ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty.
Valencia)
FIRST 3 CASES – ADDED BY ATTY.
VALENCIA*
JONAS TAGUIAM v. COMELEC and
ANTHONY C. TUDDAO (G.R. No. 184801, July
30, 2009)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City in Cagayan
during the 2007 National and Local
Elections. On May 19, 2007, petitioner was
proclaimed by the City Board of Canvassers
(CBOC) as the 12th ranking and winning
candidate for the said position with 10,981 votes.
Private respondent obtained 10,971 votes and
was ranked no. 13.
On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed with
the COMELEC a petition for correction of
manifest errors in the Election Returns and
Statement of Votes for 27 clustered precinct
and for the annulment of the proclamation of
the affected winning candidate in
Tuguegarao City. He alleged that he was
credited with less votes in several Statements of
Votes by Precincts (SOVP) as compared with
the tally of his votes in the election returns
(ERs), whereas petitioner was credited with
more votes. Private respondent offered evidence
in the following nine precincts: 0035A/0036A,
0061A/0063A, 69A/69B, 87A/87B, 192A/192B,
264A/265A, 324A/325B, 326A, and 328B.
On December 20, 2007, the Second Division of
the COMELEC granted instant Petition filed by
Anthony Tuddao for Correction of Manifest Error
and Annulment of Proclamation of Jonas
Taguiam.
The COMELEC concluded that nine votes
should be added to the total number of votes
garnered by private respondent; while 24 votes
should be deducted from the total number of
votes obtained by petitioner. Thus, the total
number of votes obtained by private respondent
was 10,980, while the total number of votes
received by petitioner was 10,957. As such,
private respondent was rightfully the 12th winning
candidate for the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the COMELEC En Banc on
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October 9, 2008. Hence, this Petition
for Certiorari
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of private
respondent’s petition for correction of
manifest errors in the Election Returns and
Statement of Votes despite its late filing.
RULING: No.
While the petition was indeed filed beyond the 5-
day reglementary period, the COMELEC
however has the discretion to suspend its rules
of procedure or any portion thereof. Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure state, to wit:
Sec. 3. Construction. – These rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote the
effective and efficient implementation of the
objectives of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections
and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action
and proceeding brought before the Commission.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. – In the interest
of justice and in order to obtain speedy
disposition of all matters pending before the
Commission, these rules or any portion thereof
may be suspended by the Commission.
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in
accordance with the spirit of Section 6, Article
IX-A of the Constitution which bestows upon the
COMELEC the power to "promulgate its own
rules concerning pleadings and practice before it
or before any of its offices" to attain justice and
the noble purpose of determining the true will of
the electorate.
In Jaramilla v. Commission on
Elections and Dela Llana v. Commission on
Elections, the Court affirmed the COMELECs
suspension of its rules of procedure regarding
the late filing of a petition for correction of
manifest error and annulment of proclamation in
view of its paramount duty to determine the real
will of the electorate. The Court has consistently
employed liberal construction of procedural rules
in election cases to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.
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For acting pursuant to its Constitutional mandate
of determining the true will of the electorate with
substantiated evidence, the Court finds no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
annulling the proclamation of petitioner. Said
proclamation is flawed from the beginning
because it did not reflect the true and legitimate
will of the electorate. Having been based on a
faulty tabulation, there can be no valid
proclamation to speak of.
CONSTANCIO D. PACANAN JR. v. COMELEC
and FRANCISCO M. LANGI, SR., (G.R. No.
186224, August 25, 2009)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr.
and private respondent Francisco M. Langi, Sr.
were candidates for mayor in the municipality of
Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007
elections. After the canvassing of votes, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of
Motiong, Samar proclaimed petitioner as the
duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of
3,069 votes against private respondents 3,066
votes.
Thereafter, private respondent filed with the
RTC a Protest dated May 25, 2007 which was
docketed as Election Case No. 07-1, contesting
the results of the elections in 10 of the 49
precincts in Motiong, Samar, and alleging acts of
violence and intimidation and other election
irregularities in the appreciation of the votes by
the MBC.
On January 7, 2008, the RTC rendered a
decision in Election Case 07-1, which declared
private respondent as the winner in the May 14,
2007 mayoralty race for Motiong, Samar with a
plurality of six (6) votes and annulled the
proclamation as mayor of the petitioner. Private
respondent was awarded the amount of P
32,510 as actual damages.
On January 10, 2008, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal and before the RTC, Branch 27,
Catbalogan, Samar. He also appealed the RTC
decision dated January 7, 2008 to the Comelec
which docketed the case as EAC No. A-13-2008.
On March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division
issued an Order dismissing the appeal for
Protestee-Appellants failure to pay the correct
appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Rules
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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of Procedure within the five-(5)-day reglementary
period.
On March 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Comelec En Banc
denied in the Resolution dated January 21,
2009, declaring that the appeal was not
perfected on time for non-payment of the
complete amount of appeal fee and for late
payment as well. The Comelec En Banc held
that the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over
the appeal because of the non-payment of the
appeal fee on time. Thus, the Comelec First
Division correctly dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioner invokes liberality in the application of
the election law. He asserts that the popular will
of the people expressed in the election of public
officers should not be defeated by reason of
sheer technicalities. Petitioner argues that the
true will of the people of Motiong in the May 14,
2007 elections should be determined by ordering
the Comelec to give due course to his appeal
and to resolve the same on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether the Order of Comelec First
Division and the Resolution of the Comelec
En Banc dismissing petitioner’s appeal be
set aside, applying the mandated liberal
construction of election laws with regards to
non-payment or the insufficient payment of
appeal fees.
RULING: The Court granted the petition.
Section 3, Rule 22 (Appeals from Decisions of
Courts in Election Protest Cases) of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates that the
notice of appeal must be filed within five (5) days
after promulgation of the decision.
Moreover, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the
Comelec rules require the payment of appeal
fees in appealed election protest cases, the
amended amount of which was set at P3,200.00
in Comelec Minute Resolution No. 02-0130,[11]
to wit:
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-
SC also provide the procedure for instituting an
appeal and the required appeal fees to be paid
for the appeal to be given due course.
With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC,
the previous rule that the appeal is perfected
only upon the full payment of the appeal fee,
now pegged at P3,200.00, to the COMELEC
Cash Division within the period to appeal, as
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stated in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended, no longer applies.
To clarify the procedural rules on the payment of
appeal fees, the COMELEC issued on July 15,
2008, Resolution No. 8486, which the Court
takes judicial notice of. The resolution pertinently
reads:
xxx The non-payment or the insufficient
payment of the additional appeal fee of
P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash
Division, in accordance with Rule 40,
Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended, does not affect
the perfection of the appeal and does not
result in outright or ipso facto
dismissal of the appeal. Following, Rule
22, Section 9 (a) of the COMELEC Rules,
the appeal may be dismissed. And
pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the
same rules, if the fees are not paid, the
COMELEC may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid and may
dismiss the action or the proceeding. In
such a situation, the COMELEC is merely
given the discretion to dismiss the
appeal or not.
The COMELEC First Division should have been
more cautious in dismissing petitioners appeal
on the mere technicality of non-payment of the
additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the public
interest involved in election cases. This is
especially true in this case where only one vote
separates the contending parties. The Court
stresses once more that election law and rules
are to be interpreted and applied in a liberal
manner so as to give effect, not to frustrate, the
will of the electorate.
Applying the mandated liberal construction of
election laws, the Comelec should have initially
directed the petitioner to pay the correct appeal
fee with the Comelec Cash Division, and should
not have dismissed outright petitioners appeal.
This would have been more in consonance with
the intent of the said resolution which sought to
clarify the rules on compliance with the required
appeal fees.
Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are
subject to a liberal construction. This liberality is
for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of the objectives of
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and for achieving
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Comelec.
The petition is granted. The case was
REMANDED to the Comelec First Division for
further proceedings, in accordance with the rules
and with this disposition.
SULIGUIN VS COMELEC (sa net ko lang to
kinuha)
Promulgate rules and regulations 
 The
COMELEC has the discretion to liberally
construe its rules and, at the same time,
suspend the rules, or any portion thereof, in the
interest of justice. Disputes in the outcome of
elections involve public interest; as such,
technicalities and procedural barriers should not
be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle
to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials.
Laws governing such disputes must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technical objections .
PART 1
PRELIMINARIES
I.1. General Provisions
I.2. Suffrage, Objectives, Underlying
Philosophy: Constitutional Provision,
Definition, Nature and Basis: Article 2,
Section1; Article V
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122250 & 122258. July 21, 1997
EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN,
BULACAN, and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA,
respondents.
FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
FACTS: The election for mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan was held on May 8, 1995. Blanco
received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038
votes. Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor
with 37,240 votes. On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed
with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify
Blanco. He alleged:
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xxxx
4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent
was maintaining his own `private army' at his
residence at Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
P/Insp. Ronaldo O. Lee of the Philippine
National Police applied for and was granted
search warrant no. 95-147.
5. In compliance with said search warrant, an
elite composite team of the PNP Intelligence
Command, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS),
and Bulacan Provincial Command, backed up by
the Philippine National Police Special Action
Force, accompanied by mediamen who
witnessed and recorded the search by video and
still cameras, raided the house of respondent
Florentino Blanco.
6. A video tape was taken of the proceedings
during the raid.
7. The composite team was able to enter the
said premises of respondent Florentino Blanco
where they conducted a search of the subject
firearms and ammunition.
8. The search resulted in the arrest of (6) men
who were found carrying various high powered
firearms without any license or authority to use
or possess such long arms.
9. During the search, members of the composite
team saw through a large clear glass window,
respondent's Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a
closed room of the subject premises.
10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and
his wife, the members of the composite police-
military team applied for the issuance of a
second search warrant so that they could enter
the said room to seize the said firearm.
11. While waiting for the issuance of the second
search warrant, respondent's wife and
respondent's brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming
to be the campaign manager of respondent in
the Nationalist People's Coalition Party, asked
permission to enter the locked room so they
could withdraw money in a vault inside the
locked room to pay their watchers, and the
teachers of Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995
elections.
12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs.
Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco, were
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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allowed to withdraw (10) large plastic bags from
the vault.
13. When the said PNP composite team
examined the (10) black plastic bags, they found
out that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes
which contained 200 pay envelopes. Each pay
envelope contained the amount of P1,000.00.
The total amount of money in the (10) plastic
bags is P10,000,000.00.
14. The labels found in the envelope shows that
the money were intended as respondent's bribe
money to the teachers of Meycauayan.
15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent
perpetrated the most massive vote-buying
activity ever in the history of Meycauayan
politics. This P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100
peso denominations totalling one thousand
pesos per envelope with the inscription `VOTE!!!
TINOY.'
This massive vote-buying activity through
respondent's organization called `MTB' or
`MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO
VOLUNTEERS.' The chairman of this movement
is respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who
admitted to the police during the raid that these
money were for the teachers and watchers of
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
An MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of
Precinct 77-A, Brgy. Jasmin, Bancal,
Meycauayan, Bulacan shows that the ID is
perforated in the middle. The purpose is for the
voter to tear the office copy and return it to
respondent's headquarters to receive the
balance of the P500.00 of the bribe money after
voting for respondent during the elections. The
voter will initially be given a down-payment of
P500.00.
16. This massive vote-buying was also
perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use
of flying voters. (6) flying voters were caught in
different precincts of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who
admitted after being caught and arrested that
they were paid P200.00 to P300.00 by
respondent and his followers, to vote for other
voters in the voter's list.
17. Respondent's paid voter will identify his
target from the list of voter and will impersonate
said voter in the list and falsify his signature.
One ne Ma. Luisa de los Reyes Cruz stated that
when she went to her precinct to vote, her name
was already voted upon by another person.
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18. Earlier before the election, respondent used
his tremendous money to get in the good graces
of the local Comelec Registrar, who was
replaced by this Office upon the petition of the
people of Meycauayan.
19. The second search warrant on respondent's
residence yielded to more firearms and
thousands of rounds of ammunition. These guns
were used by respondent to terrorize the
population and make the people afraid to
complain against respondent's massive vote
buying and cheating in today's elections.
20. The above acts committed by respondent
are clear grounds for disqualification under Sec.
68 of the Omnibus Election Code for giving
money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing election functions;
for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; and for spending in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed
by the Election Code. There are only 97,000
registered voters in Meycauayan versus
respondent's expenses of at least
P10,000,000.00 as admitted above.
On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex
Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation. The
COMELEC granted the motion after finding that
there was a "probable commission of election
offenses which are grounds for disqualification
pursuant to section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), and the evidence in support of
disqualification is strong."
On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift or
Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his
Answer to the petition to disqualify him.
On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC disqualified
Blanco on the ground of vote-buying, viz. Blanco
moved for reconsideration in the COMELEC en
banc. Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the
proceedings. He urged that as vice-mayor he
should be declared mayor in the event Blanco
was finally disqualified. The motions were heard
and the parties were allowed to file their
memoranda with right of reply. However, the
COMELEC en banc denied the motions for
reconsideration.
In this petition for certiorari, Blanco contends that
COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in upholding the validity of the May
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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17, 1995 order suspending proclamation of
Petitioner Blanco herein as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without the
benefit of any notice or hearing in gross and
palpable violation of Blanco's constitutional right
to due process of law; violating Blanco's right to
equal protection of the laws by setting him apart
from other respondents facing similar
disqualification suits whose case were referred
by COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant
to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering their
proclamation -- an act which evidently
discriminated against Petitioner Blanco; in
holding that questions of VOTE-BUYING,
terrorism and similar such acts should be resolve
in a formal election protest where the issue of
vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing
instead of disposing of the issue in a summary
proceeding; and ordering the proclamation of a
SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and
utter disregard of the doctrine laid down by in the
case of LABO vs. COMELEC.
On the other hand, Nolasco contends that he
should be declared as Mayor in view of the
disqualification of Blanco. He cites section 44 of
R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 and our decision in
Labo vs. COMELEC.
ISSUES:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and
equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly
elected mayor
HELD:
1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal
protection of the laws and his contention that the
minimum quantum of evidence was not met is
untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence
of guilt that should be strong to justify the
COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate’s
proclamation.
In any event, Blanco was given all the
opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. On May 25,
1995, he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the
Order suspending his proclamation. On May 29,
1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to
disqualify him. The COMELEC heard the
petition. Blanco thereafter submitted his position
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paper and reply to Alarilla's position paper. The
COMELEC considered the evidence of the
parties and their arguments and thereafter
affirmed his disqualification. The hoary rule is
that due process does not mean prior hearing
but only an opportunity to be heard. The
COMELEC gave Blanco all the opportunity to be
heard.
It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over proclamation and
disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of
the Constitution endows the COMELEC the all
encompassing power to "enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election x x x." We have long ruled that this
broad power includes the power to cancel
proclamations. Our laws are no less explicit on
the matter as provided in Section 68 of B.P. Blg.
881 and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
Blanco's contention that he was denied equal
protection of the law is off-line. He was not the
object of any invidious discrimination.
COMELEC assumed direct jurisdiction over his
disqualification case not to favor anybody but to
discharge its constitutional duty of disposing the
case in a fair and as fast a manner as possible.
2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor
of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in
the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the
candidate with the second highest number of
votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot
be an assumption that the second placer would
have received the other votes otherwise it is a
judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It
cannot be assumed that the second placer
would have won the elections because in the
situation where the disqualified candidate is
excluded, the condition would have substantially
changed.
Consequently, respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it
failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant
of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC. The dispute
at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the
municipality of Meycauyan, Bulacan. It concerns
the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of
republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which
our people express their sovereign judgment. Its
free exercise must be protected especially
against the purchasing power of the peso. As
succinctly held in People v. San Juan, "each
time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to
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assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of
republicanism is translated into living reality. If
that will must remain undefiled at the starting
level of its expression and application, every
assumption must be indulged in and every
guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested
exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to
impede, without authority valid in law, the free
and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage, is to
inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic
process."
G.R. No. L-46863, November 18, 1939
IRINEO MOYA, petitioner, vs. AGRIPINO GA.
DEL FIERO, respondent.
FACTS: This is a petition for review by certiorari
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
declaring the respondent, Agripino Ga. del
Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of mayor
of the municipality of Paracale, Province of
Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes
over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general
elections held on December 14, 1937, the
parties were contending candidates for mayor.
After canvass of the returns the municipal
council of Paracale, Del Fierro was proclaimed
as the elected mayor of said municipality with a
majority of 102 votes. Moya field a motion of
protest in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte. The Court of Appeals
rendered the judgment in favor of del Fierro
which is sought by Moya to be reviewed and
reversed upon the alleged errors committed:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or
contrary to the controlling decisions of this
Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."
ISSUE: Whether or not the ballots were
erroneously admitted in favor of del Fierro.
HELD: The SC dismissed the petition because
in result even if the ballots contested are
counted in favor of Moya, del Fierro still wins by
one vote.
First assignment of error:
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(1) With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in
precinct No. 2, ballot clearly appears admissible
for the respondent because the name written on
the space for mayor is "Primo del Fierro" or
"Pimo de Fierro", the error is technical and
deserves but scanty consideration.
(2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 was
erroneously admitted for the respondent; the
name written on the space for mayor being "G.T.
Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the
councilor "Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears;
but the intention of the elector is rendered vague
and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was
improperly counted for the respondent. As to this
ballot, the contention of the petitioner is
sustained.
(3) Ballot Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2 should
also have been rejected by the Court of Appeals.
The ballot bears the distinguishing mark "O. K."
placed after the name "M. Lopis" written on
space for vice-mayor. The contention of the
petitioner in this respect is likewise sustained.
(4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was
properly admitted for respondent. The elector
wrote within the space for mayor the name of
Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial
board and wrote the respondent's name
immediately below the line for mayor but
immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted
by him for vice-mayor. The intention of the
elector to vote for the respondent for the office of
the mayor is clear under the circumstances.
(5) Ballot F-131 in precinct No. 1 was also
properly counted for the respondent. The elector
wrote the respondent's name on the space for
vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake,
he placed an arrow connecting the name of the
respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed
on the left side of the ballot.
(6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for
the respondent. Although the name of the
respondent is written on the first space for
member of the provincial board, said name is
followed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico
Palma, which latter name is followed in the next
line by word "consehal" and the name of a
candidate for this position. The intention of the
elector to vote for the respondent for the office of
mayor being manifest.
(7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid for the
respondent. The Christian name of the
respondent was written on the second space for
member of the provincial board, but his surname
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was written on the proper space for mayor with
no other accompanying name or names.
(8) Ballot F-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein
"Agripino F. Garcia" appears written on the
proper space, is valid for the respondent. In his
certificate of candidacy the respondent gave his
name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The
conclusion of the trial court, upheld by the Court
of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro"
and "Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not
without justification and, by liberal construction,
the ballot in question was properly admitted for
the respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner
refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in
precinct No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and
Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots
appear to be among the 75 ballots found by the
Court of Appeals as acceptable for the
respondent on the ground that the initial letter
"P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is
a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy
of the respondent.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner
questions the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del
Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor. There
was no other candidate for the office of mayor
with the name of "Rufino" or similar name and,
as the respondent was districtly identified by his
surname on these ballots, the intention of the
voters in preparing the same was undoubtedly to
vote for the respondent of the office for which he
was a candidate.
The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72
ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the
office of mayor. Indicated under the discussion
of petitioner's second assignment of error,
namely, that "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del
Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the
certificate of candidacy of the respondent, we
hold that there was no error in the action of the
Court of Appeals in awarding the said ballots to
the respondent.
With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-
26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit
F-77 in precinct No. 2, SC accepted the rest of
the disputed ballots for the respondent not only
for the specific reasons already given but also
for the more fundamental reason that as long as
popular government is an end to be achieved
and safeguarded, suffrage must continue to be
the manes by which the great reservoir of power
must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
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wrought by the people through their Constitution
in the interest of good government and the
common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the
adoption of a representative type of government,
necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as
a particle of popular sovereignty and as the
ultimate source of the established authority. He
has a voice in his Government and whenever
called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it
efficacy and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally,
is the reason for the rule that ballots should be
read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with
reasonable, liberality.
No technical rule or rules should be permitted to
defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention
is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes
to the very root of the system. Rationally, also,
this must be the justification for the suggested
liberalization of the rules on appreciation of
ballots which are now incorporated in section
144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act
No. 357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two
ballots herein held to have been erroneously
admitted by the Court of Appeals for the
respondent, the latter still wins by one vote.
B petitioner vs.
BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and THE
B E
respondents
FACTS: COMELEC excluded from the canvass
for the election of delegates in the lone district of
the province of Sulu the returns from Siasi,
Tapul, Parang and Luuk for being spurious or
manufactured returns and therefore considered
as no returns at all. That was the effect of
massive violence, terrorism and fraud. Unless
set aside then, petitioner Abdulgafar Pungutan,
who otherwise would have been entitled to the
last remaining seat for de egates t t e
C nstituti na C n enti n w u d se ut t
esp ndent en a in u a a
etiti ne c ntended t at suc e c usi n
etu ns wi esu t t the disfranchisement
of a large number of legitimate voters. Petitioner
thus dispute the power of respondent
Commission to exclude such returns as a result
of oral testimony as well as the examination of
the fingerprints and signatures of those who
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allegedly voted as the basis for the holding that
no election in act did ta e p ace
ISSUE: WON the Commission exceeded its
constitutional power by encroaching on terrain
properly judicial, the right to vote being involved.
HELD: There is no merit to the contention that
respondent Commission is devoid of power to
disregard and annul the alleged returns for being
spurious or manufactured. The COMELEC has a
clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns. In
the discharge of its functions, it should be
allowed considerable latitude in devising means
and methods that will insure the accomplishment
of the great objective for which it was created --
free, orderly and honest elections.
If pursuant to Administrative Law, the findings of
fact of administrative organs created by ordinary
legislation will not be disturbed by courts of
justice, except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of
such findings ... there is no reason to believe
that the framers of our Constitution intended to
place the Commission on Elections — created
and explicitly made 'independent' by the
Constitution itself — on a lower level than said
statuory administrative organs.
How the right to vote is to be exercised is
regulated by the Election Code. Its enforcement
under the Constitution is, as noted, vested in
COMELEC. Such a power, however, is purely
executive or administrative. Thus, although
independent of the President — to which the
Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of
the 'enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of
decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.
The question of inclusion or exclusion from the
list of voters is properly judicial. As to whether or
not an election has been held is a question of a
different type. It is properly within the
administrative jurisdiction of COMELEC.
The rejection by the COMELEC of the returns in
question would result in the disfranchisement of
a large number of voters, but this is merely
provisional, subject to the final determination of
the validity of the votes at the protest that may
be filed with the Constitutional Convention.
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BADELLES VS. CABILI, 27 SCRA 11,
February 27, 1969
FACTS:
Two election protests against the duly
proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City,
after the elections, based on the allegations of
flagrant violations of certain mandatory
provisions of the Election Code, to be more
specifically set forth hereafter, were dismissed in
a single order by the Court of First instance of
Lanao del Norte. In one of them, the election of
Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City
Mayor of Iligan City, was contested by
protestant, Mariano Badelles. In the other, the
protestants are the now appellants, Bonifacio P.
Legaspi and Cecilio T. Barazon, who along with
the five protestees were among those who were
registered candidates voted for in such election
for councilors in the City of Iligan, with the
protestees being credited with the five highest
number of votes, with protestants Legaspi and
Barazon obtaining sixth and seventh places
respectively.
In the petition of protestant Badelles, it was
stated that both he and protestee Camilo P.
Cabili were the duly registered candidates for the
Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, both having
filed their respective certificates of candidacy in
accordance with law and as such candidates
voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It
was then alleged that the Board of Canvassers,
on November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected
protestee.
Protestant would impugn the election of Cabili on
the ground that there were "flagrant violations of
mandatory provisions of law relating to or
governing elections . . ." in that more than 200
voters were registered per precinct contrary to
the provision limiting such number of 200 only
and that no publication of the list of voters for
each precinct was made up to the election day
itself, enabling persons who under the law could
not vote being allowed to do so. As a result of
such alleged "flagrant violations of the laws
relative to or governing elections" around 8,300
individuals were allowed to vote illegally.
It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000
qualified voters were unable to exercise their
right of suffrage in view of their failure, without
any fault on their part, to have the proper
identification cards or the non-listing of their
names in the list of voters. It was stated further
that even in the case of those individuals
provided with identification cards with their
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names included in the list of voters, they could
not avail themselves of their right of suffrage as
their applications for registration could not be
found. Mention was also made of the fact that
the final lists of voters and the applications for
registration were delivered to their respective
precincts late on election day itself thus
preventing them from voting.
Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged, was
caused by the excessive number of voters being
listed and many having been assigned to
precincts other than the correct ones. What was
thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were
cast by those not qualified to do so, numbering
8,300 or more and that an approximately equal
number, who were duly registered with the
Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were
unable to vote due to the above circumstances.
The proclamation then could not have reflected
the true will of the electorate as to who was the
mayor elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili
over the protestant consisted of only 2,344
votes. The prayer was for the proclamation of
protestee as well as other candidates for elective
positions being set aside and declared null and
void, protestant pleading further that he be
granted other such relief as may be warranted in
law and equity. The protest of the candidates for
councilor Legaspi and Barazon, in the other case
against protestees was in substance similarly
worded.
In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to
dismiss the petition on the following grounds:
1. That the protest was filed beyond the
reglementary period;
2. That the lower court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the COMELEC being the
proper body to hear the same;
3. That the complaint states no cause of action.
The single order of dismissal in both cases as
indicated was based on the lack of a cause of
action. The reasoning followed by the lower
court in reaching the above conclusion that there
was no cause of action proceeded along these
lines:
"Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of
election officers which do not tend to affect the
result of the elections are not of themselves
either ground for contest or for proper matters of
inquiry. . . .There is no allegation in the protest
that the alleged irregularities committed by the
election officers would tend to change the result
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of the election in favor of the protestants and
against t e p testees ”
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal issued by
COMELEC on March 23, 1968 is valid.
HELD: NO. Without the lower court having so
intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial
abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire into and
pass upon in an appropriate proceeding
allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such
character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Why an election protest is more fitly and
appropriately the procedure for determining
whether irregularities or serious violations of the
electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections
was clearly and succinctly explained in the
Moscoso decision, the opinion coming from
Justice Makalintal.
Thus: "The question of whether or not there had
been terrorism, vote-buying and other
irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban
City should be ventilated in a regular election
protest, pursuant to Section 174 of the Election
Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city
board of canvassers from canvassing the
election returns and proclaiming the winning
candidates for municipal offices."
It would follow then that if the grievance relied
upon is the widespread irregularities and the
flagrant violations of the election law, the proper
remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.
That such should be the case should occasion
no surprise. If that right be disregarded or
frittered away, then popular sovereignty
becomes a myth. A republic then to be true to its
name requires that the government rests on the
consent of the people, consent freely given,
intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and
thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really
looked upon as the ultimate sources of
established authority. It is their undeniable right
to have officials of their unfettered choice. The
election law has no justification except as a
means for assuring a free, honest and orderly
expression of their views. It is of the essence
that corruption and irregularities should not be
permitted to taint the electoral process. It may
not always be thus unfortunately. That should be
the ideal however. If there be a failure to observe
the mandates of the Election Code, the
aggrieved parties should not be left remediless.
Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an
election protest that fitly serves that purpose. It
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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was sought to be thus utilized in these two
cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and far from
entirely satisfactory manner. That in itself is no
reason for the courts to slam the door against
any opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what
would happen if the order of dismissal
complained of were not set aside. Hence the
inevitability of its reversal.
The scope of our decision must not be
misinterpreted however. All that it directs is that
the protestees in both cases be required to
answer. Thereafter, if, as is not unlikely, there be
a denial of the serious imputations made as to
the alleged irregularities, the lower court could
properly inquire into what actually transpired.
After the facts are thus ascertained in
accordance with the accepted procedural rules,
then the appropriate law could be applied. It
must be clearly emphasized that we do not at
this stage intimate any view as to the merit, or
lack of it, of either protest. That would be
premature to say the least.
All we do is to set aside the order of dismissal.
The order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is
reversed and the two cases remanded to the
lower court for proceeding and trial in
accordance with this opinion and the law.
ROMUALDEZ VS RTC TACLOBAN
226 SCRA 408
FACTS:
Petitioner Philip Romuadez is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, also the son of the
former Governor of Leyte and nephew of then
First Lady Imelda Marcos.
In the early 1980s, he established his legal
residence in Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte by
causing the cinstruction of his residential house
therein. He also served as Brgy. Captain in the
1980s and had also acted as Campaign
Manager of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan in
Leyte, where he voted in the 1984 Batasan
Election and in the 1986 Snap Presidential
Election.
During the People Power Revolution in 1986,
petitioner and his immediate family fled to the
US, and on December 23, 1991, he was able to
return to the Philippines and immediately went
back to his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
On February 1, 1992, petitioner registered
himself anew as a voter of Precinct #9 of said
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place. The Chairman of the BOI, who had known
him to be a resident of the place, allowed his
registration.
On February 21, 1992, respondent Donato
Advincula filed a petition with the MTC of Tolosa
praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list
of voters in Precinct #9 alleging that:
a. Romualdez was a resident of
Massachusetts, USA;
b. R ua dez’s p essi n & ccupati n
was in the USA; and
c. Romualdez does not have the required 1-
year residence in the Philippines and the
6 months residence in the
city/municipality to qualify as registered
voter.
Romualdez contended that he has been a
resident of Tolosa since early 1980s and that he
has not abandoned his residence from his
physical absence from 1986-1991.
After hearing, the court decided in favor of
Romualdez. Thus, Advincual appealed to the
RTC which reversed the decision of the lower
court thereby ordering the COMELEC of Tolosa,
Leyte to delete and cancel the name of petitioner
from the list of qualified voters.
ISSUES:
W/N The MTC or RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the petitions. YES
W/N Romualdez is qualified to be registered
as a voter. YES
HELD:
Section 142 of the Omnibus Election Coe
provides that any registered voter in the city or
municipality may petition for the exclusion of
voter from the list. However, in the case at bar,
Romualdez was estopped from assailing lack of
jurisdiction by reason of his active participation in
the proceedings before a court without
jurisdiction. Romualdez has sought an
affirmative relief when the appeal was made to
the RTC whose jurisdiction, he, in effect invoked.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and
residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he
term "residence" as used in the election law is
synonymous with "domicile", which imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention."
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure,
or for like reasons, one intends to return. That
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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residence, in the case of the petitioner, was
established during the early 1980's to be at
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence
thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In
other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
The political situation brought about by the
"People's Power Revolution" must have truly
caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes,
as well as a serious concern over the safety and
welfare of the members of their families. Their
going into self-exile until conditions favorable to
them would have somehow stabilized is
understandable. Certainly, their sudden
departure from the country cannot be described
as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of
residence" at least in the context that these
terms are used in applying the concept of
"domicile by choice."
We have closely examined the records, and we
find not that much to convince us that the
petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his residence
in the Philippines and established his domicile
elsewhere.
It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a
most precious political right, as well as a
bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and
requiring him to participate in the process of
government so as to ensure that the government
can truly be said to derive its power solely from
the consent of the governed.
I.3. Suffrage as a right and privilege:
LACSON VS POSADAS
72 SCRA 168
FACTS:
Municipal Judge Ramon Posadas of Talisay,
Negros Occidental is charged in a complaint filed
by Lacson for ignorance of the law, partiality and
violation of Lection Code 1971.
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Judge Posadas was found to have failed to
comply with the requirements of Sec. 136 of the
Election Code of 1971 which states:
Any person who has been refused
registration or whose name has been
stricken out from the permanent list of
voters may at any time except sixty (60)
days before a regular election or twenty-
five (25) days before a special election,
apply to the proper court for an order
directing the election registration board or
the board of inspectors as the case may
be, to include or reinstate his name in the
permanent list of voters, attaching to his
application for inclusion the certificate
of the Electron registration board or
the board of inspectors regarding his
case and proof of service of a copy of his
application and of the notice of hearing
thereof upon a member of the said board.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Posadas violated the right
to Suffrage of Lacson. YES
HELD:
In our republican system of government, the
exercise by the people of their right of suffrage is
the expression of their sovereign will. It is,
therefore, absolutely essential that the free and
voluntary use of this right be effectively protected
by the law and by governmental authority. As
stated in an earlier case:
* * * The people in clothing a citizen with
the elective franchise for the purpose of
securing a consistent and perpetual
administration of the government they
ordain, charge him with the performance
of a duty in the nature of a public trust,
and in that respect constitute him a
representative of the whole people. This
duty requires that the privilege thus
bestowed should be exercise, not
exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or
class of citizens professing it, but in good
faith and with an intelligent zeal for the
general benefit and welfare of the state. In
the last analysis, therefore, the inclusion
in or exclusion from the permanent
electoral list of any voter concerns not
only the latter in his individual capacity but
the public in general.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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I.4: Suffrage as a duty:
G.R. No. L-47243 June 17, 1940
CIPRIANO ABAÑIL, ET AL., vs. JUSTICE OF
THE PEACE COURT OF BACOLOD, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, ET AL.
FACTS:
In the year 1937 the total number of registered
voters in the municipality of Talisay, Negros
Occidental, was 3,658. In 1938, the electoral
census of the place showed that the number of
registered voters had increased to 18,288.
A few days before the election for Assemblymen,
there were 17,344 petitions filed in the justice of
the peace court of Bacolod for the exclusion of
the names of an equal number of persons from
the permanent list of registered voters on the
grounds that (1) they were not residents of
Talisay in accordance with the Election Code, (2)
that they could not prepare their ballots
themselves, and that (3) their registration as
voters was not done in accordance with law.
The hearing of the petitions for exclusion was
held and attorneys Hilado, Parreño, Remitio and
Severino entered their appearance for the
challenged voters. The justice of the peace of
Bacolod ascertained who of the challenged
voters were present in court and who were
absent. Thereafter the said justice of the peace
declared those who were absent in default.
Failing to obtain a reconsideration, the attorneys
for the challenged voters moved for all the
petitions to be forwarded to the CFI of Negros
Occidental which was then presided over by two
Judges.
The attorneys for the petitioners in the said
17,344 exclusion cases objected on the ground
that the aforesaid attorneys had no authority to
represent those who were absent. Whereupon
the justice of the peace of Bacolod ruled that
said attorneys could represent only the 87
challenged voters who were present in the court
room and at the same time the justice of the
peace dismissed 253 of the petitions upon
motion of the petition upon motion of the
petitioners themselves.
Although no evidence was presented by the
petitioners in support of their petition against
those who, were declared in default, the justice
of the peace of Bacolod ordered their exclusion
from the list of voters on the ground that it was
the duty of the challenged voters to appear in
court in order to be personally examined in
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accordance with section 118 (f) of the Election
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the justice of the peace of
Bacolod erred when it did not grant the motion to
remand all the exclusion cases to the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental.
RULING:
The SC held that the judgment appealed from
will accordingly be reversed and in the exercise
of their discretionary power, the case remanded
to the CFI of Negros Occidental with instruction
to hear and decide the petitions for exclusion of
the merits, giving the parties every opportunity to
present their respective evidence so that it may
thereafter make such corrections in the electoral
census of Talisay, Negros Occidental.
Section 113 of the Election Code provides that if
the Judge of the CFI is in the province, the
proceedings for the inclusion from the list of
voters shall, upon petition of any interested party
filed before the presentation of evidence, be
remanded to the said Judge who shall hear and
decide the same in the first and last instance.
When, therefore, the attorneys for the
challenged voters moved the justice of the peace
of Bacolod to remand all the exclusion cases to
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
then presided over by two Judges, it was
mandatory on said justice of the peace to grant
the motion. In view of the nature of the
proceedings which affect public interest, it was
error for the aforesaid justice of the peace not to
have remanded all the petitions for exclusion to
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
In the scheme of our present republican
government, the people are allowed to have a
voice therein through the instrumentality of
suffrage to be availed of by those possessing
certain prescribe qualifications (Article V,
Constitution of the Philippines; sections 93 and
94, Election Code). The people in clothing a
citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose
of securing a consistent and perpetual
administration of the government they ordain,
charge him with the performance of a duty in the
nature of a public trust, and in that respect
constitute him a representative of the whole
people. This duty requires that the privilege thus
bestowed should be exercised, not exclusively
for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens
professing it, but in good faith and with an
intelligent zeal for the general benefit of the
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state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 588.) In the
last analysis, therefore, the inclusion from the
permanent electoral list of any voter concerns
not only the latter in his individual capacity but
the public in general.
I.5. Role of the Judiciary:
G.R. No. L-46863, November 18, 1939
IRINEO MOYA, petitioner, vs. AGRIPINO GA.
DEL FIERO, respondent.
FACTS: This is a petition for review by certiorari
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
declaring the respondent, Agripino Ga. del
Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of mayor
of the municipality of Paracale, Province of
Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes
over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general
elections held on December 14, 1937, the
parties were contending candidates for mayor.
After canvass of the returns the municipal
council of Paracale, Del Fierro was proclaimed
as the elected mayor of said municipality with a
majority of 102 votes. Moya field a motion of
protest in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte. The Court of Appeals
rendered the judgment in favor of del Fierro
which is sought by Moya to be reviewed and
reversed upon the alleged errors committed:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or
contrary to the controlling decisions of this
Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."
ISSUE: Whether or not the ballots were
erroneously admitted in favor of del Fierro.
HELD: The SC dismissed the petition because
in result even if the ballots contested are
counted in favor of Moya, del Fierro still wins by
one vote.
First assignment of error:
(1) With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in
precinct No. 2, ballot clearly appears admissible
for the respondent because the name written on
the space for mayor is "Primo del Fierro" or
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"Pimo de Fierro", the error is technical and
deserves but scanty consideration.
(2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 was
erroneously admitted for the respondent; the
name written on the space for mayor being "G.T.
Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the
councilor "Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears;
but the intention of the elector is rendered vague
and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was
improperly counted for the respondent. As to this
ballot, the contention of the petitioner is
sustained.
(3) Ballot Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2 should
also have been rejected by the Court of Appeals.
The ballot bears the distinguishing mark "O. K."
placed after the name "M. Lopis" written on
space for vice-mayor. The contention of the
petitioner in this respect is likewise sustained.
(4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was
properly admitted for respondent. The elector
wrote within the space for mayor the name of
Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial
board and wrote the respondent's name
immediately below the line for mayor but
immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted
by him for vice-mayor. The intention of the
elector to vote for the respondent for the office of
the mayor is clear under the circumstances.
(5) Ballot F-131 in precinct No. 1 was also
properly counted for the respondent. The elector
wrote the respondent's name on the space for
vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake,
he placed an arrow connecting the name of the
respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed
on the left side of the ballot.
(6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for
the respondent. Although the name of the
respondent is written on the first space for
member of the provincial board, said name is
followed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico
Palma, which latter name is followed in the next
line by word "consehal" and the name of a
candidate for this position. The intention of the
elector to vote for the respondent for the office of
mayor being manifest.
(7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid for the
respondent. The Christian name of the
respondent was written on the second space for
member of the provincial board, but his surname
was written on the proper space for mayor with
no other accompanying name or names.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
(8) Ballot F-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein
"Agripino F. Garcia" appears written on the
proper space, is valid for the respondent. In his
certificate of candidacy the respondent gave his
name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The
conclusion of the trial court, upheld by the Court
of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro"
and "Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not
without justification and, by liberal construction,
the ballot in question was properly admitted for
the respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner
refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in
precinct No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and
Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots
appear to be among the 75 ballots found by the
Court of Appeals as acceptable for the
respondent on the ground that the initial letter
"P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is
a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy
of the respondent.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner
questions the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del
Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor. There
was no other candidate for the office of mayor
with the name of "Rufino" or similar name and,
as the respondent was districtly identified by his
surname on these ballots, the intention of the
voters in preparing the same was undoubtedly to
vote for the respondent of the office for which he
was a candidate.
The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72
ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the
office of mayor. Indicated under the discussion
of petitioner's second assignment of error,
namely, that "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del
Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the
certificate of candidacy of the respondent, we
hold that there was no error in the action of the
Court of Appeals in awarding the said ballots to
the respondent.
With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-
26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit
F-77 in precinct No. 2, SC accepted the rest of
the disputed ballots for the respondent not only
for the specific reasons already given but also
for the more fundamental reason that as long as
popular government is an end to be achieved
and safeguarded, suffrage must continue to be
the manes by which the great reservoir of power
must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
wrought by the people through their Constitution
in the interest of good government and the
common weal.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 14

Republicanism, in so far as it implies the
adoption of a representative type of government,
necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as
a particle of popular sovereignty and as the
ultimate source of the established authority. He
has a voice in his Government and whenever
called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it
efficacy and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally,
is the reason for the rule that ballots should be
read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with
reasonable, liberality.
No technical rule or rules should be permitted to
defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention
is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes
to the very root of the system. Rationally, also,
this must be the justification for the suggested
liberalization of the rules on appreciation of
ballots which are now incorporated in section
144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act
No. 357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two
ballots herein held to have been erroneously
admitted by the Court of Appeals for the
respondent, the latter still wins by one vote.
B petitioner vs.
BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and THE
PROVIN B E
respondents
FACTS: COMELEC excluded from the canvass
for the election of delegates in the lone district of
the province of Sulu the returns from Siasi,
Tapul, Parang and Luuk for being spurious or
manufactured returns and therefore considered
as no returns at all. That was the effect of
massive violence, terrorism and fraud. Unless
set aside then, petitioner Abdulgafar Pungutan,
who otherwise would have been entitled to the
last remaining seat for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention would lose out to
respondent Benjamin Abuba a
etiti ne c ntended t at suc e c usi n
etu ns wi esu t t the disfranchisement
of a large number of legitimate voters. Petitioner
thus dispute the power of respondent
Commission to exclude such returns as a esu t
a testi n as we as t e e a inati n
t e inge p ints and signatu es t se w
a eged ted as t e asis t e ding t at
n e ecti n in act did ta e p ace
ISSUE: WON the Commission exceeded its
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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constitutional power by encroaching on terrain
properly judicial, the right to vote being involved.
HELD: There is no merit to the contention that
respondent Commission is devoid of power to
disregard and annul the alleged returns for being
spurious or manufactured. The COMELEC has a
clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns. In
the discharge of its functions, it should be
allowed considerable latitude in devising means
and methods that will insure the accomplishment
of the great objective for which it was created --
free, orderly and honest elections.
If pursuant to Administrative Law, the findings of
fact of administrative organs created by ordinary
legislation will not be disturbed by courts of
justice, except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of
such findings ... there is no reason to believe
that the framers of our Constitution intended to
place the Commission on Elections — created
and explicitly made 'independent' by the
Constitution itself — on a lower level than said
statuory administrative organs.
How the right to vote is to be exercised is
regulated by the Election Code. Its enforcement
under the Constitution is, as noted, vested in
COMELEC. Such a power, however, is purely
executive or administrative. Thus, although
independent of the President — to which the
Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of
the 'enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of
decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.
The question of inclusion or exclusion from the
list of voters is properly judicial. As to whether or
not an election has been held is a question of a
different type. It is properly within the
administrative jurisdiction of COMELEC.
The rejection by the COMELEC of the returns in
question would result in the disfranchisement of
a large number of voters, but this is merely
provisional, subject to the final determination of
the validity of the votes at the protest that may
be filed with the Constitutional Convention.
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2. Elections; Essence of Elections; Basis of
Plurality of Votes; Construction of Election
Laws/Limitations to Liberal Construction:
Topic: Construction of Election Laws
G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000
ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI
JAMIL DIMAPORO
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Maruhom and Dimaporo were both candidates
for Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao
del Sur. During the counting of votes, serious
irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds
were committed at the instance of petitioner or
his followers in that votes actually casted for the
private respondent were not counted and
credited in his favor thru the concerted acts,
conspiracy and manipulation of the Board of
Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer and
the Machine Operator who happens to be a
nephew of the petitioner. Many official ballots
were refused or rejected by the machine.
As a result of the foregoing irregularities,
anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner
was illegally proclaimed as winner because he
appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the
private respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a
slight margin of only 20 votes.
Private respondent, knowing that he was
cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed
before COMELEC a petition to annul the
proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom
as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao
del Sur.
Subsequently, a Revision Committee was
created and its membership were duly appointed
in open court which committee was directed by
the COMELEC to finish the revision of ballots.
After the Revision Committee was directed by
the respondent to commence the revision of
ballots, petitioner filed a counter-protest praying
to hold in abeyance further proceedings since
the protest is subject to petition filed with the
COMELEC.
In support of his cause, petitioner insists that
there is "nothing irregular or anomalous in the
filing of the motion to dismiss" after the filing of
the answer because in effect he is merely
insisting on a preliminary hearing of his special
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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and affirmative defenses. Thus, he claims that
the summary dismissal of his motion to dismiss
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in dismissing SPR No. 52-98.
RULING:
It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case,
that the roundabout manner within which
petitioner virtually substituted his answer by
belatedly filing a motion to dismiss three (3)
months later is a frivolous resort to procedure
calculated to frustrate the will of the electorate.
As pointedly observed by the COMELEC in its
challenged Resolution dated July 6, 1999,
petitioner only filed his motion to dismiss "when
the results of the trial appeared to be adverse to
him" or right after the creation of the Revision
Committee had been ordered by the trial court. If
petitioner truly intended to move for the
preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative
defenses as he claims, then he should have
simultaneously moved for the preliminary
hearing of his special and affirmative defenses at
the time he filed his answer. Otherwise, he
should have filed his motion to dismiss "within
the time for but before filing the answer"
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
While the challenged COMELEC Resolution may
not have been entirely correct in dismissing the
petition in this regard, the soundness of its
discretion to accord unto the trial court the
competence to resolve the factual issues raised
in the controversy cannot be doubted.
Section 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution
gives the COMELEC the broad power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall." There can
hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of
this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC
all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
In accordance with this intent, the Court has
been liberal in defining the parameters of the
COMELECs powers in conducting elections.
Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing
election contests especially the appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the electorate in the choice of
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 16

public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. An election protest is imbued with
public interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of
the people is imperative, much more so in this
case considering that a mere twenty (20) votes
separates the winner from the loser of the
contested election results.
Laws and statutes governing election contests
especially the appreciation of ballots must be
liberally construed and that in applying election
laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex
but little understood legalisms.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PENA V. HRET
G.R. No. 123037
March 21, 1997
FACTS:
Pena and Abueg were rivals for the
Congressional seat in Palawan during the May
8, 1995 elections. Apparently, Abueg was
proclaimed winner.
On May 22, Pena filed a petition AD CAUTELAM
with the HRET, claiming that the elections in the
2nd district of Palawan were tainted with massive
fraud, widespread vote--‐ buying, intimidation
and terrorism and other serious irregularities
committed before, during and after the voting,
and during the counting of votes and the
preparation of election returns and certificates of
canvass which affected the results of the
election.
Because of these irregularities, Pena stated that
he lost the election by almost 7k votes. He then
assai ed ueg’s p c a ati n
Abueg filed an answer and a motion to dismiss
on June 23, averring that the HRET has not
acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same
being insufficient in form and substance. In
essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its
challenge on the fact that the petition failed to
allege the precincts where the massive fraud
and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor
did it point out how many votes would be gained
by the protestant as a result of the same.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
Pena later submitted a list of specific contested
p ecincts n Ju 10, 17 da s a te ueg’s
answer.
In October, the HRET ruled that while it had
jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the said petition, however, fails
to state a cause of action, and is therefore,
insufficient in form and substance, meriting its
dismissal.
Pena filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the HRET committed GAOD in dismissing
ena’s petiti n ad cuatelam for lack of
substance (which Pena later cured)? NO.
HELD:
ena’s petition lacking substance dismissal
proper
A perusal of the petition Ad Cuatelam,
reveals that petitioner makes no specific
mention of the precincts where
widespread election, fraud and
irregularities occurred. This is a fatal
omission, as it goes into the very
substance of the protest.
The prescription that the petition must be
sufficient in form and substance means that the
petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If
the allegations contained therein are
unsupported by even the faintest whisper of
authority in fact and law, then there is no other
course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise,
the assumption of an elected public official may,
and will always be held up by petitions of this
sort by the losing candidate.
The defect in the instant case arises from the
failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a
a e a egati n “ assi e aud, widesp ead
intimidation and terrorism and other serious
i egu a ities,” wit ut speci icati n and
substantiation of where and how these
occurrences took place, appears in the petition.
We cannot allow an election protest based on
such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise,
the whole election process will deteriorate into
an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other,
racing to disembark from the water.
Substantial amendments may be allowed but
must be within time period (10 days after
winner’s proclamation)
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 17

The Court has already ruled in Joker P.
Arroyo vs. HRET, that substantial
amendments to the protest may be
allowed only within the same period for
filing the election protest, which, under
Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of
Procedure is ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
Exception to liberal construction
While it is conceded that statutes
providing for election contests are to be
liberally construed to the end that the will
of the people in the choice of public
officers may not be defeated by mere
technical questions, the rule likewise
stands, that in an election protest, the
protestant must stand or fall upon the
issues he had raised in his original or
amended pleading filed prior to the
lapse of the statutory period for filing
the protest.
Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the
power to annul an election should be exercised
with the greatest care as it involves the free and
fair expression of the popular will. It is only in
extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances
which demonstrate to the fullest degree a
fundamental and wanton disregard of the law
that elections are annulled, and then only when it
becomes impossible to take any other step.
BINCE, JR. V. COMELEC
G.R. NOS. 111624--25
MARCH 9, 1995
FACTS:
Bince and Macu were Sangguniang
Panlalawigan candidates in Pangasinan during
the 1992 elections.
During the canvassing of the COCs for the 10
municipalities of the 6th District, Micu objected to
the inclusion of the COC of San Quintin, claiming
that it contained false statements.
Micu later secured a resolution from the
COMELEC directing the Provincial Board of
Canvassers the correct number of votes from the
municipality of San Quintin.
Meanwhile, Micu filed several petitions for
correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) for
alleged errors in other municipalities of the 6th
district (Tayug and San Miguel). Note that the
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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errors were committed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBCs).
However, after canvassing the COCs for the 10
municipalities, it turns out Bince garnered 27,370
tes against Micu’s 27,369 a a gin 1
vote. Bince was not yet proclaimed at this time
because of the absence of authority from the
COMELEC.
On June 29, the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a resolution directing the PBC to
continue with the provincial canvass and
proclaim the winning candidates.
On June 24, t e C acted n Micu’s petiti ns
for correction of the SOVs for Tayug and San
Miguel. Bince appealed, claiming that the PBC
had no jurisdiction.
Subsequently the PBC filed a petition with the
COMELEC seeking a definitive ruling as to who
should be proclaimed. Apparently, if the
corrections for the SOVs of Tayug and SM were
to be included, Emiliano Micu would gain
plurality by 72 votes.
The COMELEC resolved the PBC to proclaim
the winning candidate on the basis of the
completed and corrected Certificates of
Canvass.
However on July 21, Bince was proclaimed
winner.
Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to
Annul Proclamation, and Amended Urgent
Petition for Contempt and Annul Proclamation,
alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the
COMELEC. The COMELEC held the officers
who proclaimed Bince in contempt, and directed
the PBC to proclaim the true winner.
T e case ate tu ned t t e ega it t e C’s
granting of the petition for the correction of the
Tayug and SM SOVs. Micu claims that his
petitions for correction were valid under Section
6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Eventually, ince’s p c a ati n was a i ed,
ut n Micu’s MFR t t e en anc, was set aside
and declared null and void.
Bince appealed to the SC in a special civil action
for certiorari.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 18

ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC committed GAOD in
nu i ing ince’s p c a ati n NO
HELD:
COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction
Respondent COMELEC did not act with
GAOD in annulling the proclamation of
petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in
directing the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the
MBCs of Tayug and San Miguel to make
the necessary corrections in the SOVs
and COCs.
Nullification was justified as the basis was a
mathematical error committed by the MBCs in
the computation of votes. The COMELEC cannot
be faulted for subsequently annulling the
proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a
mathematical error in addition, committed by the
MBCs.
s to timeliness of Micu’s petitions for
correction
The petitions to correct manifest errors
were filed on time, that is, before the
petiti ne ’s p c a ati n n Ju 21,
1992. The petition of the MBC of San
Miguel was filed on June 4, 1992, while
that of the MBC of Tayug was filed on
June 5, 1992 Sti , p i ate esp ndent’s
petition was filed with the MBC of Tayug
and San Miguel on June 10 and 11, 1992,
respectively. It is definitely well within the
period required by Section 6, Rule 27 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Sec.
6 clearly provides that the petition for
correction may be filed at any time
before proclamation of a winner.
What if the petitions for correction were filed out
of time? No effect.
Assuming for the sake of argument that
the petition was filed out of time, this
incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the instant
case on substantial grounds. Adherence
to a technicality that would put a
stamp of validity on a palpably void
proclamation, with the inevitable result
of frustrating the people’s will cannot
be countenanced. Adjudication of
cases on substantive merits and not
on technicalities has been consistently
observed by the Court.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests
involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to
stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in
the choice of their elective officials. And also
settled is the rule that laws governing election
contests must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people may not be defeated
by mere technical objections.
Was allowing the correction of mathematical
errors proper? YES
It does not involve the opening of ballot
boxes; neither does it involve the
examination and/or appreciation of
ballots. The correction sought by
respondents is correction of manifest
mistakes in mathematical addition.
Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical
act of reflecting the true and correct votes
received by the candidates. In this case,
the manifest errors only sought proper
and diligent addition of the votes in Tayug
and San Miguel.
Consequently, by a margin of 72 votes, Micu
indisputa w n ince’s p c a ati n and
assumption into public office was therefore
flawed from the beginning, the same having
been based in a faulty tabulation.
TRINIDAD VS COMELEC AND SUNGA (Sept
23, 1999)
FACTS:
Petitioner (herein private respondent) Manuel C.
Sunga was one of the candidates for the position
of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of
Cagayan, in the May 8, 1995 elections. Private
respondent (herein petitioner) Ferdinand B.
Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a
candidate for re-election in the same
municipality.
On 22 April 1995, Sunga filed with the
COMELEC a letter-complaint for disqualification
against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3)
local government vehicles in his campaign, in
violation of Section 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as
amended).
On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-
complaint with the COMELEC charging Trinidad
this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e)
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(referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or
other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election
Code.
This was followed by an Amended Petition for
disqualification consolidating the charges in the
two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying,
and providing more specific details of the
violations committed by Trinidad.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that
Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes,
while Sunga trailed second.
Notwithstanding the motion for suspension of the
proclamation of Trinidad filed by Sunga, Trinidad
was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting
Sunga to file another motion to suspend the
effects of the proclamation. Both motions were
not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings
of the Law Department and directed the filing of
the corresponding informations in the Regional
Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4)
informations for various election offenses were
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other
hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd
Division for hearing.
COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition
for disqualification. Sunga filed the instant
petition contending that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for disqualification.
i ate esp ndent’s etiti n wit t is C u t was
granted and COMELEC was ordered to
reinstate. Finally, on June 22, 1998, the
COMELEC 1st Division (former 2nd Division)
promulgated the first questioned Resolution
disqualifying petitioner as a candidate in the May
8, 1995 elections. COMELEC En Banc denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and also
annulled his proclamation as duly elected Mayor
of Iguig, Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Private respondent assails the arguments raised
in the Petition and prays that he be proclaimed
as the elected Mayor in the 1998 elections.
ISSUES: (1) WON petiti ne ’s p c a ati n as
Mayor in the 1998 elections can be cancelled on
account of the disqualification case filed against
him in the 1995 elections
(2) WON respondent, as the candidate receiving
the second highest number of votes be
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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p c ai ed as Ma in t e e ent petiti ne ’s
disqualification
RULING:
(1) N , petiti ne ’s p c a ati n as Ma in t e
1998 elections cannot be cancelled on
account of the disqualification case filed
against him in the 1995 election.
With the complaint for disqualification of private
respondent rendered moot and academic by the
expiration of petitioners term of office therein
contested, COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner
from his reelected term of office in its second
questioned Resolution on the ground that it
comes as a matter of course after his
promulgated after the 1998 election. While it is
true that the first questioned Resolution was
issued eight (8) days before the term of
petitioner as Mayor expired, said Resolution had
not yet attained finality and could not effectively
be held to have removed petitioner from his
office. Indeed, removal cannot extend beyond
the term during which the alleged
misconduct was committed. If a public
official is not removed before his term of
office expires, he can no longer be removed
if he is thereafter reelected for another term.
(2) No, the candidate who received the second
highest number of votes cannot be
p c ai ed Ma in t e e ent petiti ne ’s
disqualification
As per the Certificate of Canvass, petitioner
obtained 5,920 votes as against the 1,727 votes
obtained by private respondent and 15 votes
garnered by the third mayoral candidate, Johnny
R. Banatao. This gives petitioner a high 77.26%
of the votes cast. There is no doubt, therefore,
t at petiti ne ecei ed is unicipa it ’s c ea
mandate. This, despite the disqualification case
filed against him by private respondent.
Indeed, in election cases, it is fundamental that
the peoples will be at all times upheld. This
Court has time and again liberally and equitably
construed the electoral laws of our country to
give fullest effect to the manifest will of our
people, for in case of doubt, political laws must
be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voter. The second placer is just that, a second
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 20

placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated
by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. To allow private
respondent, a defeated and repudiated
candidate, to take over the mayoralty despite
his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise the electorate without any
fault on their part and to undermine the
importance and meaning of democracy and
the people’s right to elect officials of their
choice.
PUNZALAN VS COMELEC AND MENESES
(April 27, 1998)
FACTS:
Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and
Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4)
candidates for mayor of the municipality of
Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995
elections.
On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand
Meneses as the duly elected mayor, having
garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo
Manalastas 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalans
8,612 votes.
On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an
election protest docketed as Election Case No.
E-005-95 before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results of
the elections in the municipalitys forty-seven (47)
precincts. In due time, Ferdinand Meneses filed
his answer with counter protest impugning the
results in twenty-one (21) precincts of the 47
protested by Manalastas.
On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own
election protest docketed as Election Case No.
E-006-95, also before the RTC in San Fernando,
Pampanga, questioning the results of the
elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157)
precincts.
Meneses, on his part, filed an answer with
counter-protest with respect to ninety-six (96)
precincts of the 157 protested by Punzalan.
The election contests sought the nullification of
the election of Meneses allegedly due to
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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massive fraud, irregularities and other illegal
electoral practices during the registration and the
voting as well as during the counting of votes.
The trial court rendered judgment on September
23, 1996 with the following findings, viz: that
massive fraud, illegal electoral practices and
serious anomalies marred the May 8, 1995
elections; that ballots, election returns and tally
sheets pertaining to Precinct Nos. 8, 20, 41, 53,
68, 68-A and 70 disappeared under mysterious
circumstances; and that filled-up ballots with
undetached lower stubs and groups of ballots
with stubs cut out with scissors were found
inside ballot boxes. Because of these
irregularities, the trial court was constrained to
examine the contested ballots and the
handwritings appearing thereon and came up
with the declaration that Punzalan was the
winner in the elections.
On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC
promulgated a resolution setting aside the trial
courts decision and affirming the proclamation
of Meneses by the MBC as the duly elected
mayor of Mexico, Pampanga.
Punzalan prayed for the issuance of a temporary
est aining de t set aside COMELEC’s
resolution.
ISSUES:
(1) WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in declaring as valid the ballots
credited to Meneses which did not bear the
signature of the BEI chairman at the back
thereof.
(2) WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in declaring valid (a) the ballots
wherein the signatures of the BEI chairmen
were different from their respective
signatures appearing on several COMELEC
documents, (b) those group of ballots
allegedly written by one (1) hand and (c) a
number of single ballots written by two (2)
persons, ignoring the trial courts findings on
the authenticity of said handwritings
RULING:
(1) While Section 24of Republic Act No. 7166,
otherwise known as An Act Providing For
Synchronized National and Local Elections
and For Electoral Reforms, requires the BEI
chairman to affix his signature at the back of
the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not
invalidate the same although it may
constitute an election offense imputable to
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said BEI chairman.Nowhere in said provision
does it state that the votes contained therein
shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that
the failure of the BEI chairman or any of
the members of the board to comply with
their mandated administrative
responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating
and thumbmarking of ballots, should not
penalize the voter with
disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating
the will of the people.
What should, instead, be given weight is the
consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a
ballot is considered valid and genuine for
as long as it bears any one of these
authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the
COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature
or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman
of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where
the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or
not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red or blue fibers in the
ballots. It is only when none of these marks
appears extant that the ballot can be
considered spurious and subject to rejection.
Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines provides that
in the reading and appreciation of ballots,
every ballot shall be presumed to be valid
unless there is a clear and good reason to
justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency
of an election officer in failing to affix his
signature at the back of the ballot does not
constitute as a good and clear reason to
justify the rejection of a ballot.
(2)
The appreciation of the contested ballots and
election documents involves a question of
fact best left to the determination of the
COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with
the supervision of elections all over the
country. It is the constitutional commission
vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction
over election contests involving regional,
provincial and city officials, as well as
appellate jurisdiction over election protests
involving elective municipal and barangay
officials. Consequently, in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional
infirmity or error of law, the factual findings,
conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered
by the said Commission on matters falling
within its competence shall not be interfered
with by this Court.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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On the issue of the genuineness of the
handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that
the specimens examined by Atty. Desiderio
A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an
expert witness, were mere certified true
copies of the ballots and documents
concerned. The result of examination of
questioned handwriting, even with the benefit
of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is,
at best, inconclusive. There are other factors
that must be taken into consideration. The
position of the writer, the condition of the
surface on which the paper where the
questioned signature is written is placed, his
state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the
kind of pen and/or paper used, played an
important role on the general appearance of
the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a
given case, absolute absence, or manifest
dearth, or direct or circumstantial competent
evidence of the character of a questioned
handwriting, much weight should not be
given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between the questioned
handwriting and an authentic one.
Laws and statutes governing election
contests especially appreciation of ballots
must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the electorate in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by
technical infirmities. An election protest is
imbued with public interest so much so that
the need to dispel uncertainties which
becloud the real choice of the people
is imperative.
BAUTISTA v. CASTRO
FACTS:
Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private
respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates for
the office above mentioned. After canvass,
petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner by
the Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17,
1982 with a plurality of two (2) votes. On May 25,
1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the
City Court of Quezon City, (docketed as Election
Case No. 82-408) on the ground of fraud and
illegal acts or practices allegedly committed by
Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no
counter protest.
It appears that the results of the election in all
the four (4) voting centers in Bgy. Teachers
Village East, Quezon City were contested. A
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revision and recounting of the ballots was
conducted which resulted in a tie.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring
Roberto Miguel to have received the same
number of votes as the protestee Sergio Bautista
for the position of Bgy. Captain of Bgy. Teachers
Village East, Quezon City. From this decision of
the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel filed an
appeal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. *
On July 29, 1982, judgment was rendered on the
appeal which, as stated in the first portion of this
decision, declared protestant Roberto Miguel the
duly elected Barangay Captain of Bgy.
Teachers Village East, Quezon City and setting
aside as null and void the proclamation
of protestee Sergio Bautista. Petitioner Sergio
Bautista filed the instant petition for review by
certiorari.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the supposed opinion of a
person, who was brought by private respondent
but who was never presented as a witness, is
competent and admissible evidence to support
the appellate court's (CFI) conclusion that no
less than eighteen (18) votes cast in favor of
your petitioner were written by one and the same
person.
2) Whether or not a ballot which does not
contain the signature of the poll chairman be
considered a valid ballot.
3) Whether or not respondent Judge acted
correctly in its appreciation of the contested
ballots
HELD:
Anent the first question, petitioner Bautista
questions the reliance by respondent court on
the opinion of one Desiderio A. Pagui, who was
never presented and qualified as an expert
witness. The report of Pagui allegedly appeared
only in the records of the case on file with the
CFI which was attached in the Memorandum for
Protestant Miguel.
The contention of petitioner that respondent
court relied on the report of an alleged
handwriting expert is misplaced. It should be
noted that while respondent court considered the
report of Atty. Pagui, it did not rely solely on the
said report. In the words of respondent court,
"(I)t has taken pains and meticulous effort to
examine with its naked eye the questioned
ballots and handwritings and compare the same
with each other . . ." In fact, in its effort
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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to determine the true value of the contested
ballots and in order not to disenfranchise bona
fide voters, it counted certain ballots in favor of
petitioner which the alleged handwriting expert
found as written by only one person.
It contradicted said report as regards Exhibits "I",
"J", "V" and "V-1". The respondent court was
circumspect in relying on its own findings on
whether or not these contested ballots were
prepared by one person. The ballots are the best
evidence of the objections raised. Resort to
handwriting experts is not mandatory.
Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are
not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting, this can be
done by the COMELEC (in this
case, the court taking cognizance of the appeal
in this election protest) itself.
Petitioner also argues that respondent court
misinterpreted and misapplied Section 36(f) of
Comelec Resolution No. 1539. It allegedly failed
to take into consideration the other provisions of
said Section 36 of the Resolution. We do not
agree. The law (Sec. 14 of B.P. 222) and the
rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res.
No. 1539) leave no room for interpretation.
The absence of the signature of the Chairman of
the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given
to a voter as required by law and the rules as
proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.
This requirement is mandatory for the validity of
the said ballot.
As regards exhibit "Z" and "Z-l", respondent
court reversed the decision of the trial court
which ruled that these were not marked ballots
and hence, were valid votes for petitioner
BAUTISTA. In reversing the trial court,
respondent court ruled that the presence of an
arrow with the words "and party," was meant
for no other purpose than to Identify the voter.
We agree. It cannot be said that these writings
were accidental. As a general rule, a voter must
write on the ballot only the names of candidates
voted for the offices appearing
thereon. Certain exceptions, however, are
provided in Section 149 of the Revised Election
Code. For example, prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.",
and the like and suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc.
will not invalidate the ballot (par. 5).
Initials (paragraph 15), nicknames or appellation
of affection and friendship will not invalidate the
ballot, if accompanied by the name or surname
of the candidate, and above all, if they were not
used as a means to identify the voter.
Even under a liberal view, the words written on
the ballots under consideration cannot be
considered as falling within the exception to the
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rule. Consequently,
they are irrelevant expressions that nullified the
ballots. (Lloren v. CA, et al., No. L-25907,
January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 110). Hence,
respondent court excluded Exhibits "Z" and "Z-l".
Petitioner objects to respondent court's ruling
rejecting Exh. "5". The word "BLBIOY" was
written in the spare for Barangay Captain.
"BIBOY", petitioner's nickname was duly
registered in his certificate of candidacy.
While the name written was "BLBIOY", there
was no doubt that the voter intended to vote for
"BIBOY", the nickname of which petitioner was
popularly known and which nickname was duly
registered in his certificate of candidacy. Hence,
the respondent court's decision as regards
Exhibit "5" is reversed and the vote is
counted for petitioner. Exhibit "6" was invalidated
by both respondent court and the city court as
stray vote on the ground that petitioner's name,
written as "Bo. Barangay Bautista"
was placed on the first line intended for
councilmen. We believe however that the voter's
intention to vote for BAUTISTA as Barangay
Captain was present and said vote should be
counted in favor of petitioner.
Respondent court correctly invalidated Exhibit
"7". This ballot cannot be considered as a vote
for petitioner whose name was written seven (7)
times in the ballot. The writing of a name more
than twice on the ballot is considered to be
intentional and serves no other purpose than to
identify the ballot.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent
court is MODIFIED as regards Exhibits "5" and
"6". Private respondent Roberto Miguel in
declared the duly elected Barangay Captain of
Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City,
with a plurality of twenty-two (22) votes. The
temporary restraining order issued Court on
December 2, 1982 is hereby LIFTED.
3. Power of Congress to regulate suffrage
A. Constitutional Provisions
B. Omnibus Election Code – BP 881
C. Amendments under the 1987 Constitution
D. RA 7160 Local Government Code
FORMS OF POPULAR INTERVENTION
(SCOPE OF SUFFRAGE)
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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I. ELECTIONS
(i) Definition/How exercised:
GR. No. 142907 November 29, 2000
JOSE EMMANUEL L. CARLOS, petitioner,

 vs.

HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, IN HER
CAPACITY AS THE ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN
CALOOCAN CITY (BRANCH 125) and
ANTONIO M. SERAPIO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Carlos and respondent Serapio were
candidates for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila during
May 11, 1998 elections. The petitioner was
declared as the duly elected mayor having
obtained 102,688 votes. The respondent, having
the second highest number of votes, 77270 vote,
filed with the RTC Valenzuela an election protest
challenging the results.
Serapio sought for recount of the ballot, and the
revised count resulted in the invalidation of 9679
votes of Serapio and validationg 53 votes in his
favour. The court invalidated 19975 votes of
Carlos and validated 33 votes in his favour. The
result:Serapio 76246 votes and Carlos 103551
votes. Now Serapio alleged significant badges of
fraud and vote buying perpetrated by Carlos.
The trial court declared that there was enough
pattern of fraud in the conduct of the election for
mayor in Valenzuela. It held that the fraud was
attributable to the protestee who had control
over the election paraphernalia and the basic
services in the community such as the supply of
electricity. Thus, notwithstanding the plurality of
valid votes in favor of the protestee, the trial
court set aside the proclamation of protestee
Carlos and declared protestant Serapio as the
duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City.
Wit t is, t e petiti ne fi ed a n tice appea t
the C issi n n E ecti ns He a s fi ed a
petition before the Supreme Court. The
respondent submitted that Comelec and not the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent, having the second highest
number of votes, can be declared as the duly
elected mayor. NO
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WON the trial court acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion when it set aside
the proclamation of petitioner and declared
respondent Serapio as the duly elected mayor of
Valenzuela City. YES
WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review, by petition for certiorari as a special civil
action, the decision of the RTC in an election
protest case involving an elective municipal
ficia c nside ing that it has no appellate
jurisdiction over such decision. YES
HELD:
An election is the embodiment of the popular
will, the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. The winner is the candidate who has
obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast
in the election. Even if the candidate receiving
t e a it tes is ine igi e disqua ified, t e
candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes or the second placer, can not be declared
elected. The wreath of victory cannot be
t ans e ed t e disqua ified winne t t e
repudiated loser because the law then as now
only authorizes a declaration of election in favor
of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. In other words, a defeated candidate
cann t e dee ed e ected t t e fice
The trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a
failure of election. It is the Comelec sitting en
banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to
declare a failure of election. In a petition to annul
an election, two conditions must be averred in
de t supp t a su ficient cause
of action. These are: (1) the illegality must affect
more than 50% of the votes cast and (2) the
good votes can be distinguished from the bad
ones. It is only when these two conditions are
established that the annulment of the election
can e ustified ecause t e e aining tes d
not constitute a valid constituency.
There are only three (3) instances where a
failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a)
the election in any polling place has not been
e d n t e date fi ed n acc unt ce
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling
place had been suspended e e t e u fi ed
by law for the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the
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election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes.
Thus, the trial court in its decision actually
pronounced a failure of election by disregarding
and setting aside the results of the election.
Nonetheless, as herein-above stated, the trial
court erred to the extent of ousting itself of
jurisdiction because the grounds for failure of
e ecti n we e n t significant and even non-
existent.
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to
declare a failure of election, the extent of that
power is limited to the annulment of the election
and the calling of special elections.The result is
a failure of e ecti n t at pa ticu a fice In
such case, the court can not declare a winner. A
permanent vacancy is thus created. In such
eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall
succeed as provided by law.
Both the Supreme Court and Comelec have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over
decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction
(regional trial courts) in election cases involving
e ecti e unicipa ficia s T e C u t t at ta es
jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the case.
(ii) Essence of Elections/Basis
MANUEL C. SUNGA, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and FERDINAND B. TRINIDAD
G.R. No. 125629 March 25, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of
the candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the
8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent
Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor,
was a candidate for re-election in the same
municipality.
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the
COMELEC a letter-complaint for disqualification
against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3)
local government vehicles in his campaign, in
violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended)
Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced
evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on
the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence
at all.
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Meanwhile, the election results showed that
Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes,
while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the
suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad.
However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad
was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting
Sunga to file another motion to suspend
theeffects of the proclamation. Both motions
were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd
Division.
The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings
of the Law Department and directed the filing of
the corresponding informations in the Regional
Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4)
informations7 for various elections offenses were
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other
hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd
Division for hearing which subsequently
dismissed the petition for disqualification, holding
that Resolution No. 2050 provides for the
outright dismissal of the disqualification case in
three cases: (1) The disqualification case was
filed before the election but remains unresolved
until after the election; (2) The disqualification
case was filed after the election and before the
proclamation of winners; and (3) The
disqualification case was filed after election and
after proclamation.
It further ruled that if the instant case is deemed
to have been filed upon receipt by the
COMELEC of the letter-complaint on April 26
1995, it nevertheless remained pending until
after the election. If it is deemed to have been
filed upon filing of the amended petition on 11
May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election.
In either case, Resolution No. 2050 mandates
the dismissal of the disqualification case.
Sunga filed the instant petition contending that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for
disqualification in that: Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646
requires the COMELEC to resolve the
disqualification case even after the election and
proclamation, and the proclamation and
assumption of office by Trinidad did not deprive
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; since Trinidad
was a disqualified candidate, it is as if petitioner
was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed
as the duly elected mayor.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sunga as to
the grave abuse of discretion committed by
COMELEC when it dismissed the petition for
disqualification stating that what the Resolution
mandates in such a case is for the Commission
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to refer the complaint to its Law Department for
investigation to determine whether the acts
complained of have in fact been committed by
the candidate sought to be disqualified. The
findings of the Law Department then become the
basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This
is totally different from the other two situations
contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a
disqualification case filed after the election but
before the proclamation of winners and that filed
after the election and the proclamation of
winners, wherein it was specifically directed by
the same Resolution to be dismissed as a
disqualification case. And that the filing of four
(4) criminal informations against Trinidad before
the Regional Trial Court is an indication that
there was indeed prima facie evidence of
violation of election laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sunga should be
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor in the
event Trinidad is disqualified from the position.
RULING: No. Sunga cannot be proclaimed as
Mayor.
Sunga's contention that he is entitled to be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the
event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no
support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that
the candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes is later disqualified for the office to
which he was elected does not entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a disqualified
person may not be valid to install the winner into
office or maintain him there. But in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the
votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was qualified, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our
democratic electoral process as well as the
sociological and psychological elements behind
voters' preferences. Election is the process of
complete ascertainment of the expression of the
popular will. Its ultimate purpose is to give effect
to the will of the electorate by giving them direct
participation in choosing the men and women
who will run their government. Thus, it would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency,
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the majority of whom have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him.
While Sunga may have garnered the second
highest number of votes, the fact remains that he
was not the choice of the people of Iguig,
Cagayan. "The wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now
only authorizes a declaration of election in favor
of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected." In Aquino v. COMELEC, this Court
made the following pronouncement:
To simplistically assume that the second
placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment
for the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the election.
He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate; the
conditions would have substantially
changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under such
circumstances.
Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard
the express mandate of Sec. 44, RA No.
7160, which provides in part —
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the
office of the Governor, Vice-Governor,
Mayor, Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the
Governor or Mayor, the Vice-Governor or
Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the
Governor or Mayor . . .
For purposes of this chapter, a permanent
vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses
to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns or
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office . . . .
This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and
unequivocal, thus admits no room for
interpretation but merely application. This is the
basic legal precept. Accordingly, in the event
that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a
permanent vacancy will be created for failure of
the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In
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such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor
shall succeed as provided by law.
SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LUMBA-
BAYABAO, LANAO DEL SUR, and DATU
GAMBAI DAGALANGIT
G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L.
MITMUG and private respondent DATU
GAMBAI DAGALANGIT were among the
candidates for the mayoralty position of Lumba-
Bayabao during the 11 may 1992 election. There
were sixty-seven (67) precincts in the
municipality.
The voter turnout during the election was rather
low, particularly in forty-nine (49) precincts
where the average voter turnout was 22.26%,
five (5) of these precincts did not conduct actual
voting at all.
Consequently, COMELEC ordered the holding of
a special election on 30 May 1992 in the five (5)
precincts which failed to function during election
day. On 30 July 1992 another special election
was held for a sixth precinct.
On 3 August 1992, petitioner instituted the
instant proceedings seeking the declaration of
failure of election in forty-nine (49) precincts
where less than a quarter of the electorate were
able to cast their votes. He also prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin private respondent from assuming office.
COMELEC denied the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed
an error in denying the petition.
RULING: No. There was no error in denying the
petition.
As provided under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, particularly Sec. 2, Rule 26, fefore
COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking
to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions
must concur: first, no voting has taken place in
the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law
or, even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless results in failure to elect;
and, second, the votes not cast would affect the
result of the election.
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the
votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome of
the election. But, the first requisite is missing,
i.e., that no actual voting took place, or even if
there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 27

a failure to elect. Since actual voting and election
by the registered voters in the questioned
precincts have taken place, the results thereof
cannot be disregarded and
excluded. COMELEC therefore did not commit
any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in
denying the petitions outright. There was no
basis for the petitions since the facts alleged
therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to
warrant the relief sought. For, the language of
the law expressly requires the concurrence of
these conditions to justify the calling of a special
election.
There can be failure of election in a political unit
only if the will of the majority has been defiled
and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be
determined, it must be accorded respect. After
all, there is no provision in our election laws
which requires that a majority of registered
voters must cast their votes. All the law requires
is that a winning candidate must be elected by a
plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual
number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than
25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts
cast their votes, the same must still be
respected. There is prima facie showing that
private respondent was elected through a
plurality of valid votes of a valid constituency.
RULLODA VS COMELEC (G.R. NO. 154198,
JANUARY 20,2003)
FACTS:
In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002,
Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were
the contending candidates for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered
a heart attack and passed away. His widow,
petiti ne et ni a “ ett ” Ru da, w te a etter
to the Comelec on June 25, 2002 seeking
permission to run as candidate for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late
husband. Petitioners request was supported by
the Appeal-Petition containing several signatures
of people purporting to be members of the
electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas.
On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L.
Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and
Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers
of Sto. Tomas as follows:
Just in case the names BETTY or
PETRONILA or the surname RULLODA is
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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written on the ballot, read the same as it
is written but add the words NOT
COUNTED like BETTY NOT COUNTED
or RULLODA NOT COUNTED.
During the canvass of votes, petitioner garnered
516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido
received 290 votes. Despite this, the Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas.
After the elections, petitioner learned that the
COMELEC, acting on the separate requests of
Andres Perez Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda
to be substituted as candidates for Barangay
Chairman of Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija and Barangay Sto. Tomas, San
Jacinto, Pangasinan, respectively, issued
Resolution No. 5217 dated July 13, 2002 which
denied to give due course to their COCs and to
direct the respective election officer to delete
their names. The resolution is based on
C e ec’s Res uti n N 4801 w ic sets t e
guidelines on filing of COC, more particulary
Section 9 which states that:
Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. There shall
be no substitution of candidates for barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of
Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217,
both of the COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited
petitioner from running as substitute candidate in
lieu of her deceased husband; to nullify the
proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her
as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto.
Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his
Comment, arguing that since the barangay
election is non-partisan, substitution of
candidates is not allowed. Moreover, petitioner
did not file any certificate of candidacy; hence,
there was only one candidate for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, respondent
Placido.
Public respondent COMELEC also filed its
Comment. It contends that its Resolution No.
4801 was issued not pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions but as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of the barangay elections. Therefore,
the same may not be the subject of review in a
petition for certiorari.
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ISSUE: WON Petronilla Rulloda can substitute
his deceased husband.
HELD: YES
At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner
garnered 516 votes while respondent got only
290 votes. Respondents did not deny this in their
respective Comments.
In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice
or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote through the use of the ballot, and
the elected officials which are determined
through the will of the electorate. An election is
the embodiment of the popular will, the
expression of the sovereign power of the people.
The winner is the candidate who has obtained a
majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the
election. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who receive
the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office. For, in all republican forms of
government the basic idea is that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.
Respondents base their argument that the
substitution of candidates is not allowed in
barangay elections on Section 77 of the
Omnibus Elections Code, which states:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after
the last day of the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered
or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated
by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in
accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day
of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the
case of candidates to be voted by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the
barangay election is non-partisan, there can be
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no substitution because there is no political party
from which to designate the substitute. Such an
interpretation, aside from being non sequitur,
ignores the purpose of election laws which is to
give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear
and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is
well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws
must be so construed as to give life and spirit to
the popular mandate freely expressed through
the ballot.
Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a
specific provision governing substitution of
candidates in barangay elections can not be
inferred as a prohibition against said substitution.
Such a restrictive construction cannot be read
into the law where the same is not written.
Indeed, there is more reason to allow the
substitution of candidates where no political
parties are involved than when political
considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact
that must have been subsumed by law.
Moreover, the Memorandum of the COMELEC
Law Department as well as the assailed
Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably
appears that petitioners letter-request to be
allowed to run as Barangay Chairman of Sto.
Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as
a certificate of candidacy.
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the
plurality of votes in the contested election. Laws
governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technical objections.
(iii) Construction/Limitations
DUREMDES VS COMELEC OCTOBER 27,
1989
FACTS:
In the 18 January 1988 elections, pet
Ramon D. DUREMDES, private resp Cipriano B.
PENAFLORIDA, and Rufino Palabrica ran for
the office of Vice-Governor of the Province of
Iloilo. DUREMDES was the official candidate of
the Liberal Party (LP) and PDP-Laban coalition,
while PENAFLORIDA was the official candidate
of the Lakas ng Bansa (Lakas).
During the canvass of votes by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo,
PENAFLORIDA objected verbally to some 110
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election returns from various precincts, which he
followed up with written objections which was
overruled by the board because it was not timely
filed and no evidence was presented to support
the charge. The Board thus ordered the inclusion
of the questioned election returns. On January
29, PENAFLORIDA and the Lakas filed with the
COMELEC an "Appeal by Way of a Petition for
Review," for the exclusion of the questioned
election returns and for PENAFLORIDA's
proclamation as the elected Vice-Governor of
Iloilo. On 30 January 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed
with the Comelec a Petition seeking the
annulment of election returns and the
suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate.
On 31 January 1988, the Board
proclaimed DUREMDES as the duly elected
Vice- Governor, together with the duly elected
Governor and only eight (8) members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Iloilo. Certified to
was that DUREMDES had garnered 157,361
votes (the number of his uncontested votes) in
2,377 precincts. Apparently, the Board had
made the proclamation upon DUREMDES'
"Manifestation and Motion," dated the same day,
31 January 1988, that "the contested returns will
not adversely affect the uncontested results of
the election (See Section 245, Omnibus Election
Code) ... because of the absolute certainty that
candidate Ramon Duremdes has obtained the
highest number of votes, whether or not the
contested votes were excluded."
On 2 February 1988, DUREMDES took
his oath and assumed office. Also on 2 February
1988, an "Intervention with Motion to Dismiss"
was filed by DUREMDES and two other
candidates for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
seeking the denial of PENAFLORIDA's Petition
for Annulment before the COMELEC, for lack of
merit. On 12 February 1988, Perla S. Zulueta
(also an Intervenor in SPC Case No. 88-448),
filed a case pleading that she be proclaimed as
one of the winning candidates in the 10-member
Iloilo Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On 8 March 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed
an Amended Petition challenging the legality of
the composition of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers, "a ground just known lately," and
praying for a recanvassing of the objected
election returns. On 4 April 1988, the COMELEC
granted a Motion for the consolidation of the two
cases
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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On 20 June 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed
with the COMELEC a Supplemental Petition,
charging, among others, that DUREMDES was
proclaimed "on the basis of increased votes in
the unofficial and separately tallied Statement of
Votes, more than what was actually reflected in
the Election Returns."
On 20 September 1988, the COMELEC
(Second Division), after hearing, issued a Per
Curiam Resolution, sustaining the rulings of the
Board of Canvassers on PENAFLORIDA's
objections as well as DUREMDES' proclamation.
They also directed the board of canvassers to
include in the canvass the questioned election
returns and to proclaim the winning candidates
for the 9th and 10th slots for SP and to direct the
Law Department of the Commission to conduct a
thorough investigation into the matter of the
reported falsification of the transcripts of the
stenographic notes of Stenographer Nelly C.
Escana to determine the parties responsible
therefor and to cause the filing of the necessary
criminal complaint against those probably guilty
thereof as the evidence may warrant.
PENAFLORIDA moved for
reconsideration, whereupon, the Second
Division certified and elevated the case to the
COMELEC en banc. On 4 October 1988,
PENAFLORIDA filed a Motion to Suspend
Implementation of the Second Division
Resolution which was granted by the
COMELEC.
On 12 January 1989, the COMELEC en
banc rendered a decision declaring as null and
void the proclamation of Intervenor Ramon
Duremdes; Directing the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Iloilo to immediately reconvene
and to include in the canvass of votes for Vice-
Governor the questioned/contested returns. For
that purpose, the Board shall make a formal
tabulation of the results of the contested returns
and shall prepare a new Statement of Votes and
Certificate of Canvass.
DUREMDES faults the COMELEC with
grave abuse of discretion for having disregarded
the well-settled doctrines (1) that matters of
protest, objections or issues not originally raised
before the Board of Canvassers upon the
opening of the returns, cannot be raised for the
first time before the COMELEC; and (2) that
after a proclamation has been made, a pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable, the
proper recourse, being an election protest.
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ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion by declaring as null and void
the proclamation of Duremdes and by
disregarding well-settled doctrines.
HELD: NO. It is true that, before the Board of
Canvassers, PENAFLORIDA did not raise in
issue the matter of the discrepancies between
the number of votes appearing in the Statement
of Votes and that in the Election Returns. As a
matter of fact that matter is not even listed as
one of the issues that may be raised in pre-
proclamation controversies under Section 243 of
the Omnibus Election Code. In this respect, the
law is silent as to when the same may be raised.
We are, however, not unmindful of the fact that
the statement of votes supports the certificate of
canvass and shall be the basis of proclamation
(Sec. 231, paragraph 2). Consequently, any
error in the Statement of Votes would affect the
proclamation made on the basis thereof. The
true will of the electorate may thus be not fully
and faithfully reflected by the proclamation.
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the
foregoing COMELEC pronouncement. The
Statement of Votes is a tabulation per precinct of
the votes garnered by the candidates as
reflected in the election returns. Its preparation is
an administrative function of the Board of
Canvassers. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, "it is a purely mechanical act of the
Board of Canvassers in the performance of
which the Commission has direct control and
supervision," pursuant to Section 227 of the
Omnibus Election Code. By virtue of that power,
added to its overall function to "decide all
questions affecting elections" (Article IX[C]
Section 2[3], 1987 Constitution), a question
pertaining to the proceedings of said Board may
be raised directly with the COMELEC as a pre-
proclamation controversy.
Sec. 241. Definition. — A pre-proclamation
controversy refers to any question pertaining to
or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or
directy with the Commission, or any matter
raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in
relation to the exploration, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns
(Omnibus Election Code). (Italics supplied).
When so elevated, the COMELEC acts in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction for which
reason it is not indispensable that the issue be
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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raised before the Board of Canvassers during
the canvassing. The COMELEC is not
discharging its appellate jurisdiction under
Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which has to do with contests regarding the
inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any
election returns, with a prescribed appellate
procedure to follow.
Cognizance may also be taken of the fact that at
the time PENAFLORIDA filed the Supplemental
Petition on 20 June 1988, there was no clear-cut
rule on the matter. It was only in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, which took effect on 15
November 1988, wherein it was provided under
subparagraph (2), paragraph (a), Section 4 of
Rule 27, that the matter of correction of the
statement of votes may be the subject of a pre-
proclamation case which may be filed directly
with the Commission. Nonetheless, there should
be no question, considering Section 241 in
relation to Section 227 of the Omnibus Election
Code, that the issue is one that can be raised
directly with the COMELEC. It is a procedure
that best recommends itself specially
considering that the Statement of Votes is a vital
component in the electoral process. It supports
the Certificate of Canvass and is the basis for
proclamation.
DUREMDES also calls attention to Rule
13, Section 1 (g) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which does not allow the filing of
supplemental pleadings. As stated heretofore,
however, these Rules took effect only on 15
November 1988, or five months after the
Supplemental Petition was filed. Said rule,
therefore, cannot be given retroactive effect the
legal truth being that laws of procedure may be
retroactively applied provided no substantial
rights are impaired.
That discrepancies exist between the entries in
the Statement of Votes and that reflected in the
questioned election returns, was openly admitted
by the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers at
the scheduled promulgation on 15 December
1988 of the 9th and 10th placers of the SP.
Under the circumstances, therefore, and
considering that any error in the Statement of
Votes would affect the proclamation made on the
basis thereof, and primordially, in order to
determine the true will of the electorate, the
COMELEC Decision ordering the Board of
Canvassers to reconvene and prepare a new
Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass
should be upheld.
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The Commission on Elections has ample power
to see to it that elections are held in a clean and
orderly manner and it may decide all questions
affecting the elections. It has original jurisdiction
on all matters relating to election returns,
including the verification of the number of votes
received by opposing candidates in the election
returns as compared to the statement of votes in
order to insure that the true will of the people is
known. Such clerical error in the statement of
votes can be ordered corrected by the
COMELEC.
It is DUREMDES' further submission that his
proclamation could not be declared null and void
because a pre-proclamation controversy is not
proper after a proclamation has been made, the
proper recourse being an election protest. This is
on the assumption, however, that there has been
a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is
null and void, the proclamation is no
proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive
the COMELEC of the power to declare such
nullity and annul the proclamation. DUREMDES'
proclamation must be deemed to have been null
and void. It was made on 31 January 1988 after
PENAFLORIDA had filed with the COMELEC on
29 January 1988 an "Appeal by Way of a
Petition for Review" from the rulings of the
Board, and on 30 January 1988, a Petition for
the annulment of' election returns and the
suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate. The COMELEC had not resolved
either Petition at the time the proclamation was
made. Pursuant to Sections 245, supra, and 238
of the Omnibus Election Code, therefore, the
Board of Canvassers should not have
proclaimed any candidate without waiting for the
authorization by the COMELEC. Any
proclamation thus made is void ab initio.
SEC. 238. Canvass of remaining or
unquestioned returns to continue. — In cases
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 hereof,
the board of canvassers shall continue the
canvass of the remaining or unquestioned
election returns. If, after the canvass of all the
said returns, it should be determined that the
returns which have been set aside will affect the
result of the election, no proclamation shall be
made except upon orders of the Commission
after due notice and hearing. Any proclamation
made in violation hereof shall be null and void.
In this case, with 110 contested election
returns and 25,930 ballots questioned
(COMELEC Resolution, September 20,1988, p.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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4, p. 115, Rollo), DUREMDES' margin of 7,286
non-contested votes could very well be off-set.
Moreover, DUREMDES' proclamation was made
on the basis of an official canvass of the votes
cast in 2,377 precincts only, when there were
actually 2,487 precincts. The votes in 110
precincts, therefore, were not included, which is
exactly the number of 110 election returns
questioned by PENAFLORIDA. Further,
DUREMDES was certified to have garnered
157,361 votes (ibid.), which number represents
the non-contested votes only, and clearly
excludes the totality of the "contested/deferred
votes" of the candidates concerned.
DUREMDES' proclamation having been based
on an incomplete canvass, no grave abuse of
discretion can be ascribed to the COMELEC for
directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Iloilo "to immediately reconvene and to include in
the canvass of votes for Vice-Governor the
questioned/contested returns." All the votes cast
in an election must be considered because to
disregard returns is in effect to disenfranchise
the voters (Mutuc vs. COMELEC, L-28517,
February 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662). A canvass
can not be reflective of the true vote of the
electorate unless all returns are considered and
none is omitted (Datu Sinsuat vs. Pendatun, L-
31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630).
Over and above all else, the
determination of the true will of the electorate
should be the paramount consideration.
BENITO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 106053 August 17, 1994
Petitioner Ottomama Benito and the deceased
Hadji Murad Kismen Sampiano Ogca were
candidates for mayor in the municipality of
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur in the May 11, 1992
election. Murad Sampiano Ogca obtained a total
of 3,699 votes as against petitioner's 2,644.
On May 20, 1992, candidate Ogca was killed in
an ambush while returning home from the
residence of Lanao del Sur Governor Saidamen
Pangarungan in Marawi City.
On the same date, petitioner, probably not aware
of the death of his opponent, filed a motion to
suspend the proclamation of Ogca as elected
mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, contending
that there was strong evidence of guilt against
him in a previous disqualification case.
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The Municipal Board of Directors, on the other
hand, removed Ogca from the list of living
candidates including his obtained votes and
thereby proclaimed Benito as duly elected
mayor.
On July 6, 1992, the COMELEC issued a
resolution declaring the proclamation of
petitioner an absolute nullity and of no force and
effect.
ISSUE: W/N Benito was validly proclaimed as
mayor
RULING: No. The proclamation of petitioner
Ottomama Benito as mayor-elect of Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur, by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers was not a valid proclamation.
In every election, the people's choice is the
paramount consideration and their expressed
will must, at all times, be given effect. When the
majority speaks and elects into office a
candidate by giving him the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, no one
can be declared elected in his place.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes dies, or is later declared
to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. 15 For to allow the
defeated and repudiated candidate to take over
the mayoralty despite his rejection by the
electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate
without any fault on their part and to undermine
the importance and meaning of democracy and
the people's right to elect officials of their choice.
It is petitioner's further submission that the
appeal filed by the heirs of the deceased
mayoralty candidate from the May 30, 1992
ruling of the Balabagan Municipal Board of
Canvassers was filed out of time, the same
having been submitted a day late. Well-settled is
the doctrine that election contests involve public
interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand if they
constitute and obstacle to the determination of
the true will of the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials. And also settled is the rule
that laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not
be defeated by mere technical objections.
Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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election laws should not frustrate the
determination of the popular will.
SOME PARTS OF THE RULING ON
FERNANDEZ V. COMELEC (april 2000)
(from case of Libanan Vs. HRET)
It should be noteworthy that in an unsigned
3rd April 1990 resolution, in "Jolly Fernandez vs.
COMELEC," the Court en banc had the
opportunity to debunk the argument that all
ballots not signed at the back thereof by the
Chairman and the Poll Clerk were to be
considered spurious for non-compliance with
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6646, i.e., "The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987," reading as follows:
"Sec. 15. - Signature of Chairman and Poll Clerk
at the Back of Every Ballot. - In addition to the
preliminary acts before the voting as enumerated
in Section 191 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the
chairman and the poll clerk of the board of
election inspectors shall affix their signatures at
the back of each and every official ballot to be
used during the voting. A certification to that
effect must be entered in the minutes of the
voting."
The Court declared:
"The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the
ballots is to discover and give effect to the
intention of the voter. That intention would be
nullified by the strict interpretation of the said
section as suggested by the petitioner for it
would result in the invalidation of the ballot even
if duly accomplished by the voter, and simply
because of an omission not imputable to him but
to the election officials. The citizen cannot be
deprived of his constitutional right of suffrage on
the specious ground that other persons were
negligent in performing their own duty, which in
the case at bar was purely ministerial and
technical, by no means mandatory but a mere
antecedent measure intended to authenticate
the ballot. A contrary ruling would place a
premium on official ineptness and make it
possible for a small group of functionaries, by
their negligence - or, worse, their deliberate
inaction - to frustrate the will of the electorate."
(from case of Punzalan V Comelec)
While Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7166,
otherwise known as An Act Providing For
Synchronized National and Local Elections and
For Electoral Reforms, requires the BEI
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chairman to affix his signature at the back of the
ballot, the mere failure to do so does not
invalidate the same although it may constitute an
election offense imputable to said BEI
chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it
state that the votes contained therein shall be
nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of
the BEI chairman or any of the members of the
board to comply with their mandated
administrative responsibility, i.e., signing,
authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots,
should not penalize the voter with
disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will
of the people.
LIBANAN V. HRET
G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997
VITUG, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision
of the HRET declaring Ramirez the winner of the
1995 congressional election of the lone district of
Samar against the petitioner where Ramirez led
as much as 600+votes. Libanan filed a petition
with the HRET to annul the election and
proclamation of Ramirez alleging that the
election was marred by massive election
irregularities, specifically that some of the ballots
were not signed by the BEI chairman and hence
invalid. Ramirez countered that Libanan also
committed election offenses but later on
withdrew his counter charge. The evidence and
the issues submitted by the parties for
consideration by the HRET related mainly to the
proper appreciation of the ballots objected to, or
claimed by, the parties during the revision. No
evidence was presented in support of the other
allegations of the protest so the HRET
concentrated on the appreciation of ballots. The
HRET recounted the votes cast on the valid
ballots and declared Ramirez as the winner of
the election in Eastern Samar.
ISSUE: WON the absence of the signature of
the BEI chairman makes the ballot invalid.
HELD: "No spurious ballot was found in this
case. For a ballot to be rejected for being
spurious, the ballot must have any of the
following authenticating marks: a) the
COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial
of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot;
and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case,
all the ballots examined by the Tribunal had
COMELEC watermarks. "Fraud is not presumed.
It must be sufficiently established. Moreover,
Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides in part that 'in the reading and
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appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be
presumed to be valid unless there is clear and
good reason to justify its rejection.' In the instant
case, there is no evidence to support
protestant's allegation that the ballots he
enumerated in hisMotion for Reconsideration are
substitute ballots. The absence of the BEI
Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot
cannot be an indication of ballot switching or
substitution. At best, such absence of BEI
Chairman's signature is a prima facie evidence
that the BEI Chairmen concerned were derelict
in their duty of authenticating the ballots. Such
omission, as stated in the Decision, is not fatal to
the validity of the ballots.
II. KINDS OF ELECTIONS/DISTINCTIONS
III. INITIATIVE
IV. REFERENDUM
(i) RA 6735 (Initiative)
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997
DAVIDE, JR.
FACTS: Private respondent filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a “ etiti n t end t e
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
O icia s, e p e’s Initiati e” (De in etiti n)
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
(1) Fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the
necessary publications of said Order and the
attac ed “ etiti n Initiati e n t e 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election
Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that
R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to
amend the Constitution and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of
delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A.
No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of
its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE: Whether or not (1) the absence of
subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No.
6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendment to the Constitution, and (3)
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
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HELD: NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted.
The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws. R.A.
No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are declared
void.
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and
interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle
III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
atte pe p e’s initiati e t a end t e
Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC,
sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of
such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the
petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records
and Statistics Office a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative
district; (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature
stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
egist ist te s, te s’ a ida its, and
voters’ identi icati n ca ds used in t e
immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory
petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that
the petition does not fall under any of the actions
or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a
docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere
scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
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grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its
time, energy, and resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar
as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin
petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the
view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and
cann t i p e ent t e pe p e’s initiati e t
amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that
the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no
leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO
and MENDOZA concur)
VITUG, concurring and dissenting:
I vote for granting the instant petition before the
Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier
issued by the Court did not prescribe the
exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to
campaign for constitutional amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which,
consequentially, is made permanent under the
ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin
petition and must not be so understood as
having intended or contemplated to embrace the
signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of
such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional
mandate on people initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting:
There is no question that my esteemed
colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a
scholarly and well-written ponencia.
Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view
that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
“initiat ” De in etiti n
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to
“ e di ect p p sed t e pe p e t ug
initiati e,” t e e is n i p e enting aw t e
pu p se R 6735 is “inc p ete, inadequate,
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is c nce ned ”
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(3) C e ec Res uti n N 2330, “ins a as it
prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
is id ”
I concur with the first item above. Until and
unless an initiatory petition can show the
required number of signatures — in this case,
12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines
with at least 3% in every legislative district — no
public funds may be spent and no government
resources may be used in an initiative to amend
the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot
even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully
t e a it ’s tw t e u ings
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE
T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA.
7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic
Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA
to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into
alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy
turned over the Subic military reservation to
the Philippines government. Immediately,
petitioner commenced the implementation of
its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-
ports, airport, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10 , Serye 1993, expressing
therein its absolute concurrence, as required by
said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic
Special Economic Zone and submitted such to
the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a
petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong
to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye
1993.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify
Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to
join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow
Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon
the petition by promulgating Pambayang
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Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting
Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their
power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition
for local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.
On August 15, 1993, respondents instituted a
petition for certiorari and mandamus before this
Court against the COMELEC and
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to
set aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623
insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local
initiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution
No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan from
proceeding with the authentication of the
required number of signatures in support of the
initiative and the gathering of signatures.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued
Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and
bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion
of the former naval base within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued
Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum and
providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern
the conduct of the referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for
certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution
No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent
on proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes an amendment of a national law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Comelec commit
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848.
RULING:
SC answer the question in the affirmative.
To begin with, the process started by private
respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec made preparations for a
REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the
Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below
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the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27
times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a
"Referendum"; the counting of votes was
entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the
documents were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers"
and the ballots themselves bore the description
"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word
"initiative" used in said body of Resolution No.
2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.
There are statutory and conceptual
demarcations between a referendum and an
initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and
Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one
term from the other, thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to
a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a national legislation;
and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to
a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by
the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate
to approve or reject a legislation through an
election called for the purpose. It may be of two
classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a
petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and
local legislative bodies.
Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani
A. Cruz defines initiative as the "power of the
people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or
reject them at the polls independent of the
legislative assembly." On the other hand, he
explains that referendum "is the right reserved to
the people to adopt or reject any act or measure
which has been passed by a legislative body and
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which in most cases would without action on the
part of electors become a law."
The foregoing definitions, which are based on
Black's and other leading American authorities,
are echoed in the Local Government Code (RA
7160) substantially as follows:
"SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. -- Local
Initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
"SEC. 126. Local Referendum Defined. -- Local
referendum is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of the local government units
may approve, amend or reject any ordinance
enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the
control and direction of the Comelec within sixty
(60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-
five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty
(30) days in case of barangays.
The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the
results of the said referendum."
Prescinding from these definitions, we gather
that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the
people directly either because the law-making
body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance,
resolution or act that they desire or because they
want to amend or modify one already existing.
Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative
body is given the opportunity to enact the
proposal. If its refuses/neglects to do so within
thirty (30) days from its presentation, the
proponents through their duly-authorized and
registered representatives may invoke their
power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the
local legislative body concerned. Should the
proponents be able to collect the number of
signed conformities within the period granted by
said statute, the Commission on Elections "shall
then set a date for the initiative (not referendum)
at which the proposition shall be submitted to the
registered voters in the local government unit
concerned x x x".
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the
law-making body submits to the registered
voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or
rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is
duly enacted or approved by such law-making
authority. Said referendum shall be conducted
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also under the control and direction of the
Commission on Elections.
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work
of the electorate, referendum is begun and
consented to by the law-making body. Initiative
is a process of law-making by the people
themselves without the participation and against
the wishes of their elected representatives, while
referendum consists merely of the electorate
approving or rejecting what has been drawn up
or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the
process and the voting in an initiative are
understandably more complex than in a
referendum where expectedly the voters will
simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
From the above differentiation, it follows that
there is need for the Comelec to supervise an
initiative more closely, its authority thereon
extending not only to the counting and
canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that
the matter or act submitted to the people is in the
proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted upon by the
electorate. This is especially true where the
proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated,
and should thus be broken down into several
autonomous parts, each such part to be voted
upon separately. Care must also be exercised
that "(n)o petition embracing more than one
subject shall be submitted to the electorate,"
although "two or more propositions may be
submitted in an initiative".
It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA
6735, the "Secretary of Local Government or his
designated representative shall extend
assistance in the formulation of the proposition."
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec
exercises administration and supervision of
the process itself, akin to its powers over the
conduct of elections. These law-making
powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or
change the substance or the content of
legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it
may (in fact it should have done so already)
issue relevant and adequate guidelines and
rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-
power" features of our Constitution.
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RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B.
AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul
La in and E ic u entad (“La in
G up”) c enced gat e ing signatu es an
initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino
Group filed a petition with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under Section
5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No.
6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The
proposed changes under the petition will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition
had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an
Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC issued its Resolution denying
due course to the Lambino Group's petition for
lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling
in Santiago v. Commission on Elections
declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays
for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the COMELEC
Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the
COMELEC to give due course to their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group contends that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying due course to their petition
since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that
Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and
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their petition deserves cognizance as an
expression of the "will of the sovereign people.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative
petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling
in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.
RULING:
1. The initiative petition does not comply with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
direct proposal by the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the
g e ning p isi n t at a ws a pe p e’s
initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. While this provision does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth
the full text of the proposed amendments, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution
clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to
adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on
peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the
people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such
full text.
T e essence a end ents “di ect p p sed
t e pe p e t ug initiati e up n a petiti n”
is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the
full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition. The
full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must
state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions
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of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before – not
after – signing.
M e e , “an initiati e signe ust e in ed
at the time of signing of the nature and effect of
t at w ic is p p sed” and ai u e t d s is
“decepti e and is eading” which renders the
initiative void.
In t e case t e La in G up’s petiti n,
t e e’s n t a sing e w d, p ase, sentence
text of the proposed changes in the signature
sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state
that the text of the proposed changes is attached
to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question
whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The
signature sheet does not show to the people the
draft of the proposed changes before they are
asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission
is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the
people without first showing to the people the full
text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud
n t e pe p e T at’s w t e C nstituti n
equi es t at an initiati e ust e “di ect
p p sed t e pe p e in a petiti n” –
meaning that the people must sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending
t e nati n’s unda enta aw, t e w iting t e
text of the proposed amendments cannot be
hidden from the people under a general or
special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless,
and unelected individuals.
2. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not
necessary.
The petition failed to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no need to revisit this Courts
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome
of the present petition. It settled that courts will
not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if
the case can be resolved on some other
grounds.
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will
not change the result here because the present
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petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, which provision must first be
complied with even before complying with RA
6735. Worse, the petition violates the following
provisions of RA 6735:
a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must
sign the petition as signatories. The 6.3 million
signatories did not sign the petition or the
amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only
Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the
petition and amended petition.
b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition
embracing more than one subject shall be
submitted to the electorate. The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions,
mandating the interim Parliament to propose
further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated
to the shift in the form of government.
3. The COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the
Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative
petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed
this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC. For following
this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion
is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground
alone, the present petition warrants outright
dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate
its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that
no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed
to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it
appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R.
No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997,
and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
(ii) Requirements; Procedure; Effectivity
V. RECALL
(i) Definition/Nature
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GARCIA VS COMELEC
GR NO 111511 OCTOBER 5, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia was elected
governor of the province of Bataan in the May
11, 1992 elections. In the early evening of July
1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of the 12
municipalities of the province met at the National
Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan.
At about 12:30 A.M of the following day, July 2,
1993, they proceeded to the Bagac town plaza
where they constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall
election of petitioner Garcia.
The Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben
Roque moved that a resolution be passed for the
recall of the petitioner on the ground of "loss of
confidence.
146 names appeared in Resolution No. 1 but
only 80 carried the signatures of the members of
the PRA. Of the 80 signatures, only 74 were
found genuine. The PRAC of the province had a
membership of 144 and its majority was 73.
Petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC
a petition to deny due course to said Resolution
No. 1. Petitioners alleged that the PRAC failed to
comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991
Respondent COMELEC dismissed the petition
and scheduled the recall elections for the
position of Governor of Bataan. Petitioners then
filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to
annul the said Resolution
They urged that section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing
recall through the initiative of the PRAC is
unconstitutional because: (1) the people have
the sole and exclusive right to decide
whether or not to initiate proceedings, and
(2) it violated the right of elected local public
officials belonging to the political minority to
equal protection of law. They also argued that
the proceedings followed by the PRAC in
passing Resolution No. I suffered from
numerous defects, the most fatal of which was
the deliberate failure to send notices of the
meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
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SC granted the petition on ground that the
sending of selective notices to members of the
PRAC violated the due process protection of the
Constitution and fatally flawed the enactment of
Resolution No. 1.
ISSUE(S): 1) W/N the people have the sole and
exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) W/N the procedure for recall violated the right
of elected local public officials belonging to the
political minority to equal protection of the law.
RULING:
1st issue: No. There is nothing in the
Constitution that will remotely suggest that the
people have the "sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for
any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating
recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of
the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum . . ." By this constitutional
mandate, Congress was clearly given the power
to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as
its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the
mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to
be chosen by Congress should be effective.
Using its constitutionally granted discretion,
Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative
mode of initiating recall elections to supplement
the former mode of initiation by direct action of
the people. The legislative records reveal there
were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process
thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to
diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the
direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down
on its expenses.
2nd issue: No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all
mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members
of the municipalities and component cities are
made members of the preparatory recall
assembly at the provincial level. Its membership
is not apportioned to political parties. No
significance is given to the political affiliation of
its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall
assembly, at the provincial level includes all the
elected officials in the province concerned.
Considering their number, the greater probability
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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is that no one political party can control its
majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides
that the only ground to recall a locally elected
public official is loss of confidence of the people.
The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not
in representation of their political parties but as
representatives of the people. By necessary
implication, loss of confidence cannot be
premised on mere differences in political party
affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages
multi-party system for the existence of opposition
parties is indispensable to the growth and
nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the
law as crafted cannot be faulted for
discriminating against local officials belonging to
the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to
assure that the initiation of the recall process by
a preparatory recall assembly will not be
corrupted by extraneous influences. We held
that notice to all the members of the recall
assembly is a condition sine qua non to the
validity of its proceedings. The law also requires
a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall
assembly members to convene in session and in
a public place. Needless to state, compliance
with these requirements is necessary, otherwise,
there will be no valid resolution of recall which
can be given due course by the COMELEC.
(ii) Modes of Initiating
(iii) Procedure/Effectivity/Limitations
(iv) Cases
PARAS VS COMELEC
GR NO 123169 NOVEMBER 4, 1996
FACTS: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent
Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who
won during the last regular barangay election in
1994. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall,
public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition.
At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed
the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The COMELEC, however,
deferred the recall election in view of petitioners
opposition. The COMELEC set anew the recall
election. To prevent the holding of the recall
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election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction
with the trial court issuing a temporary
restraining order. After conducting a summary
hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order
and dismissed the petition.
COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the
recall election hence, the instant petition for
certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.
Petitioners argues that Section 74 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, states that no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date
of the officials assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local
election. Petitioner insists that the scheduled
January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred
as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was
set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday
of May 1996, and every three years thereafter.
ISSUE: W/N the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the
LGC may refer to SK elections, where the recall
election is for Barangay post.
RULING: NO.
Paragraph (b) of Sec 74 of the LGC construed
together with paragraph (a) merely designates
the period when such elective local official may
be subject of a recall election, that is, during the
second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the
phrase regular local election to include the SK
election will unduly circumscribe the novel
provision of the Local Government Code on
recall. And if the SK election which is set by R.A.
No. 7808 to be held every three years from May
1996 were to be deemed within the purview of
the phrase regular local election, as erroneously
insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can
be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.
Recall election is potentially disruptive of the
normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the
prohibition against the conduct of recall election
one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity
of the next regular election for the office of the
local elective official concerned. The electorate
could choose the officials replacement in the
said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall
election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping
with the intent of the recall provision of the Code
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to construe regular local election as one referring
to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer
possible because of the limitation stated under
Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the
next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely seven (7) months
away, the same having been scheduled on May
1997 (the case has already become moot and
academic)
G.R. NO. 126576. MARCH 5, 1997
MAYOR RICARDO M.
ANGOBUNG, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
AND ATTY. AURORA S. DE
ALBAN, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local
elections of 1995. He garnered 55% of all the
votes cast.
Private respondent de Alban was also a
candidate in said elections.
September, 1996 – private respondent
respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar
in Tumauni, Isabela, a Petition for Recall against
the petitioner.
Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director
for Operations Pio Jose Joson submitted to the
COMELEC En Banc, a Memorandum[4] dated
October 8, 1996 recommending approval of the
petition for recall filed by private respondent and
its signing by other qualified voters in order to
garner at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters as required by Section 69(d) of
the Local Government code of 1991.
In turn acting on the abovementioned
Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director
Joson, the COMELEC en banc issued the herein
assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.
Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned
resolution as being unconstitutional and
therefore invalid, on two main grounds:
On October 25, 1996, the Supreme Court issued
a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining public
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respondent COMELEC from implementing and
enforcing Resolution No. 96-2951.
ISSUE:
(1) W/N the resolution of the Comelec
scheduling the recall election within one (1) year
from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections is
valid.
(2) W/N the resolution approving the Petition for
Recall albeit same was signed by just one
person in violation of the statutory 25% minimum
requirement as to the number of signatures
supporting and petition for recall was proper.
RULING:
YES. Private respondent is correct in saying that
in the light of our pronouncement in Paras v.
COMELEC, the recall election scheduled on
December 2, 1996 in the instant case cannot be
said to be barred by the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections. In construing the meaning of the term,
regular local election in Section 74 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides that
no recall shall take place within one (1) year x x
x immediately preceding a regular local election,
we ruled that for the time bar to apply, the
approaching regular local election must be one
where the position of the official to be recalled, is
to be actually contested and filled by the
electorate. Thus, in the instant case where the
time bar is being invoked by petitioner mayor in
view of the approaching Barangay Elections in
May 1997, there can be no application of the one
year bar, hence no invalidity may be ascribed to
Resolution No. 96-2951 on this ground.
No. Recall is a mode of removal of a public
officer by the people before the end of his term
of office. The peoples prerogative to remove a
public officer is an incident of their sovereign
power and in the absence of constitutional
restraint, the power is implied in all governmental
operations. Such power has been held to be
indispensable for the proper administration of
public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently
described as a fundamental right of the people in
a representative democracy.
Recall as a mode of removal of elective local
officials made its maiden appearance in section
2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz:
SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a
local government code which may not thereafter
be amended except by a majority vote of all its
Members, defining a more responsive and
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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accountable local government structure with an
effective system of recall x x x
The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337
entitled, The Local Government Code of 1983
Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one
mode of initiating the recall elections of local
election officials, i.e., by petition of at least
twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit
concerned x x x.
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by
the people before the end of his term of
office. The peoples prerogative to remove a
public officer is an incident of their sovereign
power and in the absence of constitutional
restraint, the power is implied in all governmental
operations. Such power has been held to be
indispensable for the proper administration of
public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently
described as a fundamental right of the people in
a representative democracy.
Recall as a mode of removal of elective local
officials made its maiden appearance in section
2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz:
SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a
local government code which may not thereafter
be amended except by a majority vote of all its
Members, defining a more responsive and
accountable local government structure with an
effective system of recall x x x
The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337
entitled, The Local Government Code of 1983
Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one
mode of initiating the recall elections of local
election officials, i.e., by petition of at least
twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit
concerned x x x.
Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the
mandate for Congress to enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative and referendum x x x. In
response to this constitutional call, Congress
enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which took
effect on January 1, 1992.[16]
Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991 expressly provides that recall of any
elective x x x municipal x x x official may also be
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validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-
five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit
concerned during the election in which the local
official sought to be recalled was elected. The
law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates
recall proceedings: only a petition of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters,
may validly initiate recall proceedings. We take
careful note of the phrase, petition of at least
twenty-five percent (25%) and point out that the
law does not state that the petition must be
signed by at least 25% of the registered voters;
rather, the petition must be of or by, at least 25%
of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must be
filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25%
of the total number of registered voters.This is
understandable, since the signing of the petition
is statutorily required to be undertaken before
the election registrar or his representative, and in
the presence of a represetantive of the official
sought to be recalled, and in public place in the x
x x municipality x x x.[17] Hence, while the
initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the
signatures of at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters, the petition must contain the
names of at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters in whose behalf only one
person may sign the petition in the meantime.
The court finally says, We can not and must not,
under any and all circumstances, countenance a
circumvention of the explicit 25% minimum voter
requirement in the initiation of the recall process.
Petetion Granted.
G.R. NO. 127066 MARCH 11, 1997
REYNALDO O. MALONZO VS. THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY
(CALOOCAN CHAPTER) AND ALEX L.
DAVID, CONRADO G. CRUZ, TRINIDAD
REPUNO, GLORIA M. CRUZ, MIRALI M.
DURR, FERMIN JIMENEZ, AURELIO BILUAN,
ROGELIO SARAZA, HELENE VALBUENA,
AND HIGINO RULLEPA
FACTS:
Malonzo was elected as Mayor of Caloocan City
in the elections held on May 8, 1995. However,
barely a year after his election, on July 7, 1996,
1,057 Punong Barangays, Sangguniang
Barangay members and SK chairmen
constituting a majority of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly of Caloocan passed Preparatory
Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96,
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo,
and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings
against him.
The said resolution, along with other relevant
documents, was filed by the PRA with the
COMELEC. Malonzo filed a petition with
COMELEC challenging the validity of recall
process. The COMELEC, however, rejected the
petition. It then declared the recall proceedings
to be in order.
Malonzo then filed a Petition for Certiorari With
Prayer For Temporary Restraining Order and
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction",
assailing the COMELEC's resolution as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Malonzo challenged the recall proceedings,
essentially claiming that the notices for the
meeting of the PRA were not properly served.
Moreover, he argued that it was the Liga ng mga
Barangay and not the PRA which initiated the
recall, contrary to the requirements under the
Local Government Code. He also claimed that
the proceeding followed for adopting the recall
resolution was defective and therefore void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recall proceeding was valid.
RULING:
Yes. The recall process was valid. The notices
were propery served to the members of the
PRA. Moreover, it was the PRA which initiated
the recall and not the Liga ng mga Barangay.
The resolution was properly adopted in a
meeting conducted by the PRA.
Service of the notices
The COMELEC adequately ruled on the issue of
the service of notices to the members of the
PRA. In response to petitioner's request for a
technical examination of the recall documents,
the COMELEC directed its Election Records and
Statistics Department (ERSD) to resolve the
matter of notices sent to the Preparatory Recall
Assembly members. The ERSD in turn
performed its task and reported its findings to the
COMELEC.
The ERSD and the COMELEC found that the
notices were properly served.
At the time the PRA was convened, there were
1, 699 barangay officials. 1, 927 notices were
sent. Service was done through personal
delivery or by mail. Most of these were properly
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received while there were some who refused to
accept the notice. These were all duly noted.
The COMELEC found no irregularities in the
service of the notices.
Morever, that Alex David, president of the Liga
ng mga Barangay, sent the notices is of no
moment. As a member of the PRA, he could
validly exercise the prerogatives attached to his
membership.
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the
notices sent to the PRA members is factual in
nature, and the determination of the same is
therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the
absence of patent error, or serious
inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should
not disturb the same. The factual findings of the
COMELEC, based on its own assessments and
duly supported by gathered evidence, are
conclusive upon the court, more so, in the
absence of a substantiated attack on the validity
of the same.
Validity of the recall proceedings
Ma nz ’s insistence, t at t e initiati n t e
recall proceedings was infirm since it was
convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays, is
misplaced. The Liga ng mga Barangay is
undoubtedly an entity distinct from the
Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens
that the personalities representing the barangays
in the Liga are the very members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of
whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of
the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor
Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the
record, in accordance with the existing law.
Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang
Barangay members convened and voted as
members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of
the City of Caloocan, and not as members of the
Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings,
therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground.
The law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate
proceeding. Neither did it demand a specific
procedure. What is fundamental is compliance
with the provision that there should be a session
called for the purpose of initiating recall
proceedings, attended by a majority of all the
members of the preparatory recall assembly, in a
public place and that the resolution resulting
from such assembly be adopted by a majority of
all the PRA members
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
CLAUDIO V. COMELEC
G.R. 140560. MAY 4, 2000
FACTS
Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of
Pasay City during the 11 May 1998 elections. He
assumed office on 1 July 1998.
On 19 May 1999, an ad hoc committee was
formed for the purpose of convening a
epa at Reca sse (“ R ”)
On 29 May 1999, majority of the members of the
PRA adopted a Resolution to Initiate the Recall
of Mayor Jovito Claudio for Loss of Confidence.
On 2 July 1999, the petition for recall was
formally submitted to the Office of the Election
Officer. Copies of the petition were posted in
public places in Pasay City and the authenticity
of the signatures therein was verified by the
election officer for Pasay City.
The petition was opposed on several grounds.
Principally, that the convening of the PRA took
place within the one-year prohibited period under
Sec. 74, LGC which provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective
local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office
for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one
(1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local
election. Xxxx
The COMELEC granted the petition. It ruled that
the petition did not violate the one-year ban
because the petition was filed on 2 July 1999,
ne da a te C audi ’s assu pti n ice
ISSUES
1. WoN the word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC
covers a process which includes the
convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly
and its approval of the recall resolution.
2. WoN the term "regular local election" in the
last clause of Sec. 74(b), LGC includes the
election period for that regular election or
simply the date of such election.
HELD/RATIO
1. The word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC refers to
the to the election itself by means of which
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voters decided whether they shall retain their
local official or elect his replacement.
Recall is a process which involves the
following steps:
(1) The convening of the preparatory
assembly or gathering of the signatures of
at least 25% registered voters in the LGU;
(2) The filing of the recall resolution or petition
with the COMELEC;
(3) The verification of the resolution or
petition;
(4) Fixing of the date of the recall election;
and
(5) Holding of the election.
T at t e w d “ eca ” used in Sec 74 ( ),
LGC, refers to the recall election itself is due
to the following reasons:
(1) Sec. 69, LGC provides that the power of
recall shall be exercised by the registered
voters of the LGU to which the local
elective official belongs. It is clear that the
power of recall referred to in Sec. 69 is the
power to retain/replace officials and not the
power to initiate recall proceedings. Thus,
the limitations under Sec. 74 (Limitations on
Recall) apply only to the recall elections.
In Garcia v. COMELEC, the delegation of
the power to initiate recall proceedings from
the electorate to the PRAs was questioned.
The Supreme Court held that what the
Constitution gave to the people is the
power to recall and not the power to initiate
the recall proceedings. The holding of the
PRA is not the recall itself.
(2) That the word recall refers to the recall
election is consistent with the purposes of
the limitations on recall.
The purpose of the first limitation is to
provide a reasonable basis for judging the
performance of the official (Angobung v.
COMELEC). This judgment is not given
during the preliminary proceedings (such as
the convening of the PRA) but through the
vote during the recall election itself.
(3) That the word recall refers to the recall
election is to uphold the constitutional rights
of speech and freedom of assembly of PRA
members.
To hold that limitation includes the
formation of opinion through public
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discussions on the matter of recall of an
official is to curtail these constitutional
rights.
2. The term “regular elections” does not include
the election period.
T c nst ue t e w d “ egu a e ecti ns” as
including the election period would
emasculate the right of the people to exercise
the power of recall.
In Paras v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court
held that the limitations on Sec. 74 (a) and
Sec. 74 (b) would mean that a local elective
official may be subject only to recall during the
second year of his/her term (in this case, from
1 July 1999 to mid-May 2000)
I t e “ egu a e ecti ns” enti ned in Sec
74(b) would include the election period, which
commences 90 days from the date of the
election and extends to 30 days thereafter,
the period during which the power of recall
may be exercised will be reduced even more.
(In this case, from 1 July 1999 to mid-
February 2000)
Petition DISMISSED.
AFIADO V. COMELEC
G.R. 141787. SEPTEMBER 18, 2000
FACTS
During the May 11, 1998 elections in Santiago
City, Joel Miranda won as Mayor while Amelita
Navarro won as vice-mayor. Miranda
was removed from office after it was held that
the certificate of candidacy of his father Antonio
Abaya (whom Joel substituted) was not valid
thus Joel Miranda could not
be validly proclaimed as the winner in the
mayoralty elections. By virtue of the law
on succession, Navarro became the new mayor.
On the other hand when she was still a vice-
mayor, Navarro was sought to be recalled
through a preparatory recall assembly (PRA)
and its PRA Resolution No. 1. Navarro, in
response to this, filed a petition (EM No. 99-006)
which aimed to annul the said PRA Resolution.
On December 27, 1999, petitioners alleged that
they were not informed nor were they aware of
the developments as to EM No. 99-006, thus
they filed an urgent Motion for the Early
Resolution of EM No. 99-006. They further
alleged that the COMELEC’s inaction in
resolving the said petition will render the PRA
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Resolution moot and academic since recall
elections cannot be undertaken anymore come
June 30, 2000 (one year after the assumption of
office) pursuant to Sec. 74 of the Local
Government Code.
ISSUE
WoN an elective official who became City Mayor
by legal succession can be the subject of a recall
election by virtue of a Preparatory Recall
Assembly Resolution which was passed or
adopted when the said elective official was still
the Vice-Mayor.
HELD/RATIO
No, such action is already moot and
academic. The assumption by legal succession
of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago
City is a supervening event which rendered the
recall proceeding against her moot
and academic. A perusal of the said Resolution
reveals that the person subject of the recall
process is a specific elective official in relation
to her specific office. The said resolution
is replete with statements, which leave no doubt
that the purpose of the assembly
was to recall petitioner as Vice Mayor for her
official acts as Vice Mayor.
The title itself suggests that the recall is intended
for the incumbent Vice Mayor of Santiago City.
The third paragraph of the resolution recounted
"the official acts of City Vice Mayor Navarro that
brought forth the loss of confidence in
her capacity and fitness to discharge the duties
and to perform the functions of her public office."
And because of such acts, the assembly
"RESOLVED to invoke the rescission of the
electoral mandate of the incumbent City Vice
Mayor." Clearly, the intent of the PRA as
expressed in the said Resolution is to remove
the petitioner as Vice Mayor for they already lost
their confidence in her by reason of her official
acts as such.
To recall, then, the petitioner when she is
already the incumbent City Mayor is to deviate
from the expressed will of the PRA. Having,
thus, succeeded to the position of City Mayor,
the petitioner was placed beyond the
reach of the effects of the PRA Resolution.
Even if the Preparatory Recall Assembly
were to reconvene to adopt another resolution
for the recall of Amelita Navarro, this time as
Mayor of Santiago City, the same would still not
prosper in view of Section 74 (b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides that
"No recall shall take place within one (1) year
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from the date of the official's assumption of office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
election." There is no more allowable time in the
light of that law within which to hold recall
elections for that purpose. The then Vice-Mayor
Amelita S. Navarro assumed office as Mayor of
Santiago City on October 11, 1999. One year
after her assumption of office as Mayor will be
October 11, 2000 which is already within the one
(1) year prohibited period immediately preceding
the next regular election in May 2001.
VI. PLEBISCITE
(i) Definition/Process
(ii) Section 10 Article X 1987 Constitution
(iii) Nature/Requirements/Jurisdiction
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V.
SANIDAD vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
FACTS:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991
calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976
t e Citizens sse ies (“ a anga s”) t
resolve, among other things, the issues of
martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement,
the period of its existence, the length of the
period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers. Twenty days after, the
President issued another related decree, PD No.
1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing
for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
“ a anga s” app ica e t t e nati na
referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec
4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept
1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The
Dec ee ecites in its “w e eas” c auses t at t e
pe p e’s c ntinued pp siti n t t e c n ening
of the interim National Assembly evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a new interim legislative body,
which will be submitted directly to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 47

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar
as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No.
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled
on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is
no grant to the incumbent President to exercise
the constituent power to propose amendments to
the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen
contended that the question is political in nature
hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly
propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to
proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where
the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments,
a function normally exercised by the legislature,
is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the
1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After
that period, and the regular National Assembly in
its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative
of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1
and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than
calling the interim National Assembly to
constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to
the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to
have the force and effect of legislation are
assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity
of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within
the competence of this Court to pass upon.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution
p ides: “ cases in ing t e c nstituti na it
of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en
banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the
c ncu ence at east ten Me e s ”T e
Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but
also of the Constitution itself. The amending,
like all other powers organized in the
Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a
limited power, so that the Supreme Court is
vested with that authority to determine whether
that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The
President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those
proposals to the people in sufficient time. The
President at that time also sits as the legislature.
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity
as Governor of the Province of Camarines
Norte, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent
G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7155 creates the Municipality
of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines
Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-
Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod,
Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot,
and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo,
same province.
Pursuant to said law, the COMELEC issued a
resolution for the conduct of a plebiscite. The
said resolution provides that the plebiscite shall
be held in the areas or units affected, namely the
barangays comprising he proposed Municipality
of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the
mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
In the plebiscite held throughout the Municipality
of Labo, majority of the votes cast were against
the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa.
Thus, petitioner as Governor of Camarines
Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite
conducted throughout the Municipality of Labo
and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken. It
is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite
was a complete failure and that the results
obtained were invalid and illegal because the
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 48

plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC, should
have been conducted only in the political unit or
units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising
the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely
Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,
Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-
Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses
that the plebiscite should not have included the
remaining area of the mother unit of the
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. In
support of his stand, petitioner argues that where
a local unit is to be segregated from a parent
unit, only the voters of the unit to be segregated
should be included in the plebiscite.
ISSUE:
WON the plebiscite conducted in the areas
comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo valid.
RULING:
Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall
be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political
entity who would be economically dislocated by
the separation of a portion thereof have a right to
vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phase "political units
directly affected," is the plurality of political units
which would participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, those to be included in such political
areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of
the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as
well as those living in the parent Municipality of
Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, it was concluded
that respondent COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the
resolution.
TAN VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
(Nalisudan ko ug sabot sa facts sa case huhu
please read the full text)
FACTS: Prompted by the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as
the Province of Negros del Norte, Petitioners
(Tan et. al), who are residents of the Province of
Negros Occidental filed a case for Prohibition for
the purpose of stopping the Commission on
Elections from conducting the plebiscite (held on
January 3, 1986) in the implementation of the
aforesaid law.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg.
885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code as in
Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution.
The plebiscite was confined only to the
inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte,
namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San
Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava,
Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias,
E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto.
Finding that the exclusion and non-participation
of the voters of the Province of Negros
Occidental other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte
to be not in accordance with the Constitution,
petitioners prayed that writ of mandamus be
issued to schedule the holding of another
plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the
entire Province of Negros Occidental shall
participate, at the same time making
pronouncement that the plebiscite held on
January 3, 1986 has no legal effect.
Petitioners further prayed that the respondent
COMELEC hold in abeyance the issuance of any
official proclamation of the results of the
aforestated plebiscite.
Acting on the petition, as well as on the
supplemental petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining
order, the Court required respondents to
comment. Respondents filed their Comment,
arguing that Batas Pambansa 885 should be
accorded the presumption of legality. They
submit that the said law is not void on its face
and that the petition does not show a clear,
categorical and undeniable demonstration of the
supposed infringement of the Constitution since
the requisites of the Local Government Code
have been complied with. Furthermore, they
submit that this case has now become moot and
academic with the proclamation of the new
Province of Negros del Norte.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and
municipalities of the Province of Negros
Occidental not included in the area of the new
Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall within
the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units
affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of
our Constitution.
Respondents also maintain that the requisites
under the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for
the creation of the new province of Negros del
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 49

Norte have all been duly complied with.
Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations
that the requisite area of 3,500 square
kilometers as so prescribed in the Local
Government Code for a new province to be
created has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist
that the area which would comprise the new
province of Negros del Norte, would only be
about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which
evidently would be lesser than the minimum area
prescribed by the governing statute.
Respondents, in this regard, point out and stress
that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885
creating said new province plainly declares that
the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte
comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers,
more or less.
As a final argument, respondents insist that
instant petition has been rendered moot and
academic considering that a plebiscite has been
already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a
result thereof, the corresponding certificate of
canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes
cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of
the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400
were against it; and because "the affirmative
votes cast represented a majority of the total
votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the
Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new
province which shall be known as "Negros del
Norte".
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so
the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental
pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite
sought to be restrained was held the previous
day, January 3.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite was legal
and complied with the constitutional requisites
under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution,
which states that --
"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite
in the unit or units affected."
HELD: In interpreting the above provision, the
Supreme Court held that whenever a province is
created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in
the unit or units affected" must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of
Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing boundaries
of Negros Occidental.
"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two
political units would be affected. The first would
be the parent province of Negros Occidental
because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from
the mother province to constitute the proposed
province of Negros del Norte."
The Supreme Court further held that the case of
Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable
Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R.
No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6), which
the respondents used to support their case,
should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting
view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in the
aforementioned case is the forerunner of the
applicable ruling, quoting that:
"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or
units affected" it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided
such as in the case at bar or of the people of two
or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see
no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision."
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO.
3644 which proposed the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte was passed for
approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite
shall be conducted in the areas affected within a
period of one hundred and twenty days from the
approval of this Act." However, when the bill was
enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an unexplained
change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed
new province, which are the areas affected." The
Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving
phrase to state that the new province constitutes
the area affected.
"Such additional statement serves no useful
purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous,
and far from truth. The remaining portion of the
parent province is as much an area affected.
The substantial alteration of the boundaries of
the parent province, not to mention the adverse
economic effects it might suffer, eloquently
argue the points raised by the petitioners."
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 50

Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced
that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has
no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is
hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the new province of Negros del
Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials
thereof are also declared null and void.
SO ORDERED."
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS
G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
R.A. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into
a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Mandaluyong." Prior to the enactment of the
assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora,
the incumbent congressional representative,
sponsored the bill and President Ramos signed
R.A. No. 7675 into law.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of
1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994.
The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether
they approved of the conversion of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675.
The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of
the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621
voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue
of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.
Petitioners contended that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of the "one
subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI,
Section 26(1) of the Constitution. They also
allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section
49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
into two separate districts.
Petitioners also argue that the division has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the
House of Representative beyond that provided in
the Constitution. The said division was not made
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum
population requirements.
Further, Petitioners contend that the people of
San Juan should have been made to participate
in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same
involved a change in their legislative district.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. 7675 is
unconstitutional and Whether or not San
Juan was required to participate in the
plebiscite making Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city.
HELD:
1. The law is not unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of
merit. With regards to the first contention of one
subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
separate and distinct subject from its conversion
into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence. In addition, a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule
has been invariably adopted by this court so as
not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the
present limit of the number of representatives,
the provision of the section itself shows that the
250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than 250 members,
"un ess t e wise p ided aw” T e e e,
the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is
no mention in the assailed law of any census to
show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each
attained the minimum requirement of 250,000
inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that
the requirements were not met, the said Act
enjoys the presumption of having passed
through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative district
2. Petitioners contend that the people of San
Juan should have been made to participate in
the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same
involved a change in their legislative district.
The contention is bereft of merit since the
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 51

principal subject involved in the plebiscite
was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city. The matter of separate
district representation was only ancillary
thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan
were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.
EN BANC
CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC & MUN. OF
CAINTA, PROV. OF RIZAL [G.R. No. 125646.
Sept 10, 1999]
MUN.OF CAINTA, PROV. OF RIZAL vs.
COMELEC- CITY OF PASIG [G.R. No. 128663.
Sept 10, 1999]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
 G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed
Barangay Karangalan.
 While G.R. No. 128663 involves the
proposed Barangay Napico.
 The City of Pasig claims these areas as
part of its jurisdiction/territory while
Municipality of Cainta claims that these
proposed barangays encroached upon
areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.
FACTS:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents
of Karangalan Village that they be segregated
from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela
Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and
separated into a distinct barangay to be known
as Barangay Karangalan.
The City Council of Pasig passed and approved
Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite
on the creation of said barangay was thereafter
set for June 22, 1996.
On September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig
similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of
1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City.
Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15,
1997.
Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances,
the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or
cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and
filed Petitions with the Commission on Elections
on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016) and March
12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta
called the attention of the COMELEC to a
pending case before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of
boundary dispute.
According to the Municipality of Cainta, the
proposed barangays involve areas included in
the boundary dispute subject of said pending
case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should
be suspended or cancelled until after the said
case shall have been finally decided by the
court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the
position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered
the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay
Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the
court has settled with finality the boundary
dispute involving the two municipalities. Hence,
the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of
Pasig.
 The COMELEC, however, ruled differently
in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the
Petition for being moot in view of the
holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on
March 15, 1997 where the creation of
Barangay Napico was ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast
therein. Hence, the filing of G.R. No.
128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscites
scheduled for the creation of Barangays
Karangalan and Napico should be suspended
in view of the pending boundary dispute
between the two local governments.
HELD: YES. Plebiscite on the creation of
Barangay Karangalan should be held in
abeyance pending final resolution of the
boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and
the Municipality of Cainta by the RTC Antipolo
City. The plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to
ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig
City, should be annulled and set aside.
The Court agrees with the position of the
COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving
the boundary dispute between the Municipality of
Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a
prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the
proposed barangays may be held.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig
vigorously claims that the areas covered by the
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 52

proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are
within its territory, it cannot deny that portions of
the same area are included in the boundary
dispute case pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in
controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta
or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the
creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan
and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation
of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be
properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries.
Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an
issue raised in the pending civil case, until and
unless such issue is resolved with finality, to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility.
Not only that, we would be paving the way for
potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.
In Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the
court held that
The importance of drawing with precise
strokes the territorial boundaries of a local
unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be
clear for they define the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only
within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra
vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty
in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people’s
welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in
the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent
to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same,
pending final determination of whether or not the
entire area of the proposed barangays are truly
within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Pasig.
Neither does the court agree that merely
because a plebiscite had already been held in
the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the
petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already
been rendered moot and academic. The issues
raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition
before the COMELEC against the holding of the
plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico
are still pending determination before the
Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No.
125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R.
No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order
in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is
SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15,
1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in
the City of Pasig is declared null and void.
Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in
abeyance until after the courts settle with finality
the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig
and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No.
94-300.
EN BANC
ELPIDIO M. SALVA, v. HON. ROBERTO L.
MAKALINTAL [G.R. No. 132603. September
18, 2000]
BUENA, J.:
FACTS:
On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials
and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca,
Batangas, filed a class suit against the
Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas,
Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas,
and the COMELEC, docketed as Civil Case No.
3442, before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas,
Branch XI, for annulment of Ordinance No. 05
and Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both
enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987,
series of 1998, with prayer for preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order.
 Ordinance No. 5: declared the abolition of
barangay San Rafael and its merger with
barangay Dacanlao and instructed the
Comelec to conduct the required
plebiscite (Sec 9-10, LGC)
 Resolution No. 3455: affirmed the
effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby
overriding the veto exercised by the
governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05
was vetoed by the governor of Batangas
for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was
not shown that the essential requirements
under Section 9, in relation to Section 7,
of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the
attestations or certifications of the
Department of Finance (DOF), National
Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land
Management Bureau of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), were obtained.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 53

 Pursuant to the said Resolution and
Ordinance, the Comelec promulgated
Resolution 2987, providing for the rules
and regulations governing the conduct of
the plebiscite scheduled on February 28,
1998, to decide the issue of the abolition
of barangay San Rafael and its merger
with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca,
Batangas.
In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial
court denied the ex parte motion for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction.
According to the trial court, the temporary
restraining order/injunction sought by petitioners
is directed only to COMELEC Resolution No.
2987. The trial court ruled that any petition or
action questioning an act, resolution or decision
of the COMELEC must be brought before the
Supreme Court.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend:
 That the assailed Order of the RTC
encourages multiplicity of suits and
splitting a single cause of action.
 That petitioner seek the TRO before this
Court and not the RTC
 That Resolution 2987 is dependent on the
validity of Ordinance No. 5 and Resolution
3455
Petitioners assert that when the Comelec
exercises its quasi- udicia uncti n, it’s su ect t
this Court; but where it performs its ministerial
duty, it is subject to the RTC. The conduct of a
plebiscite is ministerial in nature.
Petitioner assert that the holding of a plebiscite
could not validate an otherwise invalid ordinance
and resolution.
Solicitor General: What is reviewable by this
Court are those exercised in its
adjudicatory/quasi-judicial function, and not
those ministerial in nature. issuance of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is a ministerial
duty of the COMELEC in the exercise of its
administrative functions.
Public respondent COMELEC: submits that the
power to review or reverse COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to the SC.
The COMELEC further argues that if a RTC
does not have jurisdiction to issue writs against
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statutory agencies of government. COMELEC
contends that the temporary restraining order
sought by petitioners has been rendered moot
and academic by the actual holding of the
plebiscite sought to be enjoined.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent court has
jurisdiction to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing its Resolution No. 2987, Series
of 1998.
HELD: YES.
Section 7, Article IX‐ A of the 1987 Constitution
provides in part that:
SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
In Garces vs. Court of Appeals and Filipinas
Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, the
Court interpreted the foregoing provision that xxx
What is contemplated by the term final orders,
rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as
provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi‐ judicial powers.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
xxx. [t]he issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution
No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part
and parcel of its administrative functions. It
involves no exercise of discretionary authority on
the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi‐ judicial
power to hear and resolve controversies defining
the rights and duties of party‐ litigants, relative to
the conduct of elections of public officers and the
enforcement of the election laws.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides
for the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of the required plebiscite was not issued
pursuant to the COMELECs quasi‐ judicial
functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of
plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari
by this Court. Any question pertaining to the
validity of said resolution may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
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The assailed Order dated Feb 25, 1998, of the
RTC of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is SET
ASIDE and ANNULLED. The RTC of Balayan,
Batangas, Branch XI is ordered to proceed with
dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 3442. The
execution of the result of the plebiscite held on
February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending
on the outcome of Civil Case No. 3442.
BUAC vs COMELEC
FACTS: On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC
conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila
on the conversion of this municipality into a
highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic
Act No. 8487. The residents of Taguig were
asked this question: Do you approve the
conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known
as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic
Act No. 8487? On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite
Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without
completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other
election returns, declared that the NO votes won,
indicating that the people rejected the
conversion of Taguig into a city. However, upon
order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC
reconvened and completed the canvass of the
plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the
negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the
casting and counting of votes, private
respondents, filed with the COMELEC a petition
seeking the annulment of the announced results
of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and
recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated
the petition as an election protest, docketed as
EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second
Division. Petitioner intervened in the case. He
then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
over an action involving the conduct of a
plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be
the subject of an election protest. The
COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution
granting petitioner motion and dismissing the
petition to annul the results of the Taguig
plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC
en banc affirmed this Resolution.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC
Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-
102 constituting the committees for the
revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots. On April
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28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings
commenced and upon its termination, the
Committees on Revision submitted their
complete and final reports. Thereafter, the
COMELEC Second Division set the case for
hearing. As no witnesses were presented by
petitioner, the parties were directed to submit
their respective memoranda, which they did.
Petitioner contends that the revision of the
plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the
determination of the will of the electorate
because the revision is incomplete. He claims
that based on the Final Report of the Committee
on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision
Committees, the revision of ballots yielded a
total of 15,802 votes for YES and a total of
12,602 votes for NO. The revision committee
thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion.
HELD: No. The above factual findings of the
COMELEC supported by evidence, are
accorded, not only respect, but finality. This is so
because the conduct of plebiscite and
determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular
courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of
ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an
independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the
indisputable expertise in the field of election and
related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged
Resolution and Order in these twin petitions, the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion.
PART II
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BRILLANTES VS. YORAC
FACTS: The petitioner is challenging the
designation by the President of the Philippines of
Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as
Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B.
Davide, who had been named chairman of the
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fact-finding commission to investigate the
December 1989 coup d' etat attempt.
President Corazon Aquino appointed Comelec
Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as
Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B.
Davide, who had been named chairman of the
fact-finding commission to investigate the
Dece e 1989 c up d’ etat atte pt etitioner
Sixto Brillantes, Jr. questioned the appointment
in view of the status of the COMELEC as an
independent constitutional body and and the
specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of
t e C nstituti n t at “(I)n n case s a an
Member (of the Commission on Elections) be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacit ” i antes u t e a gued t at t e
choice of the acting chairman should not come
from the President for such is an internal matter
that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the
president violates the independence of the
COMELEC as a constitutional commission. He
cites the practice in this Court, where the senior
Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice
in the absence of the Chief Justice. No
designation from the President of the Philippines
is necessary.
The Solicitor General argues that no such
designation is necessary in the case of the
Supreme Court because the temporary
succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found
in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals.
There is no such arrangement, however, in the
case of the Commission on Elections. The
designation made by the President of the
Philippines should therefore be sustained for
eas ns “ad inist ati e e pedienc ,” t
prevent disruption of the functions of the
COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of an
Acting Chairman of COMELEC is
unconstitutional
HELD: Yes. The appointment of Yorac as Acting
Chairman of the COMELEC is unconstitutional.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution
expressly describes all the Constitutional
C issi ns as “independent ” t ug
essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the President of the
Philippines in the discharge of their respective
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functions. Each of these Commissions conducts
its own proceedings under the applicable laws
and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court
as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A,
Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the
absence of the regular chairman comes under
that discretion. That discretion cannot be
exercised for it, even with its consent, by the
President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very
terms essentially temporary and therefore
revocable at will. No cause need be established
to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the
designation of the respondent as Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Elections may
be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines
at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit.
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out that
the respondent cannot be removed at will from
her permanent position as Associate
Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that
she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or
without cause, and thus deprived of the powers
and perquisites of that temporary position.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards
to the independence of the Commission on
Elections, foremost among which is the security
of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not
available to the respondent as Acting Chairman
of the Commission on Elections by designation
of the President of the Philippines.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation
at bar is no justification for the President of the
Philippines to fill the void by extending the
temporary designation in favor of the
respondent. This is still a government of laws
and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to
be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have
been handled by the members of the
Commission on Elections themselves without the
participation of the President, however well-
meaning.
CAYETANO VS. MONSOD
FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
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letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the
same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1,
Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
It was established that after graduating from the
College of Law and hurdling the Bar, respondent
w ed in is at e ’s aw ice a s t w i e,
then worked as an Operations Officer in the
World Bank Group for about 2 years, which
involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans, and
coordinating legal, economic and project work of
the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief
Executive Officer of an investment bank and has
subsequently worked either as Chief Executive
Officer or Consultant of various companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the
requirement of the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC.
HELD: YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
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c u t…In gene a , a ad ice t c ients, and a
action taken for them in matters connected with
the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure
tgage, en ce ent a c edit ’s c ai in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
“T engage in t e p actice aw is t pe
those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice
of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it
is whether in or out of court.
A person is also considered to be in the practice
aw w en e: “ a ua e c nside ati n
engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice aw ”
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the
Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%.
He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more
t an 10 ea s tt M ns d’s past w
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
— that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least 10 years.
ZALDIVAR VS. ESTENZO
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FACTS: Geronimo Zaldivar filed a petition
against respondent, Judge Numeriano Estenzo,
of the Court of First Instance of Ormoc City for
the purpose of setting aside (a) the decision
dated April 28, 1966, rendered by the Honorable
Judge Numeriano Estenzo of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte in a Special Civil Case No.
753-0; (b) the order for the arrest of petitioner
issued in said case on the same date that the
decision was promulgated; (c) the warrant of
arrest issued pursuant to said order; (d) the
order issued in said case dated November 5,
1965, granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction; and (e) the writ of
preliminary injunction issued on the same date,
on the ground that said decision, orders, warrant
of arrest and writ of preliminary injunction were
issued by the trial court without jurisdiction.
Petitioner Geronimo Zaldivar was the incumbent
municipal mayor of Albuera, Leyte and was
named respondent in the special civil case
referred to, while the other respondent, Sotero
Pepito, was one of the petitioners in such case.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was
granted in a resolution of May 20, 1966, which
gave due course to the petition.
Respondent Judge Estenzo rendered a decision
in favor of the petitioner, now respondent,
Pepito, and against the respondent, now
petitioner Zaldivar and issued an ex-parte order
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and
the writ itself were issued on the same day the
special civil action was filed; and the arrest of
petitioner immediately followed by a warrant of
arrest were ordered by respondent Judge.
The decision assailed, as well as the challenged
orders and actuations of respondent Judge, was
the direct consequence of his assumption of
jurisdiction over the special civil action of
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
The petitioners, both of whom were municipal
councilors and local leaders and supporters of
the candidacy for reelection of Congressman
Dominador M. Tan alleged that Zaldivar, with the
municipal mayor of another municipality, a
certain Feliciano Larrazabal, "acting in their
official capacities as Municipal Mayors, are
known to be sympathetic to the candidacy of
Rodolfo Rivilla, and with grave abuse of
discretion have caused to appoint special
policemen and agents to be paid from public
funds and to be provided with uniforms and
firearms for the sole purpose of utilizing said
special policemen and agents to terrorize and
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arrest electors sympathetic to Congressman
Dominador M. Tan during the elections of
N e e 9, 1965 ”
It was the contention of petitioners that
respondents, as municipal mayors, acted
"without and in excess of their powers as
executives of their respective jurisdictions, as no
authority or sanction has been obtained from the
Executive Secretary and the Commission on
Elections, and the exercise of such powers
would be detrimental to the interest of the
electorate which they are bound to protect.
Hon. Estenzo decided in favor of Pepito, issued
the order for the arrest of Zaldivar, and granted
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence, Zaldivar sought for the setting aside of
the orders as they were issued by the trial court
without jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judiciary can be a co-
participant in this particular instance of enforcing
the Election Code as its authority was invoked.
HELD: Under the Constitution, the Commission
on Elections has "exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and shall
exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law." The Commission on
Elections is vested under the Election Code with
"direct and immediate supervision over the
provincial, municipal, and city officials
designated by law to perform duties relative to
the conduct of elections."
In the special civil action for prohibition before
respondent Judge, its essentially political
character is manifest, the main allegation being
the utilization of the power of petitioner Zaldivar
to avail himself of the authority of his office to
appoint special policemen or agents to terrorize
voters so that they would support the
congressional candidate of his choice.
Both under the Constitution and the Revised
Election Code, it is not so much the power, but
the duty of the Commission on Elections to
exercise supervision over municipal officials
precisely to enforce the Election Code. No other
agency is better suited to preclude abuse of
authority on the part of local officials, the
sanction being that it could recommend to the
President their removal if found guilty of "non-
feasance, malfeasance or misfeasance in
connection with the performance of their duties
relative to the conduct of elections."
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Moreover, this Court, from the creation of the
Commission on Elections, has accorded full
amplitude to the wide discretion vested in the
Commission on Elections in the performance of
its constitutional functions.
The RTC cannot assume jurisdiction over a case
involving the enforcement of the election code,
which pertained to the taking cognizance of a
Special Civil Action filed before it to restrain the
mayor from pursuing certain infrastructure
projects during the election period, which was
alleged to constitute a violation of Section 261 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
GALLARDO VS. TABAMO
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Petitioners seek to prohibit, restrain
and enjoin respondent Judge Tabamo from
continuing with the proceedings in a petition for
injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order filed as a taxpayer's suit.
At the time of filing both the special civil action
and the instant petition, petitioner Antonio
Gallardo was the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Camiguin and was seeking re-
election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized
elections. Petitioners Arevalo, Echavez, Aranas,
and Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial
auditor, provincial engineer, and provincial
budget officer of Camiguin.
Their co-petitioners Rambuyon, Primo and Noel
Navarro are all government project laborers. On
the other hand, the private respondent was the
incumbent Congressman of the lone
Congressional district of Camiguin, a candidate
for the same office in the said synchronized
elections and the Regional Chairman of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in
Region X.
On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his
Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the
court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and
restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting
certain public works projects as it violates the
45-day ban on public works imposed by the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881) because although they were initiated few
days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban
took effect, they were not covered by detailed
engineering plans, specifications or a program of
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work which are preconditions for the
commencement of any public works project. The
questioned projects are classified into two (2)
categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded,
consisting of 29 different projects for the
maintenance or concreting of various roads, the
rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the
construction of the Capitol Building, and (b)
those designated as Foreign-Assisted,
consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include
the construction of Human Development Center,
various Day Care cum Production Centers and
water works systems; the extension and
renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of
hospital and laboratory equipment; and the
rehabilitation of office and equipment.
On the same day, respondent Judge issued the
question TRO. In the same order, he directed
the petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days
from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead
of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order. They
contend that the case principally involves an
alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code
thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the
COMELEC, not the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special
Civil Action No. 465.
HELD: No. The material operative facts alleged
in the petition therein inexorably link the private
respondent's principal grievance to alleged
violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w),
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).There is particular
emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which
read:
c. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be
guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. —
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds. Any public official or
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employee including barangay officials and those
of government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days
before a regular election and thirty days before a
special election, releases, disburses or expends
any public funds for:
(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public
works, delivery of materials for public works and
issuance of treasury warrants and similar
devices. — During the period of forty-five days
preceding a regular election and thirty days
before a special election, any person who (a)
undertakes the construction of any public works,
except for projects or works exempted in the
preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or
avails of treasury warrants or any device
undertaking future delivery of money, goods or
other things of value chargeable against public
funds.
The court ruled that the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court under the election laws is
limited to criminal actions for violations of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself
grants its exclusive original jurisdiction over
contests involving elective municipal officials.
Neither can the court agree with the petitioner's
assertion that the Special Civil action filed in the
RTC below involves the prosecution of election
offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs
incident to or in connection with alleged election
offenses; specifically, what is sought is the
prevention of the further commission of these
offenses which, by their nature, are continuing.
There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim
that the private respondent has no legal standing
to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation
of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing
in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing
the commission of an election offense and from
filing a complaint in connection therewith. On the
contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, initiation of complaints for election
offenses may be done motu propio by the
Commission on Elections or upon written
complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered
political party or organization under the party-list
system or any of the accredited citizens arms of
the Commission. However, such written
complaints should be filed with the "Law
Department of the Commission; or with the
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offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial
Election Supervisors or Regional Election
Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated, the
private respondent was not seriously concerned
with the criminal aspect of his alleged
grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the
public works projects because of their alleged
adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while
he may have had reason to fear and may have
even done the right thing, he committed a
serious procedural misstep and invoked the
wrong authority.
LIBARDOS v. CASAR
A.M. No. MTJ-92-728 July 8, 1994
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: A sworn complaint, dated 27 October
1992, was filed before the SC by complainant,
Mayor Perlita P. Libardos of Maigo, Lanao del
Norte, against respondent Judge Abdullah M.
Casar of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Kolambugan-Maigo, Lanao del Norte,
for gross ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct, arbitrariness and conduct
unbecoming a judge.
Respondent Judge issued an order dated 14
May 1992 in Special Proceedings No. 19,
restraining the COMELEC Board of
Canvassers of Maigo, Lanao del Norte, from
canvassing the election returns of Precinct
No. 10-A until either the COMELEC or the
Regional Trial Court in Iligan City could act on
the petition of Wilfredo P. Randa, a mayoralty
candidate of the Nationalist People's Coalition
(NPC).
Complainant Librados alleged that she was an
official mayoralty candidate of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Maigo, Lanao
del Norte, in the synchronized national and local
elections held on 11 May 1992; that during the
canvassing of the election returns, the candidate
of the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC),
Wilfredo Randa, filed a complaint for
Preliminary Injunction with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Kolambugan-
Maigo, Lanao del Norte, presided over by
respondent judge, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 19, entitled "Wilfredo P. Randa,
candidate for Mayor under NPC against Board of
Canvassers, Maigo, Lanao del Norte;" that on
the basis of the said complaint, subscribed
before respondent judge, said respondent
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 60

issued the aforesaid order dated 14 May 1992,
ordering the Board of Canvassers to suspend
the canvassing of the election returns of Precinct
No. 10-A until either the Commission on
Elections, Manila, or the Regional Trial Court in
Iligan City could act on the complaint of Wilfredo
Randa; that the said order caused the delay in
the canvassing of the election returns which
was resumed only after the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Lanao del Norte sent a message
to the COMELEC (Manila) requesting that an
order be issued ordering the Board of
Canvassers, Maigo, Lanao del Norte, to
disregard the restraining order of respondent
judge.
Complainant further avers that despite the fact
that respondent judge lacked jurisdiction over
the matter, he nevertheless issued the assailed
order of 14 May 1992 on the alleged ground that
the judges of the "RTC at Iligan City are not
available to issue a Preliminary Injunction, and, it
is admitted fact the COMELEC, Manila is very
far and might not receive on time the appeal of
the petitioner." Complainant asserts that
respondent's justification in issuing the
order constituted ignorance of the law,
considering that on 14 May 1992 there was as
yet no appeal to speak of from the decision of
the Board of Canvassers because the election
returns had not been canvassed and that it is an
express provision of law that an appeal can be
had only after the Board of Canvassers has
rendered its ruling on the objections of any party
to the inclusion or exclusion of election returns.
Respondent Judge Casar admitted having
issued without jurisdiction the questioned order
of 14 May 1992. He justified its issuance "as
an immediate remedy and arrangement to
prevent bloodshed between the contending
parties, the complainant's followers, the LDP and
the oppositions (sic) followers, the NPC, which if
said eminent (sic) trouble will occur, would
caused (sic) not only irreparable damages but
may ignite and give rise to the revival of the old
centuries (sic) conflict between Christians and
Muslims in the province." He pointed out that
complainant's failure to question or move for a
reconsideration of the assailed order implied her
acceptance thereof. He likewise suggested that
complainant filed the complaint for the purpose
of harassing him and to block his application for
promotion to the Regional Trial Court.
On 23 November 1993, the Court referred this
case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONSENT JUDGE IS
GUILTY OF IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND
MAY BE HELD LIABLE. YES
HELD: Respondent judge administratively liable
for having knowingly issued an order without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court cannot overlook the fact that
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing his Order dated May 14, 1992 ordering
the Board of Canvassers of Maigo, Lanao del
Norte to suspend the canvassing of the election
returns knowing full (sic) well that he does not
have jurisdiction to act on the petition filed by
Wilfredo Randa.
Respondent's actuation as unbecoming that of a
worthy Judge, for a judge should be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence
(Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct).
While his reasons for issuing the assailed order
are perhaps commendable and demonstrative of
his concern for peace and order during the
election period in the given community, he lost
sight of his bounden duty, as a Judge, to be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1, supra). A
Judge should behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary (Rule 2.01, Canon 2, supra).
ITF v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 159139 January 13, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
CASE: Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking
(1) to declare null and void Resolution No. 6074
of the Commission on Elections (Comelec),
which awarded "Phase II of the Modernization
Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific
Consortium (MPC);"
(2) to enjoin the implementation of any further
contract that may have been entered into by
Comelec "either with Mega Pacific Consortium
and/or Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI);"
and
(3) to compel Comelec to conduct a re-bidding of
the project.
FACTS: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed
Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec
to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 61

computerized election system and allowed the
poll body to pilot-test the system in the March
1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its
Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program
for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct
biddings for the three (3) phases of its
Automated Election System; namely, Phase I —
Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase
II — Automated Counting and Canvassing
System; and Phase III — Electronic
Transmission.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to
fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections.
Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized
the release of an additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued
an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to
Bid".
Out of the 57 bidders,13 the BAC (Bids and
Awards Committee) found MPC and the Total
Information Management Corporation (TIMC)
eligible. For technical evaluation, they were
e e ed t t e C’s Tec nica W ing G up
(TWG) and the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST).
In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical
Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both
MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed
marks in the technical evaluation.
Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en
banc, on April 15, 2003, promulgated
Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to
MPC. The Commission publicized this
Resolution and the award of the project to MPC
on May 16, 2003.
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities
(including the herein Petitioners ITF of the
Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo
M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter
to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They
protested the award of the Contract to
Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in
the manner in which the bidding process had
been conducted." Citing therein the
noncompliance with eligibility as well as
technical and procedural requirements (many
of which have been discussed at length in the
Petition), they sought a re-bidding.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
In a letter-reply dated June 6, 2003 the Comelec
chairman -- speaking through Atty. Jaime Paz,
his head executive assistant -- rejected the
protest and declared that the award "would
stand up to the strictest scrutiny."
Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Commission on
Elections, the agency vested with the
exclusive constitutional mandate to oversee
elections, gravely abused its discretion
when, in the exercise of its administrative
functions, it awarded to MPC the contract for
the second phase of the comprehensive
Automated Election System.
HELD: YES. The Court declared NULL and
VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding
the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega
Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null
and void is the subject Contract executed
between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions
(MPEI). Comelec was further ORDERED to
refrain from implementing any other contract or
agreement entered into with regard to this
project.
Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso
undertaking with inexplicable haste, without
adequately checking and observing mandatory
financial, technical and legal requirements. It
also accepted the proferred computer hardware
and software even if, at the time of the award,
they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical
requirements designed to safeguard the integrity
of elections:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did
not even participate in the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding
despite its failure to meet the mandatory
eligibility requirements
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003
awarding the Contract to MPC despite the
issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed
the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on
April 21, 2003
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the
fact that during the bidding process, there were
violations of the mandatory requirements of RA
8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own
Request for Proposal on the automated election
system
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to
conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 62

bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by
the Department of Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA
8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the
automated counting machines.
Because of the foregoing violations of law and
the glaring grave abuse of discretion committed
by Comelec, the Court has no choice but to
exercise its solemn "constitutional duty" to void
the assailed Resolution and the subject
Contract. The illegal, imprudent and hasty
actions of the Commission have not only
desecrated legal and jurisprudential norms, but
have also cast serious doubts upon the poll
d ’s a i it and capacit t c nduct aut ated
elections. Truly, the pith and soul of democracy -
- credible, orderly, and peaceful elections -- has
been put in jeopardy by the illegal and gravely
abusive acts of Comelec.
LDP v. COMELEC and Aquino
G.R. No. 161265 February 24, 2004
TINGA, J.:
CASE: Petition for Certiorari assailing the
COMELEC Resolution for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS: On December 8, 2003, the General
Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP), a registered political party, informed the
COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only
the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara,
or his authorized representative may endorse
the ce ti icate candidac t e pa t ’s icia
candidates. The same Manifestation stated that
Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary
General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on
"indefinite forced leave." In the meantime,
Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated
Acting Secretary General.
On December 16, 2003, Rep. Aquino filed his
Comment, contending that the Party Chairman
does not have the authority to impose
disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General.
As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General
Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the
COMELEC to disregard the same.
On December 26, 2003, the COMELEC issued
an Order requiring the parties to file a
verified petition. It turned out that, two days
before, Sen. Angara had submitted a verified
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
Petition, in essence, reiterating the contents of
its previous Manifestations. Attached to the
Petition was a Resolution adopted by the LDP
National Executive Council, granting full
authority to Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara
to enter, negotiate and conclude a coalition
agreement with other like-minded opposition
parties, aggrupations and interest groups with
the sole purpose of uniting the political
opposition and fielding a unity ticket for the May
10, 2004 elections.
Pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination
of Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP candidate for
President was filed with the COMELEC. The
Certificate of Nomination was signed by Rep.
Aquino as LDP Secretary General.
On January 6, 2004, the COMELEC came to a
decision.
The COMELEC recognized that it "has the
authority to act on matters pertaining to ‘the
ascertainment of the identity of [a] political
party and its legitimate officers… ’
The petition was GRANTED with LEGAL
EQUITY for both Petitioner and Oppositor.
The COMELEC recognized the candidates of
LD as t e “ ngara Wing” and “ quino
Wing". Each faction or "Wing" is entitled to a
representative to any election committee to
which it may be entitled as created by the
Commission for the May 10, 2004 elections. For
the copies of the election returns, the
"Angara Wing" will be entitled to the copies
corresponding to odd number of precincts and
for the "Aquino Wing" to the even number of
precincts. The two LDP "Wings" are further
entitled to and be accorded the rights and
privileges with corresponding legal obligations
under Election Laws.
Sen. Angara thus filed the present petition for
Certiorari assailing the COMELEC Resolution
for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
Thereafter, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment.
The Office of the Solicitor General submitted a
Manifestation and Motion praying for the
granting of the Petition. The COMELEC thus
filed a separate Comment to the Petition.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 63

ISSUE:
(1) WHETHER THE COMELEC HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO ASCERTAIN THE IDENTITY
OF A POLOTICAL PARTY AND ITS
LEGITIMATE OFFICERS. YES
(2) WHETHER COMELEC RESOLUTION
SPLITTING THE LDP INTO TWO WINGS IS
VALID. NO.
HELD: COMELEC Resolution is ANNULLED
and the Petition is GRANTED IN PART.
Respondent Commission on Elections is
directed to recognize as official candidates of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino only those
whose Certificates of Candidacy are signed by
LDP Party Chairman Senator Edgardo J. Angara
or his duly authorized representative/s.
(1) The fundamental law itself, vest upon the
COMELEC the power and function to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of
such power and in the discharge of such
function, the Commission is endowed with
ample "wherewithal" and "considerable
latitude in adopting means and methods that
will ensure the accomplishment of the great
objectives for which it was created to
promote free, orderly and honest elections."
The COMELEC has the power and the duty to
step in and enforce the law not only to
protect the party but, more importantly, the
electorate in line with the ommission’s
broad constitutional mandate to ensure
orderly elections.
(2) On the issue of who as between the Party
Chairman and the Secretary General has the
authority to sign certificates of candidacy of the
official candidates of the party. Indeed, the
petitioners’ Manifestation and etition before
the COMELEC merely asked the Commission
to recognize only those certificates of
candidacy signed by petitioner Sen. Angara
or his authorized representative, and no
other.
To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC
need only to turn to the Party Constitution. It
need not go so far as to resolve the root of the
conflict between the party officials. It need only
resolve such questions as may be necessary in
the exercise of its enforcement powers.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
The COMELEC misapplied equity in the
present case. For all its conceded merits, equity
is available only in the absence of law and not as
its replacement.The COMELEC should have
decided the case on the basis of the party
constitution and election laws.
Worse, the COMELEC divided the LDP into
"wings," each of which may nominate
candidates for every elective position.
By creating the two wings, the COMELEC
e ecti e di used t e LD ’s st ength and
undeniably emasculated its chance of obtaining
t eC issi n’s n d as t e d inant in it
party.
By allowing each wing to nominate different
candidates, the COMELEC planted the seeds of
confusion among the electorate, who are apt to
be confounded by two candidates from a single
political party.
By according both wings representatives in the
election committees, the COMELEC has eroded
the significance of political parties and
effectively divided the opposition. The
COMELEC performed a disservice to the
opposition and, ultimately, to the voting public,
as its Resolution facilitated, rather than
forestalled, the division of the minority party.
A split party without a complete set of election
returns cannot successfully help preserve the
sanctity of the ballot.
The assailed COMELEC Resolution does not
advance, but subverts, this philosophy
behind political parties.
As if to rationalize its folly, the COMELEC
invokes the constitutional policy towards a free
and open party system. This policy, however,
envisions a system that shall "evolve according
to the free choice of the people," not one molded
and whittled by the COMELEC. When the
Constitution speaks of a multi-party system,
it does not contemplate the COMELEC
splitting parties into two.
SANTOS v. COMELEC and ASISTIO III
G.R. No. 164439 January 23, 2006
CARPIO, J.:
CASE: Petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division in
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 64

SPC No. 04-233 and Resolution No. 72573 of
the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated on 29
June 2004.
FACTS: Jeffrey L. Santos and Macario E. Asistio
III were candidates for the position of Councilor
for the Second District of Caloocan City in the 10
May 2004 Elections. On 18 May 2004, the City
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Asistio as
councilor-elect for the Second District of
Caloocan City. Based on the Canvass of
Election Returns and the Statement of Votes,
Asistio garnered 45,163 votes and secured the
sixth and last slot for the position of Councilor
while Santos placed seventh with 44,558
votes.
On 28 May 2004, Santos filed with the
COMELEC a Petition, docketed SPC No. 04-
233, for Annulment of Proclamation on the
Basis of Erroneous Canvass/Tallies of Votes.
Santos alleged that he was a victim of "dagdag-
bawas" and that his votes were reduced in the
State ent V tes w i e sisti ’s tes we e
increased. Santos further alleged that based on
t e ce ti ied t ue c pies t e N MFREL’s4
election returns as well as the Certificates of
Votes submitted by the poll watchers in the
Second District of Caloocan City, he obtained
46,361 votes while Asistio garnered only 45,514
votes. Santos prayed for the nullification of
the proclamation of Asistio and for his
declaration as the duly elected Councilor of the
Second District of Caloocan City.
In a Resolution promulgated on 29 June 2004,
the COMELEC First Division dismissed SPC
No. 04-233 for lack of merit.
The COMELEC First Division ruled that: (1)
Sant s’ ac watc e s and c unse du ing t e
early stages of the canvassing proceedings is
not a proper ground for the annulment of
sisti ’s p c a ati n; (2) t e d cu ents
submitted by Santos, consisting of a compilation
and tabulation of votes which he himself
prepared, and which he based on certified true
c pies N MFREL’s e ecti n etu ns and t e
originals of various Certificates of Votes
submitted by the poll watchers, are not
admissible in evidence; and (3) Santos should
have assailed the proceedings via a pre-
proclamation controversy, or through an
election protest within ten days after the
proclamation of Asistio, instead of a petition for
annulment of proclamation.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
On 29 June 2004, COMELEC En Banc
promulgated Resolution No. 7257 xxx
4. All remaining pre-proclamation cases, which
on the basis of the evidence thus far presented,
appear meritorious and/or are subject of orders
by the Supreme Court or this Commission in
petitions for certiorari brought respectively to
them shall likewise remain active cases, thereby
requiring the proceedings therein to continue
beyond 30 June 2004, until they are finally
resolved; and
5. All petitions for disqualification, failure of
elections or analogous cases, not being pre-
proclamation controversies and, therefore, not
governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and
particularly, by the second paragraph of Sec. 6,
Republic Act No. 7166, shall remain active
cases, the proceedings to continue beyond June
30, 2004, until the issues therein are finally
resolved by the Commission;
Xxx
This resolution shall take effect immediately.
Annexed to Resolution No. 7257 is a list of
cases that shall remain active before the
COMELEC until their final resolution. SPC No.
04-233 is not included in the list.
On 9 July 2004, Santos filed with the COMELEC
En Banc a motion for the reconsideration
assailing the COMELEC First Division’s
Resolution.
On 30 August 2004, Santos filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
assailing the 29 June 2004 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division and Resolution No.
7257 of the COMELEC En Banc.
In his Comment on the petition, Asistio
accused Santos of forum shopping. Asistio
informed the Court that the COMELEC En Banc
n disp sed Sant s’ ti n
reconsideration in its Order of 15 September
2004 when it affirmed the 29 June 2004
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Hence, at the time of the filing of the petition for
ce ti a i e e t is C u t, Sant s’ ti n
reconsideration was still pending before the
COMELEC En Banc.
Santos, in his Reply t sisti ’s C ent,
maintains that he is not guilty of forum shopping
because the petition before the Supreme Court
only challenges Resolution No. 7257 and not the
29 June 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division. Santos further argues that by excluding
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 65

SPC No. 04-233 from the list of cases annexed
to Resolution No. 7257, the COMELEC En Banc
effectively terminated the case to its finality.
Santos claims that he only learned on 22 July
2004 of the exclusion of SPC No. 04-233 from
the list of cases, after the petition before this
Court had been filed. However, he admits that
Resolution No. 7257 was published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on 30 June 2004.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the COMELEC First Division
committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing SPC No. 04-233. NO.
(2)Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed
grave abuse of discretion in excluding SPC No.
04-233 from the list of cases annexed to
Resolution No. 7257. MOOT.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
Santos is Guilty of Forum-Shopping
Santos filed the petition for certiorari before this
Court during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc.
The petition clearly states that he is questioning
the two Resolutions issued by the COMELEC:
the 29 June 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division in SPC No. 04-233 and the
COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 7257. It was
only when Asistio, in his Comment, called
the ourt’s attention that antos now
belatedly asserts that he only seeks to
challenge COMELEC Resolution No. 7257
and not the Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Santos stated in his petition before this Court
that on 9 July 2004, he filed a motion for
ec nside ati n t e COMELEC Fi st Di isi n’s
Resolution. However, he did not disclose that at
the time of the filing of his petition, his motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the
COMELEC En Banc. Santos did not also bother
to inform the Court of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration by the COMELEC En Banc. Had
sisti n t ca ed t is C u t’s attenti n, we w u d
have ruled on whether the COMELEC First
Division committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing SPC No. 04-233, which is one of the
issues raised by Santos in this petition. This act
of Santos alone constitutes a ground for this
C u t’s su a dis issa is petiti n
The Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division has attained Finality. Had this Court
been apprised at the outset of the pendency of
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
Sant s’ ti n ec nside ati n e e t e
COMELEC En Banc, it would have dismissed
the petition outright for premature filing.
When the COMELEC En Banc finally resolved
the motion for reconsideration, Santos no longer
elevated the denial of his motion before this
Court. He could no longer do that without
exposing his act of forum shopping. Thus, by
antos’ inaction the rder of the ME E
En Banc is now final and executory.
C nt a t Sant s’ c ai , t e COMELEC En
Banc did not dismiss outright SPC No. 04-233
even though the case was excluded in the list
annexed to Resolution No. 7257. The
COMELEC First Division in fact resolved SPC
No. 04-233. When Santos filed a motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc
accepted, considered and disposed of the
motion. Hence, the issue of whether the
COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse
of discretion in excluding SPC No. 04-233 in
the list of cases annexed to Resolution No.
7257 is now moot since the COMELEC in fact
accepted, considered and disposed of SPC No.
04-233.
ROQUE V.COMELEC (2009)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009]
VELASCO JR., J.:
FACTS: On 23 January 2007, Congress passed
RA 9369 amending the first automated election
law, RA 8436.[2] Section 5 of RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, which amendment took
effect on 10 February 2007, authorized the
COMELEC to:
Use an automated election system or systems in
the same election in different provinces, whether
paper-based or a direct recording automated
election system as it may deem appropriate and
practical for the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing/consolidation and
transmittal of results of electoral exercises:
Provided, that for the regular national and
local election, which shall be held
immediately after effectivity of this Act, the
AES shall be used in at least two highly
urbanized cities and two provinces each in
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, to be chosen
by the Commission x x x x In succeeding
regular national or local elections, the AES shall
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 66

be implemented nationwide. (Emphasis
supplied)
The COMELEC did not use any automated
election system in the 14 May 2007 elections,
the national and local elections held after RA
9369 took effect.
On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, on the one
hand, and TIM and Smartmatic (Provider), on
the other, signed the Contract for the automated
tallying and recording of votes cast nationwide in
the 10 May 2010 elections. For
P7,191,484,739.48, the COMELEC leased for
use in the 10 May 2010 elections 82,200 optical
scanners (and related equipment) and hired
ancillary services of the Provider.
On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and
citizens, filed this petition[4] to enjoin the signing
of the Contract or its implementation and to
compel disclosure of the terms of the Contract
and other agreements between the Provider and
its subcontractors.[5] Petitioners sought the
Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with
the requirement in Section 5 of RA 8436, as
amended, mandating the partial use of an
automated election system before deploying it
nationwide. To further support their claim on the
Contract's invalidity, petitioners alleged that (1)
the optical scanners leased by the COMELEC
do not satisfy the minimum systems capabilities"
under RA 8436, as amended and (2) the
Provider not only failed to submit relevant
documents during the bidding but also failed to
show "community of interest" among its
constituent corporations as required in
Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. COMELEC (Infotech).
ISSUE: Whether or not, the COMELEC gravely
abuse its discretion when it entered to contract
with Smartmatic TIM Corporation and assailing
to an automated election.
RULING: Assayed against the provisions of the
Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA
8436, as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and
even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners
invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the
project award to have complied with legal
prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of
the corresponding automation contract in
question to be valid. No grave abuse of
discretion, therefore, can be laid on the
doorsteps of respondent COMELEC. And surely,
the winning joint venture should not be faulted
for having a foreign company as partner.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
The COMELEC is an independent constitutional
body with a distinct and pivotal role in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its
awesome functions as overseer of fair elections,
administrator and lead implementor of laws
relative to the conduct of elections, it should not
be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps
be justified in the case of an organization of
lesser responsibility.[103] It should be afforded
ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in
devising means and initiatives that would enable
it to accomplish the great objective for which it
was created--to promote free, orderly, honest
and peaceful elections. This is as it should be
for, too often, COMELEC has to make decisions
under difficult conditions to address unforeseen
events to preserve the integrity of the election
and in the process the voice of the people. Thus,
in the past, the Court has steered away from
inte e ing wit t e COMELEC’s e e cise its
power which, by law and by the nature of its
office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on
c e ec’s pa t, as e e, t e C u t s u d e ain
from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to
review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.
There are no ready-made formulas for solving
public problems. Time and experience are
necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the
ends of good government. In the matter of the
administration of the laws relative to the conduct
of elections, x x x we must not by any excessive
zeal take away from the comelec the initiative
which by constitutional and legal mandates
properly belongs to it. Due regard to the
independent character of the Commission x x x
requires that the power of this court to review the
acts of that body should, as a general
proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in
appropriate cases.
This independent constitutional commission, it is
true, possesses extraordinary powers and
enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of
its functions. The road, however, towards
successful 2010 automation elections would
certainly be rough and bumpy. The comelec is
laboring under very tight timelines. It would
accordingly need the help of all advocates of
orderly and honest elections, of all men and
women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and
assist comelec personnel address the fears
expressed about the integrity of the system. Like
anyone else, the Court would like and wish
automated elections to succeed, credibly.
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ROQUE VS COMELEC
(mas maganda na digest although medyo iba rin
ang issue na gina tackle nya.)
FACTS: This case is a motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the
September 10, 2009 ruling of the Supreme
Court, which denied the petition of H. Harry L.
Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the
2010 Election Automation Project to the joint
venture of Total Information Management
Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic).
In this MR, petitioners Roque, et al. are again
before the Supreme Court asking that the
contract award be declared null and void on the
stated ground that it was made in violation of the
Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence.
Intervening petitioner also interposed a similar
motion, but only to pray that the Board of
Election Inspectors be ordered to manually count
the ballots after the printing and electronic
transmission of the election returns.
Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein,
seek a reconsideration of the September 10,
2009 Decision on the following issues or
grounds:
1 T e C e ec’s pu ic p n unce ents s w
that there is a "high probability" that there will be
failure of automated elections;
2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions
in favor of Smartmatic;
3. There is no legal framework to guide the
Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in
case the PCOS machines fail;
4. Respondents cannot comply with the
requirements of RA 8436 for a source code
review;
5. Certifications submitted by private
respondents as to the successful use of the
machines in elections abroad do not fulfill the
requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436;
6. Private respondents will not be able to provide
telecommunications facilities that will assure
100% communications coverage at all times
during the conduct of the 2010 elections; and
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS
ac ines t Quisdi i ates t e C e ec’s
bidding rules.
Note: (This digest would only deal with the
procedural aspect of the MR. Only those issues
ormgrounds wherein the Court made a ruling re:
procedure would be discussed here.)
ISSUE: Is the motion for reconsideration
meritorious?
RULING: No. Upon taking a second hard look
into the issues in the case at bar and the
arguments earnestly pressed in the instant
motions, the Court cannot grant the desired
reconsideration.
etiti ne s’ t es d a gu ent de es n
possibilities, on matters that may or may not
occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of
the first issue raised is reflected in the very
manner of its formulation and by statements,
such as "the public pronouncements of public
respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that
there is a high probability that there will be
automated failure of elections"; "there is a high
probability that the use of PCOS machines in the
May 2010 elections will result in failure of
elections"; "the unaddressed logistical
nightmares—and the lack of contingency plans
that should have been crafted as a result of a
pilot test—make an automated failure of
elections very probable"; and "COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
signed x x x the contract for full automation x x x
despite the likelihood of a failure of elections."
Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent
to proof; they have little, if any, probative value
and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound
judgment.
Petitioners, to support their speculative venture
vis-à-vis the possibility of Comelec going
manual, have attributed certain statements to
respondent Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for
the purpose a news item on Inquirer.net, posted
September 16, 2009.
Reacting to the attribution, however,
respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their
comment, described the Melo pronouncements
as ade in t e c nte t C e ec’s
contingency plan. Petitioners, however, the
same respondents added, put a misleading spin
to the Melo pronouncements by reproducing part
of the news item, but omitting to make reference
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 68

to his succeeding statements to arrive at a
clearer and true picture.
i ate esp ndents’ se ation is well-taken.
Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite portions of
what has been said, sometimes out of their
proper context, in order to assert a misleading
conclusion. The effect can be dangerous.
Improper meaning may be deliberately attached
to innocent views or even occasional crude
comments by the simple expediency of lifting
them out of context from any publication.
etiti ne s’ p stu e anent t e t i d issue, i e,
there no is legal framework to guide Comelec in
the appreciation of automated ballots or to
govern manual count should PCOS machines
fail, cannot be accorded cogency. First, it
glosses over the continuity and back-up plans
that would be implemented in case the PCOS
machines falter during the 2010 elections. The
overall fallback strategy and options to address
even the worst-case scenario—the wholesale
breakdown of the 80,000 needed machines
nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved units—
have been discussed in some detail in the
Decision subject of this recourse. The Court
need not belabor them again.
While a motion for reconsideration may tend to
dwell on issues already resolved in the decision
sought to be reconsidered—and this should not
be an obstacle for a reconsideration—the hard
reality is that petitioners have failed to raise
matters substantially plausible or compellingly
persuasive to warrant the desired course of
action.
Significantly, petitioners, in support of their
position on the lack-of-legal-framework issue,
invoke the opinion of Associate, later Chief,
Justice Artemio Panganiban in Loong v.
Comelec, where he made the following
observations: "Resort to manual appreciation of
the ballots is precluded by the basic features of
the automated election system," and "the rules
laid down in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
for the appreciation and counting of ballots cast
in a manual election x x x are inappropriate, if
not downright useless, to the proper appreciation
and reading of the ballots used in the automated
system." Without delving on its wisdom and
validity, the view of Justice Panganiban thus
cited came by way of a dissenting opinion. As
such, it is without binding effect, a dissenting
opinion being a mere expression of the individual
view of a member of the Court or other collegial
adjudicating body, while disagreeing with the
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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conclusion held by the majority.
And going to another but recycled issue,
petitioners would have the Court invalidate the
automation contract on the ground that the
certifications submitted by Smartmatic during the
bidding, showing that the PCOS technology has
been used in elections abroad, do not comply
with Sec. 1222 of RA 8436. Presently,
petitioners assert that the system certified as
having been used in New York was the
Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking device.
Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage
of the case, an entirely new factual dimension to
their cause. This we cannot allow for compelling
reasons. For starters, the Court cannot plausibly
validate this factual assertion of petitioners. As it
is, private respondents have even questioned
the reliability of the website24 whence
petitioners base their assertion, albeit the former,
citing the same website, state that the Image
Cast Precinct tabulation device refers to the
D ini n’s COS ac ines
Moreover, as a matter of sound established
practice, points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not raised in the original proceedings
cannot be brought out on review. Basic
considerations of fair play impel this rule. The
imperatives of orderly, if not speedy, justice
frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence
and on the practice of parties of going to trial
haphazardly.
Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim
that "there are very strong indications that
Private Respondents will not be able to provide
for telecommunication facilities for areas without
these facilities." This argument, being again
highly speculative, is without evidentiary value
and hardly provides a ground for the Court to
nullify the automation contract. Surely, a
possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not
a legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less
annul, the contract.
Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news
reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture has
entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a
Shanghai-based company, to manufacture on its
behalf the needed PCOS machines to fully
automate the 2010 elections.29 This
arrangement, petitioners aver, violates the bid
rules proscribing sub-contracting of significant
components of the automation project.
The argument is untenable, based as it is again
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 69

on news reports. Surely, petitioners cannot
expect the Court to act on unverified reports
foisted on it.
BRILLANTES ET. AL. V. COMELEC
FACTS: Republic Act No. 8436 mandates the
use by the COMELEC of Automated Election
System for the national and local elections. By
virtue of this law, the COMELEC promulgated a
resolution for the implementation of this law.
Under the said resolution the automation of
election was divided into 3 phases namely:
Phase 1, for the computerized registration of
voters and validation of voters; Phase 2 is for the
computerized voting and counting of votes; and
Phase 3 concerns the electronic transmission of
results. Phase 1 was implemented while on the
other hand, due to certain controversies
surrounding the implementation of Phase 1 the
same was not implemented.
This petition concerns Resolution No. 6712
issued by the COMELEC en banc promulgated
by the COMELEC barely two weeks before the
May 2004 Synchronized residential and local
elections mandating the electronic transmission
of the election results for the national elections.
The resolution in effect implements the Phase 3
of the automation though the COMELEC dubbed
the electronic transmission of results as an
“un icia ”’ quic c unt
The petitioners assail the above resolution
because here is no provision under Rep. Act No.
8436 which authorizes the COMELEC to engage
in the biometrics/computerized system of
validation of voters (Phase I) and a system of
electronic transmission of election results (Phase
III). Even assuming for the nonce that all the
three (3) phases are duly authorized, they must
complement each other as they are not distinct
and separate programs but mere stages of one
whole scheme. Consequently, considering the
failed implementation of Phases I and II, there is
no basis at all for the respondent COMELEC to
still push through and pursue with Phase III.
The petitioner essentially posits that the counting
and consolidation of votes contemplated under
Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8436 refers to the
official COMELEC count under the fully
automated system and not any kind of
"unofficial" count via electronic transmission of
advanced results as now provided under the
assailed resolution. On the other hand,
petitioner-intervenors assail the constitutionality
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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of Resolution 6712 effectively preempts the sole
and exclusive authority of Congress under
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to
canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President.
Further, as there has been no appropriation by
Congress for the respondent COMELEC to
conduct an "unofficial" electronic transmission of
results of the May 10, 2004 elections, any
expenditure for the said purpose contravenes
Article VI, Section 29 (par. 1) of the Constitution.
All of them likewise assail the legality of the
resolution on the ground that it encroaches upon
t e aut it N MFREL, as t e citizens’
accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick
count as provided under pertinent election laws.
It also violates Section 52(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code, relating to the requirement of
notice to the political parties and candidates of
the adoption of technological and electronic
devices during the elections.
COMELEC counters by saying that the Court
has no jurisdiction to pass upon the assailed
reso uti n’s a idit c ai ing t at it was
promulgated in the exercise of the respondent
COMELEC’s e ecuti e ad inist ati e p we
as a s ecause t e issue in es a “p itica
question. It likewise challenges the standing of
all the petitioners to file the present petition.
COMELEC also denied the resolution aims to
implement the Phase 3 of the election
automation system. They also argue that what is
contemplated in the assailed resolution is not a
canvass of the votes but merely consolidation
and transmittal thereof. As such, it cannot be
made the basis for the proclamation of any
winning candidate. Emphasizing that the project
is "unofficial" in nature, the COMELEC opines
that it cannot, therefore, be considered as
preempting or usurping the exclusive power of
Congress to canvass the votes for President and
Vice-President.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have standing to
file the petition
HELD: Yes. Since the implementation of the
assailed resolution obviously involves the
expenditure of funds, the petitioner and the
petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers, possess
the requisite standing to question its validity as
they have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.
In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where
there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 70

funds, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or where the petitioners
seek to restrain the respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.
Some of the petitioners are also representatives
of major political parties that have participated in
the May 10, 2004 elections. Some represent the
N MFREL, w ic is t e citizens’ a , aut ized
to conduct an "unofficial" quick count during the
said elections. They have sufficient, direct and
personal interest in the manner by which the
respondent COMELEC would conduct the
elections, including the counting and canvassing
of the votes cast therein. Drilon and De Venecia
are, respectively, President of the Senate and
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
heads of Congress which is exclusively
authorized by the Constitution to canvass the
votes for President and Vice-President. They
have the requisite standing to prevent the
usurpation of the constitutional prerogative of
Congress.
ISSUE: Whether the petition involves a computers and software, among others.
justiciable controversy
HELD: Yes. Petitioner and the petitioners-in-
intervention are questioning the legality of the
esp ndent COMELEC’s ad inist ati e issuance
will not preclude this Court from exercising its
power of judicial review to determine whether or
not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the respondent COMELEC in issuing
Resolution No. 6712. Indeed, administrative
issuances must not override, supplant or modify
the law, but must remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out.27 When the grant of
power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the
limitations respected, is justiciable – the problem
being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.28
In the present petition, the Court must pass upon
t e petiti ne ’s c ntenti n t at Res uti n N
6712 does not have adequate statutory or
constitutional basis.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating
the assailed resolution
HELD: Yes. First. The assailed resolution
usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial"
tabulation of election results based on a copy of
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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the election returns, the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress to canvass the votes for
the election of President and Vice-President.
Second. The assailed COMELEC resolution
contravenes the constitutional provision that "no
money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. By
its very terms, the electronic transmission and
tabulation of the election results projected under
Resolution No. 6712 is "unofficial" in character,
meaning "not emanating from or sanctioned or
acknowledged by the government or government
body. Any disbursement of public funds to
implement this project is contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No.
9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations
Act. The use of the COMELEC of its funds
appropriated for the AES for the "unofficial" quick
count project may even be considered as a
felony under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The implementation of the
assailed resolution would entail, in due course,
the hiring of additional manpower, technical
services and acquisition of equipment, including
According to the COMELEC, it needed
P55,000,000 to operationalize the project,
including the encoding process. Hence, it would
necessarily involve the disbursement of public
funds for which there must be the corresponding
appropriation.
Third. It disregards existing laws which
authorize solely the duly-acc edited citizens’ a
to conduct the "unofficial" counting of votes.
Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated
in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the
acc edited citizen’s a - in this case, NAMFREL
- is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the
election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial"
counting of the votes, whether for the national or
the local elections. No other entity is authorized
to use a copy of the election returns for purposes
of conducting an "unofficial" count. In addition,
the second or third copy of the election returns,
while required to be delivered to the COMELEC
under the aforementioned laws, are not intended
for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The
aforesaid COMELEC copies are archived and
unsealed only when needed by the respondent
COMELEC to verify election results in
connection with resolving election disputes that
may be imminent. However, in contravention of
the law, the assailed Resolution authorizes the
so-called Reception Officers (RO), to open the
second or third copy intended for the respondent
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 71

COMELEC as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced "unofficial" precinct
results. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an
"unofficial" count, but also taints the integrity of
the envelopes containing the election returns, as
well as the returns themselves, by creating a gap
in its chain of custody from the Board of Election
Inspectors to the COMELEC.
Fourth. Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election
Code does not cover the use of the latest
technological and election devices for "unofficial"
tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC
failed to notify the authorized representatives of
accredited political parties and all candidates in
areas affected by the use or adoption of
technological and electronic devices not less
than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use
of such devices.
Fifth. There is no constitutional and statutory
basis for the respondent COMELEC to
undertake a separate and an "unofficial"
tabulation of results, whether manually or
electronically. Indeed, by conducting such
"unofficial" tabulation of the results of the
election, the COMELEC descends to the level of
a private organization, spending public funds for
the purpose. Besides, it is absurd for the
COMELEC to conduct two kinds of electoral
counts – a slow but "official" count, and an
alleged quicker but "unofficial" count, the results
of each may substantially differ.
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M.
PAGDANGANAN
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010 ]
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: This case involves the election protest
filed with the Commission on Elections against
Joselito R. Mendoza (Mendoza), who was
proclaimed elected Governor of Bulacan in the
14 May 2007 elections. Mendoza garnered
364,566 votes while private respondent Roberto
M. Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) got 348,834
votes, giving Mendoza a winning margin of
15,732 votes.
After the appreciation of the contested ballots,
the COMELEC Second Division deducted a total
of 20,236 votes from Mendoza and 616 votes
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
from Pagdanganan. As regards the claimed
ballots, Mendoza was awarded 587 ballots
compared to Pagdanganan's 586 ballots. Thus,
the result of the revision proceedings showed
that Pagdanganan obtained 342,295 votes,
which is more than Mendoza's 337,974 votes. In
its Resolution dated 1 December 2009 (Division
Resolution), the COMELEC Second Division
annulled the proclamation of Mendoza and
proclaimed Pagdanganan as the duly elected
Governor of Bulacan with a winning margin of
4,321 votes.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Division
Resolution on 8 February 2010. On 4 March
2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order
denying Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration
and granting Pagdanganan's Motion for
Execution of the Division Resolution
ISSUE:
 Whether or not, the COMELEC gravely
abuse its discretion when it failed to credit
petitioner's claims? YES
 Whether or not, the COMELEC en banc has
the power to hear and decide the case. NO
HELD: Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion of
the COMELEC is patent in the fact that despite
the existence in its books of the clearly worded
Section 6 of Rule 18, which incidentally has
been acknowledged by this Court in the recent
case of Marcoleta v COMELEC,[5] it completely
ignored and disregarded its very own decree and
proceeded with the questioned Resolution of 8
February 2010 and Order of 4 March 2010, in all,
annulling the proclamation of petitioner Joselito
R. Mendoza as the duly elected governor of
Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M.
Pagdanganan as the duly elected governor, and
ordering petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza to cease
and desist from performing the functions of the
Governor of Bulacan and to vacate said office in
favor of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan.
The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC
is underscored by the fact that the protest that
petitioner Pagdanganan filed on 1 June 2007
overstayed with the COMELEC until the present
election year when the end of the term of the
contested office is at hand and there was hardly
enough time for the re-hearing that was
conducted only on 15 February 2010. As the
hearing time at the division had run out, and the
re-hearing time at the banc was fast running out,
the unwanted result came about: incomplete
appreciation of ballots; invalidation of ballots on
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 72

general and unspecific grounds; unrebutted
presumption of validity of ballots.
Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, the COMELEC, sitting en banc,
does not have the authority to decide election
cases in the first instance as this authority
belongs to the divisions of the COMELEC
Specifically.
Sec.3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission
En Banc.
JAMIL vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123648, December 15, 1997
FACTS: Petitioner Jamil and Private respondent
Balindong were among the mayoralty candidates
in the Municipality of Sultan Gumander, Lanao
del Sur during the May 1998 elections. During
the canvassing of the election returns by the
MBC headed by Sansarona, private respondent
objected to the inclusion of 4 election returns
from 4 precincts on the grounds of duress, for
being spurious returns and for not being an
authentic copy. The Sansarona MBC issued its
ruling on the 3 objection setting aside the
election returns from a precinct for further
investigation or to go deeper into the
contradicting testimonies of the Chairman and
the watchers or to summon the 2 BFIs who failed
to affix their signature and explain the alleged
increase of votes of a candidate. The MBC
composition was changed with Macadato as its
head. It denied the exclusion of return from
precinct.
Private respondent Balindong appealed to the
COMELEC the ruling of the Macadato MBC.
Petitioner also appealed to the COMELEC
challenging the Sansarona MBC rulings. While
these 2 cases were still pending in the
COMELEC, the Macadato MBC proclaimed
petitioner Jamil and other winning candidates.
The COMELEC Second Division issued an
Order directing the MBC to reconvene and
proclaim the winning candidate for Mayor of
Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur. The Macadato
MBC proclaimed petitioner Jamil as duly elected
Mayor. Private respondent filed with the
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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COMELEC an u gent ti n t annu petiti ne ’s
proclamation on the ground that the
proclamation was without authority of the
COMELEC, and to constitute a new Board of
Canvasser. The COMELEC Second division
annu ed petiti ne Ja i ’s p c a ati n and
directed the constitution of a new MBC. The
newly constituted MBC headed by Cariga
proclaimed private respondent Balindong as the
newly elected Mayor.
The COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of
the Second Division. Petitioner Jamil asked the
Supreme Court to revise and reverse the
decision of the COMELEC en banc
ISSUE: Which of the 2 proclamations is valid.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that both
proclamations are not valid. The Macadato and
Cariga MBC did not make definite rulings or
pronouncement on the inclusion or exclusion of
returns so that there was no complete and valid
canvass which is pre-requisite to a valid
p c a ati n etiti ne Ja i ’s p c a ati n
the MBC had no authority from COMELEC. The
Omnibus Election Code prohibits the
proclamation by the Board of Canvassers of a
candidate as winner where returns are
contested, unless authorized by the COMELEC.
It is readily observed that the May 23, 1995
issuances cannot be considered as "rulings"
within the contemplation of law; they are not
definitive rulings of exclusion by the MBC
because they merely deferred the inclusion of
the election returns pending "further
investigation." Hence, they are not "rulings" of
the board of canvassers that are deemed
affirmed within the purview of Comelec's
Omnibus Resolution on pending cases dated
June 29, 1995. The proclamation of the
petitioner is invalid due to the provisions of the
said code which prohibits the MBC to proclaim a
candidate with a pending case thereof unless
authorized by the COMELEC, there was none
based on the facts. On the other hand, the
proclamation of the private respondent was also
invalid it was not predicated on a complete and
valid canvass, but on supposed "rulings" of the
Sansarona MBC which merely "set aside for
further investigation" the three challenged
election returns from Precinct Nos. 5, 10-1 and
20-1. Said proclamation had clearly no basis in
fact and in law. It is a settled rule that an
incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot
be the basis of a valid proclamation.
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BERNARDO VS ABALOS
{Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A. Domingo,
Jr. and jesus C. Cruz vs. Benjamin S. Abalos,
r Benjamin “Benhur” balos Jr r
Eden C. Diaz, Romeo F. Zapanta, Arcadio S.
De Vera and The COMELEC}
G.R. No. 137266, December 5, 2001
FACTS: In 1998, a criminal complaint for
violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code on vote-buying was charged against
respondents. Abalos was running for the position
of Mayor at the time.
It was alleged that a few weeks before the
elections, Abalos hosted an all-expense paid trip
for Mandaluyong City public school teachers at a
beach resort. During this outing, Abalos made a
speech where he promised the teacher an
increase in their allowances.
COMELEC’s Law Depa t ent c nducted a
Preliminary Investigation, but recommended to
the en banc to dismiss said complaint due to
lack of evidence.
Thereafter, the en banc issued a Resolution
dis issing t e c p aint “insu icienc
e idence t esta is a p i a acie case ”
Instead of submitting a Motion for
Reconsideration (MFR), the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court,
claiming that the said resolution of the en banc
was made with grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioners are claiming that they would
rather go directly to the Supreme Court as a
MFR at the COMELEC level would be dilatory.
E: W/ the petitioner’s certiorari should
be given due course. NO
HELD: The petitioners should have sought a
reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En
Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule
13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
thus:
Section 1. What Pleadings are not
Allowed.- The following pleadings are not
a wed: …
d) motion for reconsideration of an en
banc ruling, resolution, order or decision
except in election offence cases;
etiti ne s’ ai u e t i e t e equired MFR utterly
disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended to
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achieve an orderly, just expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of
every action and proceeding brought before the
Commission.
C nt a t petiti ne s’ state ent t at a es t t
a MFR is ‘di at ,’ it ea s st essing t at t e
purpose of said motion is to give the COMELEC
an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If
the error is immediately corrected by way of a
MFR, then it is the most expeditious and
inexpensive recourse. But if the COMELEC
refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then
it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying
a recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition
for certiorari.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, can only
be resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Having failed to file the required
MFR t e c a enged Res uti n, petiti ne s’
instant petition is certainly premature.
The COMLEC also found that the evidence of
t e esp ndents a e e ‘p ati e a ue and
believable than the evidence of the
c p ainants;” and t at t e e idence su itted
petiti ne s a e “ e e se -serving statements,
and uncorroborated audio and visual recording
and a p t g ap ”
NB: Sec. 28 of RA 6646 states that a complaint
for vote-buying must be supported by affidavits
of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer or
p ise t e te ’s acceptance
money or other consideration from the relatives,
leaders or symphatizers of candidate. Such
affidavit was clearly missing in the complaint,
warranting its dismissal.
COQUILLA v COMELEC
{Tedulo M. Coquilla vs COMELEC and Neil M.
Avarez}
G.R. No. 15194, July 31, 2002
FACTS: Coquilla was naturalized as a US
Citizen sometime around 1965. He returned to
the Philippines in 1998, and subsequently was
repatriated under RA 8171. He took his oath and
was issued his Certificate of Repatriation on
November 2000.
Thereafter, Coquilla was registered as a voter of
Oras, Eastern Samar on January 2001. On
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February 2001, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy to run for the position of Mayor.
However, incumbent re-electionist Neil Alvarez
s ug t t e cance ati n C qui a’s COC n t e
ground that Coquilla made a material
misrepresentation that he had been living in
Oras for two years, when really, he had only
been for 6 months.
The COMELEC however failed to render
judgment on the case before the elections,
where Coquilla was elected mayor.
On July 19, 2001, the 2nd Division issued a
Res uti n w ic g anted a a ez’s petiti n and
de ed t e cance ati n C qui a’s COC 5
days after receiving the Resolution, Coquilla filed
a MFR but the en banc denied it on January 30,
2002 for being pro-forma.
The COMELEC en banc said in its decision:
An incisive examination of the allegations
in the Motion for Reconsideration shows
that the same are a mere rehash of his
averments contained in his Verified
Answer and Memorandum. Neither did
respondent raise new matters that would
sufficiently warrant a reversal of the
assailed resolution of the Second
Division. This makes the said Motion pro
forma.
On February 11, 2002, Coquilla filed a petition
for certiorari assailing the resolution of the 2nd
Division as we as t e en anc’s denia is
MFR.
a ez n t e t e and c ai s t at C qui a’s
petition be dismissed as it was filed out of time:
Coquilla received the 2nd Division Resolution on
July 28, 2001, so that Coquilla only had until
August 2001 to file the petition. Alvarez
additionally maintains that since the en banc
und C qui a’s MFR t e p -forma, the filing
of the MFR with the en banc did not suspend the
30-day prescriptive period to question the 2nd
Division ruling.
ISSUES:
1. W/N C qui a’s petition was barred by
prescription. NO
2. W/N C qui a’s MFR was p -forma. NO
HELD:
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides in pertinent parts:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for
Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider
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a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
Division shall be filed within five days from
the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if
not pro-forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution,
order, or ruling.
Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for
Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. – A
motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling, when not pro-
forma, suspends the running of the period
to elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court.
The five-day period for filing a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 19, Sec. 2 should be
counted from the receipt of the decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC
Division. In this case, petitioner received a copy
of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the
COMELEC’s Sec nd Di isi n n Ju 28, 2001
Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his
motion for reconsideration. On February 6, 2002,
he received a copy of the order, dated January
30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his
motion for reconsideration. Five days later, on
February 11, 2002, he filed this petition for
certiorari. There is no question, therefore, that
petiti ne ’s ti n ec nside ati n t e
resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, as
well as his petition for certiorari to set aside of
the order of the COMELEC en banc, was filed
within the period provided for in Rule 19, Sec. 2
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in Art.
IX(A), Sec. 7 of the Constitution.
On the contention that said motion was pro-
forma, the Court held that the motion for
reconsideration was not pro forma and its filing
did suspend the period for filing the petition for
certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a
motion for reconsideration of the issues raised
by the parties and passed upon by the court
does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise,
t e ant’s e ed w ud n t e a
reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or
some other remedy.
In the cases where a motion for reconsideration
was held to be pro forma, the motion was so
held because (1) it was a second motion for
reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the
rule that the motion must specify the findings
and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or
not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to
substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely
alleged that the decision in question was
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contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not
given notice thereof. The 16-page motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the
COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the
foregoing defects, and it was error for the
COMELEC en banc t u e t at petiti ne ’s
motion for reconsideration was pro forma
because the allegations raised therein are a
mere "rehash" of his earlier pleadings or did not
raise "new matters." Hence, the filing of the
motion suspended the running of the 30-day
period to file the petition in this case, which, as
earlier shown, was done within the reglementary
period provided by law.
Additionally, COMELEC still has jurisdiction over
the case even if Coquilla was successfully
elected. According to RA 6646, the rule is that
candidates who are disqualified by final
judgment before the election shall not be voted
for and the votes cast for them shall not be
counted. But those against whom no final
judgment of disqualification had been rendered
may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on
motion of the complainant, the COMELEC
suspends their proclamation because the
grounds for their disqualification or cancellation
of their certificates of candidacy were strong.
Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification
of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of
certificates of candidacy, which have been
begun before the elections, should continue
even after such elections and proclamation of
the winners.
The SC however found that the cancellation of
C qui a’s COC t e 2nd Div was justified since
he misrepresented a material fact on his COC.
ANGELIA V COMELEC
{Dioscoro O. Angelia vs COMELEC and
Florentino R. Tan}
G.R. No. 135468, May 31, 2000
FACTS: Angelia and Tan were Sangguniang
Bayan candidates in the 1998 elections in
Abuyog Leyte. During canvass, Angelia was
proclaimed as the eighth SB member, with only
a 4-vote advantage from Tan, who ranked 9th.
Tan later filed a petition for quo warranto with the
RTC alleging that there were clerical errors in
the counting of votes to his prejudice.
Meanwhile, Angelia took his oath and assumed
office.
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Tan eventually withdrew his quo warranto
petition and filed instead a petition for annulment
of proclamation with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC through a Resolution dated
August 18, 1998, annu ed nge ia’s
proclamation and ordered the Municipal Board of
Canvassers to make the necessary corrections
in the Election Returns in the contested
precincts. The MBOC reconvened and later
declared Tan as the 8th SB Member.
Angelia filed a MFR with the COMELEC en banc
and alleged that he was not given due notice
and hearing. Without waiting for resolution on his
MFR, Angelia filed a petition for certiorari against
the August 18, 1998 Resolution of the
COMELEC.
Tan however claims that the certiorari petition
should be dismissed as it is premature, as he
had a pending MFR with the en banc.
ISSUES:
1. W/N nge ia’s i ing ce ti a i is p pe
YES
2. W/N nge ia’s petiti n ce ti a i s u d
be dismissed. YES
HELD: Angellia acted correctly in filing the
present petition because the resolution of the
COMELEC in question is not subject to
reconsideration and, therefore, any party who
disagreed with it had only one recourse, and that
was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
As the case before the COMELEC did not
involve an election offense, reconsideration of
the COMELEC resolution was not possible and
petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. For him to wait until the COMELEC denied
his motion would be to allow the reglementary
period for filing a petition for certiorari with this
Court to run and expire.
As to the contention that Tan committed forum
shopping, the Court held this deserves no merit.
First, private respondent withdrew the quo
warranto case before filing the petition for
annulment of proclamation. Second, while the
filing of a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation
controversy, this principle admits of several
exceptions, such as when such petition is not the
proper remedy. Under Sec. 253 of the Omnibus
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Election Code, the grounds for a petition for quo
warranto are ineligibility or disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines of the respondent.
Since in the present case, private respondent
alleged the existence of manifest errors in the
preparation of election returns, clearly, the
proper remedy is not a petition for quo warranto
but a petition for annulment of proclamation.
On the argument involving clerical errors, the
proper procedure is to reconvene the BOC, and
not to annul the proclamation without notice and
hearing.
In Castromayor v. COMELEC, we held that, as
the case involved a manifest error, although the
COMELEC erred in annulling the proclamation of
petitioner without notice and hearing, the
expedient course of action was for the Municipal
Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after
notice and hearing in accordance with Rule 27,
Sec. 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to
effect the necessary corrections on the
certificate of canvass and proclaim the winning
candidate or candidates on the basis thereof.
T e C ut t ee e di ied t e en anc’s
u ing and de eted t e annu ent nge ia’s
proclamation, while ordering the BOC to
reconvene.
BANAGA V COMELEC
{Tomas T. Banaga vs COMELEC & Florencio
M. Bernabe Jr.}
G.R. No. 134696, July 31, 2000
FACTS: Banaga and Bernabe were vice-mayor
candidates in the city of Paranaque during the
1998 elections, where the CBOC proclaimed
Bernabe as the winner.
Banaga then filed an action with the COMELEC
den inated as a “petiti n t dec a e ai u e
e ecti ns and/ annu ent e ecti ns,”
alleging that the elected was tainted with
widespread fraud, vote-buying and flying voters.
Banaga also claimed that there were
‘disc epancies and issi ns’ du ing t e
canvassing stage. Banaga also prayed for the
holding of a special election for the Vice-Mayor
position.
COMELEC en anc dis issed anaga’s acti n,
holding that the grounds cited do not fall under
the circumstances enumerated in Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code that would warrant
the declaration of failure of elections.
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Banaga then filed a timely petition for certiorari
with the SC. Banaga claimed that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed his petition motu proprio and without
giving him the benefit of a hearing. Banaga also
claimed that his previously filed action should be
considered as an election protest.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of disc eti n w en it dis issed anaga’s
complaint. NO
HELD: anaga’s acti n c u d n t e c nside ed
an election protest. First, his petition before the
COMELEC was instituted pursuant to Section 4
of Republic Act No. 7166 in relation to Section 6
of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 4 of RA
7166 refers to "postponement, failure of election
and special elections" while Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code relates to "failure of
election". It is simply captioned as "Petition to
Declare Failure of Elections and/or For
Annulment of Elections".
Second, an election protest is an ordinary action
while a petition to declare a failure of elections is
a special action under the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure as amended. An election
protest is governed by Rule 20 on ordinary
actions, while a petition to declare failure of
elections is covered by Rule 26 under special
actions.
In this case, petitioner filed his petition as a
special action and paid the corresponding fee
therefor. Thus, the petition was docketed as
SPA-98-383 T is c n s t petiti ne ’s
categorization of his petition as one to declare a
failure of elections or annul election results. In
contrast, an election protest is assigned a docket
number starting with "EPC", meaning election
protest case.
Third, petitioner did not comply with the
requirements for filing an election protest. He
failed to pay the required filing fee and cash
deposits for an election protest. Failure to pay
filing fees will not vest the election tribunal
jurisdiction over the case. Such procedural lapse
on the part of a petitioner would clearly warrant
the outright dismissal of his action.
Fourth, an en banc decision of COMELEC in an
ordinary action becomes final and executory
after thirty (30) days from its promulgation, while
an en banc decision in a special action becomes
final and executory after five (5) days from
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promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme
Court. For that reason, a petition cannot be
treated as both an election protest and a petition
to declare failure of elections.
Fifth, the allegations in the petition decisively
determine its nature. Petitioner alleged that the
local elections for the office of vice-mayor in
Parañaque City held on May 11, 1998,
denigrates the true will of the people as it was
marred with widespread anomalies on account
of vote buying, flying voters and glaring
discrepancies in the election returns. He averred
that those incidents warrant the declaration of a
failure of elections.
Given these circumstances, public respondent
cannot be said to have gravely erred in treating
petiti ne ’s acti n as a petiti n t dec a e ai u e
of elections or to annul election results.
There was no failure of election as well. Before
the COMELEC can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a failure of election, two
conditions must concur: 1. No voting took place
in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by
law, or even if there was voting, the election
resulted in a failure to elect; and 2. The votes not
cats would have affected the result of the
election. The cause of such failure of election
could only be any of the following: force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
circumstances.
Banaga did not allege at all that elections were
either not held or suspended. Neither did he aver
that although there was voting, nobody was
elected. On the contrary, he conceded that an
election took place for the office of vice-mayor of
Parañaque City, and that private respondent
was, in fact, proclaimed elected to that post.
While petitioner contends that the election was
tainted with widespread anomalies, it must be
noted that to warrant a declaration of failure of
election the commission of fraud must be such
that it prevented or suspended the holding of an
election, or marred fatally the preparation and
transmission, custody and canvass of the
election returns. These essential facts ought to
have been alleged clearly by Banaga, but he did
not.
Finally, Banaga claims that COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it dismissed his
petition motu propio. However, the fact that a
verified petition has been filed does not mean
that a hearing on the case should first be held
before COMELEC can act on it. The petition to
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declare a failure of election and/or to annul
election results must show on its face that the
conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect
are present. In their absence, the petition must
be denied outright. COMELEC had no recourse
but to dismiss petition.
REYES V RTC OF ORIENTAL MINDORO
244 SCRA 41
FACTS: Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private
respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for
the position of Sanggunian Bayan of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 elections.
On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, private
respondent moved for the exclusion of certain
election returns, on the ground of serious
irregularity in the counting in favor of petitioner
qui es Rees tes “Re es” n , c nside ing
that the was another candidate (Epitacio Reyes)
bearing the same surname. Without resolving his
petition, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed on the same day petitioner as the
eight winning candidate.
On June 1, 1992, private respondent filed an
election protest before the trial court. Municipal
Board of Canvassers file its answer in which it
admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting
private respondent with only 858 votes when he
was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of
Votes. On June 23, 1992, trial court rendered its
decision annulling the proclamation of petitioner
and declaring private respondent as the eight
winning candidate for the position of councilor.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the
COMELEC and in addition filed a petition for
mandamus and prohibition in the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition because of the petitioner's
pending appeal in the COMELEC. On the other
hand, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed
the petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had
failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed
period.
Hence this instant petition, petitioner contends
that the COMELEC's First Division committed
grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether this petition for certiorari would
prosper?
HELD: NO. The filing of the present petition,
without petitioner first filing a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc,
violates Art. IX, A, Sec 7 of the Constitution
because under this provision only decisions of
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the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.
LUCITA Q. GARCES vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, SALVADOR
EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO CONCEPCION
FACTS: Lucita Garces was appointed Election
Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on
July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent
Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in
turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon
assumption of office. Concepcion, however,
refused to transfer post as he did not request for
it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant
Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac
post. But she was not able to do so because of a
Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial
Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that
prohibited her from assuming office as the same
is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting
Manager, Finance Service Department, with an
enclosed check to cover for the expenses on
construction of polling booths. It was addressed
“M s Lucita Ga ces E R Guta ac, Za anga
de N te” w ic Garces interpreted to mean as
superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile,
since Concepcion continued occupying the
Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled
his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for
mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction and damages against
Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the
COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize
respondent Concepcion as the Election
Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the
appointments of Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for
mandamus alleging that the same was rendered
moot and academic by the said COMELEC
Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only
by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the
1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the
matter should be raised only on certiorari before
the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else
the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en
banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7,
Art. IX-A.
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RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on
two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the
proper remedy, and (2) t at t e “cases”
“ atte s” e e ed unde t e c nstituti n pe tain
only to those involving the conduct of elections.
C a i ed t e RTC’s dis issa t e case
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is cognizable by
the Supreme Court?
HELD: No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
“Eac c issi n s a decide a
majority vote of all its members
any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the
commission or by the commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
t i t da s eceipt a c p t e e ”
This provision is inapplicable as there was no
case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On
t e c nt a , it was t e COMELEC’s es uti n
that triggered this Controversy.
T e “case” “ atte ” e erred to by the
constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain
to an election dispute. The settled rule is that
“decisi n, u ings, de ” t e COMELEC t at
may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that
e ate t t e COMELEC’s e e cise
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving
“e ecti e egi na , p incia and cit icia s ”
In this case, what is being assailed is the
COMELEC’s c ice an app intee t occupy
the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty
done for the operational set-up of an agency.
The controversy involves an appointive, not an
elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court
with trivial administrative questions that are best
ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law
vests with the power to exercise original
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u isdicti n e “a cases n t wit in t e
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
udicia uncti ns ”
*Petition denied
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE
SHOP V. FERRER
135 SCRA 25
FACTS: In preparation for the national elections
of November 11, 1969, then respondent
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TO BID on
September 16, 1969 calling for the submission
of sealed proposals for the manufacture and
delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths. Among
the 17 bidders , two bidders responded to the
said invitation, the Filipinas and ACME steel.
ACME steel bid was rejected by COMELEC
bidding committee due to low quality of samples,
hence the commission recommended the award
to Filipinas of the contract to manufacture and
supply the voting boots.
After final inspection of all the samples by
COMELEC Commissioners, they have noted
that ACME submitted lower bid and has
improved the sample submitted according to the
specifications required by COMELEC.
COMELEC issued a final resolution awarding the
contract to ACME.
FILIPINAS filed an injunction suit with the court
of the first instance of Manila against COMELEC
and CME T e c u t’s decisi n t at we c u t
has no jurisdiction over the nature of the suit and
complaint state no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving
an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award
of contract arising from its invitation to bid
HELD: That it is the Supreme Court, not the
Court of First Instance, which has exclusive
jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the
conduct of elections and enforcement of election
laws.
COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in
favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident
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of its inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court.
Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may
be imposed by the COMELEC from said order,
and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari
to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question
arising from said order may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders,
rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as
provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ V COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
FACTS: This case was originally an urgent
petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from proclaiming the 24th highest
senatorial candidate.
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution
in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned
resolution was received by respondent
COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and on the same
day, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
disseminate through the fastest available means
and order said Election Officials to delete the
name Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified
list of candidates tally sheets, election returns
and count all votes in favor of Fransisco I.
Chavez. But petitioner assailed that COMELEC
failed to perform its mandatory function thus the
name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted.
Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order
but the judgment be rendered requiring the
COMELEC to reopen the ballot boxes in 80,348
precincts in 13 provinces including Metro Manila,
scan t e a ts “C a ez” tes w ic we e
invalidated or declared stray and credit said
scanned “C a ez” tes in a petiti ne
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
HELD: It is quite i us t at petiti ne ’s p a e
d es n t ca t e c ecti n “ ani est
e s” in t e ce ti icates of canvass or election
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returns before the COMELEC but for the ballots
contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not
e en p inted t an “ ani est e ” in t e
certificates of canvass or election returns he
desires to be rectified. There being none,
petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular
election protest which, under the constitution and
the Omnibus Election code, exclusively pertains
to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Thus, Sec. 17 Art. Vl of the constitution provides
t at “t e Senate and t e House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contest relating to the election, returns, and
qua i icati ns t ei especti e e e s…”
(Emphasis supplied). The word sole underscores
the exclusivity of t e t i una ’s u isdicti n e However, when the COMELEC acts in a
election contest relating to their respective
members. It is therefore crystal clear that this
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant
petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which
has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint
of petitioner relating to the election of a member
of the Senate.
As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass
or election returns are not questioned, they must
be prima facie considered valid for purposes of
canvassing the same and proclamation of the
winning candidates.
Premises considered, the Court resolved to
dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.
SALVA V. MAKALINTAL
G.R. No. 132603
September 18, 2000
FACTS:
• In 1998, the Sangguinang Panlalawigan of
Batangas enacted Ordinance 05, which
abolished Brgy. San Rafael and ordered its
merger with Brgy. Dacanlao.
• The Governer of Batangas vetoed the
ordinance as it was not shown that it
complied with the requisites in Sections 7 & 9
t e LGC T e g e n ’s et was
overridden by Resolution 345.
• Consequently, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution 2987 to govern the conduct of the
needed plebiscite.
• The petitioners, officials and residents of
Brgy. San Rafael, filed for the issuance of a
TRO against the plebiscite with the trial court.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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The trial court denied their petition, claiming
that it had no jurisdiction over acts,
resolutions, or decisions of the COMELEC.
The trial court directed the petitioners to bring
the case to the Supreme Court.
 Apparently, the plebiscite was conducted
during the pendency of the case.
• The petitioners maintain that since their
action is based on the validity of Ordinance
05 and Resolution 345 (basis of COMELEC
Res. 2987) the trial court had jurisdiction.
• They further maintained that the SC only had
exclusive jurisdiction when COMELEC
exercises its quasi‐ judicial functions.
purely ministerial manner, the case may be
subject to the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case. YES
HELD: COMELEC Resolutions on the
conduct of plebiscites are administrative in
nature and subject to RTC
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
provides in part that:
“SEC 7 Un ess t e wise p ided
by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from
eceipt a c p t e e ”
In the case of Filipinas Engineering v. Ferrer, it
was held that what is contemplated by the
term ‘final orders rulings and decisions’ of
the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court are those rendered in actions
or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers. In this case, Resolution 2987 was only
issued after the COMELEC took cognizance of
Ordinance 05 and Resolution 345.
Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty
of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and
is part and parcel of its administrative
functions. It involves no exercise of
discretionary authority on the part of the
respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear
and resolve controversies defining the rights and
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duties of party litigants, relative to the conduct of
elections of public officers and the enforcement
of the election laws.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides
for the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of the required plebiscite, was not
issued pu suant t t e COMELEC’s quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of plebiscites, thus, Resolution 2987
may not be deemed as a “final order”
reviewable by certiorari by this court. Any
question pertaining to the validity of said
resolution may be well taken in an ordinary
civil action before the trial courts.
BULAONG V. COMELEC
220 SCRA 745
G.R. No. 107987
March 31, 1993
FACTS:
• Petitioner Dr. Jose Bulaong, and private
respondent Luis Villafuerte were both
candidates for the office of the Provincial
Governor of Camarines Sur in the May 1992
elections.
• Bulaong was proclaimed by the PBC as the
duly elected governor. Accordingly, Bulaong
took his oath of office.
• On July 9, 1992, Villafuerte filed an
election protest questioning the precinct
results of ten (10) Municipalities and the City
of Iriga. Subsequently, on August 21, 1992,
Villafuerte filed an Omnibus Motion praying
that the venue for the ballot revision
proceedings be conducted at the main office
of the Comelec in Intramuros, Manila.
Bulaong opposed citing the ballot revision
proceedings need not be held in Manila since
there was no untoward incident that
happened during the canvassing of votes in
Naga City.
• In an Order dated September 9, 1992, the
First Division of the COMELEC granted
Vi a ue te’s p a e a e isi n of ballots to
be held in Manila. This Order was received
by Bulaong on September 16. On September
22, Bulaong filed his MR dated September
21.
• On October 19, COMELEC thru its First
Division denied his MR. On the same day,
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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Bulaong also filed an Omnibus Motion
praying that his 2 MRs (1st MR – on the order
g anting Vi a ue te’s p a e , 2nd MR –
den ing u a ng’s u gent ti n 1 da
extension) be certified to the Comelec en
banc pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 19 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
• Later, Bulaong filed with the Comelec en
banc a manifestation and motion praying that
his MRs and his Omnibus motion filed with
the First Division be ordered certified to it for
resolution. The First Division denied
u a ng’s ani estati n t at its MRs e
certified to the En Banc because the Order
directing the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Camarines Sur to immediately send the 649
ballot boxes to Manila is merely interlocutory.
• Hence, Bulaong filed a petition for certiorati
and mandamus with prayer for a TRO to
enjoin the order to the First Division dated
September 9, 1992. While Bulaong concedes
that the order of the Comelec designating
Manila as the venue of the revision
proceedings is interlocutory, he nonetheless
contends that a reading of Section 2 of Rule
3 in conjunction with Section 5 (c) of the
same Rule would reveal that it is the duty of
the First Division to refer his MR to the En
Banc, since the matter concerning the venue
of the revision of ballots is a substantial issue
which the latter should review.
• Bulaong prays that a writ of mandamus be
issued directing the First Division to certify
and elevate his MRs to the En Banc.
ISSUE: WON the First Division of the
COMELEC committed GAOD when it refused to
ee u a ng’s MRs t t e En anc
notwithstanding the mandate of Section 5, Rule
19 of the COMELEC Rules. NO
HELD:
SC dismissed the petition. It is not
mandatory on the part of a division of the
COMELEC to refer all pending MRs to the En
Banc.
Section 5, Rule 19 provides:
“How motion for reconsideration
disposed of – Upon the filing of a motion
to reconsider a decision, resolution, order
or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court
concerned shall within twenty-four (24)
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hours from the filing thereof, notify the
Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall
within two (2) days thereafter, certify the
case t t e C issi n en anc ”
For said the motion to be referred to the en
banc, it requires the unanimous vote of the
Members of the Division as mandated by
Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules. In the
case at bar, there was an absence of such vote.
COMELEC did not commit GAoD in refusing
to refer petitioner's MR to the COMELEC en
banc because it exercised its discretionary
power under Sec 6 Rule 20 of the Comelec
Rules.
Instead of withholding its decision on such
interlocutory matter, the First Division decided to
exercise its power under Section 6, Rule 20
which states:
“W en t e a egati ns in a p test
counter-protest so warrant, or whenever
in the opinion of the Commission or
Division the interest of justice so
demands, it shall immediately order the
ballot boxes containing ballots and their
keys, list of voters with voting records,
book of voters and other documents used
in the election to be brought before the
Commission, and shall order the revision
t e a ts…
… T e e isi n a ts s a e ade in
the office of the Clerk of Court concerned
or at such places as the Commission or
Division shall designate, and shall be
completed within 3 months from the date
of the order, unless otherwise directed by
the Commission.
COMELEC cannot be compelled thru
mandamus where it exercises its
discretionary power
A mandamus proceeding involving a
discretionary power of the COMELEC does not
lie. A perusal of the aforecited section impliedly
reveals the discretionary power of the Division or
the En Banc to order a revision of ballots. This
can be gleamed from the use of the phrase,
“whenever in the opinion of the Commission
or Division the interest of justice so
demands ”
Although in most instances the revision of ballots
takes place in the office of the Clerk of Court
concerned, revision of ballots may also be held
in “such places as the ommission or
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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ivision shall designate ” Bulaong is to be
reminded that mandamus, as a remedy, is
available to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. It cannot
compel the doing of an act involving the exercise
of discretion one way or the other. Undoubtedly,
the First Division was within its powers in
designating Manila as the venue of the revision
of ballots.
SOLLER V. COMELEC
339 SCRA 685
G.R. No. 139853,
September 5, 2000
FACTS:
• Ferdinand Thoms Soller and Angel Saulong
were both candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in
the May 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998,
the Municipal BOC proclaimed Soller duly
elected mayor.
• On May 19, Saulong filed with the COMELEC
a “petiti n annu ent t e p c a ati n/
e c usi n e ecti n etu n” On Ma 25,
Saulong filed with the RTC of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro an election protest against
Soller.
• Soller filed his answer with counter-protest.
He a s ed t dis iss Sau ng’s p test
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-
shopping, and failure to state cause of action.
• COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation
case filed by Saulong.
• On Oct e 1, 1998, RTC denied S e ’s
motion to dismiss. Soller moved for
reconsideration but said motion was again
denied. He then filed with the Comelec a
petition for certiorari contending that the
RTC acted with GAOD in not dismissing
Sau ng’s e ecti n p test
• On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc
dis issed S e ’s suit T e e ecti n t i una
held that Saulong paid the required filing fee.
It also declared that the defect in the
verification is a mere technical defect which
should not bar the determination of the merits
of the case. The election tribunal stated that
there was no forum shopping to speak of.
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ISSUES:
1. WON Soller properly filed the petition for
certiorari before the SC. YES
2. WON the COMELEC committed GAOD in not
orde ing t e dis issa Sau ng’s e ecti n
protest. YES
HELD:
Procedure: MR of En Banc decision is a
prohibited pleading, unless relating to
election offenses.
Under the COMELEC Rules, an MR of its en
banc ruling is prohibited except in a case
involving an election offense. Since the present
controversy involves no election offense,
reconsideration is not possible and Soller has no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Accordingly, Soller properly filed the instant
petition for certiorari with the SC.
COMELEC en banc does not have authority
to hear and decide election cases in the first
instance. This power pertains to the
Divisions of the Comelec.
Section 3 (c), Art. IX of the Constitution reads:
“T e C issi n n Elections may sit en banc
or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules
of procedure in order to expedite the disposition
of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decision shall be
decided by the ommission en banc ”
Thus, in Sarmiento v. COMELEC and in
subsequent cases, SC ruled that the COMELEC,
sitting en banc, does not have the requisite
authority to hear and decide election cases
including pre-proclamation controversies in
the first instance. This power pertains to the
divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election cases
decided by it in the first instance is null and
void.
So e ’s petiti n wit t e COMELEC was n t
referred to a division but was instead submitted
directly to the en banc. The petition for certiorari
assai s t e t ia c u t’s de den ing t e ti n
t dis iss Sau ng’s e ecti n p test T e
questioned order of the trial court is interlocutory
ecause it d es n t end t e t ia c u t’s tas
ad udicating t e pa ties’ c ntenti ns and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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eac t e In SC’s iew, the authority to
resolve the petition for certiorari involving
incidental issues of election protest, like the
questioned order of the trial court, falls
within the division and not the en banc.
Note that the order denying the motion to
dismiss is but an incident of the election protest.
If the principal case, once decided on its merits,
is cognizable on appeal by the division of the
Comelec, then there is no reason why petitions
for certiorari relating to incidents of election
protest should not be referred first to a division
for resolution. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
S e ’s petiti n in t e i st instance
Note: SC also ruled in this case that the RTC
erred and committed GAOD in failing to dismiss
Sau ng’s e ecti n p test against S e SC
reiterated that COMELEC en banc has no
jurisdiction to affirm the refusal of RTC to
dis iss Sau ng’s e ecti n p test
SAHALI V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 201796
January 15, 2013
FACTS:
• Sadikul Sahali and Matba were gubernatorial
candidates in Tawi-tawi during the 2010
elections; while Ruby Sahali and Usman ran
for Vice Governor. Both Sahalis were
declared the winners by the PBOC.
• Alleging that the Sahalis rigged the election,
Matba and Usman both filed separate
Election Protests Ad Cautelam with the
COMELEC, wherein they contested the
results in 39 out of the 282 precincts.
• Both their protests were raffled off to the
COMELEC 1st Div, who consolidated their
petitions. It then ordered the retrieval of all
ballot boxes and election documents of the
39 precincts.
• Soon after, Matba and Usman filed a
Manifestation and Ex-parte Motion wherein
they prayed that instead of a mere recounting
of the ballots, the COMELEC should order
the technical examination of the ballots, the
Election Day Computerized Voters List
(EDCVL), the Voters Registration Record
(VRR) and the Book of Voters.
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Technical examination: comparing the
signatures and thumb marks on the
EDCVL vs. the VRRs/Books of Voters,
etc.
• The 1st Div. granted the motion and ordered
the conduct of the technical examination.
Note: this Order is interlocutory.
• Sadikul and Ruby filed with the 1st Div. a
Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and
MFR, stating that such order by the
COMELEC was issued without due process;
that the 1st Div. cannot just order a technical
examination in the absence of published
Rules.
• The COMELEC averred that it can order a
technical examination as per Section 1, Rule
18 of COMELEC Res. 8804.
• Sadikul and Ruby filed the present petition for
certiorari before the SC, alleging that the
COMELEC 1st Div. committed GAOD in
promulgating the said order.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petition for certiorari is proper. NO
2. WON the COMELEC can order the technical
examination of ballot boxes. YES
HELD:
he ME E ’s rder was interlocutory
and therefore not subject to review for
certiorari.
Sadikul and Ruby cannot resort to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail an
interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First
Division.
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest may not directly assail the order
in this Court through a special civil action for
certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of
the interlocutory order during the appeal of
the decision of the Division in due course.
Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to
review election cases falling within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only
extends to final decisions or resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc, certainly not to interlocutory
orders issued by a Division thereof.
Here, the Orders dated March 5, 2012 and May
3, 2012 issued by the First Division of the
COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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since they only disposed of an incident in the
main case i.e. the propriety of the technical
examination of the said election paraphernalia.
Thus, the proper recourse for the petitioners is to
await the decision of the COMELEC First
Division in the election protests filed by Matba
and Usman, and should they be aggrieved
thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC
en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.
Exceptions when SC can review interlocutory
orders:
Exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of
a certiorari action directed against an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC when the following circumstances
are present:
1. First, the order was issued without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction
2. Second, under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the subject of the controversy
is a matter which:
a. The COMELEC en banc may not sit
and consider
b. A Division is not authorized to act
c. The members of the Division
unanimously vote to refer to the
COMELEC en banc
Procedure: In election disputes, COMELEC
not duty‐ bound to notify and direct a party
to file an opposition to a motion filed by the
other party; ahalis’ right to due process not
violated.
The COMELEC, in election disputes, is not duty-
bound to notify and direct a party therein to file
an opposition to a motion filed by the other party.
It is incumbent upon the party concerned, if
he/she deems it necessary, to file an opposition
to a motion within five days from receipt of a
copy of the same without awaiting for the
COMELEC’s di ecti e t d s
It should be stressed that one of the factors
that should be considered in election
protests is expediency. Proceedings in election
protests are special and expeditious and the
early resolution of such cases should not be
hampered by any unnecessary observance of
procedural rules. "The proceedings should not
be encumbered by delays.
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Here, the Sahalis did not file an opposition to the a total of 201 precincts. The case was assigned
said motion for technical examination that was to the First Division, Comelec.
filed by Matba and Usman on February 24,
2012. It was only after the COMELEC First Commissioner Guiani prepared a proposed
Division issued its March 5, 2012 Order that the resolution in the case. To which the ponencia,
petitioners decided to register their opposition to Commissioner Desamito dissented.
the intended technical examination, albeit in the Commissioner Tancangco at first did not indicate
form of a motion for reconsideration of the said her vote.
Order.
On February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani
Procedure: the COMELEC has power to order retired from the service and Commissioner
technical examinations even in the absence Javier was appointed.
Of published rules to the effect; exercise of
quasi‐ judicial powers On February 24, 2000, petitioner Ambil and
respondent Ramirez received a resolution
While Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC
promulgated on February 14, 2000 (Guiani
Resolution No. 8804 does not explicitly provide
resolution), signed by Commissioner Guiani and
for the rule on the technical examination of
Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito
election paraphernalia, it does not mean,
dissenting. It declared respondent Ramirez as
however, that the COMELEC First Division does
winner. On February 28, 2000, the Comelec,
not have the power to order the conduct of such
First Division, declared that the Feb. 14
technical examination.
resolution is a useless scrap of paper which
should be ignored by the parties.
The power of the COMELEC First Division to
order the technical examination election
Comelec, First Division, issued an order setting
paraphernalia in election protest cases stems
the promulgation of the resolution in the case
from its "exclusive original jurisdiction over all
(EPC Case No. 98-29) on April 6, 2000.
contest relating to the elections, returns and
However, on the same date, petitioner Ambil
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial
filed a motion to cancel promulgation challenging
and city officials".
the validity of the purported Guiani resolution.
The Comelec, First Division, acting on the
Otherwise stated, the express grant of power to
motion, on the same date, postponed the
the COMELEC to resolve election protests
promulgation until this matter is resolved.
carries with it the grant of all other powers
necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective
The two members of the First Division, sent a
and efficient exercise of the power expressly
joint memorandum to Commissioner Desamito
granted. Verily, the exclusive original jurisdiction
the presiding Commissioner, recommending that
conferred by the constitution to the COMELEC
they proceed with the promulgation of the Guiani
to settle said election protests includes the
subject resolution and let the aggrieved party
authority to order a technical examination of
challenge it through a Motion for
relevant election paraphernalia, election
Reconsideration before the Commission en banc
returns and ballots in order to determine
or through a certiorari case before the Supreme
whether fraud and irregularities attended the
Court.
canvass of the votes.
On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division,
issued an order setting the promulgation of the
AMBIL JR V. COMELEC
resolution in the case on June 20, 2000.
But on June 19, 2000, petitioner interposed the
FACTS: Petitioner Ambil and respondent
instant petition, seeking to:
Ramirez were candidates for the position of
- annul the order dated June 15, 2000
Governor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11,
setting the promulgation of the resolution of the
1998 elections. On May 16, 1998, the Provincial
case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on June 20, 2000,
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ambil as the
and
duly elected Governor.
-prohibiting the Comelec, First Division,
from promulgating the purported Guiani
Respondent Ramirez who obtained the second
resolution and
highest number of votes, filed an election protest
-directing the Comelec, First Division, to
(EPC Case No. 98-29) challenging the results in
deliberate anew on the case and to promulgate
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the resolution reached in the case after such
deliberation.
ISSUE: Whether Comelec, First Division, in
scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in
the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction NO
HELD: The case at bar is an election protest
involving the position of Governor, Eastern
Samar. It is within the original jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections in division. Admittedly,
petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the
divisions resolution or final decision. In fact,
there was really no resolution or decision to
speak of because there was yet no
promulgation, which was still scheduled on June
20, 2000. Petitioner went directly to the Supreme
Court from an order of promulgation of the
Resolution of this case by the First Division of
the Comelec.
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a
party to an election case within the jurisdiction of
the Comelec in division cannot dispense with
the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a
decision, resolution or final order of the Division
of the Commission on Elections because the
case would not reach the Comelec en banc
without such motion for reconsideration having
been filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the
recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari
cases dispensing with a motion for
reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In
truth, the exceptions do not apply to election
cases where a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the
case to the Comelec en banc, whose final
decision is what is reviewable via certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
We must emphasize that what is questioned
here is the order dated June 15, 2000, which is
a mere notice of the promulgation of the
resolution in EPC Case No. 98-29.
Consequently, the filing of the instant petition
before this Court was premature. Petitioner
failed to exhaust adequate administrative
remedies available before the COMELEC.
This Court has held consistently that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative
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processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy should be exhausted first before
the courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is
fatal to ones cause of action.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for
prematurity. Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and
a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount
to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action.
DOUGLAS CAGAS V. COMELEC and
BAUTISTA
FACTS: The petitioner Cagas and respondent
Bautista contested the position of Governor of
the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10,
2010 automated national and local elections.
Petitioner was proclaimed the winner.
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-
buying and violations of election laws, rules and
resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on
May 24, 2010 which was raffled to the
COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner averred as his special affirmative
defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite
cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not
render a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of.
COMELEC First Division denied the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner as there
was a substantial compliance with the
requirement of COMELEC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a party aggrieved by an interlocutory
order, issued by a Division of the Comelec in an
election protest, may directly assail the order in
this Court through a special civil action for
certiorari. NO
2. Whether the case should be referred to the
Comelec en banc. NO
HELD:
1. The remedy is to seek the review of the
interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division in due course. The court
may have the power to review any decision,
order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such
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power to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to
review on certiorari an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Where the Commission in division
committed grave abuse of discretion or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
interlocutory orders relative to an action pending
before it and the controversy did not fall under
any of the instances mentioned in Section 2,
Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the
controversy to the Commission en banc as this
is not permissible under its present rules but to
elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. It does not appear that the subject controversy
is one of the cases specifically provided under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the
Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it shown
that the present controversy a case where a
division is not authorized to act nor a situation
wherein the members of the First Division
unanimously voted to refer the subject case to
the Commission en banc. Clearly, the
Commission en banc, under the circumstances
shown above, cannot be the proper forum which
the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory
orders can be referred to.
In a situation such as this where the Commission
in division committed grave abuse of discretion
or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action
pending before it and the controversy did not fall
under any of the instances mentioned in Section
2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer
the controversy to the Commission en banc as
this is not permissible under its present rules but
to elevate it to this Court via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
CAYETANO V. COMELEC and TINGA
FACTS: In the automated national and local
elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner and
private respondent were candidates for the
position of Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was
proclaimed the winner thereof.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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The private respondent filed an Election Protest
against petitioner before the COMELEC for
allegedly committing election frauds and
i egu a ities w ic t ans ated t t e atte ’s
ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig City. On the
whole, private respondent claims that he is the
actual winner of the mayoralty elections in
Taguig City.
In t e petiti ne ’s nswe wit C unte -Protest
and Counterclaim, she raised, among others, the
affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and
content of the Election Protest and prayed for
the immediate dismissal thereof. However, it was
denied by the COMELEC. Her Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to
dismiss the protest of private respondent, to
allow its review by this Court NO
HELD: The general rule is that a decision or an
order of a COMELEC Division cannot be
elevated directly to this Court through a special
civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion
to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or
ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated
to the COMELEC En Banc.
However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory
order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved
by the division which issued the interlocutory
order, except when all the members of the
division decide to refer the matter to the
COMELEC En Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a
COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can
they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari.
This does not mean that the aggrieved party is
without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies
the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved
party can still assign as error the interlocutory
order if in the course of the proceedings he
decides to appeal the main case to the
COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated
is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC
Division is a patent nullity because of absence of
jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as
where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary
restraining order without a time limit, or where a
COMELEC Division admitted an answer with
counter-protest which was filed beyond the
reglementary period.
The Court has no jurisdiction to review an order,
whether final or interlocutory, even a final
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resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated
otherwise, the Court can only review via
certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc. In short, the final order of
the COMELEC (Second Division) denying the
affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be
questioned before this Court even via a petition
for certiorari. Although the rule admits of
exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed
interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of
the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same.
However, none of the circumstances permitting
an exception to the rule occurs in this instance.
In addition to that, certiorari will not lie in this
case. The issuance of a special writ of certiorari
has two prerequisites: (1) a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Although it is not the duty of the Court to point
petitioner, or all litigants for that matter, to the
appropriate remedy which she should have
taken. The aggrieved party can still assign as
error the interlocutory order if in the course of the
proceedings he decides to appeal the main case
to the COMELEC En Banc. Moreover, the
protest filed by private respondent and the
counter-protest filed by petitioner remain
pending before the COMELEC, which should
afford petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate
her grievances. Thereafter, the COMELEC
should decide these cases with dispatch.
GUIEB V. FONTANILLA 247 SCRA 348
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay
of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan
in the barangay election of May 1994. Petitioner
was proclaimed as the winning candidate to
which the latter seasonably filed an election
protest with the Municipal Trial Court.
The Municipal Trial Court confirmed the
proclamation of the petitioner and dismissed the
protest to which private respondent appealed to
the Regional Trial Court, which gave a favorable
decision by reversing the court a quo.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with
the High Court regarding the decision.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
ISSUE: Whether the RTC is the proper forum for
the appeal and has jurisdiction on election
contests involving barangay positions NO
HELD: The RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction
over the appeal from the decision of the MTC.
Under Article IX, Section 2, Paragraph 2-C of the
Constitution, it is the COMELEC, and not the
Regional Trial Courts, that has exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
barangay officials decided by courts of limited
jurisdiction, which are the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995
EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS vs.
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: In the synchronized elections of 11 May
1992, the Relampagos and Cumba were
candidates for the position of Mayor in the
municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte.
Cumba was proclaimed the winning candidate,
with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the
former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the Relampagos filed
an election protest with theRTC of Agusan del
Norte.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge
Rosario F. Dabalos, found the Relampagos to
have won with a margin of six votes over the
Cumba and rendered judgement in favor of the
Relampagos declaring him as having won the
mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of
the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte
in the local election held on May 11, 1992, the
protestant having obtained six (6) votes more
than that of the protestee's votes.
Copies of the decision were sent to and received
by the Relampagos and Cumba on 1 July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the Cumba appealed the
decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of
appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.
The trial court gave due course to the appeal.
On 12 July 1994, Relampagos filed with the trial
court a motion for execution pending appeal,
which Cumba opposed on 22 July 1994.
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On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted
Relampagos's motion for execution pending
appeal. The writ of execution was issued.
Thereafter, Cumba filed a motion for a
reconsideration of the order of execution and the
sheriff held in abeyance the implementation of
the writ. This motion was denied.
The Cumba then filed with the respondent
COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the
order of the trial court granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and the writ of
execution.
On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC
promulgated its resolution granting the petition,
stating COMELEC has exclusive authority to
hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in election cases as
authorized by law, and therefore, assumes
jurisdiction of the instant petition
for certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The
Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ of
Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.
Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position
as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del
Norte, pending resolution of the appeal before
this Commission in the case of Relampagos vs.
Cumba.
COMELEC maintains that there is a special law
granting it such jurisdiction (Section 50 of B.P.
Blg. 697) which remains in full force as it was not
expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not exactly
correct that this law self-destructed after the May
1984 election.
B.P. Blg. 697- AN ACT TO GOVERN THE
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE
BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984
AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL
REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50
provides:
Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-proclamation
controversy refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings
of the Board of Canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate, political party or
coalition of political parties before the
board or directly with the Commission.
The Commission Elections shall be the
sole judge and shall have exclusive
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
controversies.
The Commission is hereby vested
with exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving
election cases.(Emphasis supplied).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over
petitions for, certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus in election cases where it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. YES
RULING: The authority granted to the
Commission under B.P. Blg. 697 is not
inconsistent with our election laws.
Clearly the intent of the law was to
give certiorari, jurisdiction to the Commission on
Elections because the Pimentel case said there
was none, to fill a void in the law, and avoid an
incongruous situation.
The Commission is the most logical body
whenever it performs judicial functions to take
jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus because it has appellate
jurisdiction in election cases granted by the
Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no
more appellate jurisdiction over such cases And
in the case of the Supreme Court, Justice de
Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his
dissenting opinion that under the Constitution
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
election cases should properly be limited to
decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission
on Elections, not from lower courts.
The Court agrees with the respondent
COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg.
697 whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984
election or the subsequent selection of sectoral
representatives.
ISSUE: But did not the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? NO
HELD: By the tenor of the Repealing Clause in
BP 881, it does not evidently appear that the
Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all
prior election statutes and to replace them with
the new Code.
Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code is not
inconsistent with BP 881.
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The Court must, as it now does, abandon the
ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria
cases, We now hold that the last paragraph of
Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force
and effect but only in such cases where, under
paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
CARLOS vs ANGELES
FACTS: Carlos and Serapio were candidates for
the position of mayor of the municipality of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a
City) during the May 11, 1998 elections.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers Carlos as
the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela having
obtained 102,688 votes, the highest number of
votes in the election returns.
Serapio filed with the RTC Valenzuela an
election protest challenging the results.
On June 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the trial
court an answer with affirmative defenses and
motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion
to dismiss. Petitioner elevated the order to the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) on petition
for certiorari and prohibition, which, however,
has remained unresolved.
On May 12, 1999, petitioner filed a consolidated
motion that included a prayer for authority to
photocopy all the official copies of the revision
reports in the custody of the trial court. However,
the trial court denied the issuance of such
authorization. The court likewise denied a motion
for reconsideration of the denial. Then petitioner
raised the denial to the COMELEC on petition for
certiorari and mandamus, which also remains
unresolved.
The Revision results showed the final tally:
(a) protestant Serapio - 66,602 votes.
(b) protestee Carlos - 83,609 votes,
giving the latter a winning margin
of 17,007 votes.
RTC: On the basis of the badges of fraud, the
trial court declared that there was enough
pattern of fraud in the conduct of the election for
mayor in Valenzuela hence it set aside the
proclamation of protestee Jose Emmanuel
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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Carlos by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
and declared protestant Antonio M. Serapio as
the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City.
On may 4, 2000, Petitioner filed a notice of
appeal from the decision of the trial court to the
Commission on Elections.
On May 8, 2000, petitioner filed with the SC
special civil action for Certiorari.
Respondent submitted that Comelec and not the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the present
petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the
regional trial court. Assuming that this Court and
Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction and
applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
Comelec has jurisdiction since petitioner has
perfected his appeal therewith before the filing of
the instant petition. Certiorari cannot be a
substitute for an appeal; the present petition is
violative of Revised Circular No. 28-91 on forum-
shopping; issues raised are factual, not
correctible by certiorari; and that the temporary
restraining order should be lifted, the petition
dismissed, and petitioner and counsel should be
made to explain why they should not be
punished for contempt of court.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to review, by petition for certiorari as
a special civil action, the decision of the regional
trial court in an election protest case involving an
elective municipal official considering that it has
no appellate jurisdiction over such decision. YES
RULING: The Supreme Court is vested with
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the decision
of the regional trial court in the election protest
case before it, regardless of whether it has
appellate jurisdiction over such decision.
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases ...
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition…
In like manner, the Comelec has original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus involving election cases in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. This point has been
settled in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba.
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and
Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
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writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
over decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction (regional trial courts) in election
cases involving elective municipal officials. The
Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Ergo, this Court has jurisdiction over the present
petition of certiorari as a special civil action
expressly conferred on it and provided for in the
Constitution.
(This is an ABANDONED DOCTRINE as laid
down in Relampagos vs Cumba)
GARCIA vs DE JESUS
G.R. No. 97108-09 March 4, 1992
DANIEL GARCIA and TEODORO O' HARA vs.
ERNESTO DE JESUS and CECILIA DAVID,
and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. Nos. 97108-09 March 4, 1992
TOMAS TOBON UY vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSE C. NEYRA
FACTS: Garcia v De Jesus (The Antipolo
Case)
In the 18 January 1988 local elections.
Petitioners Daniel GARCIA and Teodoro O'
HARA were the winning candidates for Mayor
and Vice Mayor, respectively, of Antipolo, Rizal.
They were proclaimed as such on 22 January
1988.
Respondents Ernesto DE JESUS and Cecilia
DAVID instituted an election protest before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo where the
results in twenty-five (25) precincts were put in
issue.
On 25 July 1988, the RTC issued an Ordered re-
examination and recounting of the votes.
On 26 September 1988, Petitioners GARCIA
and O' HARA filed before the RTC a "Motion
To Dismiss Opening of Ballot Boxes And/Or
To Dismiss The Protest" which was premised
on the ground that the allegations in the election
protest were merely self-serving.
RTC issued an Order limiting the opening of
ballot boxes to only nine (9) precincts out of the
25 protested ones, and limiting the examination
of the ballot boxes only to those anomalies
specified in the annexes attached to the election
protest by Respondents DE JESUS and DAVID.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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The latter moved for reconsideration thereof
which was denied by the RTC, in an Order dated
27 December 1988. On 9 January 1989,
Respondents DE JESUS and DAVID filed a
Petition for certiorari and mandamus before
the COMELEC which sought to nullify the RTC
Order limiting the examination of ballot boxes to
only 9 precincts.
On 13 January 1989, respondent COMELEC
temporarily restrained the proceedings before
the RTC and set for hearing Respondents
DAVID and DE JESUS' application for
Preliminary Injunction on 29 January 1989.
Petitioners GARCIA and O' HARA, meanwhile,
registered their objection to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the COMELEC over the Petition
for certiorari and mandamus through their
"Manifestation With Motion To Dismiss." It was
their contention that the COMELEC was not
empowered to take cognizance of Petitions
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
The COMELEC issued the questioned Decision,
dated 27 April 1989, which directed the RTC to
open all the ballot boxes in the 25 protested
precincts.
Uy vs Neyra (The Isabela Case)
After the canvass of election returns was made
in the same local elections, Respondent Jose C.
NEYRA was proclaimed Mayor of Gamu, Isabela
over Petitioner Tomas TOBON UY, with a
plurality of 28 votes.
Petitioner TOBON UY filed an election protest
before the RTC. The RTC declared TOBON UY
the winner "by a majority of five (5) votes" over.
On the same date that said RTC Decision was
promulgated, NEYRA filed a "Notice of Appeal,"
and TOBON UY, a "Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal," with the latter pleading set for
hearing on 10 January 1991.
The day before, or on 9 January 1991, NEYRA
filed before the COMELEC a Petition
for Certiorari and/or Prohibition seeking to
enjoin the RTC from further acting on TOBON
UY's aforesaid "Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal."
On 10 January 1991, the RTC gave due course
to NEYRA's appeal, granted execution pending
appeal stating the special reasons therefor, and
required TOBON UY to post a bond in the
amount of P300,000.00. On the same date, the
COMELEC issued a TRO enjoining the RTC
from further proceeding with the case. NEYRA's
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application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was likewise set for hearing by the COMELEC
on 24 January 1991.
On 15 January 1991, NEYRA filed a second
Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition
before the COMELEC. He sought to set aside
the RTC Order, dated 10 January 1991, which
granted TOBON UY's "Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal.
The COMELEC took cognizance of both
Certiorari Petitions and, on 15 February 1991,
issued the questioned Resolution declaring as
null and void and Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal granted by the RTC, premised on Rule
35, Section 18, of its Rules of Procedure, and
enjoining TOBON UY from "assuming the office
and performing in whatever and however
manner the duties of Mayor of Gamu, Isabela,
until the final disposition of the appeal.
BOTH Petitioners submit that COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over Certiorari, anchoring their claim
in the doctrine laid in Pimentel Case.
Both respondents submit that under the
constitution, COMELEC has appellate
jurisdiction and shall not diminish substantive
rights.
ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs
of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in
electoral contests involving municipal and
barangay officials – NO (However, this does
not hold true now. Refer to Relampagos vs
Cumba)
RULING: In the Philippine setting, the authority
to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction. Thus, such authority has always
been expressly conferred, either by the
Constitution or by law. As a mater of fact, the
well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law. It is never
derived by implication. Indeed, "(w)hile the
power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some
instance conferred on all courts by constitutional
or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular
courts which have such power are expressly
designated".
Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue
Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by
virtue of express constitutional grant or
legislative enactment.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
Significantly, what the Constitution granted the
COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction. The
Constitution makes no mention of any power
given the COMELEC to exercise original
jurisdiction over Petitioners
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus unlike
in the case of the Supreme Court which was
specifically conferred such authority (Art. VIII,
Sec. 5[1]). The immutable doctrine being that
jurisdiction is fixed by law, the power to issue
such Writs can not be implied from the mere
existence of appellate jurisdiction. Just as
implied repeal of statutes are frowned upon, so
also should the grant of original jurisdiction by
mere implication to a quasi-judicial body
tabooed. If appellate jurisdiction has to be
statutorily granted, how much more the original
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs?
Apparently, the COMELEC Rule on
its certiorari jurisdiction is patterned after the
previous authorization to the Court of Appeals to
issue Writs
of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. That authority, however,
was not inherent in the Court of Appeals but was
specifically conferred by Section 30 of the
Judiciary Act (Rep. Act No. 296) and Section
9(1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
(B.P. Blg. 129). It does not follow that just
because the 1987 Constitution, without more, it
can issue such Writs in aid of that appellate
jurisdiction.
The view that the subject Writs are but common-
law Writs not owing their existence to any
constitutional provision or statutory enactment
may be true in foreign jurisdictions but not in the
Philippine judicial system where such Writs are
specifically characterized as original Special Civil
Actions (Rule 65, Rules of court). It is original
jurisdiction that is exercised in the issuance of
said Writs. And although there may be
authorities in other jurisdictions which maintain
that such Writs are inherent in the power of
higher Courts exercising appellate jurisdiction,
the same refers to judicial tribunals, which the
COMELEC is not. What this agency exercises
are administrative and quasi-judicial powers.
The power vested in the COMELEC to
promulgate its Rules of procedure neither
confers upon itself the jurisdiction to issue the
prerogative Writs. Procedure, as distinguished
from jurisdiction, is the means by which the
power or authority of a Court to hear and decide
a class of cases is put into action (Manila
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Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523).
Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and
not substative. They cover only rules on
pleadings and practice. And in respect of the
COMELEC, the authority to promulgate its rules
of procedure was specifically "in order to
expedite disposition of cases" (Section 3, Article
IX-C). That limited purpose cannot be expanded
to include the conferment upon itself of
jurisdiction which is substantive in nature and
can only be fixed by law.
The doctrine laid down in Pimentel,
supra, holding that the COMELEC has not been
invested with jurisdiction to issue the Writs in
question, therefore, still finds application under
the 1987 Constitution. Said case also involved
an elective municipal official except that it was
decided under the regime of the 1973
Constitution and the 1978 Election Code (Pres.
Decree No. 1296).
JOSE "PEPING" NAVARRO v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and JOSE "PEMPE"
MIRANDA
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 106019. December 17, 1993.]
FACTS: Petitioner Jose "Peping" Navarro and
private respondent Jose "Pempe" Miranda were
mayoralty candidates in Santiago, Isabela during
the synchronized elections held on May 11,
1992.
Petitioner lost to private Respondent.
On May 21, 1992, petitioner filed with the
COMELEC an appeal to annul and set aside the
rulings of the Board of Canvassers of Santiago,
Isabela and the order of Manuel Agpalo, the
acting Provincial Election Supervisor in the
canvassing of votes in the mayoralty contest.
The petition alleged that:
1) The respondent Board erred in not issuing to
the appellant a written notice of the Canvassing
as required under Sec 228 of OEC;
2) The respondent Board erred in continuing with
the canvassing of the election returns despite
appe ant’s petiti n t disqua i D ing
Gorospe and Rodrigo Santos to sit in the board
of canvassers, whose integrity have been
assailed for obvious partiality towards the
candidacy of Jose Miranda;
3) The respondent Board erred in continuing with
the canvassing of contested returns despite
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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verbal and written petitions to exclude,
supported by clear and convincing evidence;
4) The respondent Board erred in continuing with
the canvassing of contested election returns
despite the filing of notices of appeal by
appellant and for failure to observe the
provisions of Section 20, R.A. 7166;
5) Respondent Agpalo erred in issuing an order
setting aside appe ant’s n tice appea , a
denia due p cess”
In his Answer/Opposition, private respondent
alleged that:
1) Petitioner failed to make a timely
objection to the 118 returns from the 118
precincts subject matter of the appeal
2) The affidavits submitted by petitioner in
support of his written objections to the
118 precincts do not make out a prima
facie case showing the existence of fraud,
irregularity or other circumstances
constituting the ground for the objection
Private respondent further alleged: a) that like
petitioner, he was not given a written notice by
the Board of Canvassers of its initial meeting; b)
that two lawyers appeared in representation of
petitioner at the meeting of the Board of
Canvassers; c) that said lawyers did not register
their objections to the regularity of the
proceedings; d) that also present at the meeting
were several supporters of petitioner; and e)
that, at any rate, such failure of the Board of
Canvassers to give notice of the initial meeting
was not his fault and a ground for a pre-
proclamation controversy.
In its Resolution dated June 29, 1992, the
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition
without prejudice to the filing of a regular
electoral protest.
Hence, this petition for special civil action
for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary
mandatory injunction, to enjoin: (a) respondent
COMELEC from implementing its questioned
Resolution dated June 29, 1992, and (b) the
proclamation of private respondent as Mayor of
Santiago, Isabela.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to
make timely objections to the alleged illegal acts
committed by the Board of Canvassers, as well
as to its composition and proceedings.
The COMELEC resorted to the minutes of the
respondent board and found nothing in the said
minutes will show any such objection by
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petitioner or his counsels of the said respondent
a d’s ai u e t send n tices t t e candidates
or political parties as required under Section 228
of the Omnibus Election Code. Or that if such
objections were raised, the same was pursued to
the end. Neither is there in the Minutes any
s wing t at petiti ne ’s ecti n t t e
composition of respondent Board particularly
Chairman Gorospe and Vice Chairman Santos
was made pursuant to the procedural
requirement provided for by Section 19, R.A. No.
7166. Failing thus, petitioner cannot now raise
and pursue said objections for the first time in
this appeal.
The only objections raised before it by the
Petitioner were as to
1. Misreading of ballots;
2. Interchanging of results;
3. Tampering/falsification of election
returns;
4. Discrepancies in the Returns;
5. Election Returns prepared under
duress; threats, coercion or
intimidation;
6. Substitute/fraudulent returns will
materially affect the standing of the
aggrieved candidate
ISSUE: Whether factual matters (non notice, etc)
are proper for consideration in a petition for
certiorari – NO
RULING: The finding that petitioner failed to
make timely objections to the composition and
the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers
involves a question of fact, which is left to the
determination of the COMELEC.
The Constitution did not intend to place the
COMELEC — explicitly made independent by
the Constitution itself — on a lower level than
that of statutory administrative agencies, whose
factual findings are generally not disturbed by
the courts except when there is no substantial
evidence to support such findings. Factual
matters are not proper for consideration in
proceedings brought either as an original
action for certiorari or as an appeal
by certiorari. The main issue in the former
case is one of jurisdiction — lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction; while in
the latter case, the issues are limited to the
consideration of questions of law.
In the absence of jurisdictional infirmity or error
of law, the conclusion reached by the COMELEC
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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on a matter that falls within its competence is
entitled to utmost respect.
Petitioner, more particularly, failed to follow the
procedure laid down in Section 244 of the
Omnibus Election Code, that is to appeal the
matter to the Commission within three (3) days
from a ruling thereon. The Commission shall
summarily decide the case within five days from
t e i ing t e e ”
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. HON.
TOMAS B. NOYNAY
G.R. No. 132365 July 9, 1998
FACTS: In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of
29 October 1996, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) resolved to file an information for
violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code against private respondents
Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and
Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public
school teachers, for having engaged in partisan
political activities. The COMELEC authorized its
Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the
prosecution of the cases.
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of
Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed
with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of
Alien, Northern Samar.
In an Order issued on 25 August 1997,
respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as
presiding judge of Branch 23, motu
proprio ordered the records of the cases to be
withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law
Department to file the cases with the appropriate
Municipal Trial Court on the ground that
pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since
the maximum imposable penalty in each of the
cases does not exceed six years of
imprisonment.
The two motions for reconsideration separately
filed by the COMELEC Regional Director of
Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through
its Legal Department having been denied by the
public respondent in the Order of 17 October
1997, the petitioner filed this special civil action.
It contends that public respondent "has
erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep.
Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide election offenses" because pursuant to
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Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and
this Court's ruling in "Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan
Lavilles, Jr.," Regional Trial Courts have the
exclusive original jurisdiction over election
offenses.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain
that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional
Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where
the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years
of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly
provides that all laws, decrees, and orders
inconsistent with its provisions are deemed
repealed or modified accordingly. They then
conclude that since the election offense in
question is punishable with imprisonment of not
more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal
Trial Courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court
has no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A.
No. 7691.
HELD: Under Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action or proceedings for violation of
the Code except those relating to the offense of
failure to register or failure to vote.
Among the offenses punished under the Election
Code are those enumerated in Section 261
thereof. The offense allegedly committed by
private respondents is covered by paragraph (i)
of said Section, thus:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The
following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and
employees. — Any officer or
employee in the civil service, …
directly or indirectly, intervenes in
any election campaign or engages
in any partisan political activity.
(ii) Under Section 264 of the Code the
penalty for an election offense
under the Code, except that of
failure to register or failure to vote,
is "imprisonment of not less than
one year but not more than six
years" and the offender shall not
be subject to probation and shall
suffer disqualification to hold public
office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
e e cise…
By virtue of the exception provided for in the
opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases
which by specific provisions of law fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of
the penalty prescribed therefor.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also
fall within the exception.
As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred
by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the
cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII
of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus
provide by law that a certain class of cases
should be exclusively heard and determined by
one court. Such law would be a special law and
must be construed as an exception to the
general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No.
7691 can by no means be considered as a
special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an
amendatory law intended to amend specific
sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980.
Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does nut have the effect
of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial
Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein
specified. That Congress never intended that
R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special
provisions is indubitably evident from the fact
that it did not touch at all the opening sentence
of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the
exception.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
HONORABLE ENRIQUE B. INTING
G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990
FACTS: On February 6, 1988, Mrs. Editha
Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor
Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
for allegedly transferring her, a permanent
Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the
Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and
without obtaining prior permission or clearance
from COMELEC as required by law.
Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed
Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election
Supervisor of Dumaguete City:
(1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
case;
(2) to prepare and file the necessary information
in court;
(3) to handle the prosecution if the evidence
submitted shows a prima facie case and (3) to
issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as
the case may be.
The directive to conduct the preliminary
investigation was pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 1752 dated January 14, 1986.
The resolution, in turn, is based on the
constitutional mandate that the COMELEC is
charged with the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for
the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections (sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution) and on the Omnibus Election Code
which implements the constitutional provision.
The Resolution authorized Regional Election
Directors and Provincial Election Supervisors to
conduct preliminary investigations of election
offenses committed in their respective
jurisdictions, file the corresponding complaints
and/or informations in court whenever
warranted, and to prosecute the same pursuant
to Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code.
After a preliminary investigation of Barba's
complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima
facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he
filed with the respondent trial court a criminal
case for violation of section 261, Par. (h),
Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor.
In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the
respondent court issued a warrant of arrest
against the accused OIC Mayor.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and
before the accused could be arrested, the trial
court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on
the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized
to determine probable cause pursuant to Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
In another order dated November 22, 1988, the
court gave Atty. Lituanas fifteen (15) days from
receipt to file another information charging the
same offense with the written approval of the
Provincial Fiscal.
Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order.
Hence, in an order dated December 8, 1988, the
trial court quashed the information. A motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The respondent trial court justifies its stand on
the ground that the COMELEC through its
Provincial Election Supervisor lacks jurisdiction
to determine the existence of probable cause in
an election offense which it seeks to prosecute
in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a preliminary
investigation conducted by a provincial election
supervisor involving an election offense has to
be coursed through the provincial prosecutor.
HELD: Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of votes, investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of
election laws, including acts or omission
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
practices.
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the
COMELEC not only to investigate but also to
prosecute cases of violation of election laws.
This means that the COMELEC is empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations in cases
involving election offenses for the purpose of
helping the Judge determine probable cause and
for filing an information in court. This power is
exclusive with COMELEC.
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among
others, to enforce and administer all laws relative
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to the conduct of election and the concomitant
authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is not without compelling reason. The
evident constitutional intendment in bestowing
this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free,
orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure
of which would result in the frustration of the true
will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC
of the authority to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public officials in relation
to their office would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.
An examination of the provisions of the
Constitution and the Election Code of 1978
reveals the clear intention to place in the
COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute election offenses committed by
any person, whether private individual or public
officer or employee, and in the latter instance,
irrespective of whether the offense is committed
in relation to his official duties or not. In other
words, it is the nature of the offense and not the
personality of the offender that matters. As long
as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction
over the same rests exclusively with the
COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power
over the conduct of elections.
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes
no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If
the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information
charging an election offense or prosecutes a
violation of election law, it is because he has
been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not
do so under the sole authority of his office.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the government.
It is only after a preliminary examination
conducted by the COMELEC through its officials
or its deputies that section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because,
when the application for a warrant of arrest is
made and the information is filed with the court,
the judge will then determine whether or not a
probable cause exists for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. HON.
LORENZO R. SILVA
G.R. No. 129417 February 10, 1998
FACTS: Pursuant to its power under Art. IX-C, §
2(6) of the Constitution, the COMELEC charged
private respondents Erasto Tanciongco and
Norma Castillo with violations of §27 of R.A. No.
6646, together with Zenon Uy, in twelve
separate informations filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Bataan. Tanciongco, who is
provincial prosecutor of Bataan, was vice
chairman, while Castillo, who is division
superintendent of schools, was secretary of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan. Uy,
who is assistant regional director of elections,
was chairman of the board. In each information,
the three were accused of having tampered, in
conspiracy with one another, with the certificates
of canvass by increasing the votes received by
then senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in
certain municipalities of Bataan in the May 8,
1995 elections.
The twelve cases were raffled to three branches
of the court presided over the respondent
judges, Honorable Lorenzo R. Silva Jr.
(Branches 2 and 3) and Honorable Benjamin T.
Vianzon (Branch 1).
On October 30, 1996, Tanciongco and Castillo
filed a joint "Omnibus Motion for Examination of
Evidence to Determine the Existence of
Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest; and Dismissal of the Cases."
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, who had
been designated by the Commission on
Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a
comment joining in private respondents' request.
On the other hand, the complainant, Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. expressed no objection to the
dismissal of the cases against the two.
In orders dated March 31, and April 7, 1997,
respectively, Judges Silva and Vianzon
summarily dismissed the cases against private
respondents.
The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal
of the cases to the Court of Appeals by filing
notices on April 18, 1997, but the judges denied
due course to its appeal. The sole basis for the
denials was the fact that the prosecutor, whom
the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the
cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against
the COMELEC.
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Hence, this petition
for certiorari and mandamus seeking the
nullification of the orders of the two judges,
denying due course to the Notices of Appeal of
the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Who as between the COMELEC or its
designated prosecutor has authority to decide
whether or not to appeal from the orders of
dismissal?
HELD: The authority to decide whether or not to
appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC.
Art. IX-C, § 2(6) of the Constitution expressly
vests in it the power and function to "investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices."
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to
prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They
derive their authority from it and not from their
offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power
of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño to oppose the
appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was
beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated
prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the
determination of whether there was probable
cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found
none, whether the cases should be dismissed.
Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after
appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief
State Prosecutor thought there was no probable
cause for proceeding against private
respondents, he should have discussed the
matter with the COMELEC and awaited its
instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELEC's
findings, he should have sought permission to
withdraw from the cases. But he could not leave
the determination of probable cause to the
courts and agree in advance to the dismissal of
the cases should the courts find no probable
cause for proceeding with the trial of the
accused. It was, therefore, grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judges
to rely on the manifestation of Chief State
Prosecutor Zuño as basis for denying due
course to the notices of appeal filed by the
COMELEC.
Whether the orders of dismissal should be
appealed is for the COMELEC to decide, not for
Chief State Prosecutor Zuño whom it has merely
deputized to represent in it court.
Their sole contention is that the petition should
be dismissed because, so it is argued, it should
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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have been brought in the name of the People of
the Philippines and have been filed by the
Solicitor General.
This contention is without merit. This is not the
first time the COMELEC has come to this Court
in its own name in regard to an action taken
against it in cases filed by it in the lower courts.
The COMELEC has sufficient interest in filing the
petition [for certiorari] to set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals having sustained the
demurrer to evidence in the criminal case
against private respondent for violation of the
Election Laws. This is so, for it is not only
entrusted with the duty to enforce the said law
but also to prosecute all election offenses.
KILOSBAYAN vs.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 128054 October 16, 1997
FACTS: On December 14, 1993, public
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec)
received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter
informing the former of "two . . . serious
violations of election laws", thus:
The documented admission of Secretary of
Budget Salvador Enriquez, in the October 5,
1993 hearing of the Commission on
Appointments, that the amount of P70 million
was released by his department, shortly before
the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of a
private entity, the so-called "Philippine Youth,
Health and Sports Development Foundation,"
headed by Mr. Ronaldo Puno, who had been
repeatedly identified by columnist Teodoro
Benigno as a key member of the Sulu Hotel
Operation (SHO), which had reportedly engaged
in dirty election tricks and practices in said
elections. . . .
The illegal diversion of P330 million by
Malacanang from the Countryside Development
Fund to the Department of Interior and Local
Government which disbursed this huge amount
shortly before the May 11, 1992 elections, as
revealed by DILG Budget Officer Barata, in a
hearing of the Senate Finance Committee,
chaired by Sen. Vicente Sotto III, held last
November 22, 1993.
On December 14, 1993, then Comelec
Chairman Christian Monsod called a meeting of
the Comelec En Bancwhich resolved to refer
petitioner Kilosbayan's letter-complaint to the
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Law Department for comment and/or
recommendation. Said letter-complaint was
docketed as E.O. Case No. 93-193.
The evidence proffered by Kilosbayan in support
of its letter-complaint consisted of the published
writings of Teodoro Benigno in his column in the
Philippine Star newspaper imputing to the so-
called Sulo Hotel Operation (SHO) headed by
PYHSDFI's chairman, Ronaldo Puno, the
commission of illegal election activities during
the May 11, 1992 elections, including the
obtention of government funds for electioneering
purposes.
Kilosbayan did not submit evidence to prove its
case which ended in the dismissal of the same.
Petitioner Kilosbayan contended that it is the
Comelec that is duty-bound to search for
evidence to prove its letter-complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is the Comelec that is
duty-bound to search for evidence to prove a
letter-complaint.
HELD: The task of the Comelec as investigator
and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense
complaint, is not the physical searching and
gathering of proof in support of a complaint for
an alleged commission of an election offense. A
complainant, who in effect accuses another
person of having committed an act constituting
an election offense, has the burden, as it is his
responsibility, to follow through his accusation
and prove his complainant. If the complainant
fails to proffer the necessary evidence to show
probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of
denial or any evidence in controversion, of the
accusation, the complaint must be dismissed,
since any person accused of a crime is
presumed innocent and does not at all have to
make a response or reaction to the charges
against him.
The Comelec, in acting upon an election offense
complaint in the course of preliminary
investigation, initially facilitates the confrontation
process between the complainant and the
respondents by requiring the submission of and
interfacing, their respective evidences.
Ultimately, the Comelec passes upon the
contending parties' respective submission and
proofs and weighs the fact and circumstances
established therefrom. Contrary to the
asseveration of petitioner Kilosbayan, the
preliminary investigation is not an occasion for
the Comelec to, as a duty, spoonfeed the
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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complainant with evidence needed to prove its
case.
EUGENIO "JING-JING" FAELNAR vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAMON
CODILLA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the RTC, Branch 19, Cebu City, and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: On April 8, 1997, pet Eugenio Faelnar
filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Guadalupe,
Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay
elections. The following day, on April 9, 1997, a
basketball tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-
JING FAELNARS CUP," opened at the
Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to
April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a complaint for
electioneering filed against petitioner and Cecilio
Gillamac by Antonio Luy. The complaint alleged
that the basketball tournament was actually a
campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign
period which officially started on May 1, 1997, in
violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Luy alleged that: (1) during the tournament, a
streamer bearing petitioners name was placed
on the facade of the Guadalupe Sports Complex;
(2) petitioners name was repeatedly mentioned
over the microphone during the games; (3) the
tournament was widely published in the local
newspaper; and (4) a raffle sponsored by Cecilio
Gillamac was held with home appliances given
away as prizes.
Petitioner denied participation in the tournament
and claimed that its major sponsor was Gillamac
Marketing, Inc. He contended that the same was
purely a sporting event for the benefit of the
youth. The complaint was investigated by Atty.
Edwin Cadungog, election officer of Cebu City,
who later recommended the dismissal of the
charges against petitioner and Gillamac. On the
other hand, the Law Department of the
COMELEC recommended the filing of a case
against petitioner and Gillamac for violation of
80, in relation to 262, of the Omnibus Election
Code, and 50 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2888, in relation to 12 of Republic Act No. 6679.
The COMELEC en banc resolved to dismiss the
case. However, on motion of Antonio Luy, the
COMELEC reconsidered its action. Accordingly,
pet and Gillamac were formally charged in the
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City under two
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941
and CBU-49942. Petitioner moved to quash the
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information or, in the alternative, for
reinvestigation of the case, contending that
Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the
complaint against him, was immediately
executory and could no longer be reconsidered.
Petition was denied.
ISSUE: WON the first resolution of the
COMELEC is final and executory.
HELD:
1. The first resolution of COMELEC (dismissing
the case against Faelnar) was not final and may
be subject to a Motion for Reconsideration.
Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the 1988 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provide for an exception in
what pleadings are not allowed:
“M ti n econsideration of an en banc
ruling, resolution, order or decision,
e cept in e ecti n ense cases”
An MR of a ruling, resolution or decision of the
COMELEC en banc is allowed in cases involving
election offenses. There is no question that what
is involved in this case is a resolution in an
election offense. Therefore, an MR is allowed
under the Rules.
Faelnar, likewise, invokes Rule 34, Section 10 of
the same Rules which states that:
SEC. 10. Appeals from the Action of the
State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal.
Appeals from the resolution of the State
Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal on
the recommendation or resolution of
investigating officers may be made only to
the Commission within ten (10) days from
receipt of the resolution of said officials,
provided, however that this shall not
divest the Commission of its power to
motu proprio review, revise, modify or
reverse the resolution of the chief state
prosecutor and/or provincial/city
prosecutors. The decision of the
Commission on said appeals shall be
immediately executor and final.
(Emphasis added)
However, this section does not apply to
investigations conducted by COMELEC, but to
the resolutions of the State Prosecutor, or
Provincial or City Fiscal, who has the delegated
power to conduct preliminary investigation of
election offense cases. But if COMELEC
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conducts the investigation through its own
investigating officer, the section does not apply.
2 H we e , e en i it was ina , Fae na ’s ti n
to quash was not the proper remedy as it was an
attempt to circumvent a final resolution of the
COMELEC. The proper remedy would have
been a petition for certiorari under Rule 64,
which must be filed within 30 days from notice of
judgment. In this case, Faelnar filed his motion
to quash more than a year after.
LAUREL V. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE
FACTS: Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo sent a verified
letter-complaint to Jose P. Balbuena charging
Herman Tiu Laurel with "Falsification of Public
Documents" and violation of [Section 74] of the
Omnibus Election Code. It alleged that both his
father and mother were Chinese citizens but
when petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for
the position of Senator he stated that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
An investigation was conducted by the
COMELEC Law Department and a Report was
made recommending the filing of Information.
During en banc, COMELEC resolved to file the
necessary information against respondent and to
file a criminal complaint against respondent for
falsification. Director Balbuena filed an
information for Violation of Section 74, in relation
to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Inhibition, seeking the
inhibition of the entire COMELEC because of its
bias in rendering a resolution.
Plaintiff filed on 07 May 1996 a Motion to Quash
alleging lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority
on the part of Director Balbuena to file the
information. However, it was denied which
prompted him to file a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court and
ruled that the proper procedure was followed by
the COMELEC but directed the trial court to
remand the case to the COMELEC for reception
of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC resolution dated January 25, 1996,
which approved the filing of a criminal complaint
against petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that there
was no flaw in the procedure followed by the
COMELEC in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation.
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HELD:
1. It was error for the Court of Appeals to hold
there was no flaw in the procedure followed by
the COMELEC in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation.
There are two ways through which a complaint
for election offenses may be initiated. It may be
filed by the COMELEC motu proprio, or it may
be filed via written complaint by any citizen of the
Philippines, candidate, registered political party,
coalition of political parties or organizations
under the partylist system or any accredited
citizens arms of the Commission.
- Motu proprio complaints may be signed by the
Chairman of the COMELEC and need not be
verified.
On the other hand, complaints filed by parties
other than the COMELEC must be verified and
supported by affidavits and other evidence. The
complaint in question in this case is one filed by
Pardo in his personal capacity and not as
chairman of the COMELEC. There is nothing in
the rules that require that only the COMELEC en
banc may refer a complaint to the Law
Department for investigation. There is no rule
against the COMELEC chairman directing the
conduct of a preliminary investigation, even if he
himself were the complainant in his private
capacity.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that
petitioner's protestations on COMELEC's having
acted as complainant, investigator, prosecutor,
judge and executioner in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation ring hollow.
-No. the records show that there is basis to at
least find probable cause to indict the petitioner
for violation of the Omnibus Election Code and it
appears from the records that Chairman Pardo
had no other participation in the proceedings
which led to the filing of the Information.
-The entire COMELEC cannot possibly be
restrained from investigating the complaint filed
against petitioner, as the latter would like the
courts to do. The COMELEC is mandated by no
less than the Constitution to investigate and
prosecute, when necessary, violations of
election laws. This power is lodged exclusively
with the COMELEC. For the entire Commission
to inhibit itself from investigating the complaint
against petitioner would be nothing short of an
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abandonment of its mandate under the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code
TAN VS. COMELEC
237 SCRA 353, OCTOBER 4, 1994
FACTS: On May 10, 1992, the petitioner, as an
incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was
designated by the COMELEC as Vice-Chairman
of the City Board of Canvassers in the said area
for the May 11, 1992, synchronized national and
local elections conformably with the provisions of
Section 20 (a) of Republic Act 6646 and Section
221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code.
On the basis of the votes canvassed by the
Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was
proclaimed the winning candidate for a
congressional seat to represent the Second
District of Davao City in the House of
Representatives.
Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate
for the position, filed a number of cases
questioning the validity of the proclamation of
Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the
City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful,
erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass."
Meanwhile, the electoral protest of private
respondent Alterado was dismissed by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
("HRET"). The criminal complaint for
"Falsification of Public Documents and Violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"
before the Office of the Ombudsman was
likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of
criminal intent on the part of therein
respondents. Still pending is an administrative
charge, instituted in the COMELEC against the
City Board of Canvassers, including herein
petitioner, for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty,
Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the
Service."
Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative
complaint against him for alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the COMELEC thereover, he being
under the Executive Department of the
government. The COMELEC denied petitioner's
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the
jurisdiction to take action on the
administrative case when in fact the
petitioner as a City prosecutor is under the
Administrative jurisdiction.
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HELD: T e COMELEC’s aut it unde Secti n
2 (6-8), Article 9 of the Constitution is virtually
all-encompassing when it comes to election
matters, also Section 52, Article 7 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It should be stressed
that the administrative case against petitioner is
in relation to the performance of his duties as an
Election canvasser and not as a City Prosecutor.
T e COMELEC’s andate inc udes its aut it
to exercise direct and immediate suspension and
control over national and local officials or
employees, including members of any national
and local law enforcement agency and
instrumentality of the government, required by
law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections. To say that the COMELEC is without
jurisdiction to look into charges of election
offenses committed by officials and employees
of government outside the regular employ of the
COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the
proper and sound exercise of such
recommendatory power and, perhaps more than
that, even a possible denial of the process to the
official or employee concerned.
RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CALAMBA
LAGUNA and SEVERINO LAJARA
FACTS: RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and
SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for mayor
in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May 1995
elections. After obtaining a majority of some
24,000 votes, Lajara was proclaimed winner by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers. On 15 May
1995 Canicosa filed with the COMELEC a
Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to
Declare Null and Void the Canvass and
Proclamation because of alleged widespread
frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of
votes, preparation of election returns, violence,
threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered
voters voting, and delay in the delivery of
election documents and paraphernalia from the
precincts to the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer.
Canicosa particularly averred that: (a) the names
of the registered voters did not appear in the list
of voters in their precincts; (b) more than one-
half of the legitimate registered voters were not
able to vote with strangers voting in their stead;
(c) he was credited with less votes than he
actually received; (d) control data of the election
returns was not filled up in some precincts; (e)
ballot boxes brought to the Office of the
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Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i.e.,
without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals;
and, (f) there was delay in the delivery of
election returns.
But the COMELEC en banc dismissed the
petition on the ground that the allegations therein
did not justify a declaration of failure of election.
ISSUE: WON the grounds cited by Canicosa
warrants a declaration of failure of election.
HELD: NO. Indeed, the grounds cited by
Canicosa do not warrant a declaration of failure
of election. Section 6 of BP Blg. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, reads:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and
after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect.
Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where
a failure of election may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation
and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results
in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes.
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None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls
under any of those enumerated.
Canicosa bewails that the names of the
registered voters in the various precincts did not
appear in their respective lists of voters. But this
is not a ground to declare a failure of election.
The filing of a petition for declaration of failure of
election therefore is not the proper remedy.
Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections on
8 May 1995 the final list of voters was posted in
each precinct pursuant to Sec. 148 of RA No.
7166. Based on the lists thus posted Canicosa
could have filed a petition for inclusion of
registered voters with the regular courts. The
question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of
voters involves the right to vote which is not
within the power and authority of COMELEC to
rule upon. The determination of whether one has
the right to vote is a justiciable issue properly
cognizable by our regular courts.
On the other hand, Canicosa could have also
filed with the COMELEC a verified complaint
seeking the annulment of the book of voters
pursuant to Sec. 10, of RA No. 7166.
Canicosa also avers that more than one-half
(1/2) of the legitimate registered voters were not
able to vote, instead, strangers voted in their
behalf. Again, this is not a ground which
warrants a declaration of failure of election.
Canicosa was allowed to appoint a watcher in
every precinct. The watcher is empowered by
law to challenge any illegal voter. In fine, the
grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not
fall under any of the instances enumerated in
Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.
JOSEPH PETER SISON V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 134096, MARCH 3, 1999
FACTS: It appears that while the election returns
were being canvassed by the Quezon
City Board of Canvassers but before the
winning candidates were proclaimed,
petitioner commenced suit before the
COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to
suspend the canvassing of votes and/or
proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a
failure of elections. The said petition was
supposedly filed pursuant to Section 63 of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, as amended) on the ground of "massive
and orchestrated fraud and acts analogous
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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thereto which occurred after the voting and
during the preparation of election returns and in
the custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in
a failure to elect.
While the petition was pending before the
COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers
proclaimed the winners of the elections in
Quezon City, including the winning candidate for
the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the
COMELEC promulgated its challenged
resolution dismissing the petition before it on the
ground (1) that the allegations therein were not
supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the
grounds recited were not among the pre
proclamation issues set forth in Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 7166
ISSUE: WON the grounds are valid?
HELD: Under the pertinent codal provision of the
Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3)
instances where a failure of elections may be
declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation
and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass
thereof such election result in a failure to elect
on account of force majuere, violence, terrorism
, fraud, or other analogous causes.
We have painstakingly examined
petitioner's petition before the COMELEC but
found nothing therein that could support an
action for declaration of failure of elections. He
never alleged at all that elections were either
not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's
claim of failure to elect stood as a bare
conclusion bereft of any substantive support to
describe just
exactly how the failure to elect came about.
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CARLOS V. ANGELES
G.R. NO. 142907, NOV. 29, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later
converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998
elections. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed
petitioner as the mayor. The private respondent
filed an election protest with the RTC. The court
came up with revision reports, which also
showed that the petitioner got the highest
number of votes. Nevertheless, in its decision,
the trial court set aside the final tally of valid
votes because of its finding of "significant
badges of fraud," which it attributed to the
present petitioner. The court then declared
private respondent as the winner. The petitioner
appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a
petition to the SC questioning the decision of the
RTC. The private respondent questioned the
jurisdiction of the SC.
ISSUE: As to the jurisdiction of Comelec and
the Courts
HELD: Both the SC and COMELEC have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of
trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTCs) in
election cases involving elective municipal
officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed
with the COMELEC, the same would not bar the
present action as an exception to the rule
because under the circumstances, appeal would
not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The power to nullify an election must be
exercised with the greatest care with a view not
to disenfranchise the voters, and only under
circumstances that clearly call for such drastic
remedial measure. More importantly, the trial
court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of
election. It is the COMELEC en banc that is
vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a
failure of election. Assuming that the trial court
has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election,
the extent of that power is limited to the
annulment of the election and the calling of
special elections. The result is a failure of
election for that particular office. In such case,
the court cannot declare a winner.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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TEODULO M. COQUILLA VS.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND MR. NEIL ALVAREZ
G.R. 151914, JULY 31, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner Coquilla was born on
February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras,
Eastern Samar. In 1965, he joined the US Navy
and was naturalized as a US Citizen. On
October 15, 1998, petitioner came back to the
Philippines and took a residence certificate.
Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 8171 to the special committee on
naturalization. His application was approved on
November 7, 2000, and on November 10, 2000,
he took oath as citizen of the Philippines. On
November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for
registration as a voter of Oras, Eastern Samar,
in addition, on February 27, 2001, he filed
his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he
had been a resident thereof for 2 years. On
March 5, 2001, Mr. Alvarez filed for
the cance ati n petiti ne ’s ce ti icate of
candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation by stating thereat that the
latter has been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for two years, when in truth and in fact he
had resided therein for only about six months
since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath
as a citizen of the Philippines. The Comelec was
unable to render judgment on the case before
the election.
Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and
proclaimed mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar. On
July 19, 2001, the Comelec (2nd Div)
ordered t e cance ati n t e petiti ne ’s
certificate of candidacy. Comelec en banc
affirmed the order, thus this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1)
year before the elections held on May 14, 2001.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the term
“ esidence” is t e unde st d not in its
common acceptation as e e ing t “dwe ing”
or “ a itati n”, ut at e t “D ici e” legal
residence, that is, the place where a party
actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person
at birth. It is usually the place w e e t e c i d’s
parents reside and continues until the same
is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice). In the case at bar, petitioner
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lost his domicile of origin by becoming a
US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy in 1965.
From then on and until November 10, 2000,
when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any
right to reside in the Philippines. Indeed,
residence in the United States is a requirement
for naturalization as a US citizen. Wherefore, the
petition is without merit and DISMISSED."
SANCHEZ v. COMELEC
153 SCRA 67
FACTS: In the mayoral contest in Pampanga,
Biliwang was proclaimed winner. Sanchez filed
an action to annul the proclamation with the
COMELEC and to declare that there was a
failure of election and to call for a special
election. This was based on the ground that
massive terrorism was made by the incumbent
mayor in ordering armed men to hold at gunpoint
teachers who were counting the ballots and
replacing the ballots with pre- prepared ones in
favor of Baliwag. Baliwag denied the allegations.
The COMELEC issued a resolution declaring
that there was failure of elections in San
Fernardo Pampanga and referred the same to
the President and Batasang Pambansa so that
the necessary law would be passed for holding a
special election. Biliwag contends that
the ground of terrorism cannot be invoked in pre-
proclamation controversy.
ISSUE: WON fraud and terrorism is considered
a pre-proclamation controversy to justify the
resolution of declaring that there was a failure of
election in San Fernando Pampanga.
HELD: Election is not complete until all the
essential acts thereof are concluded. In
this case, election is not complete unless there is
a proclaimed winner. The matter involves
a failure to elect based on the ground that the
election was marred by massive terrorism. The
1973 Constitution vests power to the COMELEC
to be the sole judge of all election contest and
controversy and that it had the power to declare
a failure of election and call
for a special election.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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BAGO P. PASANDALAN V. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and BAI SALAMONA L. ASUM
[G. R. No. 150312. July 18, 2002]
CARPIO, J.:
Doctrine: A petition for declaration of failure of
election must specifically allege the essential
grounds that would justify the exercise of this
extraordinary remedy. Otherwise, the
S ND L N’S can dis iss ut ig t t e
petition for lack of merit. No grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the
S ND L N’S in suc a case because the
S ND L N’S ust e e cise wit ut st
circumspection the power to declare a failure of
election to prevent disenfranchising voters and
frustrating the electorates will.
FACTS: Bago Pasandalan and private
respondent Bai Salamona L. Asum were
candidates for mayor in the Municipality of
Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur during the May
14, 2001 elections.
On May 23, 2001, Pasandalan filed a petition
e e pu ic esp ndent S ND L N’S
seeking to nullify the election results in Barangay
Cabasaran, Barangay Deromoyod, Lamin,
Barangay Wago, Barangay Meniros, Barangay
Bualan, and Barangay Pantaon, all of
Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner alleged that while voting was going on,
some Cafgus stationed near Sultan Gunting
Elementary School indiscriminately fired their
firearms causing the voters to panic and leave
the polling center without casting their votes.
Taking advantage of the confusion, supporters of
Asum allegedly took the official ballots, filled
them up with the name of Asum and placed
them inside the ballot boxes. In another
barangay, the members of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) allegedly failed to sign their
initials at the back of several official ballots and
to remove the detachable coupons. The BEI
members allegedly affixed their initials only
during the counting of votes.
asanda an c ai s t at su ’s supp te s,
ta ing ad antage t e ist ig t etween su ’s
nephew and the supporters of candidate Norania
Salo, grabbed the official ballots and filled them
up with the name of Asum, in another polling
place. Pasandalan contends that a technical
examination of several official ballots from the
contested precincts would show that only a few
persons wrote the entries.
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On June 26, 2001, Asum filed an Answer
denying Pasandalan’s a egati n t at t e e the voting and during the preparation and the
of shots fired on May 14, 2001 disrupted the
voting. Private respondent countered that the
gunshots were heard around 2:35 p.m. and not
at the start of the voting. On June 30, 2001,
Asum was sworn into office and assumed the
position of municipal mayor of the
Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur.
On Oct e 12, 2001, t e S ND L N’S
issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for
ac e it T e S ND L N’S u ed t at the
power to declare a failure of election, being an
extraordinary remedy, could be exercised only in
three instances: (1) the election is not held; (2)
the election is suspended; or (3) the election
results in a failure to elect. The third instance is
understood in its literal sense, that is, nobody
was elected.
The S ND L N’S dis issed t e petiti n
because none of the grounds relied upon by
Pasandalan falls under any of the three
instances justifying a declaration of failure of
e ecti n T e S ND L N’S u ed t at is
allegations are better ventilated in an election
c ntest It did n t gi e c edence t asanda an’s
evidence in support of his allegations of
terrorism and fraud since the evidence consisted
n a ida its e ecuted asanda an’s wn
p watc e s T e S ND L N’S c nside ed
these affidavits self-serving and insufficient to
annul the results of the election.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a failure of
election--- There was none.
HELD: We rule that the petition is without merit.
T e S ND L N’S c ect dis issed t e
petition for declaration of failure of election
because the irregularities alleged in the petition
should have been raised in an election protest,
not in a petition to declare a failure of election.
Under Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known
as The Synchronized Elections Law of 1991, the
S ND L N’S en anc is e p we ed t
declare a failure of election under Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
Section 6 of the Code prescribes the conditions
for the exercise of this power, thus:
SEC. 6. Failure of Election. - If, on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for closing of the voting, or after
transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement
or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Based on the foregoing provision, three
instances justify a declaration of failure of
election. These are:
(a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation
and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes.
What is common in these three instances is the
resulting failure to elect which means nobody
emerged as a winner.
asanda an’s a egati ns d n t a unde an
the instances that would justify the declaration of
failure of election. The election was held in the
16 protested precincts as scheduled. At no point
was the election in any of the precincts
suspended. Nor was there a failure to elect
because of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes during the
preparation, transmission, custody and canvass
of the election returns. The alleged terrorism was
not of such scale and prevalence to prevent the
holding of the election or to cause its
suspension. In fact, the casting and counting of
votes, the preparation, transmission and
canvassing of election returns and the
proclamation of the winning candidate took place
in due course.
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Courts exercise the power to declare a failure of
election with deliberate caution so as not to
disen anc ise t e e ect ate asanda an’s
allegations of terrorism and fraud are not
sufficient to warrant a nullification of the election
in the absence of any of the three instances
justifying a declaration of failure of election.
To warrant a declaration of failure of election on
the ground of fraud, the fraud must prevent or
suspend the holding of an election, or mar fatally
the preparation, transmission, custody and
canvass of the election returns. The allegations
of massive substitution of voters, multiple voting,
and other electoral anomalies should be
resolved in a proper election protest in the
absence of any of the three instances justifying a
declaration of failure of election.
The nullification of elections or declaration of
failure of elections is an extraordinary remedy.
The party who seeks the nullification of an
election has the burden of proving entitlement to
this remedy.
In the instant case, it is apparent that the
allegations do not constitute sufficient grounds
for the nullification of the election. Pasandalan
even failed to substantiate his allegations of
terrorism and irregularities. His evidence
consisted of mere affidavits which are
insufficient.
asanda an ewai s t e S ND L N’Ss
dismissal of his petition without first conducting a
technical examination of the questioned
p ecincts T e S ND L N’S is n t andated
to conduct a technical examination before it
dismisses a petition for nullification of election
when the petition is, on its face, without merit. In
Typoco, petitioner Typoco buttressed his petition
with independent evidence that compelled the
S ND L N’S t c nduct a tec nica
examination of the questioned returns. In the
present case, Pasandalan failed to attach
independent and objective evidence other than
the self-serving affidavits of his own poll
watc e s In Mit ug S ND L N’S, we
u ed t at t e S ND L N’S c u d dis iss
outright a petition for nullification of election if it
is plainly groundless and the allegations therein
could be better ventilated in an election protest.
Clearly, the fact that a verified petition is filed
wit t e S ND L N’S d es n t necessa i
mean that a technical examination or a hearing
on the case should be conducted first before the
S ND L N’S can act n the petition. There
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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is no grave abuse of discretion if the
S ND L N’S dis isses t e petiti n e en
without a technical examination or hearing if the
petition fails to show on its face the existence of
any of the three instances required by law to
declare a failure of election. The
S ND L N’S in t is case c ect dis issed
the petition.
Pasandalan believes that notwithstanding the
fact that actual voting took place in the
questioned precincts, the election in this case,
just like in Basher v. Commission on Elections,
was illegal, irregular, and void. Citing Basher,
Pasandalan argues that the peculiar set of facts
in this case do not merely show a failure of
election but the absence of a valid electoral
exercise. The fact that an election is actually
held prevents as a rule a declaration of failure of
election. It is only when the election is attended
by patent and massive irregularities and
illegalities that this Court will annul the election
Basher does not apply to this case. Unlike in
Basher, the election in this case proceeded as
scheduled, in accordance with law and
S ND L N’S u es N ne t e e te e
circumstances that marred the election in Basher
is present in this case. We have ruled that there
is failure of election only if the will of the
electorate is muted and cannot be ascertained. If
the will of the people is determinable, the same
must be respected as much as possible.
JE Y J ’
EN BANC, AND JESUS EMMANUEL
PIMENTEL
GR 136191, November 29, 1999
FACTS: Jesus O. Typoco and Jesus Emmanuel
Pimentel were both candidates for the position of
Governor in Camarines Norte during the May 11,
1998 elections. On June 10, 1998, TYPOCO
filed a petition alleging that massive fraud and
irregularities attended the preparation of the
election returns considering that upon technical
examination, 305 election returns were found to
have been prepared in group by one person. A
ep t t e S ND L N’S’s ERSD V te s
Identification Division disclosed, among others,
t at t e “ andwritten entries on278
S ND L N’S c pies e ecti n etu ns
particularly under the columns
Congressman/Governor/Vice-
Governor/Nickname or Stage Name, were
written by one and the same person in groups.
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T e S ND L N’S En anc p u gated a
resolution dis issing TY OCO’s petiti n t e
Declaration of Failure of Elections and/or
Annulment of Elections in Camarines Norte for
lack of merit, claiming that the grounds cited by
TYPOCO do not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of the ERSD
Voters Identification Division can warrant the
declaration of a Failure of Elections and/or
Annulment of Elections?
HELD: NO. First, the Court pointed to Section 4
of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as
“T e S nc nized E ecti ns Law 1991,”
w ic t e S ND L N’S de i es its aut it
to declare a failure of elections. Second, the
court quoted Section 6 of the same law, which
enumerates the causes for a declaration of a
Failure of Election. These are explained in the
case of Mitmug v. Commission on Elections,
wherein the Court held that two conditions must
concur:
(1) no voting has taken place in the precincts
concerned on the date fixed by law, or
even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in a failure to
election; and
(2) the votes cast would affect the result of
the election.
In Loong v. Commission on Elections, the Court
added that the cause of such failure of election
should have been any of the following: force
majeur, violence, terrorist, fraud of other
analogous cases.
Further in Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
t e C u t stated t at “T e S ND L N’S can
call for the holding or continuation of election by
reason of failure of election only when the
election is not held, is suspended or results in a
failure to elect. The latter phrase, in turn, must
be understood in its literal sense, which is
“n d was e ected ”C ea t en, t e C u t
held that there are only three instances where a
failure of election may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of
force majeure ,violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous cases;
(b) the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting on account of force
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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majeure,, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes;
(c) after the voting and during the preparation
and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes. In all instances there must
have been failure to elect.
This is obvious in the first scenario where the
election was not held and the second where the
election was suspended. As to the third
scenario, the preparation and transmission of the
election returns, which gave rise to the
consequence of a failure to elect must as
aforesaid be literally interpreted to mean that
nobody emerged as a winner. While fraud is a
ground to declare a failure of election, the
commission of fraud must be such that it
prevented or suspended the holding of an
election including the preparation and
transmission of the election returns. The ground
invoked by TYPOCO is not proper in a
dec a ati n ai u e e ecti n TY OCO’s
e ie was S ND L N’S t de a
recount of the votes cast, on account of the
falsified election returns, which is properly the
subject of an election contest. The
PASANDAL N’S, t e e e, ad n c ice ut
t dis iss TY OCO’s petiti n in acc dance
with clear provisions of the law and
jurisprudence.
HADJI RASUL BATADOR BASHER vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ABULKAIR AMPATUA
EN BANC [G.R. No. 139028. April 12, 2000]
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Doctrine: An election must be held at the place,
date and time prescribed by law. Likewise, its
suspension or postponement must comply with
legal requirements. Otherwise, it is irregular and
void.
FACTS: Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher
and Private Respondent Abulkair Ampatua were
both candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao
del Sur during the May 12, 1997 barangay
election. The election was declared a failure and
a special one was set for June 12, 1997. Again,
the election failed and was reset to August 30,
1997.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 109

Election Officer Diana DatuImam reported that
she was allegedly advised by some religious
leaders not to proceed with the election because
"it might trigger bloodshed." She also claimed
that the town mayor yelled at and threatened her
to declare a failure of election in Maidan.
Subsequently, the election officer proceeded to
Maidan to conduct the election starting at 9:00
p.m. until the early morning of the following day.
The holding of the election at that particular time
was allegedly announced "over the mosque."
The tally sheet for the said "election" showed the
following results: private respondent 250 votes;
petitioner 15 votes; and Baulo Abdul Razul, a
third candidate 10 votes. Private respondent was
proclaimed winner.
Petitioner then filed a Petition before the
COMELEC praying that the election be declared
a failure. Alleging that no election was conducted
in the place and at the time prescribed by law,
petitioner narrated that there was a dispute that
day among the candidates regarding the venue
of the election in the lone voting precinct of the
barangay. In order to avoid bloodshed, they
ultimately agreed that no election would be
conducted. Accordingly, the election officer
turned over for safekeeping the ballot box
containing election paraphernalia to the acting
station commander (OIC) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP). The following day,
petitioner and the third candidate were surprised
to learn that the election officer had directed the
Board of Election Tellers to conduct the election
and to fill up the election returns and certificates
of canvass on the night of August 30, 1997 at
the residence of the former mayor. Petitioner
also stated that no announcement to hold the
election at the former mayors house that night
was ever made.
As earlier stated, the COMELEC dismissed the
Petition. The COMELEC ruled against a failure
of election because the two conditions laid down
in Mitmug v. COMELEC were not established. It
held that the "election was conducted on the
scheduled date. The precinct functioned. Actual
voting took place, and it resulted not in a failure
to elect."
ISSUE: Whether the "election" held on the date,
at the time and in the place other than those
officially designated by the law and by the
COMELEC was valid
HELD: No. Citing Mitmug v. COMELEC, the
COMELEC points out that a failure of election
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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requires the concurrence of two conditions,
namely (1) no voting took place in the precinct or
precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if
there was voting, the election resulted in a failure
to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have
affected the result of the election. It ruled that
these requirements were not met.
We do not agree. The peculiar set of facts in the
present case show not merely a failure of
election but the absence of a valid electoral
exercise. Otherwise stated, the disputed
"election" was illegal, irregular and void.
a. Election Situs Was Illegal - The place where
the voting was conducted was illegal. Section 42
of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the
chairman of the board of election tellers shall
designate the public school or any other public
building within the barangay to be used as
polling place in case the barangay has one
election precinct. Petitioner, citing an Affidavit
supposedly executed by the members of the
Board of Election Tellers (BET) for Barangay
Maidan, alleges that the election of officials for
said barangay was held at the residence of
former Mayor Alang Sagusara Pukunun, which is
located at Barangay Pandarianao, instead of the
officially designated polling precinct at Cagayan
Elementary School. While the BET members
later repudiated their Affidavit, however, they
failed to specify the exact venue. This glaring
omission definitely raises serious questions on
whether the election was indeed held in a place
allowed by law.
b. Voting Time Was Likewise Irregular - The law
provides that the casting of votes shall start at
seven o'clock in the morning and shall end at
three o'clock in the afternoon, except when there
are voters present within thirty meters in front of
the polling place who have not yet cast their
votes, in which case the voting shall continue but
only to allow said voters to cast their votes
without interruption." Section 22, Article IV of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2971 also specifies
that the voting hours shall start promptly at 7:00
a.m. and end at 3:00 p.m. of the same day.
However, the "election" for Barangay Maidan
officials was supposed to have been held after
9:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the wee hours
of the following day. Certainly, such schedule
was not in accordance with law or the
COMELEC Rules. The COMELEC erred in
relying on the second sentence of Section 22,
Article IV of COMELEC Resolution 2971, which
states that "if at three o'clock in the afternoon,
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 110

there are still voters within thirty meters in front
of the polling place who have not cast their
votes, the voting shall continue to allow said
voters to cast their votes without interruption."
This sentence presupposes that the election
commenced during the official time and is simply
continued beyond 3:00 p.m. in order to
accommodate voters who are within thirty
meters of the polling place, already waiting for
their turn to cast their votes. This is clearly the
meaning and intent of the word continue -- "to go
on in a specified course of action or condition."
The strained interpretation espoused by the
COMELEC encourages the conduct of
clandestine "elections," for it virtually authorizes
the holding of elections beyond normal hours,
even at midnight when circumstances could be
more threatening and conducive to unlawful
activities.
c. Election Date Was Invalid - The COMELEC
scheduled the special election on August 30,
1997. Any suspension or postponement of an
election is governed by Section 2 of RA 6679
which states that "when for any serious cause
such as rebellion, insurrection, violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia, and any analogous causes of
such nature that the holding of a free, orderly
and honest election should become impossible
in any barangay, the Commission on Election
motu proprio or upon sworn petition of ten (10)
registered voters of a barangay, after summary
proceedings of the existence of such grounds,
shall suspend or postpone the election therein to
a date reasonably close to the date of the
election that is not held or is suspended or
postponed, or which resulted in a failure to elect,
but not later than thirty (30) days after the
cessation of the cause for such suspension or
postponement of the election or failure to elect,
and in all cases not later than ninety (90) days
from the date of the original election."
Election Officer Diana Datu-Imam of Tugaya,
Lanao del Sur practically postponed the election
in Barangay Maidan from the official original
schedule of 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. of August 30,
1997 to 10:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the
early morning of August 31, 1997. She
attempted to justify her postponement of the
election by citing threats of violence and
bloodshed in the said barangay. However, as
election officer, she has no authority to declare a
failure of election. Indeed, only the COMELEC
itself has legal authority to exercise such
awesome power. An election officer alone, or
even with the agreement of the candidates,
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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cannot validly postpone or suspend the
elections.
d. Election Postponement Was Invalid - Datu-
Imam did not follow the procedure laid down by
law for election postponement or suspension or
the declaration of a failure of election. It
appeared from the very report of Datu-Imam to
the COMELEC that she did not conduct any
proceeding, summary or otherwise, to find out
whether any of the legal grounds for the
suspension or postponement or the declaration
of failure of the election actually existed in the
barangay concerned.
e. Notice Was Irregular - The electorate was not
given ample notice of the exact schedule and
venue of the election, as related by the election
officer herself. As can be gleaned easily from
her report, the electorate of Barangay Maidan
was not given due notice that the election would
push through after 9:00 p.m. that same day.
Apparently, the election officer's decision to hold
the election on the night of August 30, 1997 was
precipitate. Only after additional military troops
had arrived at their site in a nearby barangay
about 8:30 p.m. did the election officers proceed
to Barangay Maidan. Arriving at Maidan, they
allegedly proceeded to conduct the election
"after announcing it over the mosque."
Such abbreviated announcement "over the
mosque" at such late hour did NOT constitute
sufficient notice to the electorate. Consequently,
not the entire electorate or even a respectable
number could have known of the activity and
actually participated therein or voluntarily and
discerningly chosen not to have done so.
Indeed, the Court in Hassan v. COMELEC held
that the notice given on the afternoon of the
election day resetting the election to the
following day and transferring its venue was "too
short." In the case at bar, the announcement
was made only minutes before the supposed
voting. If one-day notice was held to be
insufficient in Hassan, the much shorter notice in
the present case should all the more be declared
wanting. It should in fact be equated with "no
notice."
The "election" supposedly held for officials of
Barangay Maidan cannot be clothed with any
form of validity. It was clearly unauthorized and
invalid. It had no legal leg to stand on. Not only
did the suspension/postponement not comply
with the procedure laid down by law and the
COMELEC Rules, neither was there sufficient
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 111

notice of the time and date when and the place
where it would actually be conducted. It was thus
as if no election was held at all. Hence, its
results could not determine the winning punong
barangay.
The Petition is GRANTED.
SULTAN MUHAMAD MITMUG vs. COMELEC
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lumba-
Bayabao, Lanao del Sur and Datu Gambai
Dagalangit
GR Nos. 106270-73, Feb 10, 1994
FACTS: Sultan Mitmug and Datu
Dagalangit were among the candidates for the
mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao during the
11 May 1992 election. Other candidates for the
said position also included Datu Elias
Abdusalam and Datu Bagtao Khalid.
There were sixty-seven (67) precincts in the said
municipality.
Voter turnout was rather low, particularly in forty-
nine (49) precincts where the average voter
turnout was 22.26%, i.e., only 2,330 out of
9,830registered voters therein cast their votes.
Five (5) of these precincts did not conduct actual
voting at all.
Consequently, the COMELEC ordered the
holding of a special election on 30 May 1992 in
the five (5) precincts which failed to function
during election day. On 30 July 1992, another
special election was held for a sixth precinct.
In the interim, Sultan Mitmug filed a petition
seeking the annulment of the special election
conducted on 30May 1992 alleging various
irregularities such as the alteration, tampering
and substitution of ballots. But on 13 July 1992,
COMELEC considered the petition moot since
the votes in the subject precincts were already
counted.
Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure
of election in some or all precincts of Lumba-
Bayabaowere also filed with COMELEC by other
mayoralty candidates.
1. On 6 June 1992, Datu Gamba Dagalangit
filed an urgent petition praying for the
holding of a special election in Precinct No.
22-A alleging therein that when the ballot
box was opened, ballots were already torn to
pieces. On 14 July 1992, the petition was
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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granted and a special election for Precinct
No. 22-A wasset for 25 July 1992.
2. On 16 June 19992, Datu Elias Abdusalam,
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition
to declare failure of election in twenty-nine
(29) more precincts as a result of alleged
tampering of ballots and clustering of
precincts. On 16 July 1992, the petition was
dismissed. COMELEC ruled that there must
be a situation where there is absolute
inability to vote before a failure of election
can be declared. Since voting was actually
conducted in the contested precincts, there
was no basis for the petition.
3. On 20 June 1992, private respondent filed
another petition, this time seeking to exclude
from the counting the ballots cast in six (6)
precincts on the ground that the integrity of
the ballot boxes therein was violated. Again,
on 14 July 1992, COMELEC considered the
petition moot, as the issue raised therein
was related to that of SPA No. 92-311 which
on 9 July 1992 was already set aside as
moot.
4. On 1 July 1992, Datu Bagato Khalid Lonta, a
fourth mayoralty candidate, filed a petition
which in the main sought the declaration of
failure of election in all sixty-seven (67)
precincts of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur,
on the ground of massive
disenfranchisement of voters. On 9 July
1992, COMELEC dismissed the petition,
ruling that the allegations therein did not
support a case of failure of election.
Subsequently, Sultan Mitmug filed a motion to
intervene in these four (4) petitions but
COMELEC treated the same as a motion for
reconsideration and promptly denied it
considering that under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure such motion was a prohibited
pleading.
Thereafter, a new board of Election Inspectors
was formed to conduct the special election set
for 25 July1992. Sultan Mitmug impugned the
creation of this Board. Nevertheless, on 30 July
1992, the new Board convened and began the
canvassing of votes. Finally, on 31 July 1992,
Datu Dagalangit was proclaimed the duly elected
Mayor of Lumba-Bayabao,Lanao del Sur.
On August 3, 1992, Sultan Mitmug filed this
petition for certiorari seeking the declaration of
failure of election in forty-nine (49) precincts
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 112

where less than a quarter of the electorate were
able to cast their votes. He also prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin Datu Dagalangit from assuming office.
On August 10, 1992, Sultan Mitmug lodged an
election protest with the Regional trial Court of
Lanao del Sur disputing the result not only of
some but all the precincts of Lumba-Bayabao,
del Sur. COMELEC et al. assert that with the
filing of an election protest, petitioner is already
deemed to havea bandoned the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying motu proprio and without
due notice and hearing the petitions seeking to
declare a failure of election in some or all of the
precincts in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur
HELD: NO. Sultan Mitmug did not abandon this
petition for certiorari when he filed an election
protest.
When Sultan Mitmug filed his election protest
with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur,
he informed the trial court of the pendency of
these proceedings. Evidently, Sultan Mitmug did
not intend to abandon his recourse with this
Court. On the contrary, he intended to pursue it.
Where only an election protest ex abundante ad
cautela is filed, the Court retains jurisdiction to
hear the petition seeking to annul an election.
. place in the precinct or precincts on the date
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petitions outright.
====
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, within
twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of a verified
petition to declare a failure to elect, notices to all
interested parties indicating therein the date of
hearing should be served through the fastest
means available. 18 The hearing of the case will
also be summary in nature.
Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of the
law is that a petition of this nature must be acted
upon with dispatch only after hearing thereon
shall have been conducted. Since COMELEC
denied the other petitions 20 which sought to
include forty-three (43) more precincts in a
special election without conducting any hearing,
it would appear then that there indeed might
have been grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petitions.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
However, a closer examination of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec. 2, Rule 26,
thereof which was lifted from Sec. 6, B.P. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines, indicates otherwise. It reads
—
Sec. 2. Failure of election. — If, on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes the election in
any precinct has not been held on the date fixed,
or had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the
custody of canvass thereof, such election results
in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on
the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for
the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause
of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2)
conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken
fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless results in failure to elect;
and, second, the votes not cast would affect the
result of the election.
There being no grave abuse of discretion, the
Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
BANAGA JR. VS. COMELEC
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to
annul the en banc resolution of public
respondent Commission on Elections
promulgated on June 29, 1998, in a COMELEC
special action case, SPA No. 98-383.
FACTS: Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent
Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-
mayor of the City of Parañaque in the May 1998
election. In said election, the city board of
canvassers proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr.,
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 113

as the winner for having garnered 71,977 votes
e petiti ne anaga, J ’s 68,970 tes
Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with
the COMELEC on May 1998, a Petition to
Declare Failure of Elections and/or For
Annulment of Elections, alleging that said
election was replete with election offenses, such
as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged
that numerous Election Returns pertaining to the
position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque
appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated.
In fact, there were people arrested who admitted
the said election offenses. Therefore, the
incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of
elections because it cannot be considered as the
true will of the people.
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should
be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in
the City of Parañaque, during the May 1998 local
elections.
Respondent COMELEC dis issed petiti ne ’s
suit and held that the election offenses relied
upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the
instances enumerated in Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The election tribunal
concluded that based on the allegations of the
petition, it is clear that an election took place and
that it did not result in a failure to elect and
therefore, cannot be viewed as an election
protest.
Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the
respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu
propio without any basis whatsoever and without
giving him the benefit of a hearing.
ISSUE:
 WON petition to declare a failure of elections
and/or for annulment of election is considered
as an election protest.
 WON respondent COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners petition, in the light of petitioners
foregoing contentions.
HELD:
1) N M anaga, J ’s petiti n d c eted as
SPA-98-383 before the COMELEC was a
special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. An election protest is an ordinary
governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a
petition to declare failure of elections is covered
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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by Rule 26 under special actions. Petitioner also
did not comply with the requirements for filing an
election protest such as failing to pay filing fee
and cash deposits for an election protest.
2) No. Respondent COMELEC committed no
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition to declare failure of elections and/or for
annulment of elections for being groundless. The
petition to declare a failure of election and/or to
annul election results must show on its face that
the conditions necessary to declare a failure to
elect are present. Respondent COMELEC only
based its decision on the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring
a failure of election. There are three instances
where a failure of election may be declared,
namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation
and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes.
The instances being not present in the petition of
Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC
have no other recourse but to dismiss the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. The assailed RESOLUTION of
public respondent is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
AMPATUAN VS. COMELEC
FACTS: Ampatuan and Candao both run for
governor in Maguindanao in May 14, 2001
Elections. The slate of Ampatuan emerged as
winners as per election returns.
On May 23, 2001, respondents filed a petition
with the Comelec for the annulment of election
results and/or declaration of failure of
elections in several municipalities in
the province of Maguindanao. They claimed that
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the elections were completely sham and farcical.
The ballots were filled-up en masse by a few
persons the night before election day, and in
some precincts, the ballot boxes, official ballots
and other election paraphernalia were not
delivered at all.
On May 25, 2001, the Comelec issued an order
suspending the proclamation of the winning
candidates for congressman of the second
district, governor, vice-governor and board
members of Maguindanao.
On May 30, 2001, petitioners filed with
the Comelec a motion to lift the suspension of
proclamation.
On June 14, 2001, the Comelec issued an order
lifting the suspension of proclamation of the
winning candidates for governor, vice-governor
and board members of the first and second
districts. Consequently, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers proclaimed petitioners winners.
On June 16, 2001, respondents filed with the
Supreme Court a petition to set aside
the Comelec order dated June 14, 2001, and
preliminary injunction to suspend the effects of
the proclamation of the petitioners. Meantime,
petitioners assumed their respective offices
on June 30, 2001. On July 17, 2001, the Court
resolved to deny respondents petition.
Petitioners assumption into office
notwithstanding, on July 26, 2001,
the Comelec ordered the consolidation of
respondents petition for declaration of failure of
elections with SPA Nos. 01-244, 01-332, 01-360,
01-388 and 01-390. The COMELEC further
ordered a random technical examination on four
to seven precincts per municipality on the
thumb-marks and signatures of the voters who
voted and affixed in their voters registration
records, and forthwith directed the production of
relevant election documents in these
municipalities.
On August 28, 2001, the Comelec issued
another order directing the continuation of the
hearing and disposition of the
consolidated SPAs on the failure of elections
and other incidents related thereto. It likewise
ordered the continuation of the technical
examination of election documents as authorized
in the July 26, 2001 order.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
On September 27, 2001, the Comelec issued an
order outlining the procedure to be followed in
the technical examination.
On September 26, 2001, petitioners filed the
present petition. They claimed that by virtue of
their proclamation pursuant to the June 14,
2001 order issued by the Comelec, the proper
remedy available to respondents was not a
petition for declaration of failure of elections but
an election protest. The former is heard
summarily while the latter involves a full-blown
trial. Petitioners argued that the manner by
which the technical examination is to be
conducted would defeat the summary nature of a
petition for declaration of failure of elections.
On October 5, 2001, petitioners filed a
motion reiterating their request for a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the implementation of
the July 26, 2001 and August 28,
2001 Comelec orders.
On October 22, 2001, the Comelec issued an
order suspending the implementation of the two
(2) assailed orders.
However, on November 13, 2001,
the Comelec issued another order lifting the
suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC had
u isdicti n t act n esp ndents’ petiti ns e en
after proclamation of petitioners as winners.
HELD: SC denied the petition. The authorities
petitioners relied upon involved pre-proclamation
controversies.
In Loong v. Commission on Elections, SC ruled
that a pre-proclamation controversy is not the
same as an action for annulment of election
results, or failure of elections. These two
remedies were more specifically distinguished in
this wise:
While, however, the Comelec is restricted, in
pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the
election returns on their face and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
investigate election irregularities, the Comelec is
duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence, and other analogous causes
in actions for annulment of election results or for
declaration of failure of elections, as the
Omnibus Election Code denominates the
same. Thus, the Comelec, in the case of
actions for annulment of election results or
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declaration of failure of elections, may
conduct technical examination of election
documents and compare and analyze voters
signatures and thumbprints in order to
determine whether or not the elections had
indeed been free, honest and clean.
The fact that a candidate proclaimed has
assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of
its authority to annul any canvass and illegal
proclamation. In the case at bar, SC cannot
assume that petitioners proclamation and
assumption into office on June 30, 2001, was
legal precisely because the conduct by which the
elections were held was put in issue by
respondents in their petition for annulment of
election results and/or declaration of failure of
elections.
Respondents allegation of massive fraud and
terrorism that attended the May 14, 2001
election in the affected municipalities cannot be
taken lightly as to warrant the dismissal of their
petition by the Comelec on the simple pretext
that petitioners had been proclaimed winners.
SC have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the
validity of a proclamation may be challenged
even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate
has assumed office.
Petitioners likewise rely on the case of Typoco,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections.
This Court held that Comelec committed no
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a petition
for declaration of failure of elections. However,
we made a pronouncement that the dismissal
was proper since the allegations in the petition
did not justify a declaration of failure of
elections. Typocos relief was for Comelec to
order a recount of the votes cast, on account of
the falsified election returns, which is properly
the subject of an election contest.
Respondents petition for declaration of failure of
elections, from which the present case arose,
exhaustively alleged massive fraud and terrorism
that, if proven, could warrant a declaration of
failure of elections.
The Comelec en banc has the authority to annul
election results and/or declare a failure of
elections. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code further provides that:
Section 6. Failure of election.- If, on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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analogous causes the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and
after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election of failure to elect.
Elucidating on the concept of failure of election,
SC held that:
xxx before Comelec can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2)
conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken
place in the precincts concerned on the date
fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless resulted in a failure to
elect; and second, the votes cast would affect
the result of the election. In Loong vs.
Commission on Elections, this Court added that
the cause of such failure of election should have
been any of the following: force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
cases.
In another case, we ruled that while it may be
true that election did take place, the irregularities
that marred the counting of votes and the
canvassing of the election returns resulted in a
failure to elect.
In the case at bar, the Comelec is duty-bound to
conduct an investigation as to the veracity of
respondents allegations of massive fraud and
terrorism that attended the conduct of the May
14, 2001 election. It is well to stress that
the Comelec has started conducting the
technical examination on November 16, 2001.
However, by an urgent motion for a temporary
restraining order filed by petitioners, in virtue of
which we issued a temporary restraining order
on November 20, 2001, the technical
examination was held in abeyance until the
present. In order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, we lift the temporary restraining order
and allow the technical examination to proceed
with deliberate dispatch.
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LOONG VS. COMELEC
FACTS: Automated elections systems was used
for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu.
Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC
Task Force to have administrative oversight of
the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and
watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of
discrepancies between the election returns and
the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in
the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation
where proceeding with automation will result in
an erroneous count, he suspended the
automated counting of ballots in Pata and
immediately communicated the problem to the
technical experts of COMELEC and the
suppliers of the automated machine. After the
consultations, the experts told him that the
problem was caused by misalignment of the
ovals opposite the names of candidates in the
local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the
automated machines. The error was in the
printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of
which, the automated machines failed to read
them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an
emergency meeting of the local candidates and
the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu
elections. Among those who attended were
petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent
Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri
(candidates for governor.) The meeting
discussed how the ballots in Pata should be
counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There
was lack of agreement. Some recommended a
shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others
insisted on automated counting (Loong AND
Jikiri).
Reports were made stating that the automated
counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu
was not working well were received by the
COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5)
municipalities were rejected by the automated
machines. These municipalities were Talipao,
Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were
rejected because they had the wrong sequence
code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino,
Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc
his report and recommendation, urging the use
of the manual count in the entire Province of
Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued
Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a
manual count but only in the municipality of
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty.
Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner
of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution
No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the
manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid
down the procedure for the counting of votes for
Sulu at the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18,
1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed
COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy,
whether or not COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The
main issue in the case at bar)
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that
its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper
to call for a special election for the position of
governor of Sulu.
HELD: The petition of Tupay Loong and the
petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are
dismissed, there being no showing that public
respondent gravely abused its discretion in
issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-
1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo
order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the
petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of
first impression and undoubtedly suffered with
significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory
of the right of the petitioner, the private
respondents and the intervenor to the position of
governor of Sulu. These are enough
considerations to call for an exercise of the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(2.) A resolution of the issue will involve an
interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated
election in relation to the broad power of the
COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of
the Constitution "to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this
provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary
and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
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The order for a manual count cannot be
characterized as arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical. It is well established that the
automated machines failed to read correctly the
ballots in the municipality of Pata. The technical
experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the
automated machines found nothing wrong the
automated machines. They traced the problem
to the printing of local ballots by the National
Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the
automated count would result in a grossly
erroneous count. An automated count of the
local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a
wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the
electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously
failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine-related for human
foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however,
that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the
COMELEC from levitating above the problem. .
We cannot kick away the will of the people by
giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A.
8436 did not prohibit manual counting when
machine count does not work. Counting is part
and parcel of the conduct of an election which is
under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the
Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that
cannot count the result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of
automated counting created post election
tension in Sulu, a province with a history of
violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively
in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order
situation caused by the delay in the counting of
votes.
Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not
denied process. The Tolentino memorandum
clearly shows that they were given every
opportunity to oppose the manual count of the
local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard.
They later submitted written position papers.
Their representatives escorted the transfer of the
ballots and the automated machines from Sulu
to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual
count from beginning to end.
(3.) The plea for this Court to call a special
election for the governorship of Sulu is
completely off-line. The plea can only be
grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a
failure of election, viz:
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of
force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes, the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and
after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election, not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election
cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a
special election only for the position of Governor
will be discriminatory and will violate the right of
private respondent to equal protection of the law.
The records show that all elected officials in Sulu
have been proclaimed and are now discharging
their powers and duties. These officials were
proclaimed on the basis of the same manually
counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is
illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be
countenanced. Private respondent's election
cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot
be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be
addressed to the COMELEC and not to this
Court.
LUCERO VS. COMELEC
FACTS: The petitioners were two of the five
candidates for the Second Legislative District of
Northern Samar in the synchronized national
and local elections held on 11 May 1992.
The canvass of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited
Jose L. Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P.
Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of
204 votes. However, this tally did not include the
results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of
Silvino Lobos, where the submitted election
returns had not been canvassed because they
were illegible; of Precinct No. 13 of Silvino
Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 118

and no election was held; and of Precinct No.
16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the
election returns were missing.
On 22 May 1992, Lucero asked the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), in SPA No. 92-282,
to:
1. Order Respondent Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Northern Samar to suspend the
proclamation of Private Respondent Jose L.
Ong, Jr.;
2. Direct Respondent Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Northern Samar to correct the
Certificate of Canvass (CEF 20) for Las Navas
and, accordingly, to correct the total votes so
far counted by it for Petitioner from 24,068 to
24,088, thus reducing the margin it found in
favor of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr.
from 204 to 184 votes only;
3. Order a special election in Precinct 13,
Barangay Gusaran, Silvino Lobos, pursuant to
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;
4. Order a recount of the votes for
Representative of the Second District of
Northern Samar in Precinct 16, Barangay
Tubgon, and Precinct 7, Barangay Camayaan,
both of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 234
of the Omnibus Election Code;
5. Order a recount of the votes for
Representative in the 52 precincts herein
above enumerated in order to correct "manifest
errors" pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act
7166 and for this purpose order the impounding
and safekeeping of the ballot boxes of all said
precincts in order to preserve the integrity of
the ballots and other election paraphernalia
contained therein.
On 2 June 1992, the COMELEC, acting on
Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the PBC
to desist from reconvening until further orders.
On 8 June 1992, Ong moved to lift the
suspension of the proceedings by the PBC,
which Lucero opposed on 10 June 1992 on the
ground that the canvass could not be completed
even if the PBC were to reconvene because no
election was held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay
Gusaran) of Silvino Lobos and there was no
canvassing of the votes in Precinct No. 7
(Barangay Camayaan) and Precinct No. 16
(Barangay Tubgon) both of Silvino Lobos.
On 13 June 1993, the COMELEC en
banc promulgated a resolution which orders the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Northern
Samar to bring to the Commission within three
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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(3) days from receipt hereof the ballot boxes
from Precinct 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. The
Municipal Treasurer of said town is directed to
turn over custody of said ballot boxes to the
Provincial Election Supervisor, and the keys
thereof shall likewise be turned over by the
appropriate officials in custody thereof to the
PES, who shall in turn give one key for each
ballot box to the duly authorized representatives
of the petitioner and the respondent.
On 15 June 1992, Lucero filed an urgent motion
to constitute a Special Board of Election
Inspectors (SBEI) to count the votes of Precincts
Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos.
On 20 June 1992, Ong, in a special civil action
for certiorari filed with SC which questioned the
order for the recount of ballots in Precincts No. 7
and 16.
Despite the pendency of this petition, the
COMELEC ordered the recount of the ballots in
Precinct No. 16 by a SBEI which recorded 43
votes for Lucero and 2 votes for Ong.
On 25 June 1992, SC issued in G. R. No.
105717 a temporary restraining order against the
implementation by the COMELEC of its Order of
2 June 1992 and its Resolution of 13 June 1992.
On 23 December 1992, SC promulgated its
decision in G. R. No. 105717, the petition
for certiorari is GRANTED and a writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby ISSUED
directing the COMELEC to CEASE and DESIST
from implementing its order of June 2, 1992 and
its resolution dated June 13, 1992, and the same
are hereby declared NULLIFIED.
SPA No. 92-282 was raffled to the First Division
of the COMELEC. However, during the
consultations on the case by the Members of the
First Division, the concurrence of at least two of
them could not be obtained; accordingly,
pursuant to the COMELEC Rules, the case was
elevated for proper disposition to the
COMELEC en banc to which the parties
submitted their respective memoranda on 19
November 1993.
COMELEC en banc promulgated a
resolution whose dispositive portion reads as
follows:
1. To direct the special Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Northern Samar (a) to include in
the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino
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Lobos the forty-three (43) votes of petitioner
Lucero and the two (2) votes of private
respondent Ong as reflected in the election
returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon)
prepared by the special Board of Election
Inspectors constituted by the Commission to
recount the votes (ballots) in said precinct, as
canvassed by the special Municipal Board of
Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (b) to include in
the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino
Lobos, the sixty-one (61) votes of private
respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of
petitioner Lucero as reflected in the election
returns (MBC Copy submitted as "Comelec
Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-an),
as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of
Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (c) to retabulate
the total number of votes of petitioner Lucero for
the Municipality of Las Navas and to enter in the
provincial certificate of canvass the correct total
which is two thousand five hundred thirty-seven
(2,537) as reflected in the Statement of Votes
(C. E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Las
Navas; and (d) to submit to the Commission a
computation of the votes of the contending
parties including therein all the votes of petitioner
Lucero (with alternative totals) and private
respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of
Silvino Lobos and the total votes of petitioner
Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas as
corrected. However, under no circumstances
should the Board proclaim any winning
candidate until instructed to do so by the
Commission;
2. To issue an Order calling for a special election
in the last remaining Precinct No. 13 (Barangay
Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if
justified by the result of the canvass by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern
Samar, and to notify the parties of the schedule
of election activities for that precinct; and
3. After including in the tabulation the results of
the special election of Precinct No. 13, to decide
the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of
Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to
Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, to
resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner
Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of
votes of the candidates concerned would affect
the over-all results of the election after the
totality of the votes of the contending parties
shall have been determined.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by
way of separate special civil actions
for certiorari to challenge the Resolution.
In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1)
the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of
Silvino Lobos must be unconditional because the
election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his
chances in the special election in Precinct No.
13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the
returns for Precinct No. 7 were to be included
beforehand in the canvass.
In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions (1) the
authority of the COMELEC to order the
correction of the alleged manifest error in the
Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas
despite the absence of any appeal; and (2) the
authority of the COMELEC to call for a special
election in Precinct No. 13 almost two years after
the regular election.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in calling for a special
election in Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2)
years, or more specifically after one (1) year and
ten (10) months, following the day of the
synchronized elections.
HELD: On the authority of the COMELEC to
order the holding of a special election, Section 6
of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after
the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results
in a failure to elect, and if in any of such cases
the failure or suspension of election would affect
the result of the election, the Commission shall,
on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later
than thirty days after the cessation of the cause
of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
The first paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No.
7166 likewise provides:
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Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and
Special Elections. — The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling of
special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6
and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be
decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a
majority votes of its members. The causes for
the declaration of a failure of election may occur
before or after the casting of votes or on the day
of the election.
There are, therefore, two requisites for the
holding of special elections under Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is
a failure of election, and (2) that such failure
would affect the results of the election. The
parties admit that the failure of the election in
Precinct No. 13 was due to ballot-box snatching
and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC
as to the necessity and inevitability of the holding
of a special election in said precinct, even if the
result of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the
questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election
returns.
The COMELEC held:
Based on the adjudged correction of the votes in
favor of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of
Las Navas, the results of the recount of votes
(ballots) of Precinct No. 16 (Silvino Lobos), and
the votes reflected in the available copy of the
election returns for Precinct No. 7 (Silvino
Lobos), it is safe to predict that when the special
Provincial Board of Canvassers will reconvene to
sum up the votes of the contending parties, the
original lead of private respondent Ong of two
hundred four (204) votes against petitioner
Lucero — 24,272 as against 24,068 — will be
reduced to either 175 or 173 depending on
whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29 or a
high of 31 votes as reflected in the election
returns of Precinct No. 7.
Without preempting the exact figures which only
the special Provincial Board of Canvassers can
correctly determine, undoubtedly it is inevitable
that a special election will have to be held in
Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the
Municipality of Silvino Lobos.
Given the established lead of private respondent
Ong over petitioner Lucero, We answer in the
affirmative. According to Comelec records, the
number of registered voters in Precinct No. 13
is two hundred thirteen (213). Since the lead of
respondent Ong is less than the number of
registered voters, the votes in that precinct could
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affect the existing result because of the
possibility that petitioner Lucero might get a
majority over Ong in that precinct and that
majority might be more than the present lead of
Ong.
On the basis of the additional votes credited so
far to the parties, the following computation is in
order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2
more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of
24,274, while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be
added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from
Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's
earlier lead will thus be reduced to 143, which is
admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in
Precinct No. 13.
The two requirements then for a special election
under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
have indeed been met.
In fixing the date of the special election, the
COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be
not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of the postponement or suspension of
the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it
should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended, or which resulted
in failure to elect. The first involves questions of
fact. The second must be determined in the light
of the peculiar circumstances of a case. In the
instant case, the delay was not attributable to the
poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of
the electorate of the Second Legislative District
of Northern Samar. The delay was, as stated in
the opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily
caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of
the petitioners which muddled simple issues.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that G.
R. No. 113509 is the third case Ong has brought
to this Court. Considering then that the
petitioners themselves must share the blame for
the delay, and taking into account the fact that
since the term of the office of the contested
position is only three years, the holding of a
special election in Precinct No. 13 within the next
few months may still be considered "reasonably
close to the date of the election not held." Ong's
postulation should then be rejected.
Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is
that, considering the COMELEC's disposition of
Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he
would then be declared and proclaimed the duly
elected Representative of the Second Legislative
District of Northern Samar despite the fact that
as earlier observed, there was no counting of the
votes of Precinct No. 7, and the results of the
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district elections for Representative would be
affected by the failure of the election in Precinct
No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a
proclamation based on an incomplete canvass
where the final result would have been affected
by the uncanvassed result of Precinct No. 7 and
by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13
and to impose upon the people of the Second
Legislative District of Northern Samar a
Representative whose mandate is, at the very
least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent.
BORJA VS COMELEC
FACTS: Borja and Capco were municipal mayor
candidates during the 1995 elections in Pateros.
Capco was proclaimed winner. Borja then filed a
petition to declare a failure of elections and to
nullify the canvass/proclamation a’s grounds
were the following:
1. Lack of notice of date and time of canvass
2. Fraud
3. Violence or terrorism
4. Flying voters and unqualified board of
election inspectors
The COMELEC En Banc dismissed the petition
in the assailed Resolution, finding that there
were grounds for an election protest. The 3
instances we e n t a eged in a’s petiti n
Borja claims that the COMELEC en banc
committed a grave abuse of discretion by
deciding on his petition, claiming that it should
have been heard by a Division first. His basis
was Article 9C of the 1987 Constitution,
which states:
SEC.3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC En Banc had
committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dis issing a’s etiti n? (NO)
HELD: A petition to declare a failure of
elections is not an election protest, nor is it a
pre-proclamation case, which is the it is
important to distinguish.
In order to resolve the issue, there must first be
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a determination as to whether a petition to
declare a failure of election qualifies as an
election case or a pre-proclamation controversy.
If it does, the Constitution mandates that it be
heard and adjudged by the COMELEC through
any of its Divisions. Recall that the COMELEC
en banc is only empowered to resolve motions
for reconsideration of cases decided by a
Division.
A petition to declare a failure of election is
neither a pre-proclamation controversy as
classified under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the
Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor an
election case. Furthermore, under RA 7166, only
the COMELEC en banc has the authority to
decide on the existence of a failure of elections.
Borja’s grounds are grounds for an election
protest; the proper action of election protests
is with the RTC.
a’s g unds (t e ac n tice t e date
and time of canvass, fraud, violence, terrorism,
disenfranchisement of voters, presence of flying
voters, and unqualified members of the BEI) are
proper grounds only in an election contest but
not in a petition to declare a failure of election
and to nullify a proclamation.
It must be remembered that Capco was duly
elected and proclaimed as Mayor of Pateros.
Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of
regularity and validity. To destroy the
presumption, Borja must convincingly show that
is pp nent’s ict was p cu ed t ug
extra-legal means. This he tried to do by alleging
matters in his petition which he thought
constituted failure of elections.
The COMELEC can call for the holding or
continuation of election by reason of failure of
election only when the election is not held, is
suspended or results in a failure to elect, and the
latter phrase must be understood in its literal
sense, w ic is “n d was e ected a’s
petition was nothing but a simple election protest
involving an elective municipal position, which
under Sec 251 of the Election Code, falls within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
appropriate RTC.
Borja was accorded due process when the en
banc reviewed and evaluated his petition.
Nor can Borja claim that he was denied due
process because when the COMELEC en banc
reviewed and evaluated his petition, the same
was tantamount to a fair hearing of his case. The
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fact that Capco was not even ordered to rebut
the allegations therein certainly did not deprive
him of his day in court. If anybody here was
aggrieved by the alleged lack of notice and
hearing, it was Capco whose arguments were
never ventilated.
BALINDONG VS COMELEC
FACTS: Balindong and Tanog were municipal
mayor candidates in Lanao del Sur during the
1995 elections. Tanog won by a margin of 149
votes, and was subsequently proclaimed.
Balindong then filed a petition to suspend or
annul proclamation against Tanog. He alleged
that the polling place in Precinct 4 had been
transferred rom one barangay to another. Due to
this transfer, he claims that some of his
supporters were not able to cast their votes.
Despite his objection to the inclusion of Precinct
4’s e eti n etu ns, the MBOC included the
sa e, w ic ed t Tan g’s ict
One month later, Balindong filed a supplemental
petition wherein he prayed for the conduct of a
technical examination to prove that the ER of
Precinct 4 was manufactured. The COMELEC
2nd Division dis issed t a ind ng’s
petiti ns, u ing t at a ind ng’s p pe acti n
would be an election protest. This was affirmed
by the COMELEC En banc.
The COMELEC en banc held that the transfer of
the polling place of Precinct 4 was illegal
because it was made only by the parties, without
notice and hearing. This transfer was in violation
of the prohibition against transfers less than 45
days before a regular election, as provided in
Sections 153-154 of the OEC. The COMELEC,
therefore, ordered its Law Department to
investigate the matter and determine the parties
responsible for it.
However the en banc held that there was no
failure of election (due to the lack of 2
conditions). Despite the illegal transfer of venue,
an election actually took place in Precinct 4. And
even then, only 66 people were not able to vote,
w ic is n t en ug t e c e Tan g’s
margin of 149 votes.
Balindong filed a petition for certiorari with the
SC, claiming that the COMELEC committed a
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to annul the
results of the elections in precinct 4.
ISSUE: W/N Tan g’s p c a ati n s ud e he can prove fraud. Balindong must find his own
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annulled on the ground of the illegal transfer of
polling venue? (No)
W/N a technical examination is proper? (No)
HELD: The transfer of the polling place is
illegal but is not a ground for a declaration of
a failure of elections.
The mere fact that the transfer of polling place
was not made in accordance with law does not
warrant a declaration of failure of election and
the annulment of the proclamation of the winning
candidate, unless the number of uncast votes
will affect the result of the election. In the case at
bar, although the COMELEC declared the
transfer of the polling place to be illegal, the fact
is that only 66, out of 255 registered voters in
Precinct No. 4, were not able to vote. Assuming
that all the 63 signatures on the affidavit
submitted by petitioner were authentic and that
the 63 voters who signed the complaint-affidavit
would have voted for petitioner, their votes would
increase petitioners 2,122 votes to 2,185 only,
which is still less than private respondents total
of 2,271 votes. The additional votes would not
have materially affected the results of the
election so as to warrant a declaration of failure
of election.
Technical examination of ballots not proper
as long as the returns appear to be authentic
and duly accomplished on their face.
s u ed t e SC in L ng COMELEC, “as
long as the returns appear to be authentic and
duly accomplished on their face, the Board of
Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them
to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting
or the counting of the votes. Corollarily, technical
examination of voting paraphernalia involving
analysis and comparison of voters signatures
and thumbprints thereon is prohibited in pre-
proclamation cases which are mandated by law
to be expeditiously resolved without involving
evidence aliunde and examination of voluminous
documents which take up much time and cause
delay in defeat of the public policy underlying the
summary nature of pre-proclamation
controversies. If the technical examination of the
Voters List and Voters Affidavits was sustained
in that case, it was because even before the
technical examination was conducted, the
Commission already noted certain badges of
fraud just by looking at the election results of
a ang, Su u ”
In the case at bar, there is no prima facie case of
fraud. Indeed, what Balindong wants is a
technical examination of the signatures so that
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evidence rather than fish for it in this manner. To
allow election documents to be examined on a
mere hunch or at the whim of a losing candidate
without any factual basis would be to allow him
to trifle with the will of the people.
The proper remedy is to file an election
protest with the RTC.
He can there show if the illegality of the transfer
of the polling place, as determined by the
COMELEC, in any way affected the result of the
voting in the precint and ultimately the result of
the election in Pualas, Lanao del Sur.
Procedure: Filing of petition for annulment of
proclamation tolled the period for filing an
election protest.
As his petition was not acted upon by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, he filed a
petition for the annulment of private respondents
proclamation in the COMELEC. Pursuant to 248
of the OEC, the filing of this case for suspension
or annulment of the proclamation of Tanog
suspended the running of the period for filing an
election protest.
BULAONG vs COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Jose M. Bulaong and private
respondent Luis R. Villafuerte were candidates
for Provincial Governor of Camarines Sur in the
elections held on May 11, 1992, private
respondent being, at the time, the incumbent
Governor. Petitioner was proclaimed elected by
the Provincial Board of canvassers.
Private respondent filed an election protest,
alleging fraud and other irregularities in 594
precincts located in 10 municipalities and one
city (Iriga City) of Camarines Sur. He prayed that
a revision of the ballots and other election
documents and their technical examination be
ordered, that the results of the elections be
annulled and that he be declared the duly
elected Governor of Camarines Sur. Petitioner
filed his answer denying that any irregularity
attended the conduct of the elections.
On motion of private respondent the
Commission on Elections ordered the revision of
the ballots to be held in Manila. Petitioner
questioned the order but this Court upheld the
ordered the Commission's order. The revision of
ballots then proceeded. The revision of ballots in
594 precincts resulted in a reversal of the
results. Private respondent Luis R. Villafuerte
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received 171,577 votes, while petitioner Jose M.
Bulaong received 170,361.
Petitioner then filed a motion for the technical
examination of the election documents alleging
that there had been tampering of the ballots
between the time the ballot boxes were brought
to Manila and the time the revision began. His
motion was granted by the Commission which
limited the period for the examination to one
month.
Petitioner here asked several times for the
extension of the period in which he will submit
the evidence. However despite several
extensions, petitioner again manifested that he
was not ready to present his testimonial
evidence. He asked instead to be allowed to
submit the affidavits of his witnesses. For this
purpose he asked for 45 days from June 27,
1994 within which to secure their affidavits.
Noting that the next election was less than a
year away, the Commission granted petitioner
only 15 days within which to submit the affidavits
of his witnesses and after that another period of
15 days (up to July 27, 1994) within which
petitioner should make his formal offer of
exhibits and submit his memorandum.
Petitioner thereafter filed two motions in
succession. He filed a motion to allow his
witnesses to examine and identify ballots and
other election documents before giving their
affidavits. He asked that subpoenas be issued to
them to come to Manila for the purpose. He
alleged that these witnesses were public school
teachers who composed the Board of Elections
Inspectors in the last election and that they
would state in their affidavits that the signatures
on the reverse side of some ballots were not
genuine.
But at the hearing held on July 12, 1994, which
was the last day of the period granted to him for
submitting the affidavits of witnesses, petitioner
was able to submit the affidavit of only one
witness, namely Consuelo B. Gonzales, who
was the Chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct No. 61. Petitioner
explained that because the witnesses had not
been able to see the ballots, he was not able to
obtain their statements. For this reason he was
not ready to submit his evidence. He reiterated
his request for the issuance of subpoenas to his
witnesses.
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T e COMELEC, t is ti e, denied petiti ne ’s
motion to allow his witnesses to view/examine
ballots and other election documents before
executing their affidavits.
ISSUE:
 W/N petitioner should be granted any further
extensions
 W/N the best evidence of the result of the
elections is the result of the revision of the
ballots
HELD:
Petitioner had been given sufficient time to
prove his allegations. The grant of further
extension to him would be inconsistent with
the summary nature of the proceedings
Petitioner contends that there are "huge,
abnormal and unexplained discrepancies"
between the election sheets and election
returns, on the one hand, and the result of the
revision of the ballots, on the other hand, and
that he, as "aggrieved party," has a right to show
(1) that the ballots found in the ballot boxes are
not the ballots cast and canvassed on election
day and (2) that there was "massive, large-scale
and fraudulent substitution/switching of ballots
after election day."
The SC ruled that petitioner had been given
sufficient time to prove his allegations. The grant
of further extension to him would be inconsistent
with the summary nature of the proceedings,
especially given the proximity of the May 1995
elections. Petitioner's request to have his
witnesses examine and identify the ballots
appears to be actually an attempt to circumvent
the first order dated June 7, 1994, which denied
his motion for additional time to finish the
technical examination of the ballots and other
election documents. Altogether he was given 55
days to complete the technical examination of
election documents. Despite this, however, he
still wanted further extension.
Various reasons were given for petitioner's
failure to complete the technical examination of
the ballots. These reasons, as the Commission
ruled, did not justify the request for further
extension, because they were not attributable to
it or to private respondent. Also there is no basis
petiti ne ’s a egati n t at e was "practically
forced" to agree to submit the affidavits of
witnesses in lieu of their testimonies, considering
that it was his own failure twice to present them
which "forced" him to agree to submit instead
their affidavits. It was, therefore, contrary to his
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own undertaking for him to demand later that his
witnesses be first allowed to view, examine and
identify the ballots before they gave their
affidavits, or that they be allowed to testify.
The SC held that the Commission did not
commit any abuse of its discretion in issuing its
order denying petitioner's motion for further time
to have a technical examination of the ballots.
Although generally the best evidence of the
result of the election are not the election
returns but the result of the revision of the
ballots, the rule does not apply if it is shown
that the ballots were substituted or altered
after the election. In such a case it is the
election returns which must prevail.
It is insisted, however, that it is absolutely
necessary for petitioner to have the Chairmen of
the Board of Election Inspectors of 174 precincts
go over the ballots because of the discrepancy
between the result of the canvass and those of
the revision of ballots. Petitioner argues that
although generally the best evidence of the
result of the election are not the election returns
but the result of the revision of the ballots, the
rule does not apply if it is shown that the ballots
were substituted or altered after the election. In
such a case it is the election returns which must
prevail.
Petitioner's contention assumes the very fact in
dispute. Whether the ballots in this case were
indeed tampered with, is a question which the
petitioner has to prove. That there is a "huge
discrepancy" between the result of the canvass
and that of the revision is no proof that the
Commission committed a grave abuse of
discretion in denying his request for additional
time to conduct a technical examination of
election documents and to have his witnesses
examine the ballots before requiring them to
make their affidavits. For as already stated, he
was given sufficient time to present proof of
tampering or substitution of ballots but he failed
to do so. Petitioner thus begs the question when
he claims that because the ballots have been
tampered with, the elections returns constitute
the best evidence of the result of the election.
Anyway the question whether there has been
substitution of ballots and what the actual result
of the election is, will still be determined by the
Commission when it undertakes its own
independent evaluation and appreciation of the
contested ballots and election documents. As we
have held, handwriting experts, while probably
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useful, are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting; this can be done by the
COMELEC itself. As for the allegedly fake
ballots, no better authority than the COMELEC
can determine their authenticity, having itself
ordered and supervised the printing of all the
official ballots. We cannot overemphasize the
fact that the Commission on Elections under the
Constitution is the agency vested with exclusive
original jurisdiction over election contests
involving regional, provincial and city officials, as
well as appellate jurisdiction over election
contests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials. Unless the Commission is
shown to have committed a grave abuse of
discretion, its decision and rulings will not be
interfered with by this Court.
HASSAN vs COMELEC
FACTS: Hassan and private respondent
Hassan-Buatan were vice-mayor candidates
during the 1995 elections in Lanao del Sure. But
due to threats of violence and terrorism in the
area, there was a failure of elections in 6 out of
the 24 precincts in the municipality. Elections
were not held in several precincts because of the
failure of the BEIs to report.
The elections were postponed twice (on May 27
and on May 29), and both times, the BEIs did not
report, so for the May 29 elections, the
COMELEC was forced to appoint police and
military personally just so the elections can push
through.
The canvass of both elections (on May 8 and
May 29) show that Hassan-Buatan won the
plurality of votes by a margin of 219 votes over
Hassan. Hassan then filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the declaration of a failure of
elections on the following grounds:
1. voting started at 10 am, and ended at 2
pm because of rapid gunfire and grenade
launching (violence or terrorism)
2. change of venue
3. notice of the change of venue only sent
the night before
4. only 21% of registered voters were able to
vote, leaving the remaining 78%
disenfranchised
5. non-performance of the BEIs
The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution
denying his petition for failure of elections and
ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
complete the canvass and declare Hassan-
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Buatan as the winner. The SC would later grant
Hassan’s TRO assai ing t is Res uti n
The COMELEC held that the petition for the
declaration of the failure of elections is not valid
since the special elections in the 5 disputed
precincts would not change the outcome of the
election. The number of voters in the precincts
not counted to 219 (the exact number of
Hassan- uatan’s ead), and t us t e COMELEC
said that it was improbably that all of them would
vote for Hassan.
ISSUE: W/N there was a failure of elections in
this case. (Yes)
HELD: The violence in the area prevalent
enough to cause a failure of elections.
The COMELEC can not turn a blind eye to the
fact that terrorism was so prevalent in the area,
sufficient enough to declare that no voting
actually occurred on May 29, 1995 in the areas
concerned.
It must be recalled that elections had to be set
for the third time because no members of the
Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) reported for
duty due to impending threats of violence in the
area. This then prompted COMELEC to deploy
military men to act as substitute members just so
elections could be held; and to thwart these
threats of violence, the COMELEC Team,
moreover, decided to transfer the polling places
to Liangan Elementary School which was 15
kilometers away from the polling place.
Nonetheless, voting on May 29 had to be
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting because of threats of
violence, grenade launching and gunfires.
More than 1,000 voters were disenfranchised.
It was quite sweeping and illogical for the
COMELEC to state that the votes uncast would
not have in any way affected the results of the
elections. While the difference between the two
candidates is only 219 out of the votes actually
cast, the COMELEC totally ignored the fact that
there were more than a thousand registered
voters who failed to vote. Aside from Precinct 7-
A where the ballot box had been burned and
which had 219 voters, the COMELEC failed to
consider the disenfranchisement of about 78% of
the registered voters in the five (5) precincts of
Madalum. Out of the 1,546 registered voters,
only 328 actually voted because of the
insufficient and ineffectual notice given of the
time and place of elections. Whether or not
another special election would turn the tide in
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petitioners favor is of no moment because what
is more important is that the electors should not
have been deprived of their right to vote which
was rather apparent in the case at bar.
Notice; importance and when considered
sufficient.
The SC cannot agree with the COMELEC that
petitioner, his followers or the constituents must
be charged with notice of the special elections to
be held because of the failure of the two (2)
previous elections. To require the voters to come
to the polls on such short notice was highly
impracticable. In a place marred by violence, it
was necessary for the voters to be given
sufficient time to be notified of the changes and
prepare themselves for the eventuality.
It is essential to the validity of the election that
the voters have notice in some form, either
actual or constructive of the time, place and
purpose thereof. The time for holding it must be
authoritatively designated in advance. The
requirement of notice even becomes stricter in
cases of special elections where it was called by
some authority after the happening of a condition
precedent, or at least there must be a substantial
compliance therewith so that it may fairly and
reasonably be said that the purpose of the
statute has been carried into effect. The
sufficiency of notice is determined on whether
the voters generally have knowledge of the time,
place and purpose of the elections so as to give
them full opportunity to attend the polls and
express their will or on the other hand, whether
the omission resulted in depriving a sufficient
number of the qualified electors of the
opportunity of exercising their franchise so as to
change the result of the election.
On setting the date of the special election.
In fixing the date of the special election, the
COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be
not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of the postponement or suspension of
the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it
should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended, or which resulted
in failure to elect. The first involves questions of
fact. The second must be determined in the light
of the peculiar circumstances of a case.
The re-scheduling of the special elections from
May 27 to May 29, was done in uncommon
haste and unreasonably too close for all voters
to be notified of the changes, not only as to the
date but as to the designated polling place. We
must agree with the dissenting opinion that even
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in highly urbanized areas, the dissemination of
notices poses to be a problem. In the absence of
proof that actual notice of the special elections
has reached a great number of voters, we are
constrained to consider the May 29 elections as
invalid. If only to ascertain the will of the people
and to prevent that will from being muted, it is
necessary that a special election be held in view
of the failure of elections in Madalum, Lanao del
Sur.
AKBAYAN v COMELEC
FACTS: On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-
Youth, together with other youth movements
sought the extension of the registration of voters
for the May 2001 elections. The te s’
registration has already ended on December 27,
2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged
18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion
for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth
alleged that there are about 4 million youth who
were not able to register and are now
disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8
of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no
registration shall be conducted 120 days before
the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however
counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act
8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its
residual and stand-by powers can reset the
periods of pre-election acts including te s’
registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised
grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its
right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of
Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no
voters registration shall be conducted within 120
days before the regular election. The right of
suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by
measures like voters registration, which is not a
mere statutory requirement. The State, in the
exercise of its inherent police power, may then
enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
te ’s egist ati n t e u ti ate pu p se
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important
end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly manner – one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the pressing
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 127

order of the day and the prevalent circumstances
of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in
t at R 8189’s p isi n is e p icit as t t e
prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-
election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day
special registration, COMELEC has shown in its
pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially
create a setback in the other pre-election
matters because the additional voters from the
special two day registration will have to be
screened, entered into the book of voters, have
to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then
ente ed int t e c pute ized te ’s ist; and
then they will have to reprint the voters
information sheet for the update and distribute it
– by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would
have been overshot because of the lengthy
processes after the special registration. In short,
it will cost more inconvenience than good.
Further still, the allegation that youth voters are
disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in
AKBAYAN-Y ut ’s p eading was attac ed an
actual complaint from an individual youth voter
about any inconvenience arising from the fact
that the voters registration has ended on
December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al
admitted in their pleading that they are asking an
extension because they failed to register on time
for some reasons, which is not appealing to the
court. The law aids the vigilant and not those
who slumber on their rights.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v
COMELEC
FACTS: COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list
representatives from 13 parties which obtained
at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system as members of the House
of Representatives. Upon petition for
respondents, who were party-list organizations, it
proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than
2% of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system on the ground that under the
Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives
come from the party-list representatives.
ISSUE: Is the twenty percent allocation for party-
list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it
merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be
filled up completely and all the time?
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
HELD: It is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested
Congress with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system
of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the
system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes
cast for the party list system to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that
only those parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR determination of total number of
party-list representatives = #district
representatives/.80 x .20
Additional representatives of first party = # of
votes of first party/ # of votes of party list
system
Additional seats for concerned party = # of
votes of concerned party/ # votes of first
party x additional seats for concerned party
ISSUE: Are the two percent threshold
requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
HELD: Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold,
Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two
percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features
the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable
of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
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ISSUE: How should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?
HELD: Step One. There is no dispute among the
petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this
Court that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they each received. Then the
ratio for each party is computed by dividing its
votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at
least two percent of the total votes are
guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties
shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as t e “ i st” pa t
Step Two. The next step is to determine the
number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other
parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
exceed that to which the first party is entitled by
virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three. The next step is to solve for the
number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on
proportional representation.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI v COMELEC
FACTS: etiti ne s c a enged t e C e ec’s
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved
the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the
2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied
with the pace by which Comelec acted on their
petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. W et e n t petiti ne ’s ec u se t t e
Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate
in the party list elections.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.
RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue
notwithstanding the availability of other remedies
"where the issue raised is one purely of law,
where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." The facts attendant to the case
rendered it justiciable.
2. Political parties – even the major ones -- may
participate in the party-list elections subject to
the requirements laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent
to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that
they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sect a pa ties ganizati ns”. It
is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to
determine proportional representation of the
“ a gina ized and unde ep esented”, t e c ite ia
for participation, in relation to the cause of the
party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of
the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine
the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in
the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the
factual allegations was necessary which was
beyond the pale of the Court, the Court not being
a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and
the Constitution, the Court decided to set some
guidelines culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
The Court ordered that the petition be remanded
in the Comelec to determine compliance by the
party lists.
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PIMENTEL JR. v HRET
FACTS: Petitions for prohibition, mandamus and
preliminary
injunction were filed before the court that the
respondents be
ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and
reconfigure" the
composition of the HRET and CA to include part-
list representatives in accordance with the Party
List System Act (RA 7941) and Sec 17 and 18,
Art VI.
Having in mind that out of 220 members of the
House, 14 of
which are party-list representatives (PLR), the
petitioners put
forward that LP reps (having a total of 13
members) be ousted and be replaced by PLR
nominees.
ISSUES:
(I) Whether or not the present composition of
HRET and CA violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation
because no party-list representatives are
members thereof.
(II) Whether the refusal of the HRET and CA to
reconstitute
themselves to include party list representatives
constitute a grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
The court dismissed the case on the following
grounds:
(I) The present composition of the HRET and CA
does not violate the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation because:
a. Sec 17 and 18 of Art. VI explicitly confers to
the House the
power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members will occupy the
seats allotted to the House in HRET and CA.
And even if the PLR comprise the sufficient no.
and have their own nominees, their primary
recourse would be the House (and not
the Supreme Court) in accordance with the
doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.
b. The petitioners have no locus standi on the
case, thus failed
to meet the requirements set forth for judicial
review. The
petitioners were not unlawfully deprived of seats
in HRET and CA and neither were they
nominees to take the seat.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
(II) There was likewise no grave abuse in the
action or lack of
action by HRET and CA because under Sec 17
and 18 of Art VI, the HRET and CA are deprived
of any power to reconstitute themselves.
(III) The instant petitions must fail because of the
new set of
district and party-list reps elected in the House. It
cannot be
resolved based on the "present composition" of
the House as presented by the petitioners.
PARTIDO NG MGA MANGGAGAWA (PM)
AND BUTIL FARMERS PARTY v. COMELEC
FACTS: In the earlier case of Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC, the SC came up
with a simplified formula for the computation of
additional seats for party-list which was
reiterated in the other cases of Bagong Bayani,
Bayan Muna, etc. as follows:
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6835
which adopted the simplified ua “one
additional seat per additional two percent of the
total party-list votes." This Resolution was issued
in relation to the SC ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani
v. COMELEC.
The May 10, 2014 party list elections yielded
results which granted one seat to PM (for
garnering 3.5220% of votes) and Butil Farmers
(for garnering 3.3742%). On June 2, 2004, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. NBC 04-004
holding petitioners entitled to only one (1)
nominee each on the basis of Resolution No.
6835.
Based on the aforementioned formula, PM and
BUTIL filed with the COMELEC a petition to re-
tabulate the party-list votes and immediately
proclaim their respective second nominees to
the HR on June 22, 2004. They claimed that
based on the formula, they are entitled to an
additional one seat for the party list
representative.
The herein petitioners (alongside CIBAC)
likewise submitted a Supplement to the Joint
Motion on June 25, 2004 to justify their
entitlement to one seat by using the established
formula for additional seats. Based on the
computation, it was claimed that PM and BUTIL
are indeed entitled to an additional seat in the
Congress for their respective party lists. This
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 130

was wed t e COMELEC en anc’s
issuance of Resoution No. NBC 04-011 on July
31, 2004 which directed the re-tabulating and
proclaiming the new party list representatives.
However, the COMELEC failed to resolve the
issues pointed out by the petitioners and conduct
a re-tabulating of party list votes despite the
lapse of time and the Motions for Resolution filed
by the petitioners (an Urgent Motion for
Resolution on July 1, 2004 and a Motion to
Resolve on July 12, 2004). Because of this, they
filed the present petition on Aug. 18, 2004. They
seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent Commission:
a) To convene as the National Board of
Canvassers for the Party-List System;
b) To declare them as entitled to one (1)
additional seat each;
c) To immediately proclaim their respective
second nominees;
d) To declare other similarly situated party-
list organizations as entitled to one (1)
additional seat each; and
e) To immediately proclaim similarly
situated parties' second nominees as duly
elected representatives to the House of
Representatives.
Respondent Commission contends that the
petition at bar was filed belatedly. Under Article
IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution and Rule 64,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the instant
petition must be filed within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the notice of the decision, order or
ruling to be reviewed. Since more than 30 days
have lapsed from the time PM and BUTIL
allegedly received notice of respondent
Commission's Resolution No. 6835, it is urged
that the instant petition was filed out of time.
ISSUES:
1. W/n the present petition is filed out of time.
2. W/n petitioners are entitled to one additional
seat.
HELD:
1. NO. While it is true that the aforementioned
provisions provide that the instant petition must
be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice
of the resolution, the same was actually timely
filed. The present petition was filed by PM et al
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
18 days from their receipt of the copy of
Resolution NBC 04-011.
Additionally, Resolution No. 6835 was not
rendered in the exercise of respondent
COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers. Its issuance
was not brought about by a matter or case filed
before the respondent Commission. Rather, it
was issued by the respondent Commission in
the exercise of its administrative function to
enforce and administer election laws to ensure
an orderly election.
2. NO. In the landmark case of Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC, the Court set the
"four inviolable parameters" of the party-list
system under the Constitution and R.A. No.
7941, to wit:
First, the twenty percent allocation -- the
combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold -- only
those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified
party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation -- the
additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to
their total number of votes."
The landmark case of Ang Bagong Bayani, from
which COMELEC Resolution No. 6835 was
based from, was a decision made pro hac vice.
This means that the said decision was only
ade “ t is ne pa ticu a eas n,” t at eas n
being that the petitioner in the Ang Bagong
Bayani case was entitled to an additional seat in
the party list election because of getting more
than 4% of the total votes but only getting 0.51 in
the computation for the additional seats.
With the decision from the said case being made
pro hac vice, the formula established in the
Veterans case remains binding as the doctrine to
be applied in computing for additional seats.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 131

In applying strictly the formulas in Veterans, the
Court found that herein petitioners are not
entitled to any additional seat for their party list
representatives, with PM only getting 0.74 and
BUTIL only 0.71.
NPC v. COMELEC
FACTS: R.A. 6646 was enacted which prohibits
any newspaper, radio, any person making the
use of media to sell or give free of charge of
space or time for political purpose except
COMELEC. Petitioners in these cases consist of
representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and
time for political advertisements; two (2)
individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the
coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and
voters who claim that their right to be informed of
election Issue and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section
11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising
freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that
the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b)
amounts to censorship, because it selects and
singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a
particular content, namely, media-based election
or political propaganda during the election period
of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media's role, function and duty to
provide adequate channels of public information
and public opinion relevant to election Issue.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,
and that the suppression of media-based
campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the COMELEC space of the
newspapers and on COMELEC time of radio and
television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and Issue in
the election thereby curtailing and limiting the
right of voters to information and opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
HELD: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that
the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of
expression and freedom of the press has to be
taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
may be seen to be a special provision applicable
during a specific limited period — i.e., "during
the election period." In our own society, equality
of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office,
without regard to the level of financial resources
that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly
an important value.
One of the basic state policies given
constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the
State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The essential question is whether or not the
assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises
during an election period, or whether such act
has gone beyond permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone
outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election
periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its
applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution,
Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time
to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of
news or news-worthy events relating to
candidates, their qualifications, political parties
and programs of government. Moreover, Section
11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcasters or editors or commentators or
columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so
long at least as such comments, opinions and
beliefs are not in fact advertisements for
particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any
report or commentary other coverage that, in
responsible media, is not paid for by candidates
for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to
cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the
right to free speech of the candidates
themselves is not unduly repressive or
unreasonable.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 132

PPI v. COMELEC
FACTS: On 2 March 1995, Comelec
promulgated Resolution No. 2772 which reads in
part
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The
Commission shall procure free print space
of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least
one newspaper of general circulation in
every province or city for use as "Comelec
Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of
candidates for senator and from March 21,
1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of
said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be
obtained from any magazine or periodical of
said province or city.
The said Resolution also provides that the
Comelec space shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec
space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a
non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to
declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the
taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent
Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power
of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
over the information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772
is unconstitutional.
2. Whether there was necessity for the taking,
i.e. compelling print media companies to donate
“C e ec space ”
HELD: The Supreme Court declared the
Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to
compel print media companies to donate
“C e ec space” a unts t “ta ing” p i ate
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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personal property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases.
Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking
has not been established by respondent
Comelec, considering that the newspapers were
not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking
of private property for public use is authorized by
the constitution, but not without payment of just
compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. In the case at bench, there is
no showing of existence of a national emergency
to take private property of newspaper or
magazine publishers.
Section 2 of resolution 2772 does not provide a
constitutional basis for compelling publishers,
against their will to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
ADIONG v. COMELEC
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and
7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of
the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. --
The following are lawful election
propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals,
stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or
other written or printed materials not more
than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in
width and fourteen (14) inches in length.
Provided, that decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting
areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section
21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election
propaganda. —
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or
publicly exhibit any election propaganda in
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 133

any place, whether public or private,
mobile or stationary, except in the
COMELEC common posted areas and/or
billboards, at the campaign headquarters
of the candidate or political party,
organization or coalition, or at the
candidate's own residential house or one
of his residential houses, if he has more
than one: Provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two
(2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails
t e COMELEC’s Res uti n ins a as it
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in
“ i e” p aces i e ca s and t e ing
vehicles. According to him such prohibition is
violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No.
6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may
prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on
“ i e” p aces, pu ic p i ate, and i it t ei
location or publication to the authorized posting
areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The
portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347
t e COMELEC p iding t at “deca s and
stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph
() Secti n 21 e e ” is DECL RED NULL
and VOID T e COMELEC’s p i iti n n
p sting deca s and stic e s n “ i e” p aces
whether public or private except in designated
areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null
and void on constitutional grounds. The
prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in
the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly,
the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation
strikes at the freedom of an individual to express
his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to
convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the
statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction
as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizen’s p i ate p pe t , w ic in t is case is a
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they
include the posting of decals or stickers in the
p i ac ne’s i ing ed ) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal
rule prescribed by the Constitution would be
violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law. (The right to
property may be subject to a greater degree of
regulation but when this right is joined by a
“ i e t ” inte est, t e u den usti icati n n t e
part of the Government must be exceptionally
convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met
in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a
rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards
their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section
26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article
IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars
and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated
that the posting of decals and stickers on cars,
calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the
vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election
propaganda not the financial resources of the
candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and
stic e s n “ i e” p aces w et e pu ic
private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST
ATTORNEY OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC
[289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR
1998]
FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio
and television broadcasting companies. It was
declared to be without legal standing to sue in
this case as, among other reasons, it was not
able to show that it was to suffer from actual or
threatened injury as a result of the subject law.
Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had
the requisite standing to bring the constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and
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television broadcast stations in the Philippines
affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P.
No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92,
B.P. No. 881 which provides:
“C e ec Ti e- The Commission shall procure
radio and television time to be known as the
“C e ec Ti e” w ic s a e a cated equa
and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television
stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and television stations are
hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the period
ca paign ”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the
same law requires COMELEC to procure print
space in newspapers and magazines with
payment, Section 92 provides that airtime shall
be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus
it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and
television stations to provide free airtime.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running
to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential
election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required
to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that
the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of airtime to
advertisers and to require these stations to
provide free airtime is to authorize unjust taking
of private property. According to petitioners, in
1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air
ti e ne u eac da and, in t is ea ’s
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in
iew COMELEC’s equi e ent t at it p ide
at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881
denies radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws.
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881
constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.
HELD: etiti ne ’s a gu ent is wit ut e it
broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast that
there are frequencies to assign. Radio and
television broadcasting companies, which are
given franchises, do not own the airwaves and
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frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely
given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus,
such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and
supervising radio and television stations, the
state spends considerable public funds in
licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out
radio and television stations to provide free
airtime as against newspapers and magazines
which require payment of just compensation for
the print space they may provide is likewise
without merit. Regulation of the broadcast
industry requires spending of public funds which
it does not do in the case of print media. To
require the broadcast industry to provide free
airtime for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what
the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not
own the airwaves, no private property is taken by
the requirement that they provide airtime to the
COMELEC.
OSMENA V. COMELEC
GR NO. 132231 31 MARCH 1998
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Emilio Osmena and Pablo Garcia,
candidates for public office in the 1998 elections,
seek to invalidate provision of RA 6646
(Electoral Reform Law of 1987), which prohibits
mass media from selling or giving free of charge
print space or air time for campaign or other
political purposes, except to the COMELEC.
They contend that the ban has not only failed to
level the playing field, but actually worked to the
grave disadvantage of the poor candidates by
depriving them of a medium which they can
afford to pay while their affluent rivals can
always resort to other means of reaching voters.
ISSUE: W/N the ad ban is constitutional.
RULING: YES. There is actually no suppression
of political ads but only a regulation of time and
manner of advertising T e te p itica “ad
an” is actua is eading, as a t ug t e
provision prohibits the sale or donation of print
space and air time to political candidates, it
mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself
allocate to the candidates space and time in the
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media. In this case, there is no total ban on
political ads, much less restriction on the content
of the speech.
ABSCBN v. COMELEC
GR No. 133486 28 January 2000
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: COMELEC passed a resolution issuing
a restraining order on ABSCBN from conducting
exit polls after the 1998 elections, upon the belief
that such project might conflict with the official
COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick
count of the Namfrel. ABSCBN prayed for a TRO
against the COMELEC resolution, which was
granted by the court. The exit polls were then
actually conducted and reported by the media
without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUES:
 W/N the freedoms of speech and of the press
also protect the holding of exit polls and the
dissemination of data derived therefrom. YES
 W/N t e COMELEC’s a s ute ban on exit
polling is valid. NO
RULING: YES. The freedoms of speech and of
the press should be upheld when what is sought
to be curtailed is the dissemination of information
meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of
suffrage. When faced with borderline situations
in which the freedom of a candidate to speak or
the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked
against actions allegedly made to assure clean
and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor
of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the
eed t e citizen and t e State’s p we t
regulate should not be antagonistic. There can
be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts
to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the
right to know are unduly curtailed.
NO. The assailed COMELEC resolution is too
broad, since its application without qualification
as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.
Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code
prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting
centers. There is no showing, however, that exit
polls or the means to interview voters cause
chaos in voting centers. Neither has any
evidence been presented proving that the
presence of exit poll reporters near an election
precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the
voters.
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Dissent: Kapunan, J.
The clear-and-present danger test is not a
sovereign remedy for all free speech problems. It
was originally formulated for the criminal law and
only later appropriated for free speech cases. To
apply the said test to regulatory measures would
be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail
when a regular hammer is all that is needed.
Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor
of the freedom of expression, and any restriction
is treated an exemption. Any act that restrains
speech should be greeted with furrowed brows.
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if:
1. It is within the constitutional power of the
government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial
government interest;
3. The government interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression;
4. The incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
E en t ug t e g e n ent’s pu p ses a e
legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties, when the end
can be more narrowly achieved.
LABAN v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 161265. February 24, 2004
FACTS: Prior to the May 2004 elections, the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has
been divided because of a struggle of authority
between Party Chair Edgardo Angara and Part
Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having
endorsed two different sets of candidates under
the same party, LDP.
The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The
Commission in its resolution has recognized the
factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara
Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC
committed a grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing the two sets of nominations and
endorsements by the same party.
HELD: The COMELEC erred in its resolution.
Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC)
signed by the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his
duly authorized representative/s shall be
recognized.
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AKBAYAN-YOUTH vs COMELEC, 355 SCRA
318
FACTS: The petitioners, as representatives the
youth sector, seeks to direct the COMELEC to
conduct a special registration before the May 14,
2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18
to 21 because around four million youth failed to
register on or before the December 27, 2000
deadline set by the respondent under Republic
Act No. 8189 (Voter's Registration Act of 1996).
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic
leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman if the
Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and
People's Participation, conducted a hearing
attended by Commissioner Luzviminda G.
Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with
Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra (now
Commissioner).
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners
Tancangco and Lantion submitted a special registration of new voters during the
Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on
the Request for a Two-day Additional
Registration of New Voters Only. Immediately,
Commissioner Borra called a consultation
meeting among regional heads and
representatives, and a number of senior staff
headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod
Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with
the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr., of
the ASD, to disapproved the request for
additional registration of voters on the ground
that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides
that no registration shall be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish
all pre-election activities.
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued
Resolution N. 3584 denying the request to
conduct a two-day additional registration of new
voters. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners
AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et. al. filed before this Court
the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent
COMELEC's Resolution and/or to declare
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar
as said provision effectively causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others
similarly situated.
Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus directing respondent
COMELEC to conduct a special registration of
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new voters and to admit for registration
petitioners and other similarly situated young
Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14,
2001 General Elections. On March 09, 2001,
herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the
University of the Philippines, likewise filed a
Petition for Mandamus, praying that this Court
direct the COMELEC to provide for another
special registration day under the continuing
registration provision under the Election code.
This court resolved to consolidate the two
petitions.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001. -
No
b. Whether or not this Court can compel
respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a
period between the COMELEC's imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14,
2001 general elections. - No
HELD: The petitions are bereft of merit.
A. The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. The
exercise of the right of suffrage is subject to
existing substantive and procedural
requirements. Thus, as to the substantive
aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
provides:
SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE
EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE
DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT
LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND
WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR
AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY
PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX
MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY,
OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE
REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON
THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a
citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must
undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition
to the minimum requirements, is obliged by law
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to register under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters
Registration Act of 1996.
Stated differently, the act of registration is an
indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. Proceeding from the significance of
registration as a necessary requisite to the right
to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of
its inherent police power, may enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election.
Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, which provides a
system of continuing registration, is explicit, to
wit:
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of
Voters. The Personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily
in the office of the Election Officer during
regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before
a regular election and ninety (90) days before
a special election. (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among
others, speaks of a prohibitive period within
which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of
voters from the permanent voters list, provides:
SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from
the List Any registered voter, representative of
a political party x x x may file x x x except one
hundred (100) days prior to a regular election
xxx.
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present
case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed
COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law
explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election.
Corollary, it is specious for herein petitioners to
argue that respondent COMELEC may validly
and legally conduct a two-day special
registration, through the expedient of the letter of
Section 28 of R.A. 8436.
Petitioners bare allegation that they were
disenfranchised when respondent COMELEC
pegged the registration deadline on December
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27, 2000 instead of January 13, 2001 the day
before the period before the May 14, 2001
regular elections commences is not sufficient.
There is no allegation in the two consolidated
petitions and the records are bereft of any
showing that anyone of herein petitioners has
filed an application to be registered as a voter
which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a
complaint before the respondent COMELEC
alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of
the Election Officer to register between the
period starting from December 28, 2000 to
January 13, 2001, and that he or she was
disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC
from filing his application for registration.
While it may be true that respondent COMELEC
set the registration deadline on December 27,
2000, this Court is of the Firm view that
petitioners were not totally denied the
opportunity to avail of the continuing registration
under R.A. 8189.
COMELEC did not commit an abuse of
discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584 which
resolved to deny the request to conduct a two-
day additional registration of new voters on
February 17 and 18, 2001. In denying the
request of petitioners to hold a special
registration, acted within the bounds and
confines of the applicable law on the matter --
Section 8 of RA 8189. COMELEC simply
performed its constitutional task to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, inter alia, questions
relating to the registration of voters; evidently,
respondent COMELEC merely exercised a
prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one
which squarely falls within the proper sphere of
its constitutionally-mandated powers.
B. As to petitioners prayer for the issuance of the
writ of mandamus, SC held that it cannot, in view
of the very nature of such extraordinary writ,
issue the same without transgressing the time-
honored principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of
mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion of a public officer where
the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any manner in
which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.
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Considering the circumstances where the writ of
mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the
present case, we are of the firm belief that
petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction
of this Court, that they are entitled to the
issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to
effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of voters. For the
determination of whether or not the conduct of a
special registration of voters is feasible, possible
or practical within the remaining period before
the actual date of election, involves the exercise
of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by
mandamus.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. Private
respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked
the Constitution's one year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations
made by her in Voter Registration Record and in
her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified
and canceling the certificate of candidacy."
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate. On the same day, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner
that they cannot receive or accept the
aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for
the filing of the same having already lapsed on
March 20, 1995.
Consequently, petitioner filed the
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros,
Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to
private respondent's petition was likewise filed
with the head office on the same day. In said
Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the
word "seven" in her original Certificate of
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Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by
adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
and that "she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence.
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) came up
with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's
Petition for Disqualification meritorious; 2)
striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and
3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy.
In a resolution, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Leyte.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a
Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995,
petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte
held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged
that the canvass showed that she obtained a
total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833
votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy
of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to
the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying
petitioner from running for the congressional
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public
respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for
relief.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was a resident,
for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the
May 9, 1995 elections. - Yes
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HELD: Residence implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It
is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place
for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an
individual to have different residences in various
places. However, a person can only have a
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not and
individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said
statement becomes material only when there is
or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly
ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
Petitioner merely committed an honest mistake
in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided
for the residency qualification requirement. This
honest mistake should not, however, be allowed
to negate the fact of residence in the First
District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of
paper.
Petitioner's domicile
An individual does not lose his domicile even if
he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Residence implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully
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made distinctions between (actual) residence
and domicile for election law purposes.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as
a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her
adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for
various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's
powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in
Tacloban.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends
that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she
was eight years old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 1952, she "abandoned her
residency (sic) therein for many years and . . .
(could not) re-establish her domicile in said place
by merely expressing her intention to live there
again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents.
As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the
fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile;
2. 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change
of residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. The evidence
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince
this court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former
domicile with one of her own choosing
(domicilium voluntarium).
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Petitioner did not lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to
the late President Marcos
There is a clearly established distinction
between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile"
and "residence." The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be
inferred from the use of the term "residence" in
Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are
well delineated.
When Petitioner was married to then
Congressman Marcos, petitioner was obliged to
follow her husband's actual place of residence
fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal
and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing
which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his
family's residence. But assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the
conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose
her domicile of origin.
Insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting
the rights and obligations of husband and wife —
the term residence should only be interpreted to
mean "actual residence." The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil
law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner
married the former President in 1954, she kept
her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that
petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a
new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was
lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to
rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban
and Farm in Olot, Leyte.
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SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M.
SARANGANI and HADJI NOR HASSAN v.
COMELEC and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR,
MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN
G.R. No. 135927 June 26, 2000
BUENA, J.:
CASE: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which seeks to nullify the Order
issued by the COMELEC dated June 29, 1998,
finding Padian Torogan in Madalum, Lanao Del
Sur as "ghost precinct"
FACTS: On September 15, 1997, a petition for
annulment of several precincts and annulment of
book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was
filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji
Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D.
Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the
precincts sought to be annulled was Padian
Torogan, subject matter of the present petition
for certiorari.
On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru
the Clerk of the Commission sent telegrams to
the respective BEI of the questioned precincts in
Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian
Torogan, to file their answer to the petition for
abolition of precincts and annulment of book of
voters.
On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of
Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani,
herein petitioner, together with other oppositors
who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the 23
barangays, filed an "Answer in Opposition"
which included the affidavits of the barangay
chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to
the fact that the move to annul the book of voters
and abolish the questioned election precincts
were for the purpose of diminishing the
bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum,
Lanao del Sur.
After hearing and submission of formal offer of
exhibits and memoranda by the parties, the
COMELEC issued an Order dated February 11,
1998, referring the case to its Law
Department for appropriate investigation.
The COMELEC Law Department conformably
issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998
directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del
Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive investigation
on the alleged ghost precincts and thereafter
submit a report on the investigation conducted."
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Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK
FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a
memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing
Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro
and Anuar Datudacula "to conduct ocular
inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost
barangays in the Municipality of Madalum,
Lanao Del Sur."
On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was
conducted on the alleged ghost precincts. It was
found out that:
(1) in Barangay Padian Torogan, there are
only two structures: One is a concrete
house with no roof, and the other is a
wooden structure without walls and roof.
This obviously mean that no single human
being could possibly reside in these two
structures.
Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan
means a cemetery not a residential place. So
this contradicts the records being brought by the
COMELEC Team from the Census saying that
the area has 45 households with a total
population of 285.
(2) In Barangay named Rakutan, the ocular
inspection was stopped by the Madalum
Municipal Chief of Police Mahdi
Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized
Machine Gun
On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer
Casan Macadato submitted to the Provincial
Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City
its 1st Indorsement dated June 19, 1998
reporting the results of the ocular inspection
that Padian Torogan and Rakutan were
uninhabited.
On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the
assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as
ghost precinct." The dispositive portion of the
COMELEC Order reads:
Xxx
(2) finds Padain Togoran as ghost precinct and
shall be excluded from the special election to be
conducted in Madalum.
(3) Order the Investigating Team, thru Madatu,
to immediately resume the investigation, the
remaining ghost precincts in Madalum and to
submit its findings to the Commission with
dispatch, allowing it to submit partial findings if
necessary.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
ISSUE: Whether the respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct.
NO.
HELD: The petition states that precinct No. 27A
located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the
one declared as a ghost precinct by the
COMELEC although the assailed Order did not
mention any specific precinct but simply
declared "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." To
be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by
the assailed Order would be the election precinct
in the said place.
The determination of whether a certain election
precinct actually exists or not and whether the
voters registered in said precinct are real voters
is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-
honored precept that factual findings of the
COMELEC based on its own assessments
and duly supported by evidence, are
conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the
absence of a substantiated attack on the validity
of the same.
Upon review of the records, the Court finds that
the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate
the facts and verified that there were no public or
private buildings in the said place, hence its
conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If
there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be
no registered voters, or the registered voters
may have left the place. It is not impossible for a
certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants
considering that people migrate.
A barangay may officially exist on record and
the fact that nobody resides in the place does
not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of
local government. Under the Local Government
Code of 1991, the abolition of a local
government unit (LGU) may be done by
Congress in the case of a province, city,
municipality, or any other political subdivision. In
the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan
Manila area and in cultural communities, it may
be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panglunsod concerned subject to
the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite 16
conducted for the purpose in the political units
affected.
The findings of the administrative agency
cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari
particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been
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overlooked or disregarded which when
considered would have substantially affected the
outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad
powers to ascertain the true results of an
election by means available to it.
The assailed order having been issued pursuant
to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the
absence of any finding of grave abuse of
discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent,
said order shall stand.
Judicial interference is unnecessary and
uncalled for. No voter is disenfranchised
because no such voter exist. The sacred
right of suffrage guaranteed by the
Constitution is not tampered when a list of
fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral
exercise.
Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on
citizens who are qualified to vote and are not
otherwise disqualified by law.
On the contrary, such exclusion of non-
existent voters all the more protects the
validity and credibility of the electoral
process as well as the right of suffrage
because the "electoral will" would not be
rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some
ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to,
rather than frustrate the will of the people.
FOOTNOTES:
The Commission shall establish all election
precincts.
The precincts actually established in the
preceding regular elections shall be maintained,
but the Commission may introduce such
adjustments, changes or new divisions or
abolish them, if necessary; Provided, however,
That the territory comprising an election precinct
shall not be altered or a new precinct established
within forty-five days before a regular election
and thirty days before a special election or a
referendum plebiscite.
Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 7160.
Sec. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A
local government unit may be abolished when its
income, population or land area has been
irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum
standards prescribed for its creation under Book
III of this Code, as certified by the national
agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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Congress or the sanggunian concerned, as the
case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local
government unit shall specify the province, city,
municipality, or barangay with which the local
government unit sought to be abolished will be
incorporated or merged.
Sec. 10, R.A. 7160.
Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Election
(COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date effectivity of the law or
ordinance affecting such action unless said law
or ordinance fixes another date.
Art. V, Section 1, 1987 Constitution.
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement shall be imposed
on the exercise of suffrage.
TECSON v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161434, March 03, 2004
VITUG, J.:
CASE: The issue of citizenship is brought up to
challenge the qualifications of a presidential
candidate to hold the highest office of the land.
Our people are waiting for the judgment of the
Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr.,
the hero of silver screen, and now one of the
main contenders for the presidency, a natural-
born Filipino or is he not?
FACTS: On 31 December 2003, respondent
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. filed his COC for the position of
President of the Rep of the Phil. under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the forthcoming 2004 national elections.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 143

In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be
20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be
Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No.
161824, initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the COMELEC
to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen; he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent
on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted
a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only
a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the
COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in
support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the
certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified
photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by
Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed
a case for bigamy and concubinage against the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
discovering his bigamous relationship with
Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the
affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the
certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the
Records Management and Archives Office,
attesting to the fact that there was no record in
the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or
Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines
before 1907, and 6) a certification from the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the
National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
On his part, respondent FPJ, presented twenty-
two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being - a) a certification issued
by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to
be no available information regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San
Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by
the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives that no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e)
copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643,
No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death
of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by
the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in
the said office during the period of from 1900
until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed
SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit.
Three days later, or on 26 January 2004,
Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration.
The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by
the COMELEC en banc.
On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65,
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The
petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ
of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of
the COMELEC resolutions.
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434,
and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions
they directly instituted before it.
The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 144

election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET), does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction over the qualifications of
presidential candidates?
RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology
in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by
the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically
speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A
quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as
being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election
contest can only contemplate a post-election
scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
who would have received either the second or
third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include
cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency
or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in
reference to a post-election scenario. Election
contests consist of either an election protest or a
quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,
to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal,” promulgated by the Supreme
Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support
this premise—
“Rule 12. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
“Rule 13. How Initiated. – An election contest is
initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President or
Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.
“Rule 14. Election Protest. – Only the registered
candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.”
ISSUE: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born
Filipino citizen.
HELD: It is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or
not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in
the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen
first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
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IN SUM:
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the
petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the
resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of
merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ
from running for the position of President in the
10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of
jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R.
No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been
di ect e e ated t t is C u t in t e atte ’s
capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election
contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the
primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are
held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824,
whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to
take on the matter of whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
“en asse Fi ipinizati n” t at t e i ippine i
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend
to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity
given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has
been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
must not only be material, but also deliberate
and willful.
DE GUZMAN VS COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
GR 129118 19 JULY 2000
FACTS: Comelec reassigned petitioners to other
stati ns pu suant t Secti n 44 t e V te ’s
registration act. The act prohibits election
officers from holding office in a particular city or
municipality for more than 4 years. In
accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned
petitioners, who were election officers to other
stations. Petitioners claim that the act violated
the equal protection clause because not all
election officials were covered by the prohibition.
Petitioners contend that RA 8189 Section 44 is
unconstitutional as it violates the equal
protection clause enshrined in the constitution;
that it violates constitutional guarantee on
security of civil servants; that it undermines the
constitutional independence of comelec and
c e ec’s c nstituti na aut it ; t at it
contravenes the basic constitutional precept; that
it is void for its failure to be read on 3 separate
readings
ISSUE: Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is
unconstitutional
RULING: No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not
unconstitutional. It has not violated the equal
protection clause. It is intended to ensure the
impartiality of election officials by preventing
them from developing familiarity with the people
of their place of assignment. Section 44 is
relevant to the subject matter of registration as it
seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration
process by providing a guideline for the Comelec
to follow in the reassignment of election officers.
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Large-scale anomalies in the registration of
voters cannot be carried out without the
complicity of election officers, who are the
highest representatives of Comelec in a city or
municipality.
Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter of
registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of
the registration process by providing a guideline
for the Comelec to follow in the reassignment of
election officers. The law merely provides the
basis for the transfer of an election officer and
does not deprive the Comelec of its power to
appoint its officials.
CAWASA VS COMELEC
(GR No. 150469, 3 July 2002)
FACTS: Jun Rascal Cawasa and private
respondent Adbulmalik M. Manamparan were
among the candidates for mayor in the
Municipality of Nunungan, Lanao Del Norte. Out
of the forty (40) precincts in Nunungan, only
thirty-six (36) functioned, as there was a failure
of election in the remaining four (4) precincts.
Thus the proclamation was deferred, as the
number of registered voters would affect the
election results. A special election was set for
the remaining (4) precincts. After the special
election, Cawasa was proclaimed Mayor.
Manamparan filed an appeal and petition for the
annulment of the proclamation of petitioner
Cawasa and for the annulment of the special
election results. The Comelec en banc
promulgated a resolution annulling the results of
the special elections of the 4 precincts and
annulling the proclamation of the winning
candidates.
ISSUE: Whether or not the result of the special
election was valid due to the transfer of polling
places in adjacent areas.
RULING: No. The Comelec ruled that the result
of the special elections in the 4 contested
precincts were declared annulled, so as the
proclamation of the winning candidates, as such
election was not genuinely held and resulted in
failure to elect on account of fraud. As clearly
provided by the law, the location of polling
places shall be the same as that of the
preceding regular election. While the
proclamation of a candidate has the effect of
terminating pre-proclamation issues, a
proclamation that is a result of an illegal act is
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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void and cannot be ratified by such proclamation
and subsequent assumption of office.
COQUILLA VS COMELEC
FACTS: Coquilla was naturalize as a US citizen
sometime around 1965. He returned to the
Philippines in 1998 and was subsequently
repatriated through RA 8171. He took his oath
and was issued his Certificate of Repatriation on
November 2000.
Coquilla thereafter registered as a voter in Oras,
Eastern Samar on January 2001. He later filed
his Certificate of Candidacy to run for mayor on
February 2001.
Re-electionist Neil Alvarez sought for the
cance ati n C qui a’s COC n t e g und
that Coquilla made a material misrepresentation
that he had been living in Oras for two years
when in fact, he had only been in the place for 6
months.
The COMELEC however failed to render
judgment on the case before the elections took
place, where Coquilla was eventually elected
mayor.
On July 19, 2001, the 2nd Division of COMELEC
issued a Res uti n g anting a ez’s petiti n
and ordered the cance ati n C qui a’s COC
After 5 days from receiving the resolution,
Coquilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the en banc denied it on January 30, 2002 for
being pro-forma.
ISSUE: W/N Coquilla is a resident of Oras for
at least 1 year before the elections held on
May 14, 2001. NO
HELD: The term "residence" is to be understood
not in its common acceptation as referring to
"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile"
or legal residence, that is, "the place where a
party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person
at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s
parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of
origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after
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enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on
and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was
an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may
have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a
resident alien.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that
he reestablished residence in this country in
1998 when he came back to prepare for the
mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a
Community Tax Certificate in that year and by
"constantly declaring" to his townmates of his
intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor
in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of
being an alien and a non-resident can be waived
either separately, when one acquires the status
of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, or at the same time when one
acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an
individual may obtain an immigrant visa under
§13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948
and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)
and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On
the other hand, he may acquire Philippine
citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473,
as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine
national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship
by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which
case he waives not only his status as an alien
but also his status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of
petiti ne ’s status w en e ente ed t e c unt
on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998,
October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the
statement "Philippine Immigration [–]
Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As
for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore
the added inscription "good for one year stay."
Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a
Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan
includes a former Filipino citizen who had been
naturalized in a foreign country and comes or
returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is
entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to
the Philippines for a period of one (1) year"
(§3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner
entered the country on the dates in question, he
did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose
stay as such was valid for one year only.
Hence, petitioner can only be held to have
waived his status as an alien and as a non-
resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking
his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency
to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras,
Eastern, Samar.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS COMELEC
FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte,
stating that she is 7-months resident in the said
district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and
a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition
for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging
that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-
year residency requirement. Imelda thus
a ended e COC, c anging “se en” nt s t
“since c i d d ” T e p incia e ecti n
supervisor refused to admit the amended COC
for the reason that it was filed out of time.
Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with
Comelec's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division
declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck
off the amended as well as original COCs. The
Comelec in division found that when Imelda
chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly
declaring that she is a resident of that place, she
is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days,
as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc
affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case,
Imelda won in the election. But
the Comelec suspended her proclamation.
Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.
Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which
provides that a petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
must be decided, after due notice and hearing,
not later than 15 days before the election. Since
the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April
24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election,
Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case.
She contended that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the
election of members of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Imelda was a resident for election
purposes of the First District of Leyte for
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a period of 1 year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections
2. W/N the COMELEC loses jurisdiction to
hear and decide a pending
disqualification case after the elections.
HELD:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District
of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore
possessed the necessary residence
qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a
seat in the House of Representatives for the
following reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As
domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban,
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of
law. This domicile was established when her
father brought his family back to Leyte.
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based
on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements
can the presumption of continuity or residence
be rebutted, for a change of residence requires
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. Petitioner held various residences for
different purposes during the last four decades.
None of these purposes unequivocally point to
an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not
aut atica gain t e us and’s d ici e W at
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of
origin. The term residence may mean one thing
in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear
is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-
affecting the rights and obligations of husband
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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and wife — the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is
that when petitioner married the former
President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessarium.
d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a
new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was
lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to
"rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban
and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable
for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte,
while living in her brother's house, an act which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of
R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881, it is evident that the Comelec does not
lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P.
881 even after the elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.
- Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute
requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
time is generally construed to be merely
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directory, "so that non-compliance with them
does not invalidate the judgment on the theory
that if the statute had intended such result it
would have clearly indicated it.
MARCITA MAMBA PEREZ vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and RODOLFO E.
AGUINALDO
FACTS: On March 26, 1998, private respondent
filed his certificate of candidacy for
Representative of the Third District of Cagayan
in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later,
on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and
citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent as a
candidate on the ground that he had not been a
resident of the district for at least one (1) year
immediately before the day of the elections as
required by Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution.
In support of her claim, petitioner presented
private respondents certificates of candidacy for
governor of Cagayan; his voters affidavit; and his
voter registration record dated June 22, 1997, in
all of which it is stated that he is a resident of
Barangay Calaoagan Dackel, Municipality of
Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of
Cagayan.
Petitioner alleged that private respondent filed
an application for the transfer of his registration
as voter from Gattaran, Cagayan (First District)
to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (Third District) only on
December 17, 1997 and that said application
was approved only on January 7,
1998. Petitioner prayed that in the event the
case was not finally decided before the elections
and private respondent obtained the highest
number of votes, the latters proclamation be
suspended.
In his answer, private respondent claimed that
while he had been a resident of Gattaran,
Cagayan in 1990, he transferred his residence to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting an apartment
at No. 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, in order to hide his mistress from
public view because, at that time, his marriage to
his former wife was still subsisting. In support of
his claim, he presented the affidavit of the owner
of the apartment, Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, in
which it is stated that private respondent had
been his lessee since July 1990.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the
COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding
private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as
representative for the Third District of Cagayan.
On May 11, 1998, private respondent was
elected Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan, with 65,058 votes over his rival
Manuel N. Mambas 58,507 votes. He was
proclaimed elected and was sworn in office.
On May 22, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration reiterating her allegation that
private respondent lacked the requisite
residency in the Third District of Cagayan.
Her motion was, however, denied by the
COMELEC en banc in its resolution of June 11,
1998. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON Private Respondent was ineligible
to run for HREP of the 3rd District of Cagayan
HELD: As already stated, the petition for
disqualification against private respondent was
decided by the First Division of the COMELEC
on May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11,
1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding
the fact that private respondent had already
been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had
taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998,
petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration
on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc
denied on June 11, 1998.
Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of
proceedings for disqualification even after the
elections if the respondent has not been
proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no
jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the
proclamation of private respondent barred
further consideration of petitioners action. In the
same vein, considering that at the time of the
filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private
respondent was already a member of the House
of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction
over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, 17 of the
Constitution, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of
private respondents ineligibility.
The meaning and purpose of the residency
requirement were explained recently in our
decision in Aquino v. COMELEC, as follows:
. . . [T]he place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found
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at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that
private respondent changed his residence from
Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan,
in July 1990 on the basis of the following: (1) the
affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner of
the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St.,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private
respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the contract of
lease between private respondent, as lessee,
and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential
apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30,
1996; (3) the marriage certificate, dated January
18, 1998, between private respondent and
Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the certificate of live birth of
private respondents second daughter; and (5)
various letters addressed to private respondent
and his family, which all show that private
respondent was a resident of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.
There is thus substantial evidence supporting
the finding that private respondent had been a
resident of the Third District of Cagayan and
there is nothing in the record to detract from the
merit of this factual finding.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy, which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement. The said
statement becomes material only when there is
or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.
In this case, although private respondent
declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to
the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a
resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he
was actually a resident of the Third District not
just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998
elections but for more than seven (7) years since
July 1990. His claim that he had been a resident
of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible
considering that he was governor from 1988 to
1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for
him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao,
which is the capital of the province of Cagayan.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO
ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M. SERIO
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
VICENTE Y. EMANO
FACTS: During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y.
Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed
provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It was
his third consecutive term as governor of the
province. In his Certificate of Candidacy dated
March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to
be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of
Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter
Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City
(geographically located in the Province of
Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in
which he claimed 20 years of residence. On
March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein
that his residence for the preceding two years
and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street,
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City.
Among those who ran for the mayorship of the
city in 1998, along with Emano, was Erasmo B.
Damasing, counsel of herein petitioners. On May
15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr.,
Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all
residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition
before the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 98-
298, in which they sought the disqualification of
Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that
he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year
residence requirement.
Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the
Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the
duly elected city mayor. Thus, on May 29, 1998,
petitioners filed another Petition before the
Comelec, this time for quo warranto, in which
they sought (1) the annulment of the election of
private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of
Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the
next highest number of votes, as the duly
elected mayor of the city.
In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the
Comelec First Division denied the Petition for
Disqualification. Upon petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation,
the two cases were consolidated.
Ruling of the Comelec: The Comelec en banc
upheld the findings and conclusions of the First
Division, holding that "[t]he records clearly show
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that the respondent is an actual resident of
Cagayan de Oro City for such a period of time
necessary to qualify him to run for mayor
therein. This fact is clearly established by the
respondent having a house in the city which has
been existing therein since 1973 and where his
family has been living since then."
ISSUE: WON Emano had duly established his
residence in CDO at least one year prior to the
elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship
HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the
residency requirement needed for him to qualify
as a mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in
Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually
resided there before he registered as a voter in
that city in 1997.
His transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto
divest him of his position as governor. First,
there is no law that prevents an elected official
from transferring residence while in office.
Second, an elective official's transfer of
residence does not prevent the performance of
that official's duties, Third, as ruled in Frivaldo,
the loss of any of the required qualifications for
election merely renders the official's title or right
to office open to challenge. No one challenged
his right to the Office when he transferred his
residence.
The sanctity of the people's will, as expressed in
the election result, must be respected. He is not,
after all, a stranger to the city, much less to its
voters.
Applying Mamba-Perez case—These facts
indubitably prove that Emano was a resident of
CDO for a period of time sufficient to qualify him
to run for public office.
Fact that CDO is a highly urbanized city and that
its residents do not participate in provincial
elections is of no moment. Such political
subdivisions and voting restrictions, however,
are simply for the purpose of parity in
representation. The classification does not
completely isolate its residents, politics,
commerce and other businesses from the entire
province especially when the city is at the very
heart of the province itself.
CDO was once an integral part of MO and
remains a geographical part of the province. Not
only is it at the center of the province; more
important, it is itself the seat of the provincial
government. As a consequence, the provincial
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officials who carry out their functions in the city
cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting
acquainted with its concerns and interests.
The issue before the Court is whether Emano's
residence in the city qualifies him to run for and
be elected as mayor, not whether he could have
continued sitting as governor of the province.
There was no challenge to his eligibility to
continue running the province; hence, the Court
cannot make any pronouncement on such issue.
The actual, physical and personal presence of
Emano in CDO is substantial enough to show his
intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the
voters to evaluate his qualifications for the
mayorship.
There is no question that Emano was the
overwhelming choice of the people. He won by a
margin of about 30,000 votes. Thus, it is apt to
reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the
people as expressed through the ballot must be
given fullest effect. In case of doubt, political
laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to
the popular mandate.
NOLASCO V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 122250 & 122258 JULY 21, 1997
FACTS: The election for mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan was held on May 8, 1995. Florentino P.
Blanco received 29,753 votes; while Eduardo A.
Alarilla got 23,038 votes. Edgardo Nolasco was
elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes.
On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the
COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco for
allegedly performing acts which are grounds for
disqualification under the Omnibus Election
Code – giving money to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing
election functions; for committing acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; and for
spending an amount for his campaign in excess
of what is allowed by the law.
This massive vote-buying activity was
engineered by Blanco through his organization
called `MTB' or `Movement for Tinoy Blanco
Volunteers.'
The COMELEC First Division heard the petition
to disqualify Blanco. The parties thereafter
submitted their position papers. On August 15,
1995, the First Division disqualified Blanco on
the ground of vote-buying,
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A motion for reconsideration was filed by Blanco
in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the Vice-
Mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that
should Blanco be finally disqualified, the
mayoralty position be turned over to him. The
parties were allowed to file their memoranda.
En anc denied anc and N asc ’s ti ns
It ordered the proclamation of Alarilla, the
second placer, as the duly elected Mayor.
Thus, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and
equal protection of laws.
2. WON the COMELEC committed GAOD in
proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor
HELD:
1. No, Blanco was not denied due process and
equal protection of the laws. He was given all
the opportunity to prove that the evidence on
his disqualification was not strong. The
COMELEC heard his petition. Blanco
thereafter submitted his position paper and
reply to Alarilla's position paper. The
COMELEC considered the evidence of the
parties and their arguments and thereafter
affirmed his disqualification. The hoary rule is
that due process does not mean prior hearing
but only an opportunity to be heard. The
COMELEC gave Blanco all the opportunity to
be heard.
anc ’s c ntenti n t at t e ini u
quantum of evidence was not met is
untenable. What RA 6646 and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a
mere evidence of guilt that should be strong
to justify the COMELEC in suspending a
winning candidate’s p c a ati n
2. Yes. It is in gross violation and utter
disregard of the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court in precedent cases.
Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the
Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled
principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC
that the candidate with the second highest
number of votes cannot be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate be
disqualified.
The SC stated:
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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”T si p istica assu e t at t e sec nd
placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the
mind of the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections.
He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes
the disqualified candidate, the conditions
would have substantially changed. We are
not prepared to extrapolate the results under
t e ci cu stances ”
Nolasco was adjudged as Mayor of
Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the
disqualification of Blanco.
DOMINGO, JR. V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 136587 AUGUST 30, 1999
FACTS: During the May 11, 1998 elections,
petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and private
respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. (Benhur) were
both mayoralty candidates of Mandaluyong City.
Abalos won.
After the proclamation of Abalos, Domingo filed
the instant petition for disqualification, on the
ground that during the campaign period, Abalos
"prodded" his father, then incumbent
Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr.,
to give "substantial allowances" to public school
teachers appointed as chairpersons and
members of the Boards of Election Inspector
(BEIs) for Mandaluyong City.
Petitioner's allegations were obtained from the
"Pasyal-Aral" outing for Mandaluyong City public
school teachers, where Mayor Abalos, Sr.
announced that the teachers appointed to the
BEIs will each be given substantial allowances.
Petitioner alleged that it was done so as to
influence them into voting for him (Benhur) and
ensuring his victory.
Petitioner presented "overwhelming" pieces of
evidence -- photographs and of the said activity,
affidavits of 3 public school teachers, and
videotapes showing Mayor Abalos Sr.
announcing Benhur as the one responsible for
such release. These were "not denied" by
Benhur, who also presented "no evidence" to
substantiate his defense.
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Domingo alleges that Benhur's act of "prodding"
his father constitutes a violation of Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate
who, in an action or protest in which he is
a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money
or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral
functions; . . . shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. . . .
In dismissing the petition for disqualification for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, the
COMELEC 1st Division admonished petitioner
and his counsel for attempting to mislead the
COMELEC by making false and untruthful
statements in his petition.
On reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc,
affirmed the findings and conclusions of its 1st
Division.
ISSUE: WON Mayor Abalos Jr. (Benhur)
violated Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. NO
HELD: Nothing in the affidavits suggests
knowledge on any degree of participation of
Benhur in the grant of these allowances. His
name was not even mentioned or alluded to by
any of the three affiants. The videotapes did not
prove his participation therein either. The burden
of proving that private respondent indirectly
influenced the public school teachers, through
his father, was a burden that petitioner failed to
meet. Neither is this burden overcome by the
argument that private respondent, for himself,
had "no evidence" to rebut petitioner's
allegations, since the burden of proving factual
claims rests on the party raising them.
Besides, it is not true that private respondent
gave only denials and did not present any
evidence to his defense. Benhur presented in
evidence a certified true copy of Joint Circular
No. 1, series of 1998, issued by the DECS, DBM
and DILG, which authorized the payment of
allowances of public school teachers chargeable
to local government funds. The Joint Circular
provided the basis for private respondent's
argument that the disbursement of funds by then
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mayor Abalos, Sr. was valid as having been
made pursuant to administrative circular, and
was not an unlawful attempt made in conspiracy
with private respondent to secure the latter's
victory in the elections.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion in
the COMELEC's decision to dismiss the petition
for disqualification. The conclusion that
petitioner's evidence is insufficient to support the
charge of violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code was arrived at only after a careful
scrutiny of the evidence at hand, especially of
the videotapes of petitioner.
TRINIDAD V. SUNGA
FACTS: Both Trinidad (incumbent mayor) and
Sunga were candidates for the position of Mayor
in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan,
in the May 8, 1995 elections.
Sunga filed letter-complaints for disqualification
against Trinidad. Meanwhile, the election results
showed that Trinidad garnered the highest
number of votes thus, he was proclaimed the
elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another
motion to suspend the effects of the
proclamation.
On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC disqualified
Trinidad as a candidate in the May 8, 1995
elections. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, claiming denial of due process
alleging that there was no hearing
conducted. Then May 11, 1998 elections came,
and was again proclaimed as duly elected Mayor
of Iguig, Cagayan. But such proclamation was
again subsequently annulled.
ISSUE: May petitioners proclamation as Mayor
under the May 11, 1998 elections be cancelled
on account of the disqualification case filed
against him during the May 8, 1995 elections?
HELD: NO. The expiration of the term of office
contested in the election protest has the effect of
rendering the election protest moot and
academic.
With the complaint for disqualification filed by
Sunga rendered moot and academic by the
e pi ati n T inidad’s te ice t e ein
contested, COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner
from his reelected term of office in its second
questioned Resolution on the ground that it
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comes as a matter of course after his
disqualification in SPA No. 95-213 promulgated
after the 1998 election.
While it is true that the first questioned
Resolution was issued eight (8) days before the
term of petitioner as Mayor expired, said
Resolution had not yet attained finality and could
not effectively be held to have removed
petitioner from his office. Indeed, removal cannot
extend beyond the term during which the alleged
misconduct was committed. If a public official is
not removed before his term of office expires, he
can no longer be removed if he is thereafter
reelected for another term.
GO V. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner was the incumbent
representative of the Fifth District, province of
Leyte when she filed on February 27, 2001 with
the municipal election officer of the municipality
of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for
mayor of the said municipality.
On February 28, 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner
filed with the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another
certificate of candidacy for governor.
Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file
with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit
of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor.
However, the provincial election supervisor
refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and
suggested that, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 3253-A, she should file it with the
municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where
she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.
Private respondents filed similar petitions to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that petitioner
filed certificates of candidacy for two positions,
namely, that for mayor, and that for governor,
thus, making her ineligible for both.
The COMELEC granted the petition and
disqualified the petitioner from running for both
position.
ISSUE: Whether an affidavit of withdrawal of
candidacy should be filed with the election officer
of the place where the certificate of candidacy
was filed
HELD: NO. There is nothing in Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code which mandates that the
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the
same office where the certificate of candidacy to
be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed
directly with the main office of the COMELEC,
the office of the regional election director
concerned, the office of the provincial election
supervisor of the province to which the
municipality involved belongs, or the office of the
municipal election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A requires that
the withdrawal be filed before the election officer
of the place where the certificate of candidacy
was filed, such requirement is merely directory,
and is intended for convenience.
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House
of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D.
ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO
Secretary, House of
representatives, respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected Representative for the
Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur
during the 1987 congressional elections. He took
his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and
thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the
rights and privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, Dimaporo filed with the
COMELEC a COC for the position of Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17
February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the
COMELEC, Mitra, Speaker and Secretary of the
House of Representatives excluded petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article
IX of the OEC.
DImaporo lost in the autonomous region
elections, through a letter, he expressed his
intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress." The
record does not indicate what action was taken
on this communication, but it is apparent that
Dimaporo failed in his bid to regain his seat in
Congress since this petition praying for such
relief was subsequently filed on 31 January
1991.
Dimaporo now contends that following the
dropping of his name from the Roll, he was
excluded from all proceedings of the House of
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Representatives; he was not paid the
emoluments due his office; his staff was
dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites
were occupied by other persons. In effect, he
was virtually barred and excluded from
performing his duties and from exercising his
rights and privileges as the duly elected and
qualified congressman from his district.
Dimaporo admits that he filed a COC for the
position of Regional Governor of Muslim
Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did
not thereby lose his seat as congressman
because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is
not operative under the present Constitution,
being contrary thereto, and therefore not
applicable to the present members of Congress.
Dimaporo points out that the term of office of
members of the House of Representatives, as
well as the grounds by which the incumbency of
said members may be shortened, are provided
for in the Constitution. The grounds by which
such term may be shortened may be
summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture
of his seat by holding any other
office or employment in the
government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or
controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a
disciplinary action for disorderly
behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as
determined by resolution of the
Electoral Tribunal in an election
contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary
renunciation of office.
He maintains that section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional
provisions in that it provides for the shortening of
a congressman's term of office on a ground not
provided for in the Constitution. Neither can it be
justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional
provision on voluntary renunciation of office as
only the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he
claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited
his seat as it is only when a congressman holds
another office or employment that forfeiture is
decreed. Filing a COC is not equivalent to
holding another office or employment.
Mitra, et. al. through the Office of the Solicitor
General contend that Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present
Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation
contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the
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term "voluntary renunciation" of office
enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution. That the ground provided in Section
67 is not included in the Constitution does not
affect its validity as the grounds mentioned
therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition,
other modes of shortening the tenure of office of
Members of Congress, among which are
resignation, death and conviction of a crime
which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold
public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a
COC is an act of resignation which estops him
from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be
aware of existing laws. They further maintain
that their questioned "administrative act" is a
mere ministerial act which did not involve any
encroachment on judicial powers.
ISSUE: W the mere filing of a COC ipso facto
considers an elective official resigned? YES
Is Sec 67 BP 881 still operative? YES
RULING
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether
national or local running for any
office other than the one which he
is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-
President shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his COC.
The precursor of this provision is the last
paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which
reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal,
or city official running for an office,
other than the one for which he has
been lastly elected, shall be
considered resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his
COC.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180
reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office.
— Any elective provincial,
municipal or city official running for
an office, other than the one which
he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from
office from the moment of the filing
of his COC.
Sec 67 BP881 of OEC is constitutional and is
operative even if it is not expressly written in the
constitution.
The rationale is that the officials
running for office other than the ones they
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are holding will be considered
resigned not because of abuse of facilities
of power or the use of office facilities but
primarily because under our Constitution,
we have this new chapter on
accountability of public officers.
Now, what is the significance of
this provision on accountability of public
officers? This only means that all elective
public officials should honor the mandate
they have gotten from the people.
Argument was said that the mere
filing is not the intention to run. Now, what
is it for? If a Batasan Member files the
COC, that means that he does not want to
serve, otherwise, why should he file for an
office other than the one he was elected
to? The mere fact therefore of filing a
certificate should be considered the overt
act of abandoning or relinquishing his
mandate to the people and that he should
therefore resign if he wants to seek
another position which he feels he could
be of better service. (Garcia)
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional
basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact,
Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of
Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption
that the questioned statutory provision is no
longer operative does not hold water. He failed
to discern that rather than cut short the term of
office of elective public officials, this statutory
provision seeks to ensure that such officials
serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another
public office and thereby cutting short their
tenure by making it clear that should they fail in
their candidacy, they cannot go back to their
former position. This is consonant with the
constitutional edict that all public officials must
serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle
with the mandate which they have received from
their constituents.
When an elective official covered thereby
files a COC for another office, he is deemed to
have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his
term. The term remains and his successor, if
any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the
Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the
tenure of office of members of Congress, does
not preclude its application to present members
of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that
"(t)he President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such
constitutional expression clearly recognizes that
the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the
Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are not
exclusive.
The basic principle which underlies the entire
field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a
constitutional measure is presumed to be
created. This Court has enunciated the
presumption in favor of constitutionality of
legislative enactment.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation
of office under Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution is broad enough to include the
situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881.
The act contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a COC for another office
constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary
renunciation of the elective office presently being
held is evident.
As the mere act of filing the COC for another
office produces automatically the permanent
forfeiture of the elective position being presently
held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines,
that the other position be actually held. The
ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution is different from the
forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of
voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7,
par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a COC for another
office having been spelled out in Section 67,
Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory
interpretation was indulged in by respondents
Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives in excluding petitioner's name
from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the
administrative head of the House of
Representatives and he exercises administrative
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powers and functions attached to his office. As emoluments due his office, and his office suites
administrative officers, both the Speaker and were occupied by other persons. When he lost
House Secretary-General perform ministerial his bid for the gubernatorial race, petitioner
functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's expressed his intention to resume performing his
name from the Roll considering the unequivocal duties and functions as an ELECTED MEMBER
tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. OF CONGRESS. HE IS NOW CLAIMING THAT
When the COMELEC communicated to the SEC. 67, ART. IX OF BP BLG. 881 IS NOT
House of Representatives that petitioner had OPERATIVE UNDER the present Constitution
filed his COC for regional governor of Muslim which provides specific grounds by which the
Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to term of members of the House can be
abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect shortened2.
of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was
their ministerial duty to do so. These officers ISSUES:
cannot refuse to perform their duty on the 1. W/N Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute operative under the 1987 Constitution
imposing the duty. The reason for this is 2. W/N the respondent Speaker and/or
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction
esp ndent Sec eta “ad inist ati e act”
of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the could exclude petitioner from the rolls of the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances HOR
imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers HELD/RATIO:
of the government from the highest to the lowest 1.
are creatures of the law and are bound to obey Petitioner Respondents Court
it. No. The Yes. Sec. 67, Yes. “ erm”
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept provision cuts Art. IX of BP is different
that a public office is a public trust. It is created short the term Blg. 881 is from “tenure”
for the interest and benefit of the people. As of office of a still operative of office. The
such, the holder thereof is subject to such Member of under the term of office
regulations and conditions as the law may Congress. present prescribed by
impose and he cannot complain of any Constitution the Constitution
restrictions which public policy may dictate on as the may not be
his office. voluntary act extended or
of resignation shortened by
contemplated the legislature.
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO vs. HON. in the said However, the
RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of provision falls period during
Representatives, and HON. CAMILO L. SABIO within the which an officer
Secretary, House of Representatives term actually holds
“ unta the office
Davide, Jr., J.: renunciation (tenure) may
ice” in be affected by
FACTS: Petitioner Dimaporo was elected Sec. 7(2), Art. circumstances
Representative for the Second Legislative VI of the within or
District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 Constitution. beyond the
congressional elections. In January 1990, he power of said
filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of officer. Tenure
Regional Governor of the ARMM with the may be shorter
Comelec. Upon being informed of this than the term
development, respondents Speaker and or it may not
Secretary of the House of Representatives
(HOR) e c uded petiti ne ’s na e t eR
of Members of the HOR pursuant to Sec. 67, Art. 2Sec. 7(2), Art. VI: Voluntary renunciation of office.
IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881)1 Sec. 13, Art. VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
enacted in 1985. He was excluded from all instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
proceedings of the House, was not paid the corporations or subsidiaries.
Sec. 16(3), Art. VI: Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior.
Sec. 17, Art. VI: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral
Tribunal in an election contest.
1 Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881): Any elective
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even exist at in the 1987 Congressman

all. Under the Constitution. may be
questioned shortened are
provision, NOT
when an exclusive.
elective The legal
official maxim should
covered not be applied
thereby files a with the same
certificate of rigor in
candidacy for construing a
another office, constitution as
he is deemed a statute
to have because the
voluntarily cut maxim is only a
short his rule of
tenure, NOT interpretation
his term. The and not a
term remains constitutional
and his command. It
successor, if serves only as
any, is allowed an aid in
to serve its discovering
unexpired legislative
portion. intent where
Under the rule The grounds Sec. 2, Art. XI such intent is
expression mentioned in of the not otherwise
unius est the Constitution manifest.
exclusion Constitution provides that He cannot be etiti ne ’s Petitioner failed
alterius 3 , the cannot be all public said to have filing of a to discern that
statute is exclusive officers to the forfeited his Certificate of the purpose of
repugnant to since there exclusion of the seat as it is Candidacy is the statutory
the pertinent are other President, only when a an act of provision is not
constitutional modes of Vice-President, congressman resignation, to cut short the
provisions shortening the Members of the holds another which estops term of office of
since it tenure of Supreme office or him from public officials
provides for office of a Court, employment claiming but rather to
the shortening Member of Members of the that forfeiture otherwise ensure that
of a Congress Constitutional is decreed, because he is such officials
c ng ess an’ such as Commissions, pursuant to presumed to serve out their
s term of resignation, and the Sec. 13, Art. be aware of entire term of
office on a death, and Ombudsman VI of the existing laws. office by
ground not conviction of may be Constitution. discouraging
provided for in a crime, removed from them from
the present which carries office as running for
Constitution. a penalty of provided by another public
If it were the disqualificatio law. This office. Sec. 67,
intent of the n to hold clearly Art. IX of BP
framers to public office, recognizes Blg. 881 makes
include the which are not that the 4 it clear that
provisions of included in grounds should
Sec. 67, Art. the found in Art. incumbent
IX of BP Blg. enumeration. VI of the public officials
881, they Constitution fail in their
should have by which the candidacy for
incorporated it tenure of a another office,
they cannot go
3 The expression of one thing excludes all others.
back to their
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former position. nothing save a

This is in new election or
perfect appointment
consonance can restore the
with the ousted official.
constitutional
edict that all A public office
public is a public trust.
officials must It is created for
serve the the interest and
people with benefit of the
utmost loyalty people. As
and not trifle such, the
with the holder of such
mandate an office is
which they subject to
have received regulations and
from their conditions as
constituents. the law may
impose and he
The ground cannot
for forfeiture complain of
in Sec. 13, Art. any restrictions
VI of the which public
Constitution policy may
is different dictate on his
from the office.
forfeiture
decreed in 2.
Sec. 67, Art. IX Petitioner Respondents Court
of BP Blg. No. Yes. Their Yes. Since
881, which is Resp ndents’ questioned the legal
actually a so-called “ad inistrative effects of filing
mode of “ad inist ati e act” is a e e a certificate of
voluntary act” cann t e ministerial act, candidacy
renunciation justified as an which did not have already
of office under interpretation involve any been spelled
Sec. 7, Art. VI of the encroachment out in Sec. 67,
of the Constitutional on judicial Art. IX of BP
Constitution. provision on powers. Blg. 881,
As discussed voluntary respondents
by renunciation of can’t be said
Constitutional office because to have
Commissioners only the courts indulged in
, the filing of can interpret any statutory
the certificate laws. interpretation.
of candidacy Both of them
is already an perform
overt act of an ministerial
intention to functions as
relinquish the administrative
office officers and it
currently held. was their duty
Once the to remove
certificate is petiti ne ’s
filed, the seat is name from
forever the Roll
forfeited and considering
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the the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his

unequivocal Precinct Number and the particular Barangay
tenor of Sec. where he was a registered voter. His biodata
67, Art. IX of submitted together with his COC gave his
BP Blg. 881. address as "Acacia Street, Mariana, Quezon
They cannot City," which is part of the Fourth District of
refuse to Quezon City. In other words, his COC and his
perform their biodata filed with COMELEC did not expressly
duty on the state that he was a registered voter of Quezon
ground of an City or that he was a resident of the Second
alleged District thereof within the purview of Sec. 39,
invalidity of par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991,
the statute which provides:
imposing such Sec. 39. Qualifications — (a) An elective
duty because local official must be a citizen of the
it might hinder Philippines; a registered voter in the
the barangay, municipality, city, or province
transaction of or, in the case of a member of the
public sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
business. panglunsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
Officers of the district where he intends to be elected; a
government resident therein for at least one (1)
from the year immediately preceding the day of
highest to the the election; and able to read and write
lowest are Filipino or any other local language or
creatures of dialect.
the law and In view of the seeming deficiency in the COC
are bound to of Hernandez, Jurilla Et Al herein challenged his
obey it. qualification before the COMELEC explaining
however that since they became aware of the
g unds He nandez’s qua i icati n n a te
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES the elections, they chose to file their petition
under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Before Elections Procedure authorizing the filing of such petition
at any day after the last day for filing certificates
G.R. No. 105436 June 2, 1994 of candidacy but not later than the date of
EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, proclamation.
BERNARDO NAZAL, REY, MEDINA, Hernandez alleged that his failure to so state in
MELENCIO CASTELO and GODOFREDO his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number
LIBAN, petitioners, is satisfactorily explained by him in that at the
vs. time he filed his certificate he was not yet
COMELEC and ANTONIO V. assigned a particular Precinct Number in the
HERNANDEZ, respondents. Second District of Quezon City. He was formerly
BELLOSILLO, J.: a registered voter of Manila, although for the
past two (2) years prior to the elections he was
FACTS: already a resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol
EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, Estates," admittedly within the Second District of
BERNARDO NAZAL, REY MEDINA, Quezon City. This was confirmed in the
MELENCIO CASTELO, GODOFREDO LIBAN Municipal Trial Court, and his petition was
and ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ were among the granted.
candidates in the 11 May 1992 synchronized On 2 June 1992, COMELEC promulgated its
elections for the six (6) positions of councilor for questioned resolution denying the petition for
the Second District of Quezon City. disqualification for being filed outside the
On 23 March 1992, Hernandez filed with the reglementary period under Sec. 5 of RA 6646,
COMELEC his COC for one of the contested which pertains to nuisance candidates.
seats. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he gave as Hence the instant petition for certiorari imputing
his address "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
Quezon City." However, he did not indicate on
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jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC in issuing
the assailed resolution of 2 June 1992.
ISSUE: W Hernandez id a nuisance candidate?
NO
RULING:
COMELEC referred to the action taken by
petitioners herein as one to declare private
respondent a "nuisance candidate" and
intimating that they should have instead
petitioned COMELEC to refuse to give due
course to or cancel the COC of private
respondent, citing Sec. 69 of BP Blg. 881, which
provides:
Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. —
The Commission may, motu
proprio or upon a verified petition
of an interested party, refuse to
give due course to or cancel a
COC if it is shown that said
certificate has been filed to put the
election process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion
among the voters by the similarity
of the names of the registered
candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has
no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the COC has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the
electorate.
Certainly, the holding of COMELEC that private
respondent Hernandez was a "nuisance
candidate" is erroneous because, tested against
the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by
which we can categorize him as a "nuisance
candidate," hence, the procedure therein
provided could not have been properly invoked
by petitioners herein. Neither could they apply
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which would require such petition to be filed at
any day after the last day for filing certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
While COMELEC therefore proceeded on the
erroneous premise that private respondent
Hernandez should be treated as a "nuisance
candidate" as already shown, nevertheless its
conclusion to dismiss the petition and give due
course to the candidacy of private respondent he
being a qualified voter of Precinct No. 233-B,
New Capitol Estates, Barangay Batasan Hills,
must be sustained.
JURILLA VS. COMELEC
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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FACTS: On March 23, 1992, respondent
Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission
on Elections his certificate of candidacy for one
of the contested seats for councilors in the
Second District of Quezon City. In Item No. 6 of
is ce ti icate e ga e as is add ess “ 26 L 1
New Capit Estates, Quez n Cit ” H we e , e
did not indicate in the space provided in Item No.
12 therein his Precinct Number and the
particular Barangay where he was a registered
voter.
His biodata submitted together with his
certificate of candidacy gave his address as
“ cacia St eet, Ma iana, Quez n Cit ,” w ic is
a part of the Fourth District of Quezon City. In
other words, his certificate of candidacy and his
biodata filed with the COMELEC did not
expressly state that he was a registered voter of
Quezon City or that he was a resident of the
Second District thereof within the purview of
Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code
of 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of a candidate
to indicate his Precinct Number and the
particular Barangay where he was a registered
voter invalidates his certificate of candidacy.
HELD: No. It may be gleaned from the
provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local
Government Code of 1991, earlier quoted, that
the law does not specifically require that a
candidate must state in his certificate of
candidacy his Precinct Number and the
Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it
is enough that he is actually registered as a
voter in the precinct where he intends to vote,
which should be within the district where he is
running for office.
In the case at bar, his failure to state in his
certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is
satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time
he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a
particular Precinct Number in the Second District
of Quezon City. He was formerly a registered
voter of Manila, although for the past two (2)
years prior to the elections he was already a
esident “ 26, L 1 New Capit Estates,”
admittedly within the Second District of Quezon
City
COQUILLA vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002
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FACTS: Petitioner Coquilla was born on
February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras,
Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there
until 1965, when he joined the United States
Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a
U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice
visited the Philippines while on leave from the
U.S. Navy.Otherwise, even after his retirement
from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the
United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate,
although he continued making several trips to
the United States, the last of which took place on
July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5,
2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for
repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special
Committee on Naturalization. His application
was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen
of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued
Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on
November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration
Identification Certificate No. 115123 on
November 13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for
registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar. His application was approved by the
Election Registration Board on January 12,
2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy stating therein that he
had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
"two (2) years."
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez,
who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who
was running for reelection, sought the
cance ati n petiti ne ’s ce ti icate
candidacy on the ground that the latter had
made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by stating that he had
been a resident of Oras for two years when in
truth he had resided therein for only about six
months since November 10, 2000, when he took
his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment
on the case before the elections on May 14,
2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and
received the highest number of votes (6,131)
against p i ate esp ndent’s 5,752 tes, a any material representation contained therein
margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner
was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers. He subsequently took his
oath of office.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the
COMELEC g anted p i ate esp ndent’s petiti n
and de ed t e cance ati n petiti ne ’s
certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
his motion was denied by the COMELEC en
banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC was justified in
ordering the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was
HELD: T e state ent in petiti ne ’s ce ti icate
candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for "two years" at the time he
filed such certificate is not true. Petitioner made
a false representation of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus
Election Code provides:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.
– The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his
candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for Member
of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which
he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that
he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that
the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated
in the certificate of candidacy are true to the
best of his knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that
as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
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be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election.
Indeed, it as een e d t at a candidate’s
statement in her certificate of candidacy for the
position of governor of Leyte that she was a
resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not
so or that the candidate was a "natural-born"
Filipino when in fact he had become an
Australian citizen constitutes a ground for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy.
On the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v.
COMELEC that a candidate who used her
us and’s a i na e e en t ug t ei
marriage was void was not guilty of
misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In
the case at bar, what is involved is a false
state ent c nce ning a candidate’s qua i icati n
for an office for which he filed the certificate of
candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a
material fact justifying the cancellation of
petitioner’s ce ti icate candidac T e
cance ati n petiti ne ’s ce ti icate
candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
SALCEDO II vs.COMELEC
G.R. No. 135886 August 16, 1999
FACTS: On February 18, 1968, Neptali P.
Salcedo married Agnes Celiz. Without his first
marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P.
Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita
Cacao in a civil ceremony held on September
21, 1986. Two days later, on September 23,
1986, Ermelita Cacao contracted another
marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre.
Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private
respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for
the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara,
Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them
having filed their respective certificates of
candidacy on March 27, 1998. However, on April
17, 1998, petitioner filed with the Comelec a
petition seeking the cancellation of private
respondent's certificate of candidacy on the
ground that she had made a false representation
therein by stating that her surname was
"Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private
respondent had no right to use said surname
because she was not legally married to Neptali
Salcedo. On May 13, 1998, private respondent
was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of
Sara, Iloilo.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
On August 12, 1998, the Comelec's Second
Division ruled, by a vote of 2 to 1, that since
there is an existing valid marriage between
Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the
subsequent marriage of the former with private
respondent is null and void. Consequently, the
use by private respondent of the surname
"Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation
and is a ground for the cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy.
However, in its en banc Resolution dated
October 6, 1998, the Comelec overturned its
previous resolution, ruling that private
respondent's certificate of candidacy did not
contain any material misrepresentation.
This last resolution of the Comelec prompted
petitioner to repair to this Court by way of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, claiming that
public respondent's ruling was issued in grave
abuse of its discretion.
ISSUE: Whether the use of such surname
constitutes a material misrepresentation under
section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (the
"Code") so as to justify the cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy
HELD: Every person aspiring to hold any
elective public office must file a sworn certificate
of candidacy. One of the things which should be
stated therein is that the candidate is eligible for
the office.
In case there is a material misrepresentation in
the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is
authorized to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate upon the filing of a petition by any
person pursuant to section 78 of the Code which
states that —
A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material misrepresentation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
If the petition is filed within the statutory period
and the candidate is subsequently declared by
final judgment to be disqualified before the
election, he shall not be voted for, and the votes
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cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or
the Comelec shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. The fifteen-day period in section 78 for
deciding the petition is merely directory.
As stated in the law, in order to justify the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under
section 78, it is essential that the false
representation mentioned therein pertain to a
material matter for the sanction imposed by this
provision would affect the substantive rights of a
candidate — the right to run for the elective post
for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.
Although the law does not specify what would be
considered as a "material representation," the
Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of
decisions applying section 78 of the Code.
There are two instances where a petition
questioning the qualifications of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his
certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised
under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78
thereof which provides that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material misrepresentation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
And
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253
thereof, viz.:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any
voter contesting the election of any Member
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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of the Batasang Pambansa, regional,
provincial, or city officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines shall file a sworn petition
for quo warranto with the Commissionwithin
ten days after the proclamation of the results
of the election.
The only difference between the two
proceedings is that, under section 78, the
qualifications for elective office are
misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy
and the proceedings must be initiated before the
elections, whereas a petition for quo
warranto under section 253 may be brought on
the basis of two grounds — (1) ineligibility or (2)
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and
must be initiated within ten days after the
proclamation of the election results. Under
section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is
disqualified to be elected to office, and he is
disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications
for elective office.
The material misrepresentation contemplated by
section 78 of the Code refers to qualifications for
elective office. This conclusion is strengthened
by the fact that the consequences imposed upon
a candidate guilty of having made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy are
grave — to prevent the candidate from running
or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him
for violation of the election laws. It could not
have been the intention of the law to deprive a
person of such a basic and substantive political
right to be voted for a public office upon just any
innocuous mistake.
Petitioner has made no allegations concerning
private respondent's qualifications to run for the
office of mayor. Aside from his contention that
she made a misrepresentation in the use of the
surname "Salcedo," petitioner does not claim
that private respondent lacks the requisite
residency, age, citizenship or any other legal
qualification necessary to run for a local elective
office as provided for in the Local Government
Code. Thus, petitioner has failed to discharge
the burden of proving that the misrepresentation
allegedly made by private respondent in her
certificate of candidacy pertains to a material
matter.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under section 78 must consist of
a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 165

made with an intention to deceive the electorate
as to one's qualifications for public office. The
use of a surname, when not intended to mislead
or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not
within the scope of the provision.
Thus, we hold that private respondent did not
commit any material misrepresentation by the
use of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of
candidacy.
LOONG VS COMELEC
December 22,1992
FACTS: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed
with the respondent Commission his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of
the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the
election held on 17 February 1990 (15 January
1990 being the last day for filing said certificate);
herein two (2) private respondents (Ututalum
and Edris) were also candidates for the same
position.
On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election),
respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent
Commission (Second Division) a petition seeking
to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional
Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter
made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy as to his age. On 7 March 1990, the
other candidate, respondent Edris, filed a
"Petition in Intervention" raising the same issue.
Pet Loong seek the dismissal of the petition and
allege that it is not a practice among the Muslim
people in the community where respondent was
born to record the birth of a child with the Office
of the Civil Registry and that respondent
COMELEC has no jurisdiction because such
petition is actually one which is to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
which, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), as amended by Election
Reforms Law of 1987, should have been filed
within 5 days following the last day for filing of
the certificate of candidacy.
On 15 May 1990, the respondent COMELEC
rendered that it has jurisdiction to try the instant
petiti n and L ng’s ti n t dis iss n t e
ground of lack of jurisdiction is hereby denied.
He filed a MR which was also denied.
Loong contends that the case was filed out of
time because it was filed beyond the 25-day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. On the other hand, private
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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respondent Ututalum alleges that SPA No. 90-
006, though filed only on 5 March 1990, was
filed when no proclamation of winner had as yet
been made and that the petition is deemed filed
on time as Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure states that the petition to
disqualify a candidate on grounds of ineligibility
"shall be filed any day after the last day for filing
of certificates of candidacy but not later than the
date of proclamation."
On 3 July 1990, Loong was proclaimed as the
duly elected Vice-Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region. Hence, this special civil
action of certiorari to annul the aforesaid
resolutions of respondent Commission.
ISSUE: WON the disqualification case
against Loong was filed within the period
prescribed by law.
RULE: NO. The undisputed facts are as follows:
petitioner Loong filed his certificate of candidacy
on 15 January 1990 (The last day for filing the
same), the election for officials of the Muslim
Mindanao Autonomous Region being on 17
February 1990; but private respondent Ututalum
filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify
candidate Loong only on 5 March 1990, or forty-
nine (49) days from the date Loong's certificate
of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January 1990),
and sixteen (16) days after the election itself.
On the part of respondent Commission, it held in
its assailed resolution that the petition in SPA
No. 90-006 was timely filed, applying Sections 6
and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646, 9 and Section 2,
Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
which states that the petition to deny due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy must be
filed within five (5) days following the last day for
the filing of a certificate of candidacy, both read
in the light of the Frivaldo ruling.
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that the certificate of candidacy of the
person filing it shall state, among others, the
date of birth of said person. Section 78 of the
same Code states that is case a person filing a
certificate of candidacy has committed false
representation, a petition to cancel the certificate
of the aforesaid person may be filed within
twenty-five (25) days from the time the
certificate was filed. Clearly, such was filed
beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 166

Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
refers to Disqualification of Candidates; and
Section 1 of said rule provides that any
candidate who commits any act declared by law
to be a ground for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate. The
grounds for disqualification as expressed in
Sections 12 and 68 of the Code are the
following:
SEC. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who
has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months wor for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate
who, in an action or protest in which he is a party
is declared by final decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration
to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public official performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election compaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85,
86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who
is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said
or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in
the election law.
The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum
does not fall under the grounds of
disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is
expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel
certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3,
Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at
any time after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy but not later than the
date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule
issued by respondent Commission which,
although a constitutional body, has no legislative
powers. Thus, it cannot supersede Section 78
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
of the Omnibus Election Code which is a
legislative enactment.
Moreover, it will be noted that nothing in
Sections 6 or 7 modified or alters the 25-day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for
filing the appropriate action to cancel a certificate
of candidacy on account of any false
representation made therein. On the contrary,
said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78
of the Code. Section 6 refers only to
the effects of a disqualification case which may
be based on grounds other than that provided
under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of
Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects
referred to in Section 6 applicable to
disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of
the Code. Nowhere in Section 6 and 7 Rep. Act.
No 6646 is mentioned made of the period within
which these disqualification cases may be filed.
This is because there are provisions in the Code
which supply the periods within which a petition
relating to disqualification of candidates must be
filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and
Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to
disqualification a certain candidate fails to file the
petition within the 25-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons,
the election laws do not leave him completely
helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a
petition forquo warranto within ten (10) days
from the proclamation of the results of the
election, as provided under Section 253 of the
Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules
of procedure similarly provides that any voter
contesting the election of any regional, provincial
or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may
file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral
Contest Adjudication Department. The petition
may be filed within ten (10)days from the date
the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
It is true that the discovery of false
representation as to material facts required to be
stated in a certificate of candidacy, under
Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after
the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the
person who discovers such misrepresentations
and who would want the disqualification of the
candidate committing the misrepresentations. It
would seem, therefore, that there could indeed
be a gap between the time of the discovery of
the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 167

made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of
the Code has lapsed) and the time when the
proclamation of the results of the election is
made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be
petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of
the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to
wait for the proclamation of the results, so that
he could avail of a remedy against the
misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a
petition for quo warranto against him.
Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what
it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, it
unnecessary and should be remedied.
In sum, tha case filed by private respondent
Ututalum beyond the 25-day period (from the
filing by petitioner Loong of the questioned
certificate of candidacy) prescribed by Section
78 of the Code. It follows that the dismissal of
said petition for disqualification is warranted.
Further it would appear that we cannot treat
such as a petition for quo warranto (Section 253
of the Code) for when it was filed with the
respondent Commission, no proclamation of
election results had as yet been made, it was
premature.
G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO
FACTS: On March 20, 1995, private respondent
Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On
March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another
candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position
by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines," and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo
remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and
he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of
the Second Division.
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed
the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes was issued showing the
following votes obtained by the candidates for
the position of Governor of Sorsogon: Antonio H.
Escudero, Jr. 51,060, Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440,
RaulR.Lee 53,304, Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental)
petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-
elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but
promulgated according to the petition "only on
June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed
"the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon
to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming
candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June
29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995
proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995,
at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after
"his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted." As such, when "the said order (dated
June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no
more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative,
he averred that pursuant to the two cases of
Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor— not Lee
— should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First
Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution holding that Lee, "not having
garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
the highest number of votes, and having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold
the office of governor of Sorsogon".
ISSUES:
1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared"
disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 168

elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon
– NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in
the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence? -NO!
HELD:
1. It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R.
No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in
G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such
elections is final and can no longer be changed.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or
denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person's future status with finality. This is
because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again, as the occasion demands."
2. Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee
proclamation. We uphold him for the following
reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs.
COMELEC, "the fact remains that he (Lee) was
not the choice of the sovereign will," and in
Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee is "a second
placer, just that, a second placer."
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to
have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship
and inasmuch as he obtained the highest
number of votes in the 1995 elections, he—
not Lee —should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's
proclamation was patently erroneous and should
now be corrected.
CONCLUSION OF THE COURT:
In sum, we rule that the citizenship
requirement in the Local Government Code is
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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to be possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at
the start of the term of office to which he has
been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to
be in full force and effect up to the present, not
having been suspended or repealed expressly
nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's
repatriation by virtue thereof to have been
properly granted and thus valid and effective.
Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative
nature of the law granting him a new right to
resume his political status and the legislative
intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of
having been forced to give up his citizenship and
political aspiration as his means of escaping a
regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be
given retroactive effect as of the date of his
application therefor, during the pendency of
which he was stateless, he having given ' up his
U. S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed
the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship
as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed
instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to
August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated
as of said date as well. The foregoing, of
course, are precisely consistent with our holding
that lack of the citizenship requirement is not
a continuing disability or disqualification to
run for and hold public office. And once again,
we emphasize herein our previous rulings
recognizing the Comelec's authority and
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and
equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest
will of our people, for in case of doubt,
political laws must be interpreted to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. Otherwise
stated, legal niceties and technicalities
cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may
not be defeated by mere technical objections
(citations omitted)."
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo
every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
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deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court
has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to
ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal
of the popular electoral choice, this Court
must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues
in a manner that would give effect to the will
of the majority, for it is merely sound public
policy to cause elective offices to be filled by
those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby
giving effect to the apparent will of the people,
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions
that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee
has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically
easy to find fault with his cause. The Court
could have refused to grant retroactivity to
the effects of his repatriation and hold him
still ineligible due to his failure to show his
citizenship at the time he registered as a
voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could
have disputed the factual findings of the
Comelec that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent
dual citizenship as a disqualification "from
running for any elective local position." But
the real essence of justice does not emanate
from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as
a brick in the ultimate development of the
social edifice.
Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed
the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes
harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke
substantial justice in the larger social context
consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political
life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship
only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot
seriously entertain any doubt about his
loyalty and dedication to this country. At the
first opportunity, he returned to this land,
and sought to serve his people once more.
The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly
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voted for him three times. He took an oath of
allegiance to this Republic every time he filed
his certificate of candidacy and during his
failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to re-assume his nationality of
birth despite several legal set-backs speak
more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than
any legal technicality, of his consuming
intention and burning desire to re-embrace
his native Philippines even now at the ripe
old age of 81 years.
Such loyalty to and love of country as well as
nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of
justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would
have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of
a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most
powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay,
single-mindedly insisted on returning to and
serving once more his struggling but beloved
land of birth.
He therefore deserves every liberal
interpretation of the law which can be applied
in his favor. And in the final analysis, over
and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable
people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve
to be governed by a leader of their
overwhelming choice.
MARQUEZ VS COMELEC GR No. 112889
243 SCRA 538 April 18, 1995
FACTS: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated
candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a
petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of
the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his
petition for quo warranto against Eduardo
Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from
justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent
filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for ten (10) counts of
insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal
Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of
Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A
warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is
claimed, has yet to be served on private
esp ndent n acc unt is a eged “ ig t”
that country.
etiti ne ’s su sequent ec u se (in G.R. No.
105310) t e COMELEC’s Ma 8, 1992
resolution was dismissed without prejudice,
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however, to the filing in due time of a possible
post-election quo warranto proceeding against
private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner
filed a petition with the COMELEC for
cance ati n esp ndent’s C C n acc unt
t e candidate’s disqua i icati n unde Sec 40 (e)
of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-
elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith,
petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings
(EPC 92-28) against private respondent before
the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent who, at the
time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy
(and to date), is said to be facing a criminal
charge before a foreign court and evading a
warrant for his arrest comes within the term
“ ugiti e ustice” c nte p ated Secti n
40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified
from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible
from holding on to, an elective local office.
HELD: YES. Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA
7160) p ide t at a “Fugiti e ustice in
c i ina cases e e and a ad” a e “disqua i ied
unning an e ecti e ca p siti n”
It has been held that construction placed upon
law by the officials in charge of its enforcement
deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs.
CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there
clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as
it is so written. An administrative rule or
regulation can neither expand nor constrict the
law but must remain congruent to it.
T e c n ine ent t e te “ ugiti e
ustice” in tic e 73 t e Ru es and
Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to
e e n t a pe s n “w as een c n icted
ina udg ent” is an in dinate and undue
circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any
definite finding on whether or not private
esp ndent is in act a “ ugiti e ustice” as
such term must be interpreted and applied in the
ig t t e C u t’s pini n T e issi n is
understandable since the COMELEC outrightly
dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the
basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Oversight
Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts,
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is thus constrained to remand the case to the
COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved
factual matter.
RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO vs. HON. LUIS
SANTOS, as Secretary of the Department of
Local Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as
Acting Governor of Cagayan
G.R. No. 94115 August 21, 1992
FACTS: Petitioner was the duly elected
Governor of the province of Cagayan, having
been elected to said position during the local
elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a
term of four (4) years therefrom. He took his oath
sometimes around March 1988.
Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was
crushed, respondent Secretary of Local
Government sent a telegram and a letter, both
dated December 4, 1989, to petitioner requiring
him to show cause why should not be
suspended or remove from office for disloyalty to
the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from
receipt thereof.
On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for
disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation
of the Constitution was filed against petitioner for
acts the latter committed during the coup.
Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the
questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as
charged and ordering his removal from office.
Installed as Governor of Cagayan in the process
was respondent Melvin Vargas, who was then
the Vice-Governor of Cagayan.
While this case was pending before this Court,
petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11,
1992 elections.
The Court, in a resolution dated May 14, 1992,
issued a temporary restraining order against the
Commission to cease and desist from enforcing
its May 9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome
of the disqualification case, thereby allowing the
canvassing of the votes and returns in Cagayan
to proceed.
On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the
aforementioned case granting petition and
annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the
Commission on the ground that the decision of
respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality
and is still pending review with this Court. As
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petitioner won by a landslide margin in the
elections, the resolution paved the way for his
eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
ISSUE: whether or not Aguinaldo may be
dismissed as re-elected Governor of Cagayan
on the ground that he was previously removed
from the same office by the Secretary of Local
Government due to an administrative charge?
HELD: NO. Petitioner's re-election to the
position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered
the administration case pending before Us moot
and academic. It appears that after the
canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
most number of votes among the candidates for
governor of Cagayan province.
Considering the fact narrated, the expiration of
petitioner's term of office during which the acts
charged were allegedly committed, and his
subsequent reelection, the petitioner must be
dismissed for the reason that the issue has
become academic.
Offenses committed, or acts done, during a
previous term are generally held not to furnish
cause for removal and this is especially true
were the Constitution provides that the penalty in
proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond
the removal from office, and disqualification from
holding office for a term for which the officer was
elected or appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is
separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of
the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor.
The Court should ever remove a public officer for
acts done prior to his present term of office. To
do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When a people
have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of
such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule
the will of the people.
Clear then, the rule is that a public official can
not be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of
the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
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foregoing rule, however, finds no application
to criminalcases pending against petitioner for
acts he may have committed during the failed
coup.
WILMER GREGO V. COMELEC and
HUMBERTO BASCO
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997] [274 SCRA
481]
ROMERO, J.:
(Municipal Government, Disqualification, Non-
Retroactive effect)
FACTS: Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the
Local Government Code) which took effect on
January 1, 1992, disqualifies a person for any
e ecti e p siti n n t e g und t at “ ad een
removed from office as a result of an
ad inist ati e case”
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from
his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of
serious misconduct in an administrative
complaint. He ran as a candidate for Councilor,
won and assumed office for three terms during
the Elections of January 18, 1988; May 11,1992
and Ma 8, 1995 s in t e past, esp ndent’s
right to office was contested.
On May 13, 1995, petitioner, seeks for the
esp ndent’s disqua i icati n, pu suant t t e
above provision, contending that as long as a
candidate was once removed from office due to
an administrative case, regardless of whether it
took place during or prior to the effectivity of the
Code, the disqualification applies.
Respondent contends that the petitioner is not
entitled to said relief because Section 40 par. b
of the LGC may not be validly applied to persons
who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do
so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder,
and retroactive legislation which impairs vested
rights
ISSUE: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No.
7160 applies retroactively to those removed from
office before it took effect on January 1, 1992
HELD: No. It is a settled issue that Section 40
(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 does not have any
retroactive effect. Laws operate only
prospectively and not retroactively.
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A statute, despite the generality in its language,
must not be so construed as to overreach acts,
events or matters which transpired before its
passage: “Le p spicit, n n espicit ” T e aw
looks forward, not backward.
CAASI V. CA
191 SCRA 317 GR No. 88831, 84508,
November 8, 1990
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
DOCTRINE: To be qualified to run for elective
office in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have
“wai ed is status as a pe anent esident
immigrant of a foreign country.
NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of
the CA and Petition for certiorari to review the
decision of the Commission on Election
FACTS: Merito Miguel was elected as
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the
local elections of 1988.Petitions were filed for his
disqualification under Sec 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, on the ground that he is a green
card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the
US, not of Bolinao. One of the petitioners is
Mateo Caasi, his rival candidate for the position
of mayor. The Miguel admitted that he holds a
green card issued to him by the US Immigration
Service, but he denied that he is a permanent
resident of the US. He allegedly obtained the
green card for convenience in order that he may
freely enter the US for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there. He
alleged that he is a permanent resident of
Bolinao, Pangasinan that he voted in all previous
elections.
COMELEC dismissed the petitions, except for
Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr. According to
the COMELEC, the possession of a green card
by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he
had abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
The COMELEC further said that as the
respondent meets the basic requirements of
citizenship and residence for candidates to
elective local officials under Sec 42 of Local
Govt. Code, there is no legal obstacle to his
candidacy for mayor.
In the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Badoy, he opined that a green card holder, being
a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a
foreign country, under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
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Election Code, has to prove that he has waived
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
to be qualified to run for election office.
ISSUES:
a. Is green card a proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the US? Yes.
b. Did Miguel waive his status as permanent
resident or immigrant to US prior tothe
local elections? No.
c. Is he disqualified to become a candidate
of municipal mayor? Yes.
HELD: Migue ’s i ig ati n t t e US in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. The intention to live
there permanently is evidenced by his
app icati n an i ig ant’s isa
Immigration is defined as removing into one
place from another/entering into a country with
the intention of residing in it. While an Immigrant
is a person who removes into a country for the
purpose of permanent residence
As a resident alien in the US, Miguel owes
temporary and local allegiance to the US, in
return for the protection given to him during the
period of his residence.
Sec 18, Art XI of the 1987 Constitution which
states t at: “ n pu ic ice e p ee w
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during
is tenu e s a e dea t wit aw,” is is n t
applicable to Miguel. This is because Miguel for
he acquired the status of an immigrant of US
before he was elected to public office, not
“du ing is tenu e” as a
Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
p ides t at: “ n pe s n w is a pe anent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless such person has waived
his status as permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the
e ecti n aws,” is t e app icable law to him
Residence in the municipality where he intends
to run for elective office for at least 1 year at the
time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of
the qualifications that a candidate for elective
public office must possess.
Miguel resided in Bolinao for only 3 months after
his return to the Philippines and before he ran for
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mayor. Clear policy of excluding from the right to
hold elective public office those Philippine
citizens who possess dual loyalties and
allegiance, as such are incapable of the entire
devotion to the interest and welfare of their
homeland.
To be qualified to run for elective office in the
Philippines, the law requires that the candidate
w is a g een ca d de ust a e “wai ed
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country. His act of filing a certificate
of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines
did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of US.
The waiver of green card should be manifested
by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for elective office.
Wit ut suc p i wai e , e was “disqua i ied t
un an e ecti e ice ”
Migue ’s app icati n i ig ant status and
permanent residence in the US and his
possession of a green card attesting to such
status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of US despite his occasional
visits to the Philippines. Miguel filled up his
application for Immigrant Visa in his own
handwriting, answe ing “ e anent ” n t e
question of his length of intended stay. On its
face, the green card identifies Miguel in clear
bold letters as a Resident Alien.
SC annulled the election of Miguel as municipal
mayor.
MERCADO VS. MANZANO
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and
Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for
Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano
garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the
pending petition for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not
a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.
From the facts presented, it appears that
Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
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The Commission on Elections declared
Manzano disqualified as candidate for said
elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held
to have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered
himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is
disqualified to hold public elective office in the
Philippines.
HELD: The court ruled that the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A.
7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to
dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states.
Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition.
Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
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view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by
naturalization takes an oath that he renounces
his loyalty to any other country or government
and solemnly declares that he owes his
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and
complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within
the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere
with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of
candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce
his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. By declaring in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On t e t e and, p i ate esp ndent’s at
allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that
he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after
taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against
any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but
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subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
AZNAR VS. COMELEC
FACTS: E i i “Lit ” Os eña i ed is ce ti icate
of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position
of Provincial Governor of Cebu in the 18 January
1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he
is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of
the United States. COMELEC en banc decided
to suspend the proclamation. Osmeña
maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging
that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.
Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmeña, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a
valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that
he was continuously residing in the Philippines
since birth and has not gone out of the country
for more than six months, and (4) that he has
been a registered voter in the Philippines since
1965.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is no longer
a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship.
HELD: YES. Osmena is still a Filipino. The court
e d t at zna ’s c ntenti n was n t e it i us
zna ’s a gu ent t at Os eña is n t a Fi ipin
citizen and therefore, disqualified from running
for and being elected to the office of Governor of
Cebu, is not supported by substantial and
convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide
proof that Osmeña has lost the citizenship by
any of the modes provided for under C.A. No.
63, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign
country, (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of
a foreign country. Osmeña did not lose his
Philippine citizenship in any of the modes
provided.
By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father,
the presumption that Osmeña is a Filipino
remains. In this case, Osmeña denies having
taken the oath of allegiance of the United States.
He is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine passport and has continuously
participated in the electoral process in this
country since 1963.
The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice
Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmeña obtained
certificates of Alien Registration as an American
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 175

citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years
old and the second in 1979, he should be
regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship, does not hold water. The
court in this case held that Osmeña is still a
Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not
even declared a dual citizen.
VALLES vs COMELEC
FACTS: Rosalind Lopez was born on May 16,
1934 in Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez,
an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she
left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.
In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a
Filipino citizen. Since then, she has continuously
participated in the electoral process not only as a
voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as
Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she
ran for and was elected governor of Davao
Oriental.
Subsequently, several other petitions were filed
against Lopez, all of them questioning her
citizenship. One of these petitions were filed by
herein petitioner, Valles.
However like all the other petitions, this was
dismissed on based on the following grounds:
1. Her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus
sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under
the 1987 Philippine Constitution;
2. She was married to a Filipino, thereby
making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure
under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act
473;
3. And that, she renounced her Australian
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia and her Australian
passport was accordingly cancelled as
certified to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila;
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the
private respondent is an Australian citizen,
placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
1. In 1988, private respondent registered
herself with the Bureau of Immigration as
an Australian national
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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2. She applied for the issuance of an
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR),
and
3. She was issued Australian Passport
ISSUE: W/N Lopez is a Filipino citizen, and is
qualified to run for public office (YES)
HELD: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth,
as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis
of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was
born on May 16, 1934. Historically, this was a
year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution
of the Philippines were the principal organic acts
by which the United States governed the
country.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine
citizens as: all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside therein who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in the Philippine Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands.
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April
11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a
certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of
Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of
the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
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Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the
assumption that the private respondent is a
Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced
her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this
contention, petitioner cited private respondents
application for an Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR).
LABO JR. vs COMELEC
FACTS: In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected
as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis
Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto
against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is
an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he
was naturalized as an Australian after he
married an Australian.
Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian
did not make him an Australian; that at best he
has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that
even if he indeed became an Australian when he
married an Australian citizen, such citizenship
was lost when his marriage with the Australian
was later declared void for being bigamous.
Labo further asserts that even i e’s c nside ed
as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a
mere technicality which should not frustrate the
will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him
by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public
office (NO)
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the
second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can
replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified
(NO)
HELD:
1st issue: No. Labo did not question the
authenticity of evidence presented against him.
He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It
was not his marriage to an Australian that made
him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently
swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the
government of Australia. He did not dispute that
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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he needed an Australian passport to return to
the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as
an immigrant here.
It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen.
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore
allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that
when he lost his Australian citizenship, he
became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated
or be declared as a Filipino through an act of
Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public
office. His claim that his lack of citizenship
should not overcome the will of the electorate is
not tenable. The people of Baguio could not
have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and
the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner
(curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo
had they known he is Australian). The electorate
had no power to permit a foreigner owing his
total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at
least a stateless individual owing no allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of
the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
2nd issue: Lardizabal on the other hand cannot
assert, through the quo warranto proceeding,
that he should be declared the mayor by reason
La ’s disqua i icati n ecause La diza a
obtained the second highest number of vote. It
would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired
the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they
do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that
public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast
in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected
and no measure can be declared carried unless
he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election.
JUAN FRIVALDO VS COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
174 SCRA 245
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FACTS: In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor
of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the
League of Municipalities of Sorsogon, filed with
the COMELEC a petition for annulment of
F i a d ’s e ecti n and p c a ati n ecause
apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as
an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said that
he was forced to be naturalized because the
then President Marcos was after him; but that
participating in the Philippine elections, he has
effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant
to American laws. He also assailed the petition
as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo
warranto which is already filed out of time, the
same not being filed ten days after his
proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly
serve as a governor.
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino
citizenship. As far as Philippine law is
concerned, he is not a Filipino. He lost his
citizenship when he declared allegiance to the
United States. Even if he did lose his US
citizenship, that did not restore his being a
Filipino because he did not undergo
naturalization or repatriation proceedings.
Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections
restore his Philippine citizenship.
At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot
serve as governor when he owes allegiance to a
foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the
people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office
and employment only to the citizens of this
country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in
the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.
REPUBLIC VS DELA ROSA
FACTS: September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a
petition for naturalization under the
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC
Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the
petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order and
petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper
of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks,
the last publication of which should be at least 6
months before the date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to
cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to
January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for
public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge
granted the motion and the hearing was moved
to February 21. No publication or copy was
issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed
Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as
a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25
of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made
on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of
allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-
admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that
Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of
the Philippines and therefore disqualified from
continuing to serve as governor of the Province
of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office
and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor
of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision
becomes final and executory. The proceedings
of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities:
(1) The hearing of the petition was set ahead
of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of
hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) The petition was heard within six months
from the last publication of the petition;
(3) Petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of the judgment;
and
(4) Petitioner took his oath of allegiance
without observing the two-year waiting period.
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FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
FACTS: On March 20, 1995, private respondent
Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On
March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another
candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position
by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines," and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo
remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and
he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of
the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed
the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes was issued showing the
following votes obtained by the candidates for
the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental)
petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-
elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order dated June 21, 1995, but
promulgated according to the petition "only on
June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed
"the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon
to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming
candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June
29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995
proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995,
at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after
"his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted." As such, when "the said order (dated
June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no
more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative,
he averred that pursuant to the two cases of
Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor— not Lee
— should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First
Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution holding that Lee, "not having
garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
the highest number of votes, and having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold
the office of governor of Sorsogon".
ISSUE: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen
of the Philippines at the time of his election on
18 January 1988, as provincial governor of
Sorsogon.
HELD: The Commission on Elections has the
primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the
Congress and elective provincial and city
icia s H we e , t e decisi n n F i a d ‘s
citizenship has already been made by the
COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor
General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is
a eigne T e S icit ‘s stance is assu ed t
have bben taken by him after consultation with
COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore
represents the decision of the COMELEC itself
that the Supreme Court may review.
In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19
November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
―natu a - n‖ citizen t e i ippines,
omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such
status. The evidence shows, however, that he
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1983 per the certification from the United
States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul
Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
There were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some
of them subject to greater risk than he, who did
COMPILED BY: WIGMORE #WIGMOREFOREVER 179

not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have
been coerced — to abandon their cherished
status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to
disavow his American citizenship and reacquire
Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done
so in accordance with the laws of our country.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to
take such categorical acts.
The anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country cannot be
permitted. The fact that he was elected by the
people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office
and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility. Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or
assu pti n ice ut du ing t e ice ‘s
entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving
as governor of Sorsogon.
ADORMEO v. COMELEC & TALAGA
FACTS: Adormeo and Talaga, Jr. filed their
certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena
City for the 2001 elections. Talaga, Jr. was then
the incumbent mayor. He was elected mayor in
1992 and was again re-elected in 1995-1998.
In the election of 1998, he lost, however, in the
recall election of May 2000, he won and served
the unexpired term. Adormeo filed a Petition to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or
Disqualification of Talaga, Jr., on the ground that
the latter was elected and had served as city
mayor for 3 consecutive terms. Talaga, Jr.
responded that he was not elected City Mayor
for 3 consecutive terms but only for 2
consecutive terms since he was defeated in the
1998 election, interrupting the consecutiveness
of his years as mayor.
COMELEC First Division found Talaga, Jr.
disqualified for the position of city mayor. He
filed a motion for reconsideration and COMELEC
en banc ruled in his favor and held that 1)
respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms because he did not win in the
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as
mayor by reason of his victory in the recall
elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections
was not considered a term of office and is not
included in the 3-termdisqualification rule, and 4)
that he did not fully serve the three (3)
consecutive terms, and his loss in the 1998
elections is considered an interruption in the
continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City.
After canvassing, Talaga, Jr. was proclaimed as
the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Talaga, Jr was
disqualified to run for mayor of in the elections.
HELD: The term limit for elective local officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. It is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
The two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur:
1) That the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and
2) That he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
COMELECs ruling that private respondent was
not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
should be upheld. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
1998 elections. Voluntary renunciation of office
for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which he was elected. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption
of continuity of service.
BORJA, JR. V. COMELEC
ACTION: Determination of the scope of
constitutional provision barring elective officials,
with the exception of barangay officials, from
serving more than three consecutive terms.
FACTS: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr.
was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January
18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
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September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two
succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was
again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco
filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections.
Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate a , s ug t Capc ’s
disqualification on the theory that the latter would
have already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would
therefore be ineligible to serve for another term
after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on
Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared
private respondent Capco disqualified from
running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in
the motion for reconsideration, majority
overturned the original decision.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Capco has served for three consecutive
terms as Mayor
2. W/N Capco can run again for Mayor in the
next election
HELD:
1. No. Capco was not elected to the office of
mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he
served the full term because he only continued
the service, interrupted by the death, of the
deceased mayor. A textual analysis supports the
ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, Sec. 8
contemplates service by local officials for three
consecutive full terms as a result of election. It is
not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local officials,
he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
2. Yes. Although he has already first served as
mayor by succession, he has not actually served
three full terms in all for the purpose of applying
the three-term limit. The three-term limit shall
apply when these 2 conditions concur: (1) the
local official concerned has been elected three
consecutive times; and (2) he has fully served
three consecutive terms.
LONZANIDA VS COMELEC
[311 SCRA 602]
ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
Compiled by: Wigmore #wigmoreforever
FACTS: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected
and served two consecutive terms as municipal
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the
May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections
Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He
assumed office and discharged the duties
thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested
by his opponent who filed an election protest.
The court rendered a judgment declaring the
results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as
null and void on the ground that there was a
failure of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again
filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San
Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior
proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition
to disqualify him from running on the ground that
he had served three consecutive terms in the
same post.
T e COMELEC und t at L nzanida’s
assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation
in May 1995, although he was later unseated
before the expiration of the term, should be
counted as service for one full term in computing
the three-term limit under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC
issued a resolution granting the petition for
disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of
the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he
was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive
terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the
purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the
duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May
1995 elections.
The private respondent maintains that the
petiti ne ’s assu pti n ice in 1995 s u d
be considered as service of one full term
because he discharged the duties of mayor for
almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely
a few months before the next mayoral elections.
ISSUE: WON petiti ne ’s assumption of office as
mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995
to 1998 may be considered as service of one full
term for the purpose of applying the three-term
limit for elective local government officials.
HELD: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution
p ides t at, “t e te ice e ecti e ca
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 ELECTION LAWS Case Digest (Atty. Valencia)
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officials, except barangay officials, which shall

be determined by law shall be three years and
no such officials shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
e ected ”

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A.

N 7160) estates t e sa e u e, t at: “N ca
elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned
was e ected ”

The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served

the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was
ordered to vacate his post before the expiration
of the term.

Pursuant to the constitutional provision above,

voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel
the renounced term in the computation of the
three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

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