother, but to no avail; as
she was ashamed she just stayed in their house;
she got sick and her father sent her to
Zamboanga City for medical treatment; she

came back after two weeks but still respondent

did not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.);
she consulted a lawyer and filed an
administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; the case
was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was dismissed
and thus she filed the present administrative
case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his
sole testimony and one exhibit, the birth
certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent
declared substantially as follows: that he was
born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte; that he married Romualda Sumaylo in
Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20
years old; that because of incompatibility he had
been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that in
1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby
embraced the Islam Religion (pp.173-180 tsn,
Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know
complainant's father since 1952 because he was
his teacher; likewise he knew complainant's
mother because they were former classmates in

high school; that he became acquainted with

complainant when he used to visit her sister,
Norma, in their house; they gradually became
friends and often talked with each other, and
even talked about their personal problems; that
he mentioned to her his being estranged from his
wife; that with the consent of her parents he
invited her to be one of the usherettes in the
Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City
held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.);
that the arrangement was for him to fetch her
from her residence and take her home from the
convention site; that it was during this occasion
that they became close to each other and after
the convention, he proposed his love to her on
July 7, 1973; that (sic) a week of courtship, she
accepted his proposal and since then he used to
invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973,
respondent invited complainant to be his partner
during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the
Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that
evening after the affair, complainant complained
to him of a headache, so he decided to take her
home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to

have a joy ride, so he drove around the city and

proceeded to the airport; that when they were at
the airport, only two of them, they started the
usual kisses and they were carried by their
passion; they forgot themselves and they made
love; that before midnight he took her home; that
thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse
many times whenever they went on joy riding in
the evening and ended up in the airport which
was the only place they could be alone(p. 195,
tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October
1973 that complainant told him of her pregnancy;
that they agreed that the child be delivered in
Manila to avoid scandal and respondent would
take care of expenses; that during respondent's
talk with the parents of complainant regarding the
latter's pregnancy, he told him he was married
but estranged from his wife; that when
complainant was already in Manila, she asked
him if he was willing to marry her, he answered
he could not marry again, otherwise, he would be
charged with bigamy but he promised to file an
annulment of his marriage as he had been
separated from his wife for 16 years; that

complainant consented to have sexual

intercourse with him because of her love to him
and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit or
cajolery; and that the present case was filed
against him by complainant because of his failure
to give the money to support complainant while
in Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child and,
also to meet complainant's medical expenses
when she went to Zamboanga City for medical
check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the
following facts are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is
single, a college student, and was about 20
years and 7 months old during the time (JulyOctober 1975) of her relationship with
respondent, having been born on December 23,
1952; while respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is
married, General Manager of Zamboanga del
Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at
the time of the said relationship, having been
born on August 6, 1932;

2. That respondent is married to Romualda A.

Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that the
marriage ceremony was solemnized on
September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto
Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that said
respondent had been separated from his wife for
about 16 years at the time of his relationship with
complainant;

3. That respondent had been known by the

Barrientos family for quite sometime, having
been a former student of complainant's father in
1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's
mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in
Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with
complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and
eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia
and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma
at her residence; that he also befriended
complainant and who became a close friend
when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to
be one of the usherettes during the Masonic
Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June
28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her
residence in the morning and took her home from
the convention site after each day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and
after a week of courtship, complainant accepted
respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the
evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her
parents' permission was respondent's partner
during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the
Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about
10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place but

before going home, they went to the airport at

Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the
beach, where there were no houses around; that
after the usual preliminaries, they consummated
the sexual act and at about midnight they went
home; that after the first sexual act, respondent
used to have joy ride with complainant which
usually ended at the airport where they used to
make love twice or three times a week; that as a
result of her intimate relations, complainant
became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent,
complainant and complainant's parents, it was
agreed that complainant would deliver her child
in Manila, where she went with her mother on
October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on
the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law
Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that
respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th
and 28th of October 1973, and again in February
and March 1974; that later on complainant
decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order
to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there
in April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good
Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City;

that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl

at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City
and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about
the last week of June 1974 she went home to
Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila
and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed
some of her expenses; that she filed an
administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; which
complaint, however, was dismissed; and then
she instituted the present disbarment
proceedings against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned
respectfully recommend that after hearing,
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred
as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court
finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the Solicitor General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that
complainant was never informed by respondent
attorney of his real status as a married individual.

The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed

by respondent only after the complainant
became pregnant. Even then, respondent
misrepresented himself as being eligible to remarry for having been estranged from his wife for
16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the
assurance that he would work for the annulment
of his first marriage. It was a deception after all
as it turned out that respondent never bothered
to annul said marriage. More importantly,
respondent knew all along that the mere fact of
separation alone is not a ground for annulment of
marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to
contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in
Dipolog City though his son, who was also
studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from
him. He never introduced his son and went
around with friends as though he was never
married much less had a child in the same
locality. This circumstance alone belies
respondent's claim that complainant and her
family were aware of his previous marriage at the
very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore
inclined to believe that respondent resorted to

deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at

the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not
in accordance with the nature of the educated,
cultured and respectable, which complainant's
family is, her father being the Assistant Principal
of the local public high school, to allow a
daughter to have an affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the
perverted sense of respondent's moral values
when he said that: "I see nothing wrong with this
relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p.
209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he
even suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's
moral sense is so seriously impaired that we
cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In
Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held
that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman
while his first wife is still alive and their marriage
still valid and existing is contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality. Respondent made
a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to

allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such,

could enter into multiple marriages and has
inquired into the possibility of marrying
complainant (Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate,
however, his claim of having embraced the Islam
religion is not supported by any evidence save
that of his self-serving testimony. In this regard,
we need only to quote the finding of the Office of
the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry
complainant he said he could not because he
was already married and would open him to a
charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977).
If he were a moslem convert entitled to four (4)
wives, as he is now claiming, why did he not
marry complainant? The answer is supplied by
respondent himself. He said while he was a
moslem, but, having been married in a civil
ceremony, he could no longer validly enter into
another civil ceremony without committing
bigamy because the complainant is a christian
(p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977). Consequently, if
respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being
a moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant,
then it was grossly immoral for him to have

sexual intercourse with complainant because he

knew the existence of a legal impediment.
Respondent may not, therefore, escape
responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has
embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to
appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol
has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency.
Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral character
is a condition which precedes admission to the
Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not
dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is a
continuing qualification which all lawyers must
possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682
[1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653
[1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be
suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350
[1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395
[1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the

requirement of good character is not only a

condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law; its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law (People v.
Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990,
181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice
George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorney's
character is bad in such respects as to show that
he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the
powers of an attorney, the court retains the
power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil.
350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding
was resolved by this Court against a lawyer who
convinced a woman that her prior marriage to
another man was null and void ab initio and she
was still legally single and free to marry him (the
lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his
studies, begot a child with her, abandoned her
and the child, and married another woman (Terre
vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and
about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage

to complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor,

knowing that he did not have the required legal
capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having
carnal relations with complainant by deception,
made her pregnant, suggested abortion,
breached his promise to marry her, and then
deserted her and the child. Respondent is
therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to
those who measure up to the exacting standards
of mental and moral fitness. Respondent having
exhibited debased morality, the Court is
constrained to impose upon him the most severe
disciplinary action disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts
from its members the highest standard of
morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined to
aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient
either moral character or education (In re Puno,
19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107
SCRA 1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in

fact be of good moral character but must also be

seen to be of good moral character and must
lead a life in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a
member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but
must also behave himself in such a manner as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards
(Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989],
citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and
Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).

Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and

spread on the personal record of respondent
Daarol.

In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally

delinquent and as such, should not be allowed
continued membership in the ancient and
learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19
SCRA 439 [1967]).

G.R. No. L-2352

ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent

Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral
conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar
and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his
name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let
copies of this Resolution be furnished to all
courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
DELAY
July 26, 1910

ELADIO ALONSO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.TOMAS

VILLAMOR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellants.
J. C. Knudson, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an action brought to recover of the
defendants the value of certain articles taken
from a Roman Catholic Church located in the

municipality of Placer, and the rental value of the

church and its appurtenances, including the
church cemetery, from the 11th day of December,
1901, until the month of April, 1904. After hearing
the evidence, the court below gave judgment in
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,581, with
interest at 6 per cent from the date of the
judgment. The said sum of P1,581 was made up
of two items, one of which, P741, was for the
value of the articles taken from the church, and
the other, P840, the rental value of the premises
during the occupations by defendants. From this
judgment the defendants appealed to this court.
It appears that the defendants were on the 11th
day of December, 1901, members of the
municipal board of the municipality of Placer, and
that they on that date addressed to the plaintiff in
this case, who was the priest in charge of the
church, its appurtenances and contents, the
following letter:
PLACER, 11th December, 1901.
R. P. ELADIO ALONSO, Benedicto, Suriago.
ESTEEMED PADRE: After saluting you, we take

the liberty of writing you that in the municipality of

which we have charged we have received an
order from the provincial fiscal, dated the 5th
instant, which says: "The cemeteries, convents,
and the other buildings erected on land
belonging to the town at the expense of the town
and preserved by it belong to the town, and for
this reason the municipality is under the
obligation of administering them and of collecting
the revenues therefrom, and for this reason we
notify you that from this date all of the revenues
and products therefrom must be turned into the
treasury of the municipality in order that the
people may properly preserve them.
In the same way we notify you that the image of
St. Vicente which is now in the church, as it is an
image donated to the people by its owner, by
virtue of said order is also the property of said
people, and therefore the alms which are given it
by the devotees thereof must be also turned into
the municipal treasury for the proper preservation
of the church and for other necessary purposes.
We hope that you will view in the proper light and
that you will deliver to the bearer of this letter the
key of the alms box of the said image in order

that we may comply with our obligation in

conformity with the dispositions of said order.

ELEUTERIO MONDAYA.

We beg to remain as always by your spiritual

sons. Q. B. S. M.

MAXIMO DELOLA.

(Signed) ANDRES OJEDA.

SEGUNDO BECERRO.

TOMAS VILLAMOR.

ONOFRE ELIMANCE.

ANDRES CALINAUAN.

BERNARDINO TANDOY.

EUSEBIO LIRIO.

On the 13th of December, 1901, the defendants

took possession of the church and its
appurtenances, and also of all of the personal
property contained therein. The plaintiff, as priest
of the church and the person in charge thereof,
protested against the occupation thereof by the
defendants, but his protests received no
consideration, and he was summarily removed
from possession of the church, its appurtenances
and contents.
The only defense presented by the defendants,
except the one that the plaintiff was not the real

party in interest, was that the church and other

buildings had been erected by funds voluntarily
contributed by the people of that municipality,
and that the articles within the church had been
purchased with funds raised in like manner, and
that, therefore, the municipality was the owner
thereof.
The question as to the ownership of the church
and its appurtenances, including the convent and
cemetery, was before this court on the 23rd day
of September, 1908, in an action entitled "The
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church against the
municipality of Placer."1 Substantially the same
facts were presented on the part of the
defendants in that case as are presented by the
defendants in this. The question there litigated
was the claim upon the part of the municipality of
ownership of said church and its appurtenances
on the ground that according to Spanish law the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church was not the
owner of such property, having only the use
thereof for ordinary ecclesiastical and religious
purposes, and that the true owner thereof was
the municipality or the State by reason of the
contributions by them, or by the people, of the

land and of the funds with which the buildings

were constructed or repaired. The court decided
in that case that the claim of the defendants was
not well founded and that the property belonged
to the Roman Catholic Church. The same
question was discussed and decided in the case
of Barlin vs. Ramirez (7 Phil. Rep., 41), and the
case of The Municipality of Ponce vs. Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Rico (28 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 737, 6 Off. Gaz., 1213).
We have made a careful examination of the
record and the evidence in this case and we
have no doubt that the property sued for was, at
the time it was taken by the defendants, the
property of the Roman Catholic Church, and that
the seizure of the same and occupation of the
church and its appurtenances by the defendants
were wrongful and illegal. We are also
convinced, from such examination, that the
conclusions of the court below as to the value of
the articles taken by the defendants and of the
rent of the church for the time of its illegal
occupation by the defendants were correct and
proper. While some objection was made on
appeal by counsel for the defendants that the

value of the articles taken and of the rent of the

church and its appurtenances had not been
proved by competent evidence, no objection to
the introduction of the evidence of value was
made at the trial and we can not consider that
question raised for the first time here.
We have carefully examined the assignments of
error made by counsel for defendants on this
appeal. We find none of them well founded. The
only one which deserves especial attention at our
hands is the one wherein the defendants assert
that the court below erred in permitting the action
to be brought and continued in the name of the
plaintiff instead of in the name of the bishop of
the diocese within which the church was located,
or in the name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church, as the real party in interest.
It is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the
Roman Catholic Apostic Church itself is the real
party in interest. The plaintiff personally has no
interest in the cause of action. Section 114 of the
Code of Civil Procedure requires that every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. The plaintiff is not such
party.

Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

however, provides:
SEC. 110. Amendments in general. The court
shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such
terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to
amend any pleading or proceeding and at any
stage of the action, in either the Court of First
Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or
striking out the name of any party, either plaintiff
or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the
name of a party, or a mistaken or inadequate
allegation or description in any other respect so
that the actual merits of the controversy may
speedily be determined, without regard to
technicalities, and in the most expeditious, and
inexpensive manner. The court may also, upon
like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to
be made after the time limited by the rules of the
court for filing the same. Orders of the court upon
the matters provided in this section shall be
made upon motion filed in court, and after notice
to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be
heard.
Section 503 of the same code provides:

SEC. 503. Judgment not to be reversed on

technical grounds. No judgment shall be
reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for
such error as has not prejudiced the real rights of
the excepting party.
We are confident under these provisions that this
court has full power, apart from that power and
authority which is inherent, to amend the
process, pleadings, proceedings, and decision in
this case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the
real party in interest. Not only are we confident
that we may do so, but we are convinced that we
should do so. Such an amendment does not
constitute, really a change in the identity of the
parties. The plaintiff asserts in his complaint, and
maintains that assertion all through the record,
that he is engaged in the prosecution of this
case, not for himself, but for the bishop of the
diocesenot by his own right, but by right of
another. He seeks merely to do for the bishop
what the bishop might do for himself. His own
personality is not involved. His own rights are not
presented. He claims no interest whatever in the
litigation. He seeks only the welfare of the great
church whose servant he is. Gladly permits his

identity to be wholly swallowed up in that of his

superior. The substitution, then, of the name of
the bishop of the diocese, or the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church, for that of Padre Alonso, as
party plaintiff, is not in reality the substitution of
one identity for another, of one party for another,
but is simply to make the form express the
substance. The substance is there. It appears all
through the proceedings. No one is deceived for
an instant as to whose interest are at stake. The
form of its expression is alone defective. The
substitution, then, is not substantial but formal.
Defect in mere form can not possibly so long as
the substantial is clearly evident. Form is a
method of speech used to express substance
and make it clearly appear. It is the means by
which the substance reveals itself. If the form be
faulty and still the substance shows plainly
through no, harm can come by making the form
accurately expressive of the substance.
No one has been misled by the error in the name
of the party plaintiff. If we should by reason of
this error send this back for amendment and new
trial, there would be on the retrial the same
complaint, the same answer, the same defense,

the same interests, the same witnesses, and the

same evidence. The name of the plaintiff would
constitute the only difference between the old
trial and the new. In our judgment there is not
enough in a name to justify such action.
There is nothing sacred about processes or
pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole
purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of contending parties. They were
created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate
and promote, the administration of justice. They
do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are
always striving to secure to litigants. They are
designed as the means best adapted to obtain
that thing. In other words, they are a means to an
end. When they lose the character of the one
and become the other, the administration of
justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly
remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
The error in this case is purely technical. To take
advantage of it for other purposes than to cure it,
does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its
presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's case
smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not
a game of technicalities in which one, more

deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of

movement and position, entraps and destroys
the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside
as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections
of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that
justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike
duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it desserts its proper office as
an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to
challenge a record of a court of these Islands for
defect of form when his substantial rights have
not been prejudiced thereby.
In ordering this substitution, we are in accord
with the best judicial thought. (McKeighan vs.
Hopkins, 19 Neb., 33; Dixon vs. Dixon, 19 Ia.,
512; Hodges vs. Kimball, 49 Ia., 577; Sanger vs.
Newton, 134 Mass., 308; George vs. Reed, 101
Mass., 378; Bowden vs. Burnham, 59 Fed. Rep.,
752; Phipps and Co. vs. Hurlburt, 70 Fed. Rep.,
202; McDonal vs. State, 101 Fed. Rep., 171;

Morford vs. Diffenbocker, 20 N. W., 600; Costelo

vs. Costelo vs. Crowell, 134 Mass., 280;
Whitaker vs. Pope, 2 Woods, 463, Fed. Cas. no.
17528; Miller vs. Pollock, 99 Pa. St., 202; Wilson
vs. Presbyterian Church, 56 Ga., 554; Wood vs.
Circuit Judge, 84 Mich., 521; Insurance Co, vs.
Mueller, 77 Ill., 22; Farman vs. Doyle, 128 Mich.,
696; Union Bank vs. Mott, 19 How. Pr., 114; R. R.
Co. vs. Gibson, 4 Ohio St., 145; Hume vs. Kelly,
28 Oreg., 398.)

concur.

It is therefore, ordered and decreed that the

process, pleadings, proceedings and decision in
this action be, and the same are hereby,
amended by substituting the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Eladio
Alonso as party plaintiff, that the complaint be
considered as though originally filed by the
Catholic Church, the answer thereto made, the
decision rendered and all proceedings in this
case had, as if the said institution which Father
Eladio Alonso undertook to represent were the
party plaintiff, and that said decision of the court
below, so amended, is affirmed, without special
finding as to the costs.

VICTORIA AGUINALDO and SIMEONA

AGUINALDO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.SEGUNDO
AGUINALDO (deceased), PRIMO AGUINALDO
and RUFINA AGUINALDO, defendants,
CECILIO AGUINALDO, ANASTACIA
AGUINALDO, SIMPLICIO AGUINALDO,
DOMINGO AGUINALDO, and FELICITAS
BAGAWISAN, defendants-appellants.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson and Trent, JJ.,

Footnotes
1

11 Phil. Rep., 315.

G.R. No. L-30362 November 26, 1970

FERNANDO, J.:
Any effort on the litigant to delay, if not to defeat,
the enforcement of a final judgment, executory in
character, by raising an objection that at best

hardly rises to the level of a technicality is not

likely to elicit the sympathy of this Court or any
court for that matter. Yet, in effect, that is what
the move taken by the defendants in his case
amounted to. The lower court as was but proper
did not lend its approval. Still undeterred, they
would appeal. They ought to have known better.
There is no reason to refuse affirmance to the
order of the lower court complained of,
appointing appellants as legal representatives of
the deceased defendant and substituted in his
place pursuant to the Rules of Court in order that
the execution that ought that have taken place
long since could at long last be effected.
There is no dispute as to the antecedents. On
January 14, 1965, the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch II through its clerk issued a writ
of execution reciting that as far back as March
31, 1958, it rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiffs, 1 now appellees, requiring one of the
defendants therein, Segundo Aguinaldo, to reconvey
one-fourth () pro-indiviso of the property in litigation
to appellees, and to pay the latter the amount of
P300.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955. There
was an appeal. The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals on May 23, 1965. It was further set

forth therein that on January 5, 1965, a motion for its

execution was granted. Hence the writ of execution.
On February 13 of the same year, one Cecilio
Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and
motion to quash such writ of execution based
primarily on the allegation that defendant Segundo
Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during the
pendency of such appeal. There was an opposition
to such motion on February 25, 1965, inviting
attention to Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to
the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a
pending case, it is the duty of his attorney to give the
name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian, or their legal representative and alleging
that there was a failure on the part of the counsel to
comply with the above provision. The prayer was for
the denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for
an order requiring counsel for the defendants to
furnish the court the names as well as the
residences of the heirs or the legal representatives of
the deceased in order that they could be substituted
in his stead so as not to render nugatory a decision,
final and executory in character. On March 4, 1965,
the lower court, then presided by the Hon. Ricardo
C. Puno gave counsel of record up to March 22,
1965 within which to submit the name and residence
of the executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo.

The aforesaid counsel in turn merely manifested on

March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be such as of
May 31, 1956, and that such a pleading be
considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid
order. Considering the turn of events, plaintiffs, in
order that such a decision in their favor be not
rendered nugatory by the above technicality, had no
choice but to ask the court in a motion of April 7,
1965 to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo
Aguinaldo, defendants Cecilio, Anastasia, Simplicio
and Domingo, all bearing the surname of Aguinaldo
being the legitimate children, and one Felicitas
Bagawisan, a granddaughter, substituted as
defendants. On October 5, 1965, the lower court, this
time presided by Judge Andres Sta. Maria, granted
the aforesaid motion and substituted defendants in
place of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo.

Hence this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which

in turn by resolution of February 17, 1969
certified the matter to this Court, the question
involved being one of law. As noted at the outset,
we find for appellees.
1. It would be the height of unreason to impute
error to the lower court precisely for embodying
in the order complained of what is set forth in the
Rules of Court. Thus: "Whenever a party to a

pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or

incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to
inform the court promptly of such death,
incapacity or incompetency, and to give the
name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal
representative." 2Had the defendant, thereafter
deceased, seen to it that a new counsel was
appointed, then upon his death there could be
compliance with the above provision. To cause
plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast
an underserved reflection on the law. It is equally
vital to remember that the judgment had become
final and the stage of execution reached. Defendants
cannot be heard to allege that it is much too late now
to apply the above rule. That would be to set at
naught the principle consistently adhered to by this
Court.

It was succinctly put in Amor v. Jugo 3in these

words: "And with more compelling reason the
respondent court cannot refuse to issue such writ, or
quash it or order its stay, when the judgment had
been reviewed and affirmed by an appellate court,
for it cannot review or interfere with any matter
decided on appeal, or give other or further relief, or
assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or
reverse the judgment of the higher court." 4What was

said by us in Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez 5 is worth

recalling: "Litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt
to prolong them." 6 An excerpt from Villaflor v. Reyes 7
is equally relevant: "There should be a greater
awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the
judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable
to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from
commendable, to evade the operation of a decision
final and executory, especially so, where, as shown
in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any
right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and
indisputable." 8

2. This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated

as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any
persuasive force. Defendants had to display
ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso
v. Villamor, 9 a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt
as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a
lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to

law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to

accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily,
therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which
they are intended deserves condemnation. We have
done so before. We do so again.

WHEREFORE, the order of October 5, 1965 is

affirmed.
This decision is immediately executory. Treble
costs against defendants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal,
Zaldivar,. Castro, Teekankee, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

# Footnotes
1 Plaintiffs are Victoria Aguinaldo and Simeona
Aguinaldo.
2 Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court.
3 77 Phil. 703 (1946); Cf. Shioji v. Harvey, 43

Phil. 333 (1922); Cabigao v. Del Rosario, 44 Phil.

182 (1922); Philippine Trust Co. v. Santamaria,
53 Phil. 463 (1929).
4 Ibid., p. 707.
5 82 Phil. 776 (1949).
6 Ibid., p. 778.

ANTONIO LIM TANHU, DY OCHAY, ALFONSO

LEONARDO NG SUA and CO OYO, petitioners,
vs.HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE as Presiding
Judge, Branch III, CFI, Cebu and TAN PUT,
respondents.
Zosa, Zosa, Castillo, Alcudia & Koh for
petitioners.

7 L-23702, January 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 385.

Fidel Manalo and Florido & Associates for

respondents.

8 Ibid., p. 394.

9 16 Phil. 315. Cf. Blanco v. Bernabe, 63 Phil.

124 (1936); Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank,
84 Phil. 600 (1949); Potenciano v. Court of
Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 (1958); McEntee v.
Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272;
Urbayan v. Caltex (Phil.), L-15379, Aug. 31,
1962, 5 SCRA 1016; Udan v. Amon, L-24288,
May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 837; Palma v. Oreta, L27807, Aug. 31, 1970.

BARREDO, J.:

G.R. No. L-40098 August 29, 1975

Petition for (1) certiorari to annul and set aside

certain actuations of respondent Court of First
Instance of Cebu Branch III in its Civil Case No.
12328, an action for accounting of properties and
money totalling allegedly about P15 million pesos
filed with a common cause of action against six
defendants, in which after declaring four of the
said defendants herein petitioners, in default and
while the trial as against the two defendants not
declared in default was in progress, said court
granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss the case in

so far as the non-defaulted defendants were

concerned and thereafter proceeded to hear exparte the rest of the plaintiffs evidence and
subsequently rendered judgment by default
against the defaulted defendants, with the
particularities that notice of the motion to dismiss
was not duly served on any of the defendants,
who had alleged a compulsory counterclaim
against plaintiff in their joint answer, and the
judgment so rendered granted reliefs not prayed
for in the complaint, and (2) prohibition to enjoin
further proceedings relative to the motion for
immediate execution of the said judgment.
Originally, this litigation was a complaint filed on
February 9, 1971 by respondent Tan Put only
against the spouses-petitioners Antonio Lim
Tanhu and Dy Ochay. Subsequently, in an
amended complaint dated September 26, 1972,
their son Lim Teck Chuan and the other spousespetitioners Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co
Oyo and their son Eng Chong Leonardo were
included as defendants. In said amended
complaint, respondent Tan alleged that she "is
the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was
a partner in the commercial partnership, Glory

Commercial Company ... with Antonio Lim Tanhu

and Alfonso Ng Sua that "defendant Antonio Lim
Tanhu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck
Chuan, and Eng Chong Leonardo, through fraud
and machination, took actual and active
management of the partnership and although Tee
Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory
Commercial Company, defendants managed to
use the funds of the partnership to purchase
lands and building's in the cities of Cebu,
Lapulapu, Mandaue, and the municipalities of
Talisay and Minglanilla, some of which were
hidden, but the description of those already
discovered were as follows: (list of
properties) ...;" and that:
13. (A)fter the death of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan,
the defendants, without liquidation continued the
business of Glory Commercial Company by
purportedly organizing a corporation known as
the Glory Commercial Company, Incorporated,
with paid up capital in the sum of P125,000.00,
which money and other assets of the said Glory
Commercial Company, Incorporated are actually
the assets of the defunct Glory Commercial
Company partnership, of which the plaintiff has a

share equivalent to one third (/ 3) thereof;

14. (P)laintiff, on several occasions after the
death of her husband, has asked defendants of
the above-mentioned properties and for the
liquidation of the business of the defunct
partnership, including investments on real estate
in Hong Kong, but defendants kept on promising
to liquidate said properties and just told plaintiff
to
15. (S)ometime in the month of November, 1967,
defendants, Antonio Lim Tanhu, by means of
fraud deceit and misrepresentations did then and
there, induce and convince the plaintiff to
execute a quitclaim of all her rights and interests,
in the assets of the partnership of Glory
Commercial Company, which is null and void,
executed through fraud and without any legal
effect. The original of said quitclaim is in the
possession of the adverse party defendant
Antonio Lim Tanhu.
16. (A)s a matter of fact, after the execution of
said quitclaim, defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu
offered to pay the plaintiff the amount
P65,000.00 within a period of one (1) month, for

which plaintiff was made to sign a receipt for the

amount of P65,000.00 although no such amount
was given and plaintiff was not even given a
copy of said document;
17. (T)hereafter, in the year 1968-69, the
defendants who had earlier promised to liquidate
the aforesaid properties and assets in favor
among others of plaintiff and until the middle of
the year 1970 when the plaintiff formally
demanded from the defendants the accounting of
real and personal properties of the Glory
Commercial Company, defendants refused and
stated that they would not give the share of the
plaintiff. (Pp. 36-37, Record.)
She prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered:
a) Ordering the defendants to render an
accounting of the real and personal properties of
the Glory Commercial Company including those
registered in the names of the defendants and
other persons, which properties are located in
the Philippines and in Hong Kong;

b) Ordering the defendants to deliver to the

plaintiff after accounting, one third (/ 3) of the total
value of all the properties which is approximately
P5,000,000.00 representing the just share of the
plaintiff;

c) Ordering the defendants to pay the attorney of

the plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) by way of
attorney's fees and damages in the sum of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
This Honorable Court is prayed for other
remedies and reliefs consistent with law and
equity and order the defendants to pay the costs.
(Page 38, Record.)
The admission of said amended complaint was
opposed by defendants upon the ground that
there were material modifications of the causes
of action previously alleged, but respondent
judge nevertheless allowed the amendment
reasoning that:
The present action is for accounting of real and
personal properties as well as for the recovery of
the same with damages.

An objective consideration of pars. 13 and 15 of

the amended complaint pointed out by the
defendants to sustain their opposition will show
that the allegations of facts therein are merely to
amplify material averments constituting the
cause of action in the original complaint. It
likewise include necessary and indispensable
defendants without whom no final determination
can be had in the action and in order that
complete relief is to be accorded as between
those already parties.
Considering that the amendments sought to be
introduced do not change the main causes of
action in the original complaint and the reliefs
demanded and to allow amendments is the rule,
and to refuse them the exception and in order
that the real question between the parties may
be properly and justly threshed out in a single
proceeding to avoid multiplicity of actions. (Page
40, Record.)
In a single answer with counterclaim, over the
signature of their common counsel, defendants
denied specifically not only the allegation that
respondent Tan is the widow of Tee Hoon
because, according to them, his legitimate wife

was Ang Siok Tin still living and with whom he

had four (4) legitimate children, a twin born in
1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all
presently residing in Hongkong, but also all the
allegations of fraud and conversion quoted
above, the truth being, according to them, that
proper liquidation had been regularly made of the
business of the partnership and Tee Hoon used
to receive his just share until his death, as a
result of which the partnership was dissolved and
what corresponded to him were all given to his
wife and children. To quote the pertinent portions
of said answer:
AND BY WAY OF SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES,
defendants hereby incorporate all facts averred
and alleged in the answer, and further most
respectfully declare:
1. That in the event that plaintiff is filing the
present complaint as an heir of Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan, then, she has no legal capacity to sue as
such, considering that the legitimate wife,
namely: Ang Siok Tin, together with their children
are still alive. Under Sec. 1, (d), Rule 16 of the

Revised Rules of Court, lack of legal capacity to

sue is one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss
and so defendants prays that a preliminary
hearing be conducted as provided for in Sec. 5,
of the same rule;
2. That in the alternative case or event that
plaintiff is filing the present case under Art. 144 of
the Civil Code, then, her claim or demand has
been paid, waived abandoned or otherwise
extinguished as evidenced by the 'quitclaim'
Annex 'A' hereof, the ground cited is another
ground for a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, (h), Rule
16) and hence defendants pray that a preliminary
hearing be made in connection therewith
pursuant to Section 5 of the aforementioned rule;
3. That Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was legally
married to Ang Siok Tin and were blessed with
the following children, to wit: Ching Siong Lim
and Ching Hing Lim (twins) born on February 16,
1942; Lim Shing Ping born on March 3, 1949 and
Lim Eng Lu born on June 25, 1965 and presently
residing in Hongkong;
4. That even before the death of Tee Hoon Lim
Po Chuan, the plaintiff was no longer his

common law wife and even though she was not

entitled to anything left by Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan, yet, out of the kindness and generosity
on the part of the defendants, particularly Antonio
Lain Tanhu, who, was inspiring to be monk and in
fact he is now a monk, plaintiff was given a
substantial amount evidenced by the 'quitclaim'
(Annex 'A');
5. That the defendants have acquired properties
out of their own personal fund and certainly not
from the funds belonging to the partnership, just
as Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan had acquired
properties out of his personal fund and which are
now in the possession of the widow and neither
the defendants nor the partnership have anything
to do about said properties;
6. That it would have been impossible to buy
properties from funds belonging to the
partnership without the other partners knowing
about it considering that the amount taken
allegedly is quite big and with such big amount
withdrawn the partnership would have been
insolvent;
7. That plaintiff and Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan

were not blessed with children who would have

been lawfully entitled to succeed to the
properties left by the latter together with the
widow and legitimate children;
8. That despite the fact that plaintiff knew that
she was no longer entitled to anything of the
shares of the late Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, yet,
this suit was filed against the defendant who
have to interpose the following
C O U N T E R C L A I M
A. That the defendants hereby reproduced, by
way of reference, all the allegations and
foregoing averments as part of this counterclaim;
.
B. That plaintiff knew and was aware she was
merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan and that the lawful and legal is still living,
together with the legitimate children, and yet she
deliberately suppressed this fact, thus showing
her bad faith and is therefore liable for exemplary
damages in an amount which the Honorable
Court may determine in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion. In the event that plaintiff is

married to Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, then, her

marriage is bigamous and should suffer the
consequences thereof;
C. That plaintiff was aware and had knowledge
about the 'quitclaim', even though she was not
entitled to it, and yet she falsely claimed that
defendants refused even to see her and for filing
this unfounded, baseless, futile and puerile
complaint, defendants suffered mental anguish
and torture conservatively estimated to be not
less than P3,000.00;
D. That in order to defend their rights in court,
defendants were constrained to engage the
services of the undersigned counsel, obligating
themselves to pay P500,000.00 as attorney's
fees;
E. That by way of litigation expenses during the
time that this case will be before this Honorable
Court and until the same will be finally terminated
and adjudicated, defendants will have to spend
at least P5,000.00. (Pp. 44-47. Record.)
After unsuccessfully trying to show that this
counterclaim is merely permissive and should be

dismissed for non-payment of the corresponding

filing fee, and after being overruled by the court,
in due time, plaintiff answered the same, denying
its material allegations.
On February 3, 1973, however, the date set for
the pre-trial, both of the two defendants-spouses
the Lim Tanhus and Ng Suas, did not appear, for
which reason, upon motion of plaintiff dated
February 16, 1973, in an order of March 12,
1973, they were all "declared in DEFAULT as of
February 3, 1973 when they failed to appear at
the pre-trial." They sought to hive this order lifted
thru a motion for reconsideration, but the effort
failed when the court denied it. Thereafter, the
trial started, but at the stage thereof where the
first witness of the plaintiff by the name of
Antonio Nuez who testified that he is her
adopted son, was up for re-cross-examination,
said plaintiff unexpectedly filed on October 19,
1974 the following simple and unreasoned
MOTION TO DROP DEFENDANTS LIM TECK
CHUAN AND ENG CHONG LEONARDO
COMES now plaintiff, through her undersigned
counsel, unto the Honorable Court most

respectfully moves to drop from the complaint the

defendants Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong
Leonardo and to consider the case dismissed
insofar as said defendants Lim Teck Chuan and
Eng Chong Leonardo are concerned.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of
the Honorable Court to drop from the complaint
the defendants Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong
Leonardo and to dismiss the case against them
without pronouncement as to costs. (Page 50,
Record.)
which she set for hearing on December 21, 1974.
According to petitioners, none of the defendants
declared in default were notified of said motion,
in violation of Section 9 of Rule 13, since they
had asked for the lifting of the order of default,
albeit unsuccessfully, and as regards the
defendants not declared in default, the setting of
the hearing of said motion on October 21, 1974
infringed the three-day requirement of Section 4
of Rule 15, inasmuch as Atty. Adelino Sitoy of
Lim Teck Chuan was served with a copy of the
motion personally only on October 19, 1974,
while Atty. Benjamin Alcudia of Eng Chong
Leonardo was served by registered mail sent

only on the same date.

Evidently without even verifying the notices of
service, just as simply as plaintiff had couched
her motion, and also without any legal grounds
stated, respondent court granted the prayer of
the above motion thus:
ORDER
Acting on the motion of the plaintiff praying for
the dismissal of the complaint as against
defendants Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong
Leonardo.
The same is hereby GRANTED. The complaint
as against defendant Lim Teck Chuan and Eng
Chong Leonardo is hereby ordered DISMISSED
without pronouncement as to costs.
Simultaneously, the following order was also
issued:
Considering that defendants Antonio Lim Tanhu
and his spouse Dy Ochay as well as defendants
Alfonso Ng Sua and his spouse Co Oyo have
been declared in default for failure to appear

during the pre-trial and as to the other

defendants the complaint had already been
ordered dismissed as against them.
Let the hearing of the plaintiff's evidence exparte be set on November 20, 1974, at 8:30 A.M.
before the Branch Clerk of Court who is
deputized for the purpose, to swear in witnesses
and to submit her report within ten (10) days
thereafter. Notify the plaintiff.

20, 1974. However, on October 28, 1974, the

plaintiff, together with her witnesses, appeared in
court and asked, thru counsel, that she be
allowed to present her evidence.
Considering the time and expenses incurred by
the plaintiff in bringing her witnesses to the court,
the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby authorized to
receive immediately the evidence of the plaintiff
ex-parte.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, October 21, 1974. (Page

52, Record.)

Cebu City, Philippines, October 28, 1974. (Page

53. Record.)

But, in connection with this last order, the

scheduled ex-parte reception of evidence did not
take place on November 20, 1974, for on
October 28, 1974, upon verbal motion of plaintiff,
the court issued the following self-explanatory
order: .

Upon learning of these orders on October 23,

1973, the defendant Lim Teck Cheng, thru
counsel, Atty. Sitoy, filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof, and on November 1,
1974, defendant Eng Chong Leonardo, thru
counsel Atty. Alcudia, filed also his own motion
for reconsideration and clarification of the same
orders. These motions were denied in an order
dated December 6, 1974 but received by the
movants only on December 23, 1974.
Meanwhile, respondent court rendered the

Acting favorably on the motion of the plaintiff

dated October 18, 1974, the Court deputized the
Branch Clerk of Court to receive the evidence of
the plaintiff ex-parte to be made on November

impugned decision on December 20, 1974. It

does not appear when the parties were served
copies of this decision.
Subsequently, on January 6, 1975, all the
defendants, thru counsel, filed a motion to quash
the order of October 28, 1974. Without waiting
however for the resolution thereof, on January
13, 1974, Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong
Leonardo went to the Court of Appeals with a
petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of
the above-mentioned orders of October 21, 1974
and October 28, 1974 and decision of December
20, 1974. By resolution of January 24, 1975, the
Court of Appeals dismissed said petition, holding
that its filing was premature, considering that the
motion to quash the order of October 28, 1974
was still unresolved by the trial court. This
holding was reiterated in the subsequent
resolution of February 5, 1975 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the previous
dismissal.
On the other hand, on January 20, 1975, the
other defendants, petitioners herein, filed their
notice of appeal, appeal bond and motion for
extension to file their record on appeal, which

was granted, the extension to expire after fifteen

(15) days from January 26 and 27, 1975, for
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Suas,
respectively. But on February 7, 1975, before the
perfection of their appeal, petitioners filed the
present petition with this Court. And with the
evident intent to make their procedural position
clear, counsel for defendants, Atty. Manuel Zosa,
filed with respondent court a manifestation dated
February 14, 1975 stating that "when the nondefaulted defendants Eng Chong Leonardo and
Lim Teck Chuan filed their petition in the Court of
Appeals, they in effect abandoned their motion to
quash the order of October 28, 1974," and that
similarly "when Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay,
Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo, filed their
petition for certiorari and prohibition ... in the
Supreme Court, they likewise abandoned their
motion to quash." This manifestation was acted
upon by respondent court together with plaintiffs
motion for execution pending appeal in its order
of the same date February 14, 1975 this wise:
ORDER
When these incidents, the motion to quash the
order of October 28, 1974 and the motion for

execution pending appeal were called for hearing

today, counsel for the defendants-movants
submitted their manifestation inviting the
attention of this Court that by their filing for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction in the Court of Appeals which was
dismissed and later the defaulted defendants
filed with the Supreme Court certiorari with
prohibition they in effect abandoned their motion
to quash.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the motion to quash is
ordered ABANDONED. The resolution of the
motion for execution pending appeal shall be
resolved after the petition for certiorari and
prohibition shall have been resolved by the
Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 14, 1975. (Page
216, Record.)
Upon these premises, it is the position of
petitioners that respondent court acted illegally,
in violation of the rules or with grave abuse of
discretion in acting on respondent's motion to

dismiss of October 18, 1974 without previously

ascertaining whether or not due notice thereof
had been served on the adverse parties, as, in
fact, no such notice was timely served on the
non-defaulted defendants Lim Teck Chuan and
Eng Chong Leonardo and no notice at all was
ever sent to the other defendants, herein
petitioners, and more so, in actually ordering the
dismissal of the case by its order of October 21,
1974 and at the same time setting the case for
further hearing as against the defaulted
defendants, herein petitioners, actually hearing
the same ex-parte and thereafter rendering the
decision of December 20, 1974 granting
respondent Tan even reliefs not prayed for in the
complaint. According to the petitioners, to begin
with, there was compulsory counterclaim in the
common answer of the defendants the nature of
which is such that it cannot be decided in an
independent action and as to which the attention
of respondent court was duly called in the
motions for reconsideration. Besides, and more
importantly, under Section 4 of Rule 18,
respondent court had no authority to divide the
case before it by dismissing the same as against
the non-defaulted defendants and thereafter

proceeding to hear it ex-parte and subsequently

rendering judgment against the defaulted
defendants, considering that in their view, under
the said provision of the rules, when a common
cause of action is alleged against several
defendants, the default of any of them is a mere
formality by which those defaulted are not
allowed to take part in the proceedings, but
otherwise, all the defendants, defaulted and not
defaulted, are supposed to have but a common
fate, win or lose. In other words, petitioners posit
that in such a situation, there can only be one
common judgment for or against all the
defendant, the non-defaulted and the defaulted.
Thus, petitioners contend that the order of
dismissal of October 21, 1974 should be
considered also as the final judgment insofar as
they are concerned, or, in the alternative, it
should be set aside together with all the
proceedings and decision held and rendered
subsequent thereto, and that the trial be resumed
as of said date, with the defendants Lim Teck
Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo being allowed
to defend the case for all the defendants.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains

the contrary view that inasmuch as petitioners

had been properly declared in default, they have
no personality nor interest to question the
dismissal of the case as against their nondefaulted co-defendants and should suffer the
consequences of their own default. Respondent
further contends, and this is the only position
discussed in the memorandum submitted by her
counsel, that since petitioners have already
made or at least started to make their appeal, as
they are in fact entitled to appeal, this special
civil action has no reason for being. Additionally,
she invokes the point of prematurity upheld by
the Court of Appeals in regard to the abovementioned petition therein of the non-defaulted
defendants Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong
Leonardo. Finally, she argues that in any event,
the errors attributed to respondent court are
errors of judgment and may be reviewed only in
an appeal.
After careful scrutiny of all the above-related
proceedings, in the court below and mature
deliberation, the Court has arrived at the
conclusion that petitioners should be granted
relief, if only to stress emphatically once more

that the rules of procedure may not be misused

and abused as instruments for the denial of
substantial justice. A review of the record of this
case immediately discloses that here is another
demonstrative instance of how some members of
the bar, availing of their proficiency in invoking
the letter of the rules without regard to their real
spirit and intent, succeed in inducing courts to act
contrary to the dictates of justice and equity, and,
in some instances, to wittingly or unwittingly abet
unfair advantage by ironically camouflaging their
actuations as earnest efforts to satisfy the public
clamor for speedy disposition of litigations,
forgetting all the while that the plain injunction of
Section 2 of Rule 1 is that the "rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining not
only 'speedy' but more imperatively, "just ... and
inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." We cannot simply pass over the
impression that the procedural maneuvers and
tactics revealed in the records of the case at bar
were deliberately planned with the calculated end
in view of depriving petitioners and their codefendants below of every opportunity to
properly defend themselves against a claim of

more than substantial character, considering the

millions of pesos worth of properties involved as
found by respondent judge himself in the
impugned decision, a claim that appears, in the
light of the allegations of the answer and the
documents already brought to the attention of the
court at the pre-trial, to be rather dubious. What
is most regrettable is that apparently, all of these
alarming circumstances have escaped
respondent judge who did not seem to have
hesitated in acting favorably on the motions of
the plaintiff conducive to the deplorable objective
just mentioned, and which motions, at the very
least, appeared to be 'of highly controversial'
merit, considering that their obvious tendency
and immediate result would be to convert the
proceedings into a one-sided affair, a situation
that should be readily condemnable and
intolerable to any court of justice.
Indeed, a seeming disposition on the part of
respondent court to lean more on the contentions
of private respondent may be discerned from the
manner it resolved the attempts of defendants Dy
Ochay and Antonio Lim Tanhu to have the earlier
order of default against them lifted.

Notwithstanding that Dy Ochay's motion of

October 8, 1971, co-signed by her with their
counsel, Atty. Jovencio Enjambre (Annex 2 of
respondent answer herein) was over the jurat of
the notary public before whom she took her oath,
in the order of November 2, 1971, (Annex 3 id.) it
was held that "the oath appearing at the bottom
of the motion is not the one contemplated by the
abovequoted pertinent provision (See. 3, Rule
18) of the rules. It is not even a verification. (See.
6, Rule 7.) What the rule requires as interpreted
by the Supreme Court is that the motion must
have to be accompanied by an affidavit of merits
that the defendant has a meritorious defense,
thereby ignoring the very simple legal point that
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Ong Peng vs.
Custodio, 1 SCRA 781, relied upon by His Honor,
under which a separate affidavit of merit is
required refers obviously to instances where the
motion is not over oath of the party concerned,
considering that what the cited provision literally
requires is no more than a "motion under oath."
Stated otherwise, when a motion to lift an order
of default contains the reasons for the failure to
answer as well as the facts constituting the
prospective defense of the defendant and it is

sworn to by said defendant, neither a formal

verification nor a separate affidavit of merit is
necessary.
What is worse, the same order further held that
the motion to lift the order of default "is an
admission that there was a valid service of
summons" and that said motion could not
amount to a challenge against the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant. Such
a rationalization is patently specious and reveals
an evident failure to grasp the import of the legal
concepts involved. A motion to lift an order of
default on the ground that service of summons
has not been made in accordance with the rules
is in order and is in essence verily an attack
against the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant, no less than if it were
worded in a manner specifically embodying such
a direct challenge.
And then, in the order of February 14, 1972
(Annex 6, id.) lifting at last the order of default as
against defendant Lim Tanhu, His Honor posited
that said defendant "has a defense (quitclaim)
which renders the claim of the plaintiff
contentious." We have read defendants' motion

for reconsideration of November 25, 1971

(Annex 5, id.), but We cannot find in it any
reference to a "quitclaim". Rather, the allegation
of a quitclaim is in the amended complaint (Pars.
15-16, Annex B of the petition herein) in which
plaintiff maintains that her signature thereto was
secured through fraud and deceit. In truth, the
motion for reconsideration just mentioned, Annex
5, merely reiterated the allegation in Dy Ochay's
earlier motion of October 8, 1971, Annex 2, to set
aside the order of default, that plaintiff Tan could
be but the common law wife only of Tee Hoon,
since his legitimate wife was still alive, which
allegation, His Honor held in the order of
November 2, 1971, Annex 3, to be "not good and
meritorious defense". To top it all, whereas, as
already stated, the order of February 19, 1972,
Annex 6, lifted the default against Lim Tanhu
because of the additional consideration that "he
has a defense (quitclaim) which renders the
claim of the plaintiff contentious," the default of
Dy Ochay was maintained notwithstanding that
exactly the same "contentions" defense as that of
her husband was invoked by her.
Such tenuous, if not altogether erroneous

reasonings and manifest inconsistency in the

legal postures in the orders in question can
hardly convince Us that the matters here in issue
were accorded due and proper consideration by
respondent court. In fact, under the
circumstances herein obtaining, it seems
appropriate to stress that, having in view the
rather substantial value of the subject matter
involved together with the obviously contentious
character of plaintiff's claim, which is discernible
even on the face of the complaint itself, utmost
care should have been taken to avoid the
slightest suspicion of improper motivations on the
part of anyone concerned. Upon the
considerations hereunder to follow, the Court
expresses its grave concern that much has to be
done to dispel the impression that herein
petitioners and their co-defendants are being
railroaded out of their rights and properties
without due process of law, on the strength of
procedural technicalities adroitly planned by
counsel and seemingly unnoticed and
undetected by respondent court, whose orders,
gauged by their tenor and the citations of
supposedly pertinent provisions and
jurisprudence made therein, cannot be said to

have proceeded from utter lack of juridical

knowledgeability and competence.
1
The first thing that has struck the Court upon
reviewing the record is the seeming alacrity with
which the motion to dismiss the case against
non-defaulted defendants Lim Teck Chuan and
Eng Chong Leonardo was disposed of, which
definitely ought not to have been the case. The
trial was proceeding with the testimony of the first
witness of plaintiff and he was still under recross-examination. Undoubtedly, the motion to
dismiss at that stage and in the light of the
declaration of default against the rest of the
defendants was a well calculated surprise move,
obviously designed to secure utmost advantage
of the situation, regardless of its apparent
unfairness. To say that it must have been entirely
unexpected by all the defendants, defaulted and
non-defaulted , is merely to rightly assume that
the parties in a judicial proceeding can never be
the victims of any procedural waylaying as long
as lawyers and judges are imbued with the
requisite sense of equity and justice.

But the situation here was aggravated by the

indisputable fact that the adverse parties who
were entitled to be notified of such unanticipated
dismissal motion did not get due notice thereof.
Certainly, the non-defaulted defendants had the
right to the three-day prior notice required by
Section 4 of Rule 15. How could they have had
such indispensable notice when the motion was
set for hearing on Monday, October 21, 1974,
whereas the counsel for Lim Teck Chuan, Atty.
Sitoy was personally served with the notice only
on Saturday, October 19, 1974 and the counsel
for Eng Chong Leonardo, Atty. Alcudia, was
notified by registered mail which was posted only
that same Saturday, October 19, 1974?
According to Chief Justice Moran, "three days at
least must intervene between the date of service
of notice and the date set for the hearing,
otherwise the court may not validly act on the
motion." (Comments on the Rules of Court by
Moran, Vol. 1, 1970 ed. p. 474.) Such is the
correct construction of Section 4 of Rule 15. And
in the instant case, there can be no question that
the notices to the non-defaulted defendants were
short of the requirement of said provision.

We can understand the over-anxiety of counsel

for plaintiff, but what is incomprehensible is the
seeming inattention of respondent judge to the
explicit mandate of the pertinent rule, not to
speak of the imperatives of fairness, considering
he should have realized the far-reaching
implications, specially from the point of view he
subsequently adopted, albeit erroneously, of his
favorably acting on it. Actually, he was aware of
said consequences, for simultaneously with his
order of dismissal, he immediately set the case
for the ex-parte hearing of the evidence against
the defaulted defendants, which, incidentally,
from the tenor of his order which We have
quoted above, appears to have been done by
him motu propio As a matter of fact, plaintiff's
motion also quoted above did not pray for it.
Withal, respondent court's twin actions of
October 21, 1974 further ignores or is
inconsistent with a number of known juridical
principles concerning defaults, which We will
here take occasion to reiterate and further
elucidate on, if only to avoid a repetition of the
unfortunate errors committed in this case.
Perhaps some of these principles have not been

amply projected and elaborated before, and such

paucity of elucidation could be the reason why
respondent judge must have acted as he did.
Still, the Court cannot but express its vehement
condemnation of any judicial actuation that
unduly deprives any party of the right to be heard
without clear and specific warrant under the
terms of existing rules or binding jurisprudence.
Extreme care must be the instant reaction of
every judge when confronted with a situation
involving risks that the proceedings may not be
fair and square to all the parties concerned.
Indeed, a keen sense of fairness, equity and
justice that constantly looks for consistency
between the letter of the adjective rules and
these basic principles must be possessed by
every judge, If substance is to prevail, as it must,
over form in our courts. Literal observance of the
rules, when it is conducive to unfair and undue
advantage on the part of any litigant before it, is
unworthy of any court of justice and equity.
Withal, only those rules and procedure informed,
with and founded on public policy deserve
obedience in accord with their unequivocal
language or words..

Before proceeding to the discussion of the

default aspects of this case, however, it should
not be amiss to advert first to the patent
incorrectness, apparent on the face of the record,
of the aforementioned order of dismissal of
October 21, 1974 of the case below as regards
non-defaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo.
While it is true that said defendants are not
petitioners herein, the Court deems it necessary
for a full view of the outrageous procedural
strategy conceived by respondent's counsel and
sanctioned by respondent court to also make
reference to the very evident fact that in ordering
said dismissal respondent court disregarded
completely the existence of defendant's
counterclaim which it had itself earlier held if
indirectly, to be compulsory in nature when it
refused to dismiss the same on the ground
alleged by respondent Tan that he docketing fees
for the filing thereof had not been paid by
defendants.
Indeed, that said counterclaim is compulsory
needs no extended elaboration. As may be noted
in the allegations hereof aforequoted, it arose out
of or is necessarily connected with the

occurrence that is the subject matter of the

plaintiff's claim, (Section 4, Rule 9) namely,
plaintiff's allegedly being the widow of the
deceased Tee Hoon entitled, as such, to demand
accounting of and to receive the share of her
alleged late husband as partner of defendants
Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng
Sua in Glory Commercial Company, the truth of
which allegations all the defendants have denied.
Defendants maintain in their counterclaim that
plaintiff knew of the falsity of said allegations
even before she filed her complaint, for she had
in fact admitted her common-law relationship
with said deceased in a document she had jointly
executed with him by way of agreement to
terminate their illegitimate relationship, for which
she received P40,000 from the deceased, and
with respect to her pretended share in the capital
and profits in the partnership, it is also
defendants' posture that she had already
quitclaimed, with the assistance of able counsel,
whatever rights if any she had thereto in
November, 1967, for the sum of P25,000 duly
receipted by her, which quitclaim was, however,
executed, according to respondent herself in her
amended complaint, through fraud. And having

filed her complaint knowing, according to

defendants, as she ought to have known, that the
material allegations thereof are false and
baseless, she has caused them to suffer
damages. Undoubtedly, with such allegations,
defendants' counterclaim is compulsory, not only
because the same evidence to sustain it will also
refute the cause or causes of action alleged in
plaintiff's complaint, (Moran, supra p. 352) but
also because from its very nature, it is obvious
that the same cannot "remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court." (Section
2, Rule 17.)

record shows clearly that at least defendant Lim

immediately brought the matter of their
compulsory counterclaim to the attention of the
trial court in his motion for reconsideration of
October 23, 1974, even as the counsel for the
other defendant, Leonardo, predicated his motion
on other grounds. In its order of December 6,
1974, however, respondent court not only upheld
the plaintiffs supposed absolute right to choose
her adversaries but also held that the
counterclaim is not compulsory, thereby virtually
making unexplained and inexplicable 180-degree
turnabout in that respect.

The provision of the rules just cited specifically

enjoins that "(i)f a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon
him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action
shall not be dismissed against the defendant's
objection unless the counterclaim can remain
pending for independent adjudication by the
court." Defendants Lim and Leonardo had no
opportunity to object to the motion to dismiss
before the order granting the same was issued,
for the simple reason that they were not
opportunity notified of the motion therefor, but the

There is another equally fundamental

consideration why the motion to dismiss should
not have been granted. As the plaintiff's
complaint has been framed, all the six
defendants are charged with having actually
taken part in a conspiracy to misappropriate,
conceal and convert to their own benefit the
profits, properties and all other assets of the
partnership Glory Commercial Company, to the
extent that they have allegedly organized a
corporation, Glory Commercial Company, Inc.
with what they had illegally gotten from the

partnership. Upon such allegations, no judgment

finding the existence of the alleged conspiracy or
holding the capital of the corporation to be the
money of the partnership is legally possible
without the presence of all the defendants. The
non-defaulted defendants are alleged to be
stockholders of the corporation and any decision
depriving the same of all its assets cannot but
prejudice the interests of said defendants.
Accordingly, upon these premises, and even
prescinding from the other reasons to be
discussed anon it is clear that all the six
defendants below, defaulted and non-defaulted,
are indispensable parties. Respondents could do
no less than grant that they are so on page 23 of
their answer. Such being the case, the
questioned order of dismissal is exactly the
opposite of what ought to have been done.
Whenever it appears to the court in the course of
a proceeding that an indispensable party has not
been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the
trial and to order the inclusion of such party. (The
Revised Rules of Court, Annotated &
Commented by Senator Vicente J. Francisco,
Vol. 1, p. 271, 1973 ed. See also Cortez vs.
Avila, 101 Phil. 705.) Such an order is

unavoidable, for the "general rule with reference

to the making of parties in a civil action requires
the joinder of all necessary parties wherever
possible, and the joinder of all indispensable
parties under any and all conditions, the
presence of those latter being a sine qua non of
the exercise of judicial power." (Borlasa vs.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, at p. 347.) It is precisely "
when an indispensable party is not before the
court (that) the action should be dismissed."
(People v. Rodriguez, 106 Phil. 325, at p. 327.)
The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actuations of the court null and
void, for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.
In short, what respondent court did here was
exactly the reverse of what the law ordains it
eliminated those who by law should precisely be
joined.
As may he noted from the order of respondent
court quoted earlier, which resolved the motions
for reconsideration of the dismissal order filed by
the non-defaulted defendants, His Honor
rationalized his position thus:
It is the rule that it is the absolute prerogative of

the plaintiff to choose, the theory upon which he

predicates his right of action, or the parties he
desires to sue, without dictation or imposition by
the court or the adverse party. If he makes a
mistake in the choice of his right of action, or in
that of the parties against whom he seeks to
enforce it, that is his own concern as he alone
suffers therefrom. The plaintiff cannot be
compelled to choose his defendants, He may
not, at his own expense, be forced to implead
anyone who, under the adverse party's theory, is
to answer for defendant's liability. Neither may
the Court compel him to furnish the means by
which defendant may avoid or mitigate their
liability. (Vao vs. Alo, 95 Phil. 495-496.)
This being the rule this court cannot compel the
plaintiff to continue prosecuting her cause of
action against the defendants-movants if in the
course of the trial she believes she can enforce it
against the remaining defendants subject only to
the limitation provided in Section 2, Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court. ... (Pages 6263, Record.)
Noticeably, His Honor has employed the same
equivocal terminology as in plaintiff's motion of
October 18, 1974 by referring to the action he

had taken as being "dismissal of the complaint

against them or their being dropped therefrom",
without perceiving that the reason for the
evidently intentional ambiguity is transparent.
The apparent idea is to rely on the theory that
under Section 11 of Rule 3, parties may be
dropped by the court upon motion of any party at
any stage of the action, hence "it is the absolute
right prerogative of the plaintiff to choosethe
parties he desires to sue, without dictation or
imposition by the court or the adverse party." In
other words, the ambivalent pose is suggested
that plaintiff's motion of October 18, 1974 was
not predicated on Section 2 of Rule 17 but more
on Section 11 of Rule 3. But the truth is that
nothing can be more incorrect. To start with, the
latter rule does not comprehend whimsical and
irrational dropping or adding of parties in a
complaint. What it really contemplates is
erroneous or mistaken non-joinder and
misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join
anybody in a complaint in court only to drop him
unceremoniously later at the pleasure of the
plaintiff. The rule presupposes that the original
inclusion had been made in the honest conviction
that it was proper and the subsequent dropping

is requested because it has turned out that such

inclusion was a mistake. And this is the reason
why the rule ordains that the dropping be "on
such terms as are just" just to all the other
parties. In the case at bar, there is nothing in the
record to legally justify the dropping of the nondefaulted defendants, Lim and Leonardo. The
motion of October 18, 1974 cites none. From all
appearances, plaintiff just decided to ask for it,
without any relevant explanation at all. Usually,
the court in granting such a motion inquires for
the reasons and in the appropriate instances
directs the granting of some form of
compensation for the trouble undergone by the
defendant in answering the complaint, preparing
for or proceeding partially to trial, hiring counsel
and making corresponding expenses in the
premises. Nothing of these, appears in the order
in question. Most importantly, His Honor ought to
have considered that the outright dropping of the
non-defaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo,
over their objection at that, would certainly be
unjust not only to the petitioners, their own
parents, who would in consequence be entirely
defenseless, but also to Lim and Leonardo
themselves who would naturally correspondingly

suffer from the eventual judgment against their

parents. Respondent court paid no heed at all to
the mandate that such dropping must be on such
terms as are just" meaning to all concerned
with its legal and factual effects.
Thus, it is quite plain that respondent court erred
in issuing its order of dismissal of October 21,
1974 as well as its order of December 6, 1974
denying reconsideration of such dismissal. As
We make this ruling, We are not oblivious of the
circumstance that defendants Lim and Leonardo
are not parties herein. But such consideration is
inconsequential. The fate of the case of
petitioners is inseparably tied up with said order
of dismissal, if only because the order of exparte hearing of October 21, 1974 which directly
affects and prejudices said petitioners is
predicated thereon. Necessarily, therefore, We
have to pass on the legality of said order, if We
are to decide the case of herein petitioners
properly and fairly.
The attitude of the non-defaulted defendants of
no longer pursuing further their questioning of the
dismissal is from another point of view
understandable. On the one hand, why should

they insist on being defendants when plaintiff

herself has already release from her claims? On
the other hand, as far as their respective parentsco-defendants are concerned, they must have
realized that they (their parents) could even be
benefited by such dismissal because they could
question whether or not plaintiff can still
prosecute her case against them after she had
secured the order of dismissal in question. And it
is in connection with this last point that the true
and correct concept of default becomes relevant.
At this juncture, it may also be stated that the
decision of the Court of Appeals of January 24,
1975 in G. R. No. SP-03066 dismissing the
petition for certiorari of non-defaulted defendants
Lim and Leonardo impugning the order of
dismissal of October 21, 1974, has no bearing at
all in this case, not only because that dismissal
was premised by the appellate court on its
holding that the said petition was premature
inasmuch as the trial court had not yet resolved
the motion of the defendants of October 28, 1974
praying that said disputed order be quashed, but
principally because herein petitioners were not
parties in that proceeding and cannot, therefore,

be bound by its result. In particular, We deem it

warranted to draw the attention of private
respondent's counsel to his allegations in
paragraphs XI to XIV of his answer, which relate
to said decision of the Court of Appeals and
which have the clear tendency to make it appear
to the Court that the appeals court had upheld
the legality and validity of the actuations of the
trial court being questioned, when as a matter of
indisputable fact, the dismissal of the petition
was based solely and exclusively on its being
premature without in any manner delving into its
merits. The Court must and does admonish
counsel that such manner of pleading, being
deceptive and lacking in candor, has no place in
any court, much less in the Supreme Court, and
if We are adopting a passive attitude in the
premises, it is due only to the fact that this is
counsel's first offense. But similar conduct on his
part in the future will definitely be dealt with more
severely. Parties and counsel would be well
advised to avoid such attempts to befuddle the
issues as invariably then will be exposed for what
they are, certainly unethical and degrading to the
dignity of the law profession. Moreover, almost
always they only betray the inherent weakness of

the cause of the party resorting to them.

2
Coming now to the matter itself of default, it is
quite apparent that the impugned orders must
have proceeded from inadequate apprehension
of the fundamental precepts governing such
procedure under the Rules of Court. It is time
indeed that the concept of this procedural device
were fully understood by the bench and bar,
instead of being merely taken for granted as
being that of a simple expedient of not allowing
the offending party to take part in the
proceedings, so that after his adversary shall
have presented his evidence, judgment may be
rendered in favor of such opponent, with hardly
any chance of said judgment being reversed or
modified.
The Rules of Court contain a separate rule on
the subject of default, Rule 18. But said rule is
concerned solely with default resulting from
failure of the defendant or defendants to answer
within the reglementary period. Referring to the
simplest form of default, that is, where there is
only one defendant in the action and he fails to

answer on time, Section 1 of the rule provides

that upon "proof of such failure, (the court shall)
declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the
court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's
evidence and render judgment granting him such
relief as the complaint and the facts proven may
warrant." This last clause is clarified by Section 5
which says that "a judgment entered against a
party in default shall not exceed the amount or
be different in kind from that prayed for."
Unequivocal, in the literal sense, as these
provisions are, they do not readily convey the full
import of what they contemplate. To begin with,
contrary to the immediate notion that can be
drawn from their language, these provisions are
not to be understood as meaning that default or
the failure of the defendant to answer should be
"interpreted as an admission by the said
defendant that the plaintiff's cause of action find
support in the law or that plaintiff is entitled to the
relief prayed for." (Moran, supra, p. 535 citing
Macondary & Co. v. Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 466,
citing with approval Chaffin v. McFadden, 41 Ark.
42; Johnson v. Pierce, 12 Ark. 599; Mayden v.
Johnson, 59 Ga. 105; People v. Rust, 292 111.

328; Ken v. Leopold 21 111. A. 163; Chicago, etc.

Electric R. Co. v. Krempel 116 111. A. 253.)
Being declared in default does not constitute a
waiver of rights except that of being heard and of
presenting evidence in the trial court. According
to Section 2, "except as provided in Section 9 of
Rule 13, a party declared in default shall not be
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, nor
to take part in the trial." That provision referred to
reads: "No service of papers other than
substantially amended pleadings and final orders
or judgments shall be necessary on a party in
default unless he files a motion to set aside the
order of default, in which event he shall be
entitled to notice of all further proceedings
regardless of whether the order of default is set
aside or not." And pursuant to Section 2 of Rule
41, "a party who has been declared in default
may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the
order of default has been presented by him in
accordance with Rule 38.".
In other words, a defaulted defendant is not
actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it

may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself

at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that
any judgment against him must be in accordance
with law. The evidence to support the plaintiff's
cause is, of course, presented in his absence,
but the court is not supposed to admit that which
is basically incompetent. Although the defendant
would not be in a position to object, elementary
justice requires that, only legal evidence should
be considered against him. If the evidence
presented should not be sufficient to justify a
judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be
dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment
should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount
or be different in kind from what is prayed for in
the complaint.
Incidentally, these considerations argue against
the present widespread practice of trial judges,
as was done by His Honor in this case, of
delegating to their clerks of court the reception of
the plaintiff's evidence when the defendant is in
default. Such a Practice is wrong in principle and
orientation. It has no basis in any rule. When a
defendant allows himself to be declared in
default, he relies on the faith that the court would

take care that his rights are not unduly

prejudiced. He has a right to presume that the
law and the rules will still be observed. The
proceedings are held in his forced absence, and
it is but fair that the plaintiff should not be allowed
to take advantage of the situation to win by foul
or illegal means or with inherently incompetent
evidence. Thus, in such instances, there is need
for more attention from the court, which only the
judge himself can provide. The clerk of court
would not be in a position much less have the
authority to act in the premises in the manner
demanded by the rules of fair play and as
contemplated in the law, considering his
comparably limited area of discretion and his
presumably inferior preparation for the functions
of a judge. Besides, the default of the defendant
is no excuse for the court to renounce the
opportunity to closely observe the demeanor and
conduct of the witnesses of the plaintiff, the
better to appreciate their truthfulness and
credibility. We therefore declare as a matter of
judicial policy that there being no imperative
reason for judges to do otherwise, the practice
should be discontinued.

Another matter of practice worthy of mention at

this point is that it is preferable to leave enough
opportunity open for possible lifting of the order
of default before proceeding with the reception of
the plaintiff's evidence and the rendition of the
decision. "A judgment by default may amount to
a positive and considerable injustice to the
defendant; and the possibility of such serious
consequences necessitates a careful and liberal
examination of the grounds upon which the
defendant may seek to set it aside." (Moran,
supra p. 534, citing Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil.
446; 449-450.) The expression, therefore, in
Section 1 of Rule 18 aforequoted which says that
"thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the
plaintiff's evidence etc." is not to be taken literally.
The gain in time and dispatch should the court
immediately try the case on the very day of or
shortly after the declaration of default is far
outweighed by the inconvenience and
complications involved in having to undo
everything already done in the event the
defendant should justify his omission to answer
on time.
The foregoing observations, as may be noted,

refer to instances where the only defendant or all

the defendants, there being several, are declared
in default. There are additional rules embodying
more considerations of justice and equity in
cases where there are several defendants
against whom a common cause of action is
averred and not all of them answer opportunely
or are in default, particularly in reference to the
power of the court to render judgment in such
situations. Thus, in addition to the limitation of
Section 5 that the judgment by default should not
be more in amount nor different in kind from the
reliefs specifically sought by plaintiff in his
complaint, Section 4 restricts the authority of the
court in rendering judgment in the situations just
mentioned as follows:
Sec. 4. Judgment when some defendants
answer, and other make difficult. When a
complaint states a common cause of action
against several defendant some of whom
answer, and the others fail to do so, the court
shall try the case against all upon the answer
thus filed and render judgment upon the
evidence presented. The same proceeding
applies when a common cause of action is

pleaded in a counterclaim, cross-claim and thirdparty claim.

Very aptly does Chief Justice Moran elucidate on
this provision and the controlling jurisprudence
explanatory thereof this wise:
Where a complaint states a common cause of
action against several defendants and some
appear to defend the case on the merits while
others make default, the defense interposed by
those who appear to litigate the case inures to
the benefit of those who fail to appear, and if the
court finds that a good defense has been made,
all of the defendants must be absolved. In other
words, the answer filed by one or some of the
defendants inures to the benefit of all the others,
even those who have not seasonably filed their
answer. (Bueno v. Ortiz, L-22978, June 27, 1968,
23 SCRA 1151.) The proper mode of proceeding
where a complaint states a common cause of
action against several defendants, and one of
them makes default, is simply to enter a formal
default order against him, and proceed with the
cause upon the answers of the others. The
defaulting defendant merely loses his standing in
court, he not being entitled to the service of

notice in the cause, nor to appear in the suit in

any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he
be heard at the final hearing, (Lim Toco v. Go
Fay, 80 Phil. 166.) although he may appeal the
judgment rendered against him on the merits.
(Rule 41, sec. 2.) If the case is finally decided in
the plaintiff's favor, a final decree is then entered
against all the defendants; but if the suit should
be decided against the plaintiff, the action will be
dismissed as to all the defendants alike. (Velez v.
Ramas, 40 Phil. 787-792; Frow v. de la Vega, 15
Wal. 552,21 L. Ed. 60.) In other words the
judgment will affect the defaulting defendants
either favorably or adversely. (Castro v. Pea, 80
Phil. 488.)
Defaulting defendant may ask execution if
judgment is in his favor. (Castro v. Pea, supra.)
(Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 1, pp. 538-539.)
In Castro vs. Pea, 80 Phil. 488, one of the
numerous cases cited by Moran, this Court
elaborated on the construction of the same rule
when it sanctioned the execution, upon motion
and for the benefit of the defendant in default, of
a judgment which was adverse to the plaintiff.
The Court held:

As above stated, Emilia Matanguihan, by her

counsel, also was a movant in the petition for
execution Annex 1. Did she have a right to be
such, having been declared in default? In Frow
vs. De la Vega, supra, cited as authority in Velez
vs. Ramas, supra, the Supreme Court of the
United States adopted as ground for its own
decision the following ruling of the New York
Court of Errors in Clason vs. Morris, 10 Jons.,
524:
It would be unreasonable to hold that because
one defendant had made default, the plaintiff
should have a decree even against him, where
the court is satisfied from the proofs offered by
the other, that in fact the plaintiff is not entitled to
a decree. (21 Law, ed., 61.)
The reason is simple: justice has to be
consistent. The complaint stating a common
cause of action against several defendants, the
complainant's rights or lack of them in the
controversy have to be the same, and not
different, as against all the defendant's although
one or some make default and the other or
others appear, join issue, and enter into trial. For
instance, in the case of Clason vs. Morris above

cited, the New York Court of Errors in effect held

that in such a case if the plaintiff is not entitled to
a decree, he will not be entitled to it, not only as
against the defendant appearing and resisting his
action but also as against the one who made
default. In the case at bar, the cause of action in
the plaintiff's complaint was common against the
Mayor of Manila, Emilia Matanguihan, and the
other defendants in Civil Case No. 1318 of the
lower court. The Court of First Instance in its
judgment found and held upon the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff and the defendant mayor
that as between said plaintiff and defendant
Matanguihan the latter was the one legally
entitled to occupy the stalls; and it decreed,
among other things, that said plaintiff
immediately vacate them. Paraphrasing the New
York Court of Errors, it would be unreasonable to
hold now that because Matanguihan had made
default, the said plaintiff should be declared, as
against her, legally entitled to the occupancy of
the stalls, or to remain therein, although the
Court of First Instance was so firmly satisfied,
from the proofs offered by the other defendant,
that the same plaintiff was not entitled to such
occupancy that it peremptorily ordered her to

vacate the stalls. If in the cases of Clason vs.

Morris, supra, Frow vs. De la Vega, supra, and
Velez vs. Ramas, supra the decrees entered
inured to the benefit of the defaulting defendants,
there is no reason why that entered in said case
No. 1318 should not be held also to have inured
to the benefit of the defaulting defendant
Matanguihan and the doctrine in said three cases
plainly implies that there is nothing in the law
governing default which would prohibit the court
from rendering judgment favorable to the
defaulting defendant in such cases. If it inured to
her benefit, it stands to reason that she had a
right to claim that benefit, for it would not be a
benefit if the supposed beneficiary were barred
from claiming it; and if the benefit necessitated
the execution of the decree, she must be
possessed of the right to ask for the execution
thereof as she did when she, by counsel,
participated in the petition for execution Annex 1.
Section 7 of Rule 35 would seem to afford a solid
support to the above considerations. It provides
that when a complaint states a common cause of
action against several defendants, some of
whom answer, and the others make default, 'the

court shall try the case against all upon the

answer thus filed and render judgment upon the
evidence presented by the parties in court'. It is
obvious that under this provision the case is tried
jointly not only against the defendants answering
but also against those defaulting, and the trial is
held upon the answer filed by the former; and the
judgment, if adverse, will prejudice the defaulting
defendants no less than those who answer. In
other words, the defaulting defendants are held
bound by the answer filed by their co-defendants
and by the judgment which the court may render
against all of them. By the same token, and by all
rules of equity and fair play, if the judgment
should happen to be favorable, totally or partially,
to the answering defendants, it must
correspondingly benefit the defaulting ones, for it
would not be just to let the judgment produce
effects as to the defaulting defendants only when
adverse to them and not when favorable.
In Bueno vs. Ortiz, 23 SCRA 1151, the Court
applied the provision under discussion in the
following words:
In answer to the charge that respondent Judge
had committed a grave abuse of discretion in

rendering a default judgment against the PC,

respondents allege that, not having filed its
answer within the reglementary period, the PC
was in default, so that it was proper for Patanao
to forthwith present his evidence and for
respondent Judge to render said judgment. It
should be noted, however, that in entering the
area in question and seeking to prevent Patanao
from continuing his logging operations therein,
the PC was merely executing an order of the
Director of Forestry and acting as his agent.
Patanao's cause of action against the other
respondents in Case No. 190, namely, the
Director of Forestry, the District Forester of
Agusan, the Forest Officer of Bayugan, Agusan,
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Pursuant to Rule 18, Section 4, of
the Rules of Court, 'when a complaint states a
common cause of action against several
defendants some of whom answer and the
others fail to do so, the court shall try the case
against all upon the answer thus filed (by some)
and render judgment upon the evidence
presented.' In other words, the answer filed by
one or some of the defendants inures to the
benefit of all the others, even those who have not

seasonably filed their answer.

Indeed, since the petition in Case No. 190 sets
forth a common cause of action against all of the
respondents therein, a decision in favor of one of
them would necessarily favor the others. In fact,
the main issue, in said case, is whether Patanao
has a timber license to undertake logging
operations in the disputed area. It is not possible
to decide such issue in the negative, insofar as
the Director of Forestry, and to settle it otherwise,
as regards the PC, which is merely acting as
agent of the Director of Forestry, and is,
therefore, his alter ego, with respect to the
disputed forest area.
Stated differently, in all instances where a
common cause of action is alleged against
several defendants, some of whom answer and
the others do not, the latter or those in default
acquire a vested right not only to own the
defense interposed in the answer of their codefendant or co-defendants not in default but
also to expect a result of the litigation totally
common with them in kind and in amount
whether favorable or unfavorable. The
substantive unity of the plaintiff's cause against

all the defendants is carried through to its

adjective phase as ineluctably demanded by the
homogeneity and indivisibility of justice itself.
Indeed, since the singleness of the cause of
action also inevitably implies that all the
defendants are indispensable parties, the court's
power to act is integral and cannot be split such
that it cannot relieve any of them and at the
same time render judgment against the rest.
Considering the tenor of the section in question,
it is to be assumed that when any defendant
allows himself to be declared in default knowing
that his defendant has already answered, he
does so trusting in the assurance implicit in the
rule that his default is in essence a mere
formality that deprives him of no more than the
right to take part in the trial and that the court
would deem anything done by or for the
answering defendant as done by or for him. The
presumption is that otherwise he would not -have
seen to that he would not be in default. Of
course, he has to suffer the consequences of
whatever the answering defendant may do or fail
to do, regardless of possible adverse
consequences, but if the complaint has to be
dismissed in so far as the answering defendant is

concerned it becomes his inalienable right that

the same be dismissed also as to him. It does
not matter that the dismissal is upon the
evidence presented by the plaintiff or upon the
latter's mere desistance, for in both
contingencies, the lack of sufficient legal basis
must be the cause. The integrity of the common
cause of action against all the defendants and
the indispensability of all of them in the
proceedings do not permit any possibility of
waiver of the plaintiff's right only as to one or
some of them, without including all of them, and
so, as a rule, withdrawal must be deemed to be a
confession of weakness as to all. This is not only
elementary justice; it also precludes the
concomitant hazard that plaintiff might resort to
the kind of procedural strategem practiced by
private respondent herein that resulted in totally
depriving petitioners of every opportunity to
defend themselves against her claims which,
after all, as will be seen later in this opinion, the
record does not show to be invulnerable, both in
their factual and legal aspects, taking into
consideration the tenor of the pleadings and the
probative value of the competent evidence which
were before the trial court when it rendered its

assailed decision where all the defendants are

indispensable parties, for which reason the
absence of any of them in the case would result
in the court losing its competency to act validly,
any compromise that the plaintiff might wish to
make with any of them must, as a matter of
correct procedure, have to await until after the
rendition of the judgment, at which stage the
plaintiff may then treat the matter of its execution
and the satisfaction of his claim as variably as he
might please. Accordingly, in the case now
before Us together with the dismissal of the
complaint against the non-defaulted defendants,
the court should have ordered also the dismissal
thereof as to petitioners.
Indeed, there is more reason to apply here the
principle of unity and indivisibility of the action
just discussed because all the defendants here
have already joined genuine issues with plaintiff.
Their default was only at the pre-trial. And as to
such absence of petitioners at the pre-trial, the
same could be attributed to the fact that they
might not have considered it necessary anymore
to be present, since their respective children Lim
and Leonardo, with whom they have common

defenses, could take care of their defenses as

well. Anything that might have had to be done by
them at such pre-trial could have been done for
them by their children, at least initially, specially
because in the light of the pleadings before the
court, the prospects of a compromise must have
appeared to be rather remote. Such attitude of
petitioners is neither uncommon nor totally
unjustified. Under the circumstances, to declare
them immediately and irrevocably in default was
not an absolute necessity. Practical
considerations and reasons of equity should
have moved respondent court to be more
understanding in dealing with the situation. After
all, declaring them in default as respondent court
did not impair their right to a common fate with
their children.
3
Another issue to be resolved in this case is the
question of whether or not herein petitioners
were entitled to notice of plaintiff's motion to drop
their co-defendants Lim and Leonardo,
considering that petitioners had been previously
declared in default. In this connection, the
decisive consideration is that according to the

applicable rule, Section 9, Rule 13, already

quoted above, (1) even after a defendant has
been declared in default, provided he "files a
motion to set aside the order of default, he
shall be entitled to notice of all further
proceedings regardless of whether the order of
default is set aside or not" and (2) a party in
default who has not filed such a motion to set
aside must still be served with all "substantially
amended or supplemented pleadings." In the
instant case, it cannot be denied that petitioners
had all filed their motion for reconsideration of
the order declaring them in default. Respondents'
own answer to the petition therein makes
reference to the order of April 3, 1973, Annex 8 of
said answer, which denied said motion for
reconsideration. On page 3 of petitioners'
memorandum herein this motion is referred to as
"a motion to set aside the order of default." But
as We have not been favored by the parties with
a copy of the said motion, We do not even know
the excuse given for petitioners' failure to appear
at the pre-trial, and We cannot, therefore,
determine whether or not the motion complied
with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18
which We have held to be controlling in cases of

default for failure to answer on time. (The

Philippine-British Co. Inc. etc. et al. vs. The Hon.
Walfrido de los Angeles etc. et al., 63 SCRA 50.)
We do not, however, have here, as earlier noted,
a case of default for failure to answer but one for
failure to appear at the pre-trial. We reiterate, in
the situation now before Us, issues have already
been joined. In fact, evidence had been partially
offered already at the pre-trial and more of it at
the actual trial which had already begun with the
first witness of the plaintiff undergoing re-crossexamination. With these facts in mind and
considering that issues had already been joined
even as regards the defaulted defendants, it
would be requiring the obvious to pretend that
there was still need for an oath or a verification
as to the merits of the defense of the defaulted
defendants in their motion to reconsider their
default. Inasmuch as none of the parties had
asked for a summary judgment there can be no
question that the issues joined were genuine,
and consequently, the reason for requiring such
oath or verification no longer holds. Besides, it
may also be reiterated that being the parents of
the non-defaulted defendants, petitioners must

have assumed that their presence was

superfluous, particularly because the cause of
action against them as well as their own
defenses are common. Under these
circumstances, the form of the motion by which
the default was sought to be lifted is secondary
and the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18
need not be strictly complied with, unlike in cases
of default for failure to answer. We can thus hold
as We do hold for the purposes of the revival of
their right to notice under Section 9 of Rule 13,
that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was in
substance legally adequate regardless of
whether or not it was under oath.
In any event, the dropping of the defendants Lim
and Leonardo from plaintiff's amended complaint
was virtually a second amendment of plaintiffs
complaint. And there can be no doubt that such
amendment was substantial, for with the
elimination thereby of two defendants allegedly
solidarily liable with their co-defendants, herein
petitioners, it had the effect of increasing
proportionally what each of the remaining
defendants, the said petitioners, would have to
answer for jointly and severally. Accordingly,

notice to petitioners of the plaintiff's motion of

October 18, 1974 was legally indispensable
under the rule above-quoted. Consequently,
respondent court had no authority to act on the
motion, to dismiss, pursuant to Section 6 of Rule
15, for according to Senator Francisco, "(t) he
Rules of Court clearly provide that no motion
shall be acted upon by the Court without the
proof of service of notice thereof, together with a
copy of the motion and other papers
accompanying it, to all parties concerned at least
three days before the hearing thereof, stating the
time and place for the hearing of the motion.
(Rule 26, section 4, 5 and 6, Rules of Court (now
Sec. 15, new Rules). When the motion does not
comply with this requirement, it is not a motion. It
presents no question which the court could
decide. And the Court acquires no jurisdiction to
consider it. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs.
Municipality of Unisan 44 Phil., 866; Manakil vs.
Revilla, 42 Phil., 81.) (Laserna vs. Javier, et al.,
CA-G.R. No. 7885, April 22, 1955; 21 L.J. 36,
citing Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs.
Municipality of Unisan 44 Phil., 866; Manakil vs.
Revilla, 42 Phil., 81.) (Francisco. The Revised
Rules of Court in the Philippines, pp. 861-862.)

Thus, We see again, from a different angle, why

respondent court's order of dismissal of October
21, 1974 is fatally ineffective.
4
The foregoing considerations notwithstanding, it
is respondents' position that certiorari is not the
proper remedy of petitioners. It is contended that
inasmuch as said petitioners have in fact made
their appeal already by filing the required notice
of appeal and appeal bond and a motion for
extension to file their record on appeal, which
motion was granted by respondent court, their
only recourse is to prosecute that appeal.
Additionally, it is also maintained that since
petitioners have expressly withdrawn their motion
to quash of January 4, 1975 impugning the order
of October 28, 1974, they have lost their right to
assail by certiorari the actuations of respondent
court now being questioned, respondent court
not having been given the opportunity to correct
any possible error it might have committed.
We do not agree. As already shown in the
foregoing discussion, the proceedings in the
court below have gone so far out of hand that

prompt action is needed to restore order in the

entangled situation created by the series of
plainly illegal orders it had issued. The essential
purpose of certiorari is to keep the proceedings
in lower judicial courts and tribunals within legal
bounds, so that due process and the rule of law
may prevail at all times and arbitrariness,
whimsicality and unfairness which justice abhors
may immediately be stamped out before graver
injury, juridical and otherwise, ensues. While
generally these objectives may well be attained
in an ordinary appeal, it is undoubtedly the better
rule to allow the special remedy of certiorari at
the option of the party adversely affected, when
the irregularity committed by the trial court is so
grave and so far reaching in its consequences
that the long and cumbersome procedure of
appeal will only further aggravate the situation of
the aggrieved party because other untoward
actuations are likely to materialize as natural
consequences of those already perpetrated. If
the law were otherwise, certiorari would have no
reason at all for being.

at bar. Verily, this is one case that calls for the

exercise of the Supreme Court's inherent power
of supervision over all kinds of judicial actions of
lower courts. Private respondent's procedural
technique designed to disable petitioners to
defend themselves against her claim which
appears on the face of the record itself to be at
least highly controversial seems to have so
fascinated respondent court that none would be
surprised should her pending motion for
immediate execution of the impugned judgment
receive similar ready sanction as her previous
motions which turned the proceedings into a onesided affair. The stakes here are high. Not only is
the subject matter considerably substantial; there
is the more important aspect that not only the
spirit and intent of the rules but even the basic
rudiments of fair play have been disregarded. For
the Court to leave unrestrained the obvious
tendency of the proceedings below would be
nothing short of wittingly condoning inequity and
injustice resulting from erroneous construction
and unwarranted application of procedural rules.

No elaborate discussion is needed to show the

urgent need for corrective measures in the case

5
The sum and total of all the foregoing

disquisitions is that the decision here in question

is legally anomalous. It is predicated on two fatal
malactuations of respondent court namely (1) the
dismissal of the complaint against the nondefaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo and (2)
the ex-parte reception of the evidence of the
plaintiff by the clerk of court, the subsequent
using of the same as basis for its judgment and
the rendition of such judgment.
For at least three reasons which We have
already fully discussed above, the order of
dismissal of October 21, 1974 is unworthy of Our
sanction: (1) there was no timely notice of the
motion therefor to the non-defaulted defendants,
aside from there being no notice at all to herein
petitioners; (2) the common answer of the
defendants, including the non-defaulted,
contained a compulsory counterclaim incapable
of being determined in an independent action;
and (3) the immediate effect of such dismissal
was the removal of the two non-defaulted
defendants as parties, and inasmuch as they are
both indispensable parties in the case, the court
consequently lost the" sine qua non of the
exercise of judicial power", per Borlasa vs.

Polistico, supra. This is not to mention anymore

the irregular delegation to the clerk of court of the
function of receiving plaintiff's evidence. And as
regards the ex-parte reception of plaintiff's
evidence and subsequent rendition of the
judgment by default based thereon, We have
seen that it was violative of the right of the
petitioners, under the applicable rules and
principles on default, to a common and single
fate with their non-defaulted co-defendants. And
We are not yet referring, as We shall do this
anon to the numerous reversible errors in the
decision itself.
It is to be noted, however, that the aboveindicated two fundamental flaws in respondent
court's actuations do not call for a common
corrective remedy. We cannot simply rule that all
the impugned proceedings are null and void and
should be set aside, without being faced with the
insurmountable obstacle that by so doing We
would be reviewing the case as against the two
non-defaulted defendants who are not before Us
not being parties hereto. Upon the other hand,
for Us to hold that the order of dismissal should
be allowed to stand, as contended by

respondents themselves who insist that the same

is already final, not only because the period for
its finality has long passed but also because
allegedly, albeit not very accurately, said 'nondefaulted defendants unsuccessfully tried to
have it set aside by the Court of Appeals whose
decision on their petition is also already final, We
would have to disregard whatever evidence had
been presented by the plaintiff against them and,
of course, the findings of respondent court based
thereon which, as the assailed decision shows,
are adverse to them. In other words, whichever
of the two apparent remedies the Court chooses,
it would necessarily entail some kind of possible
juridical imperfection. Speaking of their
respective practical or pragmatic effects, to annul
the dismissal would inevitably prejudice the rights
of the non-defaulted defendants whom We have
not heard and who even respondents would not
wish to have anything anymore to do with the
case. On the other hand, to include petitioners in
the dismissal would naturally set at naught every
effort private respondent has made to establish
or prove her case thru means sanctioned by
respondent court. In short, We are confronted
with a legal para-dilemma. But one thing is

certain this difficult situations has been

brought about by none other than private
respondent who has quite cynically resorted to
procedural maneuvers without realizing that the
technicalities of the adjective law, even when
apparently accurate from the literal point of view,
cannot prevail over the imperatives of the
substantive law and of equity that always
underlie them and which have to be inevitably
considered in the construction of the pertinent
procedural rules.
All things considered, after careful and mature
deliberation, the Court has arrived at the
conclusion that as between the two possible
alternatives just stated, it would only be fair,
equitable and proper to uphold the position of
petitioners. In other words, We rule that the order
of dismissal of October 21, 1974 is in law a
dismissal of the whole case of the plaintiff,
including as to petitioners herein. Consequently,
all proceedings held by respondent court
subsequent thereto including and principally its
decision of December 20, 1974 are illegal and
should be set aside.
This conclusion is fully justified by the following

considerations of equity:
1. It is very clear to Us that the procedural
maneuver resorted to by private respondent in
securing the decision in her favor was illconceived. It was characterized by that which
every principle of law and equity disdains
taking unfair advantage of the rules of procedure
in order to unduly deprive the other party of full
opportunity to defend his cause. The idea of
"dropping" the non-defaulted defendants with the
end in view of completely incapacitating their codefendants from making any defense, without
considering that all of them are indispensable
parties to a common cause of action to which
they have countered with a common defense
readily connotes an intent to secure a one-sided
decision, even improperly. And when, in this
connection, the obvious weakness of plaintiff's
evidence is taken into account, one easily
understands why such tactics had to be availed
of. We cannot directly or indirectly give Our
assent to the commission of unfairness and
inequity in the application of the rules of
procedure, particularly when the propriety of
reliance thereon is not beyond controversy.

2. The theories of remedial law pursued by

private respondents, although approved by His
Honor, run counter to such basic principles in the
rules on default and such elementary rules on
dismissal of actions and notice of motions that no
trial court should be unaware of or should be
mistaken in applying. We are at a loss as to why
His Honor failed to see through counsel's
inequitous strategy, when the provisions (1) on
the three-day rule on notice of motions, Section 4
of Rule 15, (2) against dismissal of actions on
motion of plaintiff when there is a compulsory
counterclaim, Section 2, Rule 17, (3) against
permitting the absence of indispensable parties,
Section 7, Rule 3, (4) on service of papers upon
defendants in default when there are substantial
amendments to pleadings, Section 9, Rule 13,
and (5) on the unity and integrity of the fate of
defendants in default with those not in default
where the cause of action against them and their
own defenses are common, Section 4, Rule 18,
are so plain and the jurisprudence declaratory of
their intent and proper construction are so readily
comprehensible that any error as to their
application would be unusual in any competent
trial court.

3. After all, all the malactuations of respondent

court are traceable to the initiative of private
respondent and/or her counsel. She cannot,
therefore, complain that she is being made to
unjustifiably suffer the consequences of what We
have found to be erroneous orders of respondent
court. It is only fair that she should not be
allowed to benefit from her own frustrated
objective of securing a one-sided decision.
4. More importantly, We do not hesitate to hold
that on the basis of its own recitals, the decision
in question cannot stand close scrutiny. What is
more, the very considerations contained therein
reveal convincingly the inherent weakness of the
cause of the plaintiff. To be sure, We have been
giving serious thought to the idea of merely
returning this case for a resumption of trial by
setting aside the order of dismissal of October
21, 1974, with all its attendant difficulties on
account of its adverse effects on parties who
have not been heard, but upon closer study of
the pleadings and the decision and other
circumstances extant in the record before Us,
We are now persuaded that such a course of
action would only lead to more legal

complications incident to attempts on the part of

the parties concerned to desperately squeeze
themselves out of a bad situation. Anyway, We
feel confident that by and large, there is enough
basis here and now for Us to rule out the claim of
the plaintiff.
Even a mere superficial reading of the decision
would immediately reveal that it is littered on its
face with deficiencies and imperfections which
would have had no reason for being were there
less haste and more circumspection in rendering
the same. Recklessness in jumping to
unwarranted conclusions, both factual and legal,
is at once evident in its findings relative precisely
to the main bases themselves of the reliefs
granted. It is apparent therein that no effort has
been made to avoid glaring inconsistencies.
Where references are made to codal provisions
and jurisprudence, inaccuracy and inapplicability
are at once manifest. It hardly commends itself
as a deliberate and consciencious adjudication of
a litigation which, considering the substantial
value of the subject matter it involves and the
unprecedented procedure that was followed by
respondent's counsel, calls for greater attention

and skill than the general run of cases would.

Inter alia, the following features of the decision
make it highly improbable that if We took another
course of action, private respondent would still
be able to make out any case against petitioners,
not to speak of their co-defendants who have
already been exonerated by respondent herself
thru her motion to dismiss:
1. According to His Honor's own statement of
plaintiff's case, "she is the widow of the late Tee
Hoon Po Chuan (Po Chuan, for short) who was
then one of the partners in the commercial
partnership, Glory Commercial Co. with
defendants Antonio Lim Tanhu (Lim Tanhu, for
short) and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua (Ng Sua, for
short) as co-partners; that after the death of her
husband on March 11, 1966 she is entitled to
share not only in the capital and profits of the
partnership but also in the other assets, both real
and personal, acquired by the partnership with
funds of the latter during its lifetime."
Relatedly, in the latter part of the decision, the
findings are to the following effect: .

That the herein plaintiff Tan Put and her late

husband Po Chuan married at the Philippine
Independent Church of Cebu City on December,
20, 1949; that Po Chuan died on March 11, 1966;
that the plaintiff and the late Po Chuan were
childless but the former has a foster son Antonio
Nuez whom she has reared since his birth with
whom she lives up to the present; that prior to
the marriage of the plaintiff to Po Chuan the latter
was already managing the partnership Glory
Commercial Co. then engaged in a little business
in hardware at Manalili St., Cebu City; that prior
to and just after the marriage of the plaintiff to Po
Chuan she was engaged in the drugstore
business; that not long after her marriage, upon
the suggestion of Po Chuan the plaintiff sold her
drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she
gave to her husband in the presence of
defendant Lim Tanhu and was invested in the
partnership Glory Commercial Co. sometime in
1950; that after the investment of the abovestated amount in the partnership its business
flourished and it embarked in the import business
and also engaged in the wholesale and retail
trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge
profits;

xxx xxx xxx

That the late Po Chuan was the one who actively
managed the business of the partnership Glory
Commercial Co. he was the one who made the
final decisions and approved the appointments of
new personnel who were taken in by the
partnership; that the late Po Chuan and
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua are brothers,
the latter two (2) being the elder brothers of the
former; that defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua
are both naturalized Filipino citizens whereas the
late Po Chuan until the time of his death was a
Chinese citizen; that the three (3) brothers were
partners in the Glory Commercial Co. but Po
Chuan was practically the owner of the
partnership having the controlling interest; that
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were partners
in name but they were mere employees of Po
Chuan .... (Pp. 89-91, Record.)
How did His Honor arrive at these conclusions?
To start with, it is not clear in the decision
whether or not in making its findings of fact the
court took into account the allegations in the
pleadings of the parties and whatever might have
transpired at the pre-trial. All that We can gather

in this respect is that references are made

therein to pre-trial exhibits and to Annex A of the
answer of the defendants to plaintiff's amended
complaint. Indeed, it was incumbent upon the
court to consider not only the evidence formally
offered at the trial but also the admissions,
expressed or implied, in the pleadings, as well as
whatever might have been placed before it or
brought to its attention during the pre-trial. In this
connection, it is to be regretted that none of the
parties has thought it proper to give Us an idea of
what took place at the pre-trial of the present
case and what are contained in the pre-trial
order, if any was issued pursuant to Section 4 of
Rule 20.
The fundamental purpose of pre-trial, aside from
affording the parties every opportunity to
compromise or settle their differences, is for the
court to be apprised of the unsettled issues
between the parties and of their respective
evidence relative thereto, to the end that it may
take corresponding measures that would
abbreviate the trial as much as possible and the
judge may be able to ascertain the facts with the
least observance of technical rules. In other

words whatever is said or done by the parties or

their counsel at the pre- trial serves to put the
judge on notice of their respective basic
positions, in order that in appropriate cases he
may, if necessary in the interest of justice and a
more accurate determination of the facts, make
inquiries about or require clarifications of matters
taken up at the pre-trial, before finally resolving
any issue of fact or of law. In brief, the pre-trial
constitutes part and parcel of the proceedings,
and hence, matters dealt with therein may not be
disregarded in the process of decision making.
Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pretrial would be insignificant and worthless.
Now, applying these postulates to the findings of
respondent court just quoted, it will be observed
that the court's conclusion about the supposed
marriage of plaintiff to the deceased Tee Hoon
Lim Po Chuan is contrary to the weight of the
evidence brought before it during the trial and the
pre-trial.
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration
of the contracting parties that they take each
other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in
an instrument" signed by the parties as well as

by their witnesses and the person solemnizing

the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence
of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract. While a marriage may also be
proved by other competent evidence, the
absence of the contract must first be
satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of
the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage
is not admissible evidence of such marriage
unless proof of loss of the contract or of any
other satisfactory reason for its non-production is
first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the
purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M.
Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent
Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent
evidence, there being absolutely no showing as
to unavailability of the marriage contract and,
indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of
said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a
second assistant provincial fiscal not being
authorized by law, since it is not part of the
functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the
bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
As regards the testimony of plaintiff herself on
the same point and that of her witness Antonio

Nuez, there can be no question that they are

both self-serving and of very little evidentiary
value, it having been disclosed at the trial that
plaintiff has already assigned all her rights in this
case to said Nuez, thereby making him the real
party in interest here and, therefore, naturally as
biased as herself. Besides, in the portion of the
testimony of Nuez copied in Annex C of
petitioner's memorandum, it appears admitted
that he was born only on March 25, 1942, which
means that he was less than eight years old at
the supposed time of the alleged marriage. If for
this reason alone, it is extremely doubtful if he
could have been sufficiently aware of such event
as to be competent to testify about it.
Incidentally, another Annex C of the same
memorandum purports to be the certificate of
birth of one Antonio T. Uy supposed to have been
born on March 23, 1937 at Centro Misamis,
Misamis Occidental, the son of one Uy Bien,
father, and Tan Put, mother. Significantly,
respondents have not made any adverse
comment on this document. It is more likely,
therefore, that the witness is really the son of
plaintiff by her husband Uy Kim Beng. But she

testified she was childless. So which is which? In

any event, if on the strength of this document,
Nuez is actually the legitimate son of Tan Put
and not her adopted son, he would have been
but 13 years old in 1949, the year of her alleged
marriage to Po Chuan, and even then,
considering such age, his testimony in regard
thereto would still be suspect.
Now, as against such flimsy evidence of plaintiff,
the court had before it, two documents of great
weight belying the pretended marriage. We refer
to (1) Exhibit LL, the income tax return of the
deceased Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan indicating
that the name of his wife was Ang Sick Tin and
(2) the quitclaim, Annex A of the answer, wherein
plaintiff Tan Put stated that she had been living
with the deceased without benefit of marriage
and that she was his "common-law wife". Surely,
these two documents are far more reliable than
all the evidence of the plaintiff put together.
Of course, Exhibit LL is what might be termed as
pre-trial evidence. But it is evidence offered to
the judge himself, not to the clerk of court, and
should have at least moved him to ask plaintiff to
explain if not rebut it before jumping to the

conclusion regarding her alleged marriage to the

deceased, Po Chuan. And in regard to the
quitclaim containing the admission of a commonlaw relationship only, it is to be observed that His
Honor found that "defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng
Sua had the plaintiff execute a quitclaim on
November 29, 1967 (Annex "A", Answer) where
they gave plaintiff the amount of P25,000 as her
share in the capital and profits of the business of
Glory Commercial Co. which was engaged in the
hardware business", without making mention of
any evidence of fraud and misrepresentation in
its execution, thereby indicating either that no
evidence to prove that allegation of the plaintiff
had been presented by her or that whatever
evidence was actually offered did not produce
persuasion upon the court. Stated differently,
since the existence of the quitclaim has been
duly established without any circumstance to
detract from its legal import, the court should
have held that plaintiff was bound by her
admission therein that she was the common-law
wife only of Po Chuan and what is more, that she
had already renounced for valuable
consideration whatever claim she might have
relative to the partnership Glory Commercial Co.

And when it is borne in mind that in addition to all

these considerations, there are mentioned and
discussed in the memorandum of petitioners (1)
the certification of the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City and (2) a similar certification of the
Apostolic Prefect of the Philippine Independent
Church, Parish of Sto. Nio, Cebu City, that their
respective official records corresponding to
December 1949 to December 1950 do not show
any marriage between Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan
and Tan Put, neither of which certifications have
been impugned by respondent until now, it
stands to reason that plaintiff's claim of marriage
is really unfounded. Withal, there is still another
document, also mentioned and discussed in the
same memorandum and unimpugned by
respondents, a written agreement executed in
Chinese, but purportedly translated into English
by the Chinese Consul of Cebu, between Tan Put
and Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan to the following
effect:
CONSULATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Cebu City, Philippines
T R A N S L A T I O N

This is to certify that 1, Miss Tan Ki Eng Alias Tan

Put, have lived with Mr. Lim Po Chuan alias
TeeHoon since 1949 but it recently occurs that
we are incompatible with each other and are not
in the position to keep living together
permanently. With the mutual concurrence, we
decided to terminate the existing relationship of
common law-marriage and promised not to
interfere each other's affairs from now on. The
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) has been
given to me by Mr. Lim Po Chuan for my
subsistence.
Witnesses:
Mr. Lim Beng Guan Mr. Huang Sing Se
Signed on the 10 day of the 7th month of the
54th year of the Republic of China
(corresponding to the year 1965).
(SGD) TAN KI ENG
Verified from the records. JORGE TABAR (Pp.
283-284, Record.)
Indeed, not only does this document prove that

plaintiff's relation to the deceased was that of a

common-law wife but that they had settled their
property interests with the payment to her of
P40,000.
In the light of all these circumstances, We find no
alternative but to hold that plaintiff Tan Put's
allegation that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim
Po Chuan has not been satisfactorily established
and that, on the contrary, the evidence on record
convincingly shows that her relation with said
deceased was that of a common-law wife and
furthermore, that all her claims against the
company and its surviving partners as well as
those against the estate of the deceased have
already been settled and paid. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the respective counsel who
assisted the parties in the quitclaim, Attys. H.
Hermosisima and Natalio Castillo, are members
in good standing of the Philippine Bar, with the
particularity that the latter has been a member of
the Cabinet and of the House of Representatives
of the Philippines, hence, absent any credible
proof that they had allowed themselves to be
parties to a fraudulent document His Honor did
right in recognizing its existence, albeit erring in

not giving due legal significance to its contents.

2. If, as We have seen, plaintiff's evidence of her
alleged status as legitimate wife of Po Chuan is
not only unconvincing but has been actually
overcome by the more competent and weighty
evidence in favor of the defendants, her attempt
to substantiate her main cause of action that
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua have
defrauded the partnership Glory Commercial Co.
and converted its properties to themselves is
even more dismal. From the very evidence
summarized by His Honor in the decision in
question, it is clear that not an iota of reliable
proof exists of such alleged misdeeds.
Of course, the existence of the partnership has
not been denied, it is actually admitted impliedly
in defendants' affirmative defense that Po
Chuan's share had already been duly settled with
and paid to both the plaintiff and his legitimate
family. But the evidence as to the actual
participation of the defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng
Sua in the operation of the business that could
have enabled them to make the extractions of
funds alleged by plaintiff is at best confusing and
at certain points manifestly inconsistent.

In her amended complaint, plaintiff repeatedly

alleged that as widow of Po Chuan she is entitled
to / 3 share of the assets and properties of the
partnership. In fact, her prayer in said complaint is,
among others, for the delivery to her of such / 3
share. His Honor's statement of the case as well as
his findings and judgment are all to that same effect.
But what did she actually try to prove at the ex- parte
hearing?

According to the decision, plaintiff had shown

that she had money of her own when she
"married" Po Chuan and "that prior to and just
after the marriage of the plaintiff to Po Chuan,
she was engaged in the drugstore business; that
not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion
of Po Chuan, the plaintiff sold her drugstore for
P125,000 which amount she gave to her
husband in the presence of Tanhu and was
invested in the partnership Glory Commercial Co.
sometime in 1950; that after the investment of
the above-stated amount in the partnership, its
business flourished and it embarked in the import
business and also engaged in the wholesale and
retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under
(sic) huge profits." (pp. 25-26, Annex L, petition.)

To begin with, this theory of her having

contributed of P125,000 to the capital of the
partnership by reason of which the business
flourished and amassed all the millions referred
to in the decision has not been alleged in the
complaint, and inasmuch as what was being
rendered was a judgment by default, such theory
should not have been allowed to be the subject
of any evidence. But inasmuch as it was the clerk
of court who received the evidence, it is
understandable that he failed to observe the rule.
Then, on the other hand, if it was her capital that
made the partnership flourish, why would she
claim to be entitled to only to / 3 of its assets and
profits? Under her theory found proven by
respondent court, she was actually the owner of
everything, particularly because His Honor also
found "that defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were
partners in the name but they were employees of Po
Chuan that defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua had
no means of livelihood at the time of their
employment with the Glory Commercial Co. under
the management of the late Po Chuan except their
salaries therefrom; ..." (p. 27, id.) Why then does she
claim only / 3 share? Is this an indication of her
generosity towards defendants or of a concocted
cause of action existing only in her confused

imagination engendered by the death of her

common-law husband with whom she had settled
her common-law claim for recompense of her
services as common law wife for less than what she
must have known would go to his legitimate wife and
children?

Actually, as may be noted from the decision

itself, the trial court was confused as to the
participation of defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng
Sua in Glory Commercial Co. At one point, they
were deemed partners, at another point mere
employees and then elsewhere as partnersemployees, a newly found concept, to be sure, in
the law on partnership. And the confusion is
worse comfounded in the judgment which allows
these "partners in name" and "partnersemployees" or employees who had no means of
livelihood and who must not have contributed
any capital in the business, "as Po Chuan was
practically the owner of the partnership having
the controlling interest", / 3 each of the huge assets
and profits of the partnership. Incidentally, it may be
observed at this juncture that the decision has made
Po Chuan play the inconsistent role of being
"practically the owner" but at the same time getting
his capital from the P125,000 given to him by plaintiff

and from which capital the business allegedly

"flourished."

Anent the allegation of plaintiff that the properties

shown by her exhibits to be in the names of
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were bought
by them with partnership funds, His Honor
confirmed the same by finding and holding that
"it is likewise clear that real properties together
with the improvements in the names of
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were
acquired with partnership funds as these
defendants were only partners-employees of
deceased Po Chuan in the Glory Commercial
Co. until the time of his death on March 11,
1966." (p. 30, id.) It Is Our considered view,
however, that this conclusion of His Honor is
based on nothing but pure unwarranted
conjecture. Nowhere is it shown in the decision
how said defendants could have extracted
money from the partnership in the fraudulent and
illegal manner pretended by plaintiff. Neither in
the testimony of Nuez nor in that of plaintiff, as
these are summarized in the decision, can there
be found any single act of extraction of
partnership funds committed by any of said
defendants. That the partnership might have

grown into a multi-million enterprise and that the

properties described in the exhibits enumerated
in the decision are not in the names of Po
Chuan, who was Chinese, but of the defendants
who are Filipinos, do not necessarily prove that
Po Chuan had not gotten his share of the profits
of the business or that the properties in the
names of the defendants were bought with
money of the partnership. In this connection, it is
decisively important to consider that on the basis
of the concordant and mutually cumulative
testimonies of plaintiff and Nuez, respondent
court found very explicitly that, and We reiterate:
xxx xxx xxx
That the late Po Chuan was the one who actively
managed the business of the partnership Glory
Commercial Co. he was the one who made the
final decisions and approved the appointments of
new Personnel who were taken in by the
partnership; that the late Po Chuan and
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua are brothers,
the latter to (2) being the elder brothers of the
former; that defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua
are both naturalized Filipino citizens whereas the
late Po Chuan until the time of his death was a

Chinese citizen; that the three (3) brothers were

partners in the Glory Commercial Co. but Po
Chuan was practically the owner of the
partnership having the controlling interest; that
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were partners
in name but they were mere employees of Po
Chuan; .... (Pp. 90-91, Record.)
If Po Chuan was in control of the affairs and the
running of the partnership, how could the
defendants have defrauded him of such huge
amounts as plaintiff had made his Honor
believe? Upon the other hand, since Po Chuan
was in control of the affairs of the partnership,
the more logical inference is that if defendants
had obtained any portion of the funds of the
partnership for themselves, it must have been
with the knowledge and consent of Po Chuan, for
which reason no accounting could be demanded
from them therefor, considering that Article 1807
of the Civil Code refers only to what is taken by a
partner without the consent of the other partner
or partners. Incidentally again, this theory about
Po Chuan having been actively managing the
partnership up to his death is a substantial
deviation from the allegation in the amended

complaint to the effect that "defendants Antonio

Lim Tanhu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck
Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo, through fraud
and machination, took actual and active
management of the partnership and although Tee
Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory
Commercial Co., defendants managed to use the
funds of the partnership to purchase lands and
buildings etc. (Par. 4, p. 2 of amended complaint,
Annex B of petition) and should not have been
permitted to be proven by the hearing officer,
who naturally did not know any better.
Moreover, it is very significant that according to
the very tax declarations and land titles listed in
the decision, most if not all of the properties
supposed to have been acquired by the
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua with funds of
the partnership appear to have been transferred
to their names only in 1969 or later, that is, long
after the partnership had been automatically
dissolved as a result of the death of Po Chuan.
Accordingly, defendants have no obligation to
account to anyone for such acquisitions in the
absence of clear proof that they had violated the
trust of Po Chuan during the existence of the

partnership. (See Hanlon vs. Hansserman and.

Beam, 40 Phil. 796.)
There are other particulars which should have
caused His Honor to readily disbelieve plaintiffs'
pretensions. Nuez testified that "for about 18
years he was in charge of the GI sheets and
sometimes attended to the imported items of the
business of Glory Commercial Co." Counting 18
years back from 1965 or 1966 would take Us to
1947 or 1948. Since according to Exhibit LL, the
baptismal certificate produced by the same
witness as his birth certificate, shows he was
born in March, 1942, how could he have started
managing Glory Commercial Co. in 1949 when
he must have been barely six or seven years
old? It should not have escaped His Honor's
attention that the photographs showing the
premises of Philippine Metal Industries after its
organization "a year or two after the
establishment of Cebu Can Factory in 1957 or
1958" must have been taken after 1959. How
could Nuez have been only 13 years old then
as claimed by him to have been his age in those
photographs when according to his "birth
certificate", he was born in 1942? His Honor

should not have overlooked that according to the

same witness, defendant Ng Sua was living in
Bantayan until he was directed to return to Cebu
after the fishing business thereat floundered,
whereas all that the witness knew about
defendant Lim Teck Chuan's arrival from
Hongkong and the expenditure of partnership
money for him were only told to him allegedly by
Po Chuan, which testimonies are veritably
exculpatory as to Ng Sua and hearsay as to Lim
Teck Chuan. Neither should His Honor have
failed to note that according to plaintiff herself,
"Lim Tanhu was employed by her husband
although he did not go there always being a
mere employee of Glory Commercial Co." (p. 22,
Annex the decision.)
The decision is rather emphatic in that Lim Tanhu
and Ng Sua had no known income except their
salaries. Actually, it is not stated, however, from
what evidence such conclusion was derived in so
far as Ng Sua is concerned. On the other hand,
with respect to Lim Tanhu, the decision itself
states that according to Exhibit NN-Pre trial, in
the supposed income tax return of Lim Tanhu for
1964, he had an income of P4,800 as salary from

Philippine Metal Industries alone and had a total

assess sable net income of P23,920.77 that year
for which he paid a tax of P4,656.00. (p. 14.
Annex L, id.) And per Exhibit GG-Pretrial in the
year, he had a net income of P32,000 for which
be paid a tax of P3,512.40. (id.) As early as
1962, "his fishing business in Madridejos Cebu
was making money, and he reported "a net gain
from operation (in) the amount of P865.64" (id.,
per Exhibit VV-Pre-trial.) From what then did his
Honor gather the conclusion that all the
properties registered in his name have come
from funds malversed from the partnership?
It is rather unusual that His Honor delved into
financial statements and books of Glory
Commercial Co. without the aid of any
accountant or without the same being explained
by any witness who had prepared them or who
has knowledge of the entries therein. This must
be the reason why there are apparent
inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the
conclusions His Honor made out of them. In
Exhibit SS-Pre-trial, the reported total assets of
the company amounted to P2,328,460.27 as of
December, 1965, and yet, Exhibit TT-Pre-trial,

according to His Honor, showed that the total

value of goods available as of the same date was
P11,166,327.62. On the other hand, per Exhibit
XX-Pre-trial, the supposed balance sheet of the
company for 1966, "the value of inventoried
merchandise, both local and imported", as found
by His Honor, was P584,034.38. Again, as of
December 31, 1966, the value of the company's
goods available for sale was P5,524,050.87, per
Exhibit YY and YY-Pre-trial. Then, per Exhibit II3-Pre-trial, the supposed Book of Account,
whatever that is, of the company showed its
"cash analysis" was P12,223,182.55. We do not
hesitate to make the observation that His Honor,
unless he is a certified public accountant, was
hardly qualified to read such exhibits and draw
any definite conclusions therefrom, without risk of
erring and committing an injustice. In any event,
there is no comprehensible explanation in the
decision of the conclusion of His Honor that there
were P12,223,182.55 cash money defendants
have to account for, particularly when it can be
very clearly seen in Exhibits 11-4, 11-4- A, 11-5
and 11-6-Pre-trial, Glory Commercial Co. had
accounts payable as of December 31, 1965 in
the amount of P4,801,321.17. (p. 15, id.) Under

the circumstances, We are not prepared to

permit anyone to predicate any claim or right
from respondent court's unaided exercise of
accounting knowledge.
Additionally, We note that the decision has not
made any finding regarding the allegation in the
amended complaint that a corporation
denominated Glory Commercial Co., Inc. was
organized after the death of Po Chuan with
capital from the funds of the partnership. We
note also that there is absolutely no finding made
as to how the defendants Dy Ochay and Co Oyo
could in any way be accountable to plaintiff, just
because they happen to be the wives of Lim
Tanhu and Ng Sua, respectively. We further note
that while His Honor has ordered defendants to
deliver or pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff
P4,074,394.18 or / 3 of the P12,223,182.55, the
supposed cash belonging to the partnership as of
December 31, 1965, in the same breath, they have
also been sentenced to partition and give / 3 share of
the properties enumerated in the dispositive portion
of the decision, which seemingly are the very
properties allegedly purchased from the funds of the
partnership which would naturally include the
P12,223,182.55 defendants have to account for.

Besides, assuming there has not yet been any

liquidation of the partnership, contrary to the
allegation of the defendants, then Glory Commercial
Co. would have the status of a partnership in
liquidation and the only right plaintiff could have
would be to what might result after such liquidation to
belong to the deceased partner, and before this is
finished, it is impossible to determine, what rights or
interests, if any, the deceased had (Bearneza vs.
Dequilla 43 Phil. 237). In other words, no specific
amounts or properties may be adjudicated to the heir
or legal representative of the deceased partner
without the liquidation being first terminated.

Indeed, only time and the fear that this decision

would be much more extended than it is already
prevent us from further pointing out the
inexplicable deficiencies and imperfections of the
decision in question. After all, what have been
discussed should be more than sufficient to
support Our conclusion that not only must said
decision be set aside but also that the action of
the plaintiff must be totally dismissed, and, were
it not seemingly futile and productive of other
legal complications, that plaintiff is liable on
defendants' counterclaims. Resolution of the
other issues raised by the parties albeit important

and perhaps pivotal has likewise become

superfluous.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is granted. All proceedings held in respondent
court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to
the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are
hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the
ex-parte proceedings against petitioners and the
decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent
court is hereby ordered to enter an order
extending the effects of its order of dismissal of
the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein
petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso
Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent
court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking
any further action in said civil case gave and
except as herein indicated. Costs against private
respondent.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando,
Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992

Aquino

and

NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR

GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE
GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA
GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO
GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL
GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL,
petitioners, vs.HON COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and
ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19797
promulgated on August 23, 1991, 1 respondent
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by herein petitioners assailing the orders of the
lower court in Special Proceeding No. 88-44589
thereof which effectively sustained the appointment
of private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as
administrator of the estate of the late Domingo
Gabriel.

Petitioners' present appeal by certiorari would

have this Court set aside that decision of

respondent court, hence the need to examine the

chronology of antecedent facts, as found by
respondent court and detailed hereunder,
pertinent to and which culminated in their
recourse now before us.

allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter,

the probate court issued an order, dated July 8,
1988, appointing private respondent as administrator
of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on
a bond of P30,000.00. 4

On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after

Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XI, a petition for letters of
administration alleging, among others, that he is
the son of the decedent, a college graduate,
engaged in business, and is fully capable of
administering the estate of the late Domingo
Gabriel. Private respondent mentioned eight (8)
of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and
heirs of the decedent. 2

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of

claims against the estate of the decedent was
published in the "Metropolitan News." As a
consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private
respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic)
the Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel"
alleging that the decision in a civil case between
her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and
that she thereby had an interest in said estate. 5

On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an

order 3 setting the hearing of the petition on June 29,
1988, on which date all persons interested may show
cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted.
The court further directed the publication of the order
in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general circulation,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No
opposition having been filed despite such publication
of the notice of hearing, private respondent was

On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed

for approval by the probate court an "Inventory
and Appraisal" placing the value of the properties
left by the decedent at P18,960,000.00, which
incident was set for hearing on January 16, 1989.
6

On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy,

George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed
Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion"
praying for the recall of the letters of

administration issued to private respondent and

the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner
Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the
deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are
the herein petitioners. 7 After some exchanges and

deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that

the person who was appointed administrator is
unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform
the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable
under these circumstances. 9 The motion for

on order of the court, petitioners filed an "Opposition

to the Petition and Motion," dated May 20, 1989,
alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by
personal notice of the petition for administration; (2)
petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter,
should be preferred over private respondent; (3)
private respondent has a conflicting and/or adverse
interest against the estate because he might prefer
the claims of his mother and (4) most of the
properties of the decedent have already been
relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to
petitioners and should not be included in the value of
the estate sought to be administered by private
respondent. 8

reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise

denied in an order dated December 22, 1989. 10

On September 21, 1989, the probate court

issued an order denying the opposition of
petitioners on the ground that they had not
shown any circumstance sufficient to overturn
the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1) no evidence
was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to
prove that she is a legitimate daughter of the

From said orders, herein petitioners filed a

special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, on the following grounds:
1. The orders of September 21, 1989 and
December 22, 1989 are null and void, being
contrary to the facts, law and jurisprudence on
the matter;
2. Respondent judge, in rendering the aforesaid
orders, gravely acted with abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction,
hence said orders are null and void ab initio; and
3. Private respondent is morally incompetent and
unsuitable to perform the duties of an
administrator as he would give prior preference
to the claims of his mother against the estate
itself. 11

As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals

rendered judgment dismissing that petition for
certiorari on the ground that the appointment of
an administrator is left entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court which may not be
interfered with unless abused; that the fact that
there was no personal notice served on
petitioners is not a denial of due process as such
service is not a jurisdictional requisite and
petitioners were heard on their opposition; and
that the alleged violation of the order of
preference, if any, is an error of fact or law which
is a mistake of judgment, correctible by appeal
and not by the special civil action of certiorari. 12
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar,
petitioners primarily aver that under Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving
spouse who is first in the order of preference for
the appointment of an administrator. Petitioner
Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal
surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo
Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over
private respondent who is one of the illegitimate
children of the decedent by claimant. Aida
Valencia. Secondly, they claim that assuming

that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin

must be appointed. As between a legitimate and
an illegitimate child, the former is preferred,
hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate
daughter, must be preferred over private
respondent who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it
is contended that the non-observance or violation
per se of the order of preference already
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, private respondent contends
that the court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in not following the order of preference
because the same is not absolute and the choice
of who to appoint rests in the sound discretion of
the court. He calls attention to the fact that
petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas JoseGabriel never applied for appointment despite
the lapse of more than nine (9) months from the
death of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not
possible for the probate court to have considered
them for appointment. Besides, it is not denied
that several properties of the deceased have
already been relinquished to herein petitioners,
hence they would have no interest in applying for

letters of administration. Lastly, private

respondent submits that it has not been shown
that he is incompetent nor is he disqualified from
being appointed or serving as administrator.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of
administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be,
or the next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that

administration be granted to some other person,

it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select. (Emphases
ours.)
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules
prescribes the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of administration, categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin
and the creditors, and requires that sequence to
be observed in appointing an administrator. It
would be a grave abuse of discretion for the
probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any
valid and sufficient reason therefor.
In the appointment of the administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator. This is the same consideration
which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the

appointment of administrators for the estate. The

underlying assumption behind this rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy
and economical administration of the estate, or,
on the other hand, suffer the consequences of
waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have
the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly. 13
This is likewise the same consideration which the
law takes into account in establishing the
preference of the widow to administer the estate
of her husband upon the latter's death, because
she is supposed to have an interest therein as a
partner in the conjugal partnership. 14 Under the
law, the widow would have the right of succession
over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as
much, if not more, interest in administering the entire
estate correctly than any other next of kin. 15 On this
ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the
widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every
right and is very much entitled to the administration
of the estate of her husband since one who has
greater interest in the estate is preferred to another
who has less. 16

Private respondent, however, argues that

Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be
appointed administratrix by reason of her failure
to apply for letters of administration within thirty
(30) days from the death of her husband, as
required under the rules.
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides
that the preference given to the surviving spouse
or next of kin may be disregarded by the court
where said persons neglect to apply for letters of
administration for thirty (30) days after the
decedent's death. However, it is our considered
opinion that such failure is not sufficient to
exclude the widow from the administration of the
estate of her husband. There must be a very
strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow
from the administration. 17
In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason
sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from
appointment as administratrix of the decedent's
estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference
is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid
cause 18 despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the
30-day period be likewise waived under the

permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which

merely provides that said letters, as an alternative,
"may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors."

On the other hand, we feel that we should not

nullify the appointment of private respondent as
administrator. The determination of a person's
suitability for the office of judicial administrator
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of
the court exercising the power of appointment
and said judgment is not to be interfered with on
appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. 19
Administrators have such a right and corresponding
interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle
them to protection from removal without just cause.
Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and
specific causes authorizing the probate court to
remove an administrator.

While it is conceded that the court is invested

with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it must, however, have some fact
legally before it in order to justify such removal.
There must be evidence of an act or omission on
the part of the administrator not conformable to
or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the

court which it deems sufficient or substantial to

warrant the removal of the administrator. 20 In the
instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs
of the deceased, there being no factual and
substantial bases therefor, is not adequate
ratiocination for the removal of private respondent.
Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator
does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of
the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition,
the court may also exercise its discretion in
appointing an administrator where those who are
entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given
time. 21

On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal

positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit
of the estate and those interested therein, more
than one administrator may not be appointed
since that is both legally permissible and
sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a) of Rule 78
specifically states that letters of administration may
be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next
of kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a
contingency which may arise when there is only one
administrator but which may easily be remediable
where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed the remaining executor or administrator

may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, coadministration herein will constitute a recognition of
both the extent of the interest of the widow in the
estate and the creditable services rendered to and
which may further be expected from private
respondent for the same estate.

Under both Philippine and American

jurisprudence, the appointment of coadministrators has been upheld for various
reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented; 24 (2) where justice
and equity demand that opposing parties or factions
be represented in the management of the estate of
the deceased; 25 (3) where the estate is large or, from
any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;
26
(4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate; 27 and (5) when a person
entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him
in the office. 28

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we

deem it just, equitable and advisable that there
be a co-administration of the estate of the
deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel

and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel.

As earlier stated, the purpose of having coadministrators is to have the benefit of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented, especially
considering that in this proceeding they will
respectively represent the legitimate and
illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby,
it may reasonably be expected that all interested
persons will be satisfied, with the representatives
working in harmony under the direction and
supervision of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent
Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING
the validity of the appointment of respondent
Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator
and ORDERING the appointment of petitioner
Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in
Special Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI,
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo R.
Bengzon, with Associate Justices Fidel P.
Purisima and Salome A. Montoya, concurring;
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 16.
2 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 19797, 12-13.
3 Ibid., id., 14-15.
4 Ibid., id., 16-17.
5 Ibid., id., 18-19.
6 Ibid., id., 20-23.
7 Ibid., id., 25-26.
8 Ibid., id., 32-33.

13 Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, et al., 190 SCRA 112

(1990).
14 De Guzman vs. Limcolioc, 67 Phil. 404
(1939).
15 Fule, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 74
SCRA 189 (1976).
16 Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, etc.
vs. Escolin, et al., jointly decided with Testate
Estate of the Late Linnie Jane Hodges, et al. vs.
Carles, et al., 56 SCRA 266 (1974).
17 1 ALR 1247.
18 Capistrano, et al. vs. Nadurata, et al., 46 Phil.
726 (1922); Arevalo, etc. vs. Bustamante, et al.,
69 Phil. 656 (1940).

9 Ibid., id., 35-36.

19 Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 190

SCRA 421 (1990).

10 lbid., id., 56.

20 Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, et al., supra.

11 Ibid., id., 6.

21 Alabama vs. Hill, 76 S.E. 1001; Re Weaver,

119 N.W. 69.

12 Rollo, 16-21.

22 Matute vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 26 SCRA

768 (1969).

RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, vs.ATTY.

EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

23 The "next of kin" has been defined as those

persons who entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent's property (Cooper
vs. Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341).

24 Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, et al., supra.

25 Matias vs. Gonzales, et al., 101 Phil. 852
(1957); Corona vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 116
SCRA 316 (1982); Vda. de Dayrit vs. Ramolete,
et al., 117 SCRA 608 (1982).
26 Copeland vs. Shapley, 100 NE. 1080, cited in
34 C.J.S., Executors & Administrators, 1316.
27 In re Drew's Estate, 236 N.W. 701.
28 In re Fichter's Estate, 279 N.Y.S. 597.

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to
refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors
rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of
malpractice and recommending that he be
suspended from the practice of law.
I
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant,
obtained a favorable judgment from the
Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC)
which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the
premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil
Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as

counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC).
She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid
the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's
appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to
comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and
Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
(CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA,
Co should have filed a petition for review and not
an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and
executory on November 19, 1986.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion
was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CAG.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of
the MTC and the RTC were null and void for
being contrary to law, justice and equity for
allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the
rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting
his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of
a petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to
file an action for annulment.

On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course

to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let
the records remain with it. However, on
November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the
records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be
remanded to the court a quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a
Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or
Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC
and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting
that the decisions were not in accordance with
existing laws and policies. On December 17,
1987, the CA dismissed the petition for
annulment or novation explaining that
. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two
sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other
means whereby the defeated party may procure
final and executory judgment to be set aside with
a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a)
the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or
lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been
obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in
the present complaint to the effect that the
judgments in the former cases were secured
through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis

supplied).

1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.

On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent

Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set
Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of
the CA decision. The CA denied the motion.
Again, respondent requested the CA to set his
Motion For Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988.

On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant

filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the
ground that the case was still pending review by
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore
the motion for execution was premature. On
August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance
of a writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC
affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of
execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued
on October 18, 1988.

In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA

denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a
resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the
motion for reconsideration of the February 12
Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084)
questioning the decisions of the MTC and the
RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a
Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the
petition for having been filed and paid late on
December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988,
respectively. A motion for reconsideration from
such resolution was likewise denied with finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6,

On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special

civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC,
Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and
complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ
of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844
and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent
alleged that the order granting the writ of
execution was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since

a petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No.

11690) was still pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff,
Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation
of the writ of execution until the petition filed in
SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The
CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's
Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and
Void the Writ of Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in
SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus
with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order,
respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review
by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No.
17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the
IBP Board of Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent
his client "within the bounds of the law." The

Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and

honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow
his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun
for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits
the attorney to use any arguable construction of
the law or rules which is favorable to his client.
But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted
under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently
frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless actions (Annotated Code of
Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]).
Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's
zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics
579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every
effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Implementing said Canon are the following rules:

Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple

actions arising from the same cause.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully
use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory
motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous
appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and
delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein,
The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for
Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976];
Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F.
2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No.
844 of the MTC were fully protected and her
defenses were properly ventilated when he filed
the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But
respondent thereafter resorted to devious and
underhanded means to delay the execution of
the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to
his client. The said decision became executory

even pending its appeal with the RTC because of

the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and
to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due.
Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the
decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed
with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective
and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no
allegation therein that the courts had no
jurisdiction, that his client was denied due
process, or "that the judgments in the former
cases were secured through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219
SCRA 530 (1993):
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds:
(a) that the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or
(b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p.
534).
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records
of the case be remanded, respondent knew very
well that the decision of the MTC was already
ripe for execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v.

Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:

. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is
remanded to the trial court for execution, the
function of the trial court is ministerial only; the
trial court is merely obliged with becoming
modesty to enforce that judgment and has no
jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to
reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals,
226 SCRA 250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals,
complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution
of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to
wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the
Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the
Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the

Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or
Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of
Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On
Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or
Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the
Court of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For
Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus
with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by
respondent to forestall the execution of the same
judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum
shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the
Court explained that forum shopping exists
when, by reason of an adverse decision in one
forum, defendant ventures to another for a more

favorable resolution of his case. In the case of

Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 272
(1976), this Court explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse
of the Court's processes and improper conduct
that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as
contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer
who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions
(which obviously delays the execution of a final
and executory judgment) subjects himself to
disciplinary action for incompetence (for not
knowing any better) or for willful violation of his
duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity
to the courts and to maintain only such actions
as appear to him to be just and are consistent
with truth and honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his
rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable
judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed,
respondent violated the duty of a member of the
Bar to institute actions only which are just and
put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly
contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco,
220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the

Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number

of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent
'has made a mockery of the judicial processes'
and disregarded canons of professional ethics in
intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in
whose favor a judgment in the case was
rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to
defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and
Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for
one year.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-31174 May 30, 1972
MANUEL Y. MACIAS, petitioner-appellant, vs.UY
KIM, ANDRES CO, NEMESIO G. CO, NICASIO
G. CO, MANUEL SOSANTONG and RELIABLE
REALTY CORPORATION, defendantsappellees.

Petitioner in his own behalf.

J. Natividad & Associates for respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:p
Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on
December 2, 1969 a petition for review by
certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres
Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel
Sosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation, and
Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance,
alleging that he filed on May 5, 1969 a complaint
dated April 30, 1969 for the annulment of a deed
of sale, reivindicacion and damages against
respondents docketed as Civil Case No. 76412
and assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of
First Instance presided over by Honorable Jose
L. Moya, wherein he averred:
(1) that he is a beneficiary of the estate of Julian
Wolfson pending settlement in Special
Proceedings No. 57405 before Branch VI of the
Manila Court of First Instance and also a
beneficiary of the estate of Rosina Marguerite

Wolfson pending settlement in Special

Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII of the
Manila Court of First Instance. In Special
Proceedings No. 63866, he appealed from the
order dated December 27, 1967 appointing
Ricardo Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator to
the Supreme Court, which appeal was docketed
as G.R. No. L-29235;
(2) that he has been named as special
administrator of the estate of Rosina in Special
Proceedings No. 67302 originally assigned to
Branch VI but later transferred to Branch VIII and
consolidated with Special Proceedings No.
63866 but the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII
dismissed said Special Proceedings No. 67302
in an order dated February 20, 1967, which he
also appealed to the Supreme Court and
docketed as G.R. No. L-28054;
(3) that to protect his interest as such beneficiary
in the estates of Rosina and Julian, he caused a
notice of lis pendens to be annotated on Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 49877/ T-158, 49878/T158, 49879/T-158, 49880/T-158, 49881/T-158 all
issued in the name of Rosina covering five
adjacent lots in Tondo, Manila;

(4) that in an order dated April 16, 1969 (p. 73,

rec. of L-30935), Judge Manuel P. Barcelona
presiding in Special Proceedings No. 63866,
authorized respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz as
ancillary administrator of Rosina's estate, upon
the latter's motion, to sell the real properties of
the estate for the payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes, realty taxes of the estate and
expenses of administration;
(5) that respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz negotiated
for the sale of the aforesaid lots with the Reliable
Realty Corporation, which was willing to buy the
properties for P400,000.00 provided the notice of
lis pendens annotated on the titles covering said
lots is cancelled;
(6) that upon motion of respondent Vito Cruz,
Judge Manuel Barcelona in Special Proceedings
No. 63866 ordered the cancellation of the said
notice of lis pendens in an order dated April 15,
1969 (Schedule "C" of petition, p. 43, rec.);
(7) that respondent Vito Cruz executed a deed of
sale over the aforesaid properties in favor of
Reliable Realty Corporation, organized by
respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nicasio Co,

Nemesio Co, and Manuel Sosantong, and

respondent Judge Manuel P. Barcelona issued
an order dated April 24, 1969 approving the said
deed of sale (Annex "A" and Schedule "B" of
petition, pp. 38-47, rec.);
(8) that thereafter T.C.T. Nos. 49877, 49878,
49880, and 49881 were cancelled and in lieu
thereof, T.C.T. Nos. 96471/T-757, 96472/T-757,
96473/T-757 and 96474/T-757 were issued by
the Register of Deeds in favor of respondent
Reliable Realty Corporation;
(9) that the aforesaid orders of April 16, 1969 and
April 24, 1969 were issued without due notice to
petitioner and without or in excess of the
jurisdiction of the Presiding Judge in Special
Proceedings No. 63866 for the reason that he
had been divested of jurisdiction of said
proceedings by reason of his appeal therein in G.
R. No. L-29235, (p. 32, rec.);
(10) that on April 30, 1969, he caused the filing of
a notice of adverse claim on the properties
covered by T.C.T. Nos. 96471, 96472, 96473 and
96474 (p. 34, rec.); and

(11) that he spent at least P10,000.00 in his

efforts to protect and defend his hereditary
interests in the estate of Rosina;
and prays for judgment (a) declaring the deed of
sale over the aforementioned lots as null and
void, (b) directing the cancellation of the transfer
certificates of titles issued in the name of
Reliable Realty Corporation, (c) declaring that
the aforesaid five lots as his distributive share in
the estate of Rosina as well as directing the
register of deeds of Manila to issue in his name
new transfer certificates of title, and (d)
sentencing private respondents jointly and
severally to pay him P10,000.00 as actual
damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees plus legal interests
on all said values.
Private respondents Reliable Realty Corporation,
Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and
Manuel Sosantong filed a motion to dismiss
(Appendix "B", pp. 44-50, rec.) appellant Macias'
complaint in Branch X of the Manila Court of First
Instance on the grounds that the court has no
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of

the suit; that the complaint states no cause of

action; that there is another action of the same
nature pending in court; that plaintiff has no legal
capacity to prosecute the present suit; and
alleging specifically that:
(1) Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance
has no jurisdiction over the case since the
subject matter involved properly belongs
exclusively to and is within the competence of
Branch VIII and Branch IV before which courts
Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 57405 are
pending and petitioner's alleged claim of
beneficiary interest in the estate of Julian and
Rosina depends on a recognition thereof by the
probate court in said Special Proceedings Nos.
63866 and 57405;
(2) that upon the face of the complaint, the same
does not contain a cause of action; because
Branch X, which is coordinate with Branch VIII of
the Manila Court of First Instance, under the
existing jurisprudence has no authority to annul
the questioned orders issued by Branch VIII,
aside from the fact that he appealed to the
Supreme Court from the order of the Presiding
Judge of Branch VIII dismissing Special

Proceedings No. 67302 which was then pending

before Branch IV and subsequently transferred to
Branch VIII (L-28054), from the order denying
Macias' claim of beneficiary interest in Rosina's
estate and appointing respondent Vito Cruz as
ancillary administrator of the estate of Rosina in
the same Special Proceedings No. 63866 (L29235; Annex "A", pp. 51-60, rec.) as well as
from the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch
IV also denying Macias' petition for relief from the
order approving the partial distribution of the
estate of Julian and denying his motion for the
removal of Vito Cruz as administrator and
appointment of herein appellant in his place (L28947; Annex "B", pp. 61-65, rec.);
(3) that petitioner Manuel Macias is not a real
party in interest; because he is not the
beneficiary, nor legatee nor creditor, much less
an heir, of Rosina. He bases his alleged interest
in the estate of Julian who died intestate on June
15, 1964 solely on the latter's memorandum to
his sister Rosina wherein he hoped that his sister
Rosina will, after his estate is settled, give at her
convenience to petitioner Manuel Macias the
sum of P500.00; to Faustino A. Reis and

Severino Baron the amount of P10 000.00 each;

and to Dominador M. Milan and Vicente D. Recto
P1,000.00 each. The said memorandum is not a
will. Unfortunately, Rosina died on September
14, 1965 without being able to comply with the
memorandum of her brother Julian. Since
petitioner has not been declared an heir or
legatee of Julian in Special Proceedings No.
57405 nor of Rosina in Special Proceedings No.
63866, he has no legal standing to file the
present action. The aforesaid motion to dismiss
was followed by supplement alleging that since
the buyer, the Reliable Corporation, has a distinct
personality from those of its incorporators, there
is no cause of action against private respondent
Uy Kim, Nemesis Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and
Manuel Sosantong, its incorporators.
Respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz filed a motion for
intervention in said Case No. 76412 dated June
4, 1969, reiterating the ground of the motion to
dismiss advanced by the other private
respondents as aforestated and emphasizing
that this petition for relief from judgment seeks
the nullified classification by the Presiding Judge
of Branch X of the order of the Presiding Judge

of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866

dated April 15 and April 24, 1969, as admmitted
by petitioner's motion in praying that this Case
No. 76412 should not be assigned to Branch IV
or Branch VIII as his petition seeks to nullify the
orders of Presiding Judge Manuel Barcelona of
Branch VIII in said Special Proceedings No.
63866 (Annex "B", pp. 96-97, rec.).
Petitioner-appellant filed his opposition dated
June 14, 1969 to the motion to dismiss of
respondents Reliable Realty Corporation and its
incorporators as well as to the motion for
intervention filed by respondent Vito Cruz.
In an order dated June 30, 1969, Presiding
Judge Jose L. Moya of Branch X sustained the
motion to dismiss and forthwith dismissed
plaintiff's complaint herein in Civil Case No.
76412 but denied the prayer of the motion to
dismiss for cancellation of the notice of adverse
claim, which petitioner-appellant caused to be
annotated on the titles issued in favor of Reliable
Realty Corporation, from which order petitionerappellant Macias interposed his appeal, and
accordingly filed this petition for review on
certiorari.

Herein respondents Reliable Realty Corporation,

Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co and
Manuel Sosantong filed on December 12, 1969
their motion to dismiss the instant petition on the
ground that Branch X of the Manila Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over plaintiff's
complaint, for the said Branch X is without
authority to review the decisions of Branch IV, a
coordinate branch of the Manila Court of First
Instance; that petitioner-appellant is not a
beneficiary, heir or creditor of the estate of Julian
or Rosina; and that petitioner-appellant had
already appealed the order of Judge Barcelona
of Branch VIII authorizing and approving the sale
of the lots in favor of respondent Reliable Realty
Corporation respectively dated April 16 and April
24, 1969 (Annex "A" pp. 94-95, rec.), which
appeal is now pending before this Court in L30935 (pp. 87-97, rec.; pp. 4, 15, appellant's
brief; emphasis supplied).
In a manifestation dated and filed on December
19, 1969, respondent Vito Cruz adopted in toto
as his own motion to dismiss and/or answer, the
motion to dismiss dated December 12, 1969 filed
by the principal respondents (p. 102, rec.).

Petitioner-appellant filed on December 19, 1969

an opposition dated December 18, 1969 to the
motion to dismiss (pp. 104-108, rec.).
In Our resolution dated January 23, 1970, the
motion to dismiss petition for review and
certiorari was denied (p. 123, rec.).
In a manifestation dated February 13, 1970,
private respondents Reliable Realty Corporation,
Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and
Manuel Sosantong adopted as their answer their
motion to dismiss filed on December 12, 1969 (p.
133, rec.).
The appealed order of respondent Judge Jose L.
Moya, dated June 30, 1969, reads:
It appearing from the complaint that there is
presently pending in Branch VIII of this Court
Special Proceeding No. 63866 for the settlement
of the inheritance of the deceased Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson; that the plaintiff claims to be
a beneficiary by hereditary title of her estate; that
the sale of the lands forming part thereof which
the plaintiff desires to annul was approved by this
Court in Special Proceeding No. 63866; that

aside from praying for the annulment of the sale,

the plaintiff also seeks a declaration that the
lands sold constitutes his distributive share of
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson's inheritance; and
that the plaintiff has appealed to the Supreme
Court from the order approving the sale, and it
being settled that the jurisdiction to annul a
judgment or order of a branch of the Court of
First Instance is vested exclusively in the branch
which rendered the judgment or issued the order
and that any other branch, even if it be in the
same judicial district, which attempts to do so,
exceeds its jurisdiction (Tuason v. Judge Torres,
21 S.C.R.A. 1169, L-24717, December 4, 1967),
and it being unquestionable that the authority to
distribute the inheritance of a deceased person
and determine the persons entitled thereto
belongs exclusively to the court or branch thereof
taking cognizance of the proceedings for its
settlement (Branch VIII) in this case; and finally
the Supreme Court having already acquired
jurisdiction by reason of the plaintiff's appeal, no
subordinate court should attempt to pass upon
the same question submitted to it, the motion to
dismiss filed by the defendant is granted and the
complaint is dismissed.

The prayer in the motion to dismiss for the

cancellation of the notice of adverse claim which
the plaintiff caused to be annotated on the titles
to the lands on account of the present action is
denied as the only question raised by a motion to
dismiss is the sufficiency of the complaint filed in
the action. (Appendix "F", p. 78, rec.).
The pretense of herein petitioner-appellant is
without merit and the foregoing order appealed
from should be sustained.
Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estates of the deceased, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions
concerning the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be
filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of
First Instance, then presided over by former
Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings
No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate
of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was
filed and is still pending.

This Court stated the rationale of said Section 1

of Rule 73, thus:
... The reason for this provision of the law is
obvious. The settlement of the estate of a
deceased person in court constitutes but one
proceeding. For the successful administration of
that estate it is necessary that there should be
but one responsible entity, one court, which
should have exclusive control of every part of
such administration. To intrust it to two or more
courts, each independent of the other, would
result in confusion and delay.
xxx xxx xxx
The provision of section 602, giving one court
exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, was not inserted in
the law for the benefit of the parties litigant, but in
the public interest for the better administration of
justice. For that reason the parties have no
control over it. 1
On the other hand, and for such effects as may be
proper, it should be stated herein that any challenge
to the validity of a will, any objection to the

authentication thereof, and every demand or claim

which any heir, delegate or party in interest in a
testate or intestate succession may make, must be
acted upon and decided within the same special
proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same
judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the
estate shall take cognizance of the question raised,
inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called
upon to make distribution and adjudication of the
property to the interested parties, ... . 2

This was reiterated in Maningat vs. Castillo,

thus:

... The main function of a probate court is to

settle and liquidate the estates of deceased
persons either summarily or through the process
of administration. (See articles 74 to 91,
inclusive, Rules of Court.) In order to settle the
estate of a deceased person it is one of the
functions of the probate court to determine who
the heirs are that will receive the net assets of
the estate and the amount or proportion of their
respective shares. ...
It is not disputed that the orders sought to be
annulled and set aside by herein petitionerappellant in his complaint against private

respondents which was assigned to Branch X of

the Manila Court of First Instance presided over
by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge
Barcelona presiding over Branch VIII of the same
court.
Even in other cases, it is also a general principle
that the branch of the court of first instance that
first acquired jurisdiction over the case retains
such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
branches of the same court of first instance or
judicial district and all other coordinate courts.
Thus, in the 1970 case of De Leon vs. Salvador, 4
Mr. Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, ruled:

The various branches of a Court of First Instance

of a province or city, having as they have the
same or equal authority and exercising as they
do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should
not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere
with the respective cases, much less with their
orders or judgments, by means of injunction. 5
In the words of Mr. Justice Fernando, also in
behalf of the Court, "any other view would be
subversive of a doctrine that has been
steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of

which is to assure stability and consistency in

judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that
may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate
jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each
other's lawful orders. ... This is to preclude an
undesirable situation from arising one, which if
permitted, as above pointed out, would be
fraught with undesirable consequences, as
already indicated, for the bench, no less than for
the litigants. To such an eventuality, this Court
cannot give its sanction. 6
Appellant claims that his action in Civil Case No.
76412 before Branch X of the Manila Court of
First Instance, is not for the annulment of any
judgment or order of Branch VIII of said Court
and that nowhere, either in the prayer or in the
body of his complaint, does he seek for the
annulment of any order of Branch VIII (p. 8,
appellant's brief). This pretension of appellant is
belied by paragraph 8 of his complaint in Civil
Case No. 76412 alleging that the order dated
April 15, 1969 directing the register of deeds of
Manila to cancel the notice of lis pendens caused
to be annotated by the appellant on the titles
covering the five (5) lots and the order dated April

24, 1969 approving the deed of sale were both

issued by the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in
Special Proceedings No. 63866, without due
notice to and hearing of appellant; and further
belied by paragraph 9 of the same complaint
alleging that the acts of the buyers of the
aforesaid five (5) lots in causing the cancellation
of appellant's notice of lis pendens in obtaining
the registration of the deed of sale, in procuring
the cancellation of the transfer certificates of
titles over the five (5) lots in the name of Rosina,
and in securing new transfer certificates of title in
the name of defendant Reliable Realty
Corporation, are all null and void ab initio,
because (1) of the pendency of his appeal in
G.R. No. L-29235 for said appeal divested the
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of any jurisdiction
in Special Proceedings No. 63866 to sell the
properties in question notwithstanding the order
of April 24, 1969 approving the deed of sale, (2)
the orders dated April 15, 1969 and April 24,
1969 directing the cancellation of appellant's
notice of lis pendens and approving the deed of
sale may not be registered as they have not
become final and will not become final by reason
of his appeal in G.R. No. L-29235, and (3) he

was not notified of the petition to sell any portion

of Rosina's estate (pars. 8 & 9, Appendix "A", pp.
30-34, rec.). It is patent that by the aforesaid
paragraphs 8 and 9 of his complaint in Civil Case
No. 76412 before Branch X, appellant impugns
the validity of the aforementioned orders of the
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special
Proceedings No. 63866.
Furthermore, in his motion to the Honorable
Executive Judge of May 5, 1969, appellant
averred that he filed his complaint in Civil Case
No. 76412 to nullify and set aside certain orders
of Judge Manuel P. Barcelona of Branch VIII in
Special Proceedings No. 63866 over the testate
estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson and prayed
that said Case No. 76412 should not be assigned
to either Branch VIII or Branch IV (Annex "A", pp.
21-22, appellant's brief). Said motion could not
refer to orders of Judge Manuel P. Barcelona
other than the aforecited orders of April 15, 16,
and 24, 1969 in Special Proceedings No. 63866.
This appellant impliedly admits on pp. 3-4 of his
reply brief which is further emphasized by his
statement that the only purpose of his motion
dated May 5, 1969 was "to keep the action away

from possible prejudgment by the

abovementioned branches of the court below
(referring to Branch IV and Branch VIII of the
Manila Court of First Instance)."
But even without considering paragraphs 8 and 9
of appellant's complaint and his motion dated
May 5, 1969 in Civil Case No. 76412 before
Branch X, his prayer in the same complaint for
the nullification or rescission of the deed of sale
covering the five lots in question cannot be
decreed without passing upon the validity of the
orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in
Special Proceedings No. 63866 cancelling his
notice of lis pendens authorizing the sale and
approving the sale. And, as heretofore stated,
under the rules and controlling jurisprudence, the
Presiding Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court
of First Instance cannot legally interfere with, nor
pass upon the validity of said orders of the
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, which court, as
the probate court, has exclusive jurisdiction over
the estate of the decedent, including the validity
of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition
of the estate for the payment of its liabilities, and
the distribution among the heirs of the residue

thereof.
Appellant's insistence that in Civil Case No.
76412, he seeks to recover his distributive share
of the estate of the decedent Rosina, all the more
removes the said case from the jurisdiction of
Branch X; for as heretofore stated, the
distribution of the estate is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate court. He must
therefore seek his remedy in the same probate
court Branch VIII which is hearing Special
Proceedings No. 63866, instead of filing a
separate civil case in Branch X.
Moreover, his petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in G.R. No. L-30935, entitled
Macias vs. University of Michigan, et al., wherein
he questions the validity of the aforesaid orders
of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special
Proceedings No. 63866, amply covers the same
subject matter and seeks substantially the same
relief as his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412
and the present petition (see pars. 26, 28, 30-40,
and the prayer in this petition, pp. 13-34, rec. of
L-30935). .
Appellant himself states that the decision in the

three cases he filed with this Court namely, G.R.

Nos. L-29235, L-28947 and L-30935 will answer
the question whether he has legal interest in the
estates of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson and Julian
A. Wolfson (pp. 21-22, appellant's brief).
The cases he cited, as correctly contended by
appellees (Lajom vs. Viola, et al., 73 Phil. 563;
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Rodriguez vs.
Dela Cruz, 8 Phil. 665; and Quion vs. Claridad,
L-48541, January 30, 1943, 2 O.G., No. 6, June,
1943, p. 572, 74 Phil. 100), are not applicable to
and therefore do not govern the instant case,
because the actions therein were filed by the
preterited heir or legatee or co-owner long after
the intestate or testate or partition proceedings
had been closed or terminated. In the case at
bar, Special Proceedings No. 63866 is still
pending in the probate court Branch VIII of the
Manila Court of First Instance where appellant
should present, as he has in fact presented, his
alleged claim of legal interest in the estate of
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, which claim, if valid,
will certainly entitle him to all notices of all
petitions, motions, orders, resolutions, decisions
and processes issued and/or promulgated by

said probate court. There is no order by the said

probate court terminating or closing Special
Proceedings No. 63866.
However, in the recent case of Guilas vs. Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, et al.,
7

WE reiterated the rule:

... The better practice, however, for the heir who

has not received his share, is to demand his
share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and
not through an independent action, which would
be tried by another court or Judge which may
thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or
intestate court already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730,
741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra; Jingco vs.
Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082;
Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March
29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-61).
Even in the case of Quion, etc. vs. Claridad, et
al., supra, invoked by appellant, WE ruled that

the intestate proceedings, although closed and

terminated, can still be reopened within the
prescriptive period upon petition therefor by a
preterited heir.
The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or
tendency of appellant herein to file several
actions covering the same subject matter or
seeking substantially identical relief, which is
unduly burdening the courts. Coming from a
neophyte, who is still unsure of himself in the
practice of the law, the same may be regarded
with some understanding. But considering
appellant's ability and long experience at the bar,
his filing identical suits for the same remedy is
reprehensible and should merit rebuke.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed
and the appealed order is hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioner-appellant. Let this be
entered in his personal record.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee,
Barredo and Antonio, JJ., concur.
Castro and Fernando, JJ., took no part.

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

7 L-26695, January 31, 1972.

G.R. No. L-22304
Footnotes
1 Serrano, et al. vs. Chanco, et al., 5 Phil. 431,
434-35.
2 Benedicto, etc. vs. Javellana, 10 Phil. 197, 203.
3 75 Phil. 532, 535.
4 L-30871, Dec. 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 567, 573575, citing Cabigao vs. del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182;
Hubahib vs. Insular Drug, 64 Phil. 119; Manila
Railroad vs. Yatco, 23 SCRA 735 (1968);
Luciano vs. Prov'l Governor, 28 SCRA 517
(1969); Sterling Investment vs. Ruiz, 30 SCRA
318 (1969) ; Tuason vs. Torres, 21 SCRA 1169
(1967).
5 36 SCRA 573.
6 Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez, L-22585, Dec. 18,
1967, 21 SCRA 1275, 1280-1281.

July 30, 1968

SAMAR MINING CO., INC., petitioner-appellant,

vs.FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPEYO V.
TAN and RUFINO ABUYEN, respondentsappellees.
Benedicto G. Arcinas for petitioner-appellant.
Villavieja and Zapanta for respondentsappellees.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, dismissing this case, with
costs against the petitioner, and lifting the writ of
preliminary injunction therein issued.
Acting upon a claim for compensation, under Act
No. 3428, filed by Rufino Abuyen, on June 18,
1956, for a disease allegedly contracted in the
course of his employment, as foreman of the
Samar Mining Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to

as the petitioner and docketed as WC Case

No. R-VI-217, decision was rendered, on
October 14, 1958, by Pompeyo V. Tan an
officer of Regional Office No. VI of the
Department of Labor sentencing petitioner
herein:
1. To provide continued medical treatment and
hospitalization to the claimant in accordance with
Section 13 of the Act until his tuberculosis is
cured or arrested;
2. To pay to the claimant a lump sum of TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE
(P2,523.00) PESOS and a weekly compensation
of P17.40 from date hereof until he is cured or
his pulmonary tuberculosis is arrested as
certified by a competent physician but the total
compensation should not exceed P4,000.00;
payment to be made, thru the Regional Office
No. VI of the Department of Labor;
3. To pay to the workmen's compensation fund
the amount of P26.00 as administrative costs
pursuant to Section of 55 of Act 3428, as
amended.

A reconsideration of said decision having been

denied, on March 24, 1960, petitioner
commenced Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, for a writ of certiorari
and prohibition, with preliminary injunction,
against Francisco P. Arnado, as Regional
Administrator of said office, Pompeyo V. Tan, as
the writer of said decision, and claimant Abuyen,
upon the ground that Tan had acted without
jurisdiction in hearing said claim and rendering
decision thereon, and that Arnado had committed
a grave abuse of discretion in sustaining and
upholding said acts of Tan. Sustaining
respondents' objection, upon the ground of
wrong venue, the case was, however, dismissed
by said court, the decision of which was, on June
30, 1961, affirmed by Us.
On July 21, 1961, petitioner commenced, against
the same respondents in said Case No. 42836,
the present action for certiorari and prohibition,
with preliminary injunction, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Upon the filing of the case,
said court issued a restraining order, which was,
later, followed by a writ of preliminary injunction,
upon the filing and approval of the requisite

bond. After appropriate proceedings, said court

subsequently rendered the decision mentioned in
the opening paragraph hereof, dismissing the
petition, upon the ground that respondent Tan
had authority to hear and pass upon the
aforementioned claim of Abuyen, and dissolving
the writ of preliminary injunction issued
meanwhile. Hence, this appeal by petitioner
herein, who insists: 1) that, being merely a labor
attorney, respondent Tan had no authority to
make the award complained of; 2) that as
Regional Administrator, respondent Arnado could
not delegate said authority to respondent Tan;
and 3) that no such delegation of authority to him
has been made.
It is not disputed that respondent Tan is a labor
attorney, assigned to Regional Office No. VI of
the Department of Labor, and that, as such, he
has no authority to hear claims for compensation
under Act No. 3428 and to render decisions
thereon. Based, however, upon Plan No. 20-A,
submitted to the President of the Philippines by
the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission, and Executive Order No. 218,
dated December 10, 1956, particularly section 32

thereof 1 as well as on Rule 21, section 1, of the

Rules of Procedure promulgated by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2
pursuant to section 12, of Article III of said Plan
No. 20-A, and section 45 of Act No. 3428, as
amended by Republic Act No. 772, 3 we have
held, as early as August 21, 1961
... that a regional office of the Department of
Labor has original jurisdiction to hear and
determine claims for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. If a claim is
controverted, it shall be heard and decided only
by a regularly appointed hearing officer or any
other employee duly designated by the Regional
Administrator to act as hearing officer. But when
the claim is uncontroverted and there is no
necessity of requiring the claimant to present
further evidence, the Regional Administrator may
enter an award or deny the claim. Furthermore,
an employer is duty bound to controvert a claim
within 14 days from the date of the accident or
illness of the laborer or within 10 days after he or
his representative first acquired knowledge of the
said accident or sickness. Failure to do so within
the period provided will result in the renunciation

of his right to controvert the claim. But an

employer may reinstate his right to controvert the
claim by filing a petition under oath specifying the
reasons for his failure to do so. 4 .
We have repeatedly reiterated this view,5 which is
now well settled. In the case at bar, respondentsappellees contend and have introduced evidence
to the effect that Regional Administrator Arnado
had by virtue of an office order, dated
November 29, 1957, and marked as Exhibit 1
designated respondent Tan who is a duly
qualified Member of the Philippine Bar "as
Hearing Officer in the case of Rufino Abuyen vs.
Samar Mining Co., WCC Case No. 44238 (R-VI217)." As a consequence, the only issue for
determination is whether or not there has been
such designation in his favor.
Petitioner assails the evidence thereon upon the
theory:
1) that the lower court erred in reopening the
case, after its submission for decision, for the
reception of said evidence; and 2) that the same
is insufficient to establish the designation
aforementioned.

As regards the first alleged error, it appears that

petitioner had asked the lower court to render
judgment on the pleadings; that, thereafter, both
parties submitted their respective memoranda;
that, in order to bolster up their contention,
respondents attached to their Memorandum, as
Annex 1, the alleged designation of respondent
Tan by Regional Administrator Arnado that
petitioner, however, objected to the consideration
of said Annex 1; that, accordingly, the lower court
deemed it best to reopen the case for the
introduction of additional evidence and the
determination of the admissibility in evidence of
said Annex 1; and that the same was identified,
marked and admitted as Exhibit 1 at the
rehearing.
In this connection, it should be noted that trial
courts have discretionary power to reopen a case
either before or after rendition of judgment, for
the introduction of additional evidence, so as to
dispel doubts on material points. Such power is
controlled by no other rule than that of the
paramount interest of justice, and its exercise will
not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of
clear abuse thereof.6 No such abuse has been

committed in the case at bar. On the contrary, the

exercise of said power by his Honor, the trial
Judge, served to promote the interest of justice,
by clarifying the question whether or not
respondent Tan had been given the
aforementioned designation.
As a matter of fact, said Exhibit 1 merely
confirmed the allegation in respondents' answer
to the effect that respondent Tan had acted "not
as Labor Attorney but as Hearing Officer
designated pursuant to the authority granted him
by the previous Regional Labor Administrator to
try and hear the merits of the compensation case
... WCC Case No. R-VI-217, Rufino Abuyen vs.
Samar Mining Co., Inc." Moreover, pursuant to
the very cases cited by petitioner,7 the truth of
this allegation had been deemed impliedly
admitted by the petitioner, when it submitted the
case for judgment on the pleadings.8
Independently of the foregoing, the second
alleged error is obviously devoid of merit, the
signature of Regional Administrator Arnado on
said Exhibit 1 having been identified by one of
his subordinates, who, as such, as familiar
therewith.

One other point must be stressed. The illness on

which Abuyen's claim is based took place in
1956. Yet, through the present case, and Civil
Case No. 42836 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila petitioner has succeeded in prolonging
the litigation, for the compensation involved
therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more,
petitioner's contention was based upon a theory
that had been rejected by this Court as early as
August, 1961. Then again, the compensability of
Abuyen's disability had never been questioned
by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the
purpose of this case, like the previous one, has
been merely to delay, a policy "Often resorted to"
in the language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.)
"as a means of draining the resources of the
poorer party" in this case a tuberculosis
patient "and of compelling it to submit out of
sheer exhaustion."9 Thus, the conduct of
petitioner's counsel is hardly compatible with the
duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of
Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with treble costs, jointly and
severally, against the petitioner and its counsel,

Attorney Benedicto G. Arcinas and let certified

copy of this decision be attached to the personal
record of the latter, as a Member of the Bar. It is
so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.
Footnotes
Reading: "The functions, powers, duties and
responsibilities of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission shall consist of those quasilegislative and quasi-judicial functions, powers,
duties and responsibilities now vested by law Act
No. 3428, as amended by Republic Act No. 772)
in the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner
of Workmen's Compensation, as further
amended by Section 12 of the Plan: Provided,
That any provision of law or rules of court to the
contrary notwithstanding, all cases falling under
the Workmen's Compensation Law shall be filed
and heard in the Regional Office where the
respondent or any of the respondents resides or
may be found, or where the claimant or any of
the claimants resides, at the election of the
1

claimant."
"Only regularly appointed Hearing Officer shall
hear and decide compensation claims. However,
when the exigencies of the service so require,
the Regional Administrator may designate any
other employee of the Regional Office, who is a
duly qualified member of the Philippine Bar or
has graduated from a law course in an
accredited law college, to act a hearing officer." .
2

Which provides that: "In case the employer

decides to controvert the right to compensation,
he shall, either on or before the fourteenth day of
disability or within ten days after he has
knowledge of the alleged accident, file a notice
with the Commissioner, on a form prescribed by
him, that compensation is not being paid, giving
the name of the claimant, name of the employer,
date of the accident and the reason why
compensation is not being paid. Failure on the
part of the employer or the insurance carrier to
comply with this requirement shall constitute a
renunciation of his right to controvert the claim
unless he submits reasonable grounds for the
failure to make the necessary reports, on the
basis of which grounds the Commissioner may
3

reinstate his right to controvert the claim." .

4

Caltex v. Villanueva, L-15658, August 21, 1961.

Tan v. De Leon, L-16254, September 16, 1961;

San Miguel Brewery v. Sobremesana, L-18730,
September 16, 1961; La Mallorca v. Ramos, L15476, September 19, 1961; Manila Railroad v.
Manalang, L-20845, November 29, 1965;
NASSCO v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-22628, January 31, 1967.
5

Capellania of Tambobong v. Antonio, 8 Phil. 683;

Soriano v. Aquino, 31 Phil. 176; Alvarez v.
Guevara, 47 Phil. 12: Gaas v. Fortich, 54 Phil.
196; Delfin v. CAR, L-23348, March 14, 1967;
Sharruf v. Bubla, L-17029, Sept. 30, 1964; Colcol
v. PBC, L- 23117, Nov. 17, 1967; PAL v. Salcedo,
L-22119, Sept. 29, 1997; Bernabe v. CA, L18278, March 30, 1967; People v. Halasan, L21495, July 21, 1967.
6

Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 823; Bauerman v.

Casas, 10 Phil. 386; La Yebana Co. v. Sevilla, 9
Phil. 210.
7

Villamor v. Lacson, L-15945, November 28,

1964.
Harrison Foundry and Machinery v. Harrison
Foundry Worker's Association, L-18432, June 29,
1963.
9

G.R. No. L-26679

April 30, 1969

JOAQUIN UYPUANCO, petitioner-appellant, vs.

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, ET
AL., respondents-appellees.
Ramon V. Sison for petitioner-appellant. Taada,
Carreon and Taada for respondents-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., Acting C.J.:
Appeal certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals as involving a question of jurisdiction of
an inferior court (Judiciary Act, section 17).
The Equitable Banking Corporation, a domestic
bank, had sued Joaquin Uypuanco, Mariano
Mabasa, and the Traders Insurance and Surety
Co. in the Municipal Court of Manila. In the
complaint it was alleged:

2. That on June 5, 1957, the defendants obtained

by way of loan from the plaintiff the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, promising jointly and severally to pay
the same Ninety (90) days after date, with
interest thereon at ten (10%) per centum per
annum, of which amount there still remains an
outstanding balance of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P4,500.00) PESOS TOGETHER
WITH TEN (10%) per centum of the amount due,
in case the collection of said indebtedness is
made by or through an attorney-at-law, as set
forth in the promissory note, executed by said
defendants on said date, a true copy of which is
hereto attached and made as an integral part
hereof as Annex "A".

demandable claim, plaintiff was compelled to

retain the services of the undersigned counsel to
enforce the collection of the above-said
obligation and said defendants have therefore
incurred a further liability of ten (10) per centum
of the whole amount due and payable to the
plaintiff on the promissory note, Annex "A", for
attorney's fees, as stipulated therein;
Prayer was for judgment against defendants in
the sum of P4,500.00, with interest at 10% per
annum; plus interest on the accrued interest; and
10% of the entire amount payable by way of
attorney's fees.

3. That the above-mentioned sum of P4,500.00

due and payable to plaintiff on the promissory
note, Annex "A", is now long overdue and the
defendants have failed and refused, and still fail
and refuse to pay the same, or any portion
thereof, despite repeated demands upon them to
do so;

The municipal court heard the plaintiff ex parte

because defendants failed to appear at the
hearing and decided in favor of the plaintiff. The
latter then moved for execution. At the hearing of
the motion, Joaquin Uypuanco opposed the
issuance of the writ on the ground that the
municipal court had no jurisdiction over the case.
The opposition was overruled, and a writ of
execution was issued.

4. That because of defendant's failure and

refusal to satisfy plaintiff's plainly valid, just and

Uypuanco recoursed on certiorari and prohibition

to the Court of First Instance of Manila, urging

that the complaint had claimed, in addition to the

basic debt of P4,500.00, ten per cent due in case
the collection was done through counsel
(paragraph 2) and "a further liability" of 10% of
the whole amount due (paragraph 4); that all
these amounts put together totalled more than
P5,000.00 (excluding interest and costs), which
was the upper limit of the municipal court's
jurisdiction under Republic Act 2613, then the law
in force.

to comply with their obligation. The claim under

paragraphs 3 and 4 is the same one averred
under paragraph 2, to wit: P4,500.00, as balance
due on the principal, and 10% thereof as
attorney's fees, or a total of P4,950.00, as
correctly declared by the court of first instance.
The ten per centum alleged in paragraph 4 of the
complaint is the same one referred to in
paragraph 2, and not an additional amount, as
contended by appellant.

The court of first instance rejected the petition,

asserting that the complaint only demand
connection of P4,500.00, plus 10% attorney's
fees, or P4,950.00, exclusive of interest and
costs, and said amount was within the jurisdiction
of the inferior court. Not content, Uypuanco
appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter
certified the case to this Supreme Court.

This party lays much emphasis on the

expression "incurred a further liability of ten (10)
per centum of the whole amount due and
payable"; but this "further liability" must be taken
together with the averment of paragraph a of the
same complaint, that there is "P4,500.00 due
and payable to plaintiff on the promissory note".
That is to say, that besides the principal of
P4,500.00 defendants owed an additional
("further") ten per cent for attorney's fees. By
studiously omitting all reference to paragraph 3,
appellant and his counsel would make it appear
that paragraph 4 demanded 10% over and above
the ten per cent averred in paragraph 2, which is
not true.

The appeal is absolutely devoid of merit. A mere

reading of the essential allegations of the
complaint, transcribed at the beginning of this
opinion, reveals that paragraph 2 thereof avers
the sums due under the terms of the promissory
note, while paragraphs 3 and 4 allege the actual
amounts due by reason of the defendants' failure

lawphi1.nt

The circumstances surrounding this litigation

definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a
plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves severe
condemnation, wasting, as it does, the time that
the courts could well devote to meritorious cases.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
affirmed, and appellant's counsel shall pay treble
costs in all instances. Let this decision be noted
in the personal record of the attorney for
appellant in this Court for future reference. So
ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando
and Barredo, JJ., concur.Concepcion, C.J. and
Castro, J., are on leave.Capistrano and
Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

Adm. Case No. 2417

February 6, 2002

ALEX ONG, complainant, vs.ATTY. ELPIDIO D.

UNTO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This is a disbarment1 case filed by Alex Ong, a
businessman from Dumaguete City, against Atty.
Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig City)
found Atty. Unto guilty of malpractice and
recommended the penalty of one-month
suspension from the practice of law or, at the
very least, a severe reprimand against him. 2
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The
records show that the complainant received a
demand-letter from the respondent, in the latters
capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia
Garganian. The full text of respondents letter 3
reads:
"Dear Mr. Ong:
This is in connection with the claim of support of
Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you for

your only child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss

Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which
Miss Garganian is demanding from you. It is now
about two months that you have abandoned your
legal and moral obligations to support your only
child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and up
to this moment you have not given said financial
support.
I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a
possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so
that you will not be dragged unnecessarily to a
court proceeding in connection with your legal
and moral obligations to your son with Miss
Garganian.
May I advise you that within three (3) days from
your receipt of this letter, you should return to her
house her television and betamax which you got
from her house during her absence and without
her knowledge and consent. Your failure to
comply with this demand, this office will be
constrained to file the proper action in court
against you.
I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of
this letter you may come to my Law Office at the

above address or you may send your lawyer

and/or representative to discuss with me about
the preliminary matters in connection with all the
claims of Miss Garganian against you.
I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can
thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your
intentional failure or refusal to discuss these
claims amicably with our office might be
construed as your absolute refusal really.
Expecting you then.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTOCounsel for Miss
Nemesia GarganianDumaguete City
WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN"
A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a
letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an
emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the
respondent listed down the alleged additional
financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the

complainant and discussed the courses of action

that he would take against the complainant
should the latter fail to comply with his obligation
to support Ms. Garganian and her son. The
relevant portion of the respondents second letter
reads: 4
"These are the demands which my client would
want to be complied (with):
1. P1,500.00 monthly For the sustenance of
Mr. Ongs son. x x x (Note: That this amount of
P1,500.00 should be up to the completion of Mr.
Ongs son in the elementary course and this is
subject to adjustment when the son is already in
the secondary course or up to his college
course).
2. P50,000.00 - This amount should be given to
Miss Garganian as her starting capital for her
planned business venture to give her a source of
her living since she cannot anymore be a teacher
in any government position because of her
status, having a child without being lawfully
wedded. x x x.
3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned

and delivered to the house of Miss Garganian,

without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x x.
4. The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorneys
fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow
before noon in my Law Office, through my
cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.
Criminal, civil and administrative actions that
I am contemplating to file against Mr. Alex
Ong will be withheld pending the compliance
by Mr. Ong of these compromise agreements.
Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe
that one-week time as grace period for Mr. Ong
is too long a time.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTOCounsel for Miss
Nemesia Garganian"
It was alleged that the real father of Ms.
Garganians son was the complainants brother
and that the complainant merely assumed his

brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian

who was threatening to sue them. The
complainant then did not comply with the
demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint 5
with the Office of the City Fiscal (now
Prosecutors Office) of Dumaguete City against
the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one
Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail
Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy
Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another
criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim,
Ong and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation
of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced
administrative cases against the complainant
before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation,
and the Office of the Solicitor General. 6
According to the complainant, these cases were
subsequently denied due course and dismissed
by the aforesaid government agencies.

The foregoing prompted the complainant to file

the present case for disbarment. Essentially, the
complainant alleged that the respondent
"manufactured" the criminal and administrative
cases against him to blackmail him or extort
money from him. He claimed that the respondent
solicited for any information that could be used
against him in the aforementioned cases by
offering any informer or would-be witness a
certain percentage of whatever amounts they
could get from him. The complainant branded the
respondents tactics as "highly immoral,
unprofessional and unethical, constituting
malpractice of law and conduct gravely
unbecoming of a lawyer."
In support of his accusations, the complainant
submitted the following documents: (1) the aforequoted letters of the respondent addressed to the
complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2) Nemesia
Garganians affidavit where she denied any
knowledge regarding the demands listed in the
letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned
affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent for
the complainant, wherein the latter was
acknowledging that he sired Ms. Ganganians

son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints

filed against the complainant for alleged violation
of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the
Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of Manuel
Orbeta, a neighbor of the complainant who
claimed that a representative of the respondent
had asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly
prepared by the respondent, with an offer "to give
any informer 20% and witness, 10%, of any
amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong." To further
bolster the disbarment case against the
respondent, the complainant also included a
Supplemental Affidavit,7 citing several cases
previously filed against the respondent by other
parties.8
The records show that the respondent was
directed to submit his comment on the complaint
lodged against him.9 He did not file any.
Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG
forwarded the records of the case to the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental,
authorizing said office to conduct the
investigation.

It appears that the respondent did not appear

before the investigating officer, then Provincial
Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges
against him. Instead, he moved for
postponement. After denying the respondents
third request for postponement, Fiscal Bautista
proceeded with the reception of the
complainants evidence. The respondent was
duly notified of the on-going investigation but
he did not show up. When it was the
respondents turn to present evidence, notices of
the preliminary investigation were sent to his
home address in Valenzuela, Negros Oriental,
his law office in Dumaguete City and his last
known address in Quezon City. The return cards
showed that he could not be located, although
his wife received some of the notices sent to his
home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one
investigating officer to another, with some of
them inhibiting from the investigation. Finally, the
case was assigned to 2nd Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the
respondents absence as waiver of his right to
present his evidence. Finding merit in the

complainants cause, the investigator

recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one month, or, at the
very least, be severely reprimanded.
The records of the case were endorsed to the
Office of the Solicitor General.10 Thereafter, the
OSG transmitted the records to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines in Manila, "for proper
disposition, conformably with adopted policies
and procedures."11 The IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline adopted Atty. Pinilis report and
recommendation in toto.12
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the
respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the
importance of the legal profession and the
purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in
Noriega vs. Sison.13 We then held:
"In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must
initially emphasize the degree of integrity and
respectability attached to the law profession.
There is no denying that the profession of an
attorney is required after a long and laborious

study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the

attorney acquires a fixed means of support for
himself and his family. This is not to say,
however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary
value of this profession but rather on the social
prestige and intellectual standing necessarily
arising from and attached to the same by reason
of the fact that every attorney is deemed an
officer of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal
profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Court when he
said:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of
great importance to an individual and the
prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise.
The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or
capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it
is extremely desirable that the respectability of
the Bar should be maintained and that its
harmony with the bench should be preserved.
For these objects, some controlling power, some
discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment, but it must be
exercised.

The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not

meant as a punishment depriving him of a source
of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this function should be competent,
honorable and reliable in order that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in
them."
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.14 It
mandates lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01
further commands that "a lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding."
Considering the facts of this case, we find that
respondent has not exercised the good faith
required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs
of his client. It is evident from the records that he
tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his
letter-demand by threatening to file various
charges against the latter. When the complainant

did not heed his warning, he made good his

threat and filed a string of criminal and
administrative cases against the complainant.
We find the respondents action to be malicious
as the cases he instituted against the
complainant did not have any bearing or
connection to the cause of his client, Ms.
Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated
the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His
behavior is inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered
monetary rewards to anyone who could provide
him any information against the complainant just
so he would have a leverage in his actions
against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs
counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for
corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding15 and he shall not do any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business. 16 In
the case of Choa vs. Chiongson,17 we held:
"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the
cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only

within the bounds of the law. He must give a

candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his clients case with the end
view of promoting respect for the law and legal
processes, and counsel or maintain such actions
or proceedings only as appear to him to be just,
and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. He must
always remind himself of the oath he took
upon admission to the Bar that "he will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same"; Needless to
state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not
be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done
within the bounds of reason and common sense.
A lawyers responsibility to protect and
advance the interests of his client does not
warrant a course of action propelled by ill
motives and malicious intentions against the
other party."
(emphases ours)
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin
lawyers to act with the highest standards of

truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of

his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity.18 Public
confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by
the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should
act and comport himself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession.19
Finally, we note that during the investigation of
the case, despite being duly notified thereof as
evidenced by the motions for postponement he
filed on several occasions, the respondent chose
not to participate in the proceedings against him.
His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it
reflects his utter lack of respect towards the
public officers who were assigned to investigate
the case. He should be watchful of his conduct. 20
The respondent should keep in mind the solemn
oath21 he took before this Court when he sought
admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should
not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for
each word aims to promote the high standard of
professional integrity befitting a true officer of the

court.

1wphi1

Footnotes

The recommended penalty for the unprofessional

conduct of the respondent was one (1) month
suspension or reprimand. We believe that the
same is too light vis--vis the misconduct of the
respondent.

Rollo, pp. 7-9.

Id., p. 49.

Id., p. 10.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY.

ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of five (5) months and sternly warned that
a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.

Id., pp. 11-12.

Id., p. 15.

Id., pp. 22-24.

Id., pp. 20-24.

Id., pp. 27-41.

Id., p. 20.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.

Untos personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

10

Folder No. VII, p. 10.

SO ORDERED.

11

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo,

and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

12

Rollo, p. 49.

13

125 SCRA 293, 297-298 (1983).

Id., p. 9.

 Promulgated by the Supreme Court on June

21, 1988.
14

Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1,

Rule 1.03.

VENUSTIANO SABURNIDO, complainant,

vs.

15

16

Id., Canon 2, Rule 2.03.

17

260 SCRA 477 (1996).

Ducat, Jr.

vs. Villalon, Jr., 337 SCRA 622, 628
(2000).
18

19

Id., p. 629.

20

Richards vs. Asoy, 139 SCRA 529 (1985).

See Rule 138, Section 3, Revised Rules of

Court.
21

JUDGE FLORANTE MADRONO, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido, a member of
the Integrated National Police stationed at
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, charges
respondent judge Florante Madrono of the
Municipal Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong,
Misamis Oriental, with grave threats and acts
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary.
As summarized by the investigating judge, the
complaint/affidavit alleges:

ADM. MAT. No. MTJ-90-383 June 15, 1992

That at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of

November 23, 1989, complainant was awakened
by his son Charliemen Saburnido who told him
that Judge Florante Madrono with two (2)

companions were at the gate of their house, and

would like to talk to him. Complainant then went
down his house and saw Judge Madrono
together with Zosimo Panimdim and Ruel Hebe
all armed; Judge Madrono carried an M-16
Armalite Rifle, Panimdim a CAFGU member
carried with him an M-14 while Ruel Hebe also a
CAFGU member carried a pistolized carbine.
That as the complainant approached them,
Judge Madrono with his gun pointed towards
Saburnido, ordered Saburnido to stop and said,
"Do not come near Ving," hence, Saburnido
stopped. Judge Madrono then confronted
Saburnido and said, "It's good because it is
already morning. What made you angry with me,
when in fact we are friends? What did you utter
last night? Maybe you were drunk." Then Judge
Madrono asked Ruel Hebe to relate what
Saburnido told Ruel that evening. Ruel then
quoted Saburnido to have said: "Do not be
boastful Ruel." "You are as boastful as your
boss." Sensing that Judge Madrono was angry,
Zosimo Panimdim advised Judge Madrono by
telling him just to settle the matter. At that stage,
Judge Madrono ordered Saburnido to raise his
hands and to surrender with his gun poised to

shoot Saburnido, so Saburnido asked for

forgiveness but he felt dizzy and his blood
pressure went up. He then lowered his hands
and held his head but he subsequently lost
consciousness and collapsed. His son
Charliemen Saburnido came to his rescue and
helped him. Thereafter, Judge Madrono and his
companions left.
In a resolution dated March 30, 1990, the Court
required respondent judge to answer the
complaint. In his answer dated May 7, 1990, the
respondent judge, among other things, alleged:
I categorically deny that I threatened the
complainant Pfc. Venustiano Saburnido in the
morning of November 23, 1989. Many weeks
before November 22, 1989, friends had been
telling me that everytime Pfc. Saburnido
becomes drunk, even while performing his duty
as market guard at the Balingasag Public Market,
he kept on uttering defamatory words against me
but I did not react because I am not onion
skinned to criticisms which public officials must
always accept. Then at 11:00 o'clock P.M. of
November 22, 1989, CAFGUs Felicisimo
Panimdim and Ruel Hebe who were at that time

assigned by the Company Commander of "A"

Coy, 9IB to augment the INP of Balingasag,
Misamis Oriental, while they were at the Public
Market, the complainant Pfc. Venustiano
Saburnido who was heavily drunk challenged the
two CAFGUs Panimdim and Hebe to a duel and
threatened some market vendors with bodily
harm and told CAFGUs Hebe and Panimdim in
the presence of many persons "IKAY
KAPAYASON LIWAT LA SA IMONG AMO NGA
SI JUDGE MADRONO KAPAYASON" which
when translated in English "You are boastful like
Judge Madrono who is boastful and stupid"; that
in the morning of November 23, 1989, when
those statements were confirmed by CAFGU
Panimdim and Pat. Eugene Zafra, I immediately
went to the Police Station of Balingasag, Misamis
Oriental to complain to the Station Commander
about the misconduct and unruly behavior of Pfc.
Saburnido but unfortunately the Station
Commander, who is not a resident of Balingasag,
Misamis Oriental, was out; so I went to the
residence of the Deputy Station Commander for
the same purpose but at that time the Deputy
Station Commander was also out of his
residence. When CAFGUs Panimdim and Hebe

who were fully armed because they knew that

the complainant Pfc. Saburnido has a record of
rape and administratively charged before the
Police Commission and who recently murdered a
certain Edwin Pacana, I volunteered to
accompany them because I did not want a
firefight between the two armed group to happen
and I intend to mediate and to find out from the
complainant Pfc. Venustiano Saburnido why was
he acting that way; what I really did in the
morning of November 23, 1989, was to
reprimand him and I did not mince words
castigating him for his unruly conduct for which I
explained that if the two (2) CAFGUs were drunk
also and reacted to his challenge a bloodbath
could have happened.
I would like to inform Honorable Members of the
Supreme Court that if I went out of my way to
accompany the two (2) CAFGUs Hebe and
Panimdin to the street fronting the house of the
complainant Pfc. Saburnido it was only for the
purpose of seeing to it and making sure that no
shooting incident of bloodbath could ensue
between the two (2) troops of armed men.
The answer was noted in the resolution of July

10, 1990. In the same resolution, the Court

resolved to refer the complaint to the Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro
City for Investigation, Report and
Recommendation.
In his Report, investigating Judge Celso P. Largo
made the following findings of facts and
conclusions:
From the evidence thus adduced, there is no
dispute that the Respondent, Judge Madrono,
together with CAFGU member Ruel Hebe and
Zosimo Panimdim, went to the house of the
complainant Pfc. Venustiano Saburnido at
Calacala, Cogon, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental,
in the early morning of November 23, 1989. That
on the said occasion, Judge Madrono and his
two companions were all armed with high
powered rifles. That a confrontation ensued
between Judge Madrono and Saburnido
regarding the incident that happened the night
before wherein Judge Madrono demanded from
Pfc. Saburnido an explanation why he uttered
defamatory words against him; that in the course
of their confrontation, Pfc. Saburnido begged for
forgiveness from the respondent but he was

severely reprimanded by Judge Madrono; that as

a result of the said confrontation, Pfc. Saburnido
collapsed and lost consciousness and was
subsequently brought to a doctor who prescribed
some medicines for his treatment; that the said
incident was immediately reported to the Police
Station and the report was correspondingly
entered in the Police Blotter.
The remaining issue to be determined, is
whether or not Judge Madrono threatened the
complainant with his Armalite rifle by menacingly
pointing his gun at the complainant.
To the mind of the herein Investigator, the version
narrated by the complainant and his witnesses
are more credible and in consonance with the
truth and the circumstances obtaining in this
case.
To start with, it is incredible to believe that the
complainant, who is a member of the Integrated
Police of Balingasag and who has been trained
in the art of self defense and combat principles
would simply collapse and lose consciousness
by a mere scolding by the respondent. . . . A well
trained policeman such as the herein

complainant would not lose consciousness and

collapse just by a mere tongue lashing from the
Resdondent. There is a strong reason to believe
that the complainant's life was placed in
imminent danger that is by the aiming of the
loaded armalite rifle on the complainant
accompanied by threats on his life. This must be
so for what would have prompted the
complainant to raise his two hands when he was
approaching Judge Madrono if the armalite rifle
was not pointed at him.

claim of the respondent that he accompanied

Hebe to the house of Saburnido because he
noticed that Hebe was very angry and wanted to
confront Saburnido. As a matter of fact, there
was no attempt to settle the controversy between
Hebe and Saburnido because instead of doing
so, he castigated the respondent (sic) for his
alleged unruly behaviour and misconduct, to
boot.

More, the respondent himself admitted that he

was really very angry with the complainant which
explains his haste in proceeding to the house of
the complainant armed with an Armalite rifle. In
fact, it was not necessary for respondent to carry
with him his armalite rifle if indeed his real
purpose was just to settle the controversy
between Hebe and Saburnido as he claimed,
taking into account that his two companions were
fully armed with high powered guns. The fact that
when they arrived at the house of Saburnido,
Ruel Hebe did not even utter a single word and it
was the respondent who did all the scolding and
reprimanding of Saburnido, give the lie to the

The respondent acted with precipitate haste,

arrogantly and imprudently by going directly to
the house of the complainant parading around
the town with an armalite rifle and with two fully
armed body guards. He should not have taken
the law into his own hands but rather endorsed
the matter to the Office of the Station
Commander, considering that the incident
involved a policeman and a CAFGU, who were
both members of the Police Force. Although, as
he claimed that the Station Commander and his
Deputy were out of town, this nevertheless, could
not have precluded him from reporting the matter
to any police officer in the Office of the Station
Commander and leave their confrontation or

xxx xxx xxx

investigation in the hands of the Police Officers,

who had jurisdiction over the protagonists, or at
least, to avoid any scandal, call Policeman
Saburnido to his office instead of going
personally to the house of Pat. Saburnido, fully
armed.
The Court agrees with the findings and
conclusions of Executive Judge Largo.
Indeed, the gun-pointing incident was witnessed
by complainant's son, Charliemen, and a
neighbor, Theodocia Penton, whose testimonies
were neither denied nor contradicted by
respondent during the investigation. More,
witness Penton has been shown to be a simple
barrio resident without any motive to testify
falsely against respondent Judge who occupies a
respectable position in the community.
Furthermore, according to the investigating
judge:
The above narrated incident was witnessed by
Charliemen Saburnido and Theodocia Penton a
neighbor of the complainant. In effect they
corroborated the testimony of Venustiano
Saburnido. The complainant also presented a

police and Barangay Clearance to show that he

had not been accused or convicted of any crime
(Exh. "E"); complainant also presented the
Extract of the Police Blotter of Balingasag (Exh.
"F") to show that the aforesaid incident was
reported to the Police Officers of Balingasag,
Misamis Oriental.
It was highly improper for a judge to have
wielded a high-powered firearm in public and
besieged the house of a perceived defamer of
character and honor in warlike fashion and
berated the object of his ire, with his firearm
aimed at the victim an unarmed policeman,
also a person in authority at that, thereby
threatening the latter's life. In so doing,
respondent judge committed an act of grave
impropriety unbecoming of a judge and in
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
specifically, Rule 2.01, Canon 2, to wit:
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND
THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES

Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all

times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary.
Verily, the actuations of respondent Judge tend
to destroy the reputation that judges are
unblemished in character and firmly adhere to a
code of right conduct.
The claim of respondent Judge that he is
authorized to carry an M-16 Armalite because he
is in the hit list of rebels, does not confer on him
any right to take the law into his own hands or to
use the firearm for aggressive purpose to
threaten people.
As held by Executive Judge Largo, respondent
Judge should have instead left to complainant's
superiors or to a police investigator, the
responsibility of taking the appropriate action on
what respondent Judge believed were
complainant's excesses.
The case of Romero vs. Valle, Jr. (147 SCRA
197 /1987), is in point. There, a Regional Trial
Court Judge, after having engaged a lawyer in a
heated discussion during the hearing of a case,

lost his temper, banged his gavel in a very

forceful manner, unceremoniously walked out of
the courtroom and came out of his chamber
carrying a gun in plain view of the lawyers and
others present in the courtroom.
In finding the said judge guilty of grave
misconduct and in ordering him dismissed from
the service, the Court held:
On the other hand, respondent judge exhibited
shortness of temper and impatience, contrary to
the duties and restrictions imposed upon him by
reason of his office. In Calalang vs. Fernandez,
Adm. Case No. 175-J, June 10, 1971, We stated
that a judge should show no shortness of temper
for it merely detracts from the equanimity and
judiciousness that should be the constant marks
of a dispenser of justice. . . .
Respondent judge appears to have a valid
explanation for carrying a gun, but such
explanation cannot be taken as satisfactory for
his having chosen to carry the same in plain view
of the complainant and other lawyers inside the
courtroom when he came out of his chambers on
his way to the stairs. Taken in the light of what

had just transpired, the actuation of respondent

judge was not an innocent gesture, but one
calculated to instill fear in or intimidate
complainant. We cannot let this pass unnoticed.
Respondent judge's behavior constitutes grave
misconduct. It is a serious violation of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which required that a
"judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his
every day life, should be beyond reproach."
Moreover, it reveals an attitude diametrically
opposed to our pronouncement in De la Paz v.
Inutan, 64 SCRA 540, that "the judge is the
visible representation of law, and more
importantly, of justice." Certainly, one who lives
by the uncivilized precept of "might is right," is
unworthy of an office entrusted with the duty to
uphold the rule of law. (idem, pp. 202-203)
The actuations of respondent judge in the case
at bar are even more reprehensible. Respondent
did not only display his firearm to intimidate the
complainant but pointed the barrel of his highpowered gun at complainant who was unarmed

and commanded the latter to surrender for

having uttered defamatory words against
respondent the night before.
A judge should be beyond reproach even in his
private life (Castillo v. Bersama, 63 SCRA 388 /
1975). In De la Paz v. Inutan (64 SCRA 540
[1975]), a judge who poked his gun at another
inside a restaurant while in a state of intoxication
was held as not fit for service in the judiciary.
Thus:
The judge is the visible representation of the law
and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the
people draw their will and awareness to obey the
law. They see in him an intermediary of justice
between two conflicting interests, specially in the
station of municipal judges, like respondent
Judge, who have that close and direct contact
with the people before anybody else in the
judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that
regard, he must be the first to abide by the law
and weave an example for the others to follow.
He should be studiously careful to avoid even the
slightest infraction of the law.
But, here is a judge who stands across the path

of the law. Unperturbed by judicial conscience,

he breached the very law he was sworn to
uphold. Perhaps in a misplaced display of the
influence of his office, he unrestrainedly and
openly intoxicated himself in a public place,
caused disturbance and alarm, and poked his
gun at an innocent man. He wilfully moved away
from the behavioural injunctions of his office and
let himself caught by the reaches of misconduct
and misdeeds. Such conduct need be sanctioned
and must, therefore, be drawn to a close. It
throws an indelible stain on the judiciary.
The foregoing disquisition applies with equal
force to respondent judge.
ACCORDINGLY, Judge Florante E. Madrono is
found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member
of the judiciary and is hereby ordered
DISMISSED from the service, without forfeiture
of retirement benefits, but with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant, vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the
administrative case which complainant Attorney
Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G
Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short),
filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron,
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the
latter's irregular actuations with regard to the
application of V & G for registration of 163 pro
forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of
lots in its subdivision. The present complaint
charges the respondent with the following

offenses:

10, Rollo.)

1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated

requests and without sufficient justification, to act
within reasonable time (sic) the registration of
163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and
the eventual issuance and transfer of the
corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to
the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some
pecuniary or material benefit from the person or
persons interested therein.

As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had

requested the respondent Register of Deeds to
register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment
(in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G
mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was
no action from the respondent.

2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.

3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit
for himself in connection with pending official
transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or]
Government through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p.

Another request was made on February 16, 1987

for him to approve or deny registration of the
uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment.
Still no action except to require V & G to submit
proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify
certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired
requirements, respondent Renomeron
suspended the registration of the documents
pending compliance by V & G with a certain
"special arrangement" between them, which was
that V & G should provide him with a weekly
round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus
P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu
thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City
house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.

On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the

complainant that he would act favorably on the
163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter
would execute clarificatory affidavits and send
money for a round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the
pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent
through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket
money in addition to plane fare, respondent
imposed additional registration requirements.
Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics,
the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20,
1987 challenging him to act on all pending
applications for registration of V & G within
twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied
registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of
title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the
deeds of absolute sale with assignment were
ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On
May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a
reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:

... since the year 1973 continuously up to

December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15)
years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same
set of documents which have been repeatedly
and uniformly registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys.
Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is
only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C.
Renomeron, that the very same documents of
the same tenor have been refused or denied
registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the
matter en consulta to the Administrator, National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land
Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution
dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the
NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents
were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's
opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs
163 deeds of sale with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the
complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4,
1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm.
Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of

Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed
respondent to explain in writing why no
administrative disciplinary action should be taken
against him. Respondent was further asked
whether he would submit his case on the basis of
his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent
denied the charges of extortion and of directly
receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself
in connection with the official transactions
awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by
NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney
Collantes' charges against him, Attorney
Renomeron waived his right to a formal
investigation. Both parties submitted the case for
resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose,
recommended dropping the charges of: (1)
dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or

gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross

ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined
that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite
repeated requests and without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on
the registration of the documents involved, in
order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit
from the interested party, absorbed the charges
of conduct unbecoming of a public official,
extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary
or material benefit for himself in connection with
pending official transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's
recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator
Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988,
recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty
of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to
act with dispatch on documents presented to him
for registration; and (3) be warned that a
repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with
more severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary
Ordoez found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct.

Our study and consideration of the records of the

case indicate that ample evidence supports the
Investigating Officer's findings that the
respondent committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on
the documents presented to him for registration
and, notwithstanding representations by the
parties interested for expeditious action on the
said documents, he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent
eventually formally denied the registration of the
documents involved; that he himself elevated the
question on the registrability of the said
documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he
formally denied the registration thereof, that the
Administrator then resolved in favor of the
registrability of the said documents in question;
and that, such resolution of the Administrator
notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the
registration thereof but demanded from the
parties interested the submission of additional
requirements not adverted to in his previous
denial.
xxx xxx xxx

In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,'

although the respondent claims that he neither
touched nor received the money sent to him, on
record remains uncontroverted the circumstance
that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him
the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as
plane fare, not in the original denomination of
P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent
had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail
this related incident in his letter dated 5
September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but
he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's
being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his
liability. His being so should have motivated him
to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and
regulations and should have prompted him to do
his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18,
Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoez recommended to President
Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in the government
service, effective immediately.

As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the

President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No.
165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the
respondent from the government service (pp.
1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint
against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney
Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16,
1987, a disbarment complaint against said
respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is
whether the respondent register of deeds, as a
lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for
his malfeasances as a public official. The answer
is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also
constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules
of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no
man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a
source of his obligations and its violation is a
ground for his suspension, disbarment or other
disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E.
Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

A person takes an oath when he is admitted to
the Bar which is designed to impress upon him
his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an
"officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests
the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in
the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court
he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands
that in his every exertion the only criterion he that
truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what
as given the law profession its nobility, its
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high
sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty,
and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility all of which, throughout the
centuries, have been compendiously described
as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a
mandate to public service of the highest order. A
lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose
conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty

is the advancement of the quest of truth and

justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64
SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies
to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials requires public officials and
employees to process documents and papers
expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and
prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a
financial or material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of their office, and likewise
bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in the course of any transaction
which may be affected by the functions of their
office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of
Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's
cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule
103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that

adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,

nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are
"competent, honorable, and reliable" may
practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison,
125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue
"only the highest standards in the practice of his
calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150
SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which
Attorney Renomeron committed as a public
official have demonstrated his unfitness to
practice the high and noble calling of the law
(Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632;
Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150
SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney
Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the
practice of law in the Philippines, and that his
name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

A.C. No. 4724

April 30, 2003

GORETTI ONG, complainant, vs.ATTY. JOEL M.

GRIJALDO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is
what places the law profession in a unique
position of trust and confidence, and
distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this
trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the
people not only in the individual lawyer but also
in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To
this end, all members of the bar are strictly
required to at all times maintain the highest
degree of public confidence in the fidelity,

honesty, and integrity of their profession. 1 In this

administrative case for disbarment, respondent
Atty. Joel M. Grijaldo failed to perform his sworn
duty to preserve the dignity of the legal
profession.
Complainant Goretti Ong is a widow residing in
Talayan Village, Quezon City. Sometime in the
early part of 1996, she engaged the services of
respondent, a practicing lawyer in Bacolod City,
as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 52843
before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of
Bacolod City, Branch 5, against Lemuel
Sembrano and Arlene Villamil for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2 During one of the
hearings of the case, the accused offered to
amicably settle their civil obligation to
complainant by paying the amount of
P180,000.00. Complainant accepted the offer on
the condition that payment shall be made in
cash.
At the hearing held on July 17, 1996, respondent
advised complainant to wait outside the
courtroom. When he came out, he handed to
complainant cash in the amount of P100,000.00
and Metrobank Check No. 0701263862 for

P80,000.00, postdated August 16, 1996, drawn

by Atty. Roger Reyes, counsel for the accused.
Complainant objected to the check payment and
refused to settle the case, but he assured her
that the check was drawn by a reputable lawyer.
Complainant was prevailed upon by respondent
into signing an affidavit of desistance, but she
instructed him not to file it in court until the check
is cleared.
Upon presentment on its maturity date, the check
was dishonored due to a stop-payment order
from the drawer. Complainant immediately
informed respondent of the dishonor, and the
latter told her that he will talk to Atty. Reyes about
it. Later, when complainant met with respondent
in Manila, he relayed to her Atty. Reyes' offer to
replace the check with cash. Several weeks
passed without any payment of the proceeds of
the check, despite complainant's repeated
telephone calls to respondent. Sometime in
December 1996, she suggested that respondent
move for a hearing of the case, but he told her
that courts are not inclined to set hearings near
the Christmas season.
On December 17, 1996, complainant personally

went to Bacolod City to inquire about her case.

She was surprised to learn that the same was
dismissed as early as September 26, 1996. 3
Apparently, respondent submitted her Affidavit of
Desistance4 and, on the basis thereof, the public
prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the case
which was granted by the court. When
complainant confronted respondent, he admitted
to her that he had already received the amount of
P80,000.00 from Atty. Reyes but he used the
same to pay for his financial obligations.
Thus, on April 2, 1997, complainant filed an
Administrative Complaint against respondent for
disbarment.5
Complainant further alleged in her complaint that
respondent represented her in another case,
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Norma
Mondia," also for violation of B.P. 22, where she
was the offended party. Respondent approached
the accused, Norma Mondia, and offered to
delay the hearing of the case in consideration of
the amount of P10,000.00. However, Mondia did
not have that amount of money. Attached to the
complaint is the affidavit of Norma Mondia
attesting to this fact.6

Furthermore, Henry Tiu, a former client of

respondent, executed an affidavit, which is
attached to the complaint, alleging that he gave
respondent the amount of P3,000.00 for the
purpose of posting his bail bond, but respondent
did not post his bail which resulted in Tiu's
arrest.7

Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time,

alleging that he has not received a copy of the
complaint.10 On February 5, 1998, 11 complainant
furnished respondent a copy of the complaint.
However, despite receipt of a copy of the
complaint, respondent still failed to file his
comment.

Likewise, a certain Luz Dimailig, whose affidavit

is also attached to the complaint, averred that
respondent represented her as counsel for
plaintiff in a civil case before the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 52; that the case
was dismissed by the trial court; that the appeal
filed by respondent to the Court of Appeals was
dismissed due to his failure to file the appellant's
brief; and that the petition for review before the
Supreme Court was denied for lack of proof of
service on the Court of Appeals, late filing and
late payment of docket fees. Moreover, Dimailig
alleged that she gave respondent the amount of
P10,000.00 for settling the said civil case, but
she later learned that he did not remit the money
to the defendants or their counsel.8

On October 19, 1998, respondent was required

to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his
comment.12 Respondent filed a Compliance,
stating that the copy of the complaint he received
from complainant was not legible. Complainant
again furnished respondent with a clearer and
more legible copy of the complaint including its
annexes; but respondent still did not file his
comment. Consequently, on June 14, 2000,
another show cause order was issued against
respondent.13 Respondent replied by stating that
the quality of the copy furnished him by
complainant was worse than the first one he
received.

On June 25, 1997, respondent was required to

file his comment within ten days from notice. 9

Dissatisfied with respondent's explanation,

respondent was ordered to pay a fine of
P1,000.00, which he complied with on November

27, 2000.14 However, he again failed to file his

comment and, instead, moved for additional time
to file said comment.
On August 13, 2001, this case was referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. 15 The
records of the IBP show that respondent has not
filed his comment to the complaint. On January
18, 2002, the Investigating Commissioner,
Manuel A. Tiuseco, submitted his report
recommending the disbarment of respondent. 16
However, in its Resolution No. XV-2002-553
dated October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of
Governors modified the penalty of disbarment
and recommended instead respondent's
indefinite suspension from the practice of law for
grossly immoral conduct and deceit.17
After a careful review of the records of this case,
we find the recommendation of Commissioner
Manuel A. Tiuseco well-taken.
It is clear that respondent gravely abused the
trust and confidence reposed in him by his client,
the complainant. Were it not for complainant's
vigilance in inquiring into the status of her case,

she would not have known that the same had

already been dismissed on September 26, 1996.
Respondent deliberately withheld this fact from
her, notwithstanding that she talked to him
sometime in December 1996.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence. More
specifically, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state:
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's
request for information.
Respondent breached his duty to his client when
he failed to inform complainant of the status of
the criminal case. His negligence shows a glaring
lack of the competence and diligence required of
every lawyer.18 His infraction is rendered all the
more deplorable by the fact that complainant is a
resident of Quezon City and the case was filed in

Bacolod City. It was precisely for this reason that

complainant engaged the services of respondent,
a Bacolod-based lawyer, so that her interests in
the case may be amply protected in her absence.
Respondent's failure to look after his client's
welfare in the case was a gross betrayal of his
fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust and
confident which was reposed in him. In a similar
case, we held:
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as
counsel for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline
employment subject however, to the provision of
Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the
cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed to him. Respondent
Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to
inform his client of the status of the case and to
respond within a reasonable time to his client's
request for information. Respondent's failure to
communicate with his client by deliberately
disregarding its request for an audience or
conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to

be fully informed of the developments in and the

status of its case.19
Worse, when respondent used the money which
he received from Atty. Reyes to pay for his own
obligations, he violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that "[a]
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession." Furthermore:
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of
each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and
may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his

client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Respondent's misappropriation of the money
entrusted to him and his refusal to account for it
to his client despite repeated demands were
competent proof of his unfitness for the
confidence and trust reposed on him. His acts
showed a lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of
public confidence. He held the money in trust for
his client as settlement of the case he was
handling. Upon receipt thereof, he was under
obligation to immediately turn it over, in the
absence of a showing that he had a lien over it.
As a lawyer, he should have been scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to him in his
professional capacity, because a high degree of
fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. 20
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to
delay any man for money or malice and is bound
to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients. He is obligated to report promptly the
money of his client that has come into his
possession. He should not commingle it with his
private property or use it for his personal
purposes without his client's consent.

Respondent, by converting the money of his

client to his own personal use without her
consent, was guilty of deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct. Not only did he degrade
himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he
besmirched the fair name of an honorable
profession.21
Aside from violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent's failure to promptly
turn over the money to his client and his
conversion of the same for his personal use
rendered him liable for contempt under Rule 138,
Section 25 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt.
When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been demanded
he may be punished for contempt as an officer of
the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions; but proceedings under this section
shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, respondent violated his oath of
office and duties as counsel when he
approached his client's opponent and offered to
delay the case in exchange for money. His offer

to delay the case would have frustrated the

interests of his client which he had sworn to
protect. As a lawyer, respondent should avoid
any unethical or improper practices that impede,
obstruct or prevent the speedy, efficient and
impartial adjudication of cases.22
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,
the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the
latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care,
and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client
is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it

the correlative duties not only to the client but

also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A
lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client;
he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.23
Respondent's act of propositioning his client's
opponent and offering to delay the case against
her was intended to benefit the latter. Hence,
such act amounted to double-dealing and conflict
of interest, and was unethical practice of law.
Attorneys, like Caesar's wife, must not only keep
inviolate their client's confidence, but must also
avoid the appearance of treachery and doubledealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is
of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.24
Finally, respondent's cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the directives of this Court to
file his comment constitutes utter disrespect to
the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility. A resolution of this
Court is not to be construed as a mere request,

nor should it be complied with partially,

inadequately or selectively.25 Respondent's
obstinate refusal to comply therewith not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also
underscores his disrespect of our lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof.
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must
follow as demanded by the virtues of his
profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as
the disciplining authority. This is especially so, as
in the instant case, where respondent even
deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court
for him to file his comment on the complaint,
thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires a
lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due
the courts.26
All told, respondent's transgressions manifested
dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct
and grossly unethical behavior which caused
dishonor, not only to complainant, but to the
noble profession to which he belongs, for it
cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for
the profession is inexorably diminished whenever
a member of the Bar betrays their trust and

confidence.27 He has proved himself unworthy of

membership in the legal profession and must,
therefore, be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and grossly unethical behavior,
respondent ATTY. JOEL GRIJALDO is
DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name
is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
He is further directed to PAY complainant Goretti
Ong the amount of P80,000.00 within ten (10)
days from notice of this Decision.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record; the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines; the Office of the President; the
Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the
Sandiganbayan; the Philippines Judges
Association; and all courts of the land for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
Panganiban,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ .,
concur.Quisumbing, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002,
citing Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, A.C. No. 4073, 28
June 2001, 360 SCRA 6.

Id., p. 41.

11

12

Id., p. 45.

13

Id., p. 68.

14

Id., p. 84.

15

Id., p. 91.

16

Id., pp. 9497.

17

Id., p. 93.

Rollo, pp. 23.

Id., p. 8.

Id., p. 9.

Id., pp. 27.

Id., pp. 1112.

Id., p. 13.

Id., pp. 1618.

Id., p. 31.

10

Id., p. 3234.

Zarate-Bustamante v. Libatique, A.C. No. 4990,

26 September 2001, 366 SCRA 8.
18

Navarro v. Meneses, CBD A.C. No. 313, 30

January 1998, 285 SCRA 586.
19

20

Id.

Busios v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 4349, 22

December 1997, 283 SCRA 407.
21

Manila Pilots Association v. Philippine Ports

Authority, G.R. No. 130150, 1 October 1998, 297
SCRA 30.
22

 Ellis v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5505, 27 September

2001, 366 SCRA 91.
Philippine National Bank v. Cedo, A.C. No.
3701, 28 March 1995, 243 SCRA 1, 6.

that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and

to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise
of the law profession other than those allowed by
law."

Guerrero v. Judge Deray, A.M. No. MTJ-021466, 10 December 2002.

The advertisements complained of by herein

petitioner are as follows:

23

24

25

26

Busios v. Ricafort, supra.

Annex A

27

Id.

SECRET MARRIAGE?P560.00 for a valid

marriage.Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs.THE LEGAL
CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232,

5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

REGALADO, J.:

DON PARKINSON

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the

respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on

Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic

beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Nonquota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration
of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL
Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the

advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in
his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits
the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal

support services" through paralegals with the use

of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that
the services advertised are legal services, the act
of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R.
Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2
reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal

profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P.
Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers
on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and
cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the

Court are whether or not the services offered by

respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised

by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of
the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from
the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues
involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis
"legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering,
assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-

government agencies like birth, marriage,

property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does
not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made
its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to
the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's
legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain
terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the
administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field
of law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc."

gives the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and that it renders
legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it
offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the
reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical
clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal
Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical
clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as

published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of
justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members
of the bar and that it offers legal services. In
addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being
represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services
being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is
merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services
as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room
for doubt in the minds of the reading public that
legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law,

morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent
claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services
being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any
law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign
divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family
Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of
permanent union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the

foundation of the family and an inviolable social

institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relation during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned
advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the
legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to
Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading,
but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice,
where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out
that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a

motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its

bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of
permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of
immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be
reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example
alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage
in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does
not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal

support services" respondent offers do not

constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only
logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law,
morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity
of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent
should be enjoined from causing the publication
of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also
submitted that respondent should be prohibited
from further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in
general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing

computerized legal research, electronic data

gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized
legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct
of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the
case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having devoted
time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to
the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching"
upon the legal profession will deny the profession
of the great benefits and advantages of modern
technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be
careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice
of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more

importantly, for the protection of the public.

Technological development in the profession may
be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if
respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench
and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services.
Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be
offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the
Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which
are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to

include, in the information given, a disclaimer

that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable
of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should
be consulted before deciding on which course of
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising
should be directed exclusively at members of the
Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer
that it is not authorized to practice law or perform
legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals
cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for
profit, without such term being clearly defined by
rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also,
law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered,
the corporation's Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and every provision

of the Code of Professional Responsibility and

the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the
practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and
3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the
public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic,
Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to
say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is
to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the
fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is
offering and rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the

practice of law is not limited to the conduct of

cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising
clients as to their legal right and then take them
to an attorney and ask the latter to look after
their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

not a profession open to all who wish to engage

in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am.
Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons
who have qualified themselves under the law. It
follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can

engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously,
this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate
any grievance for malpractice against the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the
persons and the lawyers who act for it are
subject to court discipline. The practice of law is

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in

answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of
law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not
only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power
to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of
law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the
practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and
the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation.
(See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is
indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its
advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration
Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of
the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the
legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the

aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in
what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable

Court, paramount consideration should be given
to the protection of the general public from the
danger of being exploited by unqualified persons
or entities who may be engaged in the practice of
law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to
take a rigorous four-year course of study on top
of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course
and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in
many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration
of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses
of study and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general public
as such. While it may now be the opportune time

to establish these courses of study and/or

standards, the fact remains that at present, these
do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime,
this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from
being exploited by those who may be dealing
with the general public in the guise of being
"paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should
also be protected from the dangers which may
be brought about by advertising of legal services.
While it appears that lawyers are prohibited
under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the
instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed
by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling
prey to those who advertise legal services
without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and

foreign investment, which are in essence, legal

matters , will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure
the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression
that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when
only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by

the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight
on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly

advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited
law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that

it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the
Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only
illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ
an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.

divorce are possible in this country for a fee,

when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada

and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the
use of advertisements such as are the subject
matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an
illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act
may serve. The law has yet to be amended so
that such act could become justifiable.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the

Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

We submit further that these advertisements that

seem to project that secret marriages and

It would encourage people to consult this clinic

about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is
also against good morals and is deceitful
because it falsely represents to the public to be
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done
(and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the
practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run

by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered

by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the
fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice
of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful
practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render effective service unless he
is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He
must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear
that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and
his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend,
do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is
a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . .
Our knowledge of the law accurate or
inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when
we are acting for ourselves, but when we are
serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and

laymen generally possess rather precise

knowledge of the laws touching their particular
business or profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with zoning,
building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specification in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to
omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are
not, provided no separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a
building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise
him and the architect in respect to the building
code and the like, then an architect who
performed this function would probably be

considered to be trespassing on territory

reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not
the case. The most important body of the
industrial relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in
such matter, and without regard to legal thinking
or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing
into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread, wellestablished method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain function have

no right to do so, or that the technical education

given by our schools cannot be used by the
graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law,
we should consider his work for any particular
client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as
to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law
only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law.
Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he
would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of
a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the

representations of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not
per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an
agent for negotiations and may select an agent
particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to
accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be
an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if
the value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of
the dispute and persuade the opposite party to
the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations of a contract,
or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the

employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial
examiners of the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal government, acting by
virtue of an authority granted by the Congress,
may regulate the representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to
forbid representation before the agency by one
whom the agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board give to a party
the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by
other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the
Labor Board allows, even arguing questions
purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800,
cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a
person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in

the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily
reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the
work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and
non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in
another profession or occupation concurrently
with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic
appears to render wedding services (See Annex

"A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward

marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described
in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez
case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute of law. The business is similar
to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses
of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside
from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a

legal text which publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is amount to legal
practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem
does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text
and the forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful
practice of law. But that is the situation with many
approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is
sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL
OF
LEGAL
PRACTICE

THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal

advice on a specific problem peculiar to a

designated or readily identified person in a
particular situation in their publication and sale
of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . .
There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper
basis for the injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement any printed
material or writings relating to matrimonial law or
the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against
his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully
support, however, the finding that for the change
of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave
legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise
in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance
in the preparation of necessary documents (The

injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct

constituting the practice of law, particularly with
reference to the giving of advice and counsel by
the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State
v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be

secret.

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its

services are "strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if
the services "involve giving legal advice or
counselling," such would constitute practice of
law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that
FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this
case.

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the

phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the
subject of judicial construction and interpretation.
The courts have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of
the term, some of which we now take into
account.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in
that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically

objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services",
and not legal services, are available." 11

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of

court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give

advice or render any kind of service that involves

legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments
and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending
in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed
attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal
advice and instructions to clients to inform them
of their rights and obligations, preparation for
clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and
advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients,
advises them as to their legal rights and then takes

the business to an attorney and asks the latter to

look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16
Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with
respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One
who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is,
to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19

after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct

of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650).
A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their right under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity, performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers

Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists
in no small part of work performed outside of any

court and having no immediate relation to

proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far
as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves appearance in court
and that part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which

rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on

the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194
N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide
range of activities in and out of court. Applying
the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we
agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers
legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of
giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly nondiagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage,

transmission and reproduction of information and

communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen
in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records
or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and
installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and
other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by

respondent corporation merely involve

mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs
for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce
and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent corporation will simply do
is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to
the client the intricacies of the law and advise
him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for the
which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the

jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such

a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent
clients in court since law practice, as the weight
of authority holds, is not limited merely giving
legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened
by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of
the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure,
main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor,"
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted
everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N.
Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist

are backed up by a battery of paralegals,

counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984.
Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot
afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients.
"when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask
you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate,
too. And once the problem has been categorized,
then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms,
require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of
minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of
sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of
by our staff or, if this were a hospital the
residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common

cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive
"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had
a rich relative who died and named you her sole
heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in
taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and
your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly trained to
deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange
the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals
to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of
law by virtue of the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit
of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed

out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of
respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of
sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the
services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to

maintain proper standards of moral and

professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american
jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there
also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have
been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or
rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law
is not a lawful business except for members of the
bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason
of attainments previously acquired through education
and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or
defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients,
with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for
excluding from the practice of law those not admitted
to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar

from competition, but in the protection of the public

from being advised and represented in legal matters
by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom
the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject

respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation
separate from the law profession be adopted in
this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should
first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative
action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has
done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent, there
are schools and universities there which offer
studies and degrees in paralegal education,
while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the
concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which
set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even

been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are

also associations of paralegals in the United States
with their own code of professional ethics, such as
the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted

concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out
by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American
judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who
has not been admitted as an attorney cannot
practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted
intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person
into the practice of law. 31 That policy should
continue to be one of encouraging persons who are
unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek
legal assistance only from persons licensed to

practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned

advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something
of value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged
or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of
the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.
36

The standards of the legal profession condemn

the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A

lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades

himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer,
. . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).

It is undeniable that the advertisement in

question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us

that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to

legal services or solicitation of legal business rests

on the fundamental postulate that the that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R.
Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.

magnify his success. He easily sees the

difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or
solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule
against advertising or solicitation and define the
extent to which they may be undertaken. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely,
those which are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons,
of brief biographical and informative data. "Such
data must not be misleading and may include
only a statement of the lawyer's name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches
of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public

offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal

teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal
and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list
published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his
brief biographical and informative data in a daily
paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar,
or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card
is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm

which he is connected with, address, telephone

number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office
address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law.
44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and

contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we
find and so hold that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State
Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements

by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for

an initial consultation or the availability upon request
of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee
to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly,
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics
or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by

the American Bar Association after the decision
in Bates, on the attitude of the public about
lawyers after viewing television commercials, it
was found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics
of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%Professional from

71% to 14%Honest from 65% to 14%Dignified
from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present

situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the
kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of
such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
to adopt and maintain that level of professional
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly
accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the
part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is
a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as

to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should
be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter
on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present
proceeding which is merely administrative in
nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter
be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present
state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage in the practice
of law in this country. This interdiction, just like
the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be
subverted by employing some so-called
paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged
support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this
prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can
institute the corresponding quo warranto action,
after due ascertainment of the factual background
and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate
charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
50

Solicitor General for such action as may be

necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to

RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same
or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and
"B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly
or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate
action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is

printed together with and on the left side of "The

Legal Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which
were published in a newspaper of general
circulation.
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60;
Resolution dated December 10, 1991, Rollo,
328.
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo,
IBP Director for Legal Affairs, 1, 10; Rollo, 209,
218.
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A.
Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on Bar
Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18,
27-29, Rollo 414-416, 425-427.
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D.
Abiera, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Lawyers'
Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del
Rosario, President, 5-6; Rollo, 241-242.
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo
Sumulong, President, and Atty. Mariano M.

Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 9596.

16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit

Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.

8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de

los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105-106.

17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.

9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de

los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-371.

18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co.,

290 NYS 46218.
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).

10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E.

Sablan, Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free Legal Aid
Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.

20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.

11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C.

Limpe, President, and Atty. Barbara Anne C.
Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.

22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo,

372-373.

12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.

23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.

24 Phil. Ass'n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs.

Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al., 42 SCRA
302 (1971).

14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E.

2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode Island Bar Assoc.
vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139,
144.
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.

21 Rollo, 130-131.

25 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 863, 864.

26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.
27 Lowell Bar Ass'n. vs. Loeb. 52 N.E. 2d 27,

315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client 64,

865.
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), 11-12, citing Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co.
(1974) and Shayne, The Paralegal Profession,
Oceana Publications, 1977, Appendix II and III;
Rollo, 116-117.
30 Illustrations:
(a) A law student who has successfully
completed his third year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court (Rule
138-A, Rules of Court);
(b) An official or other person appointed or
designated in accordance with law to appear for
the Government of the Philippines in a case in
which the government has an interest (Sec. 33,
Rule 138, id.);

(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in

a municipal court for the purpose of conducting
the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
(d) A person, resident of the province and of
good repute for probity and ability, who is
appointed counsel de oficio to defend the
accused in localities where members of the bar
are not available (Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);
(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to
practice in the Philippine Patent Office (now
known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer) in trademark, service
mark and trade name cases (Rule 23, Rules of
Practice in Trademark Cases);
(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the
National Labor Relations Commission or any
Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as
a party to the case; (2) he represents an
organization or its members, provided that he
shall be made to present written proof that he is
properly authorized; or (3) he is duly-accredited
members of any legal aid office duly recognized
by the Department of Justice or the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto

by the latter (New Rules of Procedure of the

National Labor Relations Commission);
(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot
owner or claimant in a case falling under the
Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
(h) Notaries public for municipalities where
completion and passing the studies of law in a
reputable university or school of law is deemed
sufficient qualification for appointment (Sec. 233,
Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144145.
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown
Coal and Coke Co. of New York vs. U.S., 102 Ct.
Cl. 285.
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.

37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.

38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).
39 The advertisement in said case was as
follows: "Marriage license promptly secured thru
our assistance and the annoyance of delay or
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage
arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on
any matter free for the poor. Everything
confidential.".
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989),
79-80.
41 Op. cit., 80.
43 * * * Missing * * * .
44 Op. cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11,
1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930); A.B.A.
Ops. 53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934),
(July 12, 1941), 241 (Feb. 21, 1942), 284 (Aug.
1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952). .
45 Supra, Fn 2.

46 Id., 810, 825.

47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar
Association, 12, citing the American Bar
Association Journal, January, 1989, p. 60; Rollo,
248.
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director
of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, supra, Fn 38.

49 U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907);

People vs. Luna, 102 Phil. 968 (1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in
relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No. 902-A and Sec.
121, Corporation Code.