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1. UMALI VS. ESTANISLAO 209 SCRA 446

Facts:

Congress enacted RA 7167 entitled An act adjusting the basic personal and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the
poverty threshold level, amending for the purpose Sec.29 of the NIRC. The said act
was signed and approved by the President on Dec.19, 1991 and published on Jan.14,
1992 in Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation. Sec.3 of the said act states:

This act shall take effect upon its approval, while Sec.5 states: These
regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992.

Issue:

WON RA 7167 took effect upon its approval by the president on Dec.19, 1991 or on
Jan.30 1992, 15 days after its publication?

Held:

RA 7167 took effect on January 30, 1992 after 15 days of its publication. (Tanada
vs Tuvera) The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous
publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen (15) day period shall be shortened or
extended.

2. PP VS. DONATO 198 SCRA 130

Facts:

Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986
for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a
Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense;

(b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished. This was denied.

day

after

the

filing

original

information,

petition

for habeas

private

respondent

or

of

the

on

October

1986,

corpus for

and

his

co-accused

was

filed

which was dismissed on 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the parties
under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face
trial before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the
arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released
but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.

May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the
respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense
under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President
issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and
1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail,
which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the
court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof.
Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the
court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this
main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;

He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;

He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;

Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00
was offered and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held:

Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime
is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence.
It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary.
However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K
without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion
perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not
favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas
corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his
co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately,
with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court.
Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the
right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to

law,
to

public

order,

public

policy,

morals,

or

good

customs,

or

prejudicial

third
person
with
a
right
recognized
by
law.

3. PP VS. LICERA 65 SCRA 270

Facts:

In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In


1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that
where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable,
which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later
People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable.

HELD:

Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws
mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of
the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. A new doctrine
abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those
favored by the old rule.

4. CO VS. CA 227 SCRA 444

FACTS:

A criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 also known as the Bouncing Check Law
was filed against the petitioner after issuing a check on September 1, 1982 which

was dishonored on January 3, 1984. Related regulations of BP22 were released as


Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, which was meant to free the drawer of the
bouncing check, any criminal liability when the issuance of the check is part of an
agreement to guarantee or secure payment of an obligation, and as Circular No. 12
dated August 8, 1984, which was meant to overrule the former and contained express
mandate for prospective application of the regulation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Circular No. 12 is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD:

It was opined that the interpretation of the Court constitutes a part of the law as
stated in Art 8 of the New Civil Code, thus, the Circulars earning the power of law
resulted from the cognizance of them by the Court as manifested by the Court
decisions prior to the ruling of the case at bar. The Court further held that,
although the Circulars have the power of law, Circular 12 can not be applied to the
case at bar as that would be tantamount to giving retroactive effect which is in
direct violation of the Circular itself and the Art 4 of the New Civil Code
mandating prospective application of the law. The Court resolved that the assailed
decisions of the inferior courts are reversed and set aside. Criminal prosecution
is dismissed with costs de oficio.

5. NATIONAL MARKETING CORP. VS. TECSON 29 SCRA 70

Facts:

December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as


civil case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization
Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years ago. Defendant Miguel Tecson
moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of that and prescription of action. The court, then, issued an order
of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code. However, National
Marketing Corporation appealed to the court of appeals from such order. Looking at
the fact that 1960 and 1964 is a leap year, they insisted that a year means a
calendar year and a leap year would still be counted as 1 year even if it
consists of 366 days. The case reached its conclusion with the appellant's theory
with regards to the article 13 of the civil code.

Issue:

Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited
to 365 days.

Held:

The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to
the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through
legislative process and not by judicial decree.

6. QUIZON VS. BALTAZAR 76 SCRA 560

This is a petion for certiorari and prohibition to declare null and void the orders
of the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, issued in criminal cases Federico
Quizon and Profitisa Quizon, dated July 11 and August 17, 1964, respectively,
denying petitioners' motion to quash the criminal complaints against them based on
the ground of prescription of the offense of serious oral defamation of which they
were charged, and to prohibit said court from proceeding further with the said
criminal cases, except to dismiss the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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FACTS:

On May 11, 1964, private respondent, Cecilia Sangalang, with the assistance of
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliodoro B. Guinto, who had conducted the preliminary
investigation, filed with respondent court two separate criminal complaints both for
serious oral defamation, the one against petitioner Federico Quizon and the other
petitioner Profitisa Quizon, committed on the same day, November 11, 1963.

Upon being called for arraignment, petitioner presented a written motion to quash
contending principally that the offense charged had already prescribed as of May 9,
1964. Stating the provision of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense of
oral defamation prescribes in six months. Thus,

From Nov. 12
19
days
to 30, 1963

there were

December, 1963
31
days
had

January, 1964
31
days
had

February, 1964
29
days
had

March, 1964
31
days
had

April, 1964
30
days
had

From May 1 to
9 days
9, 1964 was a

matter of

From Nov. 12,


180

1963 to May 9,
days
1964 were.

The prosecution opposed the motion to dismiss by making a computation of time.


Thus, from Nov. 12, 1963 to May 11, 1964 are 180 days pursuant to the provision (of
the said Article 13) contained in paragraph 3 which reads "In computing a period,
the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included".

From Nov. 12 to

19

30, 1964, there

days

are

December

30

days

January

30

days

February
days

March 30
days

30

April

30

days
From May 1 to
11
11, 1964, there
days
are

From Nov. 12,


180
1963
to May 11,
days
1964
are

Overruling their motion, respondent court reasoned out thus:

Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, in providing for the prescriptive period for oral
defamation, speaks of month, not of day, as the basic unit in reckoning the duration of
the prescription, when it says that "offenses of oral defamation ...

shall prescribe in six months."

Article 13 of the new Civil Code says that "when the laws speak of ..., months,

..., it shall be understood that ... month ... of thirty days each ... It says
further that "If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the
number of days which they respectively have. Conformably to these legal provisions
and applying the same to the case at bar, the computation given by the public
prosecutor appears to be correct. The month of November was designated in the
complaint so it will be given the number of days it has in the calendar which is 30
days.

Hence this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether a month mentioned in Article 90 should be considered as the calendar


month and not the 30-day month.

HELD:

In accordance with Article 13 of the new Civil Code the "month" mentioned in
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be one of 30 days, and since the period
of prescription commences to run from the day "on which the crime is discovered by
the offended party," it is logical to presume, therefore, that the Legislature in
enacting Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code meant or intended to mean that in the
computation of the period provided for therein, the first day is to be excluded and
the last one included, in accord with existing laws.

The pertinent provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code are as
follows:

Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. The offenses of oral defamation and slander by
deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months.

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall


commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their agents, ...

Article 90 should be considered as the calendar month and not the 30-day month. It
is to be noted that no provision of the Revised Penal Code defines the length of
the Month. Article 7 of the old Civil Code provided that a month shall be

understood as containing 30 days; With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(R.A. No. 386), the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a
month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month (Article 13).

Hence, where the crime was committed on November 11, 1963, and the action was filed
exactly 180 days later, said action was filed on time.

7. BELLIS VS. BELLIS GR. NO. L-23678, JUNE 6, 1967

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death.
Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the
other, disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized
illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no conflicts rule (rule of
Private International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas
Law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate
children opposed the wills on the ground that they have been deprived of their
legitimes (to which they would be entitled, if Philippine law were to apply).

ISSUE: Are they entitled to their legitimes?

HELD: Said children are NOT entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law which
we must apply (because it is the national law of the deceased), there are no
legitimes. (See Art. 16, par. 2, Civil Code).

(2) The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Adolfo
Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963, cannot be applied. Said
doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and
a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even assuming that Texas
has a conflicts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile should govern,
the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas law because the deceased was BOTH a citizen and a domiciliary
of Texas. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflicts of law rule
in Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. (Lim v. Collector, 36
Phil. 472; In re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500).

(3) The contention that the national law of the deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art.
1039) should be disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in effect states that
our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is WRONG,
firstly because Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 are special provisions, while Art.
17, par. 3 is merely a general provision; and secondly, because Congress deleted
the phrase notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article
when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change, the second paragraph of Art. 10
of the old Civil Code as Art.16 in the new. It must have been its purpose to make
the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself, which must be
applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It
is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in

our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals.

(4) It has been pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent executed two wills
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedents intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it will

NOT ALTER the law, for as this Court rules in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870,
a provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with the Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.

8. GLOBE MCKAY VS. CA


176 SCRA 778

Facts:

On

November

10,

1972,

private

respondent

Restituto
Tobias,

purchasing

agent

and

administrative

assistant

to

the

engineering
operations

manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which


caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He
reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice
President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told
Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When
Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a
swindler, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his
handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners
hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie

detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators
and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias.

Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal
cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in


January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic
Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that
Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil
case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive
acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge
Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering
petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's
fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held:

Yes. In the case at bar, SC invoked Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code
provided as follows:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.

While Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations
and for the maintenance of social order, Article 21 provides for the remedy on the
action for damages.

The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file
a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful
remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as against
Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that
Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six
criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that
petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and
cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the
pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code and by such, it gives
Tobias the right to recover damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

9. PNB VS. CA 83 SCRA 236

Principles: Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The afore-cited provisions on
human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

FACTS: Philamgen executed a bond, with defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio in favour of PNB
San Fernando Branch in the amount of P2,000 to guarantee the payment of Tapnios
account on said bank. In turn, to guarantee the payment of whatever amount the
bonding company would pay to the Philippine National Bank, both defendants executed
the indemnity agreement. Under the terms and conditions of this indemnity
agreement, whatever amount the plaintiff would pay would earn interest at the rate

of 12% per annum, plus attorney's fees in the amount of 15 % of the whole amount
due in case of court litigation.

It is not disputed that defendant was indebted to PNB San Fernando in the amount of
P2,000 plus accumulated interests. Despite the banks series of demands, Tapnio
failed to pay her debts. Defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio admitted all the foregoing
facts. She claims, however, when demand was made upon her by plaintiff for her to
pay her debt to the Bank, that she told the Plaintiff that she did not consider
herself to be indebted to the Bank at all because she had an agreement with one
Jacobo-Nazon whereby she had leased to the latter her unused export sugar quota for
the 1956-1957 agricultural year, consisting of 1,000 piculs at the rate of P2.80
per picul, or for a total of P2,800.00, which was already in excess of her
obligation guaranteed by plaintiff's bond.

This lease agreement, according to her, was with the knowledge of the bank. But the
Bank has placed obstacles to the consummation of the lease, and the delay caused by
said obstacles forced 'Nazon to rescind the lease contract. Thus, Rita Gueco Tapnio
filed her third-party complaint against the Bank to recover from the latter any and
all sums of money which may be adjudged against her and in favor of the plaitiff
plus moral damages, attorney's fees and costs.

At the time of the agreement, Mrs. Tapnio was indebted to the Philippine National
Bank at San Fernando, Pampanga. Her indebtedness was known as a crop loan and was
secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her sugar quota allocation for
the agricultural year corresponding to said standing crop. This arrangement was
necessary in order that when Mrs. Tapnio harvests, the P.N.B., having a lien on the
crop, may effectively enforce collection against her. Her sugar cannot be exported
without sugar quota allotment Sometimes, however, a planter harvest less sugar than
her quota, so her excess quota is utilized by another who pays her for its use.
This is the arrangement entered into between Mrs. Tapnio and Mr. Tuazon regarding
the former's excess quota for 1956-1957.

Tuazon informed the bank that he be notified as to when the bank needs the money so
he can execute a promissory note. The manager of the San Fernando branch forwarded
his recommendation to VP JV Buenaventura and the Board of the PNB for approval of
the loan of Tapnio. The board recommended to increase the quota to P3.00 per piculs
not P2.00 to which Tuazon asked for reconsideration but the left the request
unacted considering that the prevailing price was P3.00 per picul.

Tuazon later wrote to the bank that he is rescinding the contract and thus leaving
Tacnio losing P2,800 which she could have received from Tuazon to pay for her
indebtedness to the bank.

Philamgen filed a collection case against Tapnio for the bond it paid to the PNB.
Tapnio in turn filed a third-party complaint against PNB on the ground that
Tapnios failure to pay was due to the fault or negligence of the Bank. PNB argued
that it was
not negligent because under its
charter and provisions of Corporation
Code, it is
authoprized

to approve

or disapprove loans and in

the rent of
P3.00 per piculs, it was guided

fixing the

rate

of

by statistics based on the prevailing


rate.

TC ruled that the rescission of the contract of Tuazon was due to the banks
unjustified refusal to approve said contract. CA affirmed the decision of the TC.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Was the bank negligent?

HELD: YES

It has been clearly shown that when the Branch Manager of petitioner required the
parties to raise the consideration of the lease from P2.50 to P2.80 per picul, or a
total of P2,800-00, they readily agreed. Hence, in his letter to the Branch Manager
of the Bank on August 10, 1956, Tuazon informed him that the minimum lease rental
of P2.80 per picul was acceptable to him and that he even offered to use the loan
secured by him from petitioner to pay in full the sum of P2,800.00 which was the
total consideration of the lease. This arrangement was not only satisfactory to the
Branch Manager but it was also approves by Vice-President J. V. Buenaventura of the
PNB. Under that arrangement, Rita Gueco Tapnio could have realized the amount of
P2,800.00, which was more than enough to pay the balance of her indebtedness to the
Bank which was secured by the bond of Philamgen.

There is no question that Tapnio's failure to utilize her sugar quota for the crop
year 1956-1957 was due to the disapproval of the lease by the Board of Directors of
petitioner. The issue, therefore, is whether or not petitioner is liable for the
damage caused.

"The fact that there were isolated transactions wherein the consideration for the
lease was P3.00 a picul", according to the trial court, "does not necessarily mean
that there are always ready takers of said price. " The unreasonableness of the
position adopted by the petitioner's Board of Directors is shown by the fact that
the difference between the amount of P2.80 per picul offered by Tuazon and the
P3.00 per picul demanded by the Board amounted only to a total sum of P200.00.
Considering that all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the Bank were secured
by chattel mortgage on standing crops, assignment of leasehold rights and interests
on her properties, and surety bonds and that she had apparently "the means to pay
her obligation to the Bank, as shown by the fact that she has been granted several
sugar crop loans of the total value of almost P80,000.00 for the agricultural years
from 1952 to 1956", there was no reasonable basis for the Board of Directors of
petitioner to have rejected the lease agreement because of a measly sum of P200.00.

While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the


proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly
cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest
of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar
quota. The law makes it imperative that every person "must in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith, This petitioner failed to do.

Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its
disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar
quota in question. In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and
vigilance which the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is
consequently liable for the damages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21
of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage." The afore-cited provisions on human relations were
intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts,
because "generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a principal or
master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the
principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant
or agent be a natural or artificial person. All of the authorities agree that a
principal or master is liable for every tort which he expressly directs or
authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person, A
corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an
officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or
members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing body."

Decision of CA is affirmed.

10. LAGUNZAD VS. GONZALES 92 SCRA 476

Principle: Art 26 of the NCC, every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbours and other persons

FACTS: Manuel Lagunzad had produced a film based on the life of Moises Padilla
Story. The film was based on the book written by Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.
entitled, The Long Dark Night in Negros the rights of which was bought by

Lagunzad in the amount of P2,000.00.

The book narrates the death of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty canididate under
Nacionalista Party [a minority party] against Gov Rafael Lacson of Liberal Party,
he and his men were tried and convicted in the People v Lacson, et al case. In the
book, Moises Padilla was portrayed a martyr.

Although the movie portrayed the public life of Mosises Padilla, there were scenes
which touch the private life of Moises and the mother Gonzalesa scene whom
Gonzales had relationship with Auring. Prior to the scheduled Premiere Showing of
the film, the half-sister of Moises called the petitioner expressing her objections
to some scenes and called the movie as exploitation of Moises life. In writing,
Gonzales demanded that the film be changed and some scenes be deleted. Since
Lagunzad had spent so much for the completion of the
film,
he agreed to
enter into
a licensing agreement with Gonzales.

In

the

agreement,

it

was

stipulated

that

Laginzad

will
pay

Gonzales

P20,000.00

which will be paid in three instalments but P5,000 will be advanced and 2 & % of
the gross income as royalty. For failure of Lagunzad to pay the agreed amount,
Gonzales brought a collection case against him.

Lagunzad averred that the contract be declared null and void on the ground that he
signed the agreement under duress since he was only forced to concede to the
agreement when Gonzales threatened him that she will call a press conference and
tell the media that the movie was inaccurate. Gonzales argued that the film pryed
the privacy of her family and as such Lagunzad is liable for damages.

The trial court ordered Lagunzad to pay. CA affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE: WON the film violates Art 26 of the NCC

HELD:

YES. The film was disrespectful to the dignity and privacy of the defendant.

Neither

do

we

agree

with

petitioner's

submission

that

the

Licensing

Agreement

is

null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause
or
consideration.
While
it

is

true

that

petitioner

had

purchased

the

rights

to

the
book

entitled

"The

Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's
life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler
v. Curtis, 14 "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person
to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to
protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased."

Petitioner's averment that private respondent did not have any property right over
the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well
taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a
person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate
public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a
person,
no
matter how public
a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while

it

is

true
that

petitioner

exerted

efforts

to

present

true-to-life

story

of

Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film
because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.

We also find it difficult to sustain petitioner's posture that his consent to the
Licensing Agreement was procured thru duress, intimidation and undue influence
exerted on him by private respondent and her daughters at a time when he had
exhausted his financial resources, the premiere showing of the picture was
imminent, and "time was of the essence.

As held in Martinez vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, it is necessary to distinguish


between real duress and the motive which is present when one gives his consent

reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it
against his own wish and desires, or even against his better judgment.

In

legal

effect,

contracting

there

parties

is

no

exchanges

difference

one

between

condition

contract

wherein

for

another

because

one

of

he

the

looks

for
greater profit or gain

by reason

of such change, and an

agreement wherein

one

of

the contracting parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In either
case, he makes a choice free and untramelled and must accordingly abide by it. The
Licensing Agreement has the force of law between the contracting parties and since
its provisions are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy (Art. 1306, Civil Code), petitioner Should comply with it in good
faith.

Wherefore, petition is denied. Decision of TC and CA are affirmed.

11. AYER PRODUCTION VS. CAPULONG 160 SCRA 861

Facts:

Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company,
Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), envisioned for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release the histolic peaceful struggle
of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue).

The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact ment of the events that
made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour miniseries television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four (4)
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background.

Private respondent Enrile replied to a letter asking for permission to air the
movie that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of
his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in
the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar
film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be
made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal
to them.

It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private
respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to
film the projected motion picture.

Private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary Restraining


Order seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day
Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series
without private respondent's consent and over his objection constitutes an obvious
violation of his right of privacy.

The trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing
the application for preliminary injunction.

Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for
Preliminary Injunction contending that the mini-series film would not involve the
private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary
injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression.

Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of
cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.

Respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion
picture "The Four Day Revolution constitutes an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy."

Ruling:

No, the production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture

"The Four Day Revolution does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy" due to the following reasons:

The subject mater, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the
private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.

Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily
including at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography,
more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day
Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce
Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played
by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change
of government in February 1986.

The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the
proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably
necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account.

Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The
Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or that of
any member of his family.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public
concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was
what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:"

A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or
mode of living, or by adopting a profession

or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs,
and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a
celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved
some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an
actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment.

Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight to
privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscriminately, in the decisions"
that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when
they received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public,
and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press
had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have
become legitimate matters of public interest. On one or another of these grounds,
and sometimes all, it was held that there

was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to matters


legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused.

Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be
applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different
conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the
projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances
of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of
privacy."

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be
marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be
fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other
words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation
of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. There must, further, be no
presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly
no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. The proposed motion
picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad
referred to as "matters of essentially private concern." To the extent that "The
Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private
respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such
portrayal may be carried out even

WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order dated
16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is hereby SET ASIDE.

12. MENDOZA VS. ALCALA 2 SCRA 1032

FACTS:

"Extinction of penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist."

Prior to September 12, 1965, in Criminal Case No. 3219, plaintiff, Gaudencio T.
Mendoza, filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija

charging the defendant, Maximo M. Alcala, with the crime of estafa predicated upon
a receipt. The court eventually acquitted Alcala of the offense charged with the
findings that prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant
had in fact represented to Gaudencio T. Mendoza that he had 100 cavans of palay
stored in his sister's bodega, which he offered to sell for P1,100.00.

The Court cannot believe that Gaudencio T. Mendoza would pay to the defendant the
sum of P1,100.00 on the mere representation of the defendant that the palay was in
the bodega of his sister, and on his request to pay him first as he was going to
Manila. In the first place, there is no showing why the defendant was in urgent
need of P1,100.00. Defendant also testified that he had no palay and had no land
from which to raise that palay, which matter should be known by Mendoza as they had
known each other for a long time and were even friends.

However, the Court does not expressly pass upon the defense that the receipt signed
by him arose from a usurious loan, as there is sufficient evidence to warrant a
finding that there had been no deceit or misrepresentation and that the receipt is
not what it purports to be. Any obligation which the defendant may have incurred in
favor of Gaudencio T. Mendoza is purely civil in character and not criminal.

On December 16, 1954, while said criminal case was still pending, the plaintiff
filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the complaint by
which this case was initiated. That complaint was based on the very same receipt
upon which the criminal action was predicated, and in it plaintiff, after alleging
violation of the terms of said receipt, asked for judgment against the defendant
for the sum of P1,100.00, with legal interest from September 5, 1953 until full
payment plus P550.00 for damages, P300.00 for attorney's fees, and the costs of

suit. Defendant in his answer contented that effect that the transaction
referred
to in the complaint was a usurious loan in
the sum of P500.00, and that
the same
had already been paid in full, and filed for
counterclaim for damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant could still be prosecuted for the collection of
the amount stated in the said receipt after he had been acquitted by the Court on a
charge of estafa based on the said receipt.

RULING:

YES

The pertinent provisions of law are Article 29 of the new Civil Code and Rule 107,
Section 1, Subsection (d) of the Rules of Court. Article 29 of the new Civil Code
provides:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground. A judgment of acquittal does not constitute a bar to a subsequent civil
action involving the same subject matter, even in regard to a civil action brought
against the defendant by the State, nor is it evidence of his innocence in such

action, and is not admissible in evidence to prove that he was not guilty of the
crime with which he was charged.

The declaration in the decision in Criminal Case No. 3219 to the effect that "any
obligation which the defendant may have incurred in favor of Gaudencio T. Mendoza
is purely civil in character, and not criminal," amounts to a reservation of the

civil

action

offended

in

party,

favor

of

Philippine

the
National

Bank

vs.

Catipon, supra, and the offense


charged

in said criminal

case being estafa,

which

is fraud, the present action falls under the exception to the general rule and it
can be filed independently of the criminal action. (Article 33, new Civil Code;
Dianeta vs. Makasiar, 55 O.G. 10273; People vs. Balagtas, 51 O.G. 5714.)

13. MENDOZA VS. ARRIETA 91 SCRA 113

FACTS:On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way
vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a
Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by
respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent
Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. Two separate Informations for
Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar
and Freddie Montoya. The action against the truck-driver Montoya was for causing
damage to the jeep owned by Salazar. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar was
for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner. The trial Court finds the
accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. On the other hand, accused Rodolfo Salazar is
hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged with costs de oficio, and his bond is
ordered canceled. Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any
liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between
Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped
from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Thereafter, another case was filed
against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being
the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for
the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their
vehicles.

Issue:

Whether or not the driver of the jeep(salazar) shall be held liable on damages
ensued to the vehicle of the petitioner after acquittal of the driver on the
criminal charged upon him.

Held: Jeep Owner driver Salazar was acquitted in Criminal Case. Considering that
the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and
driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by
the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, the accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held

able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. The circumstances
attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to
base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and
not on culpa aquiliana. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-ownerdriver Salazar in the criminal case where, "the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished as
well. And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the
judgment

in

criminal

case

that

acquittal

was

not

based

the

upon

reasonable

doubt,

consequently,
for

damages

longer

Salazar's

a
can

civil

action

no

be

instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil code.

14. REPUBLIC VS. BELLO 120 SCRA 203

Facts:

Private respondent Romeo Arceno was charged with the crime of malversation of public
funds in the amount of P6,619.34 which he supposedly failed to produce or to make
proper accounting thereof after repeated demands. A decision was rendered acquitting
the accused due to insufficiency of evidence to establish his beyond reasonable
doubt.

After the acquittal, the Provincial Fiscal filed Civil Case No. V-3339 for the
recovery of the total sum of P13,790.71 which represented the accountability of
Arceo

due

to

his

failure

immediately

deposit

said

with

the

funds
said

funds

the

to

National

issue

official

Treasury,

and

receipts

instead

and

to

spent

or

disbursed
them without complying with the requirements applicable to disbursements
of public
funds, with intent to defraud the government.

A motion to dismissed was filed by the private respondent on the ground that
petitioner has no cause of action. This was granted by the public respondent.

Hence, this appeal. Petitioner maintains that the decision in the criminal case does
not contain any declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.

Issue:

Whether or not the judgment rendered in the criminal case acquitting the accused is
a bar to the recovery of the petitioner of civil liability against the private
respondent.

Ruling:

No. The dispositive portion of the decision in the criminal case did not state that
the facts upon which his responsibility as an accountable officer is based were nonexistent.

The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from
the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil
action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the
criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the
commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where,
as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds
in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said

funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he


shall spend
the same
for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a
manner not
permitted
by applicable rules and regulations.

15. PADILLA VS. CA


129 SCRA 558

NOTES: This case explains the provision of Article 29 - where the judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which civil might arise did not exist.
Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases, where the court expressly declares that the civil liability of the accused is
not criminal but only civil in nature.

FACTS:

Petitioners, in this case, were accused of grave coercion by Antonio Vergara and
his family for destroying their stall in the market. Petitioners which involved a
mayor and policemen contend that removal of complainants market stall was pursuant
to the enacted municipal ordinance which gives the town mayor the power to order
the clearance of market stall as it was considered nuisance per se. Lower court
found the petitioners guilty of grave coercion beyond reasonable doubt and imposed
the payment of actual, moral, compensatory and exemplary damages. Petitioners
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals modified the lower courts
judgment acquitting the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion since the facts
showed that what they committed was not grave coercion but some other crime such as
malicious mischief or threat. However, Court of Appeals ordered them to pay the
actual damages. Petitioners filed a special civil action contending that their
acquittal as to criminal liability results to the extinguishment of civil
liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court erred in requiring petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them of the criminal charge

HELD:

What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy What Article 29 clearly
and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been
acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for
damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The
Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement
that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering
damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a


judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action.
The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the
criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless
there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not
exist.

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be


established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party
may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and
review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at
this time a separate civil action to be filed.

16. MAXIMO VS. GEROCHI 144 SCRA 326

FACTS:
Panghilason

was

charged

with

estafa

before

the

Circuit

Criminal

Court

of

Bacolod for issuing checks which were dishonored for lack of funds or that her
account with said bank had been closed and that she refused to make the necessary
deposit.

Respondent judge dismissed the case on the ground of prosecution's failure to establish her guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that if accused had any

obligation, it is simply civil in nature that could be properly ventilated within


the context of civil law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying "that the portion of the decision
regarding the civil liability of the accused be reconsidered."

MR was denied, notwithstanding admission of the accused of her obligation to pay the
specific amount to petitioner. Judge said, "this recovery of civil

liability is deemed included in the offense proved, but the question is not
indubitable because the accused was acquitted in all the four (4) informations she
was charged of."
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not civil liability of the accused is deemed absolved upon his
acquittal in criminal case.

HELD: Lower court is wrong.

If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability


arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment.

"Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil
damages already proved in the same case without need for a separate civil action."
- Padilla v. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 558)

Rationale of the rule: To require a separate civil action simply because the
accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant less of time, effort, and money on
the part of all concerned.

(Art. 29 of NCC states, "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on


the ground that his guilt has not proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action
for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted...")

17. SAPIERA VS. CA 314 SCRA 370

Facts: On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased


from Monnico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with
checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed at the back by the
petitioner.

When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawers account
was already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De Guzman and petitioner
about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4)
charges of estafa were filed against petitioner but consequently she was acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence but the court a quo did not rule on whether she could
be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. On
appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the
remaining P210, P150. After deducting the amount already collected by the latter as
civil indemnity in the criminal cases against De Guzman. Hence, this instant
petition.

Issue:
Can

petitioner

required
to

to

pay

be
civil

indemnity

private

respondent
after
trial
court
had
acquitted
her
of
criminal
charges?

Held: Yes. It is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by De Guzman were
signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be

bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof. The NIL
clearly provides Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. --- Where
the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the

following

rules

of

construction

apply:

clear

in

what

(f)

Where

signature

is

so
placed
upon
the

instrument

that

it

is

not

capacity

the

person

making
the
same
intended
to
sign,
he
is
deemed
an
indorser.
x
x
x

The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil
liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a
declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise
did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly
liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should
be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the
complainant.

18. ESCUETA VS. FANDIALAN 61 SCRA 278

Facts: On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased


from Monnico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with
checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed at the back by the
petitioner.

When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawers account
was already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De Guzman and petitioner
about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4)
charges of estafa were filed against petitioner but consequently she was acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence but the court a quo did not rule on whether she could
be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. On
appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the
remaining P210, P150. After deducting the amount already collected by the latter as
civil indemnity in the criminal cases against De Guzman. Hence, this instant
petition.

Issue:
Can

petitioner

required
to

to

private

respondent
after
trial
court
had
acquitted
her
of
criminal
charges?

pay

be
civil

indemnity

Held: Yes. It is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by De Guzman were
signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be
bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof. The NIL
clearly provides Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. --- Where
the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the

following

rules

of

construction

apply:

clear

in

what

(f)

Where

signature

is

so
placed
upon
the

instrument

that

it

is

not

capacity

the

person

making
the
same
intended
to
sign,
he
is
deemed
an
indorser.
x
x
x

The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil
liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a
declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise
did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly
liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should
be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the
complainant.

19. MADEJA VS. CARO 126 SCRA 293

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar,
DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death
of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the
deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen
L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages."

The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon.

The respondent judge granted the defendants motion to dismiss stating that Rule
111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.

ISSUE: Whether or not an independent civil action for damages may be instituted
pending the resolution of a criminal case for physical injuries.

RULING:

YES, Article 33 of the Civil Code, expressly grants such right.

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery

of

civil

liability

arising

from

the

offense

charged
is
impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
reserves
his right

to

institute

it

separately;

and

after

criminal

action

has
been
commenced,

no

civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles
creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or
physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the
criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party;
the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not
given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or
suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil
action is thus independent of the result of the civil action."

20. MANIAGO VS. CA 253 SCRA 674

Facts:

Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in
transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City
proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his
buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private
respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries against
petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a civil case for damages was
filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner Maniago. Petitioner moved for
the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the
pendency of the criminal case against his driver and because no reservation of the
right to bring it (civil case) separately had been made in the criminal case. But
the lower court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil
Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action.

Issue:

whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may


nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following
provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

Held:

No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved
as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, 1
quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all
civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to
have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to
those which arise from the offense charged. In other words the right of the
injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal
action.

On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only

(1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of
the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or

(3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action
has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal
case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless
the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

21. RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORP. VS. PP 329 SCRA 600

FACTS:

A criminal charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Double Homicide and damage to


property was charged against Romeo Dunca de Tumol, in Isabela. The accused-driver
of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp, carrying a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of
beer grande, hit and bumped a Nissan Pick-up, along the National Highway of
Barangay Tagaran, causing damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the amount
of P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr. The offended parties (Rosario
P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a
reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising from the
offense charged.

The offended parties actually filed a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi
delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the
driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The private respondents
opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex
delicto they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private respondents
withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and
manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal
action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the
accused driver.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal
action against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by
the offended parties against the employer of the truck driver.

Whether or not the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case
despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver; and
in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property.

RULING:

NO. NO.

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to
enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail
himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.

In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the
part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil

liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit,
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
can not recover damages under both types of liability.

In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action
for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict,
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Here, the liability of the
employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary,
subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based
on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of
the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily
considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.

The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an
employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his
employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is
convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be
insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability
adjudged.

ISSUE NO. 1 :Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has
been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held
subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based

on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent
filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not
instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.

ISSUE NO. 2: With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal
case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was
waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil indemnity is not part of the
penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in

the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of
civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil
action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.

22. MERCED VS. HON. DIEZ 109 PHIL 155

FACTS:

Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with
Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her
relatives forced, threatened and intimated him into signing an affidavit to the
effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for over
five years, which is not true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in
securing their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage
license; that he was again forced, threatened and intimated by defendant and her
relatives into entering the marriage with her.

Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff


Abundio Merced. She denies the material allegations of the complaint and avers as
affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's
previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan.

Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance
until final termination of Civil Case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of the validity of the marriage in the
civil action for annulment is a prejudicial question insofar as the criminal action
for bigamy is concerned.

RULING:

YES. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto
of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the
element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613,
otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity cannot
ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for
annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for
bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy

does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is
necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage
contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.

The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial
question, because determination of the validity of the second marriage is
determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy.

23. LANDICHO VS. RELOVA 22 SCRA 731

FACTS:

Rolando Landicho was charged with the crime of Bigamy, for contracting second
marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia, being lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay. Fe
Lourdes Pasia, instituted the criminal case against Landicho, who in turn, filed a
third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the
first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be
declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her.

Landicho, moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on
the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil
suit, in which Judge Relova denied motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the
instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a
third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first
marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against
him.

RULING:

NO.

The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had
been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the
second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be
precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party
complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was
correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

24. GELUZ VS. CA 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in
1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present
husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from
her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she

was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less
than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied
by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to
the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three
met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus,
in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was
at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the
provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is
the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child?

HELD:

No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According
to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet
possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child
should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to

the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical
personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited
to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the
abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly
sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the
abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.

25. RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION VS. IAC 155 SCRA 712

FACTS:

Illustre Cabiliza was charged before the RTC of Legaspi with homicide and damage to
property through reckless imprudence because he had willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously driven the Izusu dump truck owned by Rufo Mauricio Construction. The
vehicle hit the Colt Gallant driven and owned by Judge Arsenio Solidum and directly
caused his untimely death.

Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal but his appeal did not pursue because he died. A
notice of death was filed by his counsel and on the same notice, Atty. Beltran
manifested Rufo Mauricios intention to proceed with the case on appeal pursuant to his
right as employer who is subsidiarily liable.

The lower court ordered the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to substitute him as
appeallant for the civil aspect of the case. On motion of the heirs of the victim, the
court ordered a writ of execution. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied because
Cabiliza was found insolvent as manifested by the Certificate of Insolvency issued by
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.

The victims widow filed a motion for the Issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution to
be enforced against the employer of Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio
Construction Co. This was granted by the lower court and which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, Rufo filed an appeal to SC.

ISSUE:

W/N, the dismissal of criminal case against the accused wipes out not only the
employees primarily civil liability but also the employers subsidiary liability;

W/N, the petitioner can be condemned to pay the damages without the opportunity to
examine the witness;

RULING:

No. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment
of conviction( which became final and executory ) extinguished his criminal liability
to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his
civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime, for here,
no crime was committed, the accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and
therefore still regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177,
Civil Code), as in this case.

The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver
(unless said employer can prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if
he can prove due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver).

Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in the criminal case, and
to grant him his day in court for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution
witnesses on their testimonies on the driver's alleged negligence and the amount of
damages to which the heirs of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any
evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his defense, the hearing on the motion
to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must be reopened precisely for the purpose
adverted to hereinabove.

The decision of the appeallate court was however, SET aside and the case was remanded
to the trial court for hearing.

26. PP VS. BAYOTAS 236 SCRA 239

Facts:

Rogelio Bayotas was charged with raped and eventually convicted thereof on June 19,
1991.

Pending appeal, he died due to cardio respiratory disease

SC

dismissed

the

criminal

aspect

of

the appeal

but

required

the

Sol

Gen

to

comment with regard to the civil liability arising from the commission of the offense
charged.

Sol Gen ruled that the death of the accused did not extinguish his civil liability, the
appeal should be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower
court

Counsel for the accused opposed arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his civil liability

Ruling:

Yes.

The death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities based solely on
the act complained of, i.e rape.

"The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

The claim for civil liability survives nothwithstanding the death of the accused if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligations other than delict. Art. 1157 of
the CC enumerates these other sources:

Law

Contracts

Quasi-Contractsa

Quasi-delicts

In this case, the civil action may be pursued only by filing a separate civil
action against the estate of the accused depending on the source.

27. MANSION BISCUIT CORP. VS. CA 250 SCRA 195

FACTS:

Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as the president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation


(the Company), ordered numerous cartons of nutri-wafer biscuits from Mansion
Biscuit Corporation.

As payment of the orders, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong,

president of Mansion, four (4) postdated checks as payment for the nutri-wafer
biscuits before its delivery.

There were other four (4) postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each,
issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as co-signor.

Subsequently, Mansion Biscuit delivered the goods. However, the first four checks
were deposited, the same were dishonored for insufficient funds prompting Ang Cho
to inform Ty Teck of the dishonor and requested him for its replacement.

Ty Teck failed to replace the dishonored checks, instead

delivered 1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion plus cash, which were applied
to the amount of the first postdated check that bounced

Ang Cho then sent Ty Teck a formal demand letter requesting him to make good the
dishonored checks within 5 days.
Thereafter, the second batch of checks was issued by Ty Teck and Siy Gui, but

these were later on dishonored again.


This prompted Ang Cho to send a final demand letter and upon failure to
comply with it, he will then file an action against Ty Teck.

For failure of Ty Teck to comply, an Information was filed against him for
violation of BP Blg. 22; identical information was likewise filed against Siy Gui
as treasurer of Edward Ty Brothers Corp.

Both of them pleaded not guilty to the charges and thereafter filed a bond.

Notwithstanding the bond filed, the RTC issued an order of attachment on some of Ty
Tecks real properties, upon Ang Chos motion.
After the prosecution rested its case, Ty Teck filed a motion to dismiss by w

ay of demurrer to evidence, which later on Siy Gui adopted, on the ground that the
checks were issued as a mere guaranty for the payment of the goods delivered and as
replacement for the first batch of checks. This was opposed by the prosecution.

The RTC issued an order granting the motion to dismiss claiming that the
stare decisis in the cases already decided involving the same issue is where the
check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an
obligation, whether pre-existing or not the drawer is not criminally liable for
either Estafa or Violation of BP Blg. 22, and found that Siy Guis liability had
not been established by the prosecution as it appeared that he had no personal
transactions with Ang Cho although he was a co-signatory in the second batch of
four checks

The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration and for clarification
withregard to their civil liabilities, which the RTC denied and held that they did
not incur any civil liability due to their acquittal.

Initially, Ang Cho filed a special civil action of certiorari with the CA to

question the order of the RTC setting aside the order of attachment, which the CA
annulled. But thereafter, he filed another appeal with the CA assailing the
decision of the RTC absolving Ty Teck and Siy Gui from civil liability in criminal
cases.

Pending appeal, Ty Teck died so his counsel filed a motion to dismiss but the CA
denied and ordered his substitution by his children.
The CA rendered a decision dismissing the appeal and held that the civil liab

ility sought to be enforced by Ang Cho was not the personal obligation of Ty Teck
but a contractual obligation of the Company, hence, Ang Cho should file a separate
civil action against it.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:

W/N civil liability can be enforced against Ty Teck for non-payment of the goods
notwithstanding the fact that the contract was between the Company, on behalf of Ty
Teck, and Mansion.

Ang Chos Argument: When Ty Teck issued the worthless checks inducing Mansion to
deliver the goods, 2 civil liabilities arose, arising from crime (Art. 100, RPC)and
from tort or quasi-delict.

Ty Tecks Argument: They cannot be held liable for the Companys contractual
obligations and that Ang Cho should file a separate case against it.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:

TY TECK AND SIY GUI ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL LIABILITIES ARISING FROM THE
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY THEY ARE REPRESENTING AS IT IS NOT THEIR
PERSONAL LIABILITY.

The civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by


Mansion Biscuit to the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against Ty
Teck because the said civil liability was not his personal liability to Mansion
Biscuit Corporation, rather, it was the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers
Corporation, of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit Corporation

As held by the Court of Appeals:

Assuming that plaintiff-appellant has basis for his quasi-delict claim, the same
must be addressed still against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation

for the established facts show that the post-dated checks were
appellee not in payment of his personal obligations but of the
Moreover the fraud allegedly committed by accused-appellee was
the contractual obligation, not an independent act which could

issued by accusedcorporation's.
merely incidental to
serve as a source of

obligation. The cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, to illustrate that the


existence of a contract does not preclude an action on quasi-delict where the act
that breaks the contract constitutes a quasi-delict, have no application because
the acts complained of therein were performed to break an existing contract,
whereas the alleged fraud herein was committed at the time of the creation of the

contractual relationship and as an incident thereof.

o
In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished
both their criminal and civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting
them that the issuance of the checks in question did not constitute a violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.Consequently, no civil liability arising from the alleged delict may
be awarded

Judgment appealed from AFFIRMED in toto.

28. PP VS. SANTIAGO 51 PHIL 68

Facts:

Felicita Masilang, aged 18, was the appellant's niece. After the appellant raped
her, he then conducted the girl to the house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who
later brought a protestant minister who conducted a ceremony to marry the appellant
and Felicita. The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as

above stated, and the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant
hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his act.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage ceremony was valid.

Held:

The manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the marriage, as well
as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife, and the
ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress.

The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no
impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.

Affirmed.

29. NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY 259 SCRA 129

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on
two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and
ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja

on

September

that

the

marriage
merely

27,

groom
with

Ida

separated.

1994
has

despite

was

knowledge

subsisting

Penaranda
It

the

and

told

that
that

they

are

Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for
almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy

Sumaylo

and

Gemma

G.

del

Rosario

outside

his

courts

jurisdiction

on

October

27,

1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said
wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous
there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter
was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided in the
Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the
written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of
the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however,
Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.

PP VS. DAVID 13 CA REP. 495

DE LORIA VS. FELIX 104 SCRA 1 Facts:

Fact appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons
lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired
properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and
surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition,
two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen
Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and persuaded her to go to confession.

They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter,
upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without
benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the
rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the
bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of
Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in
articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or
witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.

After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be
denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista
performing the burial ceremonies.

On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to
compel defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the
deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim
to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted
the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in
the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and
dismissed the complaint.

Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the
legal question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief
whether the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the
law, a valid and binding marriage.

Issue: W/N the marriage was celebrated in Articulo Mortis?

Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause
for nullity?

Ruling:

Yes. There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize


marriage. There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract
marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."

The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it
requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the
data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically
substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is
not voidable (under Act 3613) this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of
such affidavit.

In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates
the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not
one of them.

In
for

the

second

place,

bearing

in

mind

that

the

"essential

requisites

marriage

are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent"
(section 1),

the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife" which in this case actually occurred

In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the
parties copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its
omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is
executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple
in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had
been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its
environs.

32. MARTINEZ VS. TAN 12 PHIL 731

Facts:

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the
peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did
not constitute a legal marriage.Lower court ruled ruled in favor of the defendant
Angel Tan that Tan and Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence supporting
this were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of defendant that he and
plaintiff appeared before the justice of peace along with their witnesses (by
Ballori and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that he, the defendant, plaintiff and
Ballori appeared before the justice of peace and signed the document, the testimony
of Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and the testimony of the bailiff
of court that defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two witnesses were all
present during the ceremony.

Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of
September, 1907, before the justice of the peace

Held:

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is
affirmed.

The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that
they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to
solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and
the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice,
the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A
mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed
by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that
the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of
the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the
contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the
admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified
to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties

mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said
document which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same.
It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write
the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they
signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so
hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.

33. SANTOS VS. CA 240 SCRA 20

Article 36: Psychological Incapacity

FACTS:

Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got
married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in
1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias
parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to,
among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias
parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels
opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return
home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be
in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to
locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife
come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity.
Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate
with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia
attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The
prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels
petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define
the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law.
But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the
provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to
allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church

tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological
incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC

also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

In

the

Leouel

case

at

stands

bar,

although

aggrieved,

his

dismissed because the alleged


of

his

wife

is not

petition

must

be

PI

clearly shown

by the factual

settings
presented.
settings

do

The
not

factual
come

close

to

to

the

standard

required
to decree a nullity of marriage.

34. GOMEZ VS. LIPANA 33 SCRA 615

FACTS: The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the


first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in
1935. At the time of the second marriage the first was still subsisting, which
fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.

The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the Register
of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February 1, 1944, in the name of "Joaquin
Lipana married to Isidra Gomez." On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and
childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7,
1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present
suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husband's share in the Cubao property in
favor of the said estate.

The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the
husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted
provision and declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of
the estate of the deceased second wife.

ISSUES: WON the validity of marriage can be attacked collaterally

HELD: The controlling statute is Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the
Marriage Law which became effective on December 4, 1929 and was in force when the
two marriages were celebrated. The pertinent provisions are as follows:

SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless;

The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent
court.

SEC. 30. Annullable marriages. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) That the former husband or wife of either was living and the marriage with such
former husband or wife was then in force;

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity. The action to obtain a
decree of nullity of marriage, for causes mentioned in the preceding section, must
be commenced within the periods and by the parties as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b); by either party during the life of the
other, or by the former husband or wife.

xxx xxx xxx

The appellant, relying on Section 30(b) quoted above, maintains that his marriage
to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in an action for that purpose,
which in the light of Section 31 could be filed only by either party thereto,
during the lifetime of the other, or by the former spouse.

However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in this case,


particularly the first paragraph thereof, which says that "any marriage contracted

by

any

person
with
any

person

during

the

lifetime

of

the

first

spouse

of

such

person

other

than

such

first

spouse

shall

be

illegal

and

void
from
its

performance." This is the general rule, to which the only exceptions are those
mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of the same provision.

There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto
Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and
there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section

(b). The burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under
it; and the defendant has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever
having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage
less than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was
then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.

35. REPUBLIC VS. CA 268 SCRA 198

Facts:

Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and
gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency
to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is
separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of


her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own
testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the

Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence
as

he

1991,

appeared
the

only

during

the

pre-trial

conference.

On

14

May

trial

court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor


General appealed

to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in
toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue:

Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological


incapacity

Held:

The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and
family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity,
existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by

gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no


clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but
appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at
the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the
essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order
the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed
decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.

36.

CHI MING TSOI VS. CA 266 SCRA 344

FACTS:

Private respondent Gina Lao and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila

Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were
to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and
fourth night.

From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on
the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them.

A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet
homosexual and that she had observed him using an eyebrow and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother.

The parties submitted themselves to physical examination and it was revealed that
Gina was still a virgin. Chi Ming was also found to be capable of erection.
Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made but according to him, he
did not want the marriage annulled because he loves her very much.

After the trial, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void ab
initio. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, Chi Ming Tsoi elevated the matter before SC.

ISSUE:

Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a


psychological incapacity ?

HELD: Yes!

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with
his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,

observe

mutual

therefor

is

love,

actually

respect

the

and

fidelity.

spontaneous,

(Art.

mutual

68,

affection

Family

Code),

between

the

husband

sanction

and

wife

and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with

another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is

to

say

could

not

have

cared

less.

This

is

so

because

an

ungiven

self

is

an

unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is

sexual

gift

intimacy

and

which

brings

participation

in

spouses

the

wholeness

mystery

and

of

oneness.

creation.

It

Sexual

is

intimacy

function

is

which

enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

37. CHOA VS. BELDIA GR. NO. 120582, MAY 17, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this
union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan.

I (Taken from G.R. No. 120582. May 17, 1999)

In 1991, petitioner Leni Choa initiated a case for concubinage against her husband,
Alfonso Choa, in the MTCC, Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case NO. 49106.

In March 1994, when the promulgation of the decision was about to take place,
Alfonso filed with the RTC, Bacolod City, a complaint for annulment of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Thus, Alfonso filed with the MTCC a motion in an
order dated March 23, 1994. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, on June 22, 1994, he filed with the RTC, Bacolod City, a petition for
certiorari with injunction against the trial court. On July 13, 1994, the RTC
issued a restraining order, and denied Leni Choa's motion for intervention.

II (Taken from G.R. No. 143376.

November 26, 2002)

The case went to trial with respondent husband presenting his evidence in chief.
After his last witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits.
Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner wife filed a Motion to Dismiss
(Demurrer to Evidence). The RTC denied petitioners Demurrer to Evidence and held
that [respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must
controvert.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get
along with each other. The testimony of respondent husband basically complains
about three aspects of petitioners (wifes) personality; namely, her alleged (1)
lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an

intention of procreative sexuality.

Issue:

I (For G.R. No. 120582. May 17, 1999)

Whether or not it is proper to suspend the promulgation of judgment in the


concubinage case due to a prejudicial question, annulment of marriage.

II (Taken from G.R. No. 143376.

November 26, 2002)

Whether or not psychological incapacity

of the wife has been satisfactorily

proven.

Ruling:

I (For G.R. No. 120582. May 17, 1999)

Yes, it is proper to suspend the promulgation of judgment in the concubinage case


due to a prejudicial question, annulment of marriage.

A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a civil


action and a criminal action are both pending and there exist in the former an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue in the civil action resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

The prejudicial question is the issue raised in the civil case for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Under this article, a marriage was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the marital obligations of marriage. True enough, the nullity of
marriage between petitioner and private respondent brings about two things: One,
there is no marriage at all; Two, there is no ground to convict Alfonso Choa of
concubinage because one element of the crime is not attendant, that is, the man
must be married at the time of its commission.

II (For G.R. No. 143376.

November 26, 2002)

No, the psychological incapacity


proven.

of

the

wife

has

not

been

satisfactorily

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his
wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the
gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their
marital union.

Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity


was grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. In Molina case, the Supreme Court affirmed that

mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional


outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative


sexuality is easily belied by the fact that two children were born during their
union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect already
existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert


testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly
failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true,

was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it


was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Hence demurrer to evidence was proper. Petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on alleged psychological incapacity is
denied.)

38. DOMINGO VS. CA 226 SCRA 572

Facts:

Delia Domingo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Roberto Domingo, on the ground that, unknown to her, he was previously married at
the time of their marriage. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void
and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties
she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.

Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab
initio, the petition for declaration of nullity is unnecessary citing People v.
Aragon and People v. Mendoza. Roberto claims that declaration of nullity is
necessary under Article 40 of the Family Code is only for the purpose of
remarriage. The lower court denied the motion. CA affirmed the denial. Hence, this
petition

Issues:

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary.


If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of
remarriage; and

Whether

or

not

herein

petition

is

the

proper

remedy

of

private

respondent

recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her


exclusively.

HELD:

to

1) Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly


required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriagebe
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The Declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 40 may be resorted to even


for a purpose other than remarriage. Crucial to the proper interpretation of
Article 40 is the position of the word "solely." xxx. As it is placed, it is meant
to qualify "final judgment." Had the provision been stated as follows: "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage...," the word "solely" will qualify "for purposes of remarriage" and the
husband would have been correct. The said article as finally formulated included
the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.

2) Yes. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and
the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." Private respondent's ultimate prayer
for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. The Family Code has

clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of


which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them.

39. AQUINO VS. DELIZO 109 PHIL 21

FACTS:

Fernando Aquino, petitioner, was married to Conchita Delizo, defendant. Petitioner


filed a complaint on the ground of fraud alleging that defendant conceived a child
which was not his own. This means that defendant concealed the fact that she was
pregnant with another man and then got married to him. Only the plaintiff testified
and presented documentary evidence such birth certificate and affidavit of the
petitioners brother who admitted that he is the father of defendants child.
Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not concealing the pregnancy constitutes fraud

and

may

be

ground of annulment of marriage

HELD:

Yes. Under the new

Civil Code,

concealment by the wife

of the

fact that at

the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in
relation to Art. 86, par. (3).

In this case, it was alleged that defendant (wife) was only four months pregnant
and was naturally plump or fat, therefore, plaintiff (husband) would not be
expected to know by merely looking at her that she was pregnant at the time of
their marriage.

40. ANAYA VS. PALAROAN 36 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action
for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the

validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim.

counterclaim

was

being

negotiated,

Fernando

divulged

to

her

While the amount of

that

several

months

prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of

his.

According

constituted

fraud

to

in

her,

the

obtaining

non-divulgement

her

consent.

marriage with Fernando on such ground.

to

She

her

of

prayed

such

for

the

pre-marital

annulment

secret

of

her

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital

relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:

The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not

one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it

is

further

excluded

misrepresentation

annul a marriage.

or

by

deceit

the

as

to..

last

paragraph

chastity

shall

providing

give

ground

that

for

no

an

other

action

to

Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore

would not warrant an annulment of marriage.

41. TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA 56 SCRA 1

Facts:

On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his
marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was
obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he
discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no
sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not
live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration.

Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen
failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13,
1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of
his evidence.

In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in
default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines, referred the case to the City


Fiscal of Manila for investigation
to
the

determine
parties,

whether

collusion

directing

the

exists

between

City

Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof.

Assistant

City

Fiscal

Rafael

A.

Jose,

assigned

to

the

case,

issued

subpoena to

petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring


petitioner with him as well as copies
of

other

annulment

documents
case

on

in

connection

August

27,

1962

with

the

at

10:00 A.M. but petitioner failed to comply.

Issue:

Whether or not the decree of legal separation can be promulgated based on


petitioners evidence and without the appearance of his wife.

Held:

Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the
rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation

based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in


case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of
evidence for the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:

"ART. 88.No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation


of facts or by confession of judgment.

"In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101,


paragraph 2, shall be observed."

"ART. 101.No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of


facts or by confession of judgment.

"In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there
is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated."

The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact
that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as
much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public
have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social
institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated
evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses
the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for
this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to
direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the
integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.

42. JOCSON VS. ROBLES 22 SCRA 521

Facts:

Gloria Jocson commenced an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo
Robles on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage.

Allegedly, herein defendant contracted a previous marriage with a certain Josefina


Fausto which also filed a criminal complaint against herein defendant on the same
ground of bigamy.

Herein plaintiff asked for moral and exemplary damages and alleged that during
their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical abuse. On the otherhand,

defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage and argued that he was
compelled by force, threat and intimidation by the parents of the plaintiff.
Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that no genuine
issue of facts are involved in the case. To support this argument, defendant
presented affidavits executed by herein plaintiffs father and brother. On the date
set by the court, both parties did not appear in court.

The defendants motion was denied by the lower court on the ground that before
judgment can be had on the nullity of the marriage, proof that a previous marriage
was validly subsisting. In addition, the court found an indication that there was
collusion between the parties so as to get a declaration of nullity of marriage.
Hence this appeal by the defendant.

Issue:

Whether or not the affidavits are sufficient to render judgment and declaration of
nullity of marriage?

Held:

The higher court ruled that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the
motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.

43. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO 139 SCRA 139

FACTS: In 1972, petitioner, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent, a US


citizen got married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in
the Philippines; and, they begot two children. In 1982, the couples got divorced in
Nevada, United States and petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner claiming that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982.

The lower court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. Thus, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada is valid in the Philippine


jurisdiction.

Held: Yes, the divorce is valid. It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada has released private
respondent from the marriage based on the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.

To maintain that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. Petitioner should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

44. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355

Facts:

Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb.


As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On
left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified
against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground
entirely mental in character."

24, 1948, in Cebu City.


June 24, 1950, Escano
complaint for divorce
of "extreme cruelty,

On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On
September 13, 1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a
complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFICebu.

Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an
award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to
take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving
her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran).
This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court
below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts
plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory
negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection
involves the performance of a positive act.

Issues:

WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was
issued.

WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the
grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and
desertion of her husband.

Held:
1. YES

At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC.
Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce
but only provides for legal separation.

For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would
be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of
the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of
our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorce outside the Phils.

Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction.

2. YES

The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced
by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury
upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of
moral damages.

It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of


legal separation has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that
the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176)
expressly cited.

But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect
accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably
deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the
Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory,
there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of
breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations
physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and
factum".

45. PP VS. SENSANO 58 PHIL 73

Facts:

Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. After the birth
of their only child, the husband left his wife and was gone for three years without
writing to her or sending her support. While the husband was away, the wife began
to live with Marcelo Ramos. When husband returned, he filed a charge of adultery
which resulted in a conviction and a sentencing. When the sentence was completed,
wife begged the husband to take her back but he refused. Abandoned a second time,
the wife fled back to Ramos. Husband, knowing that his wife reverted to her lover,
did not do anything to assert his rights and left for the states. He returned to
the Philippines seven years later and presented a second charge of adultery.

Issue: WON the second charge of adultery can be a ground for legal separation.

Held/Ratio:

No. The husband was only assuming a mere pose of an offended spouse. He consented
to the adulterous relations of his wife and Ramos and is thus, therefore barred
from instituting any criminal proceeding. Even if he was still in a foreign
country, he would have still been able to take action against the accused but since
he didnt take this option, it showed a considerable lack of genuine interest as
the offended party.

46. BUGAYOG VS. GINEZ 100 PHIL 620

Facts:

Bugayong was a serviceman of the US Navy. He was married on 1949 to Ginez while on
furlough leave. Before he reported back to duty, they made arrangements as to where
the wife would stay. In July 1951, the husband received letters informing him of
his wifes infidelities. In Aug. 1952, he sought his wife and after finding her,
they lived together as husband and wife for two nights and one day. The night
after, they continued to live together but the next day, when he questioned her
about her illicit affairs, she deserted him. He took this as confirmation of her
infidelities. On November, he filed a complaint for legal separation. The court
ordered the dismissal of the action based on wifes motion to dismiss. He appealed
but the CA furthered the case, since it constituted questions of law, to the SC.

Issue:

WON the copulation which transpired after the husband knew about his wifes alleged
infidelities can be considered an act of condonation.

Held/Ratio:

Yes. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission of one party of a


matrimonial offense which the other party committed. According to American
jurisprudence, any cohabitation and sexual intercourse with the guilty party after
the commission for the offense and with knowledge of the offense will amount to
evidence of condonation. Resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of
condonation is inferred.

47. MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES 109 PHIL 789

Facts:

Matubis and Praxedes got married on 1943. The couple agreed to live separately on
1944. On April, 1948, the spouses entered into anagreement stating that both
relinquishtheir rights over each other as husband and wife, that both are free to
marry again, and that wife is no longer entitled to support. In Jan. 1955, the
husband cohabited with another woman and had a child with her. On April 1956, wife
alleged abandonment and concubinage subsequently filing a petition for legal
separation. RTC held that the acts constituted concubinage but dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue:
WON there was consent of the wife to her husbands concubinage.

Held/Ratio:

Yes. As seen in the agreement, there was an express condonation and consent granted
to the husband.

Having consented, the wife cannot claim legal separation and is undeserving of the
courts sympathy.

The petition was also filed after the prescriptive period. She came to know the
situation in Jan. 1955 but only instituted the complaint on April. 1956 more than
a year later.

48. CONTRERAS VS. MACARAIG 33 SCRA 222

Facts:

In Sept. 1962, family driver told Elena Contreras that her husband Macaraig was
living with another woman. She ailed to verify the rumor from her husband. In April
1963, she heard rumors that her husband was seen with another woman who was
pregnant. In May of the same year she once more failed to ascertain the veracity of
the allegations because she was afraid that it would precipitate a quarrel and
drive him away. However she finally found out about her husbands mistress and the
birth of the latters child. In December 1963, wife finally met with her husband
and pleaded him to give up his mistress and return to the conjugal home, assuring
him that all would be forgiven. He declined. In the same month, she filed suit for
legal separation but the case was dismissed because prescription had, according to
the court, already taken place from Sept. 1962 when she had found out about her
husbands illicit relationship from the family driver. The CA dismissed the
complaint because of prescription.

Issue:
WON the period of prescription is counted from Sept. 1962 or from December 1963.

Held/Ratio:

December 1963. This was the only time when she became truly cognizant of her
husbands infidelity. Hearsay information would not have been legally sufficient as
a basis for legal separation.

49. RAMOS-SOMOSA VS. VAMENTA 46 SCRA 11

FACTS:

Petitioner Lucy Samosa- Ramos filed for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage on the part of respondent Clement Ramos. She also sought for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injuction for the return of her
paraphernal exclusive porperty. The hearing on the motion was opposed by respondent
Ramos alleging that if the motion for P.I. were heard, the prospect of
reconciliation of the spouses would become even dim. Respondent Judge Vamonte,
thereafter, granted respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition.

Hence, the petition;

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Article 103 of the New Civil Code prohibiting the hearing for an
action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from filing of the
petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on the petition for
preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such suit.

RULING:

No.

The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain
passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from
hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court
that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to
be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal
language of such codal provision; that the law, however, remains cognizant of the
need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what
is set forth in the following article.

It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse
shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective

property.

The

husband

shall

continue

to

manage

the

conjugal

partnership
property
but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to
manage said
property,

in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian
and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in
accordance with the orders of the court." 2 There would appear to be then a
recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not
be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be
appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The
absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is
thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification
then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason
for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she
accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile
continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an
assertion that was not specifically denied by him.

What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, 3 thus possesses relevance:
"It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil
Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a
reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each

other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another,
and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate
reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative
policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the
determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite
according to the circumstance ... The law expressly enjoins that these should be
determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the
courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused." 4 At any
rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971,

more
than

six

months

certainly

had

elapsed.

Thus

there

can

be

no

more

impediment

for
the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction.

50.
ARANETA VS. CONCEPCION
99 PHIL 709

FACTS:
Petitioner filed action against his wife for legal sep ground: adultery

Defendant

filed

an

omnibus

petition

to

secure

custody

of

their

three

minor

children, a monthly support of P5000 for herself and said children and the return
of her passport to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and
molesting her as well as pay for attorneys fees

3) Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him and alleging that defendant has
abandoned the childrenconjugal properties were worth only P80,000 - contends
defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she has abandoned them
and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her

children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children to love,
respect and care of a true mother and w/o means to educate them

CFI: granted custody of the children to defendant and a monthly allowance of P2300
for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2000 as attorneys
fees; reconsideration denied

DECISION OF SC; Writ prayed for is ISSUED and the respondent judge or whosoever
takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support
pendent elite in accordance with this opinion. The ocurts order fixing the alimony
and requiring payment is REVERSED

RATIO:

main reason given by judge for refusing plaintiffs request that evidence be
allowed to be introduced: art 103 of CC6 months allowancecooling off period

provision of code is mandatorycourt understands that the introduction of any


evidence, be it on the merits of the case

or on any incident, is prohibitedstatus quo to be preserved for this time

it may be noted that since 6 mos have elapsed since the filing of the petition may
not be allowedreasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be given tat
the scope of the art cited may be explained

cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation

but this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy does not
have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the
custody of children and alimony and support pendent elite according to the
circumstances

the law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to
the circumstances, if these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual
facts, rank in justice may be caused

allegations

of

adultery

letter

of

authenticity

as

evidenceabandonment

of

conjugal abodeevidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that


the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendent elite may be
lawfully exercised

the rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory,
should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary

thus determination of custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided
it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period
evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of
children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency
of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for
their custody.

51. REYES VS. INES-LUCIANO 88 SCRA 803

FACTS:
January 18, 1958: Manuel J. C. Reyes and Celia Ilustre-Reyes got married.

They had children.

March 10, 1976: Manuel attacked Celia by fist blows, bumping her head against the
cement floor, pushing her down the 13-flight stairs, hitting her in the abdomen
that floored her half unconscious.

May 11, 1976: She left their office

May 26, 1976: She returned to get her overnight bag. Manuel demanded that she get out
but she ignored him. Hence, he doused her with grape juice, kicked her, attempted to hit
her with a steel tray but was stopped by her driver.

June 3, 1976: Celia filed the following petitions against Manuel: (1) Action for support pendente
lite; (2) Legal separation for the attempt to kill her.

Contentions of Manuel: Celia committed adultery with her physician. She is thus not
entitled to support and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the Court was
excessive.

ISSUE: Whether or not Celia is entitled to support pendent lite.

HELD: Yes.

Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support BUT only if proven. In
fact, adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat
the action. BUT it must be established by competent evidence and not merely
alleged. During hearing of the application for support pendente lite and for legal
separation, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation. YET Celia
asked for support pending litigation from their conjugal partnership and not
necessarily from Manuels private funds.

As to the determination of amount, Celia was unemployed and without funds. All
their conjugal properties, including corporations where Manuel is President,
Manager and Treasurer, are in the possession of Manuel.

Standard Mineral Products earning P85,654.61

Development and Technology Consultant Inc. earning P98,879.84

The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc.

iv. That these companies have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of
the Ministry of Public Highways

The amount was reduced from P5000 since their children are in the custody of
Manuel. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite, it is not
necessary to go fully into the merits of the case. It is sufficient that the court
ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it
to justly resolve the application, in view of the merely provisional character of
the resolution to be entered. mere affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for
support pendente lite.

LAPUZ SY VS. EUFEMIO 43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

August 18, 1953: Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufeimo S. Eufemio, alleging:

September 21, 1934: Civil Marriage September 30, 1934: Canon Marriage

Lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned Lapuz

No children

Lapuz found out Eufemio was cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949

Prayed for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived
of his share of the conjugal partnership of profits
Eufemios answer:

Declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz on the ground of


his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok

During pendency of case, Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969)

June 9, 1969: Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for legal separation on 2


grounds: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year
period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

June 26, 1969: Counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her
father, Macario

July 29, 1969: Court dismissed the case - Carmen Lapuzs cause of action has
not survived
Did not act on the motion for substitution

- Eufemio

acquiesced

dismissal

of

said

in

the

counterclaims

by

praying

for
the

affirmance

order

that

of

the

dismissed

not

only

the

petition

for
legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the EufemioLapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.

ISSUE:

WON death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action? If it does,
WON abatement also applies if the action involves property rights?

HELD:
(1) YES,
- action for legal separation is purely personal (1) made by innocent spouse
(2) can still stop proceedings if they reconcile
- the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself

(2) YES

solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they cannot
survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree

Art 106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the
spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death

rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation.

enumeration

of

the

actions

that

survive

for

or

against

administrators

in

Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do not enumerate actions
for legal separation or for annulment of marriage
- even actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease.

* the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one
of the parties involved questions of property are now carried out not in
nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate proceedings.

53. MACADANGDANG VS. CA 108 SCRA 314 FACTS:

Mejias is married to Anahaw

Majias allegedly had intercourse with Macadangdang sometime in March 1967

Due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967

October 30, 1967: Mejias gave birthday to a boy (Rolando Macadangdang)

April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Macadangdang

Macadangdang opposed claim and prayed for its dismissal

Court dismissed the complaint

CA reversed the judgment and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of


Antonio Macadangdang.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue
of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw;

Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child
without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be
heard.

HELD:

1. YES
The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following

the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged
separation between
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Mejias and Anahaw.

Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967,
the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born
prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month
pregnancy.

Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there


was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first
120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child

the fact remains

Physical impossibility:

impotence of husband; inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its


proper function

living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and


serious illness of the husband.

2. NO. Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy.

Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the
presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the
child is that of the husband

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife

PETITION GRANTED. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.


54. ARROYO VS.VASQUEZ 42 PHIL 54

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO

GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921

FACTS:

Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived
together as manand wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their
common home with the intention of living separate from her husband. Marianos
efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in vain. Thereafter,
Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and
live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and crosscomplaint that she had been compelled to leave because of the cruel treatment of
her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation be declared and the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance.
The trial judge, upon consideration

of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more
to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit
with each other.

HELD: NO.

It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of
course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction
the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to
compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium.

At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to
live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo
in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint;
though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore,
reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the
cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the
marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement
as to costs of either instance.

55. ATILANO VS. CHUA CHING BENG 103 PHIL 255

Facts:

Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married on May 1951 in Zamboanga City.
After their marriage, they went to Manila and live with Chua's parents. In
October 1951, the couple went to Zamboanga to visit Pilars parents. Chua
returned toManila with the understanding that Pilar would follow him, but she
did not.

In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging that they
have been living separately for two years due to constant fights and Chua's
inability to provide a home for themselves apart from his parents.

Chua
his

stated
wife

only
she

that

he

was

willing to

support

but

if
lives

in Manilawith
him.

He

establish

was

also

willing

to

conjugal
dwelling
separate from
his parents.

Meanwhile, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite. Based on a


stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment
granting the Pilars allowance after finding that the latter's refusal to
return was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of Chua after she
had experienced some previous in-law troubles.

Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the
court by receiving and maintaining Pilar at his residence in Pasay, which
was, apart, from that of his parents and that if the Pilar refuses, he will
not be compelled to remitallowance to her in Zamboanga.

His petition was denied, thus this case.

Issue:

Whether or not Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live with
Chua

Held:

The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the
husband, the husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to
support her and even expressing his willingness to abide by her wishes to have a
conjugal dwelling apart from his parents, although this might be financially
taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges that the Art. 111, CC
imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting his wide
and family but he insists that under Art.

209,

CC

he

is

given
the
option

to

fulfill
either

said
by

duty

paying

the allowance as
fixed
by
the Court
or by

receiving

maintaining

and

the

person entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his
obligation by the second means allowed by the law. The law affords moral and
legal obstacle as aground to compel husband to provide separate maintenance
for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws is not a valid moral and
legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing the
conjugal residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized
norm of morality.

Although the husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109),

and

that

the

wife

is

entitled

to
be

supported,

our
laws
contain
no provision compelling the wife to
live with her husband where even without
legal
justification

she

establishes

her
residence

apart

from
that
provided

for by the former, yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why
she should be allowed any support from the husband.

Judgment was modified. Chua was given the option of supporting his wife at
their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of his parents, and should Pilar
refuse to abide by the terms, then Chua would be relieved from the obligation
of giving any support.

56. SERRANO VS. SOLOMON 105 PHIL 998

FACTS:

On the same day but before their marriage ceremony, Melchor Solomon made a
donation to Alejandria Feliciano to the effect that if the latter will die
before him, one half of all his properties and those acquired by them will
be given to those who have reared Alejandria. Alejandria Feliciano, whose
father went to Hawaii to seek his fortune and who until now resides there,
had been left to her father's friend named Estanislao Serrano who took care
of and raised her from the age 12 until she reached womanhood. Less than nine

months after marriage, or rather on March 2, 1949, Alejandria died without


issue.

Several months thereafter Estanislao Serrano commenced the present action to


enforce and implement the terms of the alleged donation particularly that
portion thereof to the effect that if Alejandria died before her husband
Melchor and left no children, then one half of Melchor's properties and those
acquired by him and his wife would be given to those persons who had raised
and taken care of her namely, Estanislao Serrano.

Trial Court dismissed Serranos claim. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid donation propter nuptias.

HELD:

None.

The

donation

could

not
be
regarded

as

nuptias for

a
the

donation
reason

propter

that

though

it
was
executed

before

the

marriage,

it

was not made in consideration of the marriage and, what is more important,
that the donation was not made to one or both of the (marriage) contracting
parties, but to a third person.

Manresa, in his commentary on Article 1327 of the Civil Code says the
following:

Donations excluded are those (1) made in favor of the spouses after the

celebration
of
but

marriage;
not

other
the

in

(2)

executed

consideration

in
of

favor
the

of

the

marriage;

future
and

spouses

(3) granted

to

persons

than
spouses

even

though

they

may

be

founded

on

the

marriage (6
M. 232).

57. SUMBAD VS. CA

308 SCRA 575


Facts:

When Agata Tait (AT) died in 1936, her husband George Tait Sr. (GT), lived in
common-law relationship with Maria Tait to whom he donated land to in1974. George
died in 1977 and Maria died in 1988. The following year, Emilie Sumbad (ES) and
Beatrice Tait (BT)sought an action for quieting of title, nullification of the
deed of sale, and recovery of possession of damages by virtue of being compulsory
heirs of GTs first marriage to AT. They allege that Maria sold the lots included
in the property to Okoren, et. al., despite warning the respondents that Maria
was not the real owner of the property. Okoren et. al., private respondents in
the case, bought the property anyway on the strength of a Tax Declaration and
claim that since the issuance of said Tax Declaration was made thirty years after
the death of AT, Maria,

GTs second wife, did not need the consent of her GT or his heirs for the
sale. They also claim that the action is barred bylaches.RTC rendered

judgment in favor of respondents. CA affirmed with modifications, setting


aside the attorneys fees. From this, petitioners, Sumbad, et. al, appealed
claiming that the deed of donation issued in 1974 to Maria was void for the
following reasons which the SC debunked as follows:

Issues/Held/Ratio:

(1) it was a forgery crafted by one Raquel Tait, proof of such was eyewitness testimony of one Shirley Eillenger who claims that she saw Raquel and
her male board mates forge the signatures of GT and MT in a span of thirty
minutes. ->Aside from the impossibility of accomplishment, such allegations
were not proven by handwriting experts which the petitioners failed to make
use of.

(2) it was not executed as a public instrument because the deputy clerk of
court notarized it instead of the duly authorized notary public -> deputy
clerk of court was authorized by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Administrative Code
of 1917.

(3) it contravened Art. 133 of the CC (now Art. 87 of the FC) which states
that donations made during the marriage shall be void, which also includes
common-law relationships as decided in the earlier case of Matabuena v.
Cervantes). -> There is no sufficient evidence on record to prove that GT and
MT were in fact married, or if they were, when the marriage took place. There
is no evidence as to the time the deed of donation was executed in 1974 that
GT and Maria were still continuing their common-law relationship. BTs
testimony merely states that in 1941,Maria became their stepmother and does
not conclusively prove that in1974, GT and Maria were married. Lacking
evidence to prove the contrary, the family code provision cannot apply.

58. MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES 38 SCRA 284

Facts:

20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in


favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and
wife in a common law relationship.

They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13


September 1962.

Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to
Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on
donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the
validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes marriage to the
donor. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between
live-in partners.

Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation
between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to
public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and
his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission
may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must
be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in
such codal provision would not be attained.

The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower
court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of
plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3)
remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.

59. SOLIS VS. BARROSO 53 PHIL 912

Facts:

On June 1919, spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a donation propter
nuptias of certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo
and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, in consideration of their upcoming
marriage. One condition of the donation is that in case one of the donees
dies, half of the lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the
surviving donee would retain the other half. On the same month, Alejo and
Fortunata got married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the
possession of the donated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the
same year, Juan also died. After Juans death, Maxima recovered possession of
the donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an action against
Maxima(surviving donor) et al and demanded:(1)the execution of the proper
deed of donation according to law,(2)transferring one-half of the donated
property, and(3)to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its
fruits The lower court granted the plaintiffs prayer, basing its judgment on
article 1279 of the Civil Code. It ordered the defendants to execute a deed
of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to transfer to her the legal
title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original
donation.

Issue:

WON one-half of the donated lands should properly be awarded to her.

Held:

No.

Donation proper nuptias here was no tvalid because it was made in a private
instrument. This donation must be governed by the rules on Donation. Real
Property may be valid, it must be made in the public instrument. (Formal
Validity) The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory
donations, insofar as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed,
which are then governed by the rules on contracts, and those which are to
take effect upon the donors death, which are governed by the rules
established for testamentary succession. Marriage in DPN is rather a
resolutory condition which presupposes the existence of the obligation which
may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth
of the obligation.

60. MATEO VS. LAGUA 29 SCRA 864

FACTS:

Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was
celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the
lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donors name.

In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant
daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn
undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia
the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to
petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action
and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.

On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor
of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this
only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the
harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondents
name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and
ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots
to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the
annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano
died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the

lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to
Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by
494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have
freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of
Ciprianos other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and
herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq.
m. from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation
propter nuptias for being inofficious.

HELD:

Decision

of

CA

based

on

unsupported

assumptions

set

aside;

trial

courts
order of dismissal sustained.

Before
the

the

legal

share

due

to

compulsory

heir

may

be

reached,

net

estate

of

the

decedent

must

be

ascertained,

by

deducting

all

payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased

at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious,


there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of
the disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the
properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that,
with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on
the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction
and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at
the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and
charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.

To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made
them.

61. PLATA VS. YATCO 12 SCRA 718

Facts:
1954 Amailia Plata purchased land

1958 sold the property to Celso Saldana but he resold it ot her seven
months after when she was already married to Gaudencio Begosa

Sept 1958 Amalia mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva the property in


consideration of a loan of 3,000. Gaudencio also signed the deal

Amalia and Gaudencion failed to pay mortgage and the land was then sold to
Cesarea and husband Gregorio. They then
sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was granted

However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party since she is
claiming that land was her own paraphernal property and not conjugal property

ISSUE: WON Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against Gaudencio Begosa

HELD: NO

Sufficiently proved that property contested


property since she owend it before marriage
back to her when she was already married it
property since there was no prood that they
common or conjugal funds.

is her own exclusive paraphernal


and even if Saldana did give it
did not transform it to conjugal
money paid to Saldana came from

Thus since Cesarea and Gregorio were also aware that property was paraphernal
as clearly stated in land records, illegal detainer judgment against the
husband alone doesnt affect the paraphernal property of Amalia.

Thus she had a right to ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband.

RESULT: cant decide at the moment whether property is validly conveyed to


Cesarea and Gregorio. Up to CFI of QC.

62. ROSETE VS. PROV. SHERIFF 95 PHIL 560

Facts:

In a criminal case for murder under CFI Zambales, Epifanio Fularon was
convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P2, 000.00

To satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied
upon four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio
Fularon and Gliceria Rosete. The parcels of land were sold at public auction but
there was an unsatisfied balance. Gliceria was able to redeem two

out of the four parcels of land during the public auction. However, to
satisfy the remaining balance of the indemnity, the sheriff levied upon the
two parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria.

Prior to said levy, Gliceria Rosete filed a case for conjunction to


the sheriff from carrying out the sale praying at the same time for
preliminary injunction. This writ was issued upon the filing of the
bond, but was later dissolved upon a motion filed by defendants who
counter-bond.

restrain
a writ of
requisite
put up

The dissolution of the injunction enabled the sheriff to carry out the sale as
originally scheduled and the property was sold to one Raymundo de Jesus. Gliceria
sought for the declaration of the sale by the sheriff null and void.

The lower court declared the sale null and void on the strength of the ruling
laid down in the case of Lichauco vs. Olegario.

The question to be decided is whether the sale made by the sheriff of the two
parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete in the exercise of her
right of redemption is valid it appearing that they formed part of the four
parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership which were originally sold
to satisfy the same judgment of indemnity awarded in the criminal case.

Issue: Since it appears that plaintiff redeemed the two parcels of land in
question with money obtained by her from her father, has the property become
paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of further execution?

Held:

We are of the opinion that the question should be answered in the affirmative
for the following reasons:

(a) Gliceria Rosete, the wife, redeemed the property, not in behalf of her
husband, but as successor in interest in the whole or part of the property, it
being then conjugal. The term "successor in interest" appearing in subdivision
(a), Section 25, Rule 39, includes, according to Chief Justice Moran, "one who
succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law" or "the wife as
regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her
husband's title passes to her (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1,
pp. 841-842); and (b) a property is deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1)
when acquired by her by-right of redemption, and

(2) with money belonging exclusively to her (Article 1396, old Civil Code).

The interest which a wife has in conjugal property in this jurisdiction may
be likened to that of a wife in a homestead in American jurisdiction. That
interest is known as "inchoate right of dower", or a "contingent interest."
By virtue of this inchoate right, a wife has a right of redemption of a
homestead as successor in interest of her husband.

The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property of the
plaintiff. She has acquired it by right of redemption as successor in
interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment
debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a
judgment exclusively affecting the personal liability of the latter. The
conclusion reached by the lower court on this matter is therefore not
warranted by law.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified as follows: the sale of the two
parcels of land executed by the sheriff on May 9, 1950 in favor of Raymundo de
Jesus for P970 is hereby declared null and void, and the deed of repurchase
executed by the sheriff in favor of the plaintiff on March 8, 1950

is hereby revived and maintained. The rest of the decision is declared


without effect. No pronouncement as to costs.

63. CASTILLO VS. PASCO 11 SCRA 102

Facts:

In October 1931 Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married Macaria


Pasco, a widow who had survived two previous husbands. On April 3, 1933,
Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died, and his widow married her fourth husband, Luis
San Juan, on June 8, 1934.

The property subject of litigation is a fishpond located in Bulacan. Marcelo


and Macaria bought the fishpond during their marriage from spouses Gonzales,
which was payable in 3 installments. The initial payment was P1, 000.00 but
only P400.00 cash was given as payment because the vendor-spouses owed
Macaria P600.00. The other 2 installments were paid out of loans guaranteed
by parcels of land which are exclusive paraphernal properties of Macaria.

Upon the death of Marcelo, his children and grandchildren from the first wife
filed a complaint for partition and accounting against Macaria in CFI
Bulacan. CFI Bulacan declared the property to be the exclusive paraphernal
property of Macaria and CA affirmed.

The heirs of Marcelo contended that they should have a share to the fishpond
because it was acquired during the marriage of Marcelo and Macaria, hence
conjugal.

CA found that the fishpond was purchased with the exclusive funds of Macaria,
who was known to be a woman of means even before she married Marcelo. It was
also established that Marcelo could not have afforded the property who was
only earning a meager income as provincial treasurer.

Issue: Whether or not the litigated fishpond is conjugal or paraphernal


property

Held: The litigated fishpond is both conjugal and paraphernal property.

On the initial payment:

The initial payment was established to come out from Macarias exclusively
private funds. The finding of the CA is that Gonzales owed this particular
indebtedness to Macaria Pasco alone, and in the absence of proof that the
husband authorized her to use community funds therefor, the appellate Court's
finding cannot be disturbed by us. Whether the evidence adverted to should be
credited is for the Court of Appeals to decide.

On the other two installments:

Although the other two installments were paid by loans which were guaranteed
by mortgage on paraphernal property of Macaria, it was shown that the loans
have been made to Marcelo and Macaria as joint borrowers. The loans thus
became obligations of the conjugal partnership of both debtor spouses, and
the money loaned is logically conjugal property. While the securing mortgage
is on the wife's paraphernalia the mortgage is a purely accessory obligation
that the lenders could, waive if they so chose, without affecting the
principal debt which was owned by the conjugal partnership, and which the
creditors could enforce exclusively against the latter it they so desired.

As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and
partly with money of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the
property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to

the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An undivided


one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the remaining five-sixths
(5/6) held property of the conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo Castillo
and Macaria Pasco.

64. ZULUETA VS. PAN AM 43 SCRA 397

Facts:

On October 23, 1964, the spouse Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta

hereinafter referred to as plaintiff and Mrs. Zulueta, respectively as


well as their daughter, Carolinda Zulueta hereinafter referred to as Miss
Zulueta were passengers aboard a PANAM plane, on Flight No. 841-23, from
Honolulu to Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. As the plane
landed on said Island, the passengers were advised that they could disembark
for a stopover of about 30 minutes. Shortly before reaching that place, the
flight was, according to the plaintiffs, very rough. Testifying for PANAM
its purser, Miss Schmitz, asserted, however, that it was very calm; but her
notes, Exhibit 7 prepared upon the request of Captain Zentner, on account
of the incident involved in this case state that there was unusually small
amount of roughness, which His Honor, the Trial Judge, considered properly
as an admission that there was roughness, only the degree thereof is in
dispute.

In any event, plaintiff testified that, having found the need to relieve
himself, he went to the mens comfort room at the terminal building, but
found it full of soldiers, in view of which he walked down the beach some 100
yards away.

Meanwhile, the flight was called and when the passengers had boarded the
plane, plaintiffs absence was noticed. The take-off was, accordingly,
delayed and a search for him was conducted by Mrs. Zulueta, Miss Zulueta and
other persons. Minutes later, plaintiff was seen walking back from the beach
towards the terminal. Heading towards the ramp of the plane, plaintiff
remarked, You people almost made me miss your flight. You have a defective
announcing system and I was not paged.

In the claim for damages, Mrs. Zulueta filed a motion alleging that she had, for
more than two (2) years, been actually living separately from her husband,
plaintiff Rafael Zulueta, and that she had decided to settle separately with
PANAM through compromise agreement and had reached a full and complete settlement
of all her differences with said defendant, and praying accordingly, that this
case be dismissed insofar as she is concerned, Required to comment on said
motion, PANAM expressed no objection thereto.

Upon the other hand, plaintiff prayed that the motion be denied, upon the
ground that the case at bar is one for damages for breach of a contract of
carriage, owing to the off-loading of plaintiff Rafael Zulueta, the husband
and administrator of the conjugal partnership, with the funds of which the
PANAM had been paid under said contract; that the action was filed

by the plaintiffs as a family and the lower court had awarded damages to them
as such family; that, although PANAM had questioned the award of damages, it
had not raised the question whether the lower court should have specified
what portion of the award should go to each plaintiff; that although Mr. and
Mrs. Zulueta had, for sometime, been living separately, this has been without
judicial approval; that Mrs. Zulueta may not, therefore, bind the conjugal
partnership or settle this case separately; and that the sum given by PANAM
to Mrs. Zulueta is believed to be P50,000, which is less than 3-1/2% of the
award appealed from, thereby indicating the advisability of denying her
motion to dismiss, for her own protection.

Issue:

Whether or not Mrs. Zuluetas compromise agreement with PAN AM would bind the
conjugal partnership and whether the payment she received is effective.

Ruling:

No, Mrs. Zuluetas compromise agreement with PAN AM would not bind the
conjugal partnership but the payment of P50, 000 she received is effective.

Indeed, (t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husbands consent, except in cases provided by law, and it has not been
shown that this is one of the cases so provided.

Article 113 of our Civil Code, pursuant to which (t)he husband must be
joined in all suits by or against the wife, except: (2) If they have in
fact been separated for at least one year relied upon by PANAM does
not warrant the conclusion drawn therefrom by the latter.

Obviously the suit contemplated in subdivision (2) of said Article 113 is one
in which the wife is the real party either plaintiff or defendant in
interest, and, in which, without being so, the hush must be joined as a
party, by reason only of his relation of affinity with her. Said provision
cannot possibly apply to a case, like the one at bar, in which the husband is
the main party in interest, both as the person principally grieved and as
administrator of the conjugal partnership.

Moreover, he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of


carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the
contract, with funds of conjugal partnership, the damages recoverable for
breach of such contract belongs to said partnership.

The payment of P50,000 to her is effective, insofar as it is deductible from


the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount due) from the
defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs. Zulueta. What
is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal
partnership is concerned.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public


policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal
partnership, before the dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire any
property by gratuitous title, without the husband's consent, except from her
ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.

It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations
by compromise agreement between the contending parties, but, it certainly
does not favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are
plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the defense of the rights
of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the
compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" which the law
seeks to protect by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding
that had arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus
rendering more difficult a reconciliation between them.

It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the


plaintiffs that neither is there any evidence that the money used to pay the
plane tickets came from the conjugal funds and that the award to Mrs. Zulueta
was for her personal suffering or injuries. There was, however, no individual
or specific award in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or any of the plaintiffs. The
award was made in their favor collectively. Again, in the absence of said
proof, the presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the common
benefit of the plaintiffs and that the money had come from the conjugal
funds, for, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed "(t)hat
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life." In fact Manresa maintains that they are deemed
conjugal, when the source of the money used therefor is not established, even
if the purchase had been made by the wife. And this is the rule obtaining in
the Philippines. Even property registered, under the Torrens system, in the
name of one of the spouses, or in that of the wife only, if acquired during
the marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless there
is competent proof to the contrary.

65. JOVELLANOS VS. CA 210 SCRA 126

Facts:

Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale

agreement over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married

to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners.

Leonor

Dizon

died

consequently.

Then

Daniel

married

private

respondent

Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage

Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos,

they built a house on the back portion of the premises.

With

the

lease

amounts

having

been

paid,

Philamlife

executed

to

Daniel

Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated

to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and
bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.

Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the
aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their
marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal
partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property,
were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage
under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September
2, 1955.

Issue:

WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES

Held:

The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature
of a contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a
contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon
delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally,
ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may
still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is
stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum
reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on
the installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive
condition. The failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey
title from acquiring binding force.

Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the
said amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since
September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed
the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.

Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the
execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner
the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than

those established by law, 19 and, under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos


evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership. Upon the
execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel
Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H.
Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership
with his said second wife.

NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the

corresponding

reimbursements

to

the

petitioners

who

helped

pay

for

the

amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on

property

bought

on

installments,

where

ownership

is

vested

during

the

marriage, such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.

ALVAREZ VS. ESPIRITU 14 SCRA 892

VITUG VS. MONTEMAYOR 93 PHIL 939

MARAMBA VS. LOZANO 20 SCRA 474

Facts:

1948: Plaintiff Maramba files a complaint for the collection of a sum of


money from spouses Nieves and Pascual Lozano. This was granted by the court.

1960: Not satisfied with the judgment, LOZANO appealed to the CA who
dismissed appeal because it was not filed on time.

Record of the case was then remanded to the court a quo and a writ of
execution was issued.

Aug. 18, 1960: a levy on a parcel of land in the name of Nieves Lozano was
made. A notice of a sale at a public auction was also made and scheduled for
Sept. 16, 1960.

However, Lozano had made a partial payment by then and asked for an
adjournment of the sale to October 26.

During this time, her husband died. She then prayed for a restraining order
on the sale of the lot for sale being her paraphernal property. She also
prayed that her liability be then fixed at of the amount awarded in the
judgment.

The sale proceeded anyway.

June 28, 1961: trial court grants the motion of Nieves Lozano. The sale on
her property was allowed to proceed to satisdy her liability which is only
half now from the original. (from P3,500.07 to P1,750.04)

Issues/Held/Ratio:
1. W/N the decision of the trial court last 1959 could still be questioned.

NO. SC states that a decision that is final and executory can no longer be
amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes.

2. W/N the judgement was joint or solidary.

JOINT. General rule is that when a judgment does not order the defendants to
pay jointly and severally (as in this case), none of them may be compelled to
satisfy the judgment in full.

3. W/N the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the
properties sold at the public auction.

It cannot. This is only on properties acquired during the marriage. In this


case, it is established that the property is paraphernal to the wife alone.
The court has previously stated that the construction of a house at conjugal
expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses does not
automatically make it conjugal.

The ownership remains the same until the value is paid but payment can only
be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. Since there was no
liquidation yet in the conjugal partnership of Nieves and Pascual, her
exclusive property cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other
defendant. While they may both use the building constructed in paraphernal
land, ownership is still with her until liquidation of partnership pays for
it.

69. CALTEX VS. FELIAS 108 PHIL 873

Facts:

Spouses Juliano and Eulalia Flias donated Lot No. 107 to their daughter,
Felisa Felias (ivate respondent) on March 31, 1928.

On March 26, 1941, trial court held that in a case against respondents
husband, Simeon Sawamoto, he had to pay Texas Company (Phil.) Inc. a sum of

661.94 plus legal interest and attorneys fees. A writ of execution was
issued to the provincial sheriff who levied upon Lot NO. 107 togther with the
improvements and a small parcel of coconut land and sold these at a public
auction to Texas Company now Caltex (Phil.) Inc. Provincial Sheriff executed
a final deed of sale which was duly recorded on a TCT. Felias filed an action
declaring herself the owner of the 2 parcels of land.

The court decided that the sale of Lot No. 107 is null and void and the sale
of the coconut land is not and rightfully belongs to Caltex. Both parties
appealed and CA declared that Lot No. 107 belongs to Felisa and ordered the
Register of Deeds to cancel the entry of the levy, the ertificate of sale and
the deed of sale by the sheriff. Caltex is still the exclusive owner of the
small parcel of coconut land.

Issue:

What is the status and ownership of Lot No. 107 of the cadastral survey of
the City of Agusan at the time it was levied upon and later sold by the
sheriff?

Held:
It exclusively belongs to Felisa Feias.

It was discovered by the CA that it was donated by her parents to her; it is


her paraphernal property (exclusively owned by her)

It was sold by the sheriff who believed it to be conjugal property as


stipulated in Art. 1404 of the OCC and Art. 158 of the new Civil Code.

Art. 1404 (2): Buildings constructed during the marriage on land belonging to
one of the spouse shall also belong to the partnership, but the value of the
land shall be paid to the spouse owning the same.

Art 158n (2): Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during
the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who
owns the same.

However, the building was already there even before the lot was donated to
Felisa. Therefore, Art. 1404 should not apply. Felisa exclusively owns both
the land and the building upon it. This being her own means that it is not
subject to the obligations of her husband. Furthermore, the building was
destroyed at the time of the sale by the Sheriff which means that the said
house included in the deeds executed were no longer in existence.

70. DOMINADO VS. DERAYUNAN 49 PHIL 452

Facts:

An administration proceeding was filed for the settlement of the estate of


Francisco Deruyanan. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the widow
by the 2nd marriage objected to the scheme of partition submitted by the
administrator.

After hearing the parties, the court approved the said partition which
provides that half of the conjugal property shall belong to the widow and the
other half shall belong to the deceased, which will constitute the
inheritance to be divided accordingly.

As what the law provides, 2/3 of the remaining half shall be given as the
legitime of the children and the remaining 1/3 shall remain as the free
portion where the widow shall be accorded 1/6 of the remaining portion as
usufruct.

The widow then raised the question as regards the manner of determining the
portion of the inheritance which pertains to the widow in usufruct and the 2
children inheriting with her.

Issue:

WON the determination as regards to the legitime and inheritance is correct?

Held:

Under Article 834 of the Civil Code provides that "any widower or widow who,
on the death of his or her spouse, is not be entitled or should be so by the
fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to
that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or
descendants who have not received any betterment."

What is necessary, then, to determine is the legitime of the children who


have not received any betterment. First of all, it must be noted that the
legitime which serves as a point of comparison is that of the children or
descendants who have not received any betterment, which implies that the
deceased has made use of the right to give a betterment. But, in the present
case, there being no betterment, what is the legitime of the two children?

Sanchez Roman, in solving the legal problems that might arise the
interpretation of article 834 of the Civil Code, among other things, says:

"According to article 834, the legitime that pertains to a legitimate child


or descendant not receiving any betterment, or the legitime by which the
amount of the widow's usufruct is regulated in order that said legitimes may
be equal in amount, is the two-thirds of the inheritance as a maximum when
there is no betterment; as a minimum, the one-third constituting the short
legitime only when the whole of the second third constituting the betterment
is given as such; and as a medium, said one-third constituting the short
legitime to which is to be added what remains of the third constituting the
betterment when only a part and not the whole thereof is given; and fixing
within these limits, maximum, minimum and medium, the amount which must be
allotted to the widow in each case as her share, which must be equal to that
of the child or each of the children not receiving any betterment, according
to their number." (6 Sanchez Roman, vol. 2, p. 878.)

For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby,
modified in that the portion pertaining to the widow in usufruct consists of

one-third of the estate of the deceased Francisco Derayunan, without any


special findings as to costs.

71. CALIMLIM-CANULLAS VS. FORTUN 129 SCRA 675

FACTS: Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO Canullas were


married on December 19, 1962. They begot five children. They lived in a small
house on the residential land in question. After FERNANDO's father died in
1965, FERNANDO inherited the land. In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and
was living with private respondent Corazon DAGUINES. During the pendency of
this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage. On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO
sold the subject property with the house thereon to DAGUINES for the sum of
P2,000.00. In the document of sale, FERNANDO described the house as "also
inherited by me from my deceased parents."

Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES initiated a


complaint for quieting of title and damages against MERCEDES. The latter
resisted and claimed that the house in dispute where she and her children
were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and
planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; that the sale of the
land together with the house and improvements to DAGUINES was null and void
because they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the
sale.

ISSUES: (1) whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the


exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of
conjugal property; and

(2) whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and
improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the
transaction.

HELD: (1) Yes, a correct interpretation of Art 158 yields that both the land
and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal
partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse
owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value
of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. Fernando could not have alienated the house lot to
Corazon since Mercedes had not given her consent to said sale.

(2) No, the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals
and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine
after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife
and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was

subversive of the stability of the family. As provided by Art 1409, contracts


such as this shall be void and inexistent. Also, art 1352 states contracts
with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. Additionally, the law
emphatically prohibits the spouses from donating or selling property to each
other subject to certain exceptions. This applies even to couples who are not
married but are living as husband and wife.

72. LUZON SURETY VS. DE GARCIA 30 SCRA 111

Facts:

Ladislao Chavez, principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co Inc, executed a


surety bond in favor of PNB Victorias Branch to guaranty a crop loan granted
by the latter to Chavez in the sum of PhP9,000.

Vicente

Garcia,

guarantors,
an

together

signed

indemnity

agreement

binding

themselves

solidarily

liable to indemnify
Luzon

Surety

Co Inc
and

all

against any
damages, costs

with

Ladislao

Chavez

and

Ramon

Lacson,

as

and and other expenses which the petitioner may sustain or incur in
consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the
rate of 12% per annum, computed and compounded quarterly until fully paid;
and to pay 15% of the amount involved in any litigation or other matters
growing out of or connected therewith for attorney's fees.

On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon
Surety Co. to recover the amount of PhP4,577.95, in interest, attorneys fees
and other costs.

On August 8, 1957, Luzon Surety Co. instituted a third party complaint


against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia.

On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering Chavez and Luzon
Surety Co. to pay PNB in solidarity. The same decision likewise ordered the
third party defendants Chavez, Garcia and Lacson to pay Luzon Surety Co. the
amount to be paid to PNB.

On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to satisfy
the claim of the petitioner. A writ of garnishment was soon issued levying
and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses from their sugar
plantation.

Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court ruled in favor
of them.

Issue:

WON the CPG could be liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband
to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety agreement

Held:

No. Decision appealed from was affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi:

Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership; (2) Arrears or income due,
during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of
either spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation
made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or the
wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership; (4) Major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) The maintenance of the family
and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate
children of one of the spouses;

(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or


other course. (1408a) Petitioner contends that Garcias transaction as a
guarantor through which he acquires the capacity of being trusted, adds to
his reputation and enhances his standing in the community. He can thus secure
money with which to carry on the purposes of their conjugal partnership.
While not entirely without basis, such argument cannot prosper for it would
negate what is expressly provided for in Article 161.

In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under that provision is


liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of
some advantage which clearly accrued to the wefare of the spouses. There is none
in this case. While Garcia by thus signing the agreement may be said to enhance
his reputation, such benefit, even if hypothetically

accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the
provision.

Its language is clear; it does not admit of doubt. No process of


interpretation or construction need be resorted to. It peremptorily calls for
application. Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms,
no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is
obeyed. So it is in this case. That is how the Court of Appeals acted, and
what it did cannot be impugned for being contrary to law.

73. COBB-PEREZ VS. LANTIN 23 SCRA 637

Facts:

A debt was contracted when one Damaso Perez bought leather materials from
Hormoso for his shoe manufacturing business. On February 1959, Hormoso filed
suit against Perez and one Gregorio Sumbong for the recovery of unpaid
purchases in t he amount of P17,309.44. On April, 1960, the petition was
granted by the presiding judge (Lantin, respondent) and thus ordered Perez
and Sumbong to fulfill their pecuniary obligation. They appealed but they
were dismissed. They brought the action to the SC but it was also dismissed.
Hormoso moved for the execution of judgment and this was granted on

August 15, 1961.

The Sheriff levied the shares ofcommon stock of Perez from Republic Bank but
Perez urged to stay the execution alleging that the levy was excessive and unjust
because he only owed P17,309.44 but the shares levied were worth P357,000.
Sheriff was thus stopped from auctioning the shares pending resolution of Perezs
new motion. But after respondent Judge Lantin denied both the appeal and the stay
of execution, the sheriff again served a notice for auctioning the shares. This
was subsequently cancelled by the CA pending hearing of another petition filed by
Perez on October 5. CA resolved that the levy was indeed excessive but regardless
sustained that such should be paid.

Sheriff again published a notice of action but time auctioning only 210
shares of stock.

The wife of Perez, Mrs. Cobb-Perez, filed a complaint against Hormoso,


Republic Bank and the Sheriff alleging that the levied shares were conjugal
property and thus should not be liable for Perezs exclusive debt. CFI once
more enjoined the sheriff from executing the auction but later, upon
resolving the case, it lifted its earlier order. A month before the writ of

execution was lifted, however, the wife filed another motion for
recall/lifting of writ of execution granted on August 15, 1961 on the same
grounds enunciated in italics in this paragraph. Lantin denied the motion.
This paved the way for the sheriff to, once more, give notice of the action
and execute the sale.

What followed after this was a series of delaying tactics, which finally
ended with Damaso Perez filing an urgent motion for reconsideration using now
his wifes reasons (see italics in paragraph above) and at the same time
offered instead of his shares of stocks, the dividends of such amounting to
P19,000. Sheriff was then stopped for the fifth time but the motion was still
denied. After the sheriff scheduled the auction for the sixth time, the
present petition was now filed which alleged that grave abuse of discretion
was committed in not recalling the writ of execution (ordering the levy of
210 shares of stock which were deemed conjugal and thus not answerable to
personal obligations made by the husband).

Issue/Held/Ratio:

WON levied shares are conjugal and thus liable for debt of the husband,
Perez.

No. Perez is estopped from claiming that said shares were conjugal because in the
case where he challenged it as being excessive and unjust, he had given

the impression that such stocks were exclusive. This is further confirmed by
the fact that the said stocks were registered in his name alone. Wife is also
barred by judgment made on husband because she stands in privity with him.
She cannot feign ignorance to justify a lapse of seventeen months in
questioning the legality of the levy made on the stocks.

They claim that Art. 160 of the CC is applicable but no proof was presented
that such stocks were acquired during the marriage. No evidence was adduced
as to when the shares of stock were acquired.

Conceding that they were acquired during the marriage and is conjugal, it
must be shown that the partnership is not liable for the judgment debt. No
evidence pointing to this was presented.

Petition dismissed. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which
shall be paid by their counsel.

74. AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVT CO. VS. CA 286 SCRA 272

Facts:

Phil. Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50.3M loan from AIDC. VP Cheng, for
further security of the credit line, included himself jointly/severally
liabile to PBMs indebtedness by virtue of security agreements.

PBM failed to pay the loan. AIDC filed a case against PBM and Cheng for the
money. Court rendered judgment in favor of AIDC and ordered PBM and Cheng to
pay the P50.3M with interests.

While decision was being appealed, AIDC moved for a writ of execution. Upon
placement of P8M bond, the writ was issued. Sheriff notified and scheduled
the sale of 3 conjugal properties of Cheng.

This subsequently led Cheng to file a suit of injunction against the Sheriff,
enjoining him from enforcing orders against the conjugal property since these
were not answerable to the loan.

The loan not benefiting the conjugal partnership, payment of such should not
come from the conjugal property. The lower court issued the TRO. AIDC filed a

petition for certiorari in CA which issued a TRO on the lower courts initial
TRO, paving the way for the scheduled sale of Chengs property.

The auction took place and AIDC, being the only bidder, was issued the
certificate of sale. However, after deciding the issue, the same CA which
issued the second TRO, resolved to uphold the lower courts decision. AIDC
then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the issue was now moot and
academic since the sale was already consummated. Respondents however averred
that a third-party was now questioning the sale and thus a different legal
situation was presented.

Lower court denied AIDCs motion to dismiss and after trial declared the sale
null and void. The CA affirmed the decision. After a motion of
reconsideration was denied, AIDC filed

a petition for review in the SC.

Issues/Held/Ratio:

(1) WON CA erred in ruling that the obligation incurred by Cheng did not
redound to the benefit of the family.

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract (he directly
received the money and services to be used for his own business/profession), that
contract falls under the term debts and obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proven. AIDC claims that
the benefits Chengs family would reasonably anticipate were the following: (i)
employment of Cheng would be prolonged, (ii) shares of stock of members of
Chengs family would appreciate if PBM could be rehabilitated through the loan
obtained, (ii) Chengs prestige in PBM would be enhanced and

his career would be boosted should PBM survive because of the loan. However
these are not benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the CC. It cannot be a
by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. The above-enumerated alleged
benefits are not only incidental but also speculative.

(2) Is a surety agreement/accommodation contract entered into by the husband


within the contemplation of Art. 161 of the CC.

No. The money received/services rendered redounded to benefit of PBM and the
husband merely acted as a guarantor. The contract by itself cannot be
considered as falling within the context of Art. 161.

75. CARLOS VS. ABELARDO 380 SCRA 361

FACTS:
On Oct. 31, 1989, Honorio Carlos issued a check worth $25k, in the name of

Pura Vallejo, against his personal account in Bankers Trust. It was allegedly a
loan to his daughter Maria Theresa and her husband Manuel Abelardo for the
purchadse of a house and lot from Vallejo in order to help them in their married
life. Vallejo issued an acknowledgement receipt. The failure of the spouses to
pay led Honorio to formally demand the payment. Maria Theresa acknowledged their
debt to her father but claimed that it was payable on a staggered basis. Despite
this acknowledgement and the evidence of Honorios Banks Trust Check (the one
paid to Vallejo) and his formal demand, Manuel denied the nature of the money as
a loan. He claimed, instead, that the amount given was his share in income from
Honorios business, H. L.

Carlos Construction. He even presented 10 BPI checks against the account of


HLCC to prove that he had been receiving profit from HLCC. However, he is not
included in HLCCs Articles of Incorporation or Organizational Profile as
stockholder, officer, employee, or agent. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that
a check of $25k had been issued to Vallejo against the personal account of
Honorio and that the same was received by the spouses and given to Vallejo
for payment of a house and lot that became their conjugal dwelling.

ISSUE: WON conjugal property should pay for the loan of 25, 000 even when
acknowledgement was not signed by husband

HELD: YES

- Art 121 of FCC conjugal partnership is liable for (1) debts and
obligations that benefit the conjugal partnership of gains made by both the
spouses or one of them but with the consent of the other (2) debts and
obligations that are without consent f one of the spouse but their family has
benefited.

Evidence here shows that family did benefit since they used the loan to buy
the house which became their conjugal home.

76. GARCIA VS. MANZANO


103 PHIL 798

FACTS:

Plaintiff Gonzalo Gar

cia,

husband, filed an action


for the
judicial
declaration
the

of

conjugal

the

separation

of

partnership

property
against

her wife, Consolacion Manzano. He alleged that they have been living
separately from each other since 1948 and that upon their separation, her
wife assumed the complete management and administration of the conjugal
partnership property and fictitiously transferred or alienated a majority of
said property in favor of third persons. He alleged further that her wife
failed and refused to turn over and deliver to him his rightful share and
participation in the conjugal partnership property and its fruits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judicial declaration of separation of conjugal partnership


property can be granted based on the allegations of the husband

HELD:

No. The Civil Codes (both old and new) require that separation of property
shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before
the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of
the marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code; Article 1432, old Code).

In the system established by the Code, the wife does not administer the conjugal
partnership unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree of court and
under its supervision (Arts. 168, 196) "with such limitations as they (the
courts) may deem advisable" (Art. 197 in relation to Article 196). Legally,
therefore, the wife can not mismanage the conjugal partnership property or
affairs, unless the husband or the courts tolerate it.

In the event of such maladministration by the wife (and disregarding the case
of judicial authorization to have the wife manage the partnership, since such
a case is not involved), the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial
separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and
resume the administration of the community property and the conduct of the
affairs of the conjugal partnership. He may enforce his right of possession
and control of the conjugal property against his wife (Perkins vs. Perkins,
57 Phil., 205) and seek such ancillary remedies as may be required by the
circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized
alienations or incumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For
this reason, the articles above quoted contemplate exclusively the remedies
available to the wife (who is not the legal administrator of the partnership)
against the abuses of her husband because normally only the latter can commit
such abuses.

77. PARTOSA-JO VS. CA 216 SCRA 692

FACTS:

1980, Prima Partosa-Jo filed two complaints against Jose Jo for a)judicial
separation of conjugal property and b) complaint for support for her and
their daughter Monina

29 Nov 1983: Negros Oriental RTC rendered judgment in favor of Prima but
failed to include judgment on judicial separation of property in the
dispositive portion

Prima elevated this to CA, CA affirmed judgment on support but dismissed petition
for separation of property for lack merit saying that it was not allowed as their
separation was due to their agreement rather and not because

of abandonment

ISSUES:

W/N the decision of RTC can be questioned given that it is final and
executory

W/N she is entitled to judicial separation of conjugal property on the ground


of abandonment

HELD/RATIO:

The RTC failed put judgment on separation of property in the dispositive


portion, BUT it was made in the penultimate paragraph reading as follows:

o all the properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the
defendant is subject to separation of property.

The RTC held that they were legally married and that the properties were
acquired during coverture although they were in the name of a dummy (Chinese
national kasi)

Prima submits that their agreement was not to be separated but for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy

and that he would visit and support her. But when she returned to their house
in Dumaguete in 1942, he refused to accept her.
She is entitled to separation of property on ground of abandonment.

Abandonment implies departure of one spouse with intent never to return,


followed by prolonged absence without just cause and without providing for
means although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital

relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.


The physical separation of the parties, coupled by the refusal by Jose Jo to
give support to Prima, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for
legal separation of their conjugal property. Aside from this, he admittedly
cohabitated with other women and have not established just cause for his
refusal to comply with his duties as husband.

- Court ordered for division between the two half/half. It should include
properties such as those which were registered in the name of other persons
in violation of the anti-dummy law.

The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital
flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an
accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his
promise to her of his eternal love and care.

78. LACSON VS. SAN JOSE 24 SCRA 837

Facts:

Feb 14, 1953 when they got married

Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila

March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as
support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila

*Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two
eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with
Carmen

*This was affirmed by the CFI

May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be
given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain
custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older
ones as well who are all below 7 years old.

CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should


be declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is void
too.

ISSUE: WON support should be awarded to the wife

HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time

- NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven
years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."

*Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been
declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise

*However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose
which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court,
as long as above ten) already 1968

*Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence.
Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:

Is entitled to parental care;


Shall receive at least elementary education;

Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;

Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and


intellectual development.

However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the
agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses

and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial


sanction. (Art 190/191 of NCC)

Corroborated by already 5-year separation.

79. YAPTINCHAY VS. TORRES 28 SCRA 489

FACTS :

Petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First Instance of


Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as Special Administratrix and
then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died
in Hongkong on July 7, 1965. Petitioner there alleged that the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as
husband and wife for nineteen (19) years: from 1946 to 1964 at 1951 TaftAvenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel Avenue, Pasay
City. To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered
by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y.
Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the
ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent,
had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's
estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that
having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said
petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of
integrity.

Among the properties left is a Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying
versions. In the verified petition before this Court, petitioner avers "that the
construction of said North Forbes Park property was

undertaken
jointly
by
petitioner
and
the
deceased,
petitioner
even contributing her

own
exclusive funds
therefor."

This is a

reproduction

of an allegation in petitioner's June 27, 1966 alternative motion for


reconsideration or for clarification/amendment of the herein controverted
order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873. 8 And again, in the affidavit of
Teresita C. Yaptinchay dated August 3, 1965, she spoke of the acquisition of
properties, real and personal, in her own words, "through our joint efforts
and capital, among which properties are those situated" in "North Forbes
Park." 9 All of which contradict her averment in the amended complaint dated
October 25, 1965 also verified in said Case 8873 to the effect that she
"acquired through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as

... the house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal."

10

But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner's claim of


complete or even partial ownership of the house. They maintain that the
construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay without her (petitioner's) intervention and the deceased paid with
his own personal funds all expenses incurred in connection with the
construction thereof.

11

ISSUE:

WON the Forbes Park house be a subject of the is that

HELD:

NO. PETITION DISMISSED.

Petitioner cannot claim ownership presumably based on the provisions of Article


144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either

or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." .

But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil
relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the
existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may

be

deemed

condition

to

that
be

accrue.

13

One

such

is

there

must

clear showing that


had,

the

petitioner

during

cohabitation,
really

contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to


co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in
controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make
available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the
existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial
protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or
future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. 16 At any
rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better
safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the hands of
the bonded administratrix (legal wife) in the estate proceedings. For then,
her acts would be subject to the control of the probate court.

Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein


petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction
aside.

17

issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set

80. MAXEY VS. CA 129 SCRA 187

Facts:

Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived as husband and wife
in Davao, out of this common law marriage, they had 6 children (petitioners).
1903 when they started living together

1911-1912 when Melbourne bought the lands

1919 when they married in church and when 1st wife died. 1953- husband
remarried, when 2nd wife sold the land.
1961 when children discovered sale

Plaintiffs are currently praying for the annulment of the documents of sale
over particular lands that were sold to private respondent couple by their
fathers 2nd wife. They allege that common properties belonged to their
parents who acquired the lands during their lifetime and through their joint
effort and capital. Sales of land by their father were done without their
knowledge and consent and only after their mother, Regina had died in 1953.
Children discovered sale in 1961.

Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and they
believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land.
Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and they
believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land.
Melbourne and Maxey started living together in 1903. That same year, the
children allege that they got married in the military fashion. They
acquired properties in 1911 and 1912. They got married in 1919. Regina died
sometime in 1919, soon after the church marriage.

1953: husband remarried.

Issue:

1. W/N spouses Maxey were married as early as 1903 in a military fashion as


alleged by the children

Held:

NO. The CFI and the CA were correct in rejecting this since the Act No. 3613
a.k.a. the Revised Marriage Law was approved much later (Dec. 4, 1929). It
could not apply to a 1903 marriage.

2. W/N common law spouses, prior to marriage, share conjugal property over
lands acquired in 1912.

Held:

RTC: applied Art. 144 that states that in common law marriages, the property
acquired by both through work, industry, wages, salaries are governed by the
rules of co-ownership.

CA: Ruled otherwise, they believed that the land was exclusive property of
Melbourne Maxey. Art. 144 should not have applied because the Regina did not
contribute to the acquisition of the profit. She had no income of her own.

Cannot consider this a joint effort.

SC: YES. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should apply there being no showing that
vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application.

Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they do not prejudice or impair any
vested or acquired right.

Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the
formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not legally
married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties
acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was
recognized through decisions of this Court.

Under this new code, it is believed that even if it is only the man who
works, there is still a 50-50 sharing of property acquired during their
cohabitation together.

The woman runs the household: "in the Filipino family, the wife holds the
purse, husbands hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return
and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . . (Dean Cortes)

In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Gov-Gen Leonard Wood)

Ruling:

The petitioners should


land while the private
use of one-half of the
to rule out rentals on

return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of the


respondents should pay some form of rentals for their
properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us
one hand and return of P650.00 on the other.

81. VALDES VS. RTC 260 SCRA 221

Facts:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971 and thereafter
were blessed with five children. On June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the
declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null
and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Their children
Stella and Joaquin were placed in the custody of their mother and the older
children chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner and
respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their
property as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the


procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without
marriage. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage." The Trial Court made a clarification citing Article 147 of the
Family Code which explicitly provides that the property acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and

will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their
"family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.

Valdez filed a Motion of reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this


petition.

Petitioner argues that:

Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated.

Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
should govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.

Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab


initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same
may be read consistently with Article 129.

It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children


wish to stay.

Issue:

Whether or not the property regime should be based Article 147 or on Articles
50, 51 and 52 as contended by Valdez.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on
co-ownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

82. NICDAO-CARINO VS. CARINO 351 SCRA 127

FACTS:
Article 40

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children
with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan
Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden
and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage
with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4.
Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect
a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that
her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage
b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and
void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local
civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous
marriage on SPO4s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to


claim presumptive legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence
of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise
null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the

previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no


judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In
such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to
properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall
belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the
full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise
void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there
were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147
of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their
cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party
this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the
fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

83. MODEQUILLO VS. BREVA 185 SCRA 766

FACTS:

Judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Francisco Salinas, et al.


vs. Jose Modequillo, et al., Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages. The said judgment
having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods
and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag,
Davao del Sur. On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential
land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600
square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of
P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose
Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a
parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del
Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and
assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in
the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao
del Sur.

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by


defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located
at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to
the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt
sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of
those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

WON a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family
Code.

HELD:

YES.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the
Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article
153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after
its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap
year).

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from


the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not welltaken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the
provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles
152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are
exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment
aforecited No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment
arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976
and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court
on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution
provided in the Family Code.

TAYAG VS. CA 209 SCRA 665

BENITEZ-BADUA VS. CA 229 SCRA 468

Facts:

Vicente Benitez married Isabel Chipongian, acquired many props in Laguna.


Isabel predeceased Vicente, former died on 4/25/82 while latter died
intestate on 11/13/89.

On 9/24/90 Vicentes sis and nephew Victoria (priv resps) Benitez Lirio and

Feodor Benitez Aguilar filed @ RTC for issuance of letter of admin for
Aguilar, saying that Vicente had no legal heirs since Marissa Benitez Badua
was never a related by blood and not legally adopted therefore not a legal
heir.

On 11/2/90 Marissa opposed saying that shes sole heir and shes capable of
managing estate. She presented the ff evids:

daughter

Private resps (Victoria) presented testimonial evids:

-gyne for treatment

of Vicente categorically declared that Marissa is not a biological child

TC on 12/17/90 dismissed petition of Victoria. Ruled that Marissa is


legitimate daughter and sole heir (relying on FC 166 and 170)

CA reversed on 5/29/92 saying that Marissa is NOT biological child and


therefore not legal heir. CA said that TC failed to apply FC 166 and 170.

Issue: WON Marissa is a biological child of Vicente and Isabel and WON TC
misapplied FC 166 and 170

Held:

NO. Marissa is not a biological child and yes, TC misapplied said FC


provisions. SC said that reliance on FC 164, 166, 170 and 171 are misplaced
since said provisions show situation where husband denies own child with wife
and not a situation where a child is alleged not to be a natural child of a
couple.

SC only sustained CA findings on ruling that Marissa is not a biological


child Vicente and Isabel based on the ff:

brother Dr. Nilo Chipongian, saying that shes been married already for

10 years but at age 36 was not yet pregnant and so she was even brought to
the attention of Dr. Manahan who was a well known ob-gyne. Many other people
(neighbors) corroborated this point that Iabel never became pregnant. Had she
been, it would have been noticed by people around her.

she was born in the Benitez household in Nagcarlan when she would have been
born in the hospital and in the skillful hands of Dr. Manahan who was the obgyne of her putative mother.

Extrajudicial settlement of Nilo and Vicente after Isabels death saying


that they are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel for she has no other

ascending or descending heirs. Letter of Isabel to Vicente pleading him to


give Marissa her share which she would not have need to do had Marissa been
their legal heir.

86. RODRIGUEZ VS. CA 245 SCRA 150

FACTS:

On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was
brought before court, by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against
Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein

At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as
first witness.

In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to reveal
the identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel raised a
timely objection which the court sustained.

The petitioner now comes to this court questioning the act of the lower court
in sustaining the objection

Contentions:

Petitioner:

Felicitas

Agbulos

Haber

should

not

be

allowed

to

reveal

the

name

of

the
father

of

private

respondent

because

such

revelation

was

prohibited

by
Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article provided:

"When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she
shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child;
neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be
indentified."

Respondent:

Navarro v. Bacalla: the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff in said


case, could be used to established his paternity

ISSUE: Was the Lower Court correct in sustaining the objection?

HELD:

Yes.
REASON 1:

Private respondent cannot invoke our decision in Navarro v. Bacalla, 15 SCRA


114 (1965). While we ruled in Navarro that the testimony of the mother of the
plaintiff in said case, could be used to established his paternity, such
testimony was admitted during the trial without objection and the defendant
accepted the finding of the trial court that he was the father of the
plaintiff.

Rule: the testimony of the mother may be used to prove paternity IF the
father does not object.

In the case at bench, petitioner timely objected to the calling of the mother
of private respondent to the witness stand to name petitioner as the father
of said respondent.

REASON2:

No similar prohibition found in Article 280 of the Civil Code of the


Philippines has been replicated in the present Family Code. This undoubtedly
discloses the intention of the legislative authority to uphold the Code
Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity of illegitimate children.

Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were
repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children (Art. 175).

Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by


any of the following:

"The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

'(1) The record of birth appearing in the Civil Register or a final judgment;
or

'(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private


handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.'

"In the absence of the foregoing evidence the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:

'(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or

'(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a,
266a, 267a)'"

Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article
283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the filiation may be proven by "any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."

87. REPUBLIC VS. CA 227 SCRA 401

Facts:

Woman (Castro) seeks judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage (civil)


to Cardenas on the ground that no marriage license was issued to them prior to
the solemnization of the marriage. Allegedly Cardenas personally attended to
the procurement of the license, and in fact, the marriage contract itself has
reference to a license number. But upon requesting the Civil Registrars
Office for a copy, said office could not find the license in question. RTC
Quezon City, however, ruled against Castro stating inability of the
certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show
that there was no marriage license issued. She appealed to the CA which
consequently declared the marriage null and void. Petitioner RP petitions the
SC for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON documentary and testimonial evidence presented are sufficient to


establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar prior to
the marriage.

Held/Ratio:

Yes. Section 29, Rule


search is made and no
considered admissible
office. CAs decision
and void.

132 of the Rules of Court provides that if a diligent


record is found in the office in question, it can be
evidence that there exists no record or entry in that
is affirmed. Marriage of the parties is considered null

LUNA VS. IAC 137 SCRA 7

SANTOS VS. CA 242 SCRA 407

FACTS:

Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986.
On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel
and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros
Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed
the dismissal.

ISSUE:

Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate
with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity?

RULING:

No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband
Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL


ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)


incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to

the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include


their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his


present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. PETITION IS
DENIED.

90. REPUBLIC VS. CA 209 SCRA 189

Facts:

Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition for change of surname, from Vicencio to


Yu. Cynthia alleged that she was born to spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and
Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. After a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their
conjugal abode. Since then, Pablo Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support
to his family and it was Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of her mother. Her
mother and Ernesto Yu got married.

Since her childhood, she had not known much less remembered her real father
Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu. Despite
of which she had been using the family name Vicencio in her school and other
activities. In view of such situation, confusion arose as to her

parentage
and
she had

been

subjected

to inquiries

why
as

she

is

using

Vicencio

her family

name,

both

by

her

classmates

and

their

neighbors,

causing

her

extreme
embarrassment.
Her
step-father
had
been
consulted
about
the petition and had given his consent thereto.

Trial court granted petition, CA affirmed. Solicitor General disagrees.

Issue: Whether the change of Cynthias surname to that of her step-fathers


surname was proper.

Held:

We have recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds to warrant


a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name
and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good

faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of

name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.

Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable
grounds aforecited. She says that confusion has arisen as to her parentage
because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her father, assuming
duties of rearing, caring and supporting her. Since she is known in society as
the daughter of Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has been subjected to
inquiries regarding her use of a different surname, causing her much
humiliation and embarrassment.

The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable
cause to warrant private respondents change of surname. Such change might
even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact

that
private
(2)

respondents

step-father

has

two

children

with
her
mother.

In the event

of her step-fathers death, it is possible that private


respondent

may

even

claim

daughter. In
his
memorandum, the
Solicitor

General,

that Ernesto
Yu
has
no

opines

inheritance

rights

as

legitimate

intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made


before the petition for change of name was heard by the trial court that the
change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has
not opted for such a remedy.

Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres


and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears
the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is
a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change
of nameand to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.

Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondents parentage


because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences
could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-fathers surname,
even if she is not legally adopted by him.

91. LLANETA VS. AGRAVA 57 SCRA 29

Facts:

From the denial by the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, in its special proceeding H-00237, of her petition for change of name,
Teresita Llaneta has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari.

Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer
with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin
Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another
man out of which Teresita was born. Teresita lived with Atanacia's mother-inlaw, Victoria vda. de Ferrer.

Teresita was raised using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and
throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for
a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon as she was required

to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic


Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is
Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and
an unknown father.

On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of
Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold
difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court below on March 18,
1969 for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.
After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition; hence the
present recourse.

The respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three


decisions of this Court, that disallows such change of name as would give the
false impression of family relationship.

Issue:

Whether or not it is proper that her name be changed from Teresita Llaneta to
Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname
Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason,
would cause untold difficulties and confusion.

Ruling:

Yes, it is proper that her name be changed from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita
Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta,
instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would
cause untold difficulties and confusion.

The principle that change of name that would give the false impression of
family relationship is not allowed remains valid but only to the extent that
the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or
future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the
community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's
widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben,

have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of


the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives
and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various Government
agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented
by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by
every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no
opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and
her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years
before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to her use of his
surname is open to speculation.

One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of
action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it
with her.

92. SILVA VS. PERALTA 110 PHIL 56

FACTS:

In 1944, defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger sister Florence in the


latters arrest and investigation in Anibongan. There, defendant met plaintiff
and appellant Saturnino Silva, a US citizen and officer of the US Army. Silva
then started courting Esther and she later accepted his proposal of marriage
having been made to believe that he was single. They started living together
as common-law H & W in Dec 1944 and bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr. They were
married on Jan 14, 1945. However, no documents of marriage were prepared nor
executed. Only evidence offered was testimonies of the defendant and her
counsel.

Appellant

Silva

Australia

during

such
It

however,

was

married

to

time.

was

only

after

May

1945,

when

he

was
sent
back

to

US
for
medical
treatments

of

his

battle

wounds,

did

divorce
Aussie.
To
add,
on

May

9,
1948,
with

he

contracted

another

marriage

he

one

Priscilla

Isabel

of

co-

plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva. ISSUES:

WON appellants deception and fraud justified award of damages to defendant

WON defendant misrepresented herself as Mrs. Silva

HELD:

Judgment modified. Defendant appellee Esther Peralta is enjoined from


representing herself, directly or indirectly, as wife of appellant Saturnino
Silva; and appellant Silva is ordered to pay defendant PhP 30,000 by was of
pecuniary and moral damages, plus PhP 5,000 as attys fees.

RATIO:

(1) Yes, if appellant revealed his true situation, appellee would never have
agreed to be with appellant. Esthers loss of employment in the Girl Scouts
Davao Council was ultimately a result of Silvas deception and she should be
indemnified therefor. His concealment of his real status was not mere dolo but
actual fraud. He should then stand solely liable for any & all damages arising
therefrom.

Moreover, Esther acted in good faith since Slva formerly introduced her as
Mrs. Silva, sent her letters thus addressed which implied authority to use his
name.

(2) Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that no marriage had
really taken place. It is not proper for Esther to continue representing
herself as the wife of Saturnino considering that at the time, he was still
married to Priscilla Isabel. And as per Art 370 CC, a married woman is
authorized to use husbands surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from
doing likewise.

93. CALDERON VS. REPUBLIC 19 SCRA 721

Facts:

Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural
guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" be
changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon." It is alleged in the petition that
the petitioner is an illegitimate child, out of a bigamous marriage contracted
by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname "Del Prado" which
the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has
become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname which the petitioner
carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and would give
cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other people; that
petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C.
Calderon; and that it is the desire of the
petitioner

to

have
her
is

surname
the

changed from

"Del

Prado"

to

"Calderon

"which

surname

of
her
then

foster

father,

the

husband

of

her

mother.

granted

the
petition
and

ordered

petitioner

the

change

of

the

name

of

the

from

"Gertrudes
Josefina,
Calderon."

del

Prado,"

to

"Gertrudes

Josefina

The

court

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petition for a
change of name, based upon "proper and reasonable cause" redounding to the
best interest of the child

Held: The court says, "In the opinion of the Court the reasons adduced by the
petitioner are valid and will redound to the best interests of said minor who
after all is not at fault to have come to this world as an illegitimate
child." A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be
granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child.
When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind
what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her
husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one supporting the child and that he is
agreeable to the child's using his surname. The court further states that
"While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction
as the petitioner herein shall principally enjoy the surname of the father,
yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law, from taking
another surname with the latters consent and for justifiable reasons." The
purpose of the law in allowing a change of name, as contemplated by the
provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests. The
Solicitor General expresses an apprehension that because the petitioner here
is of tender age, who cannot as yet understand and appreciate the value of the
change of her name, may be prejudiced in her rights under the law. This

apprehension

is

dispelled

by
the
pronouncement
this

Court,

of
speaking

through Mr. Justice Makalintal, as follow:

...
name
as

But

change

of

authorized
Rule

103

under
does

not

by

itself define, or affect


a change in, one's existing family relations,
or in the rights and
duties
flowing
nor

therefrom;

does it create new

family rights and duties where none before was existing. It does not alter
one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only
the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him (38 Am. Jur.

596).

(In

Re

Petition

for

Change

of

Name

of

Joselito

Yu,

Juan

S.

Barrera vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-20874, May 25, 1966)

94. NALDOZA VS. REPUBLIC 112 SCRA 568

FACTS:

Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia. They begot two children
named Dionesio Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Zosima's husband left her after she
confronted him with his previous marriage with another woman. He never
returned to the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled Cong. Maglana in the sum
of 50,000.00 pesos and one Galagar in the sum of 10,000.00 pesos, also Eloy
Gallentes and other persons.

The classmates of Dionesio Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly teased them about
their father being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in
court against their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not two minors should be allowed to discontinue using their


father's surname and should use only their mother's surname.

HELD:

No, the two minors are not allowed to discontinue using their father's surname
and their mother's surname instead.

Mother's desire to change her children's surname should not be the sole
consideration for the change. Also, eliminating father's surname by the minor
children merely because their father is an alleged swindler is not sufficient
justification for change of surname. To allow the change of surname would
cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might create the impression
that the minors are illegitimate.

Article 364 of the Civil Code states that legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father. The minors Dionesio Jr. and
Bombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally
the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname. Rule 103, Section 5, Rules
of Court states, the change of name is allowed only when there are proper and
reasonable cases for such change.

95. LUKBAN VS. REPUBLIC 98 PHIL 574

Facts:

- Dec 10, 1933 petitioner married Lourdes Lukban but left after a fight.
Never came back in 20 years.

ISSUE: Won Francisco can be declared presumptively dead

HELD: No, since it isnt authorized by law and to be declared a widow is


dependent upon the death of her husband

RESULT: petition is denied

Gue v RP presumption of death cant be declared since you cant be dead.

96. ABOITIZ VS. PEPITO 18 SCRA 1028

FACTS:

- Between the night of November 30, and the early morning of December 1, 1961,
Demetrio Pepito, a crew member of m/v P. Aboitiz, disappeared therefrom while
said vessel was on voyage.

Dec. 26, 1961 Aboitiz Shipping Corp received from Vivencia Pepito a letter
dated Dec. 21, stating that it is being notified that one of its employees was
reported missing while m/v P. Aboitiz was navigating. The letter states that
it is believed that Demetrio is already dead.

Jan. 12, 1962 Vivencia filed with the Regional Office of Dept of Labor (DoL)
a notice and claim for compensation, asking for death benefits.

Feb. 15, 1962 Aboitiz receive a copy of the complaint/claim

Feb. 16, 1962 Aboitiz sent to the DoL its own version: Pepito disappeared
while off duty, and when the vessel was near Bucas Grande Island while the
ship was in navigation on a calm sea and good weather. We do not know if he
purposely jumped and swam ashore

- March 21, 1962 - without hearing, the Regional Administrator issued an award
for death benefits to respondents, planted upon the ground that the right to
compensation of the claimant has not been controverted by respondent within
the period provided for by law. The report states that Demetrio was found
missing on Dec. 1, 1961.

The MR was denied and the Workmens Compensation Commission affirmed

ISSUE: WON non-controversion of the fact that a person is missing is an


admission of the persons death NO

RATIO:

Aboitizs controversion (feb.16) was made beyond the periods set forth in the
law and the rules and regulations of the Workmens Compensation

Commission, namely, 14 days from the date of accident or 10 days from


knowledge thereof. According to its own report, it had knowledge of the
disappearance on Dec.1.

Logically, the next problem we face is the scope of the non-controversion


which may be clamped upon Aboitiz.

the

notice

and

claim

for

compensation

simply

says

that

while

the

vessel

was
navigating,

the

herein

deceased

was

lost

or

reported

missing.

This

claim was filed on January 12, 1962, or barely 42 days after the event took
place. At that time, no presumption existed that Demetrio Pepito was dead.

The boat was not lost. This opens up a number of possibilities. Because
nothing is certain. Nobody knows what has happened to him.

Legal implications such as right to compensation, succession, the legal


status of the wife are so important that courts should not so easily be
carried to the conclusion that the man is dead. The result is that death
cannot be taken as a fact. Non-controversion in compensation cases, as in the
case of pleadings in ordinary civil cases, simply means admission of facts,
not conclusions of law.

As applied to the case before us, the mere failure to controvert the statement
that Demetrio Pepito is believed to be dead or deceased because

he was lost or was reported missing, does not import an admission that the
man is actually dead, but that he was just lost or missing.

therefore, Aboitizs non-controversion admits but the fact that Demetrio


Pepito was lost or missing, but certainly is not an admission of the actual
fact of death.

Requiring Aboitiz to pay for death benefits violates its right to due process.
The Commission, to justify the award, refers to an investigation

report made 42 days after the incident by one Morales, a constabulary agent to
the effect that no one knew what happened to Demetrio Pepito because he
disappeared at midnight on a rough sea (big waves). But this report does not
prove death, it just confirms the fact of disappearance. Moreover, it was not
presented in any hearing, hence, it is a mere hearsay.

- At this point, more than 4 years has already elapsed, hence, the
disappearance could come within the coverage of art. 391, of CC: ART. 391. The
following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
estate among the heirs: (3) A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.

Hence,

the

records

of

the

case

are

returned

to

the

Workmens

Compensation

Commission for it to hold a hearing and render judgment accordingly.

97. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. LUCERO 124 SCRA 425

Facts:

Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed as captain of the ship EASTERN
MINICON of eastern shipping lines and under the contract, his employment was
good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically
terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It
was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be
paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila .

On February 16 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hong Kong to Manila,
Captain Lucero sent three distress messages to the company stating that due to
the violent weather, their voyage is at peril. Subsequently, his last message
was for his entire crew to abandon ship.

The company then notified the coast guard and the latter conducted a search,
but to no avail.

The insurers then informed the company about the loss of the vessel. Eastern
Shipping then paid the death benefits to the heirs of the crew, however the
widow of Capt. Lucero refused to accept the benefits.

Mrs. Lucero then filed a complaint for payment of the accrued salary of her
husband which the company stopped paying on March 1980. She then alleged that
because the contract of her husband was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, the
company should pay her for her husbands salary until the ill fated vessel
returned to the port of Manila.

The company refused to pay. The National seamen board upheld the complaint and
the decision was affirmed by the NLRC

Issue: WON Mrs. Lucero was entitled to the accrued salary

Held:

The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391 regarding the presumption of death at
sea. They argue that it was too early to presume that Mr. Lucero has died
because under the law, four (4) years have not yet passed.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost
during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;...

The Supreme Court ruled however that a preponderance of evidence from the
telegraph messages and the fact that the vessel was not heard of again show
that it can be logically inferred that the vessel has sunk and the crew
perished. As the Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts,
known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the

presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence
controls."

Hence the decision of the NLRC is reversed; however, death benefits should be
paid.

98. REYES VS. ALEJANDRO 141 SCRA 65

FACTS: Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the absence of her
husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their
conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and
his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left
neither will nor any property in his name or any debts.

The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established


that she and Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in
April 1962 her husband left the conjugal home due to some misunderstanding
over personal matters; that since then petitioner has not received any news
about the whereabouts of her husband; that they have not acquired any

properties during their marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation
in favor of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the petition is to
establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of
the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. After hearing the
Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L. Reyes
left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an
absentee.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the judicial declaration of absence
spouse for any purpose other than the protection of the interest or property
of the absentee.

HELD:

The

No, there is no need.

need

to

properties

have

which

person

have

judicially

to

be

by

the

declared

an

absentee

is

when

he

has

taken
cared
of

or

by

administered

representative

appointed

Court

384,

of

(Article

the

absentee

separation

of

is

Civil

Code);

asking

property

the

spouse

191,

Civil

for

(Article

Code) or his wife is asking the


Court
that the
administration of an
classes
of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code).

Considering that neither the petition alleges, nor the evidence shows, that
Roberto L. Reyes has any rights, interest or property in the Philippines,
there is no point in judicially declaring him an absentee as the primordial
purpose of the declaration is to provide for an administrator of the property
of the absentee.

REPUBLIC VS. MACLI-ING 135 SCRA 367

REPUBLIC VS. VALENCIA 141 SCRA 462

FACTS:

Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her 2 minor children,


Bernardo and Jessica Go, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of the birth of
Bernardo and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of Cebu. The case was docketed
as Special Proceedings.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition alleging that petition for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Article
412 of the New Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of clerical errors.

Respondent Leonor Valencia admitted that her petition involves substantial


changes which are change in the civil status and nationality or citizenship of
the respondents. The petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship
of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status
from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother
from "married" to "single". However, she also alleged that

substantial
civil
suit

changes

registry
is

filed,

in

record

the

may

evidence

be
is

allowed

if

proper

submitted,

notice

were

the petition was done.

given

and

publication

of

Local Civil Registry of Cebu filed the motion to dismiss the petition since
corrections are not merely clerical but substantial. Lower court denied the
motion to dismiss. Oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed by
way of petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the correction of


petitioners citizenship and civil status and the citizenship and civil status
of her minor children

HELD:

No. This Court adheres to the principle that substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.

What is an appropriate adversay proceeding? One having opposing parties;


contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded
the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding."
(Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39).

Article 412 of the New Civil Code speaks of a summary proceeding for
correction of entries in the civil registry that refer to mere clerical errors
such as mispelled names, occupation of parents, etc.

However, if the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has
been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.
Moreover, if all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition
for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if
filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer
be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to

the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected
and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries


of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of
Cebu was filed by respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant
to the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly
served on the Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The
order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar
and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the
entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said
petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic
on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent
Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary evidence in support
of her petition. The Republic on the other hand cross-examined respondent
Leonor Valencia.

The Court is of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the
lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction
of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and
the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well
be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.

101. KUMALA SALIM WING VS. ABUBAKAR 102 SCRA 523

FACTS:

Kumala

citizen,

Salim

Wing,

married

to

petitioner

Wing

herein,

Siong,

47

years

Muslim

woman

old,

Chinese

and

Filipino

citizen.

The
couple
have been married for almost ten (10) years now and that during
this
length

of time, they have six (6) children; and all these children are living and
none had died. The third child, Bio Heong, whose sex is sought to be corrected
in this petition, was born in Tulay, Jolo, Sulu. The couple had all their
children registered with the Immigration Office as aliens but that in the case
of Bio Heong, their third female child, a mistake as to her sex was committed
in the issuance of the child's certificate of live birth after the child, Bio
Heong was delivered from the womb of its mother, petitioner herein assisted by
the attending nurse, Hadji Kimjiok Donesa, who due to a confusion created by
other deliveries she attended the same day when Bio Heong was also delivered,
instructed Andami Labbay, her clerk, to prepare the Certificate of Live Birth
of the newly born child, Bio Heong, and dictated the entries to be filled up
in said document. This erroneous document was then filed with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Jolo, Sulu, without the attending nurse nor the
parents of the child having discovered its mistake before registration. The
couple had not discovered the mistake because both had no formal schooling and
does not read nor understand English. However, when the couple wanted to

register their child, Bio Heong, with the Immigration Office in Jolo, Sulu,
the error or mistake in the child's certificate of live birth was discovered
by the Immigration Office. Despite the discovery, the couple had the child,
Bio Heong, registered in the Immigration Office with the data used as
appearing in said certificate of live birth without correction. However, the
Immigration Officer advised the couple to see a lawyer to have the mistake
corrected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there must be an adversary proceeding, not one summary in


nature, in order to justify the correction of such an entry in the Civil
registry.

HELD:

YES. Considering the publication made, the appearance of the parties concerned
either personally or through their competent representatives and the
presentation of the evidence during the hearing, this petition is not summary
in nature, but it is undoubtedly an appropriate proceeding, where the matter
proved was threshed out in a regular trial on the merits. The persuasive
quality of the decision is thus apparent. No effort was spared to ascertain
the truth of the matter. What is clearly discernible is that an error was
committed and all that the Court did in accordance with law was to have it
corrected. It would be unwarranted under the circumstances, to reverse such a
decision. It must be affirmed.

1. Its conformity to the settled rule first set forth in the leading case of
Ty

Kong

Tin

v.

the

Philippines,

The

matter

was

the

Republic
1954

therein

of

decision,

is

quite

clear.

involved

citizenship

not

only

of

the

petitioner

but of his children. This Court, through Justice Bautista Angelo, in


interpreting Article 412 of the Civil Code, held: "After a mature
deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are
mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those which
may affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons

involved.
petition

If
is

error

then

order

in

the

purpose

merely

to

of

correct

the
a

the

court

may

issue

an

order

that

the

error

or

clerical

mistake

may be corrected. It refers to a substantial change, which affects the status


or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper
action depending upon the nature of the issue involved.

2. Nor would it be the first time that a procedure of this character did
suffice for the correction of an error in the records of the Civil Registrar.
In Malicden v.
Republic

16

this

Court

held

that

testimonial

evidence

may

override

an

erroneous entry. Thereafter, in Alisoso v. Lastimoso 17 this Court ruled that


an unauthorized false entry may be cancelled by the Court through an action of
this nature. Matias v. Republic, 18 the opinion being penned by then Acting
Chief Justice J.B.L Reyes, is even more in point. Thus: "Granting that the
supplying of a name that was left blank in the original recording of the birth
does not constitute, as contended by the Solicitor General, a rectification of
a mere clerical error, it is well to observe that the doctrine of the case of

Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321, and subsequent adjudications predicated


thereon, forbade only the entering of material corrections or amendments in
the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action against the
Civil Registrar. In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings
were not summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of
the court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested,
including direct service on the Solicitor General himself.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No costs.

102. LEONOR VS. CA 256 SCRA 69

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the
judgment of the lower court. It was shown that she was married to the private
respondent

and

they

had

three

kids.

While

her

husband

was

studying

and
working

abroad,

he

cohabited

with

another

woman.

This

prompted

her

to

file

for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed a
divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was
void for absence of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held in favor
of the private respondent. Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a
petition for the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the Philippines.
The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioners appeal. The
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the
latter denied the same. She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to
assail the validity of CAs decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?

HELD:

Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondents contention is


untenable. The Court explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning
typographical or other clerical errors in the marriage contract. It does not
apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children shall be
affected. The Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioner contending that
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.

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