PHIL 4401:Professional Ethics

Kaylee Blankenship
November 20, 2012
The Duty of Veracity in the Professional-Client Relationship
Today it has become more and more common to see incidences of deception, lying, and
bluffing in the professional context. One only has to look at business practices today to
understand why societies have become more wary than ever of business corporations. There are
also growing numbers of cases where patients sue doctors for malpractice. These unfortunate
increasing occurrences have led to a level of mistrust between clients and the professionals. So
the question has become, are deceptive practices morally justifiable in certain contexts involving
the professional client relationship? Some theorists like Ellin and Carr would argue that
sometimes deception and non-disclosure of information is permissible and sometimes even
required. However, these claims are hard to justify. Theorists Bayles, Gorovitz, ONeill and
Gillespie on the other hand present more logical arguments, clearly illustrating how deceptive
practices in professional-client relationships are basically never morally justifiable because it
somehow limits the general rights and autonomy of clients.
It is important to first evaluate why the arguments of Ellin and Carr are flawed. Here we
will begin by looking at Joseph Ellin and his article Special Professional Morality and the Duty
of Veracity. His overall claim is basically that ordinary people have different moralities than
professionals do. Professionals are ordinary people, but their lives are split between their
ordinary duties on the one hand and their professional duties on the other, thus creating the idea
of special professional morality. From there Ellin makes three main points: first, that there is a
difference between ordinary morality and special professional morality, second that lying is
different than deception, and third that deception is morally okay. The way he presents his

argument is that lying is not okay, but deception is because of this special professional
morality. In our ordinary morality we think of lying and deception as the same thing and that
both are morally wrong as claimed by theorists like Kant. Ethics also has to do with the habits
that you get into. If a doctor gets into a habit of deceiving his or her patients, is that okay? Or is
it only acceptable in extreme situations? This is where I think Ellin fails in supporting his claims.
He merely claims that the fiduciary relationship encourages deception without really providing
any supporting evidence. The fiduciary model is supposed to be based on trust as is implicated
in the word itself, so it would only be logical to draw the conclusion that deception would betray
that trust. However, Ellin says that this would only happen in the off chance that the client
actually figured out that they were being deceived.
The fiduciary model that Ellin mentions relates to the model that Bayles mentions in his
article The Professional-Client Relationship. He claims that this model is most applicable to
professional-client relationships. In this model, the clients trust has to earned by the professional
because the professional has an obligation to take into consideration the wants and beliefs of the
clients in his decision making process. Since the relationship is based on trust, the professionals
superior knowledge is recognized but the client retains significant authority and responsibility in
decision-making. The client. The professional must take into account the values of the client and
the client has the right to decide whether or not to follow the course of action that the
professional suggests. The professional has duties and obligations to the client and these duties
and obligations include: keeping the client informed and informing them in the beginning as
well. The knowledge of the professional has been earned and thus respected, as is the clients
autonomy. Ellins version of the fiduciary model does not take into account the clients values,
which limits the clients autonomy when making decisions. Instead, his model of the fiduciary is

more like Bayless paternalistic model, in which the professional has all the power and the
professional can use the patient as a means to an end, as Kant would claim. Clients in all
professional-client relationships, whether it be medical or business, have a right to as much
autonomy as possible. The professionals job should be apply his expertise and present the client
with sufficient, truthful information so they can make an informed decision.
In Gorovitzs Informed Consent and Patient Autonomy, we see the emphasis on the
right of autonomy. Kant is another theorist who seems to emphasize autonomy the most. We can
say that Gorovitz is arguing from a Kantian perspective. When we show respect for other people,
for Kant, that is an expression of moral law. We ought not treat other people merely as a means
to our own end instead; we should treat them as an end in themselves. Gorovitz claims that the
patients right of choice is not diminished by the possibility that they may not choose correctly.
The professional needs to be aware of the clients autonomy. The client has the right to be
stupid basically, in the professional point of view. The client may choose what the professional
knows is the third or fourth best choice or not consent to the best choice at all. For Ellin,
professionals from his point of view would employ deception at this point to try and persuade
clients to pick what the professional believes to be the best choice. However, for Gorovitz, there
would be no point in trying to manipulate clients with deception as long as you present them
with the possibilities and allow them to choose which they think is the best based on their values.
That right is not based on the professionals superior knowledge, but in paternalism it is. For
example, just because a physician and patient share a common objective, it doesnt nullify the
patients right of autonomous decision despite the superior knowledge of the physician.
Therefore, the physician has a duty to inform his patients about all the options available to them
and allow them to decide, without employing deceptive means.

ONeill also has a similar view supporting Gorovitzs claims, and is concerned more with
the ethics in the medical field. She differentiates between two types of ethics. The first is actionoriented ethics which is based on the act of the decision or the decision making process. This is
where Kant would fit in. The second is result-oriented ethics, which is based on the results. This
would be Mill and his theory of utilitarianism where the morality of an action is based on
creating the most happiness and the least amount of pain. Autonomous action is the action of
agents who can understand and choose what they do. When a persons capacity or reasoning is
reduced their autonomic abilities are reduced as well. This is really important in the medical field
because clients are most often impaired in some way. In these cases the model of paternalism
seems to be reasonable and a good way of approaching problems for ONeill. Despite the fact
that clients may be impaired, they still have a right to autonomy and to be informed. The
professional has a duty to his patients to inform them as much as possible, based on their level
of capacity. Paternalism is only acceptable in those extreme and narrow circumstances. The more
the clients capacity to understand, the greater his or her ability is to choose freely, the more the
autonomy of the client increases and decreases the need for the paternalism model.
Now we can transition into business ethics, which is where Albert Carr comes in. His
article Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, focuses more on bluffing in business, making two main
points. The first is that business is a game, which he compares to the game of poker. In poker, in
order to win, one must be adept in the art of bluffing. You dont want to show players your cards
and you also want to persuade others to believe your hand is either really good or really bad in
certain instances. So, you bluff which is similar to deception in that it is not quite lying, but you
are also not revealing the whole truth, instead you are misleading. It is thus not unethical or
immoral to abide by these rules of business. Carr believes that in business one must follow what

others do and play this bluffing game in order to have power and be successful. The second point
he makes is the foundation of his argument. That it is not even a question as to what business
ought to be, but simply that business is a certain way and that is just the way it is. For example,
look at used car salesmen. Today they are known to be very shady and deceptive, however, it
only came to be looked at this way because this practice has become common over the years.
Some business practices, like used car salesmen, it is simply assumed they will be deceptive. A
supplement of this is that Carr also believes there is a difference between morality in business
and morality at home or in your personal life, which is similar to Ellin.
Carr believes deception required in business, but why? Gillespie points out that Carrs
argument on this score is very weak. He argues that the conventionalist rule that it is ethically
correct to do something because it is not illegal is such a feeble rule because it is obvious that
legality does not automatically establish morality. The way things are didn't come about
naturally, it came from institutionalized practices that have been around for years and years and
have become accepted. Also, the way things are arent the only way; it can change, but it takes a
lot of strength. Part of the problem is fear and passivity in the world or business, but no one is
going to change the world unless one person does it. Gillespie points this out, illustrating how
Carr doesnt even ask the question is this the way business ought to be?. Business may be a
game, but it doesnt have to be seen this way. Gillespie outlines Carrs conventionalist position,
claiming that he makes four main arguments. His first argument is that business is a form of
competition similar to poker. The second argument is that, as a competition, the rules are
different than they are in ordinary social dealings (ordinary and professional morality are
parallel- they dont intersect). Thirdly, if business abides by the ordinary moral standards then
that individual is at a disadvantage. Thus, if there is a conflict between ordinary and special

professional morality professional may deviate from the ordinary and instead adopt the special
morality view. The priority view is when there are conflicts, the ordinary morality overrules the
special professional morality and the lines intersect again. So, Carr believes that anyone who
ascribes to this priority view in business is putting himself or herself at a disadvantage, because
no one else is. You have to play the game in order to get ahead. The fourth argument is that it is
not unethical or immoral to abide by the current rules of business.
There also three rules, from Gillespies point of view that supports Carrs argument.
The first is that if business practice is not illegal, it is thereby ethically acceptable. The second is
that if a businessman does not take advantage of legal opportunities, others will surely do so.
Finally, the third argument is that if a practice is so widespread it could be considered a norm
everyone then expects conformity. Of these three rules, Gillespie claims that the first rule is the
weakest argument, since it should be obvious that legality does not establish morality. If it did
then it would be like saying Im not wrong because Im not breaking the law. This only means
that you are legally right, not morally right. We can change the law to reflect our ethics, but
usually this only happens after the action takes place. An example of this would be slavery. The
second argument that business as a game follows the conventionalist line of thought that since
this is such a common and widespread practice that it is moral and ethical. However this doesnt
automatically make it ethical/moral. The obvious fallacy of this argument of Carrs is that unlike
poker, business is not a game.
Though both Carr and Ellin claim the deception and bluffing are morally acceptable and
sometimes even required in professional-client relationships, it is clear that these practices only
serve to harm clients or restrict their basic rights. Bayles, Gorovitz, and ONeill clearly illustrate
how deception, especially in the medical context, only serves to limit the client and their right to

make decisions concerning their life. The same goes for bluffing in business. As Gillespie points
out, business is not a game and thus should not be treated as one. Business professionals, just like
any other professionals, have a duty to be truthful to the public. Just because deception, lying,
and bluffing have been used in the past in professional-client relationships, doesnt mean that
they should be continually employed today. When one talks about ethics it should be about the
way things ought to be not how they are; change is possible.