EASEMENT

Valisno v. Adriano G.R. No. L-37409,

May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 398 Grino Aquino, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the owner of a parcel
of land in Nueva Ecija which he bought from his sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco.
Said land is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco and other vegetables
and adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano, on the bank of the Pampanga River. At the
time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the
Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing Adrianos land.
Later, Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived
of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57 hectare land. Thus,
Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation of waters rights in the Bureau of Public
Works and Communications (Bureau PWC). Bureau PWC ruled in favour of
Valisno. Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a reinvestigation
of the case which was granted. In the meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal
at his own expense due to his urgent need to irrigate his watermelon fields. Valisno
then filed a complaint for damages. However, the Secretary of Bureau PWC
reversed its decision and dismissed Valisnos complaint. It held that Eladio Adrianos
water rights which had been granted in1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936
or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water rights since
then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law.
Hence, the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs
partitioned among themselves. Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of the land which
Honorata received from her fathers estate did not acquire any water rights with the
land purchased. The trial court held that Valisno had no right to pass through the
defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that under
Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming a right to
water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Bureau-PWC and
his decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court
within thirty days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the
Public Works Secretary collaterally. Furthermore, there was nothing in Valisnos
evidence to show that the resolution was not valid. It dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim. Valisnos motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed to
the Court of the Appeals who certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the
Civil Code should apply to this case.

HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence of the irrigation
canal on Adrianos land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to
Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno was
equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in
Article 624 of the Civil Code: The existence of an apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be
considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement
may continue actively and passively, 100 unless at the time, theownership of the
two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of
either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the
deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in
common on by two or more persons (Civil Code). This provision was lifted from
Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided: Whenever a tract of
irrigated land which previously received its waters from a single point is divided
through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title, between two or more
owners, the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free passage
to the water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates, and
without right to any compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed
of conveyance. The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and
transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's
property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano
Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights,
title, interest and participations over the parcel of land above- described, together
with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500
GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe
with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the water rights and such other
improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to
Valisno, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of
Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive. Water
rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in
a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water
is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have
qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property
right, which survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters
in favor of Valisno has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as Adrianos act
of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the
Pampanga River.

Ronquillo, et. al. v. Roco, et. al.

G.R. No. L-10619, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 84 Montemayor, J.

FACTS: Plaintiff Leogario Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted
use of a road which traversed the land of the defendants, Rocos, in going to
Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City for more than 20 years and that
the Rocos have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of a right
of way of said plaintiffs. 101 On May 12, 1953, the defendants along with a number
of men maliciously obstructed plaintiffs right of way by constructing a chapel in the
middle of the said road and then later, by means of force, intimidation, and threats,
illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed
hermitically the road passage way thereby preventing the plaintiff from using it. The
plaintiff claims that he has already acquired the easement of right of way over the
land thru prescription by his continuous and uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of
land as passage way. However, plaintiffs complaint was dismissed by the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription.
HELD: No. The Court held than an easement of right of way may not be acquired
thru prescription because though it may be apparent, it is nevertheless
discontinuous or intermittent, and therefore, under Article 622 of the New Civil
Code, can be acquired only by a virtue of a title. Furthermore, a right of way cannot
be acquired by prescription because prescription requires that the possession be
continuous and uninterrupted.

Taedo v. Bernad
G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 86 Padilla, J.

FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On
the said two lots, a septic tank was constructed for the common use of the
occupants of both lots. Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Taedo and
the other Lot 7501- B was also mortgaged to Taedo as a security for the payment
of loan with an agreement that Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501-B to him.
However, said Lot 7501-B was sold to herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita
Sim. Upon learning of the said sale, Taedo offered to redeem the property from Sim
but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building
of Eduardo Taedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also
asked Taedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B.
Taedo was then constrained to file an action for legal redemption and damages
invoking Article 1622 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, respondent Spouses

claimed they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that Eduardo Taedo has no
right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be
redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Taedo. ISSUE: Whether or not
the petitioners right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot 7501-B,
ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners
who do not have the same interest. 102
HELD: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no statement abolishing
or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot
7501- A to Eduardo Taedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe
and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo
Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law.
Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient
estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude.

Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333 Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago,
Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The private
respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties. Before the
petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in
going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed
through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the
petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of
its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property through which
the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass. Later, or sometime in
August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach
hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative
passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it.
Therefore, an action for injunction with damages was filed against the petitioner by
the private respondents before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. The CFI
rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private respondents had
acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy based on its long
existence and its continued use and enjoyment by the private respondents and also
by the community at large. On appeal, Appellate Court held as without basis the
trial court's finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over
the passageway in question by virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed
out that an easement of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622

of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by
prescription. That notwithstanding, the appellate court went on to rule that ". . . in
the interest of justice and in the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction,
there is no reason for Us in not treating the easement here sought by appellees
Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco as one that is not dependent
upon the claims of the parties but a compulsory one that is legally demandable by
the owner of the dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate."

ISSUE: Whether or not the easement may be granted to private respondent over
the land of Costabella.
HELD: No. It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is
involved here, is discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by prescription.
Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood
correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct pronouncement, the respondent
Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the
dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement had been validly
constituted over the petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to
commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory
easement which the private respondents, as owners of the "dominant" estate, may
demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate.
Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the owner of the dominant estate
may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the
existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment
of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts;
and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
In the case at bar, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had
established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law.

Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 74 Fernan, C.J.

FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate bounded on north by the servient
estate owned by respondents and an estate owned by Magsino, all of which are
located in Talisay, Batangas. The servient estate is bound on the north by the
national highway. To provide access to the highway, a one meter road path was
paved through in which half of its width was taken from the estate of Magsino and
the other half from the estate of the respondent. Petitioner started a nursery plant

type of business in which pushcarts were used to haul the plants from his estate to
and from his nursery and the highway, using the one meter road path. As his
business grew, he bought a jeepney to enable him to transport more plants and soil
catering to the now bigger demand. The problem however was that the jeepney
cannot pass through the road path since its width would not be accommodated by a
one meter width. Petitioner made a request upon the respondent to sell to him 1
meters of their property so that the pathway may be widened to enable his jeepney
to pass through. The respondents refused. Petitioner went to court praying that he
would be granted the additional land to the right of way already constituted but the
trial court rendered a decision adverse to the petitioner because there was no such
necessity as it was shown that there was the presence of dried river bed only 80
meters away from the property of the petitioner which he may use as an alternative
route. The CA affirmed said decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be granted his prayer to buy the
additional land to increase the existing one meter road path.
HELD: Yes. Even with the presence of the dried river bed, upon thorough
investigation, it was found to be an inadequate right of way because a concrete
bridge traverses it thereby the jeep would have to jump over said bridge which has
a height of 5 meters in order to reach the highway. It was also found that during the
rainy season, the same was impassable as it became flooded. This right of way
could not provide adequate access to the highway thereby when an estate has no
access to a public road, it may demand for a right of way. Furthermore, under Article
651 of the Civil Code, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately
determine the width of the right of way. In this case, since the business of the
petitioner grew larger and pushcarts became tedious to transport his nursery plants,
it became necessary for him to do so with a jeepney. And in order to efficiently
make such transportation of his plants, the right of way had to be widened to
accommodate the width of the jeepney of the petitioner. The petitioner thus shall be
granted the additional land to the existing right of way.

Case v. Heirs of Tuason

G.R. No. L-5044, December 1, 1909, 14 Phil. 521 Torres, J.
FACTS: The counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibaez
alleged that the parties whom he represents are owners in common of the property
adjoining that of the petitioner Edwin Case on the southwest. The latter, extended
his southwest boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and
Santibaez. They alleged that the true dividing line between the property of the
petitioner and that of the said heirs is a belonging to the respondents, and that
about two years ago, when Case made alterations in the buildings erected on his
land, he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall owned by the

respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the wall is the property of the heirs of the late
Tuason and Santibaez.
HELD: The wall in controversy belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and
Santibaez for the reason, among others, that in the public document by which one
of their original ancestors acquired on the 19th of April, 1796, the property now
possessed by them, it appears that property was then already inclosed by a stone
wall. The wall supports only the property of the respondents and not that of the
petitioner, can not be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire length would
belong to the adjoining building owned by Mr. Case. There is not sufficient proof to
sustain such claim, and besides, the building erected thereon disproves the
pretension of the petitioner. Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of
party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the
contrary, among others, in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the common
point of elevation. The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three
cases dealt with in the said article of the code, and is that of juris tantum unless the
contrary appear from the title of ownership of the adjoining properties, that is to
say, that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property owners, or
where there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a
presumption against the party wall. It can not be presumed that the aforesaid
portion was a party wall, and that it was not exclusively owned by the respondents,
inasmuch as the latter have proven by means of a good title that has not been
impugned by the petitioner, that when one of their ancestors and principals
acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which the building
was erected; it must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property
the wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included.

Choco v. Santamaria
G.R. No. 6076, December 29, 1911, 21 Phil. 132 Mapa, J.
FACTS: The defendant in the building of his house, has made several openings and
windows in the walls of the house on both sides overlooking then property of the
plaintiff; that at the time the defendant was building his house, and the windows
and the openings were being made, the plaintiffs protested, and later on and in the
year 1905 made written protest and demand on the defendant, and the defendant
received the written protest and referred it to his counsel, who, from the evidence,
appears to have suggested an amicable and adjustment of the matter, but the
adjustment was not made, and this action was brought. The Trial Court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Severina and Flora Choco, and against the
defendant, Isidro Santamaria, forever prohibiting the opening of the window stated,
which must be closed, and forever prohibiting the opening of the windows and
openings marked, which must be closed or made to conform to the requirements of
law with regard to dimensions and an iron grate embedded in the wall, with the
costs of the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred by not ordering in his judgment the
final and perpetual closing of the large window opened in the balcony of the back
part of the appellee's house and that, though the appellant's lot can be seen
through the window, it is not contiguous to the latter's property.
HELD: To judge from the photographic views, it opens on the boundary line
between the said lot and that the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a
part of the wall that belongs to the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the
testimony of the defendant's witness who took the said photographs, in so far as he
said that "a part of 106 the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs' property,
since between it and the plaintiffs' property there does not intervene the distance
required by law that of two meters in the first case, and 60 centimeters in the
second, therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of the provisions of article 582
of the Civil Code which reads as follows: Windows with direct views, or balconies or
any similar openings projecting over the estate of the neighbor, cannot be made if
there is not a distance of, at least, 2 meters between the wall in which they are built
and said estate. Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property,
unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters. Because of the lack of the distance
required by law, the window in question must be closed, and consequently the
judgment appealed from should be modified in this sense, as regards this window.

Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 90596, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 748 Sarmiento, J
FACTS: Petitioner Solid Manila Corporation is the owner of the land in Ermita,
Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the
private respondent Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. The private respondents title came
from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as
easement of way. As a consequence, there is an annotation which was entered
wherein a construction of private alley has been undertaken. However, the
petitioner averred that they and their neighbors have been using the private alley
and maintained and contributed to its upkeep until sometime in 1983. Due to this,
the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered used.
The petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent to have
the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo issued
ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. However, the
Court of Appeals ordered the restoration of the annotation. They ruled that an
easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private
respondents title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the
property, merger brought about an extinguishment of the easement. The
petitioner then averred that the very deed of sale executed between the private
respondent and the previous owner of the property excluded the alley in question,

and that in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the alley as an
easement, notwithstanding the sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement had been extinguished by merger.
HELD: No. The Court held that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of
the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code,
a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is
consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here, however. The
servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in
favor of a particular tenement but rather, 107 for the benefit of the general public
as stated in Article 614 of the Civil Code. In personal servitude, there is therefore no
owner of a dominant tenement to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons
without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said,
presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the
termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner
conveys the property in favor of the public, if that is possible, no genuine merger
can take place that would terminate a personal easement.

Floro v. Llenado
G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713 Romeo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro Park Subdivision who has its
own egress and ingress to and from the Mac Arthur Highway by means of its Road
Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing. On the other hand, Respondent Orlando Llenado,
is the registered owner of Llenado Homes Subdivision, adjacent to Floro Park
Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by Llenado, the land was known as the Emmanuel
Homes Subdivision, a duly licensed and registered housing subdivision in the name
of Soledad Ortega. Bounded on the South by the 5 to 6 meter-wide Palanas Creek,
which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west by ricelands
belonging to Marcial Ipapo. the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or
passage to the Mac Arthur Highway. However, a proposed access road traversing
the idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision
plan of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision which was duly approved by the defunct
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. Meanwhile, the Llenados sought, and
were granted permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park
Subdivision as passageway to and from MacArthur Highway. However no contract of
easement of right of way was ever perfected by both parties. Later, Floro barricaded
Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby preventing
its use by the Llenados. Llenado instituted a complaint before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan against Floro for easement of right of way. The RTC granted the prayer for

the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered Floro to open
the road and pay damages. Thereafter, the trial court rendered another judgment
dismissing the case and lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
previously issued and ordered the plaintiff to pay defendant damages and costs. On
appeal by Llenado on the CA, the judgment of the RTC was reversed ordering Floro
to open roads 4 and 5 and remove all the objects that prevent passage on road 5
and to pay the plaintiff damages with costs and payment of indemnity for the
easement of right of way.

ISSUE: Whether or not Llenado is entitled to a compulsory easement of right of

way.
HELD: No. For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way
under the Civil Code, the preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof
must be established. These preconditions are: (1) that the dominant estate is
108 surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) after payment of proper indemnity
(Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and, (4) that the
right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate;
and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650). The
burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory
right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. On the past subdivision plans
by Emmanuel Homes which is bought by Llenado, there is an indication of an access
road through IPAPOs property although it was not properly paved, a dirt road will
suffice. Seeing this, Llenado has failed to comply with the first requirement. If the
servitude requested by Llenado is allowed, other subdivision developers/owners
would be encouraged to hastily prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious provisions
for access roads merely for registration purposes. Furthermore, if such practice were
tolerated, the very purpose for which Presidential Decree No. 957 was enacted, that
is, to protect subdivision buyers from unscrupulous subdivision owners/developers
who renege on their duties to develop their subdivisions in accordance with the duly
approved subdivision plans, would be defeated. In order to justify the imposition of
the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial
necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by
law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of a
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the same should not
be imposed. The complaint for easement of right of way filed by Llenado in the
lower court did not contain a prayer for the fixing of the amount that he must pay
Floro in the event that the easement of right of way is constituted. Thus, the
existence of the second requisite has likewise not been established. Private
respondent Llenado admitted that the Ipapo riceland was no longer being

cultivated. Indications are that it has already been abandoned as a ricefield. There
was no reason for private respondent's failure to develop the right of way except
the inconvenience and expenses it would cost him. Hence, the third requisite has
not been met. Failing to establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles
649 and 650 of the Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's bid for a compulsory
easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must
fail.

Quimen v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996, 257 SCRA 163 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio,
Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan.
They 109 agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did,
with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal
road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their
brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2)
equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is behind the
property of Sotero, father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda
purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia
who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner
offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a
public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that
she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda
constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public
highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay
for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was
thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. Later, Yolanda
purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6- B, located directly
behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their
house from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's
perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire
frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long.
Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and
egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself
obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the
facade of the store to reach the road. Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper
court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The report was that
the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing
the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending
inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters to
avoid the store. However, the trial court dismissed her complaint. The Court of

Appeals reversed the decision declaring that she was entitled to a right of way on
petitioners property and that the way proposed by Yoland would cause the least
damage and detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more
accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down
the avocado tree standing thereon.
HELD: Yes. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of
way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an
adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the
proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate;
and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While
shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when
there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other
hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most
convenient to pass 110 through. In other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen.
However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if
it will not be the shortest. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of
strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way
which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second
alternative should be preferred.

De Jesus, et. al. v. Homart Corporation, et. al.

G.R. No. 44191 R, August 28, 1974, 19 CA Rep. 831
FACTS: Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus are owners of the building located in Tondo,
Manila. They brought an action for damages against Homart Corporation and
Howmill Manufacturing Corporation, owners of the land adjoining the plaintiff on the
same street where a sixty storey concrete building was constructed. Plaintiffs allege
that the defendants failed to observe the necessary care and precautions to protect
the construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support, thereby causing it to sink in some parts; its walls, ceilings, and floorings to
crack in some places; and by the careless manner of handling the cement used the
roofings of the building of the plaintiff were damaged with the accumulated debris
piled thereon.

ISSUE: Whether or not proper precautions had been taken by the defendants in
constructing the building in question so as to prevent causing damage to the
building of the plaintiff.
HELD: No. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides No property shall make such
excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building sufficient
lateral or subjacent support. A reading of Article 684 shows that the duty of an
adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support is an absolute one. It does not depend on the degree of care and
precaution made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land.
Plaintiffs house which adjoins the seven storey concrete building constructed by the
defendants had sunk by about eight inches. The sinking of the left side of the house
of the plaintiffs was due to the weakening of subjacent support and to the weight of
the seven storey concrete building constructed by the defendant, as the excavation
made necessarily disturbed the subjacent soil of the plaintiffs land. Defendants
having failed to provide the plaintiffs land and house with sufficient lateral and
subjacent support are liable for damages.

La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 111

G.R. No. 95252, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 498 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: The Tuasons owned a vast tract of land in Quezon City and Marikina, and
when they sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings, it
was expressly provided in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the boundary line
between the property sold and the adjoining property of the Tuasons shall be a road
fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property sold to
the Philippine Building Corporation and the other half from the portion adjoining
belonging to the Tuasons. Philippine Building Corporation then sold and assigned
with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to ATENEO which
assumed the mortgage and the obligation in the seven and one-half roadway. On
their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to
Philippine Building Corporation into a residential village known as LA VISTA
Subdivision. Thus the boundary between LA VISTA and the portion sold to ATENEO
was the 15-meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan Road. The Tuasons
developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15-meter wide boundary, while ATENEO
deferred improvement on its share and erected instead an adobe wall on the entire
length of the boundary. ATENEO subsequently sold to Solid Homes Inc. the land
which the latter developed into a subdivision now known as LOYOLA Grand Villas.
Solid Homes Inc. now claims to have an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan
Road through which they could have access to Katipunan Avenue. LA VISTA however
instructed its security guards to prohibit agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc.,
from traversing Mangyan Road, and even constructed concrete posts that prevented

the residents of LOYOLA from passing through. Solid Homes, Inc., filed a case before
the Regional Trial Court and prayed that LA VISTA been joined from preventing and
obstructing the use and passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road. The
lower court recognized the easement of right-ofway along Mangyan Road in favor of
Solid Homes, Inc., and ordered LA VISTA to pay damages. On appeal by LA VISTA,
the decision of the lower court was affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.

HELD: Yes. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e.,
the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively, clearly
established a contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. A voluntary
easement is quite evidently manifested in the stipulation in the Deed of Sale with
mortgage executed by them. When the easement was established by their contract,
the parties unequivocally made provisions for its observance by all whom in the
future might succeed them in dominion. It is thus very apparent that the parties and
their respective 112 predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of
right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and
servient estates. With this, the free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created
by the voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally
demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with the corresponding duty on
the servient estate not to obstruct the same. LA VISTA contends that there are other
routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road, however, this should not be taken into
consideration since the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish
only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at
bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of
necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives
the termination of the necessity.

Alcantara v. Reta, Jr.

G.R. No. 136996, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 364
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Alcantara and the other petitioners claim that they were tenants or
lessees of the land owned by Reta. The land has been converted into a commercial
center and Reta is threatening to eject them. They claim that since they are
legitimate tenants or lessees of such land, they have the right of first refusal to
purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517,

the Urban Land Reform Act. They also claimed that the amicable settlement
executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble, one of the petitioners, was void ab initio
for being violative of PD No. 1517. On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is
question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517 since it was not proclaimed as an
Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). Alcantara, among others, then filed complaint for
the exercise of the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517 in the Regional Trial
Court. However, such complaint was dismissed and such dismissal was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE: Whether the Alcantara and the other petitioners have the right of first
refusal.
HELD: No. The land involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone
(ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing Authority
requesting that said land be declared as an ULRZ. Clearly, the request to have the
land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property was an ULRZ.
PD No. 1517 pertains to areas proclaimed as ULRZ. Consequently, petitioners
cannot claim any right under the said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ. To
be able to qualify and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree,
one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must
have 113 built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously
for the last ten (10) years. Those who do not fall within the said category cannot be
considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first
refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the
same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time. Reta denies that he has lease
agreements with Alcantara and Roble. Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to
present evidence of a lease agreement other than his testimony in court. Reta
allowed Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered
tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Roble was
also allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his
gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article
614 of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the
conclusion would still be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct and not
of lease. Thus, Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by PD No. 1517. With
regard to the other petitioners, Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements with
them. This notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate tenants who can
exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517. From the moment Reta
demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease agreements,
which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid monthly, ceased to exist as
there was termination of the lease. In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified
to exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517. There was also no intention
on the part of Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the petitioners had the right
of first refusal, the situation which would allow the exercise of that right, that is, the

sale or intended sale of the land has not happened. PD No. 1517 applies where the
owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.

Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114170, January 15, 1999, 301 SCRA 52 Mendoza,
J.
FACTS: Private respondent Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc. (MFI) and petitioner Prosperity
Credit Resources, Inc. (PCRI) executed a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU)
wherein PCRI acceded to MFIs request to redeem three of the seven lots foreclosed
and won by the former in the ensuing public auction. The MOA was conditioned
upon the agreement that the petitioner shall be given a right of way on the existing
private road which forms part of the area to be redeemed by private respondents.
Later, PCRI filed an injunctive suit against MFI alleging, inter alia, that the latter, in
violation of the terms of the MOU, refused to allow PCRI to make excavations on one
side of the access road for the installation of water. The trial court granted the
petition for the issuance of the 114 writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On
appeal, the CA set aside the assailed order of the trial court; hence, this petition for
review on certiorari. PCRI contends that it is entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction as may be gleaned from the following provision in
the MOU: The above cited lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to
ingress and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL
RESOURCES, INC. or its successors=in-interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering private respondent to allow
petitioner to undertake excavations along the access road for the purpose of
installing water pipes.
Held: Yes. There is no question as to the meaning of the terms ingress and
egress. They give petitioner the right to use the private road as means of entry
into and exit from its property on the northwestern side o f the compound. The
question concerns the meaning of the phrase for whatever kind of passage. The
trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to make
excavations on the side of the access road in order to install a network of pipes. The
word passage does not, however; clearly and unmistakably convey a meaning
that includes a right to install water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning
of the word, as defined in Websters Dictionary, is that act or action of passing:
movement or transference from one place or point to another. this legal meaning is
not different. It means, according to Blacks Law Dictionary, the act of passing;
transit; transition.

Villanueva v. Velasco
G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 99
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said
property. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its
southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of
right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest
of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to
petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the
aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement.
Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley
Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for easement. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian
and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement. On August 13, 1991, a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued, ordering the Gabriels to provide the
right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. On
January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He
maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he was
not a party to the civil case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner.
HELD: Yes. Unlike other types of encumbrance of real property, a servitude like a
right of way can exist even if they are not expressly stated or annotated as an
encumbrance in a Torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the estates
to which they actively or passively belong. Moreover, Villanueva was bound by the
contract of easement, not only as a voluntary easement but as a legal easement. A
legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exist unless its removal is
provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before
the execution of the conveyance conformably with Article 649 in accordance with
Article 617 of the Civil Code.

National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114348, September 20, 2000, 340 SCRA 661

Pardo, J.
FACTS: A free patent over 3 hectares of land in Cagayan was issued and
registered in the name of private respondent Dick Manglapus predecessor-ininterest, Vicente Manglapus. The land was granted to the latter subject to the
provisions of sections 113, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which
provide that except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, the land hereby acquired shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to
encumbrance for a period of 5 years from the date of this patent and shall not be
liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of that
period. Subsequently, private respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente
Manglapus by absolute sale and was later registered 11 years later from the
issuance of patent. Meanwhile, petitioner National Irrigation Administration entered
into a contract with Villamar Development Construction. Under the contract,
petitioner NIA was to construct canals in Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of
petitioners land and made diggings and fillings thereon. Private respondent then
filed a complaint for damages alleging that petitioners diggings and fillings
destroyed the agricultural use of his land and that no reasonable compensation was
paid for its taking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation
for the taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way.
HELD: No. We find that NIA is under no obligation. We sustain the appeal. We agree
with NIA that the Transfer Certificate of Title and the Original Certificate of Title
covering the subject parcel of land contained a reservation granting the government
a right of way over the land covered therein. Under the Original Certificate of Title,
there was a reservation and condition that the land is subject to to all conditions
and public easements and servitudes recognized and 116 prescribed by law,
especially thouse mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. This reservation, unlike the other
provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a
subsisting condition. Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands
granted by patent, shall further be subject to a right of way not exceeding twenty
meters in width for public highways, railrods, irrigation, ditches, aqueducts,
telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar works as the Government or any public
or quasi-public service or enterprises, including mining or forest concessionaires
may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with damages for the
improvements only. Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that Easements are
established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal
and the latter voluntary easements. In the present case, we find and declare that a
legal easement of a rightof-way exists in favor of the government. The land was
originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The

ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case,
just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an
easement of a right of way. appelle, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law
is imperative. Under Article 637 of the Civil Code, it is provided that lower estates
are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they
carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase the burden. A similar provion is found under Article 50 of the
Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067), which provides that lower estates
are obliged to receive the water which naturally and without the intervention of man
flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone or eath which they carry with
them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the
owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this natural flow. As
worded, the two aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower
estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man
descend from higher estates. However, where the waters which flow from a higher
estate are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage
occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to
compensation.

MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

Acap v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118114, December 7, 1995, 251 SCRA 30 Padilla, J.
FACTS: The title to Lot 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental was evidenced by OCT R-12179. The lot has an area of 13,720 sq. m. The
title was issued and is registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and
Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot.
In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled Declaration of
Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Cosme Pido. Since 1960, Teodoro
Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering an area of 9,500
sq. m. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap
continued to be the registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold
rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pidos death, to his widow Laurenciana. The
controversy began when Pido died interstate and on 27 November 1981, his
surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre, wherein they
declared to have adjudicated upon themselves the parcel of land in equal share,

and that they waive, quitclaim all right, interests and participation over the parcel of
land in favor of Edy de los Reyes. The document was signed by all of Pidos heirs.
Edy de los Reyes did not sign said document. It will be noted that at the time of
Cosme Pidos death, title to the property continued to be registered in the name of
the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of
Rights in his favor, de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of
a notice of an adverse claim against the original certificate of title. Thereafter, delos
Reyes sought for Acap to personally inform him that he had become the new owner
of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Delos Reyes
alleged that he and Acap entered into an oral lease agreement wherein Acap agreed
to pay 10 cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982, Acap allegedly
complied with said obligation. In 1983, however, Acap refused to pay any further
lease rentals on the land, prompting delos Reyes to seek the assistance of the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The MAR invited
Acap, who sent his wife, to a conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. The wife
stated that the she and her husband did not recognize delos Reyess claim of
ownership over the land. On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years, delos
Reyes filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Acap,
alleging that as his leasehold tenant, Acap refused and failed to pay the agreed
annual rental of 10 cavans of palay despite repeated demands. On 20 August 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject declaration of heirship and waiver of rights is a
recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent over the lot in
question.

HELD: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising
from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to
ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain
conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only
pursuant to a legal mode or 120 process. While title is the juridical justification,
mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in
question. Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are
generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through
occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and the derivative
mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain
contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum). In the case at
bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract
(deed) of sale. They are not the same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate
thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon
the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public
instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs

adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they
see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court. Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary
rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a
contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a
mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to
relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private
respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot
conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver
document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any
other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.

DONATION
Central Phil. University v. CA
246 SCRA 511
DOCTRINE:
Onerous Donation: one executed for a valuable consideration which is considered the
equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value
of the donation.
When a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the
land a school, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition
but a resolutory one.
FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., then a member of the Board of Trustees of CPU, executed a
deed of donation in favor of CPU over a parcel of land, with the following annotations
1 The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment
and use of a medical college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum;
2 The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third party nor in any
way encumber said land;
3 The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the said college
shall be under obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income from
the land or any of its parks shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ
CAMPUS FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus and erection of a building
thereon.
50 years later, private respondents, the heirs of Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed an action for

annulment of donation, reconveyance and damages against CPU alleging that the latter had not
complied with the conditions of the donation. They also argued that CPU negotiated with the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated property with another land. In its
answer CPU alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed and it
denied any violation of the conditions in the deed of donation.
In 1991, the RTC ruled against CPU and ordered it to reconvey the property in favor of the heirs
of the donor. Petitioner appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that the
annotations at the petitioner's certificate of title were resolutory conditions, breach of which
should terminate the rights of the donee thus making the donation revocable. The CA also ruled
that while the first condition mandated the use of the donated property for the establishment of a
medical school, the donor did not fix a period within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence,
until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the condition, petitioner could not be considered as
having failed to comply with its part of the bargain. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the donation was onerous and the conditions therein resolutory, although such conditions
were given no fixed period. -- YES
HELD:
Based on the conditions in the deed of donation, the donation was onerous. When Don Ramon
Lopez donated the parcel of land but imposed an obligation upon CPU to establish a medical
college thereon, the donation must be for an onerous consideration.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, in conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as
the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the
event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the
condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a
condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.It is not correct to say that
the school had to be constructed before the donation became effective, that is, before the donee
could become the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the
donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition.If there was no
fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the
donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall
be deemed lost and extinguished.
The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action of private respondents is
unavailing. When the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it
can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil
Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix the duration because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance
and such period has arrived.
This general rule, however, cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances
existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of 50 years has allowed petitioner to
avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the
donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more
need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere
technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary
and expensive multiplication of suits.

Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up
to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as
donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only
just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes,
revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the
donor by means of reconveyance.
DISSENTING OPINION (Davide):
I agree with the view in the majority opinion that the donation in question is onerous considering
the conditions imposed by the donor on the donee which created reciprocal obligations upon
both parties. Beyond that, I beg to disagree.
First of all, may I point out an inconsistency in the majority opinion's description of the donation
in question. In one part, it says that the donation in question is onerous. Yet, later on it states
that the donation is basically a gratuitous one.
Second, the discussion on conditional obligations is unnecessary. There is no conditional
obligation to speak of in this case. It seems that the "conditions" imposed by the donor and as
the word is used in the law of donations is confused with "conditions" as used in the law of
obligations. In his annotation of Article 764 of the Civil Code on Donations, Arturo M. Tolentino
states clearly the context within which the term "conditions" is used in the law of donations, to
wit:
The word "conditions" in this article does not refer to uncertain events on which the birth or
extinguishment of a juridical relation depends, but is used in the vulgar sense of obligations or
chargesimposed by the donor on the donee. It is used, not in its technical or strict legal sense,
but in its broadest sense.
Clearly then, when the law and the deed of donation speaks of "conditions" of a donation, what
are referred to are actually the obligations, charges or burdens imposed by the donor upon the
donee and which would characterize the donation as onerous. In the present case, the donation
is, quite obviously, onerous, but it is more properly called a "modal donation." A modal donation
is one in which the donor imposes a prestation upon the donee. The establishment of the
medical college as the condition of the donation in the present case is one such prestation.
The conditions imposed by the donor Don Ramon Lopez determines neither the existence nor
the extinguishment of the obligations of the donor and the donee with respect to the donation. In
fact, the conditions imposed by Don Ramon Lopez upon the donee are the very obligations of
the donation to build the medical college and use the property for the purposes specified in
the deed of donation. It is very clear that those obligations are unconditional, the fulfillment,
performance, existence or extinguishment of which is not dependent on any future or uncertain
event or past and unknown event, as the Civil Code would define a conditional obligation.
It is incorrect to say that the "conditions" of the donation in the present case are resolutory
conditions because, applying Article 1181 of the Civil Code, that would mean that upon
fulfillment of the conditions, the rights already acquired will be extinguished. Obviously, that
could not have been the intention of the parties. What the majority opinion probably had in mind
was that the conditions are resolutory because if they are not complied with, the rights of the
donee as such will be extinguished and the donation will be revoked. To my mind, though, it is
more accurate to state that the conditions here are not resolutory conditions but, for the reasons
stated above, are theobligations imposed by the donor.

Third, I cannot subscribe to the view that the provisions of Article 1197 cannot be applied here.
The conditions/obligations imposed by the donor herein are subject to a period. I draw this
conclusion based on our previous ruling in Barretto vs. City of Manila, in which we said that
when the contract of donation has no fixed period in which the condition should be fulfilled, the
provisions of what is now Article 1197 are applicable and it is the duty of the court to fix a
suitable time for its fulfillment. Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of the
conditions/obligations of the present donation, it can be inferred that a period was contemplated
by the donor. Don Ramon Lopez could not have intended his property to remain idle for a long
period of time when in fact, he specifically burdened the donee with the obligation to set up a
medical college therein and thus put his property to good use. There is a need to fix the duration
of the time within which the conditions imposed are to be fulfilled.
It is also important to fix the duration or period for the performance of the conditions/obligations
in the donation in resolving the petitioner's claim that prescription has already barred the
present action. I disagree once more with the ruling of the majority that the action of the
petitioners is not barred by the statute of limitations. The mere fact that there is no time fixed as
to when the conditions of the donation are to be fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the
statute of limitations will not apply anymore and the action to revoke the donation becomes
imprescriptible.
Admittedly, the donation now in question is an onerous donation and is governed by the law on
contracts (Article 733). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be upheld, except
its ruling that the conditions of the donation are resolutory.

Lagazo v. CA
287 SCRA 18

DOCTRINES:
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an
onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is indispensable, its absence makes the donation null
and void.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action seeking to recover from private respondent Cabanlit a parcel of land
which the former claims to have acquired from his grandmother by donation. Private
respondent, on the other hand, put up the defense that when the alleged donation was
executed, he had already acquired the property by a Deed of Assignment from a transferee of
plaintiff-appellee's grandmother.
After trial, the lower court decided in favor of plaintiff-appellee and against defendant-appellant,
rationalizing that the evidence presented by the former is more credible than that of the latter.
Respondent Court of Appeals reversed trial courts decision and anchored its ruling upon the
absence of any showing that petitioner accepted his grandmother's donation of the subject land.

Citing jurisprudence that the donee's failure to accept a donation whether in the same deed of
donation or in a separate instrument renders the donation null and void, Respondent Court
denied petitioner's claim of ownership over the disputed land. The appellate court also struck
down petitioner's contention that the formalities for a donation of real property should not apply
to his case since it was an onerous one he paid for the amortizations due on the land before
and after the execution of the deed of donation reasoning that the deed showed no burden,
charge or condition imposed upon the donee; thus, the payments made by petitioner were his
voluntary acts.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not
be stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose
any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in
fact and in reality paid for the installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in
question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as
provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by
Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his
right of possession against private respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation.
1
2

ISSUES:
Whether or not the acceptance of a donation made in a separate instrument but not formally
communicated to the donor may be considered complete, valid and subsisting. -- NO
Whether or not the deed of donation which did not expressly impose any burden (the expressed
consideration being purely one of liberality and generosity) but the recipient actually paid
charges imposed on the property like land taxes and installment arrearages may be deemed
onerous and thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts. -- NO
HELD.
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an
onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.
The Supreme Court ruled that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that
petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such
payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee.
Supreme Court agrees with the respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were
merely his voluntary acts.
As a pure or simple donation, the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee (Art. 734 of the Civil Code). Acceptance of the donation by the donee
is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and void. Furthermore, if the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

De Luna v. Abrigo

181 SCRA 150

FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The
donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and
conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the
donor. When the Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna revived the said
donation by executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:
1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and
Kindergarten School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from
the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a
Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the
remaining area was retained by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with
the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The
Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the
conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The
heirs did not file an MR and went straight to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation
of the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 enforcement of a written contract)
HELD:
10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed
not by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions
for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply.
The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which
provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation.
However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of
Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules
on prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.

Liguez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-11240, December 18, 1957, 102 Phil. 577 Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: The case began upon complaint filed by petitioner-appellant against the widow and
heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of land in barrio Davao. Plaintiff averred
to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said land, executed in her favor by the
late owner, Salvador P. Lopez, on 18 May 1943. The defense interposed was that the donation
was null and void for having an illicit causa or consideration, which was the plaintiff's entering
into marital relations with Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had been
adjudicated to the appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance, since 1949. It was
ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land originally belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Salvador P. Lopez and his wife, Maria Ngo; that the latter had met and berated
Conchita for living maritally with her husband, sometime during June of 1943; that the widow
and children of Lopez were in possession of the land and made improvements thereon; that the
land was assessed in the tax rolls first in the name of Lopez and later in that of his widow.; and
that the deed of donation was never recorded. Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals held that
the deed of donation was inoperative, and null and void (1) because the husband, Lopez, had
no right to donate conjugal property to the plaintiff appellant; and (2) because the donation was
tainted with illegal cause or consideration, of which donor and donee were participants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid.
HELD: In the present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would not have conveyed the
property in question had he known that appellant would refuse to cohabit with him. The
cohabitation was an implied condition to the donation, and being unlawful, necessarily tainted
the donation itself. The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by
the law but will both be left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as barring the
party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a defense.
Memo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans. The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed
land on the strength of a donation regular on its face. To defeat its effect, the appellees must
plead and prove that the same is illegal. But such plea on the part of the Lopez heirs is not
receivable, since Lopez, himself, if living, would be barred from setting up that plea; and his
heirs, as his privies and successors in interest, can have no better rights than Lopez himself.
Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being thus precluded from pleading the defense of
immorality or illegal causa of the donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness of the same must
be decided by different legal principles. In this regard, the Court of Appeals correctly held that
Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria
Ngo, because said property was conjugal in 124 character and the right of the husband to
donate community property is strictly limited by law.

Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-35648, March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 54 Paras, J.
FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the
questioned lot from her mother Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation or by way of

purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration thereof. The donation or sale was
consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. Juan then
filed for himself and his supposed co-owner Resitituta an application for a Torrens Title over the
land which was later on granted pronouncing him (married to Resitiuta) as the owner of the
land. A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between petitioner, Pershing Tan Queto
and Restituta with the consent of her husband for a period of 10 years. The lease of contract
having expired, Restituta filed for unlawful detainer against Tan Queto. The unlawful detainer
case was won by the spouses in the Municipal Court but on appeal in the CFI the entire case
was dismissed because of a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the
disputed lot and the spouses became the owners of a parcel of land with the house thereon
previously owned before the barter by Tan Queto. After the barter agreement, Tan Queto
constructed on the disputed land a concrete building without any objection from Restituta.
Afterwards Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the
registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with
damages. The respondent courts decision which later on was affirmed by the Supreme court
led to the reformation of the Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta from
a sale to a conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents.
Hence, this petition for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate
of her parents was valid hence a paraphernal property.
HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not paraphernal. The oral donation of the
lot cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art.
749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not
complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her
hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual
transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited. The fact is ownership was acquired by
both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale
(See Art. 712, Civil Code) with 125 P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or
consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the
spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that
RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her own).

Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1989, 176 SCRA 340 Cruz, J.
FACTS: Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate in 1945 and leaving a tract of 28 hectares
of land with buildings and improvements in the Quezon Province. On May 20, 1946, perfectas
siblings Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument entitled Extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero. In it they disposed that in according to
Perfectas wishes and in consideration of love and affection, the said property be donated to
private respondent Salud Suterio de Matias, Perfectas niece, who will assume the
encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P 1,000. In the same
document, the done accepted the donation in a public instrument. The instrument was never
registered nor the title transferred to Saluds name although she immediately took possession of
the land. Sometime in 1951, Salud transferred the possession of the land to her mother Juana,

who was then staying with her brother Claudio and his family. During the period they were
occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes thereon. On May 25, 1956, Juana executed a
deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. Two years later, Claudio had the land
registered in his name. Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On June 30, 1965, the
private respondents Salud and Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the
property on the ground that the deed of sale in favour of Claudio was fictitious and the
registration in his name was null and void. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by
Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and the
defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement was a donation.
HELD: Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of
the property in question. As such, they were free to give the land to whomever they pleased and
for whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they choose to respect Perfectas wishes and carry
out her intentions by donating the land to Salud, there was no legal impediment to their doing
so. There is no question that Felipe and Juana could have simply disregarded their sisters
sentiments and decided not to donate the property to Salud. The fact that they did no do this
speaks well of their integrity and their loyalty to their deceased sister. The extra-judicial
settlement also reflects their own affection for Salud which constituted the valid consideration for
their own act of liberality.

Cruz v. Court of Appeals

140 SCRA 245
DOCTRINE: In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously
donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or
reduction of the donation within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the
legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the
adoption of the child. Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege
and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction
of the donation can be adjudged.
FACTS:
Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq.m residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay
Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces private
respondents herein, in a deed of donation entitled "Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala". The property was
accordingly transferred to the names of private respondents.
Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she extrajudicially tried to revoke
the donation, but the donees resisted, alleging that: (a) the property in question was co-owned
by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the
latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance; and (b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another property, an
agricultural land of more than two hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the
donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of the adopted child.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation in the CFI.

Trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation.

On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint.
Thus, prompted herein petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject donation. -- YES
HELD:
In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or
all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation
within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted,
taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil
Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who
must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment
or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject
donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of the
total assets of the donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is
unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land (27,342 sq. m.) situated in
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although then subject to litigation.
The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is made worse by the factual finding of the CA
that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land,
the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken
from the portion of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA

198 SCRA 300
DOCTRINE: There is no need for prescription to be applied where a stipulation for automatic
reversion is expressly provided for in the terms of the deed of donation. Hence, there is no need
for a judicial declaration for the rescission of a contract because the law of the contract governs.
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of donation
in favor of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land wherein a
resolutory condition was imposed that donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a
period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise would
render ipso facto null and void and such deed and property would revert back to donors.
However, prior to the exhaustion of the period of one hundred (100) years, the Bishop of Imus
executed a deed of absolute sale to spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao for P114,000.00.
Rieta then filed a complaint for the nullification of the deed of donation, reconveyance of the
property with damages, and for the rescission of the contract.

Ignao, in his answer said that the action for the rescission of the contract and reconveyance of
the property has already prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action in the case at bar has already prescribed. -- NO
HELD:
As a general rule, article 764 of the New Civil Code provides that "(t)his action shall prescribe
after 4 years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the
donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs. But in the case at bar, there is no need
for prescription to be applied where a stipulation for automatic reversion is expressly provided
for in the terms of the deed of donation. Hence, there is no need for a judicial declaration for the
rescission of a contract because the law of the contract governs. Judicial action is proper only
when there is absence of a special provision granting the power of cancellation.
However, the resolutory condition is held to be an undue restriction on the rights of ownership
and is contrary to public policy. A donation is an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of
donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy. The condition imposed must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.

Eduarte v. CA
253 SCRA 391
DOCTRINE: All crimes which offend the donor are considered manifests of ingratitude and are
cause for revocation of donation.
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine donates half a parcel of his land to his niece, Helen Doria. For this benevolent
act, he is blessed tenfold by greed and disloyalty. He willingly and knowingly gave only half of
said land. However, there materialized a donation from him supposedly as well giving the other
half to make whole said parcel. Moreover, these lands "donated" were made for profit and
ironically enough, spirituality. This is when the Eduartes Romulo and Sally fall prey also.
Furthermore, a certain Calauan Christian Reform Church (CCRC) enters the fray. The niece,
Helen, had the audacity to falsify said donation and donate yet again to attain false pretense of
forgiveness. This, by way of giving the land to a church except of course the residence. The
Eduartes, unknowingly trust Doria and purchase the lot altogether. Pedro then moves to
reprimand his niece by setting forth machinations to effectively revoke his donation.
ISSUE:
W/N the act of Helen Doria of falsification of documents is tantamount to ingratitude towards
Pedro Calapine which would lead to the effective revocation of donation? -- YES
HELD:
This act is of pure treason. Any action that the donor takes offense to is equal to ingratitude. It is

saddening that an individual can have such a shameful display of thanks relating to family. The
mere act of falsifying documents to reserve the right to half the land to which you have already
been granted half of is appaling to say the least.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

Eduarte v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 391 128 Francisco, J.
FACTS: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 12,199
square meters. He executed a deed entitled Donation InterVivos ceding onehalf portion
thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria. Eventually, the whole parcel of land was ceded to Doria by
Calapine. Doria then donated a portion of 157 square meters to the Calauan Christian
Reformed Church. He also sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Eduarte the parcel
of land, saving the 700 square meters on which Dorias house was erected. However, Pedro
Calapine filed a complaint against Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the
spouses Eduarte claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery. He prays for
the revocation of the donation made in favour of Doria, to declare null and void the deeds of
donation and sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian Reformed Church,
Inc. and the spouses Eduarte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are buyers in bad faith of the donated property.
HELD: No. The rule is well-settled that mere possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a
registered torrens title to real property. When herein petitioners purchased the subject property
from Helen Doria, the same was already covered by TCT No. T- 23205 under the latter's name.
And although Helen Doria's title was fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights
of herein petitioners absent any showing that they had any knowledge or participation in such
irregularity. Thus, they cannot be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to
be valid on its fade and sans any annotation or notice of private respondents' adverse claim.
Contrary therefore to the conclusion of respondent Court, petitioners are purchasers in good
faith and for value as they bought the disputed property without notice that some other person
has a right or interest in such property, and paid a full price for the same at the time of the
purchase or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.
And having established beyond doubt that Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over the
disputed property which she subsequently sold to petitioners, Helen Doria should instead be
adjudged liable to private respondents, and not to petitioners as declared by the trial court and
respondent Court of Appeals, for the resulting damages to the true owner and original plaintiff,
Pedro Calapine. Petition granted.

Quilala v. Alcantara
G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001, 371 SCRA 311 Ynares Santiago, J.
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter

Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. The "Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed
on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two
instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely
that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that the
donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the
second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand
margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness The deed of donation was
registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and
TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala. On November 7, 1983, Catalina
Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that
he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate,
dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property. On September 13,
1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of
Deeds of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos. The trial court
found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was
acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no
acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null
and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without
prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and testament.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation is void for lack of acceptance on the part of the
donee Violeta Quilala.
HELD: No. As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the
Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin,
and by the donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that
the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument
is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the
instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification
of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a
contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is
agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing. Simply put, the specification
of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the
wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the
page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially
complied with. 130 In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the
notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated
in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in
another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of
donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the
notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that
should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the
second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set
forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.

Hemedes v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 347 Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes
executed a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions" whereby he
conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his
third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject to the following resolutory conditions that upon her death or
marriage, the DONEE shall revert the said property to anyone of Jose Hemedes children. On
September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion"
conveying to Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an
annotation of USUFRUCT favor of her stepmother,Justa Kausapin. Unable to pay the mortgage,
R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the property. However, Justa Kausapin executed
another agreement or Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his stepson, Enrique D. Hemedes. He
obtained tax declarations and pay realty taxes from thereon. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform
Office conducted a cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner. Enrique
Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const. Corp.(Dominium), a sister company of
Asia Brewery. Asia Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R & B
insurance informed them that they are the owners of the property where these improvements
are being built.
ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D.
Hemedes valid.
HELD: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA. It held that Maxima
failed to comply with the requirements of Art. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to repudiate
Justa Kausapins allegation that she did not execute such a deed and she never allowed to use
the land as security for the loan. It was found that the deed of conveyance to Maxima was
spurious and it follows that the original title she had for the 131 property was also null and void
so as the mortgage to R & B Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin executed an affidavit to
affirm the authenticity of the kasundudan in favor of his stepson, Enrique Hemedes whom she is
dependent from for her financial support.

Siguan v. Lim
G.R. No. 134685, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 725 Davide, Jr., C.J.
FACTS:

On 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying parcels of land and purportedly

executed by LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor of her children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil was
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. On 23 June 1993, petitioner
filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to rescind the questioned Deed of
Donation and to declare as null and void the new transfer certificates of title issued for the lots
covered by the questioned Deed. Petitioner claimed therein that sometime in July 1991, LIM,
through a Deed of Donation, fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad
faith and in fraud of creditors, including her; that LIM conspired and confederated with her
children in antedating the questioned Deed of Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors'

prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance, left no sufficient properties to
pay her obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of Siguan and rescinded the Contract, but was
reversed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by respondent may be rescinded for
being in fraud of her alleged creditor.
HELD: We resolve these issues in the negative. Art. 1381 of the Civil Code enumerates the
contracts which are rescissible, and among them are "those contracts undertaken in fraud of
creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them." The action to
rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. For this action to prosper,
the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior
to the alienation, although demandable later; (2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract
conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to
satisfy his claim; (4) the act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the
property conveyed, if it is by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. The general
rule is that rescission requires the existence of creditors at the time of the alleged fraudulent
alienation, and this must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting
aside the contract. Without any prior existing debt, there can neither be injury nor fraud. While it
is necessary that the credit of the plaintiff in the accion pauliana must exist prior to the
fraudulent alienation, the date of the judgment enforcing it is immaterial. Even if the judgment be
subsequent to the alienation, it is merely declaratory, with retroactive effect to the date when the
credit was constituted. In the instant case, the alleged debt of LIM in favor of petitioner was
incurred in August 1990, while the deed of donation was purportedly executed on 10 August
1989. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner became a creditor of LIM prior to the celebration
of the contract of donation, still her action for rescission would not fare well because the third
requisite was not met. Under Article 1381 of the Civil Code, contracts entered into in fraud of
creditors may be rescinded only when the creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims due
them. It is, therefore, "essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted
all other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. 20 Petitioner neither alleged nor proved
that she did so. On this score, her action for the rescission of the questioned deed is not
maintainable even if the fraud charged actually did exist."

Noceda vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999, 313 SCRA 504 Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Celestino Arbizo died in 1956 leaving behind a parcel of land having an area of 66,530
square meters. His heirs plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo
extrajudicially settled the partition of the land with Directo getting 11,426 square meters, Noceda
got 13,294 square meters, and Arbizo got 41,810 square meters. Plaintiff Directo donated 625
square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her
deceased sister However another extrajudicial settlement-partition was executed. Three fifths of
the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth
each. Sometime in 1981, Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo.
Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated
portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, Noceda removed the fence earlier

constructed by Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo
without her consent. Directo demanded from Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused.
Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Noceda constitute ingratitude to warrant revocation of the
donation.
HELD: Yes. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to
him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C
which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act of occupying the portion
pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of
usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is
enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation. 133 The action to revoke by
reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the time (a) the donor
had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that
the one (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. No
competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation.
Noceda v. CA
313 SCRA 504
DOCTRINE: Usurpation with regard to donee towards donor is a definite act of ingratitude and
neecessitates only to be proved to effect revocation.
FACTS:
Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda and Maria Arbizo extra-judicially partitioned a land in Zambales.
Aurora coincidentally donated on the same day of the partition to Rodolfo who happens to be
her nephew. After several surveys conducted by a certain Geodetic Engineer Eugene Quejada
of the Bureau of Lands and specific boundary adjustments, Aurora opted to fence her property
accordingly. This, for reasons of making known and presuppose which of the vast land is indeed
in her rightful possession. Even though there was an apparent exercise of giving and safety
measures so as to avoid conflict, it appears to have been averred by Rodolfo. It was made true
by his actions of passing through said fences and intentionally staying at nipa huts designated
inside Aurora's land. What comes into contention is the manner Rodolfo makes his action.
ISSUE:
W/N usurpation of Rodolfo is enough to suffice revocation of donation? -RULING:
In this case, Rodolfo is directly showing his disregard of Aurora's wishes intentionally going
beyond the boundaries Directo so painstakingly made plain. Usurpation is the undermining of
one's authority. Noceda not only negates her will but makes it obvious in the sense of flaunting it
even with the presence of Maria Arbizo.
We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had carefully considered the
questions of fact raised below and the respondent Courts conclusions are based on the
evidence on record. No cogent reason exists for disturbing such findings. We also note that

petitioner in this petition merely rehashed the same issues and arguments raised in the
respondent Court in whose decision we find no reversible error. Clearly, petitioner failed to
present any substantial argument to justify a reversal of the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Heirs of Velasquez v. CA
325 SCRA 552
DOCTRINE: An action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the
subject property. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of
title over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted. the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
FACTS:

Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in

1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless.
Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs)
and Tranquilina deGuzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their
marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire real properties.
The plaintiffs alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with
the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina
de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the conference Leoncia
told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velasquez that the
documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not
signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario
Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to
support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the
properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half(1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to
of each of all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood
sister of Leoncia de Guzman.
Plaintiffs also claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took
possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition,
defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in
question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the
partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the
defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time
defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for partition should be sustained. -- NO
HELD:
No. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property unless
it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle
the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for
partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact,
Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the nature and

the extent of his title to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.
In this case, the properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been
delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be
partitioned. After finding that no co-ownership exists between private respondents and
petitioners, the court found no reason to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners in
support of their petition.

Imperial v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 393 Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 32,837 sq. m. and
located in Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the lot for Php 1.00 to his acknowledged natural
son, petitioner in this case. Petitioner and Victor Imperial, adopted son of Leoncio, agreed that
despite the designation of the contract as Deed of Absolute Sale, the transaction is in fact a
Donation. Two years after, Leoncio filed a complaint for the Annulment of Donation. It was
however resolved through a compromise agreement under the following terms and conditions:
(1) Leoncio recognized and agreed the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner; and (2)
petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000 sq.m. portion of the donated land. 137 Leoncio died
leaving only two heirs: petitioner and Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted
in the complaint for annulment. He moved for the execution of judgment and it was granted.
After 15 years, Victor died and was survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon. Ricardo
Villalon is a lessee of the portion of the subject property. Villalon died leaving his heirs, Cesar
and Teresa Villalon, respondents in this case. In 1986, respondents filed a complaint for the
annulment of the donation. Allegedly, it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial.
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the respondents have the right to question the inofficious donation
and seek its reduction. 2.) Whether or not the 30-year prescriptive period is applicable in the
reduction of the inofficious donation.
HELD: 1.) Yes. At the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise
agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement. When Victor
substituted Leoncio, he was not deemed to have renounced his legitime. He was therefore not
precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction. Nor are Victors heirs, upon his
death, precluded from doing so. This is in accordance with Articles 772 and 1053 of the new
Civil Code, to wit: Article 772. Only those who at the time of the donors death have a right to the
legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of the inofficious
donation xxx. and Article 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the
inheritance, his rights shall be transmitted to his heirs. 2.) No. Under Article 1144 of the New
Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the
right of action accrues. Thus, the 10-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce
inofficious donations required under Article 771 of the New Civil Code to the extent that they
impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon
the death of the donordecedent. Clearly so, since only then that the net estate may be
ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. It took 24 years since the

death of Leoncio to initiate this case. Thus, the action has long prescribed. Not only has
prescription set in, they are also guilty of estoppel and laches. Fifteen years after the death of
Leoncio, Victor died. Ricardo Villalon, Victors sole heir, died four years later. While Victor was
alive, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the donation of his deceased father.

Republic of the Philippines v. Silim

G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001, 356 SCRA 1 Kapunan, J.
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of
land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools of the Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del
Sur. In the Deed of Donation, the respondents imposed the condition that the said property
should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. This donation was accepted
by the District Supervisor of the Bureau, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation
of Donation. A school building was thereafter constructed on the donated land. However,
another school building that was also supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land
could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a 1 hectare parcel of
land. By reason of this, the District Supervisor and the vice-mayors wife entered into a Deed of
Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with a bigger lot owned by the latter.
Consequently, the school buildings were constructed on this new school site and the school
building previously erected on the donated land was dismantled and transferred to the new
location. One day, respondents were surprised when he saw the vice-mayor constructing a
house on the donated land.
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not there was a valid donation despite non-notation of the acceptance
in the Deed of Donation, as required in Article 749. 2.) Whether or not the condition on the
donation was violated.
HELD: 1.) Yes. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure
that such is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, a school building was
immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the
existence of the school building put up on the donated lot. The actual knowledge by
respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal
requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
2.) No. There was no violation even after the donated lot was exchanged for another one. The
purpose of the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much
bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition
of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan
school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

Gestopa v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 111904, October 5, 2000, 342 SCRA 105 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Spouses Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed
three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which were in favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. All
deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors to amend, cancel or revoke the

donation during their lifetime, and to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during
the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. The spouses then executed another deed of donation
inter vivos in favor of Mercedes which contained the condition that the donors, Danlag spouses,
shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and that the donee enjoy the
fruits of the land during their lifetime and that the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during
the lifetime of the donors without their prior consent and approval. Consequently, Mercedes
caused the transfer of the parcels of land's tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on
them. Spouses Danlag sold two parcels of lots to Spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa and
executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject to the deed of donation
inter vivos. Mercedes Pilapil filed with the Regional Trial Court against the Spouses Danlag and
Gestopa, for quieting of title over the parcels of land and alleged that the land was donated to
her by Diego Danlag and that she accepted the donation openly and publicly exercised rights of
ownership over the donated properties, and transferred the tax declarations to her name. She
also alleged that the donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to
Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of
any act of ingratitude; and that Diego Danlag had no legal basis to revoke the donation and then
in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopa spouses. In their opposition, the spouses
Gestopa and the Danlag averred that the deed of donation was null and void because it was
obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly
executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor and that
the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at all.
ISSUE: Whether the donation is a donation inter vivos or a donation mortis causa.
HELD: The Court Rules that it was a donation inter vivos. The Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he
transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that the right to sell
belonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred to that of merely giving consent; that the
donor changed his intention by donating inter vivos properties already donated mortis causa;
that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated properties
implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six
parcels of land donated to her. 140 In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's
provisions must be read together. The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties
out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership
over the properties. Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six
parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. An acceptance clause is a mark that
the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations
mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during
the donors' lifetime. The right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's
right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. The limitation on
the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and
donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. Hence, the moment that it was
accepted by Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, ownership of the properties was transferred.

Sumipat v. Banga
G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004 Tinga, J.

FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land.
The couple was childless. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children. They are the
petitioners herein. Lauro executed a document denominated Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or
Quit-Claim over Real Properties in favor of the petitioners. On the document, it appears that the
signature of his wife, Placida which indicates that she gave her marital consent. Moreover, it
was alleged that Lauro executed it when he was already very sick and bedridden that upon
petitioner Lydias request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro whereupon
Lydia guided his hand in affixing his signature on the document. Lydia left but later returned on
the same day and requested Lauros unlettered wife, Placida to sign on the said document. After
Lauros death, his wife, Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties, 50% of the
produce went to his wife. As wifes share in the produce of the properties dwindled, she filed a
complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject
document.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding
circumstances has validly transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners.
HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property
a donation although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and
his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of
land for their subsistence and support. Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, 141 made in a separate instrument,
is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate
acceptance, the donation is null and void. In this case, the donees acceptance of the donation
is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an
instrument of donation is patently void. The Court declared that the deeds of sale questioned
therein are not merely voidable but null and void ab initio as the supposed seller declared under
oath that she signed the deeds without knowing what they were. The significant circumstance
meant, the Court added, that her consent was not merely marred by vices of consent so as to
make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all.

Sumipat vs. Banga

FACTS:
On January 5, 1983, Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated "DEED OF ABSOLUTE
TRANSFER AND/OR QUIT-CLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES" (the assailed document) in
favor of his illegitimate children (defendants-appellees) covering the three parcels of land (the
properties). On the document appears the signature of his wife Placida which indicates that she
gave her marital consent thereto. That time, Lauro was already very sick and bedridden; that
upon defendant-appellee Lydias request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of
Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his (Lauro Sumipats) hand in affixing his signature on
the assailed document which she had brought; that Lydia thereafter left but later returned on the
same day and requested Lauros unlettered wife Placida to sign on the assailed document, as she

did in haste, even without the latter getting a responsive answer to her query on what it was all
about.
After Lauro Sumipats death on January 30, 1984, his wife Placida and defendants-appellees
jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to plaintiff-appellant. As
plaintiff-appellants share in the produce of the properties dwindled until she no longer received
any and learning that the titles to the properties in question were already transferred/made in
favor of the defendants-appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles,
contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of the present appeal.
Defendant-appellee Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the assailed document, she
claiming to have acquired knowledge of its existence only on January 10, 1983 or five days after
its execution when Lauro Sumipat gave the same to her.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant-appellees, because it found that the subject
properties are conjugal having been acquired during the marriage of Lauro Sumipat and Placida
Tabotabo (Placida). However, because Placida failed to question the genuineness and due
execution of the deed and even admitted having affixed her signature thereon, the trial court
declared that the entirety of the subject properties, and not just Lauro Sumipats conjugal share,
were validly transferred to the defendants, the petitioners herein.
On appeal, the appellate court held that since Placida was unlettered, the appellees, the
petitioners herein, as the parties interested in enforcing the deed, have the burden of proving that
the terms thereof were fully explained to her. This they failed to do.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly
transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners.
HELD:
Art. 749 of the Civil Code states that:
"In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but
it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments."
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of
donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation

fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.20
In this case, the donees acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or
in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.