Cario vs Human Rights, G.R. No.

96681
December 2, 1991
Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of MPSTA and ACT
undertook "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally without disrupting classes as a last
call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from
the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assembly. Secretary of
Education issued a return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal and a memorandum directing
the DECS officials and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply.
After failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were
administratively charged and preventively suspended for 90 days. The private respondents
moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme
Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. The
motion was denied. The respondent staged a walkout. The case was eventually decided
ordering the dismissal of Esber and suspension of others. The petition for certiorari in RTC
was dismissed. Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied.
Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights alleging they
were denied due process and dismissed without due notice. The Commission issued an order
to Cario to appear and enlighten the commission so that they can be accordingly guided in
its investigation and resolution of the matter.
Cario filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether the Commission
has the jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process and
whether or not grievances justify their mass action or strike.
Issue: Does the Commission on have jurisdiction to adjudicate, try and hear the issue?
Ruling: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power. The
most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It does not however grant it the
power to resolve issues. The Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" of the matters involved.
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and lastly, the Supreme Court.
The petition is granted and respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and
Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case on the merits."

Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No. 100150 Jan 5, 1994)

CHRs power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational
guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers.

A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners)
in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private
respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days
(up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior
to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by
petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".
On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari
stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 901580. On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the
petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private
respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners for contempt;
Held: a) Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would
focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia,
for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees,
(2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4)
cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed

against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take
comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress
may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." In the particular
case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on
a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land
adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a
busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise
simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated
is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it
may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining
in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.

G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010

b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in
providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power
to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the
said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons,
and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay
for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in
character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization
composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on
moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court,
Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their
application.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as partylist.
Ruling:

Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners

application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in
Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to
acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct
prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or dangerous to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to
substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be
detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its
constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws
of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on
sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any
international laws to which we adhere.

Issue:
Is the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from
marrying employees of any competitor company valid?
Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Phils.
[G.R. No.162994. September 17, 2004]
Facts:
Pedro A. Tecson was hired by Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.) as medical
representative on October 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and
orientation. Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates,
among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company
rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing
drug companies. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly
provides that if management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with
the company, the management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking
position or preparation for employment outside the company after six
months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines
Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a
romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals
(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in
Albay. Despite of warnings, Tecson married Bettsy. The superiors of Tecson
reminded him of the company policy and suggested that either him or
Bettsy shall resign from their respective companies. Tecson requested
more time to resolve the issue. In November of 1999, Glaxo transferred
Tecson to Mindanao area involving the provinces of Butuan, Surigao and
Agusan del Sur. Tecson did not agree to the reassignment and referred this
matter to the grievance committee. It was resolved and was submitted to
voluntary arbitration.

Ruling:
Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees
of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy,
Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That
Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be
denied.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt
and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws
endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be
decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management
has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play.
Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol [G.R. No. 164774. April 12, 2006] Facts: Star
Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products. The company
policies stated that: New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in
case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd In case of two of our
employees (both single, one male and another female) developed a
friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then

decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy
stated above. degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
The complainants alleged that when they married co-employees, they
were compelled to resign because of the company policy. Arguing that
said policy is illegal, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice. Issue: whether the policy of the employer banning
spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the
employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise
of management prerogative Held: The case at bar involves Article 136 of
the Labor Code which provides: It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that
a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or
tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
Two types of employment policies involve spouses: no-spouse
employment policies - policies banning only spouses from working in the
same company anti-nepotism employment policies - those banning all
immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same
company In the US, there is what they call as bona fide occupational
qualification exception, that is, unless the employer can prove that the
reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital
status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would
better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not
discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employees
spouse. And to justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer
must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2)
that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the
duties of the job. In the Philippines we employ the standard of
reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the bona fide
occupational qualification requirement. This was illustrated in the cases of
Duncan Association of Detailman vs. Gaxo Wellcome (2004) and PT&T v.
NLRC (1997). These cases instruct us that the requirement of
reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned

employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence
of a reasonable business necessity. In the case at bar, there is no a
reasonable business necessity. The employees were hired after they were
found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a coemployee. Star Paper failed to show how the marriages of the employees
could be detrimental to its business operations. The policy is premised on
the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient.

Yrasuegui vs. PAL [G.R. No. 168081. Oct. 17, 2008]

Facts: Complainant was an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the
airline company.
Issue: Was the dismissal valid?
Held: SC upheld the legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however,
should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or
based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code.His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary.
[v]oluntarinessbasically means that the just cause is solely attributable to
the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his
actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282,
whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although
it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a
particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show
that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job.

Argument that BFOQ is a statutory defense must fail

The Constitution,the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277or the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Meiorin Test (US jurisprudence) in determining whether an employment
policy is justified.
(1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose
rationally connected to the performance of the job;
(2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary
to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and
(3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary
in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.
In Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,this Court held that in order to justify a
BFOQ, the employer must prove:
(1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential
operation of the job involved; and
(2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the
duties of the job.

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because

it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent
quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for
cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants
must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence
on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong.
Entitled to separation pay, even if terminated for just cause
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee
as an act social justice, or based on equity. Provided the dismissal:
(1) was not for serious misconduct; and
(2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.
Thus, he was granted separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months
pay for every year of service.