Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the
Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court,acting on the petition
issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez
even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that
the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get
favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given
due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to
explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising
his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court
may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme
Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise
of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of
the Supreme Courtbetrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for
theSupreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the
Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the
judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and
authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a
private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at
bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him,
are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

G.R. No. L-24438

July 30, 1965

ROSAURO PARAGAS, petitioner,

vs.
FERNANDO A. CRUZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City;
THE CITY FISCAL OF CALOOCAN CITY and ELPO (EL PORVENIR RUBBER PRODUCTS,
INC.), respondents
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In asking for reconsideration of this Court's dismissal of his petition for certiorari in the above-entitled case,
Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian, acting as counsel de parte for petitioner Rosauro Paragas, stated the following
in his written motion, filed on May 22, 1965:
"The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated
April 20, 1965 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules, of
Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise

a violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines,
a culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment."
... . The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means, because the
rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all
concerned. Butwhen the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed
force and to the ways of the cave-men! We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and
again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated
people should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all
concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the earth."
Considering the foregoing expressions to be derogatory to its dignity, this Court, by Resolution of June 2,
1965, after quoting said statements required Atty. Sebastian to show cause why administrative action should
not be taken against him.
On June 18, 1965, counsel filed an "explanatory memorandum," stating:
When we said that the said violation is a ground for impeachment, the undersigned did not say that
he would file impeachment proceedings against the Justices who supported the resolution. We said
only what we said. The task of impeaching the highest Justices in this country is obviously not the
task for a common man, like the undersigned; it is a herculean task which only exceptional men, like
Floor Leader Jose Laurel Jr., can do. In addition to this, we do not have the time, the means and the
strength for this purpose.
The assertion that "But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to
armed force and to the ways of the cave-men! We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again
and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila," is only
a statement of fact and of our wish. We learn from observation that when the laws and the rules are
violated, the victims, sometimes, resort to armed force and to the ways of the cavemen, as shown in
the case of Luis M. Taruc and in the case of Jesus Lava, both of whom went to the mountains when
they were not allowed to take their seats in the House of Representatives and, according to the
newspapers, one was charged with murder and was found guilty. It was only recently that Jesus Lava
surrendered to the authorities. We had this sad recollection when we wrote the underlined passage
mentioned in this paragraph. While writing that BRIEF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, the
thought of Verzosa and Reyes flashed across the mind of the undersigned as the shooting of those
two government employees must have resulted from some kind of dissatisfaction with their actuations
while in office. We stated or the undersigned stated that we are against the repetition of these
abominable acts that surely disturbed the peace and order of the community. Shall the undersigned
be punished by this Honorable Supreme Court only for telling the truth, for telling what happened
before in this Country? Our statement is clear and unmistakable, because we stated "We do not want
Verzosa and Reyes repeated ..." The intention of the undersigned is likewise clear and unmistakable;
he is against the repetition of these acts of subversion and hate!
We find the explanations submitted to be unsatisfactory. The expressions contained in the motion for
reconsideration, previously quoted, are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent
killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court.
That such threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in Courts are constitutive of direct
contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Varturanza 52 Off.
Gaz. 769: Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-9785, Sept. 19,
1956; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present
case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo,
77 Phil. 580
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a
right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so
with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)
Counsel's disavowal of any offensive intent is of no avail, for it is a well-known and established rule that
defamatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers.
A mere disclaimer of any intentional disrespect by appellant is no ground for exoneration. His intent
must be determined by a fair interpretation of the languages by him employed. He cannot escape

responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have understood them
as meaning. (In re Franco, 67 Phil. 313)
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian is hereby found guilty of direct contempt, and sentenced to pay
a fine of P200.00 within ten days from notice hereof, or, in case of default, to suffer imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days. And he is warned that a subsequent repetition of the offense will be more
drastically dealt with.

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA

MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners,
vs.
LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO
ALEJO,respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside the Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of possession
and damages.
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952. Petitioners
contend that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to exclusive possession and
ownership of Lot No. 1639-D which originally formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private
respondents, upon the other hand, claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot No.
1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique situation where there is an order for partition but there is no
showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the then Court of First Instance for its approval or
that a decree or order was registered in the Register of Deeds.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages alleging, inter alia, that
they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by
Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot. Pascual
Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927. 1 On 19 April 1952, Tomas
Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents predecessors-in-interest, filed a petition to
subdivide lot No. 1639. 2Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an
order 3 directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six portions as follows:
a) Hermogenes Olis lot 1639-A
b) Pascual Olis lot 1639-B
c) Bartolome Maglucot lot 1639-C
d) Roberto (Alberto) Maglucot lot 1639-D
e) Anselmo Lara lot 1639-E
f) Tomas Maglucot lot 1639-F. 4
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot). Subsequently,
Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969,
respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased
lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs
of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessors-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents
stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo.
After trail, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the existence of tax
declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Oils (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and
1639-B, respectively) 5 as indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found
that Tomas Maglucot, respondents' predecessors-in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in

fact, who commenced the action for partition. 6 The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which
states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying said provision
of law, it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence
could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the existence
of an approved partitioned against the other co-owners who claim that there was one. 7 Said court, likewise,
ruled that the tax declarations 8 over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the same are
constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of the ownership of
the subject lot by the latter. 9
The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter:
1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof and deliver
the possession of the same to Plaintiffs;
2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees:
3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for actual damages
representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to the time they actually vacate the
premises in question;
4. To pay the costs. 10
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax
declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition. 11 The CA likewise found that
the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there
was no partition of Lot No. 1639.
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the following reversible
errors:
I
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED
LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946;
II
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL, THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND OFFER
TO BUY THE DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D. HAD LONG BEEN
ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS;
III
IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF WHICH IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE;
IV
IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE
PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT
PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN
THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE
REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE; 12
Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided among the coowners and that majority of them participated in the actual execution of the subdivision. Further, the coowners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for
partition. 13 Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal
subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual
Olis were not agreeable to the partition. 14 Petitioners further contend that respondents admitted in their tax
declarations covering their respective houses that they are "constructed on the land of Roberto
Maglucot." 15 Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are estopped from claiming to be coowners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and
respondents' acquiescence because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A
beginning 1952 up to the present. 16

For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they emphasize that
petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised, or notified of the tentative subdivision
contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently confirmed the same. 17 Second, they point to the fact
that petitioners were unable to show any court approval of any partition. 18 Third, they maintain that Lot No.
1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid title, containing no
annotation of any encumbrance or partition whatsoever. 19
After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on record, we find that the
petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in this case is whether there was a valid partition in
1952.
Preliminary, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court
of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter
are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record." 20 This
case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that of
the RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based and are
premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. For these reasons, we
shall consider the evidence on record to determine whether indeed there was partition.
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which
determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper, and, second, a decision
confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court,
as the case may be.21 The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination
of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the
real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition
so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed
the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. 22 The second phase
commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court.
In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award
for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real
estate in question." Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. 23
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition is that
it is final and appealable. 23 The order of partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No.
1639 by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the
order not having been appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and
executory and cannot be disturbed.
The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it
does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the
merits of the case. 24 An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it
decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. 25
However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella
vs. Carrascoso, 26which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling. In addition, the
reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed by the trial court are not binding. 27 In this case,
both the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where
parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented thereto,
they cannot thereafter question the decree, 28especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable
expense has been incurred in the execution of the commission. 29 Respondents in this case have occupied
their respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the
order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.

This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs. Cinco. 30 In that case,
the order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties "to submit the corresponding deed of partition
to the Court for its approval." Here, the order appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to
approve the sketch plan already existing and tentatively followed by the parties.
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are not
binding upon the parties. 31 However, this rule does not apply in case where the parties themselves
actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of the court approval is to give
effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying
specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case was filed,
clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that
confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties herein are estopped from
raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan.
The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition
Lot No. 1639. 32 By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No.
1639.33 It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the coowners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have
separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves
and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with
the sketch plan. Such possession remained so until this case arose, or about forty (40) years later.
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral
partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that the court was aware that the parties therein actually
took possession of the portions in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. With the factual backdrop,
said court ordered the partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative
sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the parties therein, having occupied
specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that
same sketch/subdivision plan which would be considered by the commissioners for approval. There is no
showing that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest raised any objections. On
the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their possession of the specific portions of Lot No.
1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan.
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts the partition
allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid
partition. 34 It follows that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition when he has received
and held a portion of the subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership
rights over their share for a long time.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion
allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. 35 A person cannot claim
both under and against the same instrument. 36 In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its
provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or
none. 37Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently attacking
its validity of any part of it. 38 Here, respondents, by themselves and/or through their predecessors-ininterest, already occupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this
action was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other coowners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch plan.
In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead his adversary,
and the adversary must have placed reliance on the action and acted as he would otherwise not have done.
Some authorities, however, hold that what is tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the
part of the adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance or benefits, which arises when
a party, knowing that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if he will, upon
knowledge, and while under no disability, chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as his
own. 39 Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this
voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to ratification of what was therefore unauthorized, and
becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. 40
The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they
been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid rent.
Respondents attempted to counter this point by presenting an uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness
to the effect that the amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma was for the
payment of real property taxes. We are not persuaded. In its quite improbable that the parties would be
unaware of the difference in their treatment of their transactions for so long a time. Moreover, no evidence
was ever presented to show that a tax declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete
in the records are tax declarations for specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that respondents

would not be aware of this. With due diligence on their part, they could have easily verified this fact. This
they did not do for a period spanning more than four decades.
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of
respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses
as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his
belief be right or wrong. 41 Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of
petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an
owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced.
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support presumption. 42 Thus, after a long
possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. 43 It has been held that recitals in deeds,
possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and
acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by
deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded. 44 And where a
tract of land held in common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots has long been known and
called by the name of one of the tenants in common, and there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of a
tenancy in common, it may fairly be inferred that there has been a partition and that such lot was set off to
him whose name it bears. 45
Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing any partition of Lot
No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly indicate that no partition took place. The
logic of this argument is that unless partition is shown in the title of the subject property, there can be no
valid partition or that the annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition.
Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers to
a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the deed evidencing such
transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder. 46 As originally conceived,
registration is merely a species of notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary in order to
give it legal effect as between the parties. 47 Requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed
to prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the presumption that recorded instrument
exist and are genuine. 48
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement was merely
tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that
agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was
instituted because some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title. In
1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any
change in the possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of
partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude,
therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the finding of
actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952 having been
discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition was initially
tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and
the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such
oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. InEspina vs. Abaya, 49 we declared that
an oral partition is valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, 50 reiterated in Tan vs.Lim, 51 this Court has ruled, thus:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce
oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,
equity will proper cases where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of
possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off
to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it
has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went
into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement,
that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the ground of
estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual
for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective
parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a
part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It
has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part
performance, a court of equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.
Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First, respondents Wilfreda
Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax
declarations contain statements that the houses of respondents were built on the land owned by Roberto
Maglucot.
On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after respondents were informed
that petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging to Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda
Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo went to the house of said witness and offered to buy the share of
Roberto Maglucot.52 Aida Maglucot further testified that they refused the offer because they also intend to
use the lot for a residential purpose. 53 This testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by respondents, and
the CA did not touch upon this finding of fact. Hence, the offer to buy has been established by the
unrebutted evidence of the petitioners. Why would they give such offer if they claim to be at least a co-owner
of the said lot? In effect, respondents impliedly admit the title of the petitioners and that they are not coowners, much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D.
On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names of Constancio Alejo and
Godofreda Maglucot, 54 Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in the names of Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina
Barot, 55Tax Declaration No. 04-593 in the names of Severo Maglucot and Samni Posida 56 showing that the
houses of the above-mentioned persons are constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot 57 constitute
incontrovertible evidence of admission by the same persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto
Maglucot. Tax Declarations are public documents. Unless their veracity is directly attacked, the contents
therein are presumed to be true and accurate. 58 The lone testimony of Severo Maglucot that Roberto
Maglucot was only made to appear as owner of the land in their respective declarations because he was the
administrator of Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated and not supported by any other evidence.
No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a portion of Lot No. 1639,
particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas Maglucot, one of the original co-owners of
Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan of said lot showing the partition into six portions. 59
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition for review
oncertiorari.1wphi1 Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to the researcher of the
CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the law "by the
researcher." 60 Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without reference to
the record" 61 that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any partition." Finally,
counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "this will only show that there was no proper
study of the case by the researcher." 62
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an institution apart from
the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the persons or personnel that
may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners
to berate the researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of
the legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings and
admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts. 63
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

VILLAFLOR VS. SARITA

308 SCRA 129
FACTS:
Complainant filed a case for disbarment against respondent before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
The Commissioner assigned to investigate the case issued an order directing respondent to file his answer
or comment to the complaint. The period of time alloted to answer the complaint lapsed without respondent
submitting his comment. An order was issued requiring the parties to attend the hearing of the case but the
respondent failed to appear. A notice of hearing was sent to respondent but again he failed to attend the
proceeding. After giving the respondent enough opportunity to face the charges against him, which the latter
did not avail, the case was submitted for resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to obey notices from the IBP investigators constitutes an unethical act.
HELD:
Yes. As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to
which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The highest form of respect to the
judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.

G.R. No. 80390 March 27, 1998

CITY SHERIFF, ILIGAN CITY and SPOUSES ANGEL L. BAUTISTA and ANGELICA M.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
ALFARO FORTUNADO, EDITHA FORTUNADO, & NESTOR FORTUNADO, respondents.

MARTINEZ J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Order 1 dated January 24, 1986 of the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 262, which reversed its earlier Decision 2 dated July
31, 1985 dismissing the complaint filed by respondents.
The facts are not disputed:
Respondents Alfaro, Editha and Nestor, all surnamed Fortunado, are the registered owners of two parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 7-3041 and T-1929, both registered with the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City. Said properties were mortgaged by Arsenio Lopez, Jr. on July 24, 1968 to the Traders
Commercial Bank (now Traders Royal Bank) to secure a loan obligation in the amount of P370,000.00.
On January 6, 1971, respondents instituted an action before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XVIII, against Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Traders Royal Bank, among others, for annulment of mortgage. In said
complaint, Traders Royal Bank interposed a counterclaim for foreclosure of the mortgage.
On August 24, 1973, the trial court rendered a decision 3, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
I. As Regards the Plaintiff's Complaint:
1. Ordering the defendant Mariano Pascual to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of
P24,550.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid and
attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00 and to pay the costs.
2. Ordering the deed of real estate mortgage which is attached as Annex "B" of
the complaint to be declared null and void and, ordering the Register of Deeds of
Iligan City to cancel the said mortgage at the back of TCT No. T-1929, Book I,
Page 8 and TCT No. T-3040, Book I, Page 96 of said Register of Deeds.
II. With Respect to the Cross-Claim and the Third-Party Complaint of Defendant Traders
Commercial Bank:
1. Ordering the spouses Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Ofelia Lopez to pay the Traders
Commercial Bank jointly and severally the amount of P578,025.23, inclusive of

interest and other bank charges as of April 30, 1971, and, thereafter, plus all
interest and bank charges until full payment is made and, to pay to the bank the
amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs.
The bank 's counterclaim against the plaintiffs is hereby dismissed.
Likewise, the counterclaim of Mariano Pascual against the plaintiffs is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision, in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by eliminating paragraph 2 of
the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court declaring the real estate mortgage in
favor of the Traders Commercial Bank null and void. The decision is affirmed in all other
respects. 4
On December 28, 1983, Traders Royal Bank assigned 5 its rights to the mortgage to petitioner Angel L.
Bautista. By virtue of the said assignment, petitioner on March 19, 1984 wrote the City Sheriff of Iligan City
requesting that the mortgaged properties be foreclosed for non-payment of the loan obligation. To thwart the
pending foreclosure, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, a
complaint for cancellation of lien with preliminary injunction against petitioner, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 262.
After petitioner filed his answer, respondents moved for a summary judgment which was granted by the
court. Consequently, on July 31, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. In its
decision, the trial court delved on the issue of prescription of a mortgage action.
Respondents moved for reconsideration arguing that since the principal loan has already been paid, the
mortgage, which is an accessory contract, should likewise be extinguished.
On January 24, 1986, the trial court modified its earlier decision disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, as amended, of the summary judgment of July
31, 1985 is hereby reconsidered and modified to read:
Premises considered, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have made out a
preponderating case against the defendants.
And as prayed for in the complaint, the temporary restraining order of the Court in the case on
April 23, 1984 is hereby converted into a preliminary injunction and by these presents made
permanent. The City Sheriff of Iligan City, Mr. Angel L. Bautista and Mrs. Angelica M. Bautista
are hereby permanently restrained from conducting a public auction sale of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.). The Register of Deeds of Iligan City is
hereby further ordered to cancel Entry No. 451 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.)
on file with his office. No pronouncement as to damages or attorney's fees.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a Resolution 6 on August 28,1987, forwarding
the case to this Court for resolution reading thus:
Considering that opposing counsel left the resolution of Atty. Ramon Gonzales' motion to the
sound discretion of this Court and considering the unrefuted allegation of the said motion that
there were no documentary or testimonial evidence which were the basis of the questioned
decision but mere admissions of the parties, the questions raised on appeal become mere
questions of law, over which the Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction.
On December 29, 1987, petitioner filed this present petition for review contending that the trial court erred in
modifying its earlier decision; in declaring that he has no right to foreclose the mortgaged property; in
declaring the temporary restraining order into a permanent preliminary injunction and in ordering the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City to cancel entry No. 451 on TCT No. 3041.
We gave due course to the petition and required the contending parties to submit their respective
Memoranda on August 31, 1988.
On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel Ramon A. Gonzales, filed a verified Manifestation
informing the Court that the subject real estate mortgage has already been released by the Traders Royal

Bank on December 23, 1983 as shown in the certified true copy of the Release of Real Estate
Mortgage, 7 and that the petitioner was killed in a robbery in his house. 8 Respondents therefore pray for the
dismissal of the petition.
On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's counsel Atty. Emilio Abrogena to comment on the said
Manifestation. However, the copy of the resolution of the Court addressed to Atty. Abrogena was returned
unclaimed after three notices, 9 with the postmaster's remark "moved." In view of this development, the Court
considered the resolution as served. 10
Acting on the Manifestation of the respondents, we resolve to dismiss the petition for having been rendered
moot and academic.
The resolution of the basic issue of whether or not the petitioner has the right to extra-judicially foreclose the
mortgage is no longer necessary in view of the release of the mortgage as shown in the certified true copy
thereof. No useful purpose would be served by passing on the merits of the petition. Any ruling in this case
could hardly be of any practical or useful purpose in the premises. It is a well-settled rule that courts will not
determine a moot question or abstract proposition nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical
relief can be granted.11
However, we take notice of the failure of petitioner's lawyer, Atty. Emilio Abrogena, to inform the trial court of
the death of petitioner, a duty mandated by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
in part, to wit:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within
thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his
legal representative or representatives. Failure of the counsel to comply with this duty shall be
a ground for disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, the proper substitution of the deceased in accordance with the aforequoted provisions of Rule 3
could not be effected.
We likewise note Atty. Abrogena's failure to inform this Court of his change of address which accounts for
his failure to comment on the manifestation of respondents relative to the death of petitioner and the release
of the subject real estate mortgage.
Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to
the court are more significant than those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession. 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic. Atty. Emilio Abrogena,
counsel for petitioner, is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to inform this Court of the death of petitioner
and to perform his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. He is further warned that a
repetition of such omission in the future will be dealt with severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30362 November 26, 1970

VICTORIA AGUINALDO and SIMEONA AGUINALDO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SEGUNDO AGUINALDO (deceased), PRIMO AGUINALDO and RUFINA AGUINALDO, defendants,
CECILIO AGUINALDO, ANASTACIA AGUINALDO, SIMPLICIO AGUINALDO, DOMINGO AGUINALDO,
and FELICITAS BAGAWISAN, defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:
Any effort on the litigant to delay, if not to defeat, the enforcement of a final judgment, executory in
character, by raising an objection that at best hardly rises to the level of a technicality is not likely to elicit the
sympathy of this Court or any court for that matter. Yet, in effect, that is what the move taken by the
defendants in his case amounted to. The lower court as was but proper did not lend its approval. Still
undeterred, they would appeal. They ought to have known better. There is no reason to refuse affirmance to
the order of the lower court complained of, appointing appellants as legal representatives of the deceased
defendant and substituted in his place pursuant to the Rules of Court in order that the execution that ought
that have taken place long since could at long last be effected.
There is no dispute as to the antecedents. On January 14, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch II through its clerk issued a writ of execution reciting that as far back as March 31, 1958, it rendered
a decision in favor of plaintiffs, 1 now appellees, requiring one of the defendants therein, Segundo Aguinaldo,
to reconvey one-fourth ()pro-indiviso of the property in litigation to appellees, and to pay the latter the
amount of P300.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955. There was an appeal. The decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals on May 23, 1965. It was further set forth therein that on January 5, 1965, a motion for
its execution was granted. Hence the writ of execution. On February 13 of the same year, one Cecilio
Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to quash such writ of execution based primarily
on the allegation that defendant Segundo Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during the pendency of such
appeal. There was an opposition to such motion on February 25, 1965, inviting attention to Sec. 16, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a pending case, it is the duty of
his attorney to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian, or their legal
representative and alleging that there was a failure on the part of the counsel to comply with the above
provision. The prayer was for the denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for an order requiring counsel
for the defendants to furnish the court the names as well as the residences of the heirs or the legal
representatives of the deceased in order that they could be substituted in his stead so as not to render
nugatory a decision, final and executory in character. On March 4, 1965, the lower court, then presided by
the Hon. Ricardo C. Puno gave counsel of record up to March 22, 1965 within which to submit the name and
residence of the executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative of the deceased Segundo
Aguinaldo. The aforesaid counsel in turn merely manifested on March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be
such as of May 31, 1956, and that such a pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid
order. Considering the turn of events, plaintiffs, in order that such a decision in their favor be not rendered
nugatory by the above technicality, had no choice but to ask the court in a motion of April 7, 1965 to have
the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo, defendants Cecilio, Anastasia, Simplicio and Domingo, all
bearing the surname of Aguinaldo being the legitimate children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, a
granddaughter, substituted as defendants. On October 5, 1965, the lower court, this time presided by Judge
Andres Sta. Maria, granted the aforesaid motion and substituted defendants in place of the deceased
Segundo Aguinaldo.
Hence this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which in turn by resolution of February 17, 1969 certified the
matter to this Court, the question involved being one of law. As noted at the outset, we find for appellees.
1. It would be the height of unreason to impute error to the lower court precisely for embodying in the order
complained of what is set forth in the Rules of Court. Thus: "Whenever a party to a pending case dies,
becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of
such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representative." 2Had the defendant, thereafter deceased, seen to it that a new
counsel was appointed, then upon his death there could be compliance with the above provision. To cause
plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an underserved reflection on the law. It is equally vital to
remember that the judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached. Defendants cannot be
heard to allege that it is much too late now to apply the above rule. That would be to set at naught the
principle consistently adhered to by this Court.
It was succinctly put in Amor v. Jugo 3in these words: "And with more compelling reason the respondent
court cannot refuse to issue such writ, or quash it or order its stay, when the judgment had been reviewed
and affirmed by an appellate court, for it cannot review or interfere with any matter decided on appeal, or
give other or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgment of the
higher court." 4What was said by us in Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez 5 is worth recalling: "Litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice

that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to
prolong them." 6 An excerpt from Villaflor v. Reyes 7 is equally relevant: "There should be a greater
awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to
be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and
executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling
for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable." 8
2. This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any
persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, 9 a
1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to
render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a
worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended
deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again.
WHEREFORE, the order of October 5, 1965 is affirmed.

REGINO GABRIEL and JAIME TAPEL, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. In re:
Contempt citation against Atty. Cornelio M. Orteza, respondent.
RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In the Court's Resolution of June 11, 1976, the petition (filed on May 31, 1976) in the cases at bar for review
of the Court of Appeals decision of November 28, 1975 which affirmed in toto the Manila court of first
instance's judgment of September 27, 1968 convicting, after joint trial, the two petitioners accused of the
crime of theft, was denied for lack of merit. The Court further noted therein that a first petition for the same
purpose filed through another lawyer on March 6, 1976 had been previously denied and final judgment
entered on May 10, 1976, and cited Atty. Cornelio M. Orteza who filed the second petition at bar for
contempt and/or for disciplinary action, as follows:
... Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for
lack of merit, a previous petition for review of the same decision docketed as G.R. Nos. L43113-14 having filed by petitioners on March 6, 1976 thru Atty. Rodolfo D. Mapile and denied
as per resolution of March 15, 1976 and entry of final judgment having been made on May 10,
1976. Atty. Cornelio M. Orteza is hereby required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be held
in contempt and/or disciplinary dealt with for filing a second petition on behalf of the same
petitioners for review of the same decision of the Court of Appeals which was already
previously denied with finality within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
Respondent Atty. Orteza still filed without leave of court on July 6, 1976 a motion for reconsideration of the
Court's above-quoted resolution denying his petition for review and after having secured for the purpose an
extension (on the ground of pressure of work) filed on July 12, 1976 his explanation.
The burden of both pleadings is that the first petition to set aside the Court of Appeals affirmance of
petitioners conviction was a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, while the second petition was one
for review under Rule 45. 1
The explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory. However zealous may be counsel's concern and belief in the
alleged innocence of the petitioners, it is elementary that counsel may not split their appeal into one to set
aside the appellate court's denial of petitioners appellants' motion for reconsideration of its decision affirming
the trial court's judgment of conviction and/or for new trial (the first petition) and into another to set aside the
appellate court'sdecision itself, which affirmed the trial court's conviction of the petitioners-appellants (the
second petition).
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper conduct that tends
to impede obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of
court. 2 Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays

the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for
not knowing any better or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the
courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and
honor. 3
Thus in several instances in the past, the Court has admonished that (L)itigants and their counsels are
warned under pain of contempt and disciplinary action that a party who has already failed to have a decision
of the Court of Appeals set aside through a petition for review by certiorari with the denial of his petition (by
the First Division to which such petitions for review are assigned under the Court's standing resolution of
November 15, 1973) should not under the guise of a special civil action file a second petition for the same
purpose of setting aside the same Court of Appeals' decision to be acted upon by the Second Division (to
which special civil actions are assigned under the Court's resolution of November 15, 1973). and vice-versa,
for such conduct would tend to trifle with the Court and impede, obstruct and impede the administration of
justice". 4
Respondent Atty. Orteza is therefore adjudged guilty of contempt of court and is ordered to pay a fine of
Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos with ten (10) days from notice hereof failing which, he shall be imprisoned for
a period of (50) days. While further administrative action against him is herewith forborne, he is hereby
warned that a future repetition or the same or similar incident will be dealt with more severely.
Petitioners' purported motion for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of June 11, 1976 denying their
second petition is ordered expunged from the records as a sham motion, (as is the second petition itself),
since the decision sought, to be reviewed has long become final and executory with the entry on May 10,
1976 of final judgment of denial of the first petition. Let copies hereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and attached to his Personal record.
SO ORDERED.

Regala v Sandiganbayan GR. No. 105938 9.20.96

F: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon
which legal advice were given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG
involving ill gotten wealth. Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in the
very activity from which legal advice was sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of
the petitioner with their client.
I: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose names of their clients (privilege
information)
R: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of
fiduciary relationship with their client.
As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:

1. The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
2. Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established.
3. Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.
4. With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary.
EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN:
1. Strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate the client in the very activity
for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2. Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)
3. Government lawyers have no case against the lawyers client unless by revealing the clients name it
would provide them the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime. (present in this case)
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in
this case)

5. Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended
to be confidential.
Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901:Section 383 of the
Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the
client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into
various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:Sec. 24.
Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of,
or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity. 29Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:Sec. 20. It is the duty of an
attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that:Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end
that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial
disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land,
and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in
mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The
office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

A.M. No. 936 July 25, 1975

FERMINA LEGASPI DAROY, LYDIA LEGASPI and AGRIPINO LEGASPI, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY RAMON CHAVES LEGASPI, respondent.

AQUINO, J.:
Fermina Legazpi-Daroy, Lydia Legaspi-Acha and Agripino Legaspi of Iligan City, in a verified complaint
dated March 10, 1970, charged Attorney Ramon Chaves Legaspi of Cagayan de Oro City with malpractice
for having misappropriated the sum of four thousand pesos which he had collected for them. They prayed
that the respondent be disbarred. 1 (He was 59 years old in 1974. He passed the 1954 bar examinations with
a rating of 75.75%).
The evidence shows that the complainants hired the respondent in May, 1962 to represent them in the
intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz VelezGonzaga. The complainants, together with their brother, Vivencio, who was abroad, were adjudged as one
of the six groups of heirs of the late Gonzaga spouses, their deceased mother, Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi,
being a daughter of the spouses. The heirs in a joint petition dated April 11, 1969, which the respondent
signed as counsel for the complainants, agreed that the coconut land left by the decedents would be divided
into six equal parts, that the administrator be authorized to sell the land, and that, after payment of the
obligations of the estate, the net proceeds would be distributed among the six groups of heirs. The probate
court approved that agreement in its order of April 29, 1969 (Spec. Proc. Nop. 640 of the Misamis Oriental
CFI, Exh. A).
The land was sold. Fermina Legaspi-Daroy came to know of the sale only when the respondent wrote a note
dated November 28, 1969 to her father, Teofilo Legaspi, wherein he stated "that the money we have
deposited may be withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock". The respondent advised Teofilo
Legaspito see him on that date so that the money could be withdrawn (Exh. B).
The complainants were not able to get the money on December 8 because the respondent on December 7
sent to Mrs. Daroy a telegram countermanding his prior advice and directing here to go to Cagayan de Oro
City on December 10, a Wednesday, to receive the money (Exh. C). On December 9, a certain Atty.
Sugamo sent a handwritten note to Mrs. Daroy advising her not to go to Cagayan de Oro City on December
10 because according to the respondent "his postdated checks can be paid and/or collected either Thursday
or Friday yet" (Exh. D).

In the afternoon of that same day, December 9, Mrs. Daroy received another note, this time from the
respondent himself, "Cousin Ramon". The note contained the disturbing intelligence that Mrs. Daroy's
"Cousin Ramon" had withdrawn the money amounting to P4,000 and had spent it. The letter, a sort of
extrajudicial confession or mea culpa on respondent's part, reads as follows (Exh. E):
Dear Fermina,
I wrote this letter with the hope that you will understand me. I have received P4,000.00 our
share in the case filed and is now in my custody.
Previous (sic) I have a case wherein I was forced to use our money to solve my problem.
Now to pay the amount I have used, I sold my jeep to Mr. Ricarte Gorospe, an Employee of
the BIR here in Cag. But I am not paid as yet. So, I am waiting as he will pay at 3:00 p.m.
today and it's close as I have promised to give it on the 10th, I mean our money.
Kindly help me, defer the giving you of the sum or at least until Thursday or Friday, I bring it to
you.
I know, my responsibility on this matter.
Thanks
Cousin
Ramon
It turned out that on October 20, 1969 the respondent, as to "counsel for Fermina Daroy et al.", received
from Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay the said sum of P4,000 as "one (1) share in participation of my
clients Fermina Daroy et al. in connection with (the) order of Judge B. K. Gorospe" in the aforementioned
intestate proceeding. The respondent signed a receipt for that amount (Exh. L-1). The sheriff paid to
Attorneys Angel Quimpo, Leovigildo Tandog, Jr. and Teogenes Velez, Jr. the respective shares of the other
groups of heirs also in the sum of P4,000 for each group. Those lawyers turned over the amounts withdrawn
to their respective clients (Exh. L).
It is evident that the respondent, in writing on November 28, 1969 to Teofilo Legaspi that the money
deposited could be withdrawn on December 8, 1969, acted in bad faith. He had already withdrawn the
money before that date. He concealed that fact from the complainants.
Before the disbarment complaint was filed several demands were made upon the respondent to pay to the
complainants the amount which he had misappropriated. He repeatedly broke his promises to make
payment. As complainants' patience was already exhausted, they filed their complaint for disbarment on
March 13, 1970. 2
Atty. Alfredo R. Busico, the lawyer for the complainants, in a letter to this Court's Clerk of Court dated May
26, 1970, expressed the hope that preferential attention would be given to the case. He said that he had
"reliable information from Cagayan de Oro City" that the respondent "has been bragging that nothing will
happen to this case" (p. 20, Rollo).1wph1.t
The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In 1973 he
requested the City Fiscal of Iligan City to conduct the investigation. 3 After the investigation was finished, the
case was set for hearing. The respondent did not appear at the hearing.
Respondent Legaspi in his testimony admitted that he received the said sum of P4,000 as shown in the
receipt, Exhibit D dated October 20, 1969. He said that after receiving it he immediately wired Teofilo
Legaspi at Iligan City to see him (the respondent) in his office at Cagayan de Oro City so that Teofilo
Legaspi could tell him "the proper disposal" of that amount.
Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October 21, 1969 and at their conference they supposedly
agreed that the sum of P700 would be deducted from the P4,000 to cover the expenses which he (Legaspi)
described as "expenses involved from the parties litigants, expenses seeking evidence and other expenses
relevant to the case" and "major expenses" in the case (sic); that his attorney's fees would be equivalent "to
a share of the petitioners", an agreement which was later placed in formal form (referring
to 1968 extrajudicial settlement attached to his answer); that the balance of P3,300 would be divided into six
equal parts (six because of the four Legaspi children, the father Teofilo Legaspi and the lawyer Ramon C.
Legaspi); that under such division each participant would receive P412 each (P3,300 divided by six gives a
quotient of P550 not P412), and that he gave Teofilo the sum of P412. The respondent did not present any
receipt to prove that alleged payment.
He said that at first Teofilo Legaspi told him to keep the share of Vivencio Legaspi, who was abroad, but at
the end of October or the first week of November, 1969 Teofilo got from him (the respondent) Vivencio's

share. Again, the respondent did not ask Teofilo to sign a receipt for Vivencio's share. After paying the
shares of Teofilo and Vivencio, the balance of the amount left in respondent's possession amounted to
P2,476.
According to respondent's version, the complainants "refused consistently to receive" the said balance from
him because they wanted the full amount of P4,000. He said that he had already paid to them the sum of
P2,000 and that only the sum of P476 was left in his custody. He did not present any receipt to prove the
alleged payment of P2,000. He said that he could deliver that amount of P476 to the complainants.
Mrs. Daroy, in rebuttal, denied that her father, Teofilo Legaspi, received the sum of P412 from the
respondent. She said that her father never went to Cagayan de Oro City to confer with the respondent. She
said that there was no agreement that the respondent would participate like an heir in the partition of the
sum of P4,000. She denied that the respondent offered to pay her and her brother and sister the sum of
P2,746. She denied that the respondent paid to the complainants P2,000.
After a careful examination of the evidence, we find that respondent's testimony cannot be given any
credence. In his memorandum he stated that after he received from the sheriff "on October 29, 1969" the
sum of P4,000, he "immediately wired" his kinsman, Teofilo Legaspi, to come to Cagayan de Oro City and
that Teofilo "came onOctober 21, 1969". Respondent meant October 20, 1969, the date of the receipt,
Exhibit L-1.
The truth is that he did not send any such wire. The statement of the sheriff and respondent's office clerk in
their affidavits of March 18, 1975 that such a wire was sent is false. What he sent to Teofilo Legaspi was a
handwritten note dated November 28, 1969 (Exh. B) wherein the respondent made it appear that the said
sum of P4,000 was going to be withdrawn on "December 8, 1969 at nine o'clock". That the respondent in his
testimony and memorandum forgot that note, which is Annex C of the complaint for disbarment and which
he admitted in paragraph 4 of his answer, is an indication that he does not know the facts of his own case
and that he had no scruples in trying to mislead and deceive this Court.
That note of respondent to Teofilo Legaspi, his telegram and his letter (already quoted) to Mrs. Daroy dated
December 7 and 9, 1969, respectively (Exh. B, C and E) overwhelmingly belie his fabricated theory that he
conferred with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of October or in the first week of November, 1969. He was tempted
to concoct a story as to his alleged payments to Teofilo Legaspi because the latter is dead and could not
refute him. However, complainants' documentary evidence refutes his prevarications, distortions and
fabrications.
He attached to his memorandum (of which he did not furnish complainants a copy) his Exhibit 2, a supposed
typewritten claim against him which totalled P10,406.05. Exhibit 2 does not bear any signature. The
respondent wants to imply that the complainants were trying to blackmail him. No probative value can be
given to Exhibit 2.
The flimsiness and incredible character of respondent's defense are discernible in his Exhibit 1, which he
attached to his answer to the original complaint.
Exhibit 1 as a carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial partition executed in 1968 by the four children of
Consuelo Gonzaga, by her surviving husband, Teofilo Legaspi and by the respondent, Atty. Legaspi, all the
six being described in the document as "the legitimate children and sole heirs of Consuelo Gonzaga, who
died on March 12. 1941". Why the respondent was an heir of Consuelo Gonzaga was not explained.
In that curious instrument, the spaces for the day and month when it was signed and acknowledged before a
notary, the spaces for the description of the fourth parcel of land, the spaces for the shares adjudicated to
the heirs, the spaces for the instrumental witnesses and the spaces for the numbers of the residence
certificates and the dates and places of issue were left blank. Yet the instrument was signed by the above
six persons and duly notarized by a notary whose signature is illegible.
In that extrajudicial partition Consuelo Gonzaga was alleged to have left four parcels of land located at
Barrio Maputi, Initao, Misamis Oriental which she inherited from her father Aquilino Gonzaga. However, in
the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental dated April 29, 1969 Consuelo Gonzaga inherited
only a one-sixth share in a parcel of land located at Maputi, Initao, Misamis Oriental.
How Vivencio Legaspi, who, according to the instrument, was a resident of Alameda, California, was able to
sign it and to appear before a notary was not explained.
The incomplete document, far from being of any help to respondent Legaspi, casts a reflection on his
competency and integrity as a lawyer and on the competency and integrity of the notary before whom it was
acknowledged. As already noted, it was made to appear herein that respondent Legaspi was an heir of
Consuelo Gonzaga when, obviously, he did not possess that status. The document does not even mention
whether the deceased died intestate.

That document has no connection with the P4,000 and does not justify the misappropriation or breach of
trust committed by the respondent.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has
come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal
purposes without his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust
(Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be
immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11).1wph1.t
Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when an attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions and he is liable to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or
for any violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).
"The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In
view of that special relationship, "lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by
them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a
lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty
of promptly accounting for the funds received." (Syllabus, In re Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962).
The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a gross violation of general morality as well as
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession, "It deserves severe punishment"
(Sturr vs. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 125, 338 Pac. 2d 897).1wph1.t
A member of the bar who converts the money of his client to his own benefit through false pretenses is guilty
of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in his office of lawyer. The attorney, who violates his oath of
office, betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client and practices deceit cannot be permitted to
continue as a law practitioner. Not alone has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has
besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil.
627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131; See Cabigao and
Yzquierdo vs. Fernando Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20).
We find respondent Legaspi guilty of deceit, malpractice and professional misconduct for having
misappropriated the funds of his clients. His manufactured defenses, his lack of candor and his repeated
failure to appear at the investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Iligan and at the hearings scheduled by
this Court, thus causing this proceeding to drag on for a long time, demonstrate his unworthiness to remain
as a member of the noble profession of law. (See Capulong vs. Alio, Adm. Case No. 381, February 10,
1968, 22 SCRA 491).
Taking into account the environmental circumstances of the case, we hold that the proper disciplinary action
against the respondent is disbarment. Its salutary purpose is to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of an officer of the court. It is premised on the assumption that a member of the bar should be
competent, honorable and reliable, a person in whom courts and clients may repose confidence (In
reMacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78).
Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to
the office of an attorney (6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 242).1wph1.t
The prayer of the complainants that the respondent be ordered to pay them the said amount of P4,000 plus
attorney's fees and miscellaneous expenses incurred in the prosecution of this case amounting to more than
P1,000 cannot be granted in this disbarment proceeding. That amount should be recovered in an ordinary
action.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.