Sec 21.

Closure of Roads and Opening of Roads

54. Municipalit of Cavite vs Rojas
Facts:
The defendants occupy a 93 squeare meter parcel of land, which is a
part of Plaza Soledad owned by plaintiff Municipality, by virtue of a
lease secured from the latter. The defendants are paying monthly
rentals to the Municipality and had constructed a house thereon, also
by virtue of a permit obtained from the same Municipality. When
plaintiff ordered the defendant to vacate and deliver possession of said
land, the latter refused. The trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants. Hence this appeal by bill of exceptions.
Issue:
Whether the trial court is correct in ruling that Municipality has no legal
right to the disputed land considering that it is subject to a lease
contract to which it is a party of.
HELD: No.
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the
municipal council of Cavite could not in withdraw or exclude from
public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of
the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public
place to the defendant for private use the plaintiff municipality
exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a
contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered
so to do.
The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not
outside he commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and
plazas and streets are outside of this commerce.
Therefore, the contract, is null and void and of no force or effect,
because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the
object of a contract. The defendant must restore and deliver
possession of the land to the municipality of Cavite, which in its turn

must restore to the efendant all the sums it may have received from
rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased.
55. Kwong Sing vs The City of Manila
Facts:
Petitioner is questioning the validity of Ordinance No. 532 issued by the
City of Manila, requiring establishments engaged in laundry and dyeing
services to issue receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish. The trial
court granted the preliminary injuction but in the end denied the
granting of the permanent injuction. Hence this appeal on the ground
that the questioned ordinance is enacted beyond the scope of the
Citys police power.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 532 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: Yes.
The government of the city of Manila possesses the power to enact
Ordinance No. 532. The Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
2744, section8, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila,
with the approval of the mayor of the city to regulate business
establishments. The word regulate as embodied in the Administrative
Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to
restrain. Under the power toregulate laundries, the municipal
authorities could make proper police regulations as to the modein
which the employment or business shall be exercised. Hence, the
business of laundries and dyeing andcleaning establishments could be
regulated, as this term is above construed, by an ordinance inthe
interest of the public health, safety, morals, peace good order, comfort,
convenience, prosperity, and the general welfare.
56.Primicias vs Fugoso
Facts:

Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties,

filed an action for mandamus against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of
the City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the
holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday
afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress to grievances on the ground that the
respondent refused to grant such permit.
ISSUE:
Whether the Mayor can validly refuse to issue permits for rallies or
holding of publicmeetings.
HELD: No.
The Mayor does not have the power to refuse to grant the permit,
but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or
specify the streets or public places where the parade or
procession may pass or the meeting may be held.
57. Calapan Lumber vs Community Sawmill
The Provincial Board issued Resolutions Nos. 222 and 119, granting
the Calapan Lumber Company an exclusive right to use the road
in dispute for a period of twenty (20) year and to prohibit
lumber or logging concerns from using the same without the
company's permission. This is because it was company who financed
for the construction of such road due to insufficiency of funds of the
Province.
Issue: Whether the resolutions granting Calapan the right to refuse
passage to other loggers are valid.
Held: No.
Resolutions Nos. 222 and 119 are ultra vires because the Revised
Administrative Code do not authorize the Provincial Board to pass
and adopt said resolutions.The fact that the survey, lay-out and
actual construction of the unfinished part of the road were done
at the appellee's expense, does not convert said road after
construction into a private road, for it does not appear that the

parts of the land where the road was laid out and constructed
belong to or are owned by the appellee. As such the road involved
in this case cannot be declared private property.
58. Cebu Oxygen vs Bercilles
Facts: Petitioner sought to register a land it bought from the City,
which was formerly a part of a street. Such land, through a
resolution, was declared to be an abandoned road and not part of the
City development plan. Thereafter, it was sold through a public
bidding and petitioner was the highest bidder. Opposed by the
fiscal, his application for registration was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether the lot can be registered in the name of the petitioner,
being its buyer.
Held: Yes, the land can be registered in the name of the buyer, because
the street in question has already been withdrawn from public use, and
accordingly has become patrimonial property. The sale of the lot was
therefore valid.
59. Cabrera vs CA
Facts:
The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158,
providing to close the old road leading to the new Capitol Building
of this province to traffic. Deeds of Exchange were executed
under which the Province of Catanduanes conveyed to buyers
portions of the closed road in exchange for their own respective
properties. Part of the northern end of the old road fronting the
petitioner's house was planted to vegetables in 1977 by Eulogia
Alejandro, one of the buyers. Anselmo Pea, who had bought
Angeles Vargas's share, also in the same part of the road,
converted it into a piggery farm. Petitioner filed a complaint for the
restoration of the old public road to public access.
Issue: Whether Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange
were invalid, as so too was the closure of the northern portion
of the said road.

Held: Yes. The authority of the provincial board to close that road
and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the
following provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation to
Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Subsequently, the sale of the land is valid, as being in accordance
not only with the charter but also with Article 422 of the Civil
Code, which provides: "Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State."
60. Macasiano vs Diokno
Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized
the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This
was passed pursuant to Ordinance No.2 which was approved by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority. Thereafter, the Municipality and
Palanyag entered into a contract agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain and manage the flea markets and the vending areas
in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the
treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque.
On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction
and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran.
He also wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea
market.
Issue: Whether an the ordinance issued by the municipal council of
Paraaque authorizing the lease & use of public streets and
thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.
Held: No.
The Streets in question are local roads used for public service and are
therefore considered public or govenrmental properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of

Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority to control or

regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested
upon them by Congress.
61. PilapilvsCA
Facts:
The Pilapils own a parcel of land situated in Bahak, Poblacion,
Liloan, Cebu.The Colomidas also own a parcel of land which is
located around 70 meters from the National Road. The Colomidas
claim that they had acquired from Sesenando Longkit a road
right of way which leads towards the National Road; this road
right of way, however, ends at that portion of the property of
the Pilapils where a camino vecinal exists all the way to the
said National Road. The Colomidas "tried to improve the road of
"camino vecinal", for the convenience of the public," but the
Pilapils allegedly harassed and threatened them with "bodily harm
from making said improvement." The Pilapils also threatened to
fence off the camino vecinal. Colomidas filed a complaint against
the Pilapils claiming that they have a right to access the camino
vecinal. Respondents ' claim that there is no camino vecinal, or if there
is, it is their private property. They presented as their witness Engr.
Epifanio Jordan, Municipal Planning & Development Coordinator of
Liloan, who prepared a zoning map of Poblacion, Liloan. The map
contains a portion which shows "camino vecinal" passing through
the land of respondents at Bahak, but he declared that the
"camino vecinal" on the map is merely a proposal by his office
to the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan.
Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Liloan has a camino
vecinal in sitio Bahak of barangay Poblacion, and if it does,
whether such road traverses the property of the Pilapils.
Held:
The SC ruled that the issue has been rendered moot by the unrebutted
evidence which
shows that the Municipality of Liloan, through its Sangguniang Bayan,
had approved a zoning plan,

otherwise called an Urban Land Use Plan showing that the camino
vecinal has been closed. It is beyond dispute that the establishment,
closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative
of the Municipality of Liloan. No private party can interfere with such a
right. Thus, the decision of the Municipality of Liloan with respect to
the said camino vecinal in sitio Bahak must prevail. It is thus pointless
to concentrate on the testimonies of the witnesses since the same
have, for all intents and purposes, become irrelevant. Being duly
proved to be an official act of the Municipality of Liloan, such binds not
only thePilapils and the Colomidas, but also the general public.
Section 22.
62. Favis vs Municipality of Sabangan
Facts:
Favis instituted an action for collection against defendant Municipality
for the recovery of the sum of money representing the charge invoice
for the GI pipes used by the latter for its waterworks construction.
Mayor Velasco, in the Municipalitys Answer alleged that the previous
mayor was not authorized to contract with plaintiff concerning the GI
pipes, there being no public bidding that was had, hence the
Municipality is not legally bound for the acts of the previous mayor. The
City Court rendered judgment in favor of Favis. In filing its appeal, the
Municipality did not deposit the docket fee nor filed an appeal bond
prompting plaintiff to move for the dismissal of the appeal on the
ground of non-perfection thereof.
Issue 1: Whether the Municipality, being a local government, is exempt
from the filing of docket fees.
Issue 2: Whether the Municipality is estopped by the acts of purchasing
made by the previous Mayor considering that it has benefitted
therefrom.
Held 1: No. While no costs shall be allowed against the Government of
the Philippines where it is the unsuccessful party, the general rule that
costs are imposed upon the unsuccessful party applies to public
corporations which sue and can be sued and municipal corporations.
The lower Court, however, did not commit a fatal error of jurisdiction in

erroneously holding that the defendant municipality was exempt from

payment of the appellate court docket fee provided in Rule 40, Section
2, and taking cognizance of its appeal. In appealed cases, failure to pay
the docketing fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of the
appeal, much less affect the Court's jurisdiction, the dismissal being
discretionary in the appellate court, and that this rule is applicable by
analogy to Courts of First Instance in the exercise of the appellate
jurisdiction conferred upon them.
Held 2: No. The doctrine of estoppel can not be applied as against a
municipal corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to
make. Also, where a contract is violative of public policy, the
municipality executing it cannot be estopped to assert the invalidity on
the ground; nor can it be estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract
which has ceded away, controlled, or embarrassed its legislative or
governmental powers. Contracts requiring public bidding affect public
interest, and to change them without complying with that requirement
would indeed be against public policy.
63. City of Manila vs Tarlac Corporation
Facts. These are separate appeals from the order dated 1964 of the CIF
of Manila directing the Register of Deeds to reannotate the entry on
the TCT issued in the name of Tarlac, and another TCT in the name of
Army and Navy Club of Manila, Inc. The parcels of lands which are the
objects of the titles were reclaimed from Manila Bay and given to the
City of Manila which the latter sold to BPOE in 1911 and to Army and
Navy Club on 1918. The annotations on the titles, provided that the
optional reacquisition by the City of Manila shall lapse after 50 years
from the original conveyance. In 1961, Mayor Arsenio Lacson of Manila
advised the BPOE that the City of Manila will exercise its right to
repurchase the land. In 1963, BPOE filed a petition for the cancellation
of the right of the City to repurchase the property as annotated in the
title. In the same year, it sold the land to Tarlac. Also, Army and Navy
Club filed for the cancellation of the same annotation in its title, with
were granted. In June 10, 1964, City of Manila filed the petitions for
reannotation, the judgment granting it is now being assailed. Appellant
contends that the previous order for deletion of the annotations
already became final and conclusive. The City maintained the view
that such stipulation is void for exceeding the 10-year period fixed for
repurchases in sales a retro hence it did not object to the order of
deletion.

Issue: Whether the Citys not filing of opposition to the petition of

cancellation of the annotation to repurchase is a bar to the
reannotation of the titles considering that it was deemed as a consent
judgment.
Held:
No. The rule is clear, and it is supported by abundant authority, that a
consent decree, in which the officials of a municipality assumed
obligations not authorized by law, is null and void.
Furthermore, the continued existence of the City's authority to
reacquire the property "for public purposes only" (sic) any time after
13 July 1961 is not debatable: for such authority is nothing more than
the City's right to exercise the power of
eminent domain which the City of Manila can not be deprived of. It
does not arise from contract, nor can it be barred by prescription. In
fact, it would exist without any reservation or stipulation at all.
64. Municipal Board vs CTA
The University of Southern Philippines Foundation applied for
inclusion in the list of real estate exempt from real property taxation
the its
parcels of land which it leased from various persons for school
purposes. The City Assessor declined the request as to some lands
which earn monthly rentals. Upon appeal, the Board of Assessment
Appeals granted the exemption to the questioned lots. Thus the
Municipal Board for and in representation of the City of Cebu, appealed
to the CTA. CTA dismissed the appeal on the ground that Cebu City,
represented by the Municipal Board cannot appeal from the decision of
the Board of Assessments Appeals.
Issue: Whether the City of Cebu can appeal from the decisions of the
Board of Assessments Appeals.
Held: Yes. The City of Cebu constitutes a political body corporate
created by a special charter, endowed with the powers which pertain
to a municipalcorporation. As such, it possesses the capacity to sue
and be sued. It is authorized to levy real estate taxes for its support.
65. Calleja vs CA

Petitioner filed an action for mandamus against Municipality of Iriga,

for having been removed from office despite being a civil service
eligible, praying for reinstatement and back-pay. The Municipal Officials
were represented the Provincial Fiscal and in collaboration with Atty.
Felix, the Municipal Attorney who signed the notice of appeal of the
judgment of the lower court ordering the reinstatement of petitioner
together with the other dismissed employees. The Provincial Fiscal did
not sign the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner objected to the approval of the
appeal by the lower court on the ground that the Provincial Fiscal is the
only official who can legally represent the Municipality and he had not
signed the said notice of appeal.
Issue: Whether Atty. Felix, in his capacity as Municipal Attorney for the
Municipality of Iriga, who appeared in collaboration with the Provincial
Fiscal as counsel for respondent municipality has the authority to sign
the notice of appeal in said case, without the accompanying signature
or conformity of the Provincial Fiscal.
Held: Yes. Section 3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic Act 2264 provides that
the municipality may create the office of Municipal Attorney who shall
act as the legal counsel of the municipality
66. Municipality of Paoay vs Manaois
Facts:
A write of execution was issued in favor of respondent against
Municipality. In compliance therewith, the Sheriff leveid upon the
properties of the Municipality; the rentals of the fishery belonging to
the Municipality and about forty fishery lots leased to different persons.
The Provincial Fiscal filed for the dissolution of the attachment of levy,
which was denied.
Issue: Whether the subject fisheries can be levied considering that
they are properties of the Municipality.
Held: No. The fishery lots numbering about forty in the municipality of
Paoay, are not subject to execution. However, the amount of P1,712.01
in the municipal treasury of Paoay representing the rental paid by
Demetrio Tabije on fishery lots which represent the revenue or income
coming from the renting of these fishery lots is certainly subject to
execution.

This activity of municipalities in renting municipal waters for fishing

purposes as a
business for the reasons that the law itself, Sec. 2321 of the
Administrative Code
allowed said municipalities to engage in it for profit. And it is but just
that a town so
engaged should pay and liquidate obligations contracted in connection
with said fishing business,
with the income derived therefrom.
The properties of such municipalities not held for public use, including
funds which are not essential to the performance of their public
functions, may be levied upon and sold to satisfy valid claims against
said municipalities.
67. Macondray vs Sarmiento
Facts:
Macondray is an agent and dealer of motor vehicles, accessories and
spare parts. Ordinance 2972, which imposes licensing fees on dealers
of second-hand motor vehicles, was passed. Another Ordinance No.
2980 was passed imposing license fees on business dealers in motor
vehicles and in accessories and other kinds of machines. This
ordinance was amended by Ordinance No 3046. The defendant under
Ordinance No. 2972 assessed the amount of P912.50 against the
plaintiff as license and permit fees and compromise, as dealer in
second hand motor vehicles.Plaintiff claims that Ordinance No. 2980 as
amended by Ordinance No. 3046 makes no distinction between new
and secondhand motor vehicles, it is to be deemed to cover both.
Issue: Whether the assessment of fees for the sale of second-hand
motor vehicles constitute double taxation.
Held: Yes.
The two ordinances 2980 and 3046 speak of motor vehicles in general
and without distinction, both in the title and in the body, except that in
the body of Ordinance No. 3046 (Sec. 1), under schedule (b), it refers
to accessories and spare parts (new only). When the Municipal Board
deemed it necessary to insert this phrase, the accessories and spare

parts mentioned in said schedule would cover and include both new
and second-hand. The same thing may be said of the motor vehicles
mentioned in Sec. 1. There would be no point in requiring a dealer in
motor vehicles both new and secondhand, to take out two separate
licenses and pay two separate quarterly fees on its gross sales when it
is willing as in this case to include the sales of its second-hand motor
vehicles in those of the new and thereby pay a higher rate of fees, as
provided for in Ordinances 2980 and 3046.
CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. No.
142971, May 7, 2002]
FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a
complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio
and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the
land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road
which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend
to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International
Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just
compensation at P20,826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that the lower
court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at
P20,826,339.50.
The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price
of the property at the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the lower courts decision in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint.
HELD: No. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of
reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of
R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall
be determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner has
misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We
did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be
determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated
therein that although the general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception:

where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was
taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings."
League of Cities v. Comelec
Case 1
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City
of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the constitutionality of the
subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Issue: The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution;
Held: The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA
9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more
than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not
in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes
to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city
are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and
was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved

bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in
the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still
be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Case 2
Held: Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision
and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts
(RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on
Congress deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then
pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum
income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159
proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as
the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into
a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as
such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded
the sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial
distinction.The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified
cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on
them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone
through would appear to be indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of
fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which
they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary
qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC
of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009.
Case 3
Held: No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration
of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its
November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood
Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities.
Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc
Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc
Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on

the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on

the main decision where there is no prior decision, the Court said. In
the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling
that the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which
expressly provides that no cityshall be createdexcept in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.
It stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be
embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code, the assailed
Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased income
requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. The
unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress
provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the
Constitution.Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power,
rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the
Constitution, the Court held.
The Court further held that limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as
the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the
16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No. 176951, League of
Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of
the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)
Case 4:
Held: he 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose
sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not
only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have
also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code]
LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress
undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair
play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its
imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress, the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the

coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of

PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon,
the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of
several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It
pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th
Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to
exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending
during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain
Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. [kutob ra diri]