Notes and Cases - Evidence

I.
ADMISSIBILITY
a. General Provisions
i.
Rule 128, Sections 1-4

SECTION 1 . Evidence defined.
Evidence
is the
means,
sanctioned by these rules, of
ascertaining
in
a
judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a
matter of fact. (1)
Sec. 2 . Scope. The rules of
evidence shall be the same in all
courts and in all trials and
hearings, except as otherwise
provided by law or these rules.
(2a)
Sec.
3 . Admissibility
evidence.
Evidence
admissible when it is relevant
the issue and is not excluded
the law of these rules. (3a)
of
is
to
by
Sec.
4 . Relevancy; collateral
matters. Evidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish
the probability or improbability of
the fact in issue. (4a)
ii.
A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC(Rules on

Electronic Evidence)
Rule
3
ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS
Sec.
2.Admissibility.
An
electronic document is admissible
in evidence if it complies with the
rules on admissibility prescribed
by the Rules of Court and related
laws and is authenticated in the
manner prescribed by these Rules.
Rule
11
AUDIO,
PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND
EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE
Notes on EVIDENCE
Section 1. Audio, video and

similar
evidence.
Audio,
photographic and video evidence
of events, acts or transactions
shall be admissible provided it
shall be shown, presented or
displayed to the court and shall be
identified,
explained
or
authenticated by the person who
made the recording or by some
other person competent to testify
on the accuracy thereof.
Section
2. Ephemeral
electronic
communications.
Ephemeral
electronic
communications shall be proven
by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof. In the
absence or unavailability of such
witnesses,
other
competent
evidence may be admitted.
A recording of the telephone
conversation
or
ephemeral
electronic communication shall be
covered
by
the
immediately
preceding section.
If the foregoing communications
are recorded or embodied in an
electronic document, then the
provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.
Sec. 12 Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792)
SEC. 12. Admissibility and
Evidential Weight of Electronic
Data Message and Electronic
Documents. - In any legal
proceedings,
nothing
in
the
application of the rules on
evidence
shall
deny
the
admissibility of an electronic data
message or electronic document in
evidence
a. On the sole ground that it is in
electronic form; or
b. On the ground that it is not in
the standard written form and
electronic data message or
Dean Jose Aguila Grapilon
electronic document meeting,

and
complying
with
the
requirements under Sections 6
or 7 hereof shall be the best
evidence of the agreement and
transaction contained therein.
In assessing the evidential weight
of an electronic data message or
electronic document, the reliability
of the manner in which it was
generated,
stored
or
communicated, the reliability of
the manner in which its originator
was identified, and other relevant
factors shall be given due regard.
iii.
G.R. No. 117401 October 1, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., accusedappellant.
That on or about September 17,

1988, in the Municipality of
Kaputian, Province of Davao,
Philippines,
and
within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring,
confederating
and
mutually helping with Reynaldo
Malita and Eddie Malita, who are
charged for (sic) Murder in a
separate information, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, with the use of a bolo
and an iron bar, assault, hack and
stab his father, Bernardo Quidato,
Sr., on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him
wounds which caused his death,
and further causing actual, moral
and compensatory damage to the
heirs of the victim.
Contrary to law.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao, Branch 4, dated March 2,
1994,
finding
accused-appellant
Bernardo Quidato, Jr. guilty of the
crime of parricide.
On January 17, 1989, accusedappellant was charged with the crime

of parricide before the Regional Trial
Court of Davao. The information reads
as follows:
The undersigned accuses BERNARDO

QUIDATO, JR. of the crime of Parricide
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
Notes on EVIDENCE
Accused-appellant's case was tried

jointly with the murder case filed
against his co-accused Reynaldo
Malita and Eddie Malita who, however,
withdrew their "not guilty" plea during
the trial and were accordingly
sentenced.
Thus,
only
accusedappellant's case was tried on the
merits.
The prosecution, in offering its version

of the facts, presented as its
witnesses accused-appellant's brother
Leo Quidato, appellant's wife Gina
Quidato, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio
Mara.
Likewise,
the
prosecution
offered
in
evidence
affidavits
containing
the
extra-judicial
confessions of Eddie Malita and
Reynaldo Malita. The two brothers
were, however, not presented by the
prosecution on the witness stand.

Instead, it presented Atty. Jonathan
Jocom to prove that the two were
assisted by counsel when they made
their
confessions.
Similarly,
the
prosecution presented MTC Judge
George Omelio who attested to the
due and voluntary execution of the
sworn statements by the Malita
brothers.
Based on the foregoing pieces of

evidence, the prosecution's version of
the facts is as follows:
Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father
of
accused-appellant
Bernardo
Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being a
widower, Bernardo lived alone in his
house at SitioLibod, Brgy. Tagbaobo,
Kaputian, Davao. He owned sixteen
hectares of coconut land in the area.
On September 16, 1988, Bernardo,

accompanied by his son, herein
accused-appellant, and two hired
hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie
Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41
sacks of copra. After selling the copra,
Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for
their labor, who thereafter left.
Bernardo and accused-appellant went
back to SitioLibod that same day. 2
According to Gina Quidato, on the

evening of the next day, September
17, 1988, accused-appellant and the
Malita brothers were drinking tuba at
their house. She overheard the trio
planning to go to her father-in-law's
house to get money from the latter.
She had no idea, however, as to what
later transpired because she had
fallen
asleep
before
10:00
p.m. 3 Accused-appellant objected to
Notes on EVIDENCE
Gina Quidato's testimony on the

ground that the same was prohibited
by the marital disqualification rule
found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the
Rules
of
Court. 4 The
judge,
acknowledging the applicability of the
so-called rule, allowed said testimony
only against accused-appellant's coaccused, Reynaldo and Eddie.
As adverted to earlier, the Malita

brothers
confessed
to
their
participation in the crime, executing
affidavits detailing how Bernardo was
killed. Their version shows that Eddie
had been living with accusedappellant for the past four years. At
around 6:00 p.m. of September 17,
1988,
accused-appellant
asked
Reynaldo to come to the former's
house to discuss an important matter.
Upon Reynaldo's arrival at accusedappellant's house, he saw that his
brother Eddie was already there. They
started drinking beer. The Malita
brothers alleged that it was at this
juncture
that
accused-appellant
proposed that they rob and kill his
father. They went to Bernardo's house
only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had
stopped. Reynaldo brought along a
bolo. Upon reaching the house,
accused-appellant knocked on the
door, asking his father to let them in.
When Bernardo opened the door,
Eddie rushed in and knocked the old
man down. Reynaldo then hacked
Bernardo on the nape and neck.
Accused-appellant
and
Eddie
ransacked
Bernardo's aparador looking
for
money but they found none; so, the
three of them left.
The body of Bernardo was discovered

the next day by accused-appellant's
son, who had gone there to call
his Lolo for breakfast. The cause of

death, as stated in Bernardo's death
certificate was "hypovolemic shock
secondary to fatal hacking wound on
the posterior neck area." 5
On September 27, 1988, Leo Quidato

confronted his brother regarding the
incident and learned that Reynaldo
and Eddie Malita were the ones
responsible for Bernardo's death. The
two were promptly arrested by the
police. Aside from arresting the latter
two, however, the police also arrested
accused-appellant.
On September 29, 1988, the Malita

brothers
were
interrogated
by
Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the
Kaputian Police Station. When Mara
apprised them of their constitutional
rights, including their right to counsel,
they signified their intent to confess
even in the absence of counsel. Aware
that the same would be useless if
given in the absence of counsel, Mara
took down the testimony of the two
but refrained from requiring the latter
to sign their affidavits. Instead, he
escorted the Malita brothers to Davao
City and presented them, along with
their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO
(now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. 6
Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom

conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie,
again advising the two of their
constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer
explained the contents of the
affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita
brothers, who affirmed the veracity
and voluntary execution of the same.
Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie
affix
their
signatures
on
the
affidavits. 7
Notes on EVIDENCE
In his defense, accused-appellant

denied the allegations of the Malita
brothers. He claimed that the Malita
brothers were not at his house on the
evening of September 17, 1988. They,
however, passed by his house at
around 10:00 p.m. and asked him to
come with them to his father's house,
threatening him with harm if he
refused. Out of fear, he led the way to
Bernardo's house and even knocked
on the latter's door until Bernardo
opened the same. In the ensuing
commotion, he scampered away, but
in his confusion, reached his house
only at around 11:00 p.m., although
the same was only about one hundred
fifty meters away from Bernardo's
house. He did not call for help. Eddie
arrived a while later. Accusedappellant claimed not to have seen
the actual killing, having run away
earlier. He, however, admitted finding
a bolo, encrusted with blood, at his
house. He turned the same over to his
brother, who, in turn, surrendered the
same to the police. Accused-appellant
did not feel uneasy having Eddie
around even if he knew of the latter's
participation in the crime. 8
After
due
trial,
the
court a
quo rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF

THE FOREGOING, the court finds
the accused, Bernardo Quidato, Jr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
a co-principal in the offense of
Parricide which falls under Article
246 (of the Revised Penal Code),
for the death of his father,
Bernardo
Quidato,
Sr.,
and
accordingly, is hereby sentenced
by this court to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all

the accessory penalties provided
by law and to indemnify the other
heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the
amount
of
P50,000.00,
in
accordance with current case
doctrines of the Supreme Court,
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
From the aforesaid judgment of

conviction, appellant interposed the
present
appeal,
assigning
the
following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF REYNALDO MALITA
(EXH. C) AND EDDIE MALITA (EXH. D)
IN
CLEAR
VIOLATION
OF
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO CONFRONT
WITNESSES.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING
(THE)
EXISTENCE
OF
CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE RAISED
BY THE ACCUSED AND DISREGARDING
(ANY) ILL-MOTIVE OF REYNALDO AND
EDDIE MALITA IN KILLING THE VICTIM.
Accused-appellant must be acquitted.
In indicting accused-appellant, the

prosecution relied heavily on the
affidavits executed by Reynaldo and
Eddie. The two brothers were,
however, not presented on the
witness stand to testify on their extra-
Notes on EVIDENCE
judicial confessions. The failure to

present the two gives these affidavits
the character of hearsay. It is
hornbook doctrine that unless the
affiants themselves take the witness
stand to affirm the averments in their
affidavits, the affidavits must be
excluded from the judicial proceeding,
being inadmissible hearsay. 10 The
voluntary admissions of an accused
made
extrajudicially
are
not
admissible in evidence against his coaccused when the latter had not been
given an opportunity to hear him
testify and cross-examine him. 11
The Solicitor General, in advocating

the admissibility of the sworn
statements of the Malita brothers,
cites Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court which provides that "[t]he act
or declaration of a conspirator relating
to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration." The
inapplicability of this provision is
clearly apparent. The confessions
were made after the conspiracy had
ended and after the consummation of
the crime. Hence, it cannot be said
that the execution of the affidavits
were acts or declarations made during
the conspiracy's existence.
Likewise, the manner by which the

affidavits were obtained by the police
render the same inadmissible in
evidence even if they were voluntarily
given. The settled rule is that an
uncounseled extrajudicial confession
without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel that is, in writing and in the
presence of counsel is inadmissible
in evidence. 12 It is undisputed that
the Malita brothers gave their
statements to Patrolman Mara in the

absence of counsel, although they
signed the same in the presence of
counsel the next day. As ruled
in People vs. Compil: 13
[T]he belated arrival of a CLAO

(now PAO) lawyer the following
day even if prior to the actual
signing
of
the
uncounseled
confession does not cure the
defect (of lack of counsel) for the
investigators were already able to
extract incriminatory statements
from accused-appellant . . . Thus,
in People vs. De Jesus (213 SCRA
345
[1992])
we
said
that
admissions
obtained
during
custodial interrogations without
the benefit of counsel although
later reduced to writing and signed
in the presence of counsel are still
flawed under the Constitution.
With regard to Gina Quidato's

testimony, the same must also be
disregarded,
accused-appellant
having timely objected thereto under
the marital disqualification rule. As
correctly observed by the court a quo,
the
disqualification
is
between
husband and wife, the law not
precluding the wife from testifying
when it involves other parties or
accused. 14 Hence, Gina Quidato could
testify in the murder case against
Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly
tried with accused-appellant's case.
This testimony cannot, however, be
used
against
accused-appellant
directly or through the guise of taking
judicial notice of the proceedings in
the murder case without violating the
marital disqualification rule. "What
cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly" is a rule familiar even
to law students.
Notes on EVIDENCE
Given the inadmissibility in evidence

of Gina Quidato's testimony, as well
as
of
Reynaldo
and
Eddie's
extrajudicial
confessions,
nothing
remains on record with which to justify
a judgment unfavorable to accusedappellant.
Admittedly,
accusedappellant's defense, to put it mildly, is
dubious. His alleged acquiescence to
the demand of the Malita brothers to
accompany them to his father's house
on
the
strength
of
the
latter's verbal threats, his incredulous
escape from the clutches of the two,
his inexplicable failure to return home
immediately, his failure to seek
assistance from the authorities, the
fact that Eddie stayed with him
immediately after the incident, and
the nine-day lacuna between the
killing and his pointing to the Malita
brothers as the culprits, all suggest a
complicity more than that of an
unwilling participant. Yet, suspicion,
no matter how strong, should not
sway judgment, it being an accepted
axiom that the prosecution cannot
rely on the weakness of the defense
to gain a conviction, but must
establish beyond reasonable doubt
every circumstance essential to the
guilt of the accused. 15 This the
prosecution has failed to demonstrate.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby

GRANTED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City in
Criminal Case No. 89-9 dated March 2,
1994, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato,
Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of
reasonable doubt. Consequently, let
the accused be immediately released
from his place of confinement unless
there is reason to detain him further
for any other legal or valid cause.
With costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
iv.
G.R. No.
1992
96492
November
26,
ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO,

and
EMILIO
MANANGHAYA, petitioners, vs.
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and
VIOLETA
DELOS
REYES, respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Petitioners Romeo
Reyes,
Angel
Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya
question the respondent Court's
decision promulgated on November
22,
1990, 1 which
affirmed
with
modification the agrarian court's
decision promulgated January 10,
1990, 2 which ordered them and the
other defendants therein to, among
others, restore possession of the
disputed
landholding
to
private
respondent, EufrocinaVda. dela Cruz.
Said respondent court's decision is
now final and executory as to Olympio
Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo, the
other petitioners in the respondent
court, since they did not appeal the
same.
Since petitioners do not dispute the

findings of fact of the respondent
Court, the same shall be quoted
verbatim and are as follows:
It appears from the records that Juan

Mendoza, father of herein defendant
Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2,
Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate,
Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with
Notes on EVIDENCE
an area of 23,000 square meters and

19,000 square meters, respectively.
Devoted to the production of palay,
the lots were tenanted and cultivated
by Julian dela Cruz, husband of
plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian
died on September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged

that upon the death of Julian, she
succeeded him as bona fidetenant of
the subject lots; that between July 7 to
July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in
conspiracy with the other defendants,
prevented her daughter Violeta and
her
workers
through
force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth,
from entering and working on the
subject premises; and that until the
filing of the instant case, defendants
had refused to vacate and surrender
the lots, thus violating her tenancy
rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for
judgment
for
the
recovery
of
possession and damages with a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction in
the meantime.
Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo

and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or
appointed barangay officials of Bahay
Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied
interference
in
the
tenancy
relationship existing between plaintiff
and defendant Mendoza, particularly
in the cultivation of the latter's farm
lots. Claiming that they have always
exercised fairness, equity, reason and
impartiality in the discharge of their
official functions, they asked for the
dismissal of the case and claimed
moral damages and attorney's fees in
the total amount of P165,000.00
(Answer with Counterclaim, Records,
pp. 48-51).
For his part, defendant Mendoza

raised abandonment, sublease and
mortgage of the farm lots without his
consent and approval, and nonpayment of rentals, irrigation fees and
other taxes due the government, as
his defenses. He also demanded
actual and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees (Answer, pp.
77-78).
During the pendency of the case in

the lower court, Mendoza of the case
in the lower court, Mendoza was in
possession of the subject lots and had
cultivated the same. Upon motion of
plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy
Sheriff to supervise the harvesting of
the palay crops, to cause the
threshing thereof and to deposit the
net harvest (after deducting from the
expenses incurred), in a bonded
warehouse of the locality subject to
the disposition of the court. 3
The
respondent
Court
rendered
judgment affirming the appealed
agrarian court's decision with the
modification that Lot 106 is not
covered by it.
The
dispositive
portion
of
appealed
decision,
which
modified, states as follows:
the
was
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby

rendered, in favor of plaintiff and
against defendants:
On the Mandatory Injunction:
1. Ordering said defendants to restore

possession of the landholding subject
of the action to the plaintiff and
enjoining said defendants and any
person claiming under them to desist
from molesting them or interfering
with the possession and cultivation of
the
landholding
descriptive
in
paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2,

Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate,
a total area of 23,969 square meters,
more or less, owned by a certain Juan
Mendoza, and devoted principally to
the production of palay, as evidenced
by a Certification from the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform issued on July 30,
1984.
2. a) Ordering the defendants to

vacate the premises of the two
landholding in question and to respect
the tenancy rights of plaintiff with
respect to the same;
b) Ordering defendants, jointly and

severally to pay unto plaintiff 220
cavans of palay or its equivalent in
cash of P33,000.00 from the principal
crop year of 1984, and every harvest
time until defendants finally vacate
and
surrender
possession
and
cultivation of the landholding in
question to plaintiff.
c) the prayer for moral damages, not

having been sufficiently proved, the
same is denied.
d) Ordering defendants jointly and
severally, to pay the costs of suit.
Notes on EVIDENCE
The awards herein provided should

first be satisfied from the deposits of
the harvests ordered by the Court
from
which
the
planting
and
harvesting expenses have been paid
to defendant Olympio Mendoza; and if
said net deposits with the Court or the
warehouses as ordered by the Court
are insufficient, then the balance
should be paid by defendants, jointly
and severally. 4
Defendants who are the petitioners in

this case, in a Petition for Review
on Certiorari,
present
for
the
consideration of the Court:
[T]he lone issue of whether or not

they can be held liable, jointly and
severally,
with
the
other
defendants, for the harvests of the
litigated property, Lot No. 46, or
the money equivalent thereof
starting from the principal crop
years of 1984 and every harvest
time
thereafter
until
the
possession and cultivation of the
aforestated landholding are finally
surrendered
to
the
private
respondent. 5
It is the position of petitioners that

they are not liable jointly and
severally with Olympio Mendoza and
Severino Aguinaldo because the
present petition involves Lot No. 46,
Block 2, Psd-38453 of the bahay Pare
Estate,
bahay
Pare,
Candaba,
Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the
estate, which lot was purchased by
petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio
Mendoza's father, Juan, and which he
later donated to the barangay Bahay
Notes on EVIDENCE
Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the

construction of the Bahay Pare
Barangay High School. 6 As to their
supposed
participation
in
the
dispossession of private respondent
from
the
disputed
landholding,
petitioners present the September 30,
1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal
Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by
Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I.
Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576, 7 wherein
private
respondent's
complaint
against petitioners and the other
defendants in the agrarian court for
violation of P.D. 583 8 was dismissed,
to show that private respondent's
"point
is
already
settled
and
considered closed."9 lastly, petitioners
claim that they were included in the
present controversy so that their
political career would be destroyed.10
Private respondents deny petitioners'

allegations and contend that it was
petitioners
who
conspired
with
Olympio
Mendoza
and
Severino
Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only
from Lot No. 46 but also from Lot No.
106. They maintain that it was in
Farmlot No. 46 from where they were
ejected and dispossessed, so much so
that even if Farmlot No. 106 was
removed by the Court of Appeals from
the judgment, as Farmlot No. 46 was
harvesting palay worth at least
P33,000.00 per year since 1989,
private respondents, who are entitled
to the possession and peaceful
enjoyment of the farmlot as provided
for in Section 23 of the Agrarian
Reform Law, should be compensated
for the lost income by the petitioners
who are solidarily liable with Olympio
Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo. 11
We find for the private respondents.
It is clear that petitioners are asking

Us to re-examine all the evidence
already presented and evaluated by
the trial court and re-evaluated again
by the respondent appellate court.
Said evidence served as basis in
arriving at the trial court and
appellate court's findings of fact. We
shall not analyze such evidence all
over again but instead put finis to the
factual findings in this case. Settled is
the rule that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules
of
Court 12 absent
the
exceptions which do not obtain in the
instant case. 13
We agree with the appellate court in

its retiocination, which We adopt, on
why it has to dismiss the appeal. Said
the Court:
In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee

alleged that she "is the tenant of Farm
Lots Nos. 46 and 106 Block 2, Psd38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate,
a total area of 23,969 square meters,
more or less . . ." (Complaint, Record,
vol. 1, p.1). However, during Violeta's
testimony, she clarified that actually
only Lot No. 106, which contains an
area of P19,000 square meters, is not
included in this controversy (T.S.N.,
August 10, 1989, p. 5; May 8, 1989, p.
12). This statement was corroborated
by plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Arturo
Rivera, who informed the court that
the 19,000 square meter lot is subject
of a pending case before the MTC of
Sta. Ana, Pampanga (Ibid.,p. 15). The
inconsistency between the averment
of the complaint and the testimony of
the witness should not only because
Notes on EVIDENCE
there was no showing that she

intended to mislead defendants and
even the trial court on the subject
matter of the suit. It would in the
complaint since together with Lot 106
had been include in the complaint
since together with Lot 46, it is owned
by Olympio's father.
We also concur with the trial court's

finding on the participation of the
other appellants in the dispossession
of appellee. They not only knew
Olympio personally, some of them
were even asked by Olympio to help
him cultivate the land, thus lending
credence to the allegation that
defendant Olympio, together with his
co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and
her workers from entering the land
through
"strong
arm
methods".
(Decision of RTC, records, vol. II p.
564).
Finally, we rule that the trial court did

not err when it favorably considered
the affidavits of Eufrocina and
EfrenTecson (Annexes "B" and "C")
although the affiants were not
presented and subjected to crossexamination. Section 16 of P.D. No.
946 provides that the "Rules of Court
shall not be applicable in agrarian
cases even in a suppletory character."
The same provision states that "In the
hearing,
investigation
and
determination of any question or
controversy, affidavits and counteraffidavits may be allowed and are
admissible in evidence".
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the

quantum of evidence required is no
more than substantial evidence. This
substantial
evidence
rule
was
10
incorporated in section 18, P.D. No.

946 which took effect on June 17,
1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No. 34613,
January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226,
the Supreme Court defined what
substantial evidence is:
Substantial
evidence
does
not
necessarily
import
preponderant
evidence, as is required in an ordinary
civil case. It has been defined to be
such
relevant
evidence
as
a
reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion and
its absence is not shown by stressing
that there is contrary evidence on
record, direct or circumstantial, for the
appellate court cannot substitute its
own judgment or criteria for that of
the trial court in determining wherein
lies the weight of evidence or what
evidence is entitled to belief. 14
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible

error in the decision appealed from,
the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on November
22, 1990 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.
v.
G.R. No. 137757

14, 2000
August
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RODEGELIO
TURCO,
JR.,
aka
"TOTONG", accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant RodegelioTurco, Jr.
(aka "Totong") was charged with the
crime of rape in Criminal Case No.
2349-272, Branch I of the Regional
Trial Court of Basilan of the 9th Judicial
Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan,
under the following Information:
That on or about the 8th day of

July,
1995,
and
within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, viz., at Km. 6, Begang
Barangay, Municipality of Isabela,
Province of Basilan, Philippines,
the above-named accused, by the
use
of
force,
threat
and
intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
grab the undersigned complainant
by her neck, cover her mouth and
forcibly make her lie down, after
which the said accused mounted
on top of her and removed her
short pant and panty. Thereafter,
the said accused, by the use of
force, threat and intimidation,
inserted his penis into the vagina
of the undersigned complainant
and finally succeeded to have
carnal knowledge of her, against
her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.(p. 6, Rollo.)
At his arraignment on November 8,

1995, accused-appellant entered a
plea of not guilty, after which trial
ensued.
DECISION
The prosecution's version of the
generative facts, as gathered from the
Notes on EVIDENCE
11
testimony of its witnesses - Alejandra

Tabada, mother of the victim; PO3
Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the police officer
who
investigated
the
case;
OrlandoPioquinto, brother-in-law of
the victim; EsceleaTabada, the 13year-old victim; and Felicitasdelos
Santos Timorata, the medical record
clerk who used to be the medical
officer under Dr.RimbertoSanggalang,
the
physician
who
physically
examined the victim after the incident
- is abstracted in the Appellee's Brief
in this wise:
EsceleaTabada
and
appellant
RodegelioTurco were neighbors in
lower Begang, Isabela, Basilan, their
houses being only about sixty (60)
meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n.;
August 19, 1996). Escelea was then
staying with her father, Alejandro and
her deaf grandmother, Perseveranda
(p. 9, id). She was twelve (12) years
and six (6) months old at the time of
incident, having been born on
December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id).
The nightmare of Escelea began in the

evening of July 1995. At around seven
o'clock (7:00 p.m.) in the evening,
Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She
was accompanied by a certain Cory
Macapili, the granddaughter of her
neighbor, Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).
Cory left upon reaching Escelea's

home. Escelea went upstairs to join
her grandmother who was already
sleeping in the room. About to enter
the said room, Escelea heard a call
from outside. She recognized the
voice and when she asked who was it,
the party introduced himself as the
appellant, viz:
Notes on EVIDENCE
Q. After you heard your named

was mentioned, what did you say
if any?
A. I answered: "Who is that?"
Q. Did the person calling your
name answer you?
A. I heard, sir, "me Totong".
Q. When you say the person who
called your name "Lea" was
"Totong" you are referring to
whom?
A. Rodegelio, sir.
(p. 15, id; Underscoring supplied)
She
recognized
appellant
Turco
immediately as she had known him
for four (4) years and appellant is her
second cousin (p. 34, id). Unaware of
the danger that was about to befall
her, Escelea forthwith opened the
door. Appellant Turco, with the use of
towel,
covered
Escelea's
face.
Appellant, aside from covering the
victim's mouth, even placed his right
hand on the latter's neck.
Appellant bid Eseelea to walk. When

they reached a grassy part, near the
pig pen which was about twelve (12)
meters away from the victim's house,
appellant lost no time in laying the
victim on the grass, laid on top of the
victim and took off her shortpants and
panty (pp. 17-19, id). Escelea tried to
resist by moving her body but to no
avail. Appellant succeeded in pursuing
his evil design-by forcibly inserting his
penis inside Escelea's private part.
The victim felt terrible pain (p. 20, id).
12
Still dissatisfied, after consummating

the act, appellant kissed and held the
victim's breast. Thereafter, appellant
threatened her that he will kill her if
she reports the incident to anybody,
thus:
"He threatened me, that if you will
reveal the incident to anybody I will
kill you.
(p. 21, id; Underscoring supplied)
Finally, after having satisfied his lust,

appellant
hurriedly
went
home.
Escelea, on the other hand, upon
reaching home, discovered that her
shortpants and panty were filled with
blood (p. 23, id). For almost ten (10)
days, she just kept to herself the
harrowing experience until July 18,
1995 when she was able to muster
enough courage to tell her brother-inlaw, Orlando Pioquinto, about the said
incident. Orlando in turn informed
Alejandro, the victim's father, about
the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did
not waste time and immediately
asked Escelea to see a doctor for
medical examination (p. 27, id).
Escelea was accompanied by her

sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the
Provincial Hospital. She was examined
by Dr.Rimberto Sanggalang. After the
issuance of the medical certificate,
they went to Isabela Municipal Station
and filed Escelea's complaint against
appellant (pp. 30-33, id).
(pp. 97-100, Rollo.)
Notes on EVIDENCE
The
defense
presented
Leonora
Cabase,
neighbor
of
accusedappellant; her granddaughter Corazon
Macapili,
and
accused-appellant
himself. Accused-appellant denied the
charge. The defense that the victim
and him were sweethearts was also
advanced. Leonora Cabase mentioned
this in her direct testimony.
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt,

the trial court held:
While the accused denies the charge

of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora
Cabase was trying to project that the
complainant Escelea Tabada and the
accused
RodegelioTurco,
Jr.
are
sweethearts. In the case of People vs.
Casil, 241 SCRA 285, the Supreme
Court agrees with the trial court that
the "sweetheart story" was a mere
concoction of appellant in order to
exculpate
himself
from
criminal
liability. The claim of voluntary love
affair is an affirmative defense, the
allegation of a love affair needed
proof. Nowhere in the record of the
case that the same was substantiated,
though mentioned by Mrs. Leonora
Cabase. The accused and/or his
witnesses must present any token of
the alleged relationship like love
notes, mementos or pictures and the
like. Such bare allegation of the
defense, not to mention its utter lack
of proof, is incredulous. It is hard to
understand how such a relationship
could exculpate a person from the
rape of a terrified young child barely a
little over the age of twelve (12) years
old. Indeed, a love relationship, even
if true, will not necessarily rule out
force (People vs. Sergio Betonio, G.R.
No. 119165, September 26, 1997,
Case Digests of Supreme Court
13
Decisions, Vol. 36, No. 3, September

1-29, 1997, pp. 695-697).
motive why the case be filed against

the accused, except that the rape
really happened.
x xx
There are guiding principles in rape

cases as cited in People vs. Victor
Abrecinoz, G.R. No. 122474, October
17, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme
Court Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1,
October 2-31, 1997, pp. 157-160, and
they are: (1) an accusation for rape
can be made with facility, it is difficult
to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to
disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where two
persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit,
and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. Thus, the
credibility of the complainant is a
paramount importance, and if her
testimony
proves
credible,
the
accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof.
It
should
be
noted
that
the
complainant and the accused are
second degree cousin or they are
sixth civil degree relatives. The
mother of the accused is a first
degree cousin of the father of the
complainant. In the culture of the
Filipino family on extended family, the
relationship between the complainant
and the accused being only second
degree cousin, it becomes the duty of
an older relative (the accused) to
protect and care for a younger relative
(the complainant). It is very hard to
understand or comprehend why a
cousin files a case of rape against her
cousin, unless it is true. There is no
showing that there was compelling
Notes on EVIDENCE
x xx
x xx
It is noted that there was no

underlying
reason
why
the
complainant and/or her father would
bring an action against the accused,
except that the accused had raped
EsceleaTabada on July 8, 1995, at
about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. If it
were not true that she was raped by
the accused, why would she expose
herself to an embarrassment and
traumatic experience connected with
the litigation of this rape case. We are
aware of the Filipino culture especially
on virginity. We likened it as a mirror,
once dropped and broken, it can no
longer be pieced together ... not ever.
This is true among the Filipino folks
that the complainant belonged, poor
and helpless and everything is
entrusted to God. The complainant is
a young girl, a little over twelve (12)
years old and almost illiterate, having
attended school up to Grade III only.
So poor that her family cannot even
buy the cheapest television set and
she has to go to a house of a neighbor
for the meager joy of seeing a
television show ... and expose herself
to the danger of the dark night. All
said, it is very difficult to be poor.
Going to the court is a shout for
help ... let us try to hear it.
14
x xx
[sic] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE
CRIME OF RAPE AGAINST THE
COMPLAINANT.
x xx
x xx
III
WHEREFORE,
under
the
above
circumstances and evaluation, this
court finds the accused "GUILTY" of
rape and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify
the
complainant
the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) for moral damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO

SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING
THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER THE
PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA
AND
TO
INDEMNIFY
THE
COMPLAINANT THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00 REPRESENTING MORAL
DAMAGES BASED ON THE EVIDENCES
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
(p. 101, Rollo.)
x xx
x xx
x xx
(pp. 33-37, Rollo.)

In
accused-appellant's
brief,
he
assigns the following alleged errors:
I
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BASED ON
THE
TESTIMONIES
OF
THE
COMPLAINANT ESCELEA TABADA AND
HER WITNESS.
II
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE PROSECUTION, BASED ON THE
AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL TESTIMONIES
OF THE COMPLAINANT AND ITS
WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO PROVED
Notes on EVIDENCE
He particularly argues that his

conviction is not supported by proof
beyond reasonable doubt considering
that other than the written statement
of the complainant before the Police
Station of Isabela and before the Clerk
of Court of the Municipal Trial Court,
and her testimony during direct
examination, no other evidence was
presented to conclusively prove that
there was ever rape at all; that she
only presumed that it was accusedappellant who attacked her since she
admitted that immediately upon
opening the door, the perpetrator
hastily covered her face with a towel;
that nothing in her testimony clearly
and convincingly shows that she was
able to identify accused-appellant as
the perpetrator; that complainant
implicated accused-appellant only
because her father forced her to do
so; and lastly, that no actual proof
was presented that the rape of the
complainant
actually
happened
considering that although a medical
certificate was presented, the medicolegal officer who prepared the same
was not presented in court to explain
the same.
15
We agree with the trial court.
As aptly recalled by the trial court,

there are three guiding principles in
the review of rape cases, to wit: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused,
although innocent, to disprove; (2) in
view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant is scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution stands or falls on
its own merits and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness
of the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284
SCRA
590
[1998]; People
vs.
Balmoria, 287
SCRA
687
[1998]; People vs. Auxtero,289 SCRA
75 [1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291
SCRA 188 [1998]).
Complainant narrated the incident in

this wise:
Q While you went upstairs and about
to
enter
the
room
of
your
grandmother, did you hear anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A I heard a call, sir.
Q How was the call made?
A It is just by saying: "Lea".
Q After you heard your name was
mentioned, what did you say if
any?
A I answered: "Who is that?"
Q Did the person calling your
name answer you?
Accordingly,
the
primordial
consideration in a determination
concerning the crime of rape is the
credibility of complainant's testimony.
A I heard, sir, "me Totong".
The trial court described complainant

as "a young girl, a little over twelve
(12) years old and almost illiterate,
having attended school up to Grade III
only. So poor that her family cannot
even buy the cheapest television set
and she has to go to a house of a
neighbor for the meager joy of seeing
a television show ... and exposes
herself to the danger of the dark
night." But verily, age, youth, and
poverty are not guarantees of
credibility. Hence, thorough scrutiny
must be made by the Court.
A Rodegelio, sir.
Notes on EVIDENCE
Q When you say the person who

called your name "Lea" was
"Totong", you are referring to
whom?
Q When you say "Rodegelio", you

are referring to Rodegelio Turco,
Jr., the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q After the person calling your
name "Lea" identified himself as
"Totong", what did you do?
A I opened the door, sir.
16
Q And when you opened the door,

what happened next?
Q Do you have a copra kiln?

ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:
A Totong with the use of towel

covered my face, sir.
Q Aside from covering your face
with a towel, what else did he do?
The witness already answered that

she does not know where she was
brought, leading, Your Honor.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
A He covered my mouth, sir.

Q Aside from covering your mouth,
what else did he do?
A He placed his right hand on my
neck, sir.
Q Aside from placing his right
hand ... when he placed his right
hand on your neck, where was he?
Was he infront or behind?
A He was at my back, sir.
Q After placing his right hand on
your neck behind you, what did
"Totong" do next with that
position?
Q According to you, from your

house you were brought by the
accused to a place which you do
not know?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What place?
A Pig pen, Your Honor.
Q Do you know the owner, of that
pig pen?
A Our pig pen, Your Honor.
Q Who owned that pig pen?
A My father, Your Honor.
A He covered my mouth, sir.

Q After covering your mouth and
face, what did he do next?
Q How far is that pig pen to your

house?
A He told me to walk, sir.
A (From this witness stand to that

road outside of this building).
Q Where did he bring you?
COURT:
A I don't know exactly where he

brought me, sir.
It is about 12 meters. Alright,

continue.
Q But you know very well that he

brought you to a certain place?
PROSECUTOR
(Continuing)
A I don't know exactly the place

where he brought me, sir.
Q You stated in answer to the

question of the Honorable Court
that you were brought to the pig
pen or the place where you were
sexually abused, were you place
inside or outside?
Q Is it far from your house where

you were forcibly taken?
M.L.
GENERALAO:
A Yes, sir.
Notes on EVIDENCE
17
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:

Leading, Your Honor.
Q After removing your shortpants

and panty, what else did the
accused do?
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO:
A He abused me, sir.
I will withdraw.
Q You said that he abused you,

how did he abuse your?
Q Will you please explain to the

Court what particular place of the
pig pen that you were brought by
the accused?
A He put his private part inside my

private part, sir.
A Inside the grasses, sir.
Q When the accused was on top of

you and he forcibly abused you,
what did you do?
Q When you were already inside

the grasses near this pig pen,
what did the accused do to you?
A I tried to move my body, sir.
A He put me down, sir.

Q When you were already down on
the ground, what did the accused
do next?
Q While you were trying to move

your body and while the accused
was on top of you, what did the
accused do?
A He tried to insert his private part
to my private part, sir.
A He mounted on me, sir.

Q And when the accused was
already on top of you, what did he
do next?
A He molested me, sir.
Q Before he molested you, did he
remove anything from your body?
Q And was he able to insert his

private part?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you feel when his
private part was already inside
your private part?
A I felt pain, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q What?
A Myshortpants and panty, sir.
Q You stated that the accused
while on top of you removed your
pants and panty, did he totally
remove it from your body?
A Yes, sir.
Notes on EVIDENCE
Q Will you please explain why you

felt when the private part of the
accused was already inside your
private part?
A I felt pain when he already
finished, sir.
Q By the way, before July 8, 1995,
were you had been raped? Will you
please tell us whether you have
already experienced or you have
already your menstruation at that
time?
18
A No, sir.
Q Now you stated to the
Honorable Court ... after the
accused had sexually abused you
and you said you felt pains after
he consumated the sexual act,
after that what did he do next
after consumating the act?
A After consumating his desire, he
raised my panty and shortpants
then he kissed me and hold my
nipple, sir.
Q After the accused had raised
your
shortpants
and
panty,
embraced you, kissed you and
hold your breast, did he tell you
anything?
A He threatened me, "that if you
will reveal the incident to anybody
I will kill you."
Q In what dialect? In Chavacano,
sir.
A After the accused embraced you,
kissed you and hold your nipple
and threatened you in Chavacano
dialect, what happened next after
that?
No more, sir.
(tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.)
On cross-examination, the victim did

display some apparent confusion
when the defense counsel asked her
about the events that transpired
before the ill-fated July 8, 1995. The
query prompted her to narrate the
incident prior to said date when she
also watched television at the home
of Leonora Cabase, and that when she
arrived
home,
accused-appellant
came and called her "Lea" and when
Notes on EVIDENCE
she asked who was it, he answered

"so Totong". When she asked what he
wanted, he said he wanted to borrow
a guitar. She said that she could not
lend him the guitar since her father
was not yet around. He insisted but to
no avail, and hence he just went
home. She went to sleep afterwards.
On re-direct examination, she clarified
that when accused-appellant came to
borrow the guitar on July 8, 1995, it
was about 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon. Lastly, she said that the
incident of the borrowing of the guitar
and the incident that transpired at 7
o'clock in the evening on July 8, 1995
were separate incidents.
Significantly, three things could be

perceived: complainant's youth, her
apparent confusion concerning the
events that transpired, and her fear of
both accused-appellant and her
father.
At
the
outset,
it
should
be
remembered that the declarations on
the witness stand of rape victims who
are young and immature deserve full
credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294
SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when
the offended parties are young and
immature girls from the ages of
twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined
to lend credence to their version of
what transpired, considering not only
their relative vulnerability but also the
shame and embarrassment to which
they would be exposed by court trial if
the matter about which they testified
were not true(People vs. Clopino, 290
SCRA 432 [1998]). In addition, we take
cognizance of the trial court's
observation on the segment of the
Filipino society to which the victim
belongs - almost illiterate, having
attended school up to the third grade
19
only, and so poor that she had to go

to a neighbor's house to watch
television, yet one who values her
virginity which like a "mirror, once
dropped and broken ... can no longer
be pieced together ... not ever," this
being "true among the Filipino folks
[to which] complainant belonged, poor
and helpless everything is entrusted
to God" (p. 35, Rollo).
The victim's relatively low level of

intelligence explains the lapses in her
testimony, having intermingled two
incidents. Nonetheless, it can easily
be gathered from the record that the
defense
counsel
may
have
contributed to this confusion when he
asked the victim what transpired
"before" the incident (tsn, August 19,
1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a
witness'
testimony
should
be
expected when a person recounts
details of an experience so humiliating
and
so
painful
to
recall
as
rape (People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA
478 [1998]).Rape, as a harrowing
experience,
is
usually
not
remembered in detail. For, such an
offense is not something which
enhances one's life experience as to
be worth recalling or reliving but,
rather, something which causes deep
psychological wounds and casts a
stigma upon the victim for the rest of
her life, which her conscious or
subconscious mind would prefer to
forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA
463 [1997]). These lapses do not
detract
from
the
overwhelming
testimony of a prosecution witness
positively
identifying
the
malefactor (People vs. Baccay, 284
SCRA 296 [1998]). Further, the
testimony of a witness must be
considered and calibrated in its
entirety and not by truncated portions
thereof
or
isolated
passages
Notes on EVIDENCE
therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA

355 [1991]).
The Court finds that the victim had no

motive to falsely testify against
accused-appellant.
Her
testimony
deserves the credence accorded
thereto by the trial court (People vs.
Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]).
Pertinently, no woman, especially one
of tender age, would concoct a story
of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts, and thereafter
pervert herself by being subjected to
a public trial if she was not motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished (People
vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998]).
Another point to consider is the blood

relationship
between
accusedappellant and the victim. At this
juncture, we reiterate the trial court's
observation thereon - the mother of
accused-appellant being a first degree
cousin of the victim's father, that
makes the victim and accusedappellant second degree cousins or
sixth civil degree relatives. Filipino
culture, particularly in the provinces,
looks at the extended family as
closely-knit
and
recognizes
the
obligation of an older relative to
protect and take care of a younger
one. On the contrary, in the instant
case,
the
victim
initiated
the
prosecution of her cousin. If the
charge were not true, it is indeed
difficult to understand why the victim
would charge her own cousin as the
malefactor. Too, she having no
compelling motive to file said case
against
accused-appellant,
the
conclusion that the rape really
happened is logically reinforced.
20
As regards the initial delay of the

victim in reporting the rape incident,
suffice it to state that the delay and
initial reluctance of a rape victim to
make public the assault on her virtue
is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo,
supra). In the case at bar, the victim's
fear of her father who had moral
ascendancy over her, was explicit.
She testified that she did not disclose
the incident to her father because of
fear both of her father as well as of
accused-appellant (tsn, August 19,
1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction is
typical of a twelve-year-old girl and
only strengthens her credibility.
The issue of credibility of the victim

having been settled, there are a few
points presented by the defense that
must be passed upon:
1. Other than their blood relationship,

was there an intimate relationship
between accused-appellant and the
victim? The theory initially advanced
by the defense in the proceedings
before
the
court a
quo is
the
"sweetheart theory". In this regard,
.we agree with the trial court that the
"sweetheart story" was a mere
concoction of accused-appellant in
order to exculpate himself from
criminal
liability.
In People
vs.
Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we
held that the sweetheart theory of the
accused was unavailing and selfserving where he failed to introduce
love letters, gifts, and the like to
attest to his alleged amorous affair
with the victim. Hence, the defense
cannot
just
present
testimonial
evidence in support of the theory that
he and the victim were sweethearts.
Independent proof is necessary, such
as
tokens,
mementos,
and
photographs. It is likewise remarkable,
Notes on EVIDENCE
a
confession
possibly
of
the
bankruptcy of this theory that
accused-appellant has not insisted on
this defense in his brief, seemingly
abandoning this line.
We, therefore, conclude that whatever

familiarity and supposed closeness
there was between accused-appellant
and the victim, is explained not by an
intimate relationship but by their
blood relationship. Hence, it is
noticeable that on the day of the
incident,
when
accused-appellant
called upon the victim and the latter
asked who he was, the victim knew
right away that her caller was
accused-appellant when the latter
replied "Si Totong".
Accused-appellant,
in
his
direct
testimony, tried to deny any blood
relation with the victim EsceleaTabada
and
touched
on
the
apparent
friendship between them, as follows:
Q You mentioned earlier that you

know the complainant, why do you
know the complainant Escelea
Tabada?
A I only know her when I was

already in jail, sir.
Q You mean to say that you never
knew the complainant before you
were arrested?
A I do not know her, sir.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
21
Q Why, are you not related to the

Tabadas?
Q So, when you said that you are

not related to the Tabadas, you
were not telling the truth?
A No, Your Honor.

A Yes, sir.
ATTY.
G.V.
(Continuing)
DELA
PENA
III:
(ibid, p. 51.)
Q Have you ever seen

complainant in Begang?
the
A The complainant is at Begang,

sir.
Q And you mentioned that you
were
not
related
with
the
complainant, Mr. Witness?
2. Accused-appellant argues that no

actual proof was presented that the
rape actually happened since the
medico-legal officer who prepared the
medical certificate was not presented
in court to explain the same.
A Yes, sir, we are only close.

Q So, in other words, Mr. Witness,
you and the complainant Escelea
Tabada were already friends?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43.)
However, on cross-examination,
he notably crumbled:
Q Now, you stated in your direct
examination that you are not
related to the Tabadas in San
Antonio Begang, Isabela, Basilan,
is that right?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that
your mother is the first cousin of
the father of Escelea Tabada?
A They are cousins, sir.
Q So, indeed you are related to the
Tabadas?
A Yes, sir.
Notes on EVIDENCE
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the

court a quo erred in giving weight to
the medical certificate issued by the
examining physician despite the
failure of the latter to testify. While the
certificate could be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule since
entries in official records (under
Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
constitute exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule, since it involved an
opinion of one who must first be
established as an expert witness, it
could not be given weight or credit
unless the doctor who issued it is
presented in court to show his
qualifications. We place emphasis on
the distinction between admissibility
of evidence and the probative value
thereof. Evidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or the rules
(Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court)
or is competent. Since admissibility of
evidence is determined by its
relevance
and
competence,
admissibility is, therefore, an affair of
logic and law. On the other hand, the
weight to be given to such evidence,
once admitted, depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines
provided in Rule 133 and the
22
jurisprudence laid down by the Court.

Thus,
while
evidence
may
be
admissible, it may be entitled to little
or no weight at all. Conversely,
evidence which may have evidentiary
weight may be inadmissible because a
special
rule
forbids
its
reception (Regalado, Remedial
Law
Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p.
550).
Withal,
although
the
medical
certificate is an exception to the
hearsay rule, hence admissible as
evidence, it has very little probative
value due to the absence of the
examining physician. Nevertheless, it
cannot be said that the prosecution
relied solely on the medical certificate
(stating that there was "[h]ymen
rupture, secondary to penile insertion"
as well as "foul-smelling discharges."
The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen
secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In
fact, reliance was made on the
testimony of the victim herself which,
standing alone even without medical
examination,
is
sufficient
to
convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369
SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled
that a medical examination is not
indispensable in the prosecution of
rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No.
130591, November 17, 1999; People
vs.
Salazar, 258
SCRA
55
[1996]; People
vs.
Venerable,
supra). The
absence
of
medical
findings by a medico-legal officer does
not disprove the occurrence of
rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is
enough that the evidence on hand
convinces the court that conviction is
proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In
the
instant
case,
the
victim's
testimony alone is credible and
sufficient to convict.
Notes on EVIDENCE
As a final observation, it must be said

that the amount awarded by the trial
court in favor of Escelea Tabada as
indemnification (P50,000.00 for moral
damages) for the rape is incomplete
based on established jurisprudence
and must be modified. In People vs.
Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we
held that the award of P50,000.00 to
the victim as indemnity for rape not
committed or qualified by any of the
circumstances
under
the
Death
Penalty Law, needs no proof other
than the conviction of the accused for
the raped proved. This is different
from the P50,000.00 awarded as
moral damages which also needs no
pleading
or
proof
as
basis
thereof (People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA
411 [1998]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision

is hereby
AFFIRMED,
with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Rodegelio Turco, Jr. aka "Totong" is
ordered to indemnify the offended
party, Escelea Tabada, in the amount
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
in addition to the sum of P50,000.00
already awarded by the trial court as
moral damages.SO ORDERED.
vi.
G.R. No. 152807

12, 2003
August
HEIRS
OF
LOURDES
SAEZ
SABANPAN:
BERNARDO
S.
SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN,
DANILO
S.
SABANPAN
and
THELMA
S.
CHU;
HEIRS
OF
ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ
TAPIZ,
MA.
VICTORIA
SAEZ
LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ and
EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF
CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY
SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ
JR., petitioners, vs.
23
ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN

C.
COMORPOSA,
OFELIA
C.
ARIEGO,1 REMEDIOS COMORPOSA,
VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO,1a BELINDA
M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H.
COMORPOSA, respondents.
The Facts
The CA summarized the factual

antecedents of the case as follows:
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The admissibility of evidence should

be distinguished from its probative
value. Just because a piece of
evidence is admitted does not ipso
facto mean that it conclusively proves
the fact in dispute.
"The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos

Saez was the lawful and actual
possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275
located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao
del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares.
In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs,
his children and grandchildren.
The Case
Before
us
is
a
Petition
for
Review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the August
7, 2001 Decision and the February 27,
2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60645.
The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the

foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS
the Decision dated 22 June 2000
rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional
Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur,
REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of
Sta. Cruz, Davao del Su[r]."4
The
assailed
petitioners'
Reconsideration.
Notes on EVIDENCE
"A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer

with
damages
was
filed
by
[petitioners] against [respondents]
before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur
Municipal Trial Court.
Resolution5 denied
Motion
for
"In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who

was working in the land of Oboza was
terminated
from
his
job.
The
termination of his employment caused
a problem in relocating his house.
Being a close family friend of [Marcos]
Saez,
Francisco
Comorposa
approached the late Marcos Saez's
son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of
Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem.
Out of pity and for humanitarian
consideration,
Adolfo
allowed
Francisco Comorposa to occupy the
land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa
hut was carried by his neighbors and
transferred to a portion of the land
subject matter of this case. Such
transfer was witnessed by several
people, among them, Gloria Leano
and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa
occupied a portion of Marcos Saez'
property without paying any rental.
24
"Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii,

U.S.A. He was succeeded in his
possession by the respondents who
likewise did not pay any rental and
are occupying the premises through
petitioners' tolerance.
"On 7 May 1998, a formal demand
was made upon the respondents to
vacate the premises but the latter
refused to vacate the same and
claimed
that
they
[were]
the
legitimate claimants and the actual
and lawful possessor[s] of the
premises. A [C]omplaint was filed with
the barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,]
Davao del Sur, but the parties failed
to arrive at an amicable settlement.
Thus, the corresponding Certificate to
File Action was issued by the said
barangay and an action for unlawful
detainer was filed by petitioners
against respondents.
"Respondents, in their Answer, denied

the material allegations of the
[C]omplaint and alleged that they
entered and occupied the premises in
their own right as true, valid and
lawful claimants, possessors and
owners of the said lot way back in
1960 and up to the present time; that
they have acquired just and valid
ownership and possession of the
premises by ordinary or extraordinary
prescription, and that the Regional
Director of the DENR, Region XI has
already upheld their possession over
the land in question when it ruled that
they [were] the rightful claimants and
possessors and [were], therefore,
entitled to the issuance of a title.
favor of petitioners but the Regional

Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on
appeal, reversed and set aside the
said decision. x x x"6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), the CA upheld the right of
respondents
as
claimants
and
possessors. The appellate court held
that -- although not yet final -- the
Order issued by the regional executive
director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) remained in full force and
effect, unless declared null and void.
The CA added that the Certification
issued by the DENR's community
environment and natural resources
(CENR) officer was proof that when
the cadastral survey was conducted,
the land was still alienable and was
not yet allocated to any person.
According to the CA, respondents had

the better right to possess alienable
and disposable land of the public
domain,
because
they
have
sufficiently
proven
their
actual,
physical, open, notorious, exclusive,
continuous
and
uninterrupted
possession thereof since 1960. The
appellate court deemed as selfserving, and therefore incredible, the
Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano
Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.
Hence, this Petition.7
"The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,

Davao del Sur rendered judgment in
Notes on EVIDENCE
The Issue
25
In their Memorandum, petitioners

raise the following issues for the
Court's consideration:
"I
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Did the Court of Appeals gravely

abuse its discretion and [err] in
sustaining the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court giving credence to the
Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by
the regional executive director?
"II
abuse its discretion and err in
sustaining the Regional Trial Court's
ruling giving weight to the CENR
Officer's Certification, which only
bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda
and, [worse], it is a new matter raised
for the first time on appeal?
First Issue:
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998
Petitioners claim that the reliance of

the CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order
issued by the regional director of the
DENR was erroneous. The reason was
that the Order, which had upheld the
claim of respondents, was supposedly
not yet final and executory. Another
Order dated August 23, 1999,9 issued
later by the DENR regional director,
allegedly held in abeyance the
effectivity of the earlier one.
"III
abuse its discretion and err in holding
that the land subject matter of this
case has been acquired by means of
adverse possession and prescription?
"IV
abuse its discretion, and err in
declaring that, 'neither is there error
on the part of the Regional Trial Court,
when it did not give importance to the
affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel
[Oboza], and Paulina Paran for
allegedly being self serving?'"8
To facilitate the discussion, the fourth

and the third issues shall be discussed
in reverse sequence.
Notes on EVIDENCE
Under the Public Land Act,10 the

management and the disposition of
public land is under the primary
control of the director of lands 11 (now
the director of the Lands Management
Bureau or LMB),12 subject to review by
the DENR secretary.13 As a rule, then,
courts have no jurisdiction to intrude
upon matters properly falling within
the powers of the LMB.
The powers given to the LMB and the

DENR to alienate and dispose of
public land does not, however, divest
regular courts of jurisdiction over
possessory actions instituted by
occupants or applicants to protect
their respective possessions and
occupations.14 The
power
to
determine who has actual physical
26
possession or occupation of public

land and who has the better right of
possession over it remains with the
courts.15 But once the DENR has
decided, particularly through the
grant of a homestead patent and the
issuance of a certificate of title, its
decision on these points will normally
prevail.16
Therefore, while the issue as to who

among the parties are entitled to a
piece of public land remains pending
with the DENR, the question of
recovery of possession of the disputed
property is a matter that may be
addressed to the courts.
Second Issue:
CENR Officer's Certification
Petitioners contend that the CENR

Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a
sham
document,
because
the
signature of the CENR officer is a
mere facsimile. In support of their
argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales
Jr.17 and argue that the Certification is
a new matter being raised by
respondents for the first time on
appeal.
printed and graphic matter by

scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of
each area by a specified amount
of electric current. x x x"18
Pleadings filed via fax machines are

not considered originals and are at
best exact copies. As such, they are
not admissible in evidence, as there is
no way of determining whether they
are genuine or authentic.19
The Certification, on the other hand, is

being contested for bearing a
facsimile of the signature of CENR
Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile
referred to is not the same as that
which is alluded to in Garvida. The
one mentioned here refers to a
facsimile signature, which is defined
as
a
signature
produced
by
mechanical means but recognized as
valid in banking, financial, and
business transactions.20
Note that the CENR officer has not
disclaimed the Certification. In fact,
the DENR regional director has
acknowledged
and
used
it
as
reference in his Order dated April 2,
1998:
"x xx. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda,

in a 'CERTIFICATION' dated 22 July
1997, certified among others, that:
x xx per records available in his
Office, x xx the controverted lot x
xx was not allocated to any person
x x x."21
We are not persuaded.
In Garvida, the Court held:
"A facsimile or fax transmission is

a
process
involving
the
transmission and reproduction of
Notes on EVIDENCE
27
If the Certification were a sham as

petitioner claims, then the regional
director would not have used it as
reference in his Order. Instead, he
would have either verified it or
directed the CENR officer to take the
appropriate action, as the latter was
under the former's direct control and
supervision.
Petitioners' claim that the Certification

was raised for the first time on appeal
is incorrect. As early as the pretrial
conference at the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), the CENR Certification had
already been marked as evidence for
respondents as stated in the Pre-trial
Order.22 The Certification was not
formally offered, however, because
respondents had not been able to file
their position paper.
Neither the rules of procedure 23 nor

jurisprudence24 would sanction the
admission of evidence that has not
been formally offered during the trial.
But this evidentiary rule is applicable
only to ordinary trials, not to cases
covered by the rule on summary
procedure -- cases in which no fullblown trial is held.25
Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners' Witnesses
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in

disregarding the Affidavits of their
witnesses, insisting that the Rule on
Summary Procedure authorizes the
use of affidavits. They also claim that
the failure of respondents to file their
position paper and counter-affidavits
Notes on EVIDENCE
before the MTC amounts

admission by silence.
to
an
The admissibility of evidence should

not be confused with its probative
value. Admissibility refers to the
question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all,
while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue.26 Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.27
While
in
summary
proceedings
affidavits are admissible as the
witnesses' respective testimonies, the
failure of the adverse party to reply
does not ipso facto render the facts,
set forth therein, duly proven.
Petitioners still bear the burden of
proving their cause of action, because
they are the ones asserting an
affirmative relief.28
Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription
Petitioners claim that the court a quo

erred in upholding the defense of
prescription proffered by respondents.
It is the former's contention that since
the latter's possession of the land was
merely being tolerated, there was no
basis for the claim of prescription. We
disagree.
28
For the Court to uphold the contention

of petitioners, they have first to prove
that the possession of respondents
was by mere tolerance. The only
pieces of evidence submitted by the
former to support their claim were a
technical description and a vicinity
map drawn in accordance with the
survey dated May 22, 1936.29 Both of
these were discredited by the CENR
Certification, which indicated that the
contested lot had not yet been
allocated to any person when the
survey
was
conducted.30 The
testimony of petitioners' witnesses
alone
cannot
prevail
over
respondents'
continued
and
uninterrupted possession of the
subject lot for a considerable length of
time.
Before the Court is a Petition for

Review on Certiorari filed by accused
David Tan (petitioner) assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated February 11, 2000, and the
Resolution dated September 4, 2000.
Furthermore, this is an issue of fact

that cannot, as a rule, be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45.31
x xxxxxxxx
WHEREFORE,
the
is DENIED and
the
Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs
petitioners.SO ORDERED.
vii.
Petition
assailed
against
G.R. NO. 145006 August 30, 2006

DAVID TAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAROLYN
ZARAGOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Notes on EVIDENCE
The antecedent facts as accurately

narrated by the MTC in its Decision
are as follows:
David Tan, the accused herein, stands

charged with the crime of Violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (6 counts)
in six (6) separate informations which
read as follows:
Records show that the accused,

assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
Not Guilty, upon being arraigned.
Thereafter, these cases were set for
trial on the merits, which cases were
consolidated and tried jointly.
Carolyn Zaragoza, of legal age, the

private complainant, testified among
others that: She met the accused
through their common friend, Paul Dy
while they were having some business
negotiations (Witness identified the
accused through his pictures which
were attached to his bail bond, as said
accused failed to appear in court
despite notice, said pictures were
marked as Exhs. "J", "J-1" and J-2");
that during her first meeting with the
accused, they had a loan transaction
which was followed by another loan
transaction on June 27, 1994 in the
29
amount of P1 Million, and for which

she gave the accused a Metrobank
Check No. 001430 in the amount
ofP950,000.00 (Exhs. "K" & "K-1"),
having deduced the 5% interest from
said loan. Thereafter, the accused
issued several PCIBANK Checks,
among which are numbered as
follows: x xx When all these checks
were deposited at her account with
the City Trust Bank, Sucat (Paraaque)
Branch, they all bounced for reason
"Account Closed." She thereafter tried
to contact the accused but he
(accused) refused to talk to her. The
accused was sent by her lawyer a
formal demand through registered
mail, for him to pay in cash the
aforementioned bounced/dishonored
checks but to no avail. In filing this
case she engaged the services of a
lawyer for P50,000.00 acceptance fee
andP1,000.00 per appearance in
court; that said accused should pay
the
corresponding
interest
of P50,000.00 which had become due
since November 1994 other than the
principal obligation.
Despite ample opportunity given to

the accused to present its evidence, it
still failed to do so; hence, the court in
its Order dated March 18, 1997, the
case was deemed submitted for
decision.
On May 27, 1997, the MTC rendered

judgment, to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this

Court finds the accused David Tan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in six (6) counts,
and
hereby
sentences
said
Notes on EVIDENCE
accused to an imprisonment of six

(6) months for each case, and to
indemnify the private complainant
in the amount ofP600,000.00
representing the total amount of
the subject checks, plus interest
thereon
in
the
amount
ofP50,000.00 and attorneys fees
in the amount of P20,000.00 and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration with the MTC wherein
he denied receipt of the demand
letter3 dated
October
30,
1995
marked as Exhibit "R" and alleged
that said evidence was not included in
the formal offer of evidence. Said
motion
for
reconsideration
was
denied. He then appealed the case to
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 258 (RTC), with the following
assignment of errors:
1. The trial court gravely erred in

finding
appellant
guilty
beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of B.P. 22 on six (6) courts
(sic);
2. The trial court gravely erred in

ordering appellant to indemnify the
private complainant the value of the
six (6) checks in question, plus the
sum
of P50,000.00
interest
and P20,000.00 attorneys fees.4
On
April
16,
1999,
the
promulgated
its
Decision,
30
RTC
the
dispositive portion of which reads as

follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the

Court a quo is MODIFIED to read,
thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this

Court finds the accused David Tan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 in six (6)
counts, and hereby sentences said
accused to an imprisonment of six
(6) months for each case, and to
indemnify the private complainant
in the amount ofP600,000.00
representing the total amount of
the subject checks, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from the
filing of the Information until fully
paid and to pay the costs.
In view of the foregoing the court

a quo is directed to issue a
Warrant of Arrest against the
accused which need not be
returned until he has been
arrested.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner moved for reconsideration

of the foregoing Decision but per
Order dated July 5, 1999, the RTC
denied the same.
Notes on EVIDENCE
A Petition for Review was then filed by

petitioner with the CA, alleging as
follows:
With due respect to the Honorable

Regional Trial Court, Branch 258,
Paraaque
City,
it
committed
reversible error, thus:
1. In affirming the trial courts verdict

of conviction despite the prosecutions
failure to prove the guilt of herein
petitioner/accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. In affirming the trial courts verdict

awarding
damages
to
private
respondent.
3. In ordering the trial court to issue

warrant of arrest against petitioner
despite the fact that its verdict
affirming the trial courts decision is
not yet final and executory.6
The CA dismissed the appeal and

affirmed the RTC Decision, ruling that
petitioners guilt had indeed been
proven beyond reasonable doubt
since the existence of the element
that he had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds in or credit with
the drawee bank at the time he issued
the checks is established by the
demand letter dated October 30, 1995
notifying him of the dishonor of the
checks he issued. The CA further
pointed out that the RTC had already
deleted the MTCs award for interest
in the amount of P50,000.00 and
attorneys fees, hence, on said issue,
31
there is no error that needs to be

corrected. As to the order for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the CA
held that "[i]t is a constitutional
mandate that once accused is
convicted in the Regional Trial Court,
bail becomes a matter of discretion
upon the court and no longer a matter
of right."7
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE

TO
PROVE
THE
GUILT
OF
PETITIONER/ACCUSED
BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT MUCH MORE SO
CONSIDERING THAT THE PROOF OF
NOTICE OF DISHONOR HAS NOT BEEN
SATISFACTORILY PROVEN OR IS BASED
ON
EVIDENCE
NOT
PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED AND OFFERED.
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration where he argued that
no evidentiary weight should be given
to the demand letter dated October
30,
1995
because, although
included in the formal offer of
evidence by the prosecution, it
was not presented during trial for
proper identification, hence, it
should not have been admitted
into evidence even if the defense
failed to object to the formal offer
thereof. Petitioner insisted that the
prosecution did not have proof of
notice of dishonor, thus, petitioners
guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
x xxxxxxxx
The CA denied said motion for

reconsideration
in
its
8
Resolution dated September 4, 2000
holding that since said issue was
never raised before the trial court nor
before the RTC, the same can no
longer be considered by the reviewing
court.
Hence, this petition where it is alleged

that:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN

AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE LOWER
COURTS VERDICT OF CONVICTION
Notes on EVIDENCE
II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN

AFFIRMING
THE
TRIAL
COURTS
VERDICT AWARDING DAMAGES TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
x xxxxxxxx
III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN

SUSTAINING THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT WHICH ORDERED AN INFERIOR
COURT TO ISSUE A WARRANT OF
ARREST AGAINST PETITIONER DESPITE
THE
FACT
THAT
ITS
VERDICT
AFFIRMING THE INFERIOR COURTS
DECISION IS NOT YET FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.9
The petition is imbued with merit.
With regard to the first assignment of

error,
petitioner
reiterates
his
argument that no evidentiary weight
should be given to the demand letter
dated
October
30,
1995
because, although included in the
formal offer of evidence by the
prosecution, it was not presented
32
during
trial
for
proper
identification and should not have
been admitted into evidence even
if the defense failed to object to
the formal offer thereof.
It is quite true that this Court has

ruled
that
objection
to
the
admissibility of evidence, if not made
at the time such evidence is offered,
shall be deemed waived.10 However,
in all cases where said rule had
been
applied,
the
assailed
testimonial or object evidence
had been duly presented during
the course of the trial.
In the present case, a judicious

examination of the entire record
shows that, indeed, the demand
letter dated October 30, 1995
was never presented during the
course of the trial.
The
transcript
of
stenographic
notes11 for the hearing held on
September 26, 1996 shows that the
presentation of the testimony of the
bank representative testifying for the
prosecution was dispensed with since
the opposing parties stipulated that
the
testimony
of
a
bank
representative
would
prove
the
following:
x xx the witness will be testifying on

the points that at the time the six
checks were presented for payment,
the first two checks were dishonored
for being "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds" while the third up to the sixth
checks were dishonored for reason of
"account closed" and per records of
Notes on EVIDENCE
the bank, the account of the accused

was not sufficient to cover the amount
of the checks issued by the accused
as well as the domestic current
account of the accused and we have
here the documents, the ledger of the
accused which would prove that the
accounts of the accused, both savings
and current were not sufficient to
cover the checks issued by the
accused to the complainant?12
The only other prosecution witness is

private complainant Carolyn Zaragosa
(Zaragosa), whose testimony is to the
effect that after the checks bounced,
she tried to call up petitioner but the
latter refused to talk to her, thus, she
was constrained to obtain the services
of a lawyer. Nowhere
in
the
transcript
of
stenographic
notes[13]for the hearing held on
December 17, 1996, did Zaragosa
ever mention the existence of a
demand letter dated October 30,
1995. After the direct testimony of
Zaragosa where the exhibits marked
were only up to Exhibits "Q" and "Q1," all the subsequent hearings did
not push through. Zaragosa was never
cross-examined. The defense, despite
numerous resetting of hearing dates
set for presentation of its evidence,
failed
to
appear
during
those
hearings, prompting the MTC to deem
the case submitted for decision
without evidence for the defense.
Since there were no other hearings

held, it was impossible for the
prosecution to have presented
and marked as exhibit, the
demand letter dated October 30,
1995.
33
The very first time said demand letter

was ever mentioned or appeared in
the record was in the formal offer of
evidence, supposedly marked as
Exhibit "R." How said demand letter
came to be marked as Exhibit "R" and
inserted into the record truly mystifies
this Court. Such circumstance, to
say the least, is tainted with
irregularity
because,
as
previously
mentioned,
such
document was never presented or
identified
in
any
of
the
hearings. As
held
in Pigao
v.
Rabanillo,14 for documentary evidence
to be considered by the court, it must
have
been presented
during
trial and formally offered.
Although petitioner admits that they

failed to submit any opposition to the
formal
offer
of
evidence,
he
nevertheless raised the issue of the
non-presentation of the demand letter
in his motion for reconsideration filed
with the MTC. Evidently, the CA made
a mistake in stating that petitioner
only raised for the first time on
appeal, the issue on the admission of
the demand letter into evidence.
Thus, in view of the foregoing

significant circumstances, it would be
unreasonable to apply to the present
case the general rule that objection to
the admissibility of evidence, if not
made at the time such evidence is
offered, shall be deemed waived. As
the
demand
letter
was
never
presented during the course of the
trial, petitioner was never alerted to
its
possible
inclusion
in
the
prosecutions formal offer of evidence.
Verily, therefore, petitioners failure to
timely object to this piece of evidence
(the demand letter) is excusable. The
prosecution should not benefit from
Notes on EVIDENCE
the anomalous inclusion of the

demand letter in the records. Said
evidence
should
be
deemed
inadmissible and should not have
been considered by the MTC in
arriving at its judgment.
With the exclusion of the demand

letter from the body of evidence
presented by the prosecution, the
next question is, would the remaining
evidence still be sufficient to prove
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt? The answer must be in the
negative.
The elements of violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) are:
(1) making, drawing, and issuance of
any check to apply on account or for
value; (2) knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and (3)
subsequent dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.15
In Ongson
expounded
necessary
element, to
v. People,16 the Court

on the kind of evidence
to prove the second
wit:
As to the second element, we have

held that knowledge involves a state
of mind which is difficult to establish,
thus the statute itself creates a prima
facie presumption that the drawer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his
funds in or credit with the bank at the
34
time of the issuance and on the

check's presentment for payment if he
fails to pay the amount of the check
within five (5) banking days from
notice of dishonor.
Sec. 2 of B.P. 22 provides:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of

insufficient funds. - The making,
drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by
the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check,
shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker
or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full
by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee.
For this presumption to arise, the

prosecution
must
prove the
following: (a) the check is presented
within ninety (90) days from the date
of the check; (b) the drawer or
maker of the check receives
notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee; and (c)
the drawer or maker of the check fails
to pay the holder of the check the
amount due thereon, or make
arrangements for payment in full
within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee. In other
words, the presumption is brought
into existence only after it is
proved that the issuer had
Notes on EVIDENCE
received a notice of dishonor and

that within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the
amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment.
The
presumption
or prima
facie evidence as provided in this
section cannot arise, if such
notice of nonpayment by the
drawee bank is not sent to the
maker or drawer, or if there is no
proof as to when such notice was
received by the drawer, since there
would simply be no way of reckoning
the
crucial
5-day
period.
Furthermore, the notice of dishonor
must be in writing; a verbal
notice is not enough.17(Emphasis
supplied)
Since the prosecution failed to present

evidence during trial that a written
demand had been sent to and
received by petitioner, the second
element, that the accused had
knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds, had not been established. As
stated
in Dico
v.
Court
of
Appeals,18 "[a] notice of dishonor
received by the maker or drawer of
the check is thus indispensable before
a conviction can ensue. x xx. The lack
of a written notice is fatal for the
prosecution."
Hence,
petitioners
conviction for the crime of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 must be set aside.
However, the CA correctly affirmed

the RTCs award of the legal rate of
interest on the principal amount
ofP600,000.00. It should be borne in
mind that Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen a
criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the
35
criminal action x xx." Section 1, Rule

133 of the same Rules provides that
"[i]n civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his
case
by
a
preponderance
of
evidence." Here, private complainant
successfully
proved,
by
preponderance of evidence, that
despite all her efforts to collect from
petitioner, he failed to pay his
indebtedness. Thus, the trial court
correctly ordered petitioner to pay
private complainant civil indemnity.
Petitioners argument that private

complainant should not have been
awarded civil indemnity because she
failed to exhaust non-judicial means
before resorting to the filing of the
criminal case should not be given any
consideration as the evidence shows
that private complainant indeed tried
to demand payment from petitioner
out of court but all to no avail.
The RTC was correct in awarding

interest on the principal amount at
the legal rate which should be 12%
per annum from the filing of the
Information until fully paid, as this is
in keeping with the Courts ruling
in Trade & Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines v.
Roblett
Industrial
Construction
Corporation,19 where
the
Court
reiterated that:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its

source, i.e., law, contracts, quasicontracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be
held
liable
for
damages.
The
provisions under Title XVIII on
'Damages' of the Civil Code govern in
Notes on EVIDENCE
determining
the
measure
recoverable damages.
of
II. With regard particularly to an award

of interest in the concept of actual
and compensatory damages, the rate
of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached,

and it consists in the payment of a
sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest
due should be that which may have
been
stipulated
in
writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time
it is judicially demanded. In the
absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under
and subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.
x xxxxxxxx (Underscoring Ours)
Petitioner also keeps harping on the

issue of the MTCs error of awarding
attorneys fees, but as correctly
pointed out by the CA, the RTC had
already deleted such award for
attorneys fees. There is, therefore, no
longer any need to discuss such
aspect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY

GRANTED.
Petitioner
is ACQUITTED of
the
crime
of
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However,
petitioner is ORDERED to PAY private
36
complainant Carolyn Zaragosa the

amount of P600,000.00 representing
the total amount of the subject
checks, plus 12% interest thereon
from the filing of the Information until
fully paid and to pay the costs.SO
ORDERED.
viii.
G.R. No. L-9181

28, 1955
November
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. THE
HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, and JUAN
CONSUNJI
and
ALFONSO
PANGANIBAN, respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended information filed by
the City Attorney of Quezon City on
March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji,
Alfonso Panganiban, and another
whose identity is still unknown, were
charged
with
having
conspired
together in the murder of one Jose
Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City). Trial of the case started on May
3, 1955, and in several hearings the
prosecution had been presenting its
Notes on EVIDENCE
evidence. During the progress of the

trial on May 18, 1955, while the
prosecution was questioning one of its
witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the
National Bureau of Investigation, in
connection with the making of a
certain
extra-judicial
confession
(allegedly made before him) by
defendant Juan Consunji to the
witness, counsel for the other
defendant
Alfonso
Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any
evidence on such confession on the
ground that it was hearsay and
therefore incompetent as against the
other accused Panganiban. The Court
below ordered the exclusion of the
evidence objected to, but on an
altogether different ground: that the
prosecution could not be permitted to
introduce
the
confessions
of
defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso
Panganiban to prove conspiracy
between them, without prior proof of
such conspiracy by a number of
definite
acts,
conditions,
and
circumstances. Thereafter, according
to the transcript, the following
remarks were made:
FISCAL LUSTRE:
May we know from counsel if he is
also objecting to the admissibility
of the confession of Consunji as
against the accused Consunji
himself?
COURT:
That would be premature because
there is already a ruling of the
Court that you cannot prove a
confession unless you prove first
conspiracy thru a number of
indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances as required by law.
Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9
37
The prosecution then moved in writing

for a reconsideration of the order of
exclusion, but again the motion was
denied. Wherefore, this petition for
certiorari was brought before this
Court by the Solicitor General, for the
review and annulment of the lower
Court's order completely excluding
any evidence on the extrajudicial
confessions of the accused Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban
without prior proof of conspiracy.
We believe that the lower Court

committed a grave abuse of discretion
in ordering the complete exclusion of
the prosecution's evidence on the
alleged confessions of the accused
Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial
when the ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court,

is specific as to the admissibility of
the extrajudicial confession of an
accused, freely and voluntarily made,
as evidence against him.
SEC.
14. Confession.
The
declaration
of
an
accused
expressly acknowledging the truth
of his guilt as to the offense
charged, may be given in evidence
against him.
Under
the
rule
of
multiple
admissibility of evidence, even if
Consunji's confession may not be
competent as against his co-accused
Panganiban, being hearsay as to the
latter, or to prove conspiracy between
them without the conspiracy being
Notes on EVIDENCE
established by other evidence, the

confession
of
Consunji
was,
nevertheless, admissible as evidence
of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs.
Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande,
50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil.
296), and should have been admitted
as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in
support of its exclusion of the
proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule
123, providing that:
The act or declaration of a conspirator

relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Manifestly,
the
rule
refers
to
statements
made
by
one
conspirator during the pendency of
the unlawful enterprises("during its
existence") and in furtherance of its
object, and not to a confession made,
as in this case, long after the
conspiracy had been brought to an
end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613;
U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416;
People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718;
People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).
Besides, the prosecution had not yet

offered the confessions to prove
conspiracy between the two accused,
nor as evidence against both of them.
In fact, the alleged confessions (both
in writing and in tape recordings) had
not yet even been identified (the
presentation of Atty. Xavier was
precisely for the purpose of identifying
the confessions), much less formally
38
offered in evidence. For all we know,

the prosecution might still be able to
adduce other proof of conspiracy
between Consunji and Panganiban
before their confessions are formally
offered
in
evidence.
Assuming,
therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123
also applies to the confessions in
question, it was premature for the
respondent Court to exclude them
completely on the ground that there
was no prior proof of conspiracy.
It is particularly noteworthy that the

exclusion of the proferred confessions
was not made on the basis of the
objection interposed by Panganiban's
counsel, but upon an altogether
different ground, which the Court
issued motu proprio. Panganiban's
counsel
objected
to
Consunji's
confession as evidence of the guilt of
the other accused Panganiban, on the
ground that it was hearsay as to the
latter. But the Court, instead of ruling
on this objection, put up its own
objection to the confessions that it
could not be admitted to prove
conspiracy between Consunji and
Panganiban without prior evidence of
such conspiracy by a number of
indefinite
acts,
conditions,
circumstances, etc. and completely
excluded the confessions on that
ground. By so doing, the Court
overlooked that the right to object is a
mere privilege which the parties may
waive; and if the ground for objection
is known and not reasonably made,
the objection is deemed waived and
the Court has no power, on its own
motion, to disregard the evidence
(Marcella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
We see no need for the present to

discuss
the
question
of
the
admissibility
of
the
individual
Notes on EVIDENCE
extrajudicial confessions of two or

more accused for the purpose of
establishing conspiracy between them
through the identity of the confessions
in essential details. After all, the
confessions are not before us and
have not even been formally offered
in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it
to say that the lower Court should
have allowed such confessions to be
given in evidence at least as against
the parties who made them, and
admit the same conditionally to
establish conspiracy, in order to give
the prosecution a chance to get into
the record all the relevant evidence at
its disposal to prove the charges. At
any rate, in the final determination
and consideration of the case, the trial
Court should be able to distinguish
the admissible from the inadmissible,
and reject what, under the rules of
evidence, should be excluded.
Once more, attention should be called

to the ruling of this Court in the case
of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance
Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:
In the course of long experience we

have observed that justice is most
effectively
and
expeditiously
administered in the courts where trial
objections to the admission of proof
are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on
doubtful objections to its materiality
or technical objections to the form of
the questions should be avoided. In a
case of any intricacy it is impossible
for a judge of first instance, in the
early stages of the development of
the proof, to know with any certainty
whether testimony is relevant or not;
and where there is no indication of
bad faith on the part of the Attorney
offering the evidence, the court may
39
as a rule safely accept the testimony

upon the statement of the attorney
that the proof offered will be
connected later. Moreover, it must be
remembered that in the heat of the
battle over which the presides, a
judge of first instance may possibly
fall into error in judging of the
relevancy of proof where a fair and
logical connection is in fact shown.
When such a mistake is made and the
proof is erroneously ruled out, the
Supreme Court, upon appeal, often
finds itself embarrassed and possibly
unable to correct the effects of the
error without returning the case for a
new trial, a step which this Court is
always very loath to take. On the
other hand, the admission of proof in
a court of first instance, even if the
question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result
in much harm to either litigant,
because the trial judge is supposed to
know the law; and it is duty, upon
final consideration of the case, to
distinguish the relevant and material
from the irrelevant and immaterial. If
this course is followed and the cause
is prosecuted to the Supreme Court
upon appeal, this Court then has all
the material before it necessary to
make a correct judgment.
There is greater reason to adhere to

such policy in criminal cases where
questions arise as to admissibility of
evidence for the prosecution, for the
unjustified exclusion of evidence may
lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the
charges, from which the People can no
longer appeal.
Wherefore, the order excluding the

confessions of the accused Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is
Notes on EVIDENCE
annulled and set aside and the Court

below is directed to proceed with the
trial in accordance with law and this
opinion. Costs against respondents
Juan
Consunji
and
Alfonso
Panganiban. So ordered.
b. Relevance
i.
Rule 128
Sec.
3 . Admissibility
evidence.
Evidence
admissible when it is relevant
the issue and is not excluded
the law of these rules. (3a)
of
is
to
by
Sec.
4 . Relevancy; collateral
matters. Evidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish
the probability or improbability of
the fact in issue. (4a)
ii.
G.R. No. 150224

2004
May 19,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

appellee, vs.
JOEL
YATAR
alias
"KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao,
Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing
appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit"
to Death for the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide, and
ordering him to pay the heirs of the
40
victim,
Kathylyn
D.
Uba,
civil
indemnity
in
the
amount
of
P75,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P200,000.00, exemplary
damages
in
the
amount
of
P50,000.00, actual damages in the
amount of P186,410.00, or total
damages amounting to P511,410.00,
and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with

Homicide
under
the
following
Information:
That on or about the afternoon of

June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the
accused, in order to have carnal
knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN
D. UBA, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, and
with use of a bladed weapon stab
the latter inflicting upon her fatal
injuries resulting in the death of
the victim, and on the occasion or
by
reason
thereof,
accused,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and by means of force and
violence had carnal knowledge of
said Kathlyn D. Uba against her
will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn

Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen
year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the
ground floor of the house of their
Notes on EVIDENCE
grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan

West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking
about the letter sent by their aunt,
Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant
Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend,
Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the
letter to appellant earlier that
morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn

and her husband, together with Isabel
Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers
away. Before Judilyn and her husband
departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that
she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but
in the event she would not be able to
leave, she would just stay home and
wash her clothes or go to the house of
their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was
left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and

fifteen year old Beverly Deneng
stopped by the house of Isabel. They
saw appellant at the back of the
house. They went inside the house
through the back door of the kitchen
to have a drink of water. Anita asked
appellant what he was doing there,
and he replied that he was getting
lumber to bring to the house of his
mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on
her way home from Nagbitayan, she
saw appellant descend the ladder
from the second floor of the house of
Isabel Dawang and run towards the
back of the house.6 She later noticed
appellant, who was wearing a white
shirt with collar and black pants,
pacing back and forth at the back of
the house. She did not find this
unusual as appellant and his wife
used to live in the house of Isabel
Dawang.7
41
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw

appellant when he called her near her
house. This time, he was wearing a
black shirt without collar and blue
pants. Appellant told her that he
would not be getting the lumber he
had stacked, and that Isabel could use
it. She noticed that appellants eyes
were "reddish and sharp." Appellant
asked her where her husband was as
he had something important to tell
him. Judilyns husband then arrived
and appellant immediately left and
went towards the back of the house of
Isabel.8
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor

Faniswa received a report that a dead
woman was found in Isabel Dawangs
house. Together with fellow police
officers, Faniswa went to the house
and found the naked body of Kathylyn
Uba with multiple stab wounds.
In the evening of the same day, Isabel

Dawang arrived home and found that
the lights in her house were off. She
called out for her granddaughter,
Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground
floor was open. She noticed that the
water container she asked Kathylyn to
fill up earlier that day was still empty.
She went up the ladder to the second
floor of the house to see if Kathylyn
was upstairs. She found that the door
was tied with a rope, so she went
down to get a knife. While she groped
in the dark, she felt a lifeless body
that was cold and rigid.9
The police discovered the victims

panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag
and sandals beside her naked cadaver
at the scene of the crime, and they
found a dirty white shirt splattered
with blood within 50 meters from the
house of Isabel.
Isabel moved her hand throughout the

entire body. She found out that it was
the naked body of her granddaughter,
Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn
and her husband arrived. Isabel was
given a flashlight by Judilyn. She
focused the beam and saw Kathylyn
sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her
stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had
arrived to offer assistance. A daughter
of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the

police officers if he could relieve
himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan
accompanied him to the toilet around
seven to ten meters away from the
police station. They suddenly heard
someone shout in the Ilocano dialect,
"Nagtaray!" (Hes running away!).
Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited
through the gate of the Police Station
and saw appellant running away.
Appellant was approximately 70
meters away from the station when
Notes on EVIDENCE
The people in the vicinity informed the

police officers that appellant was seen
going down the ladder of the house of
Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30
p.m.
When questioned by the police

authorities, appellant denied any
knowledge
of
Kathylynss
11
death, however, he was placed
under police custody.
42
Police Officer Abagan recaptured

him.12 He was charged with Rape with
Homicide. When he was arraigned on
July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not
guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of

the crime of Rape with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise
known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
and was accordingly, sentenced
to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant

to Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. In his Brief,
appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE
PRESENTED
BY
THE
PROSECUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME
CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Appellants
unmeritorious.
contentions
are
The issue regarding the credibility of

the prosecution witnesses should be
resolved against appellant. This Court
will not interfere with the judgment of
Notes on EVIDENCE
the trial court in determining the

credibility of witnesses unless there
appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been
misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched
is
the rule that the findings of the trial
court on credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great weight on appeal
unless cogent reasons are presented
necessitating a reexamination if not
the disturbance of the same; the
reason being that the former is in a
better and unique position of hearing
first hand the witnesses and observing
their
deportment,
conduct
and
attitude.14 Absent any showing that
the
trial
judge
overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the
case, the trial judges assessment of
credibility deserves the appellate
courts highest respect.15 Where there
is nothing to show that the witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecutions

evidence must be appreciated in light
of the well-settled rule which provides
that an accused can be convicted
even if no eyewitness is available, as
long as sufficient circumstantial
evidence
is
presented
by
the
prosecution to prove beyond doubt
that the accused committed the
crime.17
Reference to the records will show
that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six
(6) stab and five (5) incised, were
found on the victims abdomen and
back, causing a portion of her small
intestines to spill out of her
body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitms
body was complete when Dr. Bartolo
43
examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on

July 1, 1998. According to him, the
time of death may be approximated
from between nine (9) to twelve (12)
hours prior to the completion of rigor
mortis.19 In other words, the estimated
time of death was sometime between
9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30,
1998. This was within the timeframe
within which the lone presence of
appellant lurking in the house of
Isabel Dawang was testified to by
witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although

the Post mortem Report by the
attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C.
Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal
lacerations, contusions or hematoma
were noted on the victim, 20 Dr. Bartolo
discovered the presence of semen in
the vaginal canal of the victim. During
his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that
the introduction of semen into the
vaginal canal could only be done
through sexual intercourse with the
victim.21In addition, it is apparent from
the pictures submitted by the
prosecution that the sexual violation
of the victim was manifested by a
bruise and some swelling in her right
forearm indicating resistance to the
appellants assault on her virtue.22
Significantly,
subsequent
testing
showed that the Deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen
from the vagina of the victim was
identical the semen to be that of
appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the

genetic information in all living
organisms.23 A persons DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not
Notes on EVIDENCE
change
throughout
a
persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood
is the same as the DNA found in his
saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft
of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin
tissue, and vaginal and rectal
cells.24 Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the
same DNA, with the notable exception
of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology

has been advanced as a uniquely
effective means to link a suspect to a
crime, or to exonerate a wrongly
accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes
of
criminal
investigation,
DNA
identification is a fertile source of both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
It can assist immensely in effecting a
more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the
conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and
ensuring the proper administration of
justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime

scene can link a suspect to a crime or
eliminate one from suspicion in the
same principle as fingerprints are
used.26 Incidents
involving
sexual
assault
would
leave
biological
evidence such as hair, skin tissue,
semen, blood, or saliva which can be
left on the victims body or at the
crime scene. Hair and fiber from
clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture
could also be transferred to the
victims
body
during
the
27
assault. Forensic DNA evidence is
helpful in proving that there was
physical contact between an assailant
and a victim. If properly collected
from the victim, crime scene or
44
assailant, DNA can be compared with

known samples to place the suspect
at the scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research

Institute (NSRI), which conducted the
DNA tests in this case, used the
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
amplification
method
by
Short
Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With
PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific
DNA
sequence
can
be
copied
exponentially within hours. Thus,
getting sufficient DNA for analysis has
become much easier since it became
possible to reliably amplify small
samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of
DNA
evidence,
courts
should
consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and
the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon

Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified
by the prosecution as an expert
witness on DNA print or identification
techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungrias
testimony, it was determined that the
gene type and DNA profile of
appellant are identical to that of the
extracts subject of examination.31 The
blood
sample
taken
from
the
appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19,
TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO
10/11, which are identical with semen
taken from the victims vaginal
canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists
Notes on EVIDENCE
between the semen found in the

victim and the blood sample given by
the appellant in open court during the
course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to

integrate these advances in science
and technology in the Philippine
criminal justice system, so we must
be cautious as we traverse these
relatively
uncharted
waters.
Fortunately, we can benefit from the
wealth of persuasive jurisprudence
that
has
developed
in
other
jurisdictions.
Specifically,
the
prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has
proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was
ruled that pertinent evidence based
on scientifically valid principles could
be used as long as it was relevant and
reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new
kinds of scientific techniques. DNA
typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is

relevant when it relates directly to a
fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.34 Applying
the Daubert test to the case at bar,
the DNA evidence obtained through
PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis,
and which was appreciated by the
court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.
Independently
of
the
physical
evidence of appellants semen found
in the victims vaginal canal, the trial
45
court
appreciated
the
following
circumstantial evidence as being
sufficient to sustain a conviction
beyond
reasonable
doubt:
(1)
Appellant and his wife were living in
the house of Isabel Dawang together
with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In
June 1998, appellants wife left the
house because of their frequent
quarrels; (3) Appellant received from
the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from
his estranged wife in the early
morning on June 30, 1998; (4)
Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania
and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of
June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the
house of Isabel Dawang, acting
strangely and wearing a dirty white
shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw
appellant going down the ladder of
the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m.,
wearing a dirty white shirt, and again
at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black
shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when
the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was
approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan
saw appellant in a dirty white shirt
coming down the ladder of the house
of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to
the second floor of the house of Isabel
Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The
victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a
pool of blood with her intestines
protruding from her body on the
second floor of the house of Isabel
Dawang, with her stained pants, bra,
underwear and shoes scattered along
the
periphery;
(10)
Laboratory
examination revealed sperm in the
victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J");
(11) The stained or dirty white shirt
found in the crime scene was found to
be positive with blood; (12) DNA of
slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared
with the DNA profile of the appellant
are identical; and (13) Appellant
escaped two days after he was
detained
but
was
subsequently
apprehended,
such
flight
being
indicative of guilt.35
Notes on EVIDENCE
Circumstantial
evidence,
to
be
sufficient to warrant a conviction,
must form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the
exclusion of others, is the perpetrator
of the crime. To determine whether
there is sufficient circumstantial
evidence,
three
requisites
must
concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA

evidence, the appellant contends that
the blood sample taken from him as
well as the DNA tests were conducted
in violation of his right to remain silent
as well as his right against selfincrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of
Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The

kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against selfincrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the
lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not
an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that

although accused-appellant insisted
that hair samples were forcibly taken
from him and submitted to the
National Bureau of Investigation for
forensic
examination,
the
hair
46
samples may be admitted in evidence

against him, for what is proscribed is
the use of testimonial compulsion or
any evidence communicative in
nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to

submit
to
fingerprinting,
photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. Under People v.
Gallarde,39 where immediately after
the incident, the police authorities
took pictures of the accused without
the presence of counsel, we ruled that
there was no violation of the right
against
self-incrimination.
The
accused may be compelled to submit
to
a
physical
examination
to
determine his involvement in an
offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in

this case submitted himself for blood
sampling which was conducted in
open court on March 30, 2000, in the
presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA

tests conducted by the prosecution
against him are unconstitutional on
the ground that resort thereto is
tantamount to the application of
an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post

facto law is involved in the case at
bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance
and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas an ex-post facto law refers
Notes on EVIDENCE
primarily to a question of law, DNA

profiling
requires
a
factual
determination of the probative weight
of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and

alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic
DNA evidence and bloodied shirt,
notwithstanding
the
eyewitness
accounts of his presence at Isabel
Dawangs house during the time when
the crime was committed, undeniably
link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
Appellant did not demonstrate with
clear and convincing evidence an
impossibility to be in two places at the
same time, especially in this case
where the two places are located in
the same barangay.40 He lives within a
one hundred (100) meter radius from
the scene of the crime, and requires a
mere five minute walk to reach one
house from the other. This fact
severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error,

appellant asserts that the court a
quo committed reversible error in
convicting him of the crime charged.
He alleges that he should be acquitted
on reasonable doubt.
Appellants
sustained.
assertion
cannot
be
Generally, courts should only consider

and rely upon duly established
evidence
and
never
on
mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal
relevancy
of
evidence
denotes
"something more than a minimum of
probative value," suggesting that such
evidentiary relevance must contain a
47
"plus value."41 This may be necessary

to preclude the trial court from being
satisfied by matters of slight value,
capable of being exaggerated by
prejudice and hasty conclusions.
Evidence without "plus value" may be
logically relevant but not legally
sufficient to convict. It is incumbent
upon the trial court to balance the
probative value of such evidence
against the likely harm that would
result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can

be upheld only when there is relevant
evidence from which the court can
properly find or infer that the accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof
beyond
reasonable
doubt
requires moral certainty of guilt in
order to sustain a conviction. Moral
certainty is that degree of certainty
that convinces and directs the
understanding
and
satisfies
the
reason and judgment of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it.
It is certainty beyond reasonable
doubt.42 This
requires
that
the
circumstances, taken together, should
be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a
satisfactory
conclusion
that
the
accused, and no one else, committed
the offense charged.43 In view of the
totality of evidence appreciated thus
far, we rule that the present case
passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure,
and for the purpose of meeting the
requirement
of
proof
beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential
for conviction when there is doubt as
to the identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that

Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim,
Notes on EVIDENCE
testified that she last saw the victim

alive in the morning of June 30, 1998
at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She
witnessed the appellant running down
the stairs of Isabels house and
proceeding to the back of the same
house.46 She also testified that a few
days before the victim was raped and
killed, the latter revealed to her that
"Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after
she came from the school."47 The
victim told Judilyn about the incident
or attempt of the appellant to rape
her five days before her naked and
violated body was found dead in her
grandmothers house on June 25,
1998.48 In
addition,
Judilyn
also
testified that when her auntie Luz
Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant,
separated from her husband, "this Joel
Yatar
threatened
to
kill
our
49
family." According to Judilyn, who
was personally present during an
argument between her aunt and the
appellant, the exact words uttered by
appellant to his wife in the Ilocano
dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill
all your family and your relatives x x
x."50 These statements were not
contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually

assault and kill the victim was evident
in the instant case. It is a rule in
criminal law that motive, being a state
of mind, is established by the
testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of
the offense, deeds or words that may
express it or from which his motive or
reason for committing it may be
inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that

the appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special
48
complex crime of rape with homicide.

Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn
Uba, and by reason or on the occasion
thereof, in order to conceal his lustful
deed, permanently sealed the victims
lips by stabbing her repeatedly,
thereby causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements

constitutive of rape with homicide: (1)
the appellant had carnal knowledge of
a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a
woman was achieved by means of
force, threat or intimidation; and (3)
by reason or on the occasion of such
carnal knowledge by means of force,
threat or intimidation, appellant killed
the
woman.52 However,
in
rape
committed by close kin, such as the
victims father, step-father, uncle, or
the common-law spouse of her
mother, it is not necessary that actual
force
or
intimidation
be
employed.53 Moral
influence
or
ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.54 The fact
that the victims hymen is intact does
not negate a finding that rape was
committed as mere entry by the penis
into the lips of the female genital
organ, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, suffices for
conviction of rape.55 The strength and
dilatability
of
the
hymen
are
invariable; it may be so elastic as to
stretch without laceration during
intercourse. Absence of hymenal
lacerations does not disprove sexual
abuse especially when the victim is of
tender age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the

husband of the victims aunt. He is
seven years older than the victim
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife
separated, appellant lived in the
house of his mother-in-law, together
Notes on EVIDENCE
with the victim and his wife. After the

separation, appellant moved to the
house of his parents, approximately
one hundred (100) meters from his
mother-in-laws
house.
Being
a
relative by affinity within the third civil
degree, he is deemed in legal
contemplation
to
have
moral
ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised

Penal Code, the penalty of death is
imposed when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, homicide is
committed. Although three (3) Justices
of this Court maintain their position
that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional
insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, they nevertheless submit to
the ruling of the majority that the law
is not unconstitutional, and that the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed
in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex

delicto
of
P100,000.00,57 actual
damages incurred by the family of the
victim that have been proved at the
trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and
moral
damages
of
59
P75,000.00 should be awarded in
the light of prevailing law and
jurisprudence. Exemplary damages
cannot be awarded as part of the civil
liability since the crime was not
committed
with
one
or
more
60
aggravating circumstances.
WHEREFORE, in
view
of
the
foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of
Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in
Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing
appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to
Death for the special complex crime
of
Rape
with
Homicide
49
is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that
he
be ORDERED to pay the family of the
victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex
delicto in the amount of P100,000.00,
P93,190.00 in actual damages and
P75,000.00 in moral damages. The
award
of
exemplary
damages
is DELETED.
Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the
records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of
the pardoning power. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
iii.
c. competence
Upon the finality of this Decision and
in accordance with Art. 83 of the
Notes on EVIDENCE
II.
50

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I.

Rule 128, Sections 1-4

A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC(Rules on

Section 1. Audio, video and

Dean Jose Aguila Grapilon

electronic document meeting,

G.R. No. 117401 October 1, 1998

That on or about September 17,

On January 17, 1989, accusedappellant was charged with the crime

The undersigned accuses BERNARDO

Accused-appellant's case was tried

The prosecution, in offering its version

Dean Jose Aguila Grapilon

prosecution on the witness stand.

Based on the foregoing pieces of

On September 16, 1988, Bernardo,

According to Gina Quidato, on the

Gina Quidato's testimony on the

As adverted to earlier, the Malita

The body of Bernardo was discovered

Dean Jose Aguila Grapilon

his Lolo for breakfast. The cause of

On September 27, 1988, Leo Quidato

On September 29, 1988, the Malita

Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom

In his defense, accused-appellant

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF

Dean Jose Aguila Grapilon

of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all

From the aforesaid judgment of

Accused-appellant must be acquitted.

In indicting accused-appellant, the

judicial confessions. The failure to

The Solicitor General, in advocating

Likewise, the manner by which the

Dean Jose Aguila Grapilon

statements to Patrolman Mara in the

[T]he belated arrival of a CLAO

With regard to Gina Quidato's

Given the inadmissibility in evidence

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby

Dean Jose Aguila Grapilon

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO,

Since petitioners do not dispute the

It appears from the records that Juan

an area of 23,000 square meters and

In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged

Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo

Dean Jose Aguila Grapilon

For his part, defendant Mendoza

During the pendency of the case in

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby

On the Mandatory Injunction:

1. Ordering said defendants to restore

Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2,

2. a) Ordering the defendants to

b) Ordering defendants, jointly and

c) the prayer for moral damages, not

Dean Jose Aguila Grapilon

The awards herein provided should

Defendants who are the petitioners in

[T]he lone issue of whether or not

It is the position of petitioners that

Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the