Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.

Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration
of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29,
2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying
the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in
accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as
Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On
February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration
covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City,
Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessorsin-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and

adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years,
thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated
June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad
452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters
as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 41656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting
Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing
an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower,
and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the
CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property

belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the
RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing
the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the CA declared that under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March
15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans
period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his
heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the
property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession
to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the
application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering
that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial
hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure
converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of

an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According
to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted"
into private property through prescription at the time of the application
without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because
Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and
occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere
classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed
sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on
the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 9 they argue that the reclassification of
the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription
under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the
right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the
ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor;
and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on
February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was
declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and
Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has
enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its

view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land

subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to
discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing
applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of
public dominion or of private ownership. 11Land is considered of public
dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. 12 Land belonging to
the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but
no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the
patrimonial property of the State. 13 Land that is other than part of the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of
private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, 14 all lands of the public domain belong
to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 18 lands of the public domain
were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands
of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and
grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under
the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but
added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. 21 The identification
of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and
through a positive act of the Executive Department. 22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of
public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to
wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, 23 without limitation;
and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they
are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification, 25 and the exclusive prerogative
to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified
as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when
public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the
ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made
in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to

that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its

prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used
for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian
Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by
which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of
Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of
the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral,
forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law
does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to
only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations
under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-ininterest, has been in possession and occupation of the property
subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since
June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural

land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with
the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the
public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that
the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land
is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land
as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been
made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land
prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or
glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning
point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to
the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period
of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the
Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as
written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject
of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June
12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title
is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the

application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public

domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or
title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during
the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as
the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of
law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed
by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property subject of
the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of
the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the
application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption
that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to
determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The
imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the
Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts. 31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for
the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed, we
should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly

recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted

legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent
requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land
to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations.34

incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already

ceased to be part of the public domain and has become
private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes
of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode
of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua
non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for

public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of
Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial
or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning
disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the
State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition
of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to
be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time
of the application, provided the applicants possession
and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945,
or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes
the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to

establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June
12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted
to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the
State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration
for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 179987 April 29, 2009
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land
situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his greatgrandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon
Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, includingLot9864-A,
which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment
& Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3
December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the

alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed
private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those

who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The
person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under
the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may
be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and
with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons

uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least

thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to
their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particular
is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.

with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered

with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23,
1959;
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr.

Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD &
VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was

ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on
October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935
is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481,
390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section
48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended:
and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or

sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the
Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the
Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the
present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October
29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on

land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the

alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has
introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos
worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the
Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be
registered on September 18, 1982;

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be

registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela,
have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from
the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during
their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as
to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution
had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since
section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations
from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution
which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question
from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of
Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, reads:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted
findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased
the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national
cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,

possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more
than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have
their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as
the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the
title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in
favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein
against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in
lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at
the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were
then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative.
If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that
case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60%
of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947
two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been
possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-ininterest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in
1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The
court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application
on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply
for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows
only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation

of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this

Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public
land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still
public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified
to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's
application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition
makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an
imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the
public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title
subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should
not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies
to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section
48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director
of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of
cases
beginning
with Carino in
1909 2thru Susi in
1925 3 down
4
to Herico in 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the
better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was
ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to
those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we
do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were
in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might
be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for
it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section
47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of
Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title
or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned,
likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac
vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel
vs.
Court
of
10
Appeals and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi
doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in

more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII
of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in
her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of

11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942,

which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land
Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified
in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is

deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,

a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "...
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than
a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October
29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be
conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in

the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting

corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land,
despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until
title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings
under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes
right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the
1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had
already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire,
hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were
brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a
right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held,
in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested
rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no
retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested
right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took
effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated
by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of
vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested

rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16
C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase
the land in question had become fixed and established and was
no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for
the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said
land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a
patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of
that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123
Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by
Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental
circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in
nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of
Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of
the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and
registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny
the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance
which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that
the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer

deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the

line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property
by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this
appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at
the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning
private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds
its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application
on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of
the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error not having filed the application for registration in the name
of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it
is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition
against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural
persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein
provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through
all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in
their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now.
(See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by

considering the applications for confirmation as amended to
conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and
who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of
title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the
Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title
and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the
lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty
charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily
obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule
on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent
in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively
recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms
and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has
passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past
cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos,
in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a
juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an
imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may,
in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short,
decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment

of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without
costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and,
therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting
opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct
view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case
of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases
cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of
a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act
provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old
law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through
his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby

the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private
property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake.
But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine
and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases
which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write
this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors
"shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of
the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domainand
had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to
sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as
well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the

proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and
related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited
established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up
to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We
reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of
alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without
the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso
jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property,
which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations
such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly
held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to
lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the
simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from
the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution
which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which
imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that
the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession
thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments
redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community,
particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the
filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly
reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied
and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership
have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the
deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly
extended to December 31, 1987. 7

title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed,

then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the
same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as
the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that
the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural
persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as
an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by
analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed
by us in Francisco v. City of Davao,where the legal question raised,
instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was
resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction,
I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the
application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I
assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos,
now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect
dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance,
and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered
have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were
acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner
and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the
constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may
hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder
for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly
applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to
the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of
the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold
and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications
to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession
of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on
their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to
the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually,
physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory
30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required
statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally
sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the
law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although

part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be
impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act
(which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings
for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they
lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.

they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But

such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of
the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are
already private lands because
ofacquisitive
prescription by the
corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural personstransferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the
private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by
them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the
transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be
necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign
its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was
done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for
the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural
persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the

application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war

or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold
such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional
provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for
the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain
(Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br.
1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of
title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to
ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be
allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first

apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to
ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a
dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA
799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on
the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of
the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of
the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of
refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision
that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from

acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or

construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction
adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of
the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST
37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L
Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a
vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general
principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so
interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to
give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the
other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part
of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part
nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general
rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond
the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be
altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from
becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general
everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual
is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control
Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public

policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest
manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which
would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC)

146 SCRA 509 December 29, 1986

Facts:
1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the
averment in the complaint that the land was acquired by the plaintiff
through inheritance from his parents, the former owners thereof.
2.Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of
court, amended the answer. In the amended answer, the admission no
longer appears. The alleged ownership of the land by the plaintiff was
denied coupled with an allegation that the defendant is the owner of the
land as he bought it from the plaintiffs parents while they were still alive.
3. After trial, the lower court upheld the defendants ownership of the
land. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by
the admission contained in his original answer.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct
RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it
already disappeared from the record, lost its status as a pleading and
cease to be a judicial admission. While the said pleading may be utilized

against the pleader as extrajudicial admission, they must, in order to

have such effect, be formally offered in evidence.

Factual and Procedural Antecedents:

Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C.
Sese (respondents) filed with the MTC an application for original
registration of land over a parcel of land with an area of 10, 792 square
meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province
of Bulacan, and more particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345,
Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan No. AP-03-004226.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185092

June 4, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSGJ, assailing the November 21, 2007
Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, which
dismissed its appeal and affirmed the October 3, 2003 Decision 2 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan (MTC), in LRC Case No. 026.

Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a

donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro
(Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property;
and that the property was not within a reservation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted the following
documents, namely: (1) Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the
name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing their mother
Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; (2) Certificate of
Technical Description which was approved on December 10, 1998 by the
Land Management Service, Region III, of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR); (3) Certification in lieu of lost Surveyors
Certificate issued by the same authority; (4) Official Receipt of payment
of real property tax over the subject property; (5) Certification from the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered
owners of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19-015-01557 were
Corazon Sese and others; and (6) Survey plan of Lot 11247, CAD
345,Pulilan Cadastre, approved by the Regional Technical Director of the
Land Management Service, Region III, of the DENR, stating that the land
subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified
to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or
military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there was a note
stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was
executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in
favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.

On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others,
that: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per
Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on
March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said
plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional
Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga, on December 3, 1998.
Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued
the Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the
corresponding publication. After compliance with all the requirements of
the law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits
of the application followed.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon)
testified on their claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents
submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered
were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without
objection from the public prosecutor.
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision, 3 ordering the
registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and
substance and the applicants having established their right of ownership
over the subject parcel of land and are therefore entitled to registration
thereof, the Court thereby grants the petition.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land
subject matter of this petition which is more particularly described in Plan
Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre and in their corresponding technical
descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.

Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject
lots had been in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession,
either by the applicants themselves or their predecessor-in-interest. Such
possession since time immemorial conferred an effective title on the
applicants, whereby the land ceased to be public and became private
property. It had been the accepted norm that open, adverse and
continuous possession for at least 30 years was sufficient. The MTC
noted that evidence showed that the parcel of land involved was not
covered by land patent or a public land application as certified to by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources of Tabang, Guiguinto,
Bulacan. Moreover, it added that the technical descriptions of Lot 11247
were prepared and secured from the Land Management Sector, DENR,
Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and were verified and found to be
correct by Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the Regional Survey Division.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA,
docketed as CA-GR. CV No. 81439. In its brief, 4 the OSG presented the
following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the public
domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at
least thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b)
respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof
already segregated from inalienable lands
was only from the date of declaration of
disposable that the period for counting
possession would start.

that the subject property was

of the public domain. Verily, it
such lands as alienable and
the statutory requirement of

Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents supposed

possession of the subject property. Save for the testimony of Corazon
that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is occupying the subject

property," there was no evidence that respondents were actually

occupying the subject tract of land or that they had introduced
improvement thereon.
On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision 5 affirming the
judgment of the MTC ordering the registration of the subject property in
the name of respondents. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated
October 3, 2003 of the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 026 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of
the subject property with an annotation, stating that the subject property
was alienable and disposable land, was a public document, having been
issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents were prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to
establish that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable.
With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the
doctrine of constructive possession was applicable. Respondents
acquired the subject property through a donation inter vivos executed on
July 22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the said property
from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute
sale. Further, respondent Corazon testified that a small hut was built on
the said land, which was occupied by the worker of her mother.
Moreover, neither the public prosecutor nor any private individual
appeared to oppose the application for registration of the subject
property.
The CA also stated that respondents claim of possession over the
subject property was buttressed by the Tax Declaration No. 99-1901501557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing

their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official

receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the
certificate from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating
that the registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration No. 9919015-01557 were respondents.
The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of
property were not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
RULING THAT THE APPROVED SURVEY PLAN IDENTIFIED BY ONE
OF THE RESPONDENTS IS PROOF THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.
The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have been
classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part of the inalienable
land of the public domain. In the present case, the CA relied on the
approved survey indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. It is well-settled, however, that such notation does not
suffice to prove that the land sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable. What respondents should have done was to show that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land

subject of the application for registration fell within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, they
should have adduced a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.
To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the
Philippine v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,6 where the Court stated that the trial
court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof
of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly
issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. Such government
certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated
therein. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that
respondents failed to present specific acts of ownership to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession in the concept
of an owner. Facts constituting possession must be duly established by
competent evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by respondents,
it cannot be said that it clearly manifested their adverse claim on the
property. If respondents genuinely and consistently believed their claim
of ownership, they should have regularly complied with their real estate
obligations from the start of their supposed occupation.

On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that
the subject land was alienable and disposable. The approved survey
plan of the subject property with an annotation, stating that the subject
property is alienable and disposable land, is a public document, having
been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein and are sufficient to establish
that the subject property is indeed alienable and disposable.
Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano, 7 where the Court
stated that a DENR Regional Technical Directors certification, which was
annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constituted
substantial compliance with the legal requirement. The DENR
certification enjoyed the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to
the contrary.
Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA
correctly applied the doctrine of constructive possession because they
acquired the subject land from their mother, Resurreccion, through a
donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972.Their mother, in turn, acquired
the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an
absolute sale. They claim that a small hut was built in the said land and
was occupied by a worker of her mother. They countered that although
tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession
in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property which is not in his actual or constructive custody.

Position of Respondents

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether respondents are
entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.)No. 1529, or pursuant to Section 14(2) of the same statute.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of

Commonwealth Act No. 141,8 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No.

1073,9 provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land

title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.10 Compliance with the foregoing requirements is
indispensable for an application for registration of land title, under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The absence of any
one requisite renders the application for registration substantially
defective.
Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the
disposable and alienable character of the subject land through a survey
plan, where on its lower portion, a note stated, among others, as follows:
"This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project
No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1,
1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was
approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III,
San Fernando, Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The annotation in the
survey plan, however, fell short of the requirement of the law in proving
its disposable and alienable character.
In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and Menguito v.
Republic,13 the Court reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a
surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed was alienable and
disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the
property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence
accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property
was inalienable. Thus:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which
bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is

inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No.
2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation
to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey
Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government
act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a

mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.

By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."
(Citations omitted and emphases supplied)
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. The applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; or a legislative act
or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable. 14
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 15 declared that a CENRO certification
was insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the
land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient
proof that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and
released the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must
be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 16
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the
disposable and alienable character of the subject land was an annotation
by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although this was certified by
the DENR, it clearly falls short of the requirements for original
registration.

With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession
and occupation of a parcel of land by the applicant, by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. 17 A
mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by
itself, is not sufficient.18
In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings
of this case will reveal, the earliest that respondents and their
predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and occupation of the
subject land was only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion,
acquired the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue
of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession of the subject property
commenced roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning
date expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus,
their application for registration of land title was legally infirm.
The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.1avvphi1 The case of Malabanan v.
Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of
original registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In the said case, the Court laid down the following
rules:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
xxxx

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,

consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government.
The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at
least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
(Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus, incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the

period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall

be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.20
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to
commence and operate against the State, the classification of land as
alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be
able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification,
expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a
proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer
retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently,
without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a
property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by
virtue of prescription.21 The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. 22
For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14
(1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed
to prove (a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and (b) that
their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Failing to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land,
respondents all the more cannot apply for registration by way of
prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30
years to acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove the
classification of the subject land as alienable and disposable, but also to
show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As to whether
respondents were able to prove that their possession and occupation
were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has
been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or
legal justification.1wphi1 Hence, the Court is constrained to reverse the

assailed CA decision and resolution and deny the application for

registration of land title of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21, 2007
Decision and the October 8, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the Application for Registration of Title of Respondents Corazon C. Sese
and Fe C. Sese in Land Registration Case No. 026 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 185092 : June 4, 2014

followed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CORAZON C. SESE

and FE C. SESE, Respondents.

During the trial, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their

claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal
offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered were admitted by the
MTC in the Order, without objection from the public prosecutor.

MENDOZA, J.:
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
FACTS:
Respondents filed with the MTC an application for original registration of
land over a parcel of land with an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated
in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and
more particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, PulilanCadastre,
under Plan No. AP-03-004226.
Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a
donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro
(Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property;
and that the property was not within a reservation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted among others a
survey plan approved by the Regional Technical Director of the Land
Management Service, Region III of the DENR stating that the land
subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified
to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or
military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there was a note
stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was
executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in
favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, that: "This survey
is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map
No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is
outside any civil or military reservation." Finding the application sufficient
in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10,
2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication.
After compliance with all the requirements of the law regarding
publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the application

The MTC ordered the registration of the subject property in the name of
respondents.
Later, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA. In its brief, the OSG
presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of
the public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a
period of at least thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b)
respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof
already segregated from inalienable lands
was only from the date of declaration of
disposable that the period for counting
possession would start.

that the subject property was

of the public domain. Verily, it
such lands as alienable and
the statutory requirement of

Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents supposed possession

of the subject property. Save for the testimony of Corazon that "at
present, the worker of (her) mother is occupying the subject property,"
there was no evidence that respondents were actually occupying the
subject tract of land or that they had introduced improvement thereon.
The CA however, affirming the judgment of the MTC ordering the
registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The CA
was of the view that the doctrine of constructive possession was
applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a
donation inter vivos executed on July 22, 1972 from their mother. The
latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on October 4, 1950
by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon
testified that a small hut was built on the said land, which was occupied
by the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the public prosecutor nor

any private individual appeared to oppose the application for registration

of the subject property.
The CA also stated that respondents claim of possession over the
subject property was buttressed by the Tax Declaration No. 99-1901501557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing
their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official
receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the
certificate from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating
that the registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration No. 9919015-01557 were respondents.
The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of
property were not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner. Hence, the
OSG filed this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in ruling that
the approved survey plan identified by one of the respondents is proof
that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in granting the
application for registration.
HELD:

The

decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

is

overruled.

CIVIL LAW: proof for claim of ownership

In Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012 citing Republic
v. Sarmiento 547 Phil. 157, 166167 (2007) and Menguito v. Republic,
401 Phil. 274, 287-288 (2000), the Court reiterated the rule that that a
notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property
surveyed was alienable and disposable was not the positive government
act that would remove the property from the inalienable domain and
neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the
presumption that the property was inalienable. Thus:

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which
bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is
inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No.
2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation
to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey
Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government
act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not

sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to
commence and operate against the State, the classification of land as
alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be
able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification,
expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a
proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer
retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently,
without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a
property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by
virtue of prescription. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14
(1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed
to prove (a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and (b) that
their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Failing to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land,
respondents all the more cannot apply for registration by way of
prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30
years to acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove the
classification of the subject land as alienable and disposable, but also to
show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As to whether
respondents were able to prove that their possession and occupation
were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has
been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
The petition is GRANTED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164408

March 24, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.

006985-D, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre,3 alleging that it had

purchased the land on March 9, 1992 from Jane de Castro Abalos,
married to Jose Abalos, for P300,000.00; that the land was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of its predecessor-in-interest under Tax
Declaration No. 22711; that there was no mortgage or encumbrance of
any kind affecting the land, nor was there any other person or entity
having any interest thereon, legal or equitable, adverse to that of the
applicant; and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of
the land in the concept of an owner.

DECISION

Attached to the application were several documents, namely: (1) tracing

cloth plan as approved by the Land Management Division of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (2) blue
print copies of the tracing cloth plan; (3) copies of the technical
description; (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. 2711; and (5) copies of the
Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1992.

An application for original registration of land of the public domain under

Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only
that the land has previously been declared alienable and disposable, but
also that the land has been declared patrimonial property of the State at
the onset of the 30-year or 10-year period of possession and occupation
required under the law on acquisitive prescription. Once again, the Court
applies this rule-as clarified in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic 1 in
reviewing the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004, 2 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petitioner's application for registration
of land.

The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the

application, arguing that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest
had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945; that the muniments of
title and tax declaration presented did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and that the
land was a portion of the public domain, and, therefore, was not subject
to private appropriation.4

BERSAMIN, J.:

Antecedents
On May 28, 1993, respondent Zurbaran Realty and Development
Corporation filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Pedro, Laguna
an application for original registration covering a 1,520 square meter
parcel of land situated in Barrio Banlic, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province
of Laguna, denominated as Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-

The RTC directed the Land Management Bureau, Manila; the

Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los
Baos, Laguna; and the Land Management Sector and Forest
Management Bureau, Manila, to submit a status report on the land,
particularly, on whether the land was covered by a land patent, whether it
was subject of a previously approved isolated survey, and whether it was
within a forest zone.5

In his memorandum to the DENR, Region IV (Lands Forestry Sector),

and the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna, a copy of which was furnished
the trial court, CENRO Officer Arnulfo Hernandez stated that the land
had been "verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable land under
Land Classification Project No. 23-A of Cabuyao, Laguna, certified and
declared as such pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
705, as amended, under Forestry Administrative Order No. A-1627 dated
September 28, 1981 per BFD Map LC-3004." Attached to the
memorandum was the inspection report declaring that "the area is
surrounded with concrete fence, three (3) buildings for employees
residence;" that the land was acquired through sale before the filing of
the application; that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had
been in "continuous, open and peaceful occupation" of the land, and that
"no forestry interest is adversely affected."6
CENRO Land Management Inspector/Investigator Rodolfo S. Gonzales
reported that: (1) the land was covered by a survey plan approved by the
Regional Land Director/Land Registration Authority on May 25, 1988
pursuant to PD No. 239 dated July 9, 1975; (2) it consisted of 22,773
square meters and was located in Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna;
(3) the area was entirely within the alienable and disposable area; (4) it
had never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of
taxes, and had not been confiscated in connection with any civil or
criminal cases; (5) it was not within a previously patented property as
certified to by the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna; and (6) there
was no public land application filed for it by the applicant or any other
persons as per verification from the records unit of his office. The report
further stated that a verification at the Office of the Municipal Assessor
showed that: (1) the land was declared for the first time in 1960 under
Tax Declaration No. 6712 in the name of Enrique Hemedez with an area
of 23,073 square meters; (2) it was now covered by Tax Declaration No.
2253 issued in the name of the respondent; (3) the real property taxes
had been paid since 1968; and (4) it had not been earmarked for public
or quasi-public purposes per information from the District Engineer.

After inspection, it was also found that (1) the land was residential; (2)
the respondent was in the actual occupation and possession of the land;
and (3) the land did not encroach upon an established watershed,
riverbank/bed protection, creek, right-of-way or park site or any area
devoted to general use or devoted to public service. 7
A certification was issued by the Records Management Division of the
Land Management Bureau stating that it had no record of any kind of
public land applications/land patents covering the parcel of land subject
of the application.8
The respondent presented Gloria P. Noel, its Vice President and
Treasurer, who testified that the respondent had purchased the land from
Jane de Castro Abalos on March 9, 1992 for P300,000.00; that the land
had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Abalos under
Tax Declaration No. 22711; that after the sale, a new Tax Declaration had
been issued in the name of the respondent, who had meanwhile taken
possession of the land by building a fence around it and introducing
improvements thereon; that the respondent had paid the real property
taxes thereon since its acquisition; that the respondents possession had
been continuous, open and public; and that the land was free from any
lien or encumbrance; and that there was no adverse claimant to the
land.9
Engr. Edilberto Tamis attested that he was familiar with the land because
it was a portion of Lot No. 8017 of Subdivision Plan Cad-455-D of the
Cabuyao Cadastre, owned by Corazon Tapalla who had acquired it from
the Hemedez family; that Tapalla had sold a portion of Lot No. 8017 to
Abalos and the remaining portion to him; and that he had witnessed the
sale of the land to the respondent.10
The respondents final witness was Armando Espela who declared that
he was a retired land overseer residing in Barangay Banlic from birth;
that he was familiar with the land which was part of a bigger parcel of
land owned by the Hemedez family; that his father, Toribio Espela, with

his assistance, and one Francisco Capacio worked on the land since
1960; that the entire landholding had originally been sugarland, but was
later on subdivided, sold, and resold until it ceased to be agricultural
land; that, in 1982, the land was sold to Corazon Tapalla who hired him
as the overseer; that as the overseer, he fenced and cleared the area;
that he was allowed to use the grassy portion for grazing purposes; that
in 1987, Tapalla sold part of the land to Abalos and the remaining portion
to Engr. Tamis; that he continued to oversee the land for the new owners;
that Abalos then sold her portion to the respondent in 1992; that since
then, the respondent took possession of the land, and he then ceased to
be the overseer; that the possession by the Hemedez family and its
successors-in-interest was open, continuous, public and under claim of
ownership; and that he did not know any person who claimed ownership
of the land other than those he and his father served as overseers. 11
Decision of the RTC
On May 12, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision, holding that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public,
peaceful, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960 and,
accordingly, granted the application for registration, viz:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by the
applicant, this Court hereby orders the confirmation and registration of
title of the land described as Lot 8017-A of subdivision plan Csd-04006985-D, being a portion of Lot 8017 of subdivision plan Cad-455-D,
Cabuyao Cadastre situated at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna with
an area of 1,520 square meters to be entered under the name of the
applicant Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office
address at 33 M. Viola St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City by the
Land Registration Authority. After the decision shall become final, let an
order for the issuance of a decree of title be issued in favor of said
applicant.

SO ORDERED.12
Judgment of the CA
The Republic appealed, arguing that the issue of whether the applicant
and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land within the
required length of time could not be determined because there was no
evidence as to when the land had been declared alienable and
disposable.
On June 10, 2004, the CA promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC,
and concluded that the reports made by the concerned government
agencies and the testimonies of those familiar with the land in question
had buttressed the court a quos conclusion that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous,
exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.13
Issue
Hence, the Republic appeals the adverse judgment of the CA upon the
following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS GRANT OF THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT AND ITS
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE
PERIOD OF POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION REQUIRED BY LAW.14
The Republic contends that the respondent did not establish the time
when the land covered by the application for registration became
alienable and disposable;15 that such detail was crucial because the
possession of the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, for the
purpose of determining whether it acquired the property by prescription,

should be reckoned from the time when the land was declared alienable
and disposable; and that prior to the declaration of the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, it was not susceptible to private
ownership, and any possession or occupation at such time could not be
counted as part of the period of possession required under the law on
prescription.16
The respondent counters that whether it established when the property
was declared alienable and disposable and whether it complied with the
30-year required period of possession should not be entertained
anymore by the Court because: (a) these issues had not been raised in
the trial court and were being raised for the first time on appeal; and (b)
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA,
were binding and conclusive on this Court. At any rate, the respondent
insists that it had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, and
adverse possession of the property for the prescribed period of 30 years
as evidenced by the fact that the property had been declared for taxation
purposes in 1960 in the name of its predecessors-in-interest, and that
such possession had the effect of converting the land into private
property and vesting ownership upon the respondent. 17
In reply, the Republic asserts that it duly opposed the respondents
application for registration; that it was only able to ascertain the errors
committed by the trial court after the latter rendered its decision; and that
the burden of proof in land registration cases rested on the applicant who
must prove its ownership of the property being registered. The Republic
maintains that the Court had the authority to review and reverse the
factual findings of the lower courts when the conclusion reached was not
supported by the evidence on record, as in this case. 18
Ruling
The petition for review is meritorious.

Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an

application for registration of land based on possession and occupation
of a land of the public domain, thus:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
xxxx
An application for registration under Section14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must
establish the following requisites, namely: (a) the land is alienable and
disposable property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim
of ownership; and (c) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have
possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The
Court has clarified in Malabanan19 that under Section14(1), it is not
necessary that the land must have been declared alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the law simply
requires the property sought to be registered to be alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. The
Court has explained that a contrary interpretation would absurdly limit the
application of the provision "to the point of virtual inutility."

The foregoing interpretation highlights the distinction between a

registration proceeding filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and
one filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. According to Malabanan:
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while
Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.
Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration
under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.20
In other words, registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is
based on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard
to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time.
The applicant needs only to show that the land had already been
declared alienable and disposable at any time prior to the filing of the
application for registration.
On the other hand, an application under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is
based on acquisitive prescription and must comply with the law on
prescription as provided by the Civil Code. In that regard, only the
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription
pursuant to the Civil Code.21 For acquisitive prescription to set in,
therefore, the land being possessed and occupied must already be
classified or declared as patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no
length of possession would vest any right in the possessor if the property
has remained land of the public dominion. Malabanan stresses that even
if the land is later converted to patrimonial property of the State,
possession of it prior to such conversion will not be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription.22 Thus, registration under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 requires that the land had already been converted
to patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the period of
possession required by the law on prescription.

An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529

must, therefore, establish the following requisites, to wit: (a) the land is
an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public
domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just
title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c)
the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial
property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year
period of possession.
To properly appreciate the respondents case, we must ascertain under
what provision its application for registration was filed. If the application
was filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, the determination of the
particular date when the property was declared alienable and disposable
would be unnecessary, inasmuch as proof showing that the land had
already been classified as such at the time the application was filed
would be enough. If the application was filed under Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529, the determination of the issue would not be crucial for, as
earlier clarified, it was not the declaration of the land as alienable and
disposable that would make it susceptible to private ownership by
acquisitive prescription. Malabanan expounds thereon, thus Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the
Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial
property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable
lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides
that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision
that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the

State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.23
The respondents application does not enlighten as to whether it was
filed under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The
application alleged that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation
of the property in the concept of an owner, but did not state when
possession and occupation commenced and the duration of such
possession. At any rate, the evidence presented by the respondent and
its averments in the other pleadings reveal that the application for
registration was filed based on Section 14(2), not Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529. The respondent did not make any allegation in its application
that it had been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, nor did it present any evidence to establish such fact.1wphi1

the application had already been converted to patrimonial property of the

State. In short, has the land been declared by law as no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth?
The respondent may perhaps object to a determination of this issue by
the Court for the same reason that it objects to the determination of
whether it established when the land was declared alienable and
disposable, that is, the issue was not raised in and resolved and by the
trial court. But the objection would be futile because the issue was
actually raised in the trial court, as borne out by the Republic's allegation
in its opposition to the application to the effect "that the land is a portion
of the public domain not subject to prescription." In any case, the interest
of justice dictates the consideration and resolution of an issue that is
relevant to another that was specifically raised. The rule that only
theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party on
appeal refers only to independent, not concomitant, matters to support or
oppose the cause of action.24
Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within
an area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of
the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth. The Court is left with no alternative
but to deny the respondent's application for registration.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on June 10,
2004; and DISMISSES the respondent's application for original
registration of Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad.
455-D, of the Cabuyao Cadastre.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

With the application of the respondent having been filed under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the crucial query is whether the land subject of

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

REPUBLIC vs. ZURBARAN REALTY AND

CORPORATION G.R. No. 164408, March 24, 2014

DEVELOPMENT

Facts:
Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with RTC an
application for original registration of land. Director of Lands opposed it
arguing that applicant and its predecessor in interest had not been in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of
land since June 12, 1945.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Zurbaran.
On appeal to SC, the Republic appealed arguing that Zurbaran failed to
establish the time when the land became alienable and disposable,
which is crucial in determining whether Zuburan acquired the land by
prescription.
ISSUE: What are the substantive elements in filing an application for
original registration of land?
RULING:
The requirements depend on what basis the application was filed..

The following are the bases for application:

c. Land is converted or declared as patrimonial property of the State at

the beginning of 10-year or 30-year period of possession.

1. On the basis of possession, wherein you need to show the following:

a. The land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain
(Example of non-alienable lands are forests, lakeshores, etc)
b. the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
c. the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and
occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier
Note: Land need not be declared alienable and disposable as of June 12,
1945 or earlier. It is sufficient that property is alienable and disposable at
the time of application (Malaban vs. Republic)
2. On the basis of prescription, wherein you need to prove the following:
a. Land is alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property
b. continuous possession of land for at least 10 years in good faith and
with just title OR 30 years regardless of good faith or bad faith.

Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription

(Article 1113 of Civil Code). Property of public dominion, if not longer
intended for public use or service, shall form part of patrimonial property
of State. (Article 422 of Civil Code)
Here, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public use, service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
In the case at bar, the application did not state when their possession
and occupation commenced (no allegation that they have been in
possession since June 12, 1945) and the duration. So the application is
based on prescription. Here, there is no evidence showing that the land
in question was within an area expressly declared by law either to be the
patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth.