FLORES v.

DRILON
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Under said provision, for the first year of
its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall
be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners, as taxpayers, contend that said provision is unconstitutional as under
the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B,
of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during
his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the
subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which
provides that "[t]he President shall appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned
proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and,
(c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates
the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts
HELD: YES.
The rule expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in
one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication
and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a
public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of
an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of
Agrarian Reform should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be
precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many
positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.
In this case, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official,
i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA).
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut
difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by
an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any
exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to
the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself,
e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the VicePresident, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of
Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of
Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties

Union v. Executive Secretary. However, the court held that the Congress did not
contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached
to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The
phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA
posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had
it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress
would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would
have been used. Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware
that subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they
nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the
courts.
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of
the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive
term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law
(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of
the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned
citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as
aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a
highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the
City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on
the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the
City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the
appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving
questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local
government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes
and bounds with technical descriptions. 2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of
the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers
which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the
description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.
We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area
of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the
proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the
time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to coequal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to
decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could
decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its
exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress
has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government
units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable
difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction
of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of
the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution
by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2
of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this
regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil
that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical
descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said
cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and
bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is
not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring
municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent
behind the law has been sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as
petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine
qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local
Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower
local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local
governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same
time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on
the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would
serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the
master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the
intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
(Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which,
for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes
(Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the
case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and
the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government
of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the
House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more
than three (3)consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point
that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already
served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and
eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998
and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term
asmunicipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been
conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a
litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the
same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of
R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city,
Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially
correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic

Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the

next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu
of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis
supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed
in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled
that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only
be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The
intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever
whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative
district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias
v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one titleone subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command
that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence,
we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April

18, 1995)
Posted on October 3, 2012

GR No. 112889
243 SCRA 538
April 18, 1995
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a
petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which
dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being
allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy,
a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand
theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A
warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on
private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May
8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due
time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private
respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC
for cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the candidates
disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against
private respondent before the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign
court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from
justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified
from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective
local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in
criminal cases here and abroad are disqualified from running for any elective
local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of
its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when
there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be
made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither
expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has
been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of
the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not
private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be
interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo
warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts,
is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of
this unresolved factual matter.

MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)

Disqualification case on the ground of fugitive from justice

MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)

Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon
Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the
ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local
Government Code Section 40. Disqualification.
The following persons are disqualified from running for any
local elective position (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or
non-political cases here or abroad.
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance
fraud or grand theft of personal property in the United States and
that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the
country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquezs Petition. Rodriguez
was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the
filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges before a
foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the
term fugitive from justice.

Held:
No. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or

she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is

an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term
fugitive from justice includes not only those who after conviction
to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from
jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and
ordinary connotation of the term.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone.
RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy
of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive
uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner
commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation
of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by
the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed

Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein
its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the
President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the

Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang

Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow
Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by

promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993,
requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA
7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC
of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the
ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532

defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion
of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845

and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and
providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the
validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a
national law

ISSUE:

1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating

Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum
proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of
the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the
amendment of a national law."

HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but

respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,
the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not
mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the
counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the
documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum
Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description
"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body
of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,
and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative
assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people
to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative
body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors
become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of
elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the
content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is
still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an
approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to
contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it
has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations
can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review
Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse
of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the

proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed

upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The
Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements
about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is
really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the
exercise of its review powers.
Dacanay vs. Asistio (1992)

Facts: MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission,
designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets.
Pursuant, thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up to seven (7) flea markets in that city.
However, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the
market stalls. City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue
the latters policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets.
Held: There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents market stalls
are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside
the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
other contract. Any existing leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The
right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The
interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community
whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are
under legal obligation to protect. The Mayor cannot infringe upon the vested right of the public
to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for
vehicles and pedestrians. Public respondents have the corresponding duty, arising from public
office, to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.
PART 2
Dacanay v. Asistio [G.R. No. 93654. May 6, 1992.] En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 13
concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 5 January 1979, MMC Ordinance 79-02 was enacted
by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city and municipal
streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant thereto, the
Caloocan City mayor opened up 7 flea markets in that city. One of those streets was
the Heroes del 96" where the Francisco Dacanay lives. Upon application of vendors
Rodolfo Teope, Mila Pastrana, Carmen Barbosa, Merle Castillo, Bienvenido Menes,
Nancy Bugarin, Jose Manuel, Crisaldo Paguirigan, Alejandro Castron, Ruben Araneta,
Juanita and Rafael Malibaran, and others, the city mayor and city engineer, issued
them licenses to conduct vending activities on said street. In 1987, Antonio
Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the market
stalls on Heroes del 96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets. To stop Mayor Martinez

efforts to clear the city streets, Teope, Pastrana and other stallowners filed an action
for prohibition against the City of Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the City
Engineer and/or their deputies before the RTC Caloocan City (Branch 122, Civil Case
C-12921), praying the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction ordering these
city officials to discontinue the demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the
action. The court issued the writ prayed for. However, on 20 December 1987, it
dismissed the petition and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction which it had
earlier issued. However, shortly after the decision came out, the city administration
in Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. did not pursue the
latters policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets. Invoking the trial courts
decision, Francisco Dacanay wrote a letter to Mayor Asistio calling his attention to
the illegally-constructed stalls on Heroes del 96 street and asked for demolition on
7 March 1988, wrote a follow-up letter to the mayor and the city engineer on 7 April
1988, and without receiving any response, sought the intervention of President
Aquino through a letter. These letter was referred to the city mayor for appropriate
action. On 3 April 1989, Dacanay filed a complaint against Mayor Asistio and
Engineer Sarne (OMB-0-89-0146) in the Office of the Ombudsman. After conducting
a preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman rendered a final evaluation and report
on 28 August 1989, finding that the Mayors and the City Engineers inaction is
purely motivated by their perceived moral and social responsibility toward their
constituents, but the fact remains that there is an omission of an act which ought
to be performed, in clear violation of Sections 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019. The
Ombudsman recommended the filing of the corresponding information in court. As
the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del 96 Street, through the tolerance of
the city officials, and in clear violation of the decision in Civil Case C-12921,
Dacanay filed a petition for mandamus on 19 June 1990, praying that the city
officials be ordered to enforce the final decision in Civil Case C-12921 which upheld
the city mayors authority to order the demolition of market stalls on V. Gozon,
Gonzales and Heroes del 96 Streets and to enforce PD 772 and other pertinent
laws.
The Supreme Court established that Dacanay and the general public have a legal
right to the relief demanded and that the city officials have the corresponding duty,
arising from public office, to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific
public purpose (Enriquez vs. Bidin, 47 SCRA 183; City of Manila vs. Garcia et al., 19
SCRA 413 citing Unson vs. Lacson, 100 Phil. 695), and thus ordered the City Mayor
and City Engineer of Caloocan City or their successors in office to immediately
enforce and implement the decision in Civil Case C-1292 declaring that Heroes del
96, V. Gozon, and Gonzales Streets are public streets for public use, and they are
ordered to remove or demolish, or cause to be removed or demolished, the market
stalls occupying said city streets with utmost dispatch within 30 days from notice of
the decision; the decision being immediately executory. 1. Jurisprudence applicable
to property of public dominion The streets, being of public dominion must be
outside of the commerce of man. Considering the nature of the subject premises,

the following jurisprudence co/principles are applicable on the matter: (1) They
cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts.
(Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602); (2) They cannot be acquired by
prescription against the state (Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505). Even
municipalities can not acquire them for use as communal lands against the state
(City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327); (3) They are not subject to
attachment and execution (Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52); (4)
They cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement (2-II Colin & Captain 520;
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. Vol. II, 1983 Ed. pp. 29-30). 2. Context of the
ordinance of the Metropolitan Manila Commission as to the establishment of flea
markets on municipal streets, roads and open spaces Ordinance 2, s. 1979 of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission is an ordinance authorizing and regulating the use
of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan
Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and
conditions, subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission, and for
other purposes. Section 2 of said ordinance provides that the streets, roads and
open spaces to be used as sites for flea markets (tiangge) or vending areas; the
design, measurement or specification of the structures, equipment and apparatuses
to be used or put up: the allowable distances: the days and time allowed for the
conduct of the businesses and/or activities herein authorized; the rates or fees or
charges to be imposed, levied and collected; the kinds of merchandise, goods and
commodities sold and services rendered: and other matters and activities related to
the establishment, maintenance and management and operation of flea markets
and vending areas, shall be determined and prescribed by the mayors of the cities
and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila where the same are located, subject to
the approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission and consistent with the
guidelines hereby prescribed. Section 6(m) of said ordinance provides that in the
establishment operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and
vending areas, the following guidelines, among others, shall be observed: xxx (m)
that the permittee shall remove the equipment, facilities and other appurtenances
used by him in the conduct of his business after the close or termination of business
hours. 3. Related case, Municipality of Cavite; Return of rent In the case of
Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, it was held that properties for public use may not be
leased to private individuals. Such a lease is null and void for the reason that a
municipal council cannot withdraw part of the plaza from public use. If possession
has already been given, the lessee must restore possession by vacating it and the
municipality must thereupon restore to him any sums it may have collected as rent.
4. Relate case, City of Manila v. Garcia; Ordinance legalizing the occupancy of
squatters of public land is null and void In the case of City of Manila vs. Gerardo
Garcia, 19 SCRA 413, it was held that tThe property being a public one, the Manila
Mayors did not have the authority to give permits, written or oral, to the squatters,
and that the permits granted are therefore considered null and void. As reiterated in
the case of Baguio Citizens Action Inc. vs. The City Council. 121 SCRA 368, an
ordinance legalizing the occupancy by squatters of public land is null and void. 5.

Occupation of private individuals of public places devoted for public use a nuisance
The occupation and use of private individuals of sidewalks and other public places
devoted for public use constitute both public and private nuisances and nuisance
per se, and this applies to even case involving the use or lease of public places
under permits and licenses issued by competent authority, upon the theory that
such holders could not take advantage of their unlawful permits and license and
claim that the land in question is a part of a public street or a public place devoted
to public use, hence, beyond the commerce of man. (Padilla. Civil Code Annotated,
Vol. II, p. 59, 6th Ed., citing Umali vs. Aquino, IC. A. Rep. 339.). 6. Authority of the
city mayor and the city engineer to order the demolition of illegal structures The
authority of the Municipality to demolish the shanties is mandated by PD 772, and
Section 1 of Letter of Instruction 19 ordering certain public officials, one of whom is
the Municipal Mayor to remove all illegal constructions including buildings on and
along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without
permits on public or private property (Zansibarian Residents Association vs. Mun. of
Makati, 135 SCRA 235). The City Engineer is also among those required to comply
with said Letter of Instruction. Further, Section 185, paragraph 4 of BP 337(Local
Government Code) provides that the City Engineer shall (c) Prevent the
encroachment of private buildings and fences on the streets and public places, (j)
nspect and supervise the construction, repair, removal and safety of private
buildings, (k) With the previous approval of the City Mayor in each case, order the
removal of materials employed in the construction or repair of any building or
structures made in violation of law or ordinance, and cause buildings and structures
dangerous to the public to made secure or torn down, among others. Likewise, the
Charter of the City of Caloocan, RA 5502, Article VII, Section 27, paragraph g, 1 and
m, grants the City Engineer similar powers. 7. Public street cannot be made subject
to a lease A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of
man (Arts. 420, 424. Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be
the subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva et al. vs. Castaeda and Macalino,
15 SCRA 142, citing the Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu vs.
Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869, and Muyot vs. De la Fuente, 48 O.G.
4860). The disputed areas from which the market stalls are sought to be evicted are
public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case C-12921. 8. Lease or licenses
null and void for being contrary to law As the stallholders pay fees to the City
Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City
Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such
leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public
to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of
a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community
whose health, peace. safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city
officials are under legal obligation to protect. The Executive Order issued by the
Acting Mayor authorizing the use of Heroes del 96 Street as a vending area for
stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the
general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. The Executive Order

may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the
purpose they were intended to serve: i.e.,
CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO
G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
FACTS:
Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to
hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to
board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted
catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of
the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce
his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came
to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to
the PGH. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered
contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart
from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region.
Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city
engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed, except insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 409 should prevail over Art 2189 of the Civil
Code
HELD: NO
RA 409: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city
officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.
Art 2189 CC: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of
road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409
is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subjectmatter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a
general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to
persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the
provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the
city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . .
liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason
"specifically" of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said
section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the
object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in

particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of
a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1)
because the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2)
because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not
made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well
as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of
a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the
amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that
"the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition
and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and
zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed
upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue
was and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was
made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court
of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been
put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal,
much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for
the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision"
over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or
supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917
and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said
Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of
aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and
streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely
implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition
and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the
construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national
secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the
Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as
may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special
appropriation Acts."

Aquino III vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Post under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, January
by Schizophrenic Mind

31,

2012 Posted

Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared
as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby

Creating

New

Legislative

District

from

such

Reapportionment.

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President
Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and
apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be
composed

of

176,383

population

count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by
the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be
stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless
otherwise

fixed

by

law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects:
first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to
question

the

constitutionality

of

R.A.

9716.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and
void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement

for

the

creation

of

new

legislative

district

in

province.

Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction
between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5
(3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with
nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of
250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making
the province entitled to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the

formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of the apportionment were
valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No.
4264.

SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

J. Corona

Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and
Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of
effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property
covered by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was
extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondents
defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that
the MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8027

Held: Yes to both, Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a

well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right
and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the
laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest.
Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance
No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It
is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of
public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with
Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.

PART 2
Social Justice Society vs. Hon. Lito Atienza, Jr. Mayor of Manila G.R. No. 156052 Digest
Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon vs. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila
G.R. No. 156052
March 7, 2007
Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on
November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No.
8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial
and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to
cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of

effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the socalled Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy
entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they
agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and
practicable option. Under the memorandum of understanding, the City
of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously
operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting
from the joint operations and the scale down program.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in
Resolution No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the
memorandum of understanding was effective only for a period of six months
starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted
Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and
authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether
or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City
Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding
were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until
April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor
of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Posted by Andrei Yaun at 3:33 A

Municipality of Paraaque vs. VM Realty

292 SCRA 676
Panganiban, J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to a Sanggunian Bayan Resolution of the petitioner municipality, an expropriation complaint against the property of
herein respondent for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the
homeless through a socialized housing project. The RTC of Makati authorized petitioner to take possession of subject
property upon deposit to the court an amount of its fair market value. Respondent filed a counter claim alleging that the

complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required
by RA 7160.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolution of the Municipal council is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section
19, RA 7160 in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
RULING:
The power of eminent by LGUs may be affected only by ordinance not by a mere resolution. The following essential
requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain.
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGUs to
exercise the power of eminent domain to pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec 9, Article III of the Constitution and other pertment.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer
was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the first requisite that there must be an ordinance was not complied with by the local chief executive. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, it possesses a general and permanent character
while a resolution is temporary in nature.
The petition is hereby denied without prejudice to petitioners proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject
property.