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Cause of Action

G.R. No. L-16797

February 27, 1963

RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

SOCORRO A. RAMOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Gelasio L. Dimaano for plaintiffs-appellees.
Vicente K. Aranda for defendants-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal on points of law from a decision of the Court of First

Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No.Q-4232.

The Petitioners sold elevel (11) parcels of land siuated in Bago Bantay,
Quezon city to herein respondents for the price of P101, 000. The Vendee
paid 5000 as downpayment, 2500 in which is in cash, and 2500 is in check.
The remaining balace is to be paid within 90 days. To secure the balance of
the respodent, she morgaged the elevel parcel of land and the Malinta Estate
in favor of the petitioners. Due to vendee-morgagors failure to comply with
her obligation, the forclosure of the mortgage was filed by the petitioners.
The Respodent moved to dismiss the action for forclosure, alleging that
petitioners previously had filed actions against her for the recovery of 2500
paid by check as part of the down payment, that at the time the suit was
filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable thus the
petitioners are guilty of splitting a single cause of action.
Ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering the respondent to pay P96,000,
with 12% interest, 10% of the amount due as attorneys fees, and the costs
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of the suit; and further decreeed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
properties in case of non-payment within ninety days.
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of splitting the single cause of action.
No, The Supreme Court ruled that, the first complaint filed by the petitioners
show that it was based on respondent failure to pay the 2500 in check as
part of the downpayment. While the second complaint in the present action
was for the non-payment of the remaining balance of P96,000 guaranteed by
the mortgage. The claim for P2500 was therefore, a distinct debt or

G.R. No. L-64013 November 28, 1983

JR., in his capacity as President of Union Glass & Container
Corporation, petitioners,
HOFILEA, respondents.
Eduardo R. Ceniza for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent SEC.
Remedios C. Balbin for respondent Carolina Y. Hofilea.


This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and set
aside the Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission, dated
September 25, 1981, upholding its jurisdiction in SEC Case No. 2035,
entitled "Carolina Hofilea, Complainant, versus Development Bank
of the Philippines, et al., Respondents."
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Private respondent, Carolina Hofilena was a stockholder of Pioneer Glass
Manufacturing Corporation. The Pioneer Glass obtained various loan
accomodations from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As a
security of the loans, Pioneer Glass morgaged/or assigned its assets to the
DBP. The proceeds of the financial exposure of the DBP were used in the
construction of a glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, and the operation of seven
silica mining claims owned by the corporation. Through the conversion into
equity of the accumulated unpaid interests on the various loans of Pioneer
Glass the DBP was able to gain control of the shares of common stocks of
Pioneer Glass and got 3 regulars seats in the corporations board of directors.
When Pioneed Glass suffered serious liquidity problems and could no longer
meet its financial obligation, It entered into a dation en pago agreement with
the DBP. Part of the assets transferred to the DBP was the glass plant in
Rosario, Cavite in which later sold the Union Glass and Container
The private Respondent filed a complaint before the SEC due to the alleged
illegality of the dacion en pago resulting from: [1] the supposed unilateral
and unsupported undervaluation of the assets of Pioneer Glass covered by
the agreement; [2] the self-dealing indulged in by DBP, having acted both as
stockholder/director and secured creditor of Pioneer Glass; and [3] the
wrongful inclusion by DBP in its statement of account of P26M as due from
Pioneer Glass when the same had already been converted into equity.
Union Glass moved to dismiss the case on the ground that SEC has no
jurisdiction over the case.
Ruled upholding its jurisdiction over the Petitioners, Although Union Glass is a
third party in the case. Said Party cannot be removed on the ground of its
being an indispensable party to the action, it being in possession of the
assets subject of the dacion en pago.
Whether or not Private Respondent has a cause of action against Union Glass
before the SEC.
No, the Supreme Court Ruled that SECs jurisdiction is delineated by PD no
902-A. in order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the controversy
must pertain to any of the following relationships: [a] between the
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corporation, partnership or association and the public; [b] between the

corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members, or officers; [c] between the corporation, partnership or association
and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned; and [d] among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves. The fact that the controversy at bar involves the rights of
petitioner Union Glass who has no intra-corporate relation either with
complainant or the DBP, places the suit beyond the jurisdiction of the
respondent SEC. The case should be tried and decided by the court of
general jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court. This view is in accord with the
rudimentary principle that administrative agencies, like the SEC, are
tribunals of limited jurisdiction6 and, as such, could wield only such powers
as are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. Therefore the
SC ordered the SEC to drop Union Glass as a party-defendant.
Parties to Civil Actions

G.R. No. L-19596

October 30, 1964

LAVERN R. DILWEG, plaintiff-appellant,

ECETA, defendants-appellees.
Antonio C. Amor, Enrique D. Tayag and Alonzo Q. Ancheta for plaintiffappellant.
Lopez-De Joya, Dimaguila, Hermoso & Divino and Melotindos and Dictado for
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal on pure question of law from an order rendered by the

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in its Civil Case No. 4850,
dismissing plaintiff's complaint as well as from the order denying a
motion to reconsider said order of dismissal.

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The petitioner a nonresident american, through a counsel, filed an action

against the respondents claiming civil damages arising out of alleged
libelous and defamatory statements uttered and published here in the
philippines by the respondents.
The Respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
petitioner is a nonresident alien and he never been here in the philippines
therefore the court did not acquire the jurisdiction over him.
Ruled in favor of the respondents and dismissed the case. While the
presence of the res or property within the territorial limits of the sovereignty
under which the court acts may confer jurisdiction in rem on the court, in
personal actions jurisdiction both of the subject matter and of the person or
party whose right are to be affected are essential, and a state court can
acquire no jurisdiction where neither the person nor any property of can be
found within the state. The Court has come to the conclusion that in order
that the court may validly try a case, it must have jurisdiction not only over
the persons of the parties and over the subject matter and that plaintiff must
be a resident within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in order that
jurisdiction over his person can be acquired, otherwise the Court will not be
able to render a valid judgment against him.
Whether or not correct in dismissing the case.
No, the Supreme Ruled that it is not indispensable for a foreigner to establish
residence, nor need he be physically present in a state of which he is not a
resident or citizen in order that he may initiate or maintain a personal action
against a resident or citizen of that other state for rights of action arising in,
or for violations of laws committed within, the territorial jurisdiction of that
other state. In this jurisdiction, no general law has come to our knowledge
which restricts the right of non-resident aliens to sue in our courts. It is not
disputed that plaintiffs cause of action arose in, and that the defendants are
within, our territorial jurisdiction.The fact that there are counterclaims
against the non-resident plaintiff does not alter the case. The Rules of Court
provide for remedies against nonresident defendants. And ordered the RTC
for further proceeding.

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G.R. No. L-12902

July 29, 1959

CEFERINO MARCELO, plaintiff-appellant,

NAZARIO DE LEON, defendant-appellee.
Pedro D. Maldia and San Vicente and Jardiel for appellant.
Inciong and Bacalso for appellee.
The plaintiff has appealed from the order of judge Jose N. Leuterio
of the Nueva Ecija court of first instance, dismissing his complaint
whereby he had asked that defendant be required to vacate a parcel
of land and to pay damages. The dismissal rested on two grounds,
(a) the case pertained to the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (b) as
attorney-in-fact of the true owner of the land, the plaintiff had no
right to bring the action.

The petitioner is an Attorney-in-fact of Severino Marcelo who owned a parcel
of land. The Respondents is the administrator of Severino Marcelo to which in
their agreement one-half of all the products raised in the occupied area
would be given to Severino Marcelo. Later on, petitioner notified defendant
that in addition to giving half of the produce, he would have to pay a rental
of two pesos per month. When the respondent refused to pay the additional
charges petitioner filed suit before the Court of First Instance.
Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground that CFI(RTC) has no
jurisdiction on the case since the issue involves tenancy relation falling
within the authority of agrarian court.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Respondent on the ground that , (a) the case
pertained to the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (b) as attorney-in-fact of
the true owner of the land, the plaintiff had no right to bring the action.
Whether or not RTC is correct in dismissing the case.
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Yes, The Supreme Court held that the RTC is correct in dismissing the case on
the ground that as attorney-in-fact of the true owner of the land, the plaintiff
had no right to bring the action. Such action being representative of the real
owner will not prosper if the action is not in the name of the real owner.

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