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BACHRACH Motors v.

G.R. No. 35223. September 17,1931


Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was
indebted to PNB. To secure the payment
of its debt, it induced its planters, among
whom was Mariano Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the bank. To compensate the planters for the risk, Talisay-Silay
Milling, by a resolution, undertook to credit the planters every year with a sum equal
to 2% of the debt secured.

Bachrach filed a complaint against
the Talisay for the delivery of the amount
of P13,850 or promissory notes or other
instruments of credit, as bonus in favor of
Ledesma. The complaint further prays that
the sugar central be ordered to render an
accounting of the amounts it owes
Ledesma, and to pay Bachrach Motors a
sum sucient to satisfy the judgment
mentioned in the complaint, and that the
sale made by Ledesma be declared null
and void.

PNB filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any
amount which Ledesma might be entitled
from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. Talisay
answered the complaint that Ledesmas
credit belonged to Cesar Ledesma because the latter had purchased it. Cesar
Ledesma claimed to be an owner by purchase in good faith.

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the
court held that Bachrach Motor had a preferred right to receive Ledesmas bonus,
and it ordered the central to deliver said
sum to Bachrach Motors.

PNB appealed.

Whether or not the bonus in question is
civil fruits.


SC armed the judgment.

Bonus is not a civil fruit; not an
income of the land. The amount of the
bonus, according to the resolution, is not
based upon the value, importance or any
other circumstance of the mortgaged
property, but upon the total value of the
debt secured, which is something quite
distinct from and independent of the
property referred to. As the bonus is not
obtained from the land, it is not civil fruits
of that land. It is neither rent of buildings,
proceeds from lease of lands, or income
under Article 355 of the Civil Code.


G.R. No. L-14309 June 30, 1960



The Lot No. 107 was originally
owned by the spouses Felias (parents of
Felisa). In 1927, a building was constructed there by Felisa and husband Sawamoto. In 1928, spouses Felias donated it to
their daughter, Felisa, as a result OCT was
cancelled and TCT was issued making it
her paraphernal property.

In 1941, CFI rendered judgment in a
civil case involving Sawamoto, ordering
him to pay for damages. A writ of execution was levied upon Lot No. 107, together
with the improvements. It was sold in auction to Caltex.

Felisa filed the present action to
declare herself exclusive owner of the Lot.
Trial Court declared Dysecko as owner,
and the sale at auction null and void.

CA modified trial court by declaring
Felisa Felias exclusive owner of Lot, instead of Dysekco.


Whether or not a paraphernal lot
becomes conjugal ipso facto upon construction of a conjugal house thereon.


ART. 158. Buildings constructed
at the expense of partnership during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the
spouses, also pertain to the partnership,
but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.

However, when the building was
constructed, the land was not yet owned
by Felisa. Applicable was "the familiar rule
of accessory following the principal". In
other words, when the lot was donated to
Felisa, the lot became her paraphernal
property as well as the building thereon.
The donation transmitted to her the rights
of a landowner over a building constructed on it.

Therefore at the time of the levy
and sale of the sheri, Lot No. 107 was
paraphernal property of Felisa. As such, it
was not answerable for the obligations of
her husband. The building constructed on
Lot was destroyed during the last war, so
that "at the time the Sheri executed the
final deed of sale in favor of Caltex, that
house was no longer in existence.

CA is armed.


and (2) DEL CANTO vs. (3) FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-49219 April 15, 1988



Sole issue is the applicability of the
provisions of Article 448 relating to a
builder in good faith when the property
involved is owned in common.

Plaintis (1 and 2) and defendants
(3) are co-owners pro indiviso of a Lot (45
sq m) in the proportion of and 1/3 share
each, respectively, so 30 sqm for plaintis
and 15 sqm for defendant. But the house
of defendant occupied a 5 sqm area extending on plaintis lot. The parties asked
the trial court to adjudicate who among
the parties should take possession of the
5 sq.m land in question.

Trial Court ruled that the rights of a
builder in good faith under Article 448
cannot apply to a case where one coowner has built, planted or sown on the
land owned in common. Defendants have
no other alternative except to remove and
demolish part of their house that has encroached on the land of the plaintis.


Whether or not Art 448 cannot apply in this case.


The court a quo correctly held that
Article 448 cannot apply. The co-owner is
not a 3rd person under the circumstances,
and the situation is governed by the rules
of co-ownership.

However, the co-ownership is
terminated by the partition, then the
provisions of Article 448 should apply.

The plaintis have the right to appropriate

said portion of the house of defendants
upon payment of indemnity to defendants
as provided for in Article 546. Otherwise,
the plaintis may oblige the defendants to
pay the price of the land occupied by their
house. However, if the price asked for is
considerably much more, then the latter
cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable
rent to the plainti upon such terms and
conditions that they may agree. In case of
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the
terms thereof. Of course, defendants may
demolish or remove the said portion of
their house, at their own expense, if they
so decide.


G.R. No. L-11269 February 28, 1958



It appears that Felices was the
grantee of a homestead, by virtue of
which he was issued OCT. A month after
patent, he conveyed in conditional sale to
Iriola a portion of his homestead with an

express stipulation subject to Sec. 119 of

Act 141 (PLA), that after the lapse of 5
years or as soon as may be allowed by
law, the vendor or his successors would
execute in vendee's favor a deed of absolute sale over the land in question.

2 years after sale, Felices tried to
recover the land, but the latter refused unless he was paid P2,000 as the value of
improvements. Felices deposited the received price in court and filed this action.


Whether or not appellant may recover or be reimbursed the value of his
improvements on the land in question.


While recognizing Felices' right to
"redeem", Iriola insisted that he must first
be reimbursed. But investigation found
that improvements were made after the
complaint had been filed; some of the improvements were even introduced after a
commissioner had already been appointed. "He who builds, plants or sows in bad
faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted, or sown without right to indemnity" (Art. 449, New Civil Code).

The sale in question was executed
by the parties within the 5-year prohibitive
period (Sec 118 of PLA), the same is absolutely null and void and ineective from
its inception. Consequently, Felices never
lost his title or ownership over the land in
question, and there was no need either for
him to repurchase the same.


G.R. No. L-39248
May 7, 1976



The Heirs of Luisa Abrille is the
owner of a 525,652 sqm land. She subdivided it into two lots approved by LRC: a
30,100 portion and a 577,679 sq.m portion. But the total of the 2 lots is 82,127
sq.m more than its area in TCT. Abrille was

able to secure an order from the CFI, directing the Register of Deeds to correct
the area of CT, cancel the same and issue
TCTs. There was no

notice and publication.

It was found out that the excess
area was formerly a portion of the Davao
River; hence a land belonging to the public domain; thus TCT is null and void ab

Defendant filed her answer invoking
good faith in subdividing the lot; that the
subject increase of area was made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Abrille, as riparian owner
was entitled under the law to claim, as she
did, the increase or excess in area of her
original land as her own.

The trial court rendered judgment
cancelling TCTs and directing the Register of Deeds to issue new certificates
of title in lieu thereof after the portions
consisting of 82,127 square meters, the
land involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in accordance with

On appeal, CA certified the case to
the SC.


Whether or not a Court approval on
the land in question is enough to deem the
land registered.


Lower Court is upheld.

The step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval of their Subdivision Plan with the
increased area is unwarranted and irregular. The land in question is so big as to
give allowance for a mere mistake in area.
Proceedings in registrations of land title
should have been filed instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.

The recourse under Section 44 of

Act 496 is good only insofar as it covers
previously registered lands. In the instant
case, the area of 82,127 sq.m, has not yet
been brought under the operation of the
Torrens System. Worse, the approval of

Subdivision Plans was without notice,

more particularly the Director of Lands.
For an applicant to have his imperfect or
incomplete title or claim to a land to be
originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites should all be satisfied:

1. Survey by the Bureau of Lands or a

duly licensed private surveyor;

2. Filing of application for registration;

3. Setting of the date for initial hearing of

the application by the Court;

4. Transmittal of the application with all

the documents attached thereto by the
Clerk of Court to the LRC;

5. Publication of a notice of the filing of

the application and date and place of
the hearing in the Ocial Gazette;

6. Service of notice upon owners, occupants and those known to have interests in the property by the sheri;

7. Filing of answer to the application by

any person;

8. Hearing of the case by the Court;

9. Judgment by the Court;

10. Declaration by the Court and instructing the LRC to issue a decree of confirmation and registration;

11. Entry of the decree of registration in

the Land Registration Commission;

12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register

of Deeds, and

13. Transcription of the decree in the registration book and the issuance of the
owner's duplicate OCT to the applicant
by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.


G.R. No. L-30829 August 28, 1929



During the months of September to

November every year, the waters of Laguna de Bay cover a long strip of land along
the eastern border ofthe 2 parcels of land
in question. Colegio de San Jose contends that the parcels ofland are a part of

the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,

which has been in its possession since
time immemorial by means of its tenants
or lessees and farmers.

In contrast, Government contends
that the said parcels belong to public domain, as they have always been known as
the shores of Laguna de Bay.

The CFI rendered a decision in favor of Colegio ordering the registration of
the 2 parcels in accordance with law. Both
admitted that the strip was formerly covered by water but since the Bay receded,
it was now uncovered. The government
applied Art. 458 which states the adjoin
estate (Colegio) does

not acquire the land left dry by the natural

decrease of the waters.


Whether or not the property in
question belongs to the public domain as
a part of the bed of Laguna de Bay.


Article 367 (now Art.458) provides
that the owners of estates bordering on
ponds or lagoons, do not acquire the land
left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, nor lose those inundated by them in
extraordinary floods.

The provision refers to ponds and
lagoons, and has therefore no application
to the present case, which refers to a lake,
a lagoon being legally distinct in character
from a lake. Instead, Art.77 of the Spanish
Law of Waters should apply, which provides: Lands accidentally inundated by
the waters of lakes, or by creeks, rivers or
other streams shall continue to be the
property of their respective owners.

Therefore, they must belong to
Colegio de San Jose as part of Hacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan, which was originally owned by it.

G.R. No. L-14043.
April 16, 1959



In 1920s, Maria Lim oered to
Yuseco and his wife, defendant Rosario,
for them to build a house on 2 lots owned
by Lim (Hacienda de San Lazaro). The
Yusecos accepted the oer and built a
dwelling house and an annex for garage
and servant quarters. To legalize, Lim and
the Yusecos executed a contract of lease
covering them, to run for a period of 5
years, with a yearly rental of P120.

Before death, Lim sold the 2 lots to
her married daughter, Tayag. In 1946, the
Tayags asked the Yusecos to remove their
house, or else pay them monthly rent. The
latter refused. Because of this, the Tayags
brought an action of ejection for the restitution of the lots and the recovery of a
monthly rental. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the Tayags. The defendants appealed.

The court rendered judgment adjudicating to Tayag the possession of the 2
lots, with right to appropriate the 2 buildings thereon upon payment to Yusecos of
their value, and providing that should the
plaintis fail to pay within 90 days, the defendants shall have the right to purchase
said lots. The plaintis appealed.

CA, finding the defendants as possessors in good faith, armed the lower
court. The plaintis appealed to SC.

SC armed the decision of CA to
remand the case to lower court to require
plaintis to make a choice: "whether they
would purchase the buildings erected on
the lots, or allow the defendants to buy
said lots.

Tayags choice: NOT to sell the lot,
but to appropriate the building if its valuation is as it should be and is properly and
fairly determined.

Trial court ordered the next step to
adduce evidence in connection with the
value of the buildings. Since the defendants will be the sellers, they have the
burden of proving the value of the build-

ings, giving the plaintis opportunity to


Plaintis: 2 buildings cannot be
more than P40,000. Defendants: chalet is
from P45,000 to P50,000; garage and
dwelling house, from P5,000 to P6,000.
Trial court fixed them at P50,000. This is
the order appealed from.


Whether or not a litigant who has
made a choice to sell his property appeal
the price amount fixed by the court.


NO. If petitioners were allowed to
change their mind, repudiate their choice
made in court not to sell the land but to
buy the buildings, and then compel the
owners of the houses, respondents herein,
instead to buy land, then what if respondent also claimed inability to pay the price
of the land, claiming that it is also a good
and valid reason for not compelling them
to make the purchase? How would this
litigation end, if it ever would end?

Once a party, in conformity with a
court decision, has made his choice, and
has duly informed the court of said choice,
and is accordingly ordered to comply with
the same by buying the building erected
on his land and pay the value thereof fixed
by the courts, that duty is converted into
a money obligation which can be enforced by execution, regardless of the unwillingness and alleged inability of the party concerned to pay the amount.

As to the alleged absence in the
order of execution for the houseowners to
make the transfer of the houses, that is to
be understood, that upon full payment of
the price, the respondents will execute the
corresponding deed of transfer.


G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985



Depra, is the owner of Lot in Iloilo.
In 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his
house, the kitchen encroached on DEPRA's property. DEPRAs mother filed an
action for Unlawful Detainer vs DUMLAO.
MTC found DUMLAO in good faith, and
applying Article 448, ordered a forced
lease on the encroachment between the
parties. But DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals so that DUMLAO deposited them with MTC.

In 1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint
for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO at
CFI involving the same encroachment.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that
the Decision of MTC was null and void ab
initio since such is jurisdiction of CFI. In
the MTC, the cause of action was the deprivation of possession, while in the action
to quiet title, the cause of action was
based on ownership. CFI upheld DEPRA.


Whether or not Article 448 applies.


Within the context of their mutual
concession and stipulation, the parties
have chosen a legal formula to resolve
their dispute to appeal ply to DUMLAO the
rights of a "builder in good faith" and to
DEPRA those of a "landowner in good
faith" as prescribed in Article 448.

The fairness of the rules in Article
448 has been explained as follows:

Where the builder, planter or sower
has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of
the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of
forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of
the land the option to acquire the im-

provements after payment of the proper

indemnity, or to oblige the builder or
planter to pay for the land and the sower
to pay for the proper rent.

It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because
his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.

Judgment of trial Court is set aside,
and case is remanded to RTC for further
proceedings consistent with Articles 448
and 546 as follows:

1. The trial Court shall determine:

a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34

sqm land; b) the amount of the expenses
spent by DUMLAO for the kitchen; c) the
increase in value which encroachment
may have acquired, and d) whether the
value of said area of land is considerably
more than that of the kitchen built thereon.

2. After said amounts shall have been determined, RTC shall judge, as follows:

a) grant DEPRA to exercise his option under Article 448, whether to appropriate the
kitchen by paying DUMLAO, or to oblige
DUMLAO to pay the price of said area;

b) order that if DEPRA exercises the option to oblige DUMLAO to pay the land but
the latter rejects because the value of the
land is considerably more than that of the
kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice
of DEPRAs option to sell the land. If no
agreement is reached, the Court shall fix
the terms of the lease;

c) DUMLAO shall pay reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's

land from 1952;

d) The periods shall be inextendible, and

upon failure of the party obliged to tender
to the trial Court the amount due to the
obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment.


GR 154391-92
September 30, 2004



The children (petitioners - Ismael/
Teresita) were invited by the parents (respondents - Vicente/Rosario) to occupy
the latters' 2 lots. Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict terminated this situation.
Out of pique, the parents asked them to
vacate the premises losing their right to
remain on the property. They have the
right, however, to be indemnified for the
useful improvements in good faith and
with the consent of the parents. In short,
Article 448 applies.

MTCC ruled in favor of respondents
and ordered petitioners to vacate the
premises opining that petitioners had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal
lease agreement, but by tolerance of respondents. MTCC dismissed petitioners
contention that it was an advance inheritance, on the ground that successional
rights were inchoate.

On appeal, RTC upheld MTCC.
However, it allowed respondents to appropriate the building and improvements,
after payment of the indemnity provided
for by Article 448 in relation to Articles 546
and 548.

CA upheld the 2 lower courts ruling
that petitioners status was analogous to
that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of
lease had expired, but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. But
CA said that Article 448 was inapplicable.
But under Article 1678, petitioners had the
right to be reimbursed for one half of the
value of the improvements made.

Hence, this appeal.


Whether or not Article 1678 should
apply to the case on the matters of improvements, or is it Article 447 in relation
to Articles 453 and 454.


SC rules out possession by mere
tolerance. Petitioners were invited by respondents to occupy the lots so that they
could resolve family problems. By occupying, petitioners demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation. Hence, there was a
meeting of minds.

That petitioners had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear. The issue
is the duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation, Article 1197 allows
the courts to fix the period.

However, Article 1197 applies to a
situation in which the parties intended a
period. Here, no period was intended by
the parties. Their mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify or authorize the courts to do
so. It can be safely concluded that the
agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually benefited
from the arrangement. Eectively, there is
a resolutory condition here. Having been
based on parental love, the agreement
would end upon the dissipation of the affection. Thus, petitioners no longer had any
cause for continued possession of lots.

As applied to this case, accession
refers to the right of the owner to everything that is incorporated or attached to
the property. Accession industrial -- building, planting and sowing on an immovable
-- is governed by Articles 445 to 456.

Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that apply
when the owner of the property uses the
materials of another.

HOWEVER, Art 448 is applicable.
The respondents consented to the improvements. In fact, because the children
occupied the lots, the parents certainly
approved of the improvements. Thus, petitioners have been in good faith when they
built the structures.

Therefore, CA is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The portion requiring respondents

to reimburse one half the value of improvements, and the right of petitioners to

remove those improvements (if the former

refuses to reimburse) is DELETED.

2. The case is REMANDED to the

court of origin to determine the facts applying Articles 448 and 546:

a) Respondents option to appropriate the

improvements, after paying the indemnity,
under Article 546 in relation to Article 448;
or Petitioners to pay the value of lots, unless it is considerably more than that of
the improvements, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent ;

b) The value of expenses incurred in the


c. The increase in value of improvements;

d. Respondents choice of type of indemnity to be paid (whether b or c)

e. Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of the improvements
built thereon.