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G.R. No.

208566 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation


Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel
is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It
underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request
for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya
Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is
derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations)
which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in
fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the
results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the
PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system,
whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves
dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing
the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case
of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork
barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant
the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are
concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which
his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The
power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively
and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the
GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because
of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by
the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning
their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by
the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a
congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that
is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund
on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of anappropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well
as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energyrelated ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to
further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a
general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

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