ERNESTO MORALES y DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. ALFREDO J. GUSTILO, as Presiding Judge of
RTC, Pasay City, Branch 116 and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The key issue in this case is whether, in light of R.A. No. 7659 [1] as interpreted in People
v. Simon,[2] and R.A. No. 7691,[3] Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over violations of
R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
when the imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years.
The petitioner was charged with the violation of Section 15 in relation to Section 20 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in an information filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City on 13 March 1996. The accusatory portion of
the said information reads as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of March 1996, in Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto
Morales y De la Cruz, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver to another 0.4587 grams of Metamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[4]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-8443 and raffled to Branch 116 of
the said court.
Upon his arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. [5] Subsequently, on 30
April 1996, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] on the ground that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to try the case considering that pursuant to Section 20 of R.A.
No. 7659 as construed in People v. Simon, [7] the penalty imposable for the offense
charged should not exceed prision correccional or six (6) years and under R.A.
No. 7691 it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order [8] of 9 May 1996, the RTC denied the motion. It held:

It is true that under the aforementioned provision, cases punishable with penalties of
not more than six (6) years are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts. However, the exceptions are cases falling within the exclusive original

jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court Under Section 39 of Republic Act No.
6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the Court of First Instance now the
Regional Trial Court and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, which no longer
exist, shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act. It is therefore clear that this case, which is a violation of
Republic Act No. 6425, although punishable by a penalty of less than six (6) years,
falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
His motion for the reconsideration[9] of the order having been denied,[10] the petitioner
filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.[11] The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40670.
In its Comment[12] in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
agreed with the petitioner that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try the criminal
case. It, however, asserted that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the
special civil action for certiorari, as the same involved only the question of jurisdiction of
an inferior court, hence, cognizable by the Supreme Court alone pursuant to Section 9
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in connection with Section 5(2)(c), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution and Section 17 of Republic Act No. 5440. The OSG then
recommended that the case be elevated to the Supreme Court for disposition, or that
the Court of Appeals grant the petition and set aside the challenged order of the RTC
should it rule that it had jurisdiction over petition.
In its Resolution [13] of 8 August 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction over the action. Explaining its ruling, it declared:

In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General, inter alia, contended that this
Court has no jurisdiction over the petition for it properly falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
We fully agree.
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers; x x x
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: x x x
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. x x x

Section 17 of R.A. 5446 otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 says that the
Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on certiorari final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any inferior court is on issue. It is hereby stressed that the issue in
the petition at bench is purely a question of jurisdiction which is resolvable on the
basis of the records.
After the denial [14] on 13 September 1996 of his motion for reconsideration, [15] the
petitioner came to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO

ENTERTAIN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES
OF COURT WHERE THE ISSUE IS THE JURISDICTION OF RESPONDENT RTC
JUDGE TO TRY THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE/COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO
TRY ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 15, IN RELATION TO SECTION 20, ART.
III OF R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED, INVOLVING ONLY 0.4587 GRAMS OF SHABU.
As to the first, the petitioner insists that respondent Court of Appeals has concurrent
original jurisdiction with this Court over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court involving decisions or orders of Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Section 9(1)
[16]
of B.P. Blg. 129 in relation to Section 5(1)[17] of Article VIII of the Constitution. He
cites De Jesus v. Court of Appeals [18] wherein this Court held that the original jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals under Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is concurrent with that of the
Supreme Court, and with that of Regional Trial Courts for writs enforceable within their
respective regions. The petitioner further maintains that Section 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of
the Constitution and Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No.
5440, relied upon by the Court Appeals are not applicable inasmuch as they relate to
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and not to anoriginal action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
As regards the second issue, the petitioner asserts that the RTC below has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged considering that only 0.4587 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) is involved. In light of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659,[19] as
interpreted in People v. Simon [20] and further explained in People v.
Santos [21] and Ordoez v. Vinarao, [22] the imposable penalty therefor would not
exceed prision correccional, whose maximum period is six (6) years. Hence, under R.A.
No. 7691 exclusive original jurisdiction therein is vested in Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In its Comment on the petition, the OSG submits that all violations of R.A. No. 6425, as
further amended by R.A. No. 7659, which are punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six years now fall under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Since on the basis of the

quantity of the regulated drug involved in this case the penalty imposable does not
exceed prision correccional, it is the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City which has
jurisdiction over the case. It disagreed with the opinion of the RTC that violations of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, still fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC because the latters
jurisdiction thereon mandated by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 has been preserved by
the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691. It submits that Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425
was repealed by Section 6 of R.A. No. 7691, which provides:

SEC. 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall
be considered amended or modified accordingly.
In support of its submission, it cites this Courts resolution in Gulhoran v. Escao, Jr. [23]
The OSG further contends that respondent Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing
the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction in view of Section 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129;
Sec. 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of the Constitution; and Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended by R.A. No. 5440. Nevertheless, it prays that this petition be given
due course and that Criminal Case No. 96-8443 be remanded to the proper
metropolitan trial court for further proceedings.
We resolved to give due course to this petition.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction over petitioners special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals has concurrent original
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the
Constitution and Section 17(1) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and with the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129 to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto.[24] These are original actions, not modes
of appeals.
Since what the petitioner filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 was a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals thereon is
beyond doubt.
This error of the Court of Appeals was due to its misapplication of Section 5(2)(c) of
Article VIII of the Constitution and of that portion of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 vesting upon the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is
in issue. It forgot that this constitutional and statutory provisions pertain to
the appellate -- not original -- jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as correctly maintained
by the petitioner. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a
continuation of the original suit, not a commencement of a new action, such as
that of a special civil action for certiorari. The general rule is that a denial of a
motion to dismiss or to quash in criminal cases is interlocutory and cannot be the

subject of an appeal or of a special civil action for certiorari. Nevertheless, this Court
has allowed a special civil action for certiorari where a lower court has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying a motion to dismiss
or to quash.[25] The petitioner believed that the RTC below did so; hence, the special civil
action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals appeared to be the proper remedy.
The next most logical step then is for us to simply set aside the challenged resolutions
and to direct the Court of Appeals to resolve on the merits the petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 40670. But, that would further delay the case. Considering the special importance
of the lone legal issue raised, which can be resolved on the basis of the pleadings
heretofore filed, and the fact that this Court has concurrent jurisdiction over petitioners
special action in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670, we deem it more practical and in the greater
interest of justice not to remand the case to the Court of Appeals but, instead, to take
direct cognizance thereof and resolve it once and for all. [26]
We now address the second issue.
Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon,[27] People v. De Lara,[28] People v.
Santos,[29] and Ordoez v. Vinarao,[30] the imposable penalty in this case which
involves 0.4587 grams of shabu should not exceed prision correccional. We say
by analogy because these cases involved marijuana, not methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu). In Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659, the maximum quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine
hydrochloride for purposes of imposing the maximum penalties are not the same. For
the latter, if the quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10 million shall be
imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity involved is below 200 grams, the imposable
penalties should be as follows:

a) reclusion temporal -- if the quantity involved is from 134 to 199 grams;

b) prision mayor -- if the quantity involved is from 66 to 133 grams;
c) prision correccional -- if the quantity involved is 65 grams or below.
Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
96-8443 would at most be only prision correccional whose duration is from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Does it follow then that, as the petitioner
insists, the RTC has no jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of Section 32 of
B.P. Blg. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties? This
section 32 as thus amended now reads:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. -- Except in cases falling within the

exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offender or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot
disregard. By virtue thereof, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases does
not cover those cases which by provision of law fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan regardless of the
prescribed penalty. Otherwise put, even if such cases are punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding six years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor),
jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as
the case may be.
The aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for
the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases,[31] but also to other laws which
specifically lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal
cases, e.g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. Nos. 1289
and 4363 on written defamation or libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual Property (P. D. No.
49, as amended), which vests upon Courts of First Instance exclusive jurisdiction over
the cases therein mentioned regardless of the imposable penalty; and (c) more
appropriately for the case at bar, Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No.
44, which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases
involving violations of said Act.
Jurisdiction is, of course, conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the
cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the
plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.
[32]
Accordingly, Congress may, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would be a special law and must
be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. In short,
the special law prevails over the general law.
R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered another special law on jurisdiction but
merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, it does not have the effect of repealing or modifying
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code; Section 57 of the Decree on Intellectual
Property; and Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44. In a manner of

speaking, R.A. No. 7691 was absorbed by the mother law, the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980.
That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting exclusive
jurisdiction in the Regional Trial Courts over certain cases is clearly evident from the
exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691. These special laws are not, therefore, covered by the
repealing clause (Section 6) of R.A. No. 7691.
Neither can it be successfully argued that Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by
P.D. No. 44, is no longer operative because Section 44 of B.P. Blg. 129 abolished the
Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts. While, indeed, Section 44 provides that these courts were to be deemed
automatically abolished upon the declaration by the President that the reorganization
provided in B.P. Blg. 129 had been completed, this Court should not lose sight of the
fact that the Regional Trial Courts merely replaced the Courts of First Instance as
clearly borne out by the last two sentences of Section 44, to wit:

Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and
the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old Courts
shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together
with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and necessary personnel.
In short, there was a change in name only -- from Courts of First Instance to Regional
Trial Courts. The Interim Rules and Guidelines Relative to the Implementation of B.P.
Blg. 129 promulgated by this Court on 11 January 1983 also provides that the reference
to the courts of first instance in the Rules of Court shall be deemed changed to the
regional trial courts.
Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the abolition of the Courts of First Instance
carried with it the abolition of their exclusive original jurisdiction in drug cases vested by
Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44. If that were so, then so must
it be with respect to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 57 of the
Decree on Intellectual Property. On the contrary, in the resolution of 19 June 1996
in Caro v. Court of Appeals [33]and in the resolution of 26 February 1997 in Villalon v.
Baldado, [34] this Court expressly ruled that Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive
original jurisdiction over libel cases pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code. In Administrative Order No. 104-96 this Court mandates that:

LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT.
It likewise provides that jurisdiction over cases involving violations of intellectual
property rights are confined exclusively to the Regional Trial Courts.

The same Administrative Order recognizes that violations of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
regardless of the quantity involved, are to be tried and decided by the Regional Trial
Courts therein designated as special courts. As to the latter, this Court in its Resolution
of 1 April 1997 in A.M. No. 96-11-421-RTC [35] resolved as follows:

to AMEND Administrative Order No. 104-96, dated October 21, 1996, with respect
only to the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, if the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Thus, if the imposable penalty is
below reclusion perpetua the drug related cases will be raffled among the regular
courts as ordinary criminal cases.
Thereafter in Circular No. 31-97 dated 15 May 1997, the Court Administrator directed
Judges of special courts for Kidnapping, Robbery, Carnapping, Dangerous Drugs and
other Heinous Crimes to comply with the aforesaid amendment to Administrative Order
No. 104-96. To avoid any further confusion or misunderstanding, we hereby declare that
the term regular courts found in the above amendment refers exclusively to the
Regional Trial Courts and was not intended to include Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In view of the foregoing, this Court hereby abandons the resolution in Gulhoran v.
Escao [36] where, through its Second Division, we ruled, in effect, that Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, was repealed by virtue of the repealing clause of R.A. No.
7691.
The RTC then did not commit any error in denying petitioners motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 96-8443.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, but only insofar as the issue of jurisdiction of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 is concerned. The Resolution of
8 August and 13 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, while the
challenged orders in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 116, are AFFIRMED. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to proceed
with the trial of Criminal Case No. 96-8443 with all reasonable dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 102360. March 20, 1996]

ROSITA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COUR T OF APPEALS

ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, respondents.

and

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

The instant case illustrates a long drawn-out litigation between parties who
already entered into a compromise agreement some thirty-five (35) years ago
and which agreement was given judicial imprimatur.One of them, up to now,
still refuses to be bound by the said judicial compromise.
Petitioner Rosita Domingo was one of the bona fide tenants-occupants of
an eighty-seven (87) hectare land located at Barrio Baesa, Caloocan City then
known as the Gonzales Estate.
Upon petition of the tenants sometime in 1947, the Republic of the
Philippines through the Rural Progress Administration (RPA) instituted an
action which was docketed as Civil Case No. 131 with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal for the expropriation of the Gonzales Estate and its
subsequent resale to the tenants thereof. The court ruled in favor of the
Republic and on appeal to this Court, the said decision was affirmed.
[1]

The Republic of the Philippines thereafter acquired title over the estate.
Administration of the estate was later transferred to the Peopless Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC) by the RPA. With the change in
administration came a change of policy with regard to the resale of the
subdivided lots. On March 16, 1960, the President ordered PHHC to sell a
bigger portion of the estate to persons other than thebona fide tenantsoccupants of the estate.
On October 29, 1960, fifty-two (52) tenants-occupants of the estate,
petitioner included, filed an action to compel the Republic of the Philippines
through the PHHC to sell the entire estate to them pursuant to Commonwealth
Act No. 539 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Case No. 131.
Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6376 (later redocketed as Civil
Case No. C-760).

On May 3, 1961, private respondent Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA)

filed a complaint in intervention on the basis of a document entitled
KASUNDUAN NA MAY PAGBIBIGAY KAPANGYARIHAN HINGGIL SA
ASYENDA GONZALES SA BAESA, CALOOCAN RIZAL. The said
KASUNDUAN was actually a document of sale or transfer whereby the 52
tenants conveyed unto AIA their respective landholdings in the estate. AIA
was allowed to intervene.
On November 28, 1961, AIA submitted to the lower court a Compromise
Agreement it entered into with 13 tenants-occupants of the estate. The said
agreement reads in full:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
Intervenor and plaintiffs Fausto Bajamonde, Gregorio Bajamonde, Juan
Bajamonde, Damaso Bajamonde, Andres Bajamonde, Perfecto Bajamonde,
Sixta Cleofas, Rosita Domingo, Catalina Pascual, Macaria Santos, Evaristo
Aquino, Narciso Aquino and Lazaro Pineda, assisted by their respective
counsel, respectfully manifest that they have arrived at an amicable
settlement of their case, as follows:
1. That plaintiffs herein admit all the allegations and prayer of intervenors complaint
in intervention;
2. That immediately upon acquisition of title to their respective lots, plaintiffs herein
shall convey the same to intervenor by way of absolute sale, free from all liens and
encumbrances, except any prior lien in favor of defendants, for the purchase price
of P5.55 per square meter, to be paid by intervenor, in the following manner:
P11,600.00

previously paid to and

acknowledged by plaintiffs
herein.

110,634.62

upon execution of this

agreement, as follows:

P60,000.00

directly to plaintiffs herein.

50,634.62

to defendant PHHC, for

plaintiffs account, as 10% initial
down-payment on the purchase
price of the lots, due to said

defendants from plaintiffs.

101,269.24

upon court approval of this

agreement - to be paid to
defendant PHHC, for the
account of plaintiffs herein, to
complete the required 30%
downpayment on said lots.

53,335.75

upon transfer of title in the name

of intervenor.

462,692.34

balance of purchase price, to be

liquidated in five years, in ten
equal semestral installments.

in accordance with the schedule, marked Annex A, which is attached hereto and made
an integral part hereof;
3. That the purchase price to be paid by intervenor for the individual lots of plaintiffs
herein shall be subject to adjustment, in accordance with the actual survey of said lots
to be made by defendant PHHC, duly approved by the proper government office;
4. That plaintiffs shall, immediately upon demand of intervenor, execute any and all
other documents which may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
agreement;
5. That plaintiffs shall deliver possession of said lots to intervenor, immediately upon
payment of the aforesaid sum of P101,269.24, free from all other occupants;
6. That intervenor is hereby authorized to advance, for the account of plaintiffs herein,
any and all amounts necessary to expedite the latters acquisition of title, which
amounts shall be deducted from the purchase price of their respective lots, due to
them from intervenor;
7. That for the sake of expediency, payments of the amounts mentioned herein above,
except those to defendants, shall be made by intervenor thru plaintiff Marciano
Baylon, who is hereby authorized by plaintiffs herein to receive the same for and in
their behalf, and to issue the corresponding receipts there for;
8. That documentation, notarization and other incidental expenses to be incurred in the
transfer of title from plaintiffs to intervenor shall be for the account of the latter;

9. That if, for any reason whatsoever, conveyance of title to intervenor could not be
affected, plaintiffs herein shall, upon demand from intervenor, reimburse the latter of
any and all amounts paid by intervenor under this agreement; provided, however, that
intervenors right to reimbursement under this agreement shall be without prejudice to
other legal remedies which intervenor may elect in the alternative, including the right
to ask for and receive the refund of whatever amounts it has advanced or paid for
plaintiffs account;
10. That, as security for the performance of plaintiffs obligation under this agreement,
plaintiffs herein hereby assigns, transfers and conveys to intervenor, all their rights,
interests and participation over their lots aforementioned;
11. That in the event of default by either of the parties hereto, the defaulting party
shall pay liquidated damages and attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the amount
involved.
WHEREFORE, the parties hereto respectfully pray that judgment be rendered in
accordance with the foregoing compromise agreement, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Quezon City and Malabon, Rizal, for Pasig, Rizal, November 28, 1961.
Sgd.
FAUSTO BAJAMONDE
Plaintiff
Sgd.
JUAN BAJAMONDE
Plaintiff
Sgd.
ANDRES BAJAMONDE
Plaintiff
Sgd.
PERFECTO
BAJAMONDE
Plaintiff
Sgd.
CATALINA PASCUAL
Plaintiff
Sgd.
EVARISTO AQUINO
Plaintiff

Sgd.
GREGORIO BAJAMONDE
Plaintiff
Sgd.
DAMASO BAJAMONDE
Plaintiff
Sgd.
SIXTA CLEOFAS
Plaintiff
Sgd.
ROSITA DOMINGO
Plaintiff
Sgd
MACARIA SANTOS
Plaintiff
Sgd.
NARCISO AQUINO
Plaintiff
Sgd
LAZARO PINEDA
Plaintiff

Sgd.
CRISPIN D. BAIZAS
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Shurdut Bldg., Manila
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE
(Now ARANETA UNIVERSITY)
Intervenor
By:
Sgd.
SALVADOR ARANETA
ROQUE & DAVID
By:
Sgd.
PORFIRIO C. DAVID
Counsel for Intervenor
R-410 Phil. Bank of Commerce Bldg.
Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila
[2]

On December 23, 1961, the trial court approved the above Compromise
Agreement in a partial decision embodying the said agreement.
[3]

On February 6, 1962, counsel for the tenants filed a motion for immediate
execution of the partial decision. The same was granted by the court on
February 23, 1962. Thereafter, PHHC filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court seeking to annul the order of execution. On
November 5, 1965, said petition was dismissed.
Meanwhile, some of the 13 tenants who entered into the Compromise
Agreement with AIA filed separate proceedings against the latter before the
trial courts of Caloocan City to annul the partial decision approving their
agreement. All the cases were dismissed. On her part, petitioner filed Civil
Case No. 473 but the same was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Subsequently, counsel for AIA filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution of the Partial Decision dated December 23, 1961.
On May 23, 1986, the lower court issued an order enforcing the said
decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the PHHC (now National Housing Authority) is ordered to comply
with the Partial Decision dated December 23, 1961 by executing a Deed of
Conveyance and/or transfer and delivering the titles of the lots originally awarded to
plaintiffs Rosita Domingo respecting Lot 48 free from all liens and encumbrances in
favor of Intervenor Araneta Institute of Agriculture upon proof of payment by the
intervenor of the purchase price.

So Ordered.

[4]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted order but

the same was denied on January 22, 1988.
[5]

In the meantime, even before the court could resolve the motion for
reconsideration, intervenor-private respondent filed another motion for
execution of the decision of December 23, 1961.
On July 7, 1988, the trial court issued an order which dispositively reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 22, 1988
[filed by intervenor-private respondent] is hereby GRANTED.
As prayed for, let a writ of execution be issued for the enforcement of the
Compromise Agreement dated November 28, 1961 and the partial Decision dated
December 23, 1961, ordering plaintiff Rosita Domingo:
1. To execute a deed of absolute sale of Lot 48 in favor of Intervenor Araneta Institute
of Agriculture; and
2. To deliver immediately the possession of said lot to said Intervenor Araneta
Institute of Agriculture.
SO ORDERED.

[6]

From the said order, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as
issues the following, to wit: (a) the validity of the Compromise Agreement and
the propriety of its approval in the decision of December 23, 1961; (b) the
applicability of the nullification of the Compromise Agreement and Partial
Decision by the same court on December 20, 1985; and (c) assuming that the
Compromise Agreement is valid, the correctness of the finding that intervenorprivate respondent complied with the terms and obligations of the agreement.
However, petitioner fared no better in the said appellate court. In
dismissing her petition, the Court of Appeals declared:
We shall address the first and second issues.
Plaintiff-appellant maintains that the so-called compromise agreement dated
November 28, 1961 and the partial decision dated December 23, 1961 approving said
agreement are null and void, as discussed and decided in the Order of December 20,
1985 x x x.

We find appellants contention unmeritorious.

Plaintiff-appellant filed Civil Case No. 473 against Araneta Institute of Agriculture, et
al., before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 120, to annul the partial
decision of December 23, 1961, involving the thirteen (13) tenants of whom she was
one of them. That case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal
was not appealed.
xxx xxx xxx
It will be observed that whatever the court a quo said about the Partial Decision dated
December 23, 1961, rendered by Judge Andres Reyes, approving and embodying the
Compromise Agreement dated November 23, 1961 wereobiter dicta. Being a
compromise judgment, it was final and immediately executory (Pamintuan vs. Muoz,
22 SCRA 1109, 1111; Pasay City Government vs. CFI Manila, 132 SCRA 156, 157),
unless a motion is filed to set aside the compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake,
duress, in which event, an appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion (De
los Reyes v. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945]; Piano vs. Cayanong, et al., 7 SCRA 397
[1963]; Cadano, et al. vs. Cadano, 49 SCRA 33 [1973]; Zagala vs. Jimenez, 152
SCRA 147, 157 [1987]). In the case at bar, no such motion was filed. Moreover, said
partial decision of Judge Reyes was not an issue submitted to the trial court in the
Motion to Execute Partial Decision dated December 23, 1961 on the basis of the
Compromise Agreement dated December 11, 1961. As a matter of fact, tbe dispositive
portion of the Order of December 20, 1985 did not declare the aforesaid partial
decision (compromise judgment) dated March 23, 1961 null and void.
xxx xxx xxx
On the third issue, appellant contends that the alleged intervenors compliance with its
contractual obligation has not been proven; that the trial court has ruled on the tenants
right of recission vis-a-vis the alleged agreement; and that the illegible photocopies of
alleged payment receipts were not duly presented and offered in evidence.
Appellants contention cannot be sustained.
To the motion for reconsideration of the Order dated January 22, 1988, filed by
Intervenor-appellee on February 19, 1988, has been attached Annexes A to E,
including Official Receipts dated December 6, 1961 and December 22, 1961 showing
payments made by Intervenor in compliance with the compromise judgment. We
agree with the trial court in finding them to be sufficient proof of compliance by the
Intervenor with the terms and conditions of the compromise judgment in question. In
the Order of July 7, 1988, the trial court ruled:

Now in the intervenors Motion for Reconsideration, it has averted that the sum of P1
10,634.62 and the sum of P101,269.24 have been paid in compliance with the
provisions of said Compromise Agreement and which are evidence by documents and
receipts marked as Annexes A to E and Exhibits 1, 1-A to 1-K; Exhibits 4, 4-A to 4-K.
Worthwhile noting is the Official Receipt No. 6094757, marked as Annex 1-D, dated
December 6, 1961, evidencing payment of P4,883.00 to plaintiff Rosita Domingo for
the ten (10%) percent down payment of the purchase price of the lot awarded to her
by the PHHC consisting of 12,800 square meters. Likewise, in another Official
Receipt No. 6096479, marked as Annex 4-D, dated December 29, 1961, for the
payment of P9,766.00 to plaintiff Rosita Domingo, as part payment of the price of the
lot equivalent to twenty (20%) percent of the Gonzales Estate, Baesa, Caloocan City.
It bears emphasis that the aforementioned payments of P4,683.00 (Annex 1-D) and
P9,766.00 (Annex 4-D) to Rosita Domingo are NOT DENIED either in the
Opposition to the Motion for Execution or in the Memorandum for Rosita Domingo.
Parenthetically, the photo copies of the receipts submitted by the intervenor are legible
enough for credible accounting purposes, contrary to plaintiffs claim.
Viewed from the foregoing, the ineluctably follows, that the Intervenor, indeed, has
fulfilled its obligation under the aforementioned compromise agreement of November
28, 1961, as approved by the partial decision dated December 23, 1961.
[7]

The petitioner is now before this Court raising the same issues brought to
respondent court for consideration, viz: (a) the validity of the Compromise
Agreement and the partial decision approving the same; and (b) the
admission in evidence of the receipts of payment made by private respondent
to petitioner.
[8]

The petition is not impressed with merit and we find no reason to discuss
the foregoing issues, the same having been raised before, and resolved at
length, by the trial court and respondent court in their respective
decisions. However, we shall reiterate the applicability of the following
pertinent principles to the instant case for clarity and emphasis.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and
the cause which are to constitute the contract. Once an agreement is
stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere contract binding
upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its
[9]

[10]

determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other
judgment.
[11]

Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise

agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal from such
judgment. The reason for this rule being that when both parties enter into an
agreement to end a pending litigation and request tha a decision be rendered
approving said agreement, it is only natural to presume that such action
constitutes an implicit waiver of the right to appeal against said decision.
[12]

A compromise may however be disturbed and set aside for vices of

consent or forgery. Hence, where an aggrieved party alleges mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity in the execution of the
compromise embodied in a judgment, an action to annul it should be
brought before the Court of Appeals, in accordance with Section 9(2) of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, which gives that court exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of regional trial
courts.
[13]

Here, petitioner filed an action to annul the compromise judgment with

the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 120 on the ground of
forgery. Said case was however dismissed for failure to prosecute. Clearly
then petitioner has forfeited her right to challenge the compromise judgment
not only because she did not appeal from the order of dismissal but more so
because she ventilated her remedy to the wrong court which had undoubtedly
no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of a concurrent court.
[14]

All told, we find no reason to reverse the assailed decision of respondent

court. Perforce, the partial decision dated December 23, 1961 must
accordingly be enforced and executed with deliberate dispatch and without
further delay.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.