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ON
EVIDENCE
Volume 6:
I.
Admissibility of Evidence
A. Rule 128, Sections 1-4.
1. Reyes vs. CA
2. People vs. Turco
B. Relevance
1. Rule 128, Sections 3 & 4.
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III.
I.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
A.
law, who in turn told the victims father about the rape of his daughter.
Thereafter, they did not waste time and immediately asked the victim to
see a doctor for medical examination. After the issuance of the medical
certificate, they went to the Isabela Municipal Station and filed a
compliant against the accused charging him with rape.
The trial court convicted the accused, stating that the defense of
sweetheart theory was a mere concoction of the accused in order to
exculpate him from criminal liability.
Appealing his conviction, the
accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred because no actual
proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened
considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the
medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to
explain the same.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the medical
certificate in evidence, although the medico-legal officer who prepared
the same was not presented in court to testify on it.
RULING:
Conviction affirmed. We place emphasis on the distinction between
admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
or these rules (Section 3, Rule 128) or is competent. Since admissibility
of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility
is therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to
be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation
within the guidelines provided in rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down
by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled
to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have
evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its
reception.
However, although the medical certificate is an exception to the
hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative
value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it
cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical
certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim
herself, which standing alone even without the medical examination, is
sufficient evidence. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal
officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the
evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the
instant case, the victims testimony alone is credible and sufficient to
convict.
B.
RELEVANCE:
1. SECTIONS 3 AND 4, RULE 128
SECTION 3.
Admissibility of evidence.
Evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or these rules. (3a)
SECTION 4. Relevancy; Collateral Matters. Evidence must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters
shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact
in issue.
CASES:
Bautista vs. Aparece
51 O.G. 805 (1995)
Relevance
FACTS:
As owner of the lot subject of the case, Nicolas Anasco sold the
same to Valentin Justiniani. In the same year, Valentin sold this property
to Claudio Justiniani, In October 12, 1935, Claudio Justiniani executed a
public instrument whereby he sold the same property for P100 to
Apolonio Aparece in whose name it was assessed since 1935. While
Aparece was in possession, Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered a part
of the land and took possession thereof. Thus, Aparece file a complaint
with the guerilla forces then operating in the province of Bohol. When the
case was called for hearing, and after inspection was made by a guerilla
officer, Bautista executed a public instrument wherein he promised to
return the land to Aparece in good will, and recognized Apareces lawful
ownership over the land. Thus, possession of the land was restored to
Aparece.
However, claiming that the property belongs to him, and alleging
that with the aid of armed men and pretending to be owner, usurped the
land, Bautista filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Bohol. The CFI rendered judgment declaring Aparece as owner of the
land.
On appeal, Bautista raised as defense the error of the trial court in
admitting the public instrument which he executed as evidence. He
argued that the document was executed under duress, violence, and
intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it was executed,
had no jurisdiction over the matter.
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ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a
public document executed before an officer who had no jurisdiction over
the matter.
RULING:
This argument is beside the point. The test for the admissibility or
inadmissibility of a certain document is whether or not it is relevant,
material or competent. The public document is not only relevant, but is
also material and competent to the issue of ownership between the
parties litigants. Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as
tending to prove any matter probable in ac action. And evidence is said
to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined
by the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competent evidence
is one that s not excluded by law in a particular case.
With these criteria in mind, we hold that the mere fact that the
public document was executed before a guerilla officer does not make the
same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the main issue raised in
the pleadings. The public document, considered together with the other
evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies the Court that the portions of
land in question really belong to defendant Aparece.
Lopez vs. Heesen
365 P.2d 448 (1961)
Relevance
FACTS:
Appellee Heesen, an air Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins
Model 51 30.06 rifle from the store of appellee Sears. The rifle has a bolt
action known as a Mausser type action with a Class 1 safety
mechanism.
At the time of the purchase, Heesen was given an
instruction pamphlet which he read, explaining the composition of the
rifle and gave operating instructions, including the method to be pursued
to make the gun safe.
Immediately after the purchase, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip
in an area known as Ute Park. He placed a live cartridge in the chamber
and placed the gun on safety position. He traveled a good deal during
the hours before the shooting and on one of two occasions, he discovered
the gun off safety position. This occurred when he had come down a long
hill covered with rocks and boulders. Heesen was not aware that the rifle
moved from safe to fire position at least twice before the shooting. Ten
minutes before the accident began, he left the knoll and he was carrying
the gun on his shoulder.
He later heard a rustle and saw a deer go between some trees.
When he followed the deer, his left foot went down hard on the ground on
one side of a log and his right foot slipped on the grass. This brought the
rifle down and the rifle discharged, the bullet hitting appellant Lopez, who
was nearby.
Lopez brought suit against Heesen for allegedly unlawfully
assaulting him, thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds. He also
included as party-defendant, the designer, manufacturer and seller of the
rifle, Sears, for allegedly negligently designing and manufacturing the rifle
bought by Heesen.
Defendants presented expert testimony on the general reputation of
other firearms companies who use the same modified leaf safety device
as the Higgins Model 51. Lopez objected to this evidence on the ground
that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case. He
likewise objected on the introduction of testimony on the poundage
pressure required to move the safety levers from safe to fire position on
the ground of irrelevance and immateriality. Lastly, he objected to the
introduction of opinion evidence regarding the design of the safety
mechanism, on the ground that it was a subject which is within the
province of the jury to determine.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not expert testimony on the general reputation of other
firearms companies using the same safety device is material and
relevant.
(2) Whether or not testimony on the poundage pressure required is
relevant and material.
(3) Whether or not the design of the safety mechanism was a proper
subject of expert testimony.
RULING:
(1) The expert testimony is admissible. The allegations on the ultimate
facts in issue involve whether the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a
dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent manufacture,
in that the safety mechanism moved re4adily from safe to fire
position. This is an issue, the proper understanding of which,
requires knowledge or experience and cannot be determined
independently merely from deductions made and inferences drawn
on the basis of ordinary knowledge. Moreover, the conduct of
others is proper evidence for a jury to consider, in determining
whether the tendency of the thing is dangerous, defective, or the
reverse. Considering these principles, the Court held that the
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(3)
FACTS:
Ball appeals from an order of the trial court, convicting him of
robbery.
At about 2:30 in the afternoon, two colored men, one of them tall
and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store. As the taller
man looked at jewelry and made his purchase, the shorter man looked in
the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the same day, at
around 5:30 p.m., as John Krekeler was placing the rings and watches in
the safe preparing for the closing of the store, the two men who had been
in the store at 2:30, entered the store.
They were immediately
recognized by Krekeler, especially the taller mans narrow-brimmed tall
hat, brown jacket, gray short and particularly a scar on his face.
The shorter man walked behind the counter and as Krekeler tried to
intercept him, the man hit Krekeler on the face using a 0.38 long barreled
pistol. With the gun on his back, the two men directed Krekeler to go to
the watch repair department, then to the restroom, where he was
positioned, facing the wall. Thereafter, he could hear jewelry being
dumped in a bag, and the jingle of the car register. After hearing the
door slam, Krekeler call the police. He reported that the two men took
$4,455.21 worth of watched and rings, and $140 in cash.
Three weeks later, Ball was arrested by Officers Powell and Ballard
while walking in the street. Ball shoved Officer Powell over and ran down
the avenue. The officers ran after him and he was only pacified when the
Officers fired a bullet which fell in his back. Ball claims that this evidence
of flight was not material or relevant, since it was too remote from the
date of the robbery (3 weeks later), to indicate a consciousness of guilt.
Ball likewise objected to the admissibility of the following articles found in
his person during the arrest on grounds of immateriality and irrelevance:
a brown felt hat, a brownish windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt
and shoes, and $258.02 in currency and two pennies.
ISSUES(S)
(1) Whether or not the evidence of flight is inadmissible for reason of
remoteness to the time of the commission of the crime.
(2) Whether or not the articles found in the person of the accused at
the time of his arrest are inadmissible for being irrelevant and
immaterial.
RULING:
(1) Unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the
supposed commission of the crime is a relevant circumstance. The
remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather
than to its admissibility.
(2)
money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and
extraordinary to be receivable.
C.
COMPETENCE:
1.
SECTION 3.
Admissibility of evidence.
Evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or these rules. (3a)
2.
EXCLUSIONARY RULES UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
(a)
3.
1405,
LAW
ON
SECRECY
OF
BANK
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not the recordings of Teresitas phone conversations,
made and obtained through wiretapping are admissible as evidence
(not per se inadmissible)
(2) Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the appropriate remedy to
question an order admitting the tapes into evidence
RULING:
(1)
The tape recordings are inadmissible. Relevant provisions of
R.A. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act) provides that:
Section 1: It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all parties to any private conversation or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone,
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described x x x
Section 4. Any communication, or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained, or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding section of this Act shall
not be admitted in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, or administrative hearing or investigation.
Hence, absent any clear showing that both parties consented to the
recording, the inadmissibility of the tapes is mandatory under R.A. No.
4200
(2) Certiorari was the appropriate remedy. Generally, the extraordinary
writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of a trial
court.
The proper remedy is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment, incorporating in the said appeal the grounds fro assailing the
interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate
and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
248 SCRA 590 (1995)
Competence (Anti-Wiretapping Act)
FACTS:
Ester Garcia filed a criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 4200
(Anti-Wiretapping Act) against Socorro Ramirez, for secretly taping their
confrontation. Socorro filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay granted, agreeing that the facts
charged did not constitute an offense under R.A. No. 4200 since the law
refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. After which, Ester filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling of the
lower court. Hence, Socorro filed this instant petition where she raised
three ISSUES:
(2)
That R.A. No. 4200 does not apply to the taping of the
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She
contends that R.A. 4200 only refers to unauthorized taping of
a conversation of a person other than those involved in the
conversation.
(3)
That the substance or contents of the
conversation must be alleged in the information; otherwise,
the facts charged will not constitute a violation of R.A. No.
4200.
(4)
That R.A. No. 4200 penalizes the taping of
private communication not a private conversation and
that, consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation
with Ester was not illegal under the said Act.
RULING:
(1)
R.A. No. 4200 applies to recordings by one of the parties to
the conversation. Section 1 of the Act clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by
means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be
a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication.
The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier any. Consequently, the CA was correct in concluding
that even a person privy to a communication, who records his
private conversation with another without knowledge of the latter,
will qualify as a violator under R.A. No. 4200. A perusal of the
Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports such conclusion.
(2)
II.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
City of Manila vs. Garcia
19 SCRA 413 (1967)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
Finding that it was necessary to expand the school grounds of Epifanio de
los Santos Elementary School, Manilas City Engineer, pursuant to the
Mayors directive, ordered the illegal occupants/squatters (defendants) to
vacate the property contiguous to the school. The defendants refused to
vacate, thus, prompting the City of Manila to file a suit to recover
possession over the land. The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila
favored the plaintiff.
Consequently, the squatters appealed and
questioned the lower courts finding that the city needs the premises for
school purposes. The citys evidence on this point was the certification of
the Chairman Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. The
certification recites that the amount of P100,000 had been set aside in
Ordinance 4566, the 1962-63 Manila City Budget, for the construction of
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of res judicata.
Consequently, Baguio appealed the order of dismissal.
He claimed that for the ground of res judicata to suffice as a basis for
dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI of Misamis Oriental was correct in finding
that there was res judicata by taking judicial notice of its previous
judgment.
RULING:
THE CFI OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL WAS CORRECT IN TAKING
JUDICIAL OF ITS PREVIOUS JUDGMENT. It ought to be clear even to the
appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could
take judicial notice of the finality of judgment in a case that was
previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was
done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly, such an
order is not contrary to law. The Supreme Court quoted Chief Justice
Morgan, who said: Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or
whether or not the previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration.
Prieto vs. Arroyo
14 SCRA 549 (1965)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
ZEFERINO ARROYO and GABRIEL PRIETO were registered owners of
adjoining lots in Camarines Sur. After Zeferino died, his heirs had a new
certificate of title registered in their names. Subsequently, the heirs
discovered that the technical description set forth in their transfer
certificate of title and in the original certificate of title did not conform
with that embodied in the decision of the land registration court (which
registered the land in Zeferinos name), and was less in area by 157
square meters. They, therefore, filed a petition for the correction of the
said description in their titles. Thereafter, the court issued an order
directing the correction of the technical description of the land covered by
their title.
Gabriel filed a petition to annul the order granting the correction
claiming that the 157 square meters were unduly taken from his lot.
However, his petition was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thus,
Gabriel filed a second petition containing similar allegations. As expected,
the court dismissed his second petition on the ground of res judicata.
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of illegitimate status. The CA ruled that the marriage between Yao and
Sy was not proven to be valid under the Chinese laws.
Hence, Yao filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court
claiming that the CA erred in holding that the validity of the foreign
marriage between Yao and Sy had not been proven. To support this
contention, Yao claimed that the CA should have taken judicial notice of
the Chinese laws on marriage which show the validity of her marriage to
Sy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice of foreign laws (i.e.
Chinese laws on marriage), thus, relieving Yao of her duty of proving the
validity of her marriage under Chinese laws.
RULING:
COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS.
Under the Philippine jurisprudence, to establish a valid foreign marriage
two things must be proven: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence. Though Yao may have established the fact of marriage, she
has failed to prove the Chinese laws on marriage that would show the
validity of her marriage to Sy. Well-established is the rule that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws or customs. They must
be alleged and proved as any other fact. On this point, Yao cannot rely
on a the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia (16 Phil. 137 (1910)) to prove
her case. The ruling that case did not show that the court took judicial
notice of Chinese laws on marriages. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that the court did take judicial notice of Chinese laws or
customs on foreign marriages in that case, Yao still failed to show that the
law assumed to recognized in Sy Joc Lieng case (wherein the marriage
was celebrated in 1847) was still applicable during the time of her
marriage to Sy, which took place 84 years later. Hence, the CA was
correct in considering that the validity of the marriage between Yao and
Sy has not been established.
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals
196 SCRA 650 (1991)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land of about
440 sq. meters in Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of
ownership was filed by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose
Tabuena. After trial, the court ordered Tabuena to return the property to
Tabernilla.
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At the trial, it was found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. in
1926 to Tabernilla while they were in the United States. Upon Tabernillas
return to the Philippines in 1934, Damasa Timtiman, mother of Juan
Peralta acting upon Juans instructions conveyed the land to Tabernilla.
Upon her request, she was supposedly allowed by Tabernilla to remain in
the said lot provided she paid the realty taxes on the property which she
did do so. She remained on the lot until her death and, thereafter, the
property was taken possession by Tabuena. This complaint was filed after
a demand for Tabuena to vacate was made.
The trial court rejected his defense that the subject of the sale was
a different lot and that he was the absolute owner of the said property by
virtue of the inheritance he acquired from his deceased parent. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, rejecting therein
his claim that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of Exhibits A,
B, & C which had been marked but not formally offered in evidence by
Tabernilla.
ISSUE(S):
(1)
Whether or not it was proper for the CA and trial court
properly took cognizance of the exhibits even if they were not
formally offered during trial?
(2)
Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of
Tabuenas testimony in a case it had previously heard which was
closely connected with the case before it?
RULING:
The SC reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Tabuena.
(1) No. The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an
exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits A, B, and C were marked
at pre-trial but this was only for identifying them and not for making a
formal offer. It is during the trial that the party presenting the marked
evidence decides whether to offer the evidence or not. In case they
dont, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be
given any evidentiary value.
An exception was given in People vs. Napat-a, wherein the court
ruled that evidence even if not offered can be admitted against the
adverse party if: first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the
case. In this case, these requirements had not been satisfied. The
documents were indeed testified to but there was no recital of its
contents having been read into the records.
Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex
with her and that they indeed stayed in Sunset Gardens and in Edwards
Subdivision, but it was because they were lovers and that Mia had
consented to their having sex. To support his claim that they were lovers,
he presented two letters supposedly delivered to him in the provincial jail
while he was detained by Mias cousin Lorna. There Mia explained that it
was her parents who forced her to testify against him.
The delivery of the letter was denied by Lorna but the defense
presented the provincial jail guard on duty on the supposed date of the
delivery and testified that indeed Lorna had visited Godoy on said date.
Several witnesses were also presented including two former teachers of
Mia who knew the handwriting on the two said letters as belonging to Mia
having been their former student and where thus familiar with her
handwriting particularly those made in her test papers. Other witnesses
were presented by the defense attesting that they saw the two together
in a manner that was affectionate and cordial, prior to the said
kidnapping and even during such.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused
RULING:
The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy.
Three guiding principles in the appellate review of the evidence of
the prosecution for the crime of rape, namely: a) while rape is a most
detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to
be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party
accused, though innocent; b) the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and c) that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was
never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a manner
that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable
sexual demands. In taking judicial notice, the Supreme Court said that it
is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim of the complainant of having
been threatened appears to be a common testimonial expedient and facesaving subterfuge. But it had not been duly corroborated by other
evidence nor proved that the accused indeed always carried a knife.
The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas
(such as in Palawan) young ladies are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings
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judge." Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may
take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the
Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review
filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that
the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent.
Indeed, they do not
even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the
Court cannot take judicial notice thereof. This merely showed the
weakness of the respondents case because they did not take steps to
prove that BPI did not suffer any loss in 1990. Respondents opted not to
assail the fact appearing therein - that petitioner suffered a net loss in
1990 the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact
established by petitioners other documentary exhibits. The Decision in
CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioners case. It is merely
one more bit of information showing that the petitioner did not use its
1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.
2. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Lucido vs. Calupitan
27 Phil. 48 (1914)
Judicial Admissions
FACTS:
The properties of Leonardo Lucido were sold on auction on Feb. 10,
1903 to Rosales and Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, Rosales and Zolaivar
with the consent of Lucido, sold the properties to Calupitan via a public
document. On the same day, Calupitan and Lucido executed a document
admitting the sale and that their real agreement was that redemption by
Lucido can only be effected 3 years. from the date of the document.
Lucido tendered the redemption price to Calupitan. For failure of the
latter to surrender the properties to Lucido, this case was instituted.
Calupitan claimed that the sale was not one with a right to redeem.
The lower court decided in favor of Lucido.
**original answer of Calupitan expressly stated that the transaction
was one of sale with right to repurchase. Deemed admitted by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Calupitans original answer to the complaint may be
used as evidence against him to prove that a sale with a right to redeem
was in fact agreed to by both parties?
RULING:
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The trial court ruled that the lot was paraphernal property of
Maragarita and adjudicated 2/3 of the lot to respondents and 1/3 to
petitioner Macaria. On Motion for Reconsideration, the decision was
amended with Macaria being entitled to 4/6 of the lot. On appeal to the
CA, the CA changed Macarias share to of the lot and declared that she
is not a legitimated child.
Petitioner now alleges that although the CA is correct in declaring
that she is not a legitimated child of the spouses, it has overlooked to
include in its findings of facts the admission made by the respondents
that she and Vicente and Antonina are brothers and sisters and they are
the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Maragarita. The admission
adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of respondents original complaint in
the Ejectment Case, which was however subsequently amended.
**original complaint of Macaria stated that Vicente and Antonina
are her brothers and sister but this was subsequently amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said statement in the original complaint must be
treated as a judicial admission despite the fact that the same statements
no longer appears in the amended complaint?
RULING:
No, in the Amended Complaint filed by respondents in the same
ejectment case, the supposed admission was deleted and in fact the
statement simply read, That plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of
kin of Margarita. By virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the
place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to
perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no
longer forms part of the record.
If petitioner had intended to utilize the original complaint, she
should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the original
complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have
required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission of which
as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioners submission,
therefore, there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission in the
original complaint, for the failure to offer it in evidence.
Teehankee, separate opinion:
Such admission did not cease to be a judicial admission simply
because respondents subsequently deleted the same in their amended
complaint. The original complaint, although replaced by an amended
complaint, does not cease to be part of the judicial record, not having
been expunged therefrom.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not there was judicial admission on the part of the
respondents that petitioner is a stockholder of Mr. & Ms.?
RULING:
The answer of private respondents shows that there was no judicial
admission that petitioner was a stockholder of Mr. & Ms. to entitle her to
file a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. The affirmative defenses
of private respondents directly refute the representation of petitioner that
she is a true stockholder of Mr. & Ms, by stating unequivocally that
petitioner is not the true party to the case but JAKA which continues to be
the stockholder of Mr. & Ms. In fact, one of the reliefs prayed for was the
dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the
legal interest to initiate and prosecute the same. When taken in its
totality, the Amended Answer to the Amended Petition and even the
Answer to the Amended Petition alone, clearly raises an issue to the legal
personality of the petitioner to file the complaint.
With regard to the contention of the
petitioner that respondents admission that she has 1,000 shares of
stocks registered in her name forecloses any question on her status and
right to bring a derivative suit the Court said: Where the statements of
the private respondents were qualified with phrases such as, insofar as
they are limited, qualified and/or expanded by, the truth being as stated
in the Affirmative Allegations/Defenses of this Answer they cannot be
considered definite and certain enough to be construed as judicial
admissions. A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission against
interest is entitled to overcome by evidence the apparent inconsistency
and it is competent for the party against whom the pleading is offered to
show that the statements were inadvertently made or made under a
mistake of fact. While an admission is admissible in evidence, its
probative value is to be determined from the whole statement and others
intimately related or connected therewith.
Although acts or facts
admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted, evidence
aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made through
palpable mistake.
The rule is always in favor of the liberality in
construction of pleadings so that the real matter in dispute may be
submitted for judgment in the court.
III. REAL AND DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
A.
Rule 130
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
B.
asked to disperse the crowd for not having with them the required permit,
the loyalists started hurling stones toward the police officers at the scene,
and directed their ire against Cory supporters. Salcedo, wearing a yellow
shirt was ganged upon by several men, and he was beaten and mauled.
When he tried to get away from his attackers by running away, the
attackers ran after him and when they caught up with him, he was further
beaten until he was knocked unconscious. He was dead upon arriving at
the PGH.
All these were witnessed by Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor.
Banculo and Sumilang (who was also a witness who tried to help Salcedo
but to no avail) were principal witnesses for the prosecution. The incident
was also witnessed by photographers, whose pictures ere published in
major newspapers in Metro Manila and were presented as evidence as to
the participation of the accused in the mauling. Several of the accused
were photographed with Salcedo.
Despite their defense of alibis, the trial court convicted several of
the accused of homicide and acquitted the others. Upon appeal to the
CA, the charge was qualified to murder. In the SC, the accused question
the admissibility of the photographs taken of the victims as he was being
mauled at the Luneta, for lack of proper identification by the person or
persons who took the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the photographs should be admitted as evidence
against the accused?
RULING: Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when
presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its
production and testified as to the circumstances which they were
produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is
determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the
crime. The photographer, however, is not only the witness who can
identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as
a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima
facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other
competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy.
Photographs, therefore, can be
identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who
can testify to its exactness and accuracy. Even if the person who took the
photographs was not presented to identify them, the use of these photos
by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the
crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the
photos are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed
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when appellants identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their
presence thereat.
Adamczuk vs. Holloway
13 A.2d.2 (1940)
Real and Demonstrative Evidence
FACTS:
Jack Adamczuk brought an action in trespass against defendants
car owner Morris Cohon and driven by defendant Elmer Holloway for an
incident arising out of the collision between the cars they were driving.
The accident took place at 9:30 p.m. at the junction were Highway Route
6 meet with Bridgeville Road. Adamczuk was driving southwardly on the
Bridgeville Road and Holloway was driving eastwardly on Route 6.
The jury ruled in favor of Holloway. Adamczuks motion for a new
trial was refused and these appeals followed.
It was found that on trial, Jack Adamczuk was on the stand and he
was shown Exhibit no. 3, a picture and when queried as to what it
depicted, he replied, the conditions represented by that picture truly
represents the conditions of the crossing at the time of this accident
except for the fact of daylight or dark. Then the exhibit was offered in
evidence. On cross, it was disclosed that the witness did not know who
took the picture or when it was taken.
He could not relate the
circumstances at to how the picture was taken. The court then sustained
the objection to the pictures introduction, wherein the court did not
admit it.
The none admission of this evidence is the main issue asserted by
the plaintiff in this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Photograph (Exhibit no. 3) is admissible as
evidence even if the taker is not presented to verify the picture?
RULING:
The court affirmed the decision.
The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if
relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the
taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness
and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to
reversal for substantial error.
The map or photograph must first, to be admissible, be made a part
of some qualified persons testimony. Some one must stand forth as its
testimonial sponsor; in other words, IT MUST BE VERIFIED. If a witness
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both the check and the person of Tatum with the food store in the
background. The negative and the print were admitted in evidence and
Tatum was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal,
Tatum questions the films admission into evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regiscope films were authenticated sufficiently
to warrant their admission into evidence?
RULING: Yes.
The quantum of authentication required by the courts before a
photograph may be admissible in evidence was stated thus: that some
witness, not necessarily the photographer, be able to give some indication
as to when, where and under what circumstances the photograph was
taken, and the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects
illustrated. The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be
helpful to the court and the jury.
Witness Pentecost testified that she recognized the background
shown in the picture as that of the food store, and as already mentioned,
she testified as to the stores standard procedure of regiscoping each
individual who cashed a check at the store. Also, one Philip Dale testified
at length concerning the Regiscope process. The testimony of these two
witnesses taken together amounted to a sufficient authentication to
warrant admission of the photograph into evidence.
The authentication supplied by the testimony summarized above, of
course, did not preclude appellant from attempting to prove that the
individual portrayed was someone other than the appellant, that the
photograph was inaccurate in or more respects, the appellant was
somewhere else at the moment the photograph was taken, or any other
such defense. But these arguments go to the weight rather than to the
admissibility of the exhibits in question. In our opinion, the Regiscope
exhibits, coupled with the other evidence produced by the state, sufficed
to establish a prima facie case of first degree of forgery.
III.
SECTION 2.
Documentary Evidence
Documents as
evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters,
words, numbers, figures, symbols, or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their contents. (n)
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1.
SECTION 3.
Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
ii. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
iii. When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
iv. When the original consists of numerous accounts
or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
v. When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
(2a)
SECTION 4. Original of document.
(a)The original of a document is one the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry.
(b)When a document is in two or more copies executed
at or about the same time, with identical contents,
all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of
business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are
likewise equally regarded as originals. (3a)
2. Secondary Evidence
SECTION 5. When original document is unavailable. When
the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution
or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
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This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the
admissibility of electronic data messages or electronic
documents, except the rules relating to authentication and
best evidence.
SECTION 8. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures. - An
electronic signature on the electronic document shall be
equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document
if that signature is proved by showing that a prescribed
procedure, not alterable by the parties interested in the
electronic document, existed under which (a) A method is used to identify the party sought to be bound
and to indicate said partys access to the electronic document
necessary for his consent or approval through the electronic
signature;
(b) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose
for which the electronic document was generated or
communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including
any relevant agreement;
(c) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in order
to proceed further with the transaction, to have executed or
provided the electronic signature; and
(d) The other party is authorized and enabled to verify the
electronic signature and to make the decision to proceed with
the transaction authenticated by the same.
SECTION 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures. In any proceedings involving an electronic signature, it shall
be presumed that (a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to
whom it correlates; and
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with
the intention of signing or approving the electronic document
unless the person relying on the electronically signed
electronic document knows or has notice of defects in or
unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic
signature is not reasonable under the circumstances.
(o) Public Key refers to the key of a key pair used to verify
a digital signature.
RULE 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of
paper-based documents. Whenever a rule of evidence refers
to the term of writing, document, record, instrument,
memorandum or any other form of writing, such term shall be
deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these
Rules.
SEC. 2. Admissibility. An electronic document
in evidence if it complies with the rules on
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related
authenticated in the manner prescribed by these
is admissible
admissibility
laws and is
Rules.
is incompetent as
RULING: Yes.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident.
Testimony on the entry does not come within the Best Evidence rule. It is
admissible.
Besides, from a reading of the transcript above mentioned, when
the dialogue happened, the impact of the startiling occurrence was still
fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are ADMISSIBLE AS PART OF THE
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RES GESTAE. For they grow out of the nervous excitement and mental
and physical condition of the declarant.
The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
It is not within the Best Evidence Rule as the entry was made
outside the Philippines by the employee of Air France. It would have been
an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascosos testimony.
If it were true that no entry was made the deposition of the purser could
have cleared up the matter.
Meyers vs. United States
171 F.2d 800 (1948)
Best Evidence Rule
FACTS:
Meyers, an officer of the US army, organized a Corp. called the
Aviation Electric Corp. for the manufacture of parts & accessories for
airplanes & paid into its treasury $500 to cover the authorized capital
stock. 224 shares went to June Ballabu and the remaining shares to
David Johnson & Robert Pine. It had orders worth $20,000 from the
Signal Corps of the US Army. Lamarre was made Secretary-treasurer and
the 224 shares were transferred to him & he later became President. At
the end of the war, there was reduced demand and led to the dissolution
of the corp. The US Senate created an investigating committee to look
into instances of waste, fraud, corruption, excessive profits during the
war.
Meyers testified (and so did Lamarre) that:
1. Meyers was not financially interested/connected with Aviation
Electric Corp.
2. A Cadillac automobile was purchased for the corp. & for its use
3. the sum of $10,000, paid by means of Aviation checks for
furnishing Meyers apartment was a gift from Lamarre
Based on this testimony, Meyers was charged and convicted of the
charge of subordination for perjury by the trial court. On appeal, he
alleges that the trial court took on a bizarre procedure when it accepted
the testimony of William Rogers who examined his co-defendant Lamarre
in the Senate investigation and also allowed the introduction of a
stenographic note transcript of Lamarres testimony on the same hearing.
This is based on the theory that the transcript itself was the best evidence
of Lamarres testimony before the Senate and there was no need for
Rogers testimony.
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between the three sheets, so that the duplicates and the triplicates were
filled out by the use of the carbons. While the witness was testifying, the
trial court judge interrupted and said that the triplicates are not
admissible unless it is first proven that the originals were lost and cannot
be produced.
Another witness was presented by the prosecution to testify. The
witness testified that the original practice of keeping the original white
copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers.
After the cross-examination of this last witness, the prosecution again
went back to the identification of the triplicate invoice. At this point, the
judge told the prosecutor that the originals must be produced. The
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not triplicates formed by the use of carbon papers are
admissible in evidence without accounting first for the loss of the
originals.
RULING:
The Court said that the admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has
long been a settled question. It quoted with approval the opinion of
Moran, a commentator on the Rules of Court. When carbon sheets are
inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing
of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party
to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath,
such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen
which made the surface or exposed the impression, all of the sheets so
written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be
introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the non-production
of the others.
was a store along the said street, and detective Singayan was to pose as
the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher to
approach. Soon, three men approached him. One of them was Mario
Tandoy who said: Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor? Singayan answered
yes. The exchange was made then and theretwo rolls of marijuana for
one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics
Unit). The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. The marked money
and eight foils of marijuana were found on Tandoys body. An information
was filed against Tandoy. The RTC of Makati found him guilty of violating
RA 6425. Tandoy appealed. In his appeal, Tandoy invoked the best
evidence rule and questioned the admission by the trial court of the Xerox
copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Xerox copy of the marked P10.00 bill is
excludible under the best evidence rule.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the Solicitor Generals
Comment which refuted the contention of Tandoy. The best evidence rule
applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was
actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. Since the aforesaid marked money
was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a
Xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of
accounting for the original.
U.S. vs. Gregorio
17 Phil. 522 (1910)
Best Evidence Rule
FACTS:
In a case filed by Pedro Salazar, as creditor, against Eustaquio
Balistoy for the payment of a sum of money, judgment was rendered
wherein the debtor was sentenced to pay to the plaintiff P275.92 with
interest thereon. For the execution of the judgment, two rural properties
of the debtor were attached. The date for the sale and adjudication of the
attached properties to the highest bidder was set on May 27, 1908. On
the 18th of the same month, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy
sheriff to exclude the said realty from the attachment, alleging that he
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was the owner of one of the properties levied upon for the reason that he
had acquired it by purchase from the debtor Balistoy in 1905, prior to the
filing of the complaint. Bernardo presented to the sheriff a document at
the end of which appears a memorandum which states that Eustaquio
Balistoy bought the land referred to in the said document from Luis
Balistoy and sold it to Bernardo Gregorio. Subsequently, falsification
charges were brought against Gregorio and Balistoy. The complaint for
falsification alleged that the defendants simulated a conveyance of one of
the attached properties in favor of Gregorio. However, the original
document setting forth the memorandum was not presented. Only a copy
thereof was produced in court. The trial court found the defendants guilty.
They appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in a criminal case for the falsification of a document,
the original document alleged to have been falsified must be produced
RULING:
Yes. The Court reversed the lower court. Defendants were
acquitted. In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is
indispensable that the judges and the courts have before them the
document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in
order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced at trial,
whether or not the crime of falsification was actually committed; in the
absence of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a
copy of the said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a
document which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a
case, even the existence of such original may be doubted.
Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Reyes
55 Phil 905 (1931)
Best Evidence Rule
FACTS:
The fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against
Andres Guevarra. The informations alleged that Guevarra, with malicious
intent, published on page 9 of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid, a squib
in verse, of which a translation into Spanish was included therein,
intended to impeach the honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente
Dayrit and of Mariano Nepomuceno.
The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution
copies of the Ing Magumasid containing the libelous articles with the
innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly,
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be lost during the war. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and
upheld the sale. The defendants appealed claiming that the sale never
took place since the document of sale could not be produced and the
plaintiff has failed to establish the contents of the deed of sale as required
by Rule 130, Sec. 3.
ISSUES
(1)
Whether or not the Plaintiffs have sufficiently proven the
existence, due execution and subsequent loss of the Deed of sale.
(2)
Whether or not the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence
to prove the contents of the loss deed of sale?
RULING: Yes.
The plaintiff declared that the original deed of sale signed by
defendant Tiburcia was lost during the war. The record of the present
case will bear that its existence was convincingly proven not only by the
testimony of Heraclea Vda. De Corpus, the surviving widow, and by the
environmental facts disclosed by the evidence, but also by the
disinterested testimony of Pablo Albeza. After proper proof of the due
execution & delivery of the instrument & its loss or destruction, oral
evidence may be given of its contents by any person who signed the
document, or who read it.
As to the second issue, it is not necessary, in order to admit
evidence of the contents of a lost instrument, that the witness should be
able to testify with verbal accuracy to its contents; it is sufficient if they
are able to state it in substance. Witnesses cannot be expected to recite
the content word for word. It is enough if intelligent witnesses have read
the paper & can state substantially its contents & import with reasonable
accuracy. Thus, it was held sufficient if the witness can recollect and
testify to facts showing the presence of essential elements of a contract,
namely; consent, subject matter, consideration and form in certain
instances. In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs are
more than enough to satisfy the statutory requirements as to execution
and subsequent loss of the deed of sale as well as to its contents.
Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free Workers Union
77 SCRA 24 (1977)
Best Evidence Rule
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee Compania Maritima (company) and the Defendantappellant Allied Free Workers Union (union) entered into a written
contract whereby the union will perform arrastre and stevedoring work for
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chief clerk in Iligan City in his statement. Magante did not testify on his
statement, instead it was Jayme who testified on behalf of Magante.
ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding to the plaintiff company
actual damages, moral damages, and attorneys fees on the ground that
the Auditors report on which they were based were hearsay?
RULING:
The company argues that the accountants (auditors) reports are
admissible in evidence because of the rule that when the original
consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole, the original
writings need not be produced. That rule cannot be applied in this case
because the voluminous character of the records on which the
accountants reports were based was not duly established. Moreover, in
order for said rule to be applied, the records and accounts should be
made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the
summary may be tested on cross-examination.
What applies is the general rule that an audit made by or the
testimony of a private auditor is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the
original records, books of accounts, reports or the like. The company
failed to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility
attending the production of the records in court and their examination
and analysis as evidence by the court
As to the statement presented by Teves, SC said that the best
evidence on the cost of the equipment would have been the sales invoice
instead of his mere oral testimony of. Also, he should have produced the
sales invoice. The same is true with regard to Jaymes estimates as
recoverable damages. The pertinent records of the company should have
been produced in Court. As to Magantes report, Jayme was not
competent to take his place since the statement was prepared by
Magante and not by Jayme. More appropriate still, the documents and
records on which the statement was based should have been presented
as evidence or at least brought to the Court for examination. Lower
courts award of damages is reversed and set aside.
Villa Rey Transit vs. Ferrer
25 SCRA 845 (1968)
Best Evidence Rule
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the TC erred in preventing MCI from proving
existence and the delivery of the conveyance transferring to it the land in
question?
RULING:
Trial courts do well in refusing at all times to permit the introduction
of incompetent evidence and particularly secondary evidence of the
contents of written instruments unless the facts required by the Code of
Civil Procedure as the conditions precedent for such evidence are clearly
shown to exist. Section 321 of the Code provides: An original writing
must be produced and proved, except as otherwise provided in this Act.
If it has been lost, proof of the loss must first be made before evidence
can be given of its contents. Upon such proof being made, together with
proof of the due execution of the writing, its contents may be proved by a
copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document or by the
recollection of a witness.
As will be seen in this section, the writing itself must be produced
unless it has been lost or destroyed in which case, before its contents
may be proved by other evidence, it must be shown by the party offering
secondary evidence (1) that the document was duly executed and
delivered, where delivery is necessary (2) that it has been lost or
destroyed. The execution or delivery of the document maybe established
by the person or persons, who executed it, by the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw
it executed and delivered or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it
and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the
instruments have previously confessed the execution thereof. The
destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the
fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss,
or by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or pares of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document
lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the Court that the document
was indeed lost. If it appears , on an attempt to prove the loss , that the
document is in fact in existence , then the proof of loss or destruction
fails and secondary evidence is inadmissible unless section 322 of the
Civil code of Procedure should be applicable.
After proper proof of the due execution and delivery and its loss or
destruction, oral evidence maybe given of its contents by any person who
signed the document, or who read it, or heard it read knowing, or it being
proved from other sources, that the document so read was the one in
question. Such evidence may also be given by any person who was
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present when the contents of the document was being talked over
between the parties thereto to such an extent as to give him reasonably
full information as to its contents; or the contents maybe proved by any
person to whom the parties to the instrument have confessed or stated
the contents thereof; or by a copy thereof; or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document.
De Vera vs. Aguilar
218 SCRA 602 (1983)
Best Evidence Rule
FACTS:
Petitioners (all surnamed De Vera) and respondent Leona (married
to Mariano Aguilar) are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa
Bernabe.
Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land. Such
property was mortgaged by petitioners to Bordador. When the mortgage
had matured, the respondents Spouses Aguilar redeemed the property,
and in turn Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale. Then, an OCT was issued in their name. Three years later,
the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of
Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition
thereof. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the
property to Bernabe. Petitioners De Vera filed a suit for reconveyance of
the lot. The TC rendered its decision ordering the reconveyance of the
lot. In ruling for the petitioners de Vera, the TC admitted, over the
objection of the respondents Aguilar, a Xerox copy of an alleged deed of
sale executed by respondents in favor of Bernabe.
On appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed. The CA found that
the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly
proven by petitioners, so secondary evidence (Xerox copy of deed of sale)
is inadmissible. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
RULING:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents
were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of
the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, contents although this order may be changed if necessary
in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof for the admission
of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the TC.
In the case at bar, the TC merely ruled in the existence and due
execution of the alleged deed of sale. The existence of the alleged deed
was proved by the Xerox copy. In establishing the execution of a
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