THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI,

Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a
District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase
on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned
firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was
also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with
the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch
office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid
sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous
Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed
with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even
as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract
**. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and
manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales
agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through
the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the
addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void
his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00
a month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind
and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling
sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited,
he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from
his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance
Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began
negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the
refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi
filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger,
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the
essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that
all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed
with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined
(sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably
with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office
of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P.
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining,
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk
of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and
voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms.
Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual
basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family
**."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive,
even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the
complaint in order that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of
court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi
as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him
to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months,
a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was
no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in
defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he
gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the
envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to
the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters
with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed
mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of
an honest mistake.[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his
trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on
Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he
still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's
principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12]He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy
from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until
after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa &
Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the
down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction,
none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and
baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean
hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters
both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in
his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU
ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her
honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co.,
and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and
against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely

acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]

His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that
"(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and **
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized
that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in
the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the
respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use

of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a
judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or
other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed
-- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a
right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an
officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most
other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at
all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one
who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel
or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney"
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition.
Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him,
as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our

Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.

vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great
injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his
own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people
may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his
petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of theManila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and
that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitledVirginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court,
after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen
received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its
reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not
notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18,
1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service,"
the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a
second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card.

This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial
court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier,
that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals.

restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza
the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the
matter in issue.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the
appeal, in the following words:

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and
by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8,
1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
ordered expunged from the records.

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the
appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113,
printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof
and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of
time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966,
as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration,
thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30,
1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's
motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26,
1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila
Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case
was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading
that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well
as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on
his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited
for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn
over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this
Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending
petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is
now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require
him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and
gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to
show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the
charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open
and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to
state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and
public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked
for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in
person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a
written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology.
Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations,
this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall
be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why
dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy
own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye";
and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from
thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the
Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition.
On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath
that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously
DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the
Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and
constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the
highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE,
what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in
simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in
the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with
any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to
face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way
of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current,
though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines
today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me
frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack
the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled
by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We
waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed
your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your
Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional
right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty,
what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what
injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would
correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public
opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and
dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for

charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human
defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of
things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended
as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our
self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as
a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of
the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute
resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to
spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For
we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many
weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with
a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are
utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a
first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court
has been generous in giving due course to petitions forcertiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition
we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the
U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts
and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of
the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms

the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same
three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons,
however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at
a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60
O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its
considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of
merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice
Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before;
and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in
view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have
all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion;
and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its
heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the
Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting
them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the
Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is
implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but
of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring
the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for
the exercise of the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing

examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of
decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen
knew or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated
in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time,
and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three
days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a
case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v.
Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45
Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing
the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not
fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment,
he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of
appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the
consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that
he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional
certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor
on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each
time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers
are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts'
rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's
actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official
actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and

the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as
they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official
actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as
members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose
the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of
their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens
whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary,
has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the
bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for
law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and
fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte
Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and
to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse
the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and
upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal
the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to
speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a
sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence."
(State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders
no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ...
to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be
the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel
precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102
So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the
application of appropriate penalties," adding that:

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond
bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth
or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as
such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct
product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice
and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley,
v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge
of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial
on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory
statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard
to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet
went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers
even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the
two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at
that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred
to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney,
directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the
disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which
requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their
criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re
Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing
a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree
on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of
a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly
work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the
law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust
criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The

letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the
discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with
the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was
ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court
against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the
administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only
when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an
independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil
rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the
court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully
retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of
an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and
thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that
judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court,
as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act
of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved
upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or
the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in
the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers
whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in
the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are

made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration
of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case
of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and
who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his
client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to
try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the
public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of
the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with
their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could
ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or
carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a
polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal
corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident
insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of
the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that
greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in
those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief
Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been
attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the
letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank,
or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate
a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation
before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded
citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six
months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the
insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his
associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an
angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise
by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable
attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than
by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile,
or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action
triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the
person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law
(2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we
have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the
rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of
public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the
penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount
to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the
court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the
respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out
of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there
appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of
an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult
for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at
his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism
of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely
logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra.
While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to
criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said
the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to
forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking
the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under
such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been
directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal
letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a
justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim
133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and
in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had
addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated,
in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have
been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt
under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court,
which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the
law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will
not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one,
and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the
same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to
the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not

holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a
cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the
attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him
[the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As
recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case,
we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State,
22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a
suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under
the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack
against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general
claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the
trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this
sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal
profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a
member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention
to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime
or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism
and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the
duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of

comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish
for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a
different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his
motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the
rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the
polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is
that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in
utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences,
or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom
Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking
said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be
published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal
has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who
were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one
of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would
have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press,
the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case,

which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement,
are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case
by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose
of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of
justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or
degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven
to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is
in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken
from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586,
594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile,
et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the
pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of
the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of
counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr.
Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of
one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this
Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes

a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this
Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has
committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements
of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into
question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

18

which, in the

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with
the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only
against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending
case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep
the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is
now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his
appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of
its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for
a modification thereof, however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief
Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice
Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement
from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding,
where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical
manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and
the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice
Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by
publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any
way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by
courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence
of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in
the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of
justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring
them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no

contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any
way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists,
with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and
its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment
in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt
therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics
of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or
non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of
this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or
suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is
the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude
from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right
to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the
inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all
that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but
the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally
held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one
is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right,

but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound
judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the
Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way.
Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against
this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to
drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his
client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons,
imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while
at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his
announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the
publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle
the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and,
alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members
into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming
feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It
is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the
lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be
allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid
clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be,
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting
to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy

criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and

disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them.
Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be
informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the
"complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding
at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the
individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts
as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not
as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are
lost in the majesty of their office.30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members
thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay,
even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident
of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is
vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot
unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact
alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because
public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which
call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly

of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited
upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these
may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to
assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed
to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the
imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded
and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it
may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of
respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension
should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the
practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree
and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit
of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time
after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again
fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he
is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take
effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General
and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee,

Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

EN BANC
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but
in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein,
we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers
on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them
on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the

two terms,i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who
could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect
that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of
law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services.
The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently
because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to
the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly,
the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever
doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services"
as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law
practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public
that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary
to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a

divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown
in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words
"Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if
not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement

appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral

publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate.
The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do
not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in
the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from
offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be
stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by
non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but
to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession
will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but
also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development
in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention
of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should
be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the
trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement
which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its
pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then

take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin,

problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice
for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is
an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5
Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting
for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the
bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are
wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic
and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2
to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be
given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the

administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the
meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which
may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are
prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,

as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is
not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless

he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate
or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even
by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such
act could become justifiable.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages
and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a
secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on
divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by
our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of
this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had
been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for
some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard
to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the
same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a

certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged

primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted
by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines.
The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code
limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The

incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work,
he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would
be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the

adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select
an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is
free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess
the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or
of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations
Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State
of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently
with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or
in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment
of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where
the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that
the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is

no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that
relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer

general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful

practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the
kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office
for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals
in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at
p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that
only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent
for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we
note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining
the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court,
is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and
rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases,
we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law,"
thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to
be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in

the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173,
176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N.
E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals
to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the
extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication,
such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to
laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or
employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports,
local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find
useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs,
or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments,
courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic
is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and
so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January
13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx
for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on
the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what
the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in
various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and

criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing
the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's
bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so
on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment.
These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple
deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you
wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's
just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is
even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the
case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a
one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law
who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have
been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the
bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of
the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware
that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,
there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of
their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or
skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case
of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar
to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding,39 was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As
a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical
and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in
said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation
or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains
a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an
exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise,
the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent
would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary
action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a
member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since
it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of

our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly
rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as
may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes
"A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate
action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

EN BANC
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but
in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein,
we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers
on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them
on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the

two terms,i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who
could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect
that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of
law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services.
The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently
because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to
the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly,
the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever
doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services"
as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law
practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public
that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary
to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a

divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown
in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words
"Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if
not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement

appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral

publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate.
The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do
not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in
the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from
offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be
stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by
non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but
to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession
will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but
also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development
in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention
of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should
be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the
trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement
which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its
pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then

take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin,

problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice
for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is
an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5
Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting
for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the
bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are
wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic
and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2
to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be
given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the

administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the
meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which
may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are
prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,

as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is
not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless

he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate
or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even
by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such
act could become justifiable.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages
and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a
secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on
divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by
our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of
this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had
been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for
some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard
to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the
same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a

certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged

primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted
by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines.
The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code
limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The

incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work,
he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would
be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the

adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select
an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is
free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess
the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or
of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations
Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State
of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently
with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or
in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment
of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where
the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that
the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is

no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that
relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer

general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful

practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the
kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office
for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals
in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at
p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that
only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent
for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we
note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining
the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court,
is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and
rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases,
we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law,"
thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to
be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in

the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173,
176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N.
E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals
to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the
extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication,
such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to
laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or
employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports,
local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find
useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs,
or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments,
courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic
is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and
so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January
13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx
for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on
the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what
the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in
various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and

criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing
the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's
bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so
on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment.
These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple
deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you
wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's
just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is
even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the
case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a
one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law
who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have
been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the
bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of
the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware
that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,
there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of
their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or
skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case
of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar
to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding,39 was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As
a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical
and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in
said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation
or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains
a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an
exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise,
the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent
would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary
action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a
member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since
it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of

our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly
rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as
may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes
"A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate
action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543

April 26, 1991

PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY.
ARSENIO FER. CABANTING,respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw,
Arsenio Fer. Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge)
for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession committed
in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly
bought a parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia
Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to
register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo
Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short)
another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives and
distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the Valencias
could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in
the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property.

Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their differences. (Report of Investigating
Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a
complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino
Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty.
Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of
the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an
amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature of the alleged
vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed
purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief
that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary
Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a
workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was pending, the trial court,
on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has
already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of
execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos
and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April
25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative
Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly
violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment
proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for
his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent
introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and
Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491
of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil Case No.
V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed additional
charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:

In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia
Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public
by one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago
Bernal had died already about eight years before in the year 1965.

On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.1wphi1 When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of these cases
to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis,
Pangasinan, for further investigation.

2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:

In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation
with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before
him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact
the said deeds were not in fact executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and
so Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void the said sales
(p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the
grandparents of Lydia Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the
last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of
confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights over the
property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to
sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of
donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw
allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather
(deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint
against her (Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public
document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence,
while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No.1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the
resolution of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the
Second Division both dated December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391
and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all
of these cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his
handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.

In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats
against the person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of
investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, under the sala of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases
against Atty. Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative
Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against
Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the suspension of Atty.
Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty of malpractice in
falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491
of the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying
notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation
in which they make take part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the

better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition
would constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a
ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation
is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil.
775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot
after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said
to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also
from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco
vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate
court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for
purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of the
trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus,
purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in
violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a
ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no
attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the
latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not
covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in
consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show
that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled
jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony
(Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al., L40804, Jan. 31,
1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he
deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for
the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No.
1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even
if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His
declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be
difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a
deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the
administration of justice as an officer of the court.

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA
622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63
SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnestness and with
the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his
client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining
the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan
vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important
of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102
SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to
continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore,
is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather
intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and the public
may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw
failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be
dismissed for lack of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on
direct examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several
subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded. She eventually requested the
withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses against him.1wphi1 He enjoys the legal presumption
that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. (Santos vs.
Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989), Since Atty.
Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper that the direct
testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative
Case No. 1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by
complainant for lack of interest does not ipso factoresult in the termination of a case for
suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are
constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence to
substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated
on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal
knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of

the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand."
(Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the
evidence presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in
Administrative Case No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her
additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative
cases conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil
Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the
Valencias are neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be
believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the heirs
of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue the Valencias.
Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in a meeting held
in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary witness to attest to
the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of
brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A
lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with
courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law: strive mightily but
(they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED
from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys;
2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months from
finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney Eduardo
Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds
in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the
annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench
and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as

soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to
existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court.
Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file
written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative
to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for
the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure
was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on
the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine
lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule
drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so:
the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of
a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as
an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule
of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own
organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal
service;

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many
of our provinces;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and
publish information relating thereto;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on
the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino
lawyer; and

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and
make reports and recommendations thereon; and

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in
the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession
to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional
rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues
exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the
Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the
Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed
with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the
court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just
that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but
there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can
operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational
and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service
available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and
control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes
the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court
levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose
of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as
an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not
be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to
impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does
not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration
of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might
result from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner
he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in
the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for
the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of
group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech"
issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths
that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be
thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end

condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has
never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a
new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they
will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public
responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.
Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court,
because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration
takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not
retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of
the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as
well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the
members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and
more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated
Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the
Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the
Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public.
No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the
unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar
has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized
the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a
total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual

responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378
(or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In
addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement
and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers'
group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers
who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent)
vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate
an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass
of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration,
that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII
of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,

Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction," the
Commission is composed of Supreme Court Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
(Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Conrado V.
Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then Court of Appeals Presiding Justice)
Salvador V. Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual, Ex-Senator Tecla San
Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional Convention Delegate Feliciano
Jover Ledesma (Members).
2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno, Roman Ozaeta,
Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the petition
represented the unanimous consensus of 53 Bar Associations (from all over the
Philippines) reached in convention at the Far Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on
June 23, 1962.
3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega, the
Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar
Association and the Manila Bar Association.

4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted memoranda in
favor of Bar integration, while the Manila Bar Association submitted a memoranda
opposing Bar integration.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for
the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure
was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on
the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:

5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench
and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds
in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the
annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine
lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule
drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to
existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court.
Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file
written memoranda. 4

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative
to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so:
the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of
a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as
an officer of the court.

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule
of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own
organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal
service;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many
of our provinces;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and
publish information relating thereto;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on
the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino
lawyer; and

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and
make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession
to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in
the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional

rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues
exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the
Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the
Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed
with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the
court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just
that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but
there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can
operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of
group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational
and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service
available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and
control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes
the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court
levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose
of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as
an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not
be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to
impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does
not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration
of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might
result from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner
he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in
the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for
the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.

has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized
the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech"
issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths
that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be
thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has
never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
Government.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a
total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual
responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378
(or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In
addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement
and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers'
group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers
who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent)
vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate
an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a
new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they
will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public
responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.
Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court,
because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration
takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not
retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of
the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as
well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the
members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and
more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated
Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the
Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the
Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public.
No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the
unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass
of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration,
that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII
of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,

Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction," the
Commission is composed of Supreme Court Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
(Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Conrado V.
Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then Court of Appeals Presiding Justice)
Salvador V. Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual, Ex-Senator Tecla San
Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional Convention Delegate Feliciano
Jover Ledesma (Members).

2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno, Roman Ozaeta,
Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the petition
represented the unanimous consensus of 53 Bar Associations (from all over the
Philippines) reached in convention at the Far Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on
June 23, 1962.
3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega, the
Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar
Association and the Manila Bar Association.
4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted memoranda in
favor of Bar integration, while the Manila Bar Association submitted a memoranda
opposing Bar integration.
5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.