North American Philosophical Publications

Descartes and the Dream Argument

Author(s): Douglas Odegard
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2, Studies on Descartes (Apr., 1995), pp.
155-164
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications
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of Philosophy

History
Volume

Quarterly
2, April 1995

12, Number

DESCARTES AND
THE DREAM ARGUMENT
Douglas
Descartes
an

WHEN
1.

external

The

Some

beliefs

his

on behalf of doubting whether

I base

similar

the

to my

present

there is

structure:2

beliefs
my present
in some unveridical

from experiences
relevantly

has

argument

on which

experiences

indistinguishable
/. 2.

cites dreams

world,1

Odegard

beliefs

about

the world

are

dreams.
about

the world

are

false.
. . 3.

My

present

beliefs

about

the world

may

be false.

in this way, the argument faces two problems. First, the step
Understood
uses
to
2
3
from
the rule ofDirect Inference, since itmoves from the premise
that my present beliefs about the world belong to a class containing some

false members to the conclusion that my beliefs may be among the false
It therefore needs the additional premise that I have no other
relevant evidence. But I do have other relevant evidence in this case; for I
have the evidence ofmy senses. For instance, my seeing and feeling a hand
is evidence that a hand exists. Although we cannot assume against the

members.

sceptic that it is good enough for knowledge, we can assume that it is

evidence. Therefore I have evidence for '"A hand exists' is not false" inde
pendently of the fact that the belief belongs to a class of beliefs with mostly
So the fact that the belief belongs to a class containing some
false members is irrelevant here. It is no more a reason forme to believe
that "A hand exists" may be false than the fact that Hobbes is a philosopher
and some philosophers are Greek is a reason forme to believe that Hobbes
true members.

may be Greek.

answer to
Secondly, the argument's initial premise is false ifDesc?rtese
VI is sound. Having proven to his satisfaction
the sceptic inMeditation
that a provident God exists, he argues that such a being cannot allow me
to hold a false belief about the world

if the belief fits with everything my

tell me. And this answer works only
senses, memory, and understanding
if some ofmy present beliefs about the world, viz. those that fit with my
are distinguishable
from false beliefs
senses, memory and understanding,

and hence from any beliefs in unveridical

Fortunately

dreams.

for the sceptic the dream argument can be reconstructed

155

in

156

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

a way

that avoids

structed

argument,

these particular
my

present

QUARTERLY

difficulties.3 According

experiences

are

source

to the recon

of knowledge

of

an external world only if I can know that they are not occurring in a dream
and, since I cannot know that I am not dreaming, my present experiences
are

a source

not
1.

Kp

2.

of knowledge.

In

symbols,

=> K~D

~K~D

/. 3.

~Kp

p is any proposition that asserts or implies something about

external world on the strength ofmy present experiences.

where

an

The nature of the reconstructed argument depends on the defence it

offers for its first premise, Kp zdK~D. For instance, ifwe deliberately use
"I am dreaming" in a way that implies that anything I currently believe is
false, we can argue that, since I know that p only if I can know that p is
not false and I can know that p is not false only if I can know that I am not
dreaming, I know that p only if I can know that I am not dreaming. In
symbols (using "p" for "p is false'),
(i)

Kp

(ii)

K~p

3 K~p

Premise

3 K~D

Premise
.\

1.

KPdK~D(i), (ii), H.S.

in this way, the dream argument is indistinguishable from the

Understood
demon argument, since the rationale for (ii) is the same as the rationale
for saying that I know that p is not false only if I know that there is no
demon. Since this paper will concentrate on arguments that are distinct
from the demon argument, this version will simply be set to one side.
that
Barry Stroud4 offers a different defence ofKp 3 K~D. He maintains
I know that p only if I can know anything I know to be entailed by my
knowing that p and argues that, since I know that my knowing that p
entails that I am not dreaming, I know that p only if I can know that I am
not dreaming. In symbols,
(i)
.-.

Premise

(KPK(KPd~D))dK~D
3

(Kp 3 K~D)

(ii) K(Kp

~D)

(iii) K(Kp

~D) Premise

(i) Export

.\

1. KP3K~D (ii), (iii) M.P

Another version is suggested by Crispin Wright (although his explicit

concern iswith warranted belief and not with knowledge).5 According to a
I know that p only if I can in some
Wrightian defence of Kp z> K~D,

know that I know that p and, since I know that my knowing

that p entails that I am not dreaming, I know that I know that p only if I
know that I am not dreaming, in which case I know that p only if I can in
circumstances

some

circumstances

know

that

I am

not

dreaming.

In

symbols,

DESCARTES AND THE DREAM ARGUMENT

(i) K(Kp
(ii) KKp

=> ~D)

Premise

z) K~D

(i), Closure

z> KKp

(iii) Kp
.-.

Premise

(1)

Even

(iii),

KPdK~D

ifwe accept a rationale

and Wright,

combining Kpz>K~D

First,

problems.

157

as G.E.

Moore

with Kp

combining Kpz)K~D

(ii), H.S.

forKpz>K~D
of the type offered by Stroud
to get -Kp still faces two
with ~K~D
out,6 we

points

to get K~D.

That

can

reverse

the

process

by

is, we can get the inverse

argument,
1.

Kp 3 K~D

Premise
2.

,-. 3.

K~D

Kp Premise

1,2, M.P

The only way to block the inversion is to argue that the common premise,
Kp 3 K~D, establishes that I know something about external objects only
if I can independently know that I am not dreaming. But the defences of
offered by Stroud and Wright provide scant resources for
Kp z> K~D
establishing

this independence.

Secondly, as Wright points out, the dream argument leads to inconsis

that my being in a dream right now is
tency. The argument assumes
with
my having empirical knowledge of an external world.
incompatible
Stroud and Wright think this premise is sound because dreaming is too
unreliable to be a source of knowledge. And Wright thinks that this point
should not be confined to my empirical beliefs about the world. For in
stance, he thinks that if I am dreaming right now, my philosophical

arguments

are

too

unreliable

to be

source

of knowledge.

If so, we

can

construct another argument by letting values of "p" in the dream argument

conclusion I now accept. Suppose
I accept the
include any philosophical
conclusion of the dream argument. The dream argument then works only
if another argument works the conclusion ofwhich is that I do not know

the conclusion of the dream argument. In short, the dream argument works
only if I do not know its conclusion. And, since the dream argument can be
ofmy beliefs as well as against my
directed against the reasonableness

claims, we are leftwith the inconsistent result that the dream

a reasonable conclusion only if there is no reason forme to
has
argument
believe its conclusion.

knowledge

Now, one response7 toWright's objection is to accept the inconsistency

and argue that its presence does not harm scepticism but merely discloses
its radical nature. A radical sceptic can offer the disclosure of inconsistency
as a reductio proof that the supposition "Some ofmy beliefs are reasonable"

is
the absurd result that the dream argument's conclusion
generates
reasonable only if it is not reasonable. There ismerit in this response, since
it shows how profound dream scepticism can be. But there is also a hidden

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

158

standard defences ofKp z>K~D.

cost; for it undermines

the

It utilizes

defence.

QUARTERLY
Consider

Stroud's

condition

closure

second-order

(Kp K(Kp 3 ~D)) 3 K~D

and although this condition is plausible within an ordinary set of assump
tions, it is implausible within the framework of radical scepticism. Given
radical possibilities, the world could be such that I know that I am seated
in a chair, know that my knowing this entails that I am not dreaming it,
and yet, because 1 am a sceptical philosopher who cannot see through
sceptical arguments, be incapable of knowing that I am not
dreaming it. Second-order closure is thus invalid and Stroud's defence of
the first premise collapses.

misleading

Similarly, Wright's defence utilizes an iterativity condition that cannot

survive radical scepticsm. According toWright, I must be able to tell in
some circumstances that I have knowledge when I have it if "knowledge"
is to be a normative concept. But given radical possibilities, the world could
be such that although most of the beliefs I adopt because I judge them to
I can never know that they are
be knowledge are in fact knowledge,

knowledge because in each instance the accuracy ofmy epistemic appraisal

is just a lucky accident. So again the defence of the dream argument's first
premise collapses. If the argument is to survive, its first premise needs a
better defence.

We can find such a defence by looking at what it takes forme to have

the sceptic asks
reasons to believe that external objects exist. When
an
of
external
I
have
whether
world, the initial
empirical knowledge
concern is with whether I have the right to be certain on the basis ofmy
experience that there are external objects. And I do not have a right to be
certain

unless

some

of my

beliefs

about

external

objects

are

reasonable.

So, I do not know that there are external objects on the basis ofmy present
experiences unless they give me reasons to believe that external objects
exist. And the sceptic can argue that my present experiences do not give

me reasons to believe that external objects exist unless I have independent

reason to believe that they are not in a dream. Without such an inde
pendent reason, my experiences are indifferent as towhether their objects
are external tome or simply the objects of an un veridical dream.
For

I currently

example,

feel

a chair.

This

experience

is a reason

for me

to believe that the chair is external tome only ifthere is independent reason
forme to believe that I am not feeling the chair in a dream. If there is no
such

reason,

my

experience

gives

me

no more

reason

to believe

that

the

chair I feel is external to me than it gives me to believe that the chair is

something I simply feel in a dream. So Imust have independent reason to
believe that I am not dreaming ifmy experience is to give me reason to
believe that the chair is external tome.
The same point holds formy memories. My remembering

that I entered

DESCARTES AND THE DREAM ARGUMENT

159

this room an hour ago is a reason forme to believe that I really did enter
it an hour ago only if there is independent reason forme to believe that I
am not having the memory in a dream. If there is no such independent
reason, my memory gives me no more reason to believe that I really entered
the room an hour ago than itgives me to believe that I am just remembering

in a dream that I entered the room ?anhour ago. So my memory gives me

reason to hold beliefs about the past only ifthere is independent reason for
me to believe that I am not remembering in a dream.
The sceptic can then plausibly claim that my empirical reasons to believe
that external objects exist cannot be a source of knowledge unless my
reason to believe that I am not dreaming enables me to know that I am not
dreaming which gives the sceptic the first premise of the dream argument,
the premise that I do not have empirical knowledge of external objects
unless I can know independently that I am not dreaming.
An analogy might help make this connection clearer. Suppose you tell
me that the chair I see is hot and you say nothing else about the matter.
Your report gives me reason to believe that the chair I see is stolen only if
I have independent reason to believe that you mean "is stolen" by "is hot"
and not "has a high temperature." So I know on your authority that the
chair I see is stolen only if I know independently that you mean "is stolen"
by "is hot." Just as I need independent semantic information in order to
know on your authority that the chair I see is stolen, so I need independent
knowledge that I am not currently dreaming
that the chair I feel is external.

in order to know empirically

This defence of the first premise preserves the dream argument's consis
that dreams are too
tency. There is no need to rely on the assumption
an
a
source of knowledge,
unreliable to be
assumption that can be turned
against the argument in the event that it itself takes place in a dream. The

defence simply needs the condition that my current experiences and memo
ries are a source of knowledge of an external world only if there is inde
pendent reason forme to believe that they are not part of a dream. Since
the argument is entirely a priori and does not itself rely on experience or

memory,

no

to establish

second-order

argument

with

the

that I have no reason to believe

same

structure

can

be

used

its conclusion.

to Moore's
of the argument is not vulnerable
z>
on
the basis of
K~D, my knowing
attempted inversion. According to Kp
my experience that an object is external to me requires me to be able to
know independently that my experience is not part of a dream. So I cannot
claim to know that I am not dreaming on the basis of a claim to know
Moreover,

this version

empirically something about an external object, inwhich case the inverted

argument

is incoherent.

the first premise of the dream argument can be defended in a

that
way
keeps the argument consistent and makes it immune to inversion.
Therefore

160

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

the argument's worth depends on the truth of its second

Consequently,
premise, the premise that I do not know that I am not dreaming. Recent
attention has tended to focus on the first premise and let the second one
go by without much challenge. But I think it needs a closer look, particu
larly while bearing

inmind how similar "I am awake"

is to "I exist'.8

Consider Stroud's defence of ~K~D. He thinks that ifwe accept Kp z>

we are bound to accept ~K~D as well. He thinks that, since the belief
that I am not dreaming needs defending, Imust be able to produce a test
that allows me to distinguish my present experiences from experiences in
a dream. He argues that I cannot do this without already having empirical

K~D

knowledge
dreaming

of an external world, inwhich case my knowledge

is not sufficiently independent.9

that I am not

Stroud is right, given that I have to use a test in order to know that I am
not dreaming. A test exists only if there is a quality, Q, such that I know
that all and only waking experiences have Q. But I cannot know this
empirically, since then my knowledge that I am not dreaming would depend
on my having empirical knowledge of external objects. And I cannot know
is no Q such that the connection between my
and
their not being in a dream is necessary. So there
experiences" being Q
is no qualitative difference.10
it a priori,

since

there

But the assumption that I have to use a test in order to know that I am
not dreaming does not survive close inspection. I can deduce that I am not
is right
dreaming from the premise that I am awake. Although Descartes
over
and above its being waking
that nothing about my waking experience
experience enables me to distinguish it from a dream experience, the fact
that it iswaking experience itself entails that it is not a dream experience.
So I can know deductively that I am not dreaming, provided I can know
that I am awake. And I can know that I am awake without having to apply
a

test.11

The nature of my knowledge that I am awake depends partly on the

nature ofmy reason to believe that I am awake. And my reason to believe
that I am awake is immediate. It is not that 0, where 0 is something from
which I can infer that I am awake. Nor does ithave its source in introspec

tion. Itwould have existed forme even if I had been preoccupied with other
matters and had not been paying any attention to myself. So a sceptic
cannot argue that I have reason to believe that I am awake only if I have

independent reason to believe that my introspective experiences are not in

a dream. My reason to believe that I am awake exists forme independently
ofwhat I otherwise have reason to believe and independently ofwhether
I have

any

introspective

experiences.

In this respect, "I am awake" is like "I exist." In each case, there is reason
forme to hold the belief independently of any other considerations. Indeed,
this is a comparison one would expect a Cartesian towelcome and exploit.

DESCARTES AND THE DREAM ARGUMENT

161

fails to do so only because he is so concerned about whether a

given proposition can resist demon doubt. And "I am awake" is of no use to
him in this connection, since the supposition that I am demon-deceived
when I believe that I am awake is not incoherent. But "I am awake" is a
Descartes

useful starting-point against

a dream sceptic.

Yet the fact that there is reason forme to believe that I am awake is not
by itself enough to establish that I know that I am awake. Sometimes when
I wake up in unexpected surroundings I have serious doubts about whether
I am awake, serious enough to keep me from knowing that I am awake. I

to do something like pinch myself to remove the doubt. So, even

though there is reason forme to believe that I am awake, I need something
more in order to know that I am awake. And if this something more is
empirical, I may have to know independently that I am not dreaming in
have

order to know that I am awake. And then my knowledge that I am not

dreaming cannot be based on my knowledge that I am awake.

requires something more than a reason for belief if it is to

Knowledge
meet the standard that usually governs the dialogue with a dream sceptic.
Descartes
gives voice to this standard when he says near the end of
Meditation V that my judgment is a source of knowledge only if it affords
me a basis for thinking "that no contrary reason can be brought forward
which could ever cause me to doubt of its truth." He thinks this basis for
confidence inmy epistemic judgment is supplied by the clarity and distinct
ness ofmy perception, since he thinks he can demonstrate the existence of
a God who would not allow anything that I now perceive clearly and
distinctly to be "afterwards, recognized to be false." There is no reason to
accept his theism. But we have to accept the need for a basis for epistemic

confidence. And ifhis theism does not work, the basis must be empirical.
For instance, I know that I am now awake only ifI have an empirical reason
to believe that tomorrow I probably shall not find myself waking up from
a dream that contains my present experiences. That is why I sometimes
in my
have to pinch myself: to establish features that are associated
a
with
the
absence
of
reversal.
experience
subsequent
Since my reason for confidence is empirical, Imust have an independent
reason to believe that I am not having the necessary experience in a dream.
Consequently, I know that I am awake only if I have an independent reason
to believe that I am not dreaming. So it seems that my knowledge that I
am not dreaming cannot be based on my knowledge that I am awake, since
the latter knowledge seems to depend on the former. And then it seems
that I cannot know that I am not dreaming.

But there is a subtle flaw in this sceptical line of reasoning. Although my

knowing that I am awake requires me to have an independent reason to
believe that I am not dreaming, it does not require me to know inde
I need to know prior to my
pendently that I am not dreaming. What
I
to have reason to believe
is
what
need
determined
by
knowing something

162

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

prior tomy having reason to believe it, not by what I need to have reason
to believe prior to my having a reason to be confident about the belief's
epistemic prospects. So what I need to know prior tomy knowing that am
awake is determined by what I need to have reason to believe prior tomy
having reason to believe that I am awake, not by what I need to have reason
to believe prior tomy having a reason to be epistemically confident. Since
my reason to believe that I am awake is immediate, my knowing that I am
awake does not have any prerequisites and my knowledge that I am not
dreaming can be based on it.
If this argument is correct, I know that I am not dreaming because I
know that I am awake. But can we go further than this? Can we say that
I know these truths with certainty?
We cannot say that I know them with absolute certainty. I know a truth
with absolute certainty only if I h^ve no reason to think that itmay not be
true and only if I have no reason to think that my epistemic judgment of
the belief may turn out to be mistaken. Since I have to rely on experience
formy epistemic confidence, and since my experience of similar cases only
establishes a high degree of probability that any belief I take to be true
will survive inquiry, I always have some reason to think that my epistemic
judgment may turn out to be incorrect. This holds formy belief that I am
awake no less than it does formy other beliefs.
But this does not mean that there is a ground forme to think that Imay
not be awake. Although there is a ground forme to have some doubt about
"The belief that I am awake will survive inquiry," there is no ground for
me to have any doubt about "I am awake." Accordingly
I know with
am
I
where
the
of
is
that
awake,
degree
certainty
certainty
proportionate
to the degree of probability that my belief that I am awake will survive
inquiry. So I know with certainty that I am not dreaming.
Descartes
probably would not like this answer to the sceptic, since he
seeks a ground for claiming absolute certainty. But he might find it useful
in one respect. In his synopsis o?Meditation VI he says that our knowledge
of our own mind and ofGod is always superior to our knowledge of external
objects. If he is serious about this and not just trying to appease religious
authorities, he needs to make sense of the notion of degrees of certainty.
He can do this by adopting the above conception of certainty, a conception

according to which my knowledge that I am not dreaming, and hence my

knowledge of external objects, has a high degree of certainty. This would
allow him to argue that I can know some truths about my mind and God
with an even higher degree of certainty, perhaps with absolute certainty,
since my knowledge of such matters does not depend onmy knowledge that
I am not dreaming. I am not sure that such an argument would work. But the
answer to the dream sceptic at least gives him the option of trying it out.

University ofGuelph

Received May

1, 1994

DESCARTES AND THE DREAM ARGUMENT

163

NOTES
seem to me
"At this moment
it does
indeed
that it is with eyes
... what
so
in sleep does not appear
looking at this paper
happens
as does all this. But...
on many
clear nor so distinct
occasions
in sleep been
I have
... I see so
deceived
and
that there are no certain
illusions,
by similar
manifestly
we
indications
which
wakefulness
from sleep that I am
may
by
clearly distinguish
1. Meditation

awake

I:

I am

that

in astonishment."

lost

2. See

for an

1978

treatment
extended
of this argument.
would
(1959):
say: 'You ... do not know that
"Many philosophers
certain
that you are ...." And one argument
up; it is not absolutely
in the course
of saying
of which
the philosopher
this, is an argument

Curley
3. G. E. Moore
you are standing
... in favour

it would
assert:
for certain
'You do not know
that you are not dreaming;
certain
that you are not ...." And
from this, that I do not know
absolutely
for certain
it is supposed
to follow that I do not know
that I am not dreaming,
for
certain
that I am standing
up" (p. 245).
4. Stroud,
1984, Ch. 1.

who

used

it is not

5.Wright, 1991.

6. Moore,

p. 247.

1959,

7. Thomas

Tymoczko
offer an alternative.

also

and

endorse
this response.
(1992)
Vogel
that either the inconsistency
has
argue
used to construct
the dream
principles
argument,

in the general
epistemic
the argument
is not

case

Jonathan

They

to be

faulted

or the

if the principles

can be removed
inconsistency
by using
of logical
and semantic
Their
paradoxes.
contradiction
is eliminable
without
they derive

techniques

tion

He

his

deduces

epistemic

by using
inconsistency
(where "W" means

principles

Wx

Iterativity:

tency

be

the conclusion

employed
is unconvincing,

"I am,

dream

argument.

His

is

3. Wc

Wc First-order

z) ~WWc

dream

proof

of inconsis

argument
argument

Consistency
1, 3, MP.

6. -WWc

2, 4, MP.

7. WWc~WWc

5, 6, Conj.

we
to Tymoczko-Vogel
According
in believing
that I am warranted
I do not have

and

the biconditional

and

using

a warrant

can

deduce

for believing

a similar
G.

te~WG
Wright's

rules

plus

Closure:

W(x

Consistency:
is

Wx

the epistemic
principles
3 y) z> (Wx z>Wy)
z> ~W~x

proof

1. W(te~WG)
2. WG

the

Iterativity

5. WWc

G:

dream

W~Wc Second-order

z>
WWc

4. W~Wc

since

inconsistency.
Wright's
rules and the following
or I can be, warranted
in believing
x")

z> ~Wx

1.

Their

acceptable,
in the elimina

eliminating
standard
inference

of the first-order

2.

in which

otherwise

z>WWx

W~x

Consistency:
Let V

strategy

are

But they
its source

Assumption

3 W~WG

1, Closure
3.

WGAssumption

contradiction

by assuming

164

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

4. W~WG

2, 3, M.P.
5. WWG3, Iterativity

6.

~WWG

7. WWG

4, Consistency

~WWG

5, 6, Conj.

for avoiding
their contradiction
any strategy
"may well
resources
for avoiding
contradiction.
But
Wright's
sceptic
I am warranted
is unconvincing.
Consider
the assumption
that

They conjecture
out" to give the

that

conjecture
G. Any such warrant
believing
a warrant
I do not have

must

have

for believing

turn
their
in

the form:
G.

.-.G
no

I am warranted

in believing
G only if there is
case my reason
to believe
G must
be that
is impossible.
for me to believe
So the source of the
there is no warrant
G, which
is in the assumption,
used
and not in the epistemic
contradiction
WG,
principles

But

reason

such

warrant

for me

to believe

1959

8. Malcolm
he

awake?"

in this

we might
conjecture,
to the dream
argument

Similarly,
by Wright.
in something
proper
it employs.
principles
But

is possible.
G. But

tries

the

source

itself and

to exploit an analogy
he concludes
that

too far, since

goes
is nonsense.

between

is
ofWright's
contradiction
not in the general
epistemic
"I am

the question

awake"
"Do

and

I know

"I exist."
that

I am

see also Wright,

1991, pp. 99-100.
1984, pp. 21-23;
see Austin,
at one time in his inquiries
1962, pp. 48-49. Moore
opposition,
a
I
in the description
of
remember
of
that
what
by including
description
thought
I am not
current
I could
for demonstrating
that
my
experiences
get a basis
9. Stroud,
10. For

But
dreaming.
11. Compare
not without

he

later

Kenny,

justification"

abandoned
1968:

this view.

"When

I say

See

to Moore,
1959.
I do so without
grounds,

the Preface

'I am awake'

but

(p. 30).

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Austin, J. L. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Curley, E. M. 1978. Descartes Against the Skeptics. Cambridge, MA. Har
vard University Press.
Kenny,

Anthony.

1968.

Descartes.

New

York.

Random

House.

1959. Dreaming. London. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Malcolm, Norman.
Moore, G.E. 1959. Philosophical
Papers. London. Allen and Unwin.
Stroud, Barry. 1984. The Significance ofPhilosophical
Scepticism. Oxford.
Oxford University Press.
Tymoczko, Thomas, and Jonathan Vogel. 1992. "The Exorcist's Nightmare:
A Reply to Crispin Wright." Mind. 101:543-552.
Imploding the Demon."
Wright, Crispin. 1991. "Scepticism and Dreaming:
Mind.

100:87-115.