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PhilosophyandCognitiveScience

Aristotle,Connectionism,andtheMorallyExcellentBrain
DavidDeMoss
PacificUniversity
demossdj@pacificu.edu
ABSTRACT: Can a mass of networked neurons produce moral human
agents? I shall argue that it can a brain can be morally excellent. A
connectionistaccountofhowthebrainworkscanexplainhowapersonmight
be morally excellent in Aristotle's sense of the term. According to
connectionism,thebrainisamazeofinterconnectionstrainedtorecognizeand
respondtopatternsofstimulation.AccordingtoAristotle,amorallyexcellent
humanisapracticallywisepersontrainedingoodhabits.WhatanAristotelian
theory of ethics and a connectionist theory of mind have in common is the
assumption that the successful mind/brain has the disposition to behave
appropriately in appropriate circumstances. According to Aristotle, the good
person knows the right end, desires and chooses to pursue it, and recognizes
therightmeanstoit.Thusthegoodperson'sbrainmustbeabletoformcertain
moral concepts, develop appropriate behavioral dispositions, and learn
practical reasoning skills. I shall argue that this collection of the brain's
cognitive capacities is best accounted for by a connectionist theory of the
mind/brain. The human condition is both material and moral we are brain
controlled bodies with ethical values. My essay seeks to understand the
relationshipbetweenourbrainsandourvalues,betweenhowthebrainworks
andhowwemakemoraldecisions.

How can the brain be a mind, a conscious person? Recently, some philosophers have
argued that human consciousness and cognitive activity, including even our moral
cognition and behavior, can best be explained using a connectionist or neural network
modelofthebrain(seeChurchland1995Dennett1991and1996). (1)Isthisright?Cana
massofnetworkedneuronsproducemoralhumanagents?Ishallarguethatitcanabrain
canbemorallyexcellent.Aconnectionistaccountofhowthebrainworkscanexplainhow
apersonmightbemorallyexcellentinAristotle'ssenseofthatterm.
1.Connectionism
Thebrainreceivesinputandsomehowtransformsitintooutput.Howdoesitdoit?Inpart
because of the extraordinary technological feats achieved using digital processing
computers,thebrainhasoftenbeeninterpretedasasymbolmanipulatoranditscognitive
activitiesasthetransformationofsymbolsaccordingtorules.Bycontrast,recentsuccesses
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with parallel distributed processing computers have encouraged a connectionisttheoryof

mind which regards the brain as a pattern recognizer and its cognitive activities as the
transformationofneuronalactivationpatternshowever,thesepatterntransformationsare
not rulegoverned processes, but straightforwardly causal processes in which networked
units(neurons)exciteandinhibiteachother'sactivationlevel.Thekeytotheconnectionist
theoryistheneuralnetwork.Thenetworksarelayeredsuchthatonesetofunitsreceives
theinputstimulationandresetsitspatternofactivationlevelssomesetofinbetween or
"hidden" units receives as input the activation pattern of the first set of units this set of
hidden units in turn resets its activation pattern and stimulates the next level of hidden
unitsthisprocessofactivationpatterntransformationcontinuesuntilthesetofoutputunits
resets itself accordingly and thereby sends the signal for whatever action is appropriate.
The brain, then, is like a vector transformer exchanging one pattern of stimulation for
another.
Churchland (1995) offers numerous examples of the brain's power to recognize patterns.
Recognition of tastes, colors, and smells are all cases of the brain's receiving patterns of
activation from stimulated sense organs, transforming those patterns by filtering them
throughlayersofhiddenunits,andfeedingthosepatternstootherneuralnetstoproducean
appropriate output. Vectoral transformations at the level of hidden units are the key to
categorization.Suchtransformationsatanygivenlevelareproducedaseachcell'sdegree
of activation is altered as a function of the stimulation it receives from each cell at the
previous level together with its own adjustable synaptic connection "weight." It is the
adjustable weights that make learning new categories possible, for reconfigured weights
produceanewinputoutputfunction.
Aconnectionistsystemlearnsbyadjustingitsweights.Changingtheweightschangesthe
activation patterns produced at all levels, particularly the output level. Connectionist
systems have been successfully trained in this way to recognize faces, words, and even
mines on the ocean floor. In each case, the system's weights must be slightly readjusted
numerous times to correct for output errors until it produces the appropriate inputoutput
function. This method is called backpropagation as it uses a specialized computing rule
(thegeneralizeddeltarule)topropagatetheerrormeasurethatiscalculatedattheoutput
units back through the network, thereby altering the weights. (2) Human brains probably
don'tworkexactlylikethis,buttheyarechockfullofrecurrentpathwaysinthemazeof
neuralconnectionswhichwouldmake possible some analogous learning procedure. Like
brains,connectionistsystemstrainedinthisway,notonlyrecognizetherightfaceorright
word when they "see" it, they are also able to recognize new faces (that is, new
presentationsofoldfaces)ornewwordsnotintheoriginaltrainingset,andtorecognize
previouslyencounteredfacesorwordswhoseinputsaresignificantlydegraded.
In other words, connectionist systems can generalize or categorize on the basis of
similarities. "There is a fairly clear sense," argue Bechtel and Abrahamsen, "in which
connectionistnetworksaremakingsimilarityjudgments:thesimilaritystructureisimplicit
in the weight matrix. The weights are the means of treating similar inputs similarly." (3)
Andtheweights,onceset,determinestablepatternsofactivationwithinthelocalnetwork.
Perhapsconceptscanbeviewedasstablepatternsofactivationacrossanensembleofunits
which determine further processing. (4) Indeed, analysis of the weight configurations and
activation patterns of trained connectionist systems reveals that the multidimensioned
space defined by stabilized middle layer activation patterns is partitioned into categories
centered on prototypical cases (the prototypes are defined by taking an average of the
activationpatternsproducedbyallrelevantcasesinthetrainingset.)Forexample,in the
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facial recognition system the hidden layer activation patterns for male and female faces
divide themselves along gender lines into two identifiable groups which cluster around
prototypesforamaleandafemaleface,respectively.Anotherconnectionistsystemtrained
toreadaloudfromtheprintedpageneatly,andasanaturalresultofthebackpropagation
training,separatesvowelsfromconsonantsinitsmiddlelayeractivationspace.(5)
We may say, then, that the networks in both brains and artificial connectionist systems
generalizeconceptsastheylearnbyreconfiguringtheirneuronalweights.Andsince
representations on hidden units result from the system's attempt to
accommodatetoitsenvironment...,[this]learningprocedurealsogivesthe
networkagoal:maximizingthefitofitsstatestothoseoftheenvironment(by
minimizing error in producing outputs to inputs). Thus a teleological
component is added. As a result, the representations developedinthehidden
units subserve goals, and so can be thought of as representing information
aboutthingsexternaltothesystemforthesystem.Hence,theserepresentations
areabouttheentitiessupplyingtheinput.(6)
BechtelandAbrahamsenheresuggestthattheactivationpatternsofthehiddenunitsina
trainedconnectionistsystemareintentionalstates,forsuchrepresentationsareproducedby
thesysteminorderforthesystemtopursueitsends.
Wemayconcludethatsinceaconnectionistsystemiscapableofhavingconceptsrelevant
to the achievement of its ends, ends the system is disposed to pursue under appropriate
circumstances,thenthebrain,asconnectionistsystem,hassomeoftheabilitiesrequiredof
a system capable of moral excellence. For according to Aristotle, the morally excellent
personmusthavesomecognitivegraspoftheendaswellasadisposition to pursue that
end. Aristotle also insists that moral excellence involves practical wisdom, the ability to
recognizewhatneedstobedoneinordertoachieveone'sendsinvariouscircumstances.
As we shall see, connectionist systems are also capable of matching means to ends, of
modifyingtheirownbehavioraloutputrelativetothedemandsofaperceivedsituation. (7)
InthisparagraphIhaveintroducedthemainargumentofmyessay,whichwillbefurther
developed in section three. However, I must first sketch some more details of Aristotle's
ethicalsystem.
2.AristotelianEthics
Aristotlearguesthatthegoodpersonisbothpracticallywiseandmorallyexcellent.Moral
excellence is a state of character in which one desires and chooses to pursue appropriate
ethical ends or goals. Practical wisdom involves the rational capacity to deliberate well
about what means are best for pursuing these ethical ends. Given experience and time,
practical wisdom is teachable to the extent that practical reasoning skills are teachable.
Moralexcellence,however,isamatteroftheformationofgoodhabitsonemustbecome
disposed to pursuing ethical ends. This combination of moral character and practical
intellectareessentialtoethicalaction,fortheformermakesonedotheendandthelatter
themeanstotheend.
The practically wise person excels at deliberating, calculating means to ends. But
deliberationrequiresagraspoftheendasastartingpoint,whatAristotlecallsanarcheor
firstprincipleheclaimsthat"inpracticalaffairsthatforthesakeofwhich[i.e.,theend]is
a startingpoint." (8) I have argued elsewhere that, according to Aristotle, the process
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through which one may acquire such ethical ends is inductive. (9)Good deliberation also
requires an ability to see connections between means and ends, between the particular
thingstobedone and the goals to be pursued. Such means/ends connections are also
startingpoints of a second kind, startingpoints for the induction of the end "for the
universalsarefromtheparticularsoftheseitisnecessarytohaveperception,andthisis
nous."(10)Nous,variouslytranslatedas"intuitivereason"or"comprehension"or"practical
insight," is the capacity to perceive particular thingstobedone as a means to an end.
Thus,thisabilitytograspconnectionsbetweenmeansandends,thehallmarkofpractical
wisdom, operates both in the process of induction to ethical ends and in the process of
deliberationfromethicalends.(11)
So ethical ends are startingpoints derived by induction, and means/ends connections are
startingpointsseenbytheperceptualinsightofnous.WhereEistheendandMthemeans,
here is how these two startingpoints would function syllogistically as premises in
deliberation:
1.EiswhatIshoulddo.[ethicalendstartingpoint]
2.Mis(ameansto)E.[means/endstartingpoint]
3.Therefore,MiswhatIshoulddo.[conclusion]
This represents the logical form of deliberation, even though real agents need not think
thingsthroughinthisformalfashion.Likewisewiththeinductionoftheethicalend,which
informisthesyllogisticreverseofthedeliberation:
3.M1(andM2,andM3,etc.)arewhatIshoulddo.
2.M1(andM2,andM3,etc.)are(meansto)E.
1.Therefore,EiswhatIshoulddo.
Inthiscase,theM'sin3arenotnecessarilyrecognizedasmeanstoanendthatrecognition
isrepresentedbystatement2,themeans/endstartingpoint.Statement3isathirdkindof
startingpoint, acquired by habit. Aristotle claims that moral excellence or virtue comes
aboutasaresultofhabit,thatwebecomejustbydoingjustactsthisiswhythehabitsone
formsfromtraininginyouthmake"averygreatdifference,orratherallthedifference."(12)
ThustheM'sin3indicatethecasesinthetrainingset,forexamplethevariouscommands
thatadultsissuetochildrenlearningtobejust.("GiveBobbyachancetoplay,""Don'thit
her, she didn't do anything to hurtyou," "Youhave to givehis ball back, it's not yours,"
"Youbrokethewindow,nowhowdoyouexpecttopayforit?")Althoughwesometimes
tellchildrenwhytheymustbehaveincertainways,weoftenasastartingpointsimplytell
them that they must so behave and then leave it to them to induce the ends as they
accumulatemoreexperience.(13)
Alongthewaytomoralexcellenceandpracticalwisdom,then,Aristotlerecognizesthree
kindsofstartingpoints,ethicalends,means/endsconnections,andparticular thingstobe
done.Thesethreekindsareacquired,respectively,byinduction,bytheperceptualinsight
ofnous,andbyhabit. (14)Byinductiononeknowstheend,byhabitonedesires(pursues)
theend,andbyperceptualinsight(nous)onerecognizeshowtoreachtheend.Ifaperson
is to achieve moral excellence s/he must have these cognitive capacities, as must any
connectionistsystemcapableofmoralexcellence,likeahumanbrainforinstance.
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3.ThePsychological/CognitiveCapacitiesoftheMorallyExcellentBrain
Aristotle's account of the psychological capacities of the morally excellent person is
compatiblewithaconnectionisttheoryofthemind/brain.Thegoodperson'sbrainmustbe
able:toformmorallyrelevantconcepts(byinduction)torecognizeethicalendstodevelop
appropriatebehavioraldispositions(byhabit)topursueethicalendsandtolearnpractical
reasoningskills(bynous)toperceivethemeanstotheends.Thiscollectionofthebrain's
cognitivecapacitiesarebestaccountedforbyaconnectionisttheoryofthemind/brain.
Wehavealreadyseenthatconnectionistsystemshavetheabilitytogeneralize categories
and then apply the concepts to new or modified cases. By reconfiguring its neuronal
weights,mybraincanlearntorecognizethefacesofmorethanfiftynewstudentsinjusta
few weeks time and then, as a matter of learned habit, my brain can produce the right
namefortherightfaceinavarietyofcircumstances.Stableactivationpatternshavebeen
established in the hidden units of my brain's neural nets. And this same training that
establishes the habits establishes the concepts. When the "Kari Middleton" category is
activatedIamdisposedtoproducehernameandgiventhecomplexityoftheconnectionist
systeminmyhead,Iamalsodisposedtobehaveinherpresenceinwaysboundupwithmy
categoriesof"female"and"student."Ifconnectionismprovidesaplausibleaccountofthis
braintraining,anditdoes,thenitmayalsoaccountformytendencytorespectmystudents
aspersonsandtotreatthemfairly.ParentsandteachersinsistedthatIsharemytoys,thatI
listenwhileothersaretalking,thatInotdeceiveotherstogainanadvantage,etc.Fromthis
trainingset,Aristotlewouldargue,Ihavegeneralizedaconceptoffairnessorjustice,and
have become disposed by habit to pursue the goal of behaving fairly and justly.
Connectionismprovidesalikelyaccountofthebrain'sroleinthisAristotelianprocess.The
morally excellent brain recognizes (by induction) and pursues (by habit) ethical ends.
Giventheproperstimulation,learnedvectorpatternsareactivatedinthehiddenunitsofthe
brain, and this activation is at once both a recognition of the goal and a disposition to
pursueit.
Aristotle also insists that moral excellence involves practical wisdom, the ability to
recognize (by nous) what needs to be done in order to achieve one's ethical ends. This
ability requires the identification of both an appropriate categorization of the perceived
situationandanappropriateactiontobetakentomeetthedemandsofthesituation.Aswe
havejustseen,foraconnectionistsystemtocategorizeasituation,evenanewone,isto
dispose itself to pursue a certain goal and to produce a certain output. In the case of a
relativelysimplesingletaskconnectionistsystemlikethefacerecognizer,thismaywellbe
the end of the story. Its end goal is to identify faces categorizing a face as Bill's faces
alreadydisposesittopursuethisendbythemeansofidentifying the presently perceived
faceasBill'sfacebutsincetheparticularmannerofitsoutput(wordsonascreenperhaps)
ispresumablyhardwiredandarbitrary,honingitsmeanstoanyfurtherdetailisbeyondits
ken.However,forasystemrequiringmotorskillsforinteractionwiththeenvironment,the
storymaycontinue.Initiallycategorizingthesituationmightnotbesufficientfortriggering
theappropriatemeansforachievingthegoal.
Supposeyouareacrabinsearchofatidbit.Youcategorizeyourpresentsituationas"food
for me off to the right," that is, you are stimulated into a neural activation pattern that
disposesyoutowardthegoalofgrabbingandingestingthefood.Butyouaren'thardwired
to display your categorization on a monitor screen, nor would you find that output
fulfilling. You need to actually grab the food and get it in your mouth before it moves
away.Thusyouneedawelltimedtransformationofsensoryvectorsintomotorvectors,a
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transformation likely to involve a variety of interacting neural nets generating complex

sequencesofactivationvectors.(15)Onlyinthiswaymayyourgoalbeachievedbymoving
yourarmsandpincersintherightwayattherighttime.(16)Thissortofmatchingofmeans
to ends, this sensorimotor coordination, is, according to Paul Churchland, "where
intelligence begins: in the brain's capacity for executing principled sensorimotor
transforms. . . . [and] this knowhow is embodied in the personal configuration of the
brain's synaptic weights." (17) Aristotle would call such intelligence or knowhow, when
appliedintherealmofethics,practicalwisdom,theabilitytorecognizeanddowhatneeds
tobedoneinordertoachieveone'sends,intherightmannerattherighttime.
You are no longer a crab in search of a tidbit, but an undergraduate in search of lunch.
Waiting in line at the lunch counter, you categorize your present situation as "ham
sandwichformeofftotheright."Youarestimulatedintoaneuralactivationpatternthat
disposesyoutowardthegoalofgrabbingandingestingthesandwich.Butyouhavebeen
readingaboutanimalrightsissuesinyourethicscourse.Youhesitateasanothercategoryis
activated, "suffering person nearby." Activation of this category normally disposes you
towardalleviatingthesufferingofothers.Pigsaren'tpersons,buttheyaresimilarinsome
ways. "Suffering pigs" begins to occupy a point in vector space uncomfortably near
"suffering persons." You find yourself stimulated into a neural activation pattern that
disposes you to not grab the sandwich. To thus extend a category or prototype in one's
moraldeliberationsistoinsightfullyperceiveanothermeanstoone'sethicalends. (18)The
undergraduate's imaginative connection between suffering pigs and suffering persons is,
among other things, the perceptive insight that certain particular acts are means to
previouslyestablished ends refusing to eat pigs is a means to alleviating suffering. This
insightintomeans/endconnectionsistheworkofnous,touseAristotle'stermandnousis
themarkofpracticalwisdom.(19)
Thustheconnectionistbraindoeshavethecognitivecapacitiestoachievemoralexcellence
and practical wisdom, in Aristotle's sense of those terms. It can know the right end by
induction,desiretherightendbyhabit,andperceivetherightmeansbynous.Intheend,
what makes a brain morally excellent and practically wise is the proper setting of its
neuronal weights to establish hidden layer activation patterns capable of transforming
similar inputs into similar outputs. That may sound too mechanical. But by filling in the
mechanical details, one sees that some of the capacities of the connectionist brain
machineryarejustthosecapacitiesrequiredfortheproductionofethicalbehavior.Thusthe
human condition is both material and moral we are braincontrolled bodies with ethical
values.

Notes
(1) Whereas Paul Churchland insists on accounting for the cognitive capacitiesandeven
consciousness of the human brain by appealing directly to the amazing features of
connectionist systems, Daniel Dennett argues that "even if we succeeded in explaining
[complexcognitive]processesatthelevelofsynapsesorbundlesofneurons,wewouldbe
mystified about other aspects of what must be happening" (1991, p.193). For example,
whatis unique about human cognition and consciousness is our ability to store and then
manipulateconceptsorideasasneededinaserialfashionhencehumanbrainsmusthave
the capacity to rerepresent the representations that occur in their neural networks. Thus
Dennett argues that "[c]onscious human minds are moreorless serial virtual machines
implemented...onthe parallel [connectionist] hardware that evolution has provided for
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us" (1991, p.218). This virtual machinery involves the "improvements we install in our
brainswhenwelearnourlanguages,[which]permitustoreview,recall,rehearse,redesign
our own activities, turning our brains into echo chambers of sorts, in which otherwise
evanescentprocessescanhangaroundandbecomeobjectsintheirownright....[W]ithout
anaturallanguage[acreature]hasnotalentforwrestingconceptsfromtheirconnectionist
nests and manipulating them" (1996, pp.155, 159). Churchland responds that Dennett's
virtual serial machine is an unnecessary level of explanation: "The fact is, there exists a
differentway,amuchmorenaturalandeffectiveway,ofaccountingforthewellbehaved
temporal unfolding of consciousness, and it has nothing essential to do with serial
computers or languagelike processing. The alternative lies in the dynamical behavior of
real (not virtual) recurrent networks, with their dramatic ability to generate complex
representationswithacontinuouslyunfoldingtemporaldimension"(p.267).
BothChurchlandandDennettagreethatthehardwareofthebrainisconnectionist.Dennett
believesthatavirtualmetamachinemustberunningontopofthatconnectionisthardware
to account for the sophisticated cognitive activity of conscious humans Churchland
believesthatfeaturesoftheconnectionistsystemalonearesufficient.IsDennettpositing
an unnecessary "higher" level of explanation? Or is he developing useful ways of
describing the intense complexity of the connectionist system that is the human brain? I
will be following Churchland's lead in this essay, although Dennett's alternative would
provideanimportantcontrast.
(2)ForasophisticateddescriptionofthislearningprocedureseechapterthreeofBechtel
andAbrahamsen1991.ForamuchsimplerversionseeChurchland1995,pp.4245.
(3)BechtelandAbrahamsen1991,p.121.
(4)BechtelandAbrahamsen1991,p.138.
(5)SeeChurchland1995,chs.34.
(6)BechtelandAbrahamsen1991,p.128.
(7)Matchingmeanstoendsisinpartaproblemofsensorimotorcoordination.According
toChurchland(1995),networkedsystemscansolvethisproblem.
The problem is how to produce behavior that is appropriate or intelligent
relativetoaperceivedsituation....Iftheexternalenvironmentisrepresented
inthebrainwithhighdimensionalcodingvectorsandifthebrain's"intended"
bodily behavior is represented in its motor nerves with highdimensional
coding vectors then what intelligence requires is some appropriate or well
tuned transformation of sensory vectors into motor vectors! What sort of
mechanismmightperformsuchatask?Wealreadyknowtheanswer:amulti
layeredneuralnetwork,withawellconfiguredmatrixofsynapticconnection
weights.(p.93)
(8)NicomacheanEthics1151a16.Translationsaremine.
(9) DeMoss 1990, "Acquiring Ethical Ends." My account of Aristotelian ethics in the
presentessayissupportedbyargumentspresentedinDeMoss1990whichinvolvedetailed
analysisofpassagesfromNicomacheanEthics.
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(10)NicomacheanEthics1143b45.
(11) Aristotle warns, "Let it not escape our notice that the arguments from the starting
pointsandthosetothestaringpointsdiffer"(NicomacheanEthics1095a3032).
(12)NicomacheanEthics1103b2425.
(13) Aristotle often stresses the necessity of training in good habits as a foundation for
moral growth he writes, "Wherefore the one who will be listening competently to what
concernsgoodandjustthingsandingeneralthescienceofpoliticsmusthavebeenwell
trained in his habits. For the startingpoint is the that, and if this should be sufficiently
apparent,onewillnotneedinadditionthereasonwhy"(Nicomachean Ethics 1095b68).
(Seealso1098a33b3.)
(14)Itisnotsurprising,then,thatAristotleclaimsthat"some[startingpoints]areseenby
induction,somebyperception,andsomebyacertainacquisitionbyhabit,andothersalso
inotherways"(NicomacheanEthics1098b34).
(15)SeeChurchland1995,chapter5,"RecurrentNetworks:TheConquestofTime."
(16)OneisremindedhereofAristotle'swarningthattherearemanywaystogowrongin
thechoiceofmeans.Onemustdotherightthingintheright way at the right time. (See
NicomacheanEthics1142b1628.)
(17)Churchland1995,p.95.
(18)Inhisbook,MoralImagination:ImplicationsofCognitiveScienceforEthics(1993),
MarkJohnsonexplains,
A central part of our moral development will be the imaginative use of
particular prototypes in constructing our lives. . . . Many of our moral
problemsstemfromquestionsaboutpermissiblemetaphoricalextensionsfrom
the prototype to noncentral members . . . . Our moral deliberations will be
aboutwhether,forinstance,certain'higher'mammalsoughttobeunderstood
metaphoricallyaspersons,andthereforeaccordedcertainrights.(pp.192and
195)
(19) See DeMoss 1990, pp.7273, where I discuss the nature of practical reasoning and
arguethatthe"recognitionthatcertainparticularactsaremeanstoanend...requiresan
imaginativeleap,aspecialkindofperception,nous."

References
Aristotle,EthicaNicomachea,ed.Bywater(1894)(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).
Bechtel,W.&Abrahamsen,A.(1991),Connectionism and the Mind: AnIntroductionto
ParallelProcessinginNetworks(Cambridge,MA:BasilBlackwell).
Churchland, Paul (1995), The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical
JourneyintotheBrain(Cambridge,MA:MITPress).
Churchland,Paul(1988),MatterandConsciousness:AContemporaryIntroductiontothe
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PhilosophyofMind,revisededition(Cambridge,MA:MITPress).
DeMoss,David(1990),"AcquiringEthicalEnds,"AncientPhilosophy,10,pp.6379.
Dennett,Daniel(1991)ConsciousnessExplained(Boston,MA:LittleBrown).
Johnson, Mark (1993) Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics
(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress).

PaideialogodesignbyJanetL.Olson.
AllRightsReserved

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