C.

Ministerial Duty of the Register of Deed

Denial of Registration
9. Almirol vs. The Register of Deeds of Agusan, G.R. No. L-22486,
March 20, 1968
D. PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION
Binds the land/Third Persons
14. Aznar Brothers Realty vs. Court of Appeals and Aying, et al. G.R. No.
128102, March 7, 2000
To Transfer Ownership
23. Sikatuna vs. Guevarra, G.R. No. L-18336, March 15, 1922
PRINCIPLES UNDER THE TORRENS TITLE SYSTEM

A. Indefeasibility

50. Toyota Motors Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 236
G.R. No. L-22486

March 20, 1968

TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in
the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237
in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went
to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds
upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo,
married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it
is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but

3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving
husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law (LRC
Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is necessary that the
property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs
of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of
such other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale
executed by their father.
Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the
Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to
be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for
registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon
which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon
the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him,
and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a
party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue
involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty
days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
G.R. No. 128102

March 7, 2000

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS AYING, DEMETRIO SIDA, FELOMINO AUGUSTO, FEDERICO
ABING, and ROMEO AUGUSTO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the 26 March 1996 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals declaring the private
respondents the rightful possessors de facto of the subject lot and permanently enjoining Sheriff
Juan Gato or his representative from effecting the demolition of private respondents' houses.
Culled from the evidence proffered by petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Co. (hereafter AZNAR), it
appears that Lot No. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mactan,
Lapu-Lapu City, was acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 March 1964. This deed was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964 as shown on the face

thereof. After the sale, petitioner AZNAR declared this property under its name for taxation purposes
and regularly paid the taxes thereon. Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy
portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that they leave the land in the event that the
company would use the property for its purposes. Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta.
Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the development of the subject lot into a multi-million
peso housing subdivision and beach resort. When its demands for the private respondents to vacate
the land failed, AZNAR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for
unlawful detainer and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-1027.

It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized
document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. 20 It is admissible in
evidence without further proof of authenticity 21 and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. 22 He who denies its due execution has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital
in the Acknowledgment he never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the
deed to be his voluntary act. 23 It must also be stressed that whoever alleges forgery has the
burden of proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. 24 Private respondents failed to discharge this burden of proof; hence,
the presumption in favor of the questioned deed stands.
1wphi1

First, private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on
participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated and were
made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true, would not warrant
rescission of the deed. Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made with
preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that
there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the latter shall be
proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him." In the
present case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the two
parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point; it provides: "A
partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only
with respect to such person." In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render
the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them.
The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a
given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed
evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations
thereunder. 27 Here, no right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the
subject lot is involved; thus, the conveyance executed in favor of AZNAR by private
respondents and their predecessors is valid and binding upon them, and is equally binding
and effective against their heirs. 28

G.R. No. L-18336

March 15, 1922

SIKATUNA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
POTENCIANA GUEVARA and FLORENCIO FRANCISCO, defendant-appellees.
The decision of the court contains the following order:
The contract entered into between Sikatuna and Messrs. Jacinto Palma y Hermanos is
hereby declared rescinded insofar as it refers to the land described in paragraph 5 of the
amended complaint dated November 16, 1920, in relation with paragraph 3 of the agreed
statement of facts, and:
The corporation known as Sikatuna, by its agent, is hereby ordered to execute the required
deed of transfer of the land aforesaid to the defendant upon payment of facts, and:
The defendant Potenciana Guevara is sentenced to pay the plaintiff corporation a monthly
rental of P6 from April, 1918, to the date when the deed of sale of said land is executed.
Not satisfied with this decision, the plaintiff appeals to this court and assigns as errors committed by
the court a quo the following: (a) Its decree rescinding the contract in question; (b) its order directing
the transfer of the land in controversy by the plaintiff to the defendant Potenciana Guevara; and (c)
its failure to sentence the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20 from February, 1920, until
the termination of this litigation.
The following statement of facts contained in the appellant's brief is correct:
A contract of lease of portion of land situated on Calle Bilbao of the city of Manila of about
100 square meters' area, was entered into between the partnership Jacinto, Palma y
Hermanos, as lessor, and Potenciana Guevara, as lessee, which land is a part of the land
belonging to the said partnership covered by certificate of title No. 8651 issued by the
register of deeds of the city of Manila and which was presented as evidence in this
proceeding.
The said contract contained an option in favor of the partnership Jacinto, Palma y Hermanos
by which the latter, within one year from the date of the execution thereof, could purchase
the house of Potenciana Guevara built on the land so leased; however if, within said time,
the said partnership did not exercise such option, Potenciana Guevara would have the right
to purchase the land leased to her.
This contract was never noted on the original certificate of title of the land, of which the
portion occupied by Guevara is a part.
The time for the option having expired, without the partnership having exercised its right, the
defendant attempted to purchase the said land, to which the former objected; in view of

which Potenciana Guevara in April, 1918, brought an action against the said partnership,
which was registered as civil cause No. 16060, to compel it to sell the land to her.
Neither was any notice of the commencement of that action filed with the office of the
register of deeds.
While case No. 16060 was pending, the aforesaid partnership sold to the Sikatuna
corporation all the land, including the portion which was leased to Potenciana Guevara,
which corporation recorded the transfer in the registry, under the provisions of Act No. 496,
as a result of which, transfer certificate of title No. 8651 was issued to the said corporation on
May 25, 1918.
On July 15, 1918, judgment was rendered in case No. 16060 whereby Jacinto, Palma y
Hermanos was ordered to sell to Potenciana Guevara the portion of land leased to her,
which judgment was affirmed by this Court.
This judgment, however, was not executed fro the reason that, as already stated, the land
had been sold to the Sikatuna corporation.
In the original certificate of title of the partnership Jacinto, Palma y Hermanos, just as in
transfer certificate of title No. 8651, issued to the Sikatuna corporation, there is no record of
any encumbrance whatsoever upon the land except a mortgage in favor of the National
Bank.
From the time the said land was transferred to the Sikatuna corporation, Potenciana
Guevara has been in possession of the portion leased to her until, in view of the fact that the
said corporation needed that portion of land for its own purposes, and of the further fact that
Potenciana Guevara had not paid the rentals for the land to the new owner, she was notified
in January, 1920, to vacate the premises and a demand was made upon her to pay the
corresponding rents. Having declined to do so the Sikatuna corporation commenced these
proceedings against her for unlawful entry and detainer and for the payment of rents.
The first assignment of error has to do with the recission of the sale of the property in question,
made by the partnership Jacinto, Palma y Hermanos to the herein plaintiff. The court ordered the
rescission under the provisions of the fourth paragraph of article 1291 of the Civil Code, referring to
things in litigation. But as the appellant rightfully contends, the rescission of the said sale does not lie
in the present case because the property is now in the legal possession of a third person who has
not acted in bad faith. The second paragraph of article 1295 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the subject-matter of the
contract are lawfully in the possession of third persons who have not acted in bad faith.
There is no doubt but that in this case the plaintiff corporation has the character of a third person,
and it has not been shown that it had acted in bad faith.

This case has a special circumstance in that it deals with property registered under the Land
Registration Act, No. 496, section 79 of which provides that actions concerning properties registered
under the law shall affect only the parties litigant, unless a notice of the commencement of the action
is recorded, which does not appear to have been done in the case before us. There was, therefore,
no legal obstacle to the transfer of the title of the said property, and for this special reason the said
transfer cannot be rescinded.
The second and third assignments of error are the result of the first.
We hold that the errors assigned by the appellant to the judgment appealed from have been
committed.
Wherefore, the said judgment is reversed and the defendants ordered to vacate the land in
controversy and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P132 as rents, corresponding to the period from April,
1918, to January, 1920, inclusive, and the further sum of P20 per month from February, 1920, until
the property is actually vacated, and to pay the costs of this instance. So ordered.

G.R. No. 102881 December 7, 1992

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR. and SUN VALLEY
MANUFACTURING & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Even communication exchanges between and among APT, Toyota & Sun Valley show that the
parties are certainly aware that the ownership of the disputed property more properly pertains to Sun
Valley.
There is therefore sufficient and convincing proof that Sun Valley has a clear legal right to
possession in its favor to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary/mandatory injunction. Sun
Valley's TCT gives it that right to possession. On the other hand, Toyota has not established its right
over the said property except for the assertion that there was a mistake in an instrument which
purportedly should have included the questioned strip of land.
As between the two (2) parties, Sun Valley has a better right. Under the circumstances, therefore,
and considering that the clear legal right of Toyota to possession of the disputed area has not been
established sufficient to grant the prayed for relief, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may be
issued pendente lite. (See Mara, Inc. v. Estrella, 65 SCRA 471 [1975]; De Gracia v. Santos, 79 Phil.
365 [1947]; Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225 [1946] and Torre v. Querubin, 101 Phil. 53 [1957])
In view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSE