CHAPTER 9: SEN=S CAPABILITY EQUALITY

CONTENTS
[pp 226 B 249]
Page
9.1.
9.2.
9.3.

Introduction
Sen=s Theory of Capability Equality

226
227

Relevance of Sen=s Capability Approach for the CEOP Model

245

9.1. INTRODUCTION

Sen focuses on the fundamental diversity of human capabilities in his critique of Rawls's theory and any
other theories that assess distributive justice according to how resources are distributed without
consideration of individuals= different capabilities to utilize them. Sen proposes that a theory of justice
requires some notion of Abasic capabilities@ of certain basic things that a person should be able (or
enabled) to do. Basic capability equality would presumably then rank distributions of resources according
to how close they come to providing everyone with an equal level of basic capability. Sen=s theory is in
large part a response to Rawls=s theory of justice as fairness and as such provides some important insights
into the strengths and inadequacies of the latter theory. Of even more importance is Sen=s discussion of
the concept of Aequality@ which he subjects to an incisive philosophical and economic analysis. The
themes covered in this chapter are largely based on Sen=s book, Inequality Reexamined.1
Sen=s capability approach involves
Ajudging individual advantage by the freedom to achieve, incorporating (but going beyond) actual
achievements. In many contexts, particularly in the assessment of individual well-being, these conditions
can, I have argued, be fruitfully seen in terms of the capability to function, incorporating (but going
beyond) the actual functionings that a person can achieve. The >capability approach= builds on a general
concern with freedoms to achieve (including the capabilities to function). The capability approach points to
2
the need to examine freedom to achieve in general and capabilities to function in particular@.
1
2

Sen A. (1992): Inequality Reexamined, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Idem: p 129.

226

If one were to define an opportunity Aas the capability to make or not to make use of something@, then it is
clear that Sen=s Aequal capability approach@ is nothing but an equality of opportunity approach to
distributive justice, formulated slightly differently.3 The two references in the quoted passage to Agoing
beyond ...@ already suggest Sen=s belief that one=s set of available options is of intrinsic importance, in
addition to its instrumental value for the individual, irrespective of whether he actually makes use of these
opportunities or not. To paraphrase Sen4 in this regard: to starve is not the same as to go on a diet,
because, although in both instances one does not eat, in the former one does not have the option to eat
while in the latter one does.
In the next section, these and other precepts of Sen theory of equality are covered in greater detail. This is
followed, in Section 9.3., by a discussion of the possible relevance of Sen=s theory for the CEOP model.

9.2. SEN=S THEORY OF CAPABILITY EQUALITY

In Chapters 7 and 8 the theories of Nozick and Dworkin were discussed with reference to Rawls=s theory.
In this chapter this Rawlsian perspective is even more pronounced because Sen, throughout his exposition
of his theoretical model, clearly has Rawls=s theory in mind. Sen contrasts his capability approach with
Rawls=s primary goods approach and charges the latter with ignoring inequalities in the freedoms to
achieve in favour of equality in the means of freedom. This is so, because two individuals, with equal
bundles of primary goods may, because of human diversity, have very different freedoms to pursue their
ends, even if their ends happen to be the same. Sen argues that the equality of primary goods approach
cannot adequately deal with inequalities arising from the contingencies of class, gender, location or
genetics.5
These, and other criticisms by Sen against Rawls=s theory (and other resourcist theories of equality), are
discussed (in Section 9.2.1.) before I look at Sen=s theory of equality. This sequence will show more
clearly how Rawls=s theory differs in important respects from Sen=s capability approach, which is the
topic of discussion in Sections 9.2.2. to 9.2.6..
9.2.1. Sen=s Critique of Rawls=s Theory
At various points in the exposition of his capabilities approach to equality, Sen explicitly or implicitly

3
4

See Section 11.4. infra, where the concept Aopportunity@ is given a more exhaustive treatment.
See Sen (1992): p 52.

I differ somewhat from Sen on this point. Rawls=s first principle will deal with all of these except genetic differences, which will
be ameliorated through the difference principle, but admittedly will not be eliminated all together.

227

refers to, or uses as a comparison to his theory, the Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness. The main points
of his critique of that theory are summarized in this section.
9.2.1.1. Rawls=s Conception of Equality and Sen=s Capability Equality
Rawls=s two principles of justice strive for equality of primary goods, the first principle demanding
equality of basic liberties and the second promoting more equal distributions by trading efficiency
considerations for lesser inequalities. Since the level of equality is measured by an index of primary goods
rather than in terms of equal utilities for all, expensive tastes cease to provide a ground for getting a larger
share of society=s resources. Rawls=s justification for this is that every person is responsible for his own
ends. Sen criticizes this approach by citing the cripple who has a utility disadvantage and the fact that this
measure of equality [i.e. by an index of primary goods holdings in the application of the difference
principle] does not take human difference into account. The relation between a person=s capabilities and
his holding of goods is important, because, owing to human diversity, some will be better able to satisfy
their needs and conceptions of the good than others, given the same holdings of goods. Sen describes the
Rawlsian focus on primary goods rather than on the use the person can put these to, as containing an
element of Afetishism@:
ARawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of advantage, rather than taking advantage to be a
relationship between goods and persons.@6

According to Sen, a theory of equality should combine Rawls=s index of primary goods approach and
welfarist notions of equality, i.e. individual levels of need satisfaction must be brought into the picture.
Utilitarianism focuses on the mental state brought about by having or using or controlling certain goods,
while Rawls focuses on the holdings of goods without concern for the ability of the person to convert his
holdings of goods into needs satisfaction or happiness. Sen sees basic capability equality as
Aa natural extension of Rawls=s concern with primary goods, shifting attention from goods to what goods do
to human beings@,

and adds that while

ARawlsian equality has the characteristic of being both culture-dependent and fetishist, basic capability
equality avoids fetishism, but remains culture-dependent.@7

6
7

Sen, in Darwall (1995), pp 307 B 330: p 326.

Idem: p 328 and p 329.

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9.2.1.2. Individual Holdings of Primary Social Goods As Index of Social Advantage Or Position
The point of departure of Rawls=s argument for using primary goods both as all-purpose means to diverse
ends and one=s share of primary goods as the metric to determine the distributive justice of a social
arrangement, is the recognition of the diversity of ends and values present among different individuals and
our inability to weigh these up against one another. For Rawls it therefore follows that a comparison of
the resources available to us to pursue our ends, whatever these may be, is the way out posed by the given
value pluralism and multitude of ends. The assumption is that the primary goods should be of roughly
equal usefulness to pursue a number of diverse ends. Sen raises a number of important objections to
Rawls=s concept of primary goods:
Just as people=s ends differ, their needs also differ. From this it follows that people may need different
resources to attain the same ends, such as the person with a physical disability compared to a physically
unimpaired individual. From this starting point Sen argues that Rawls=s claim that the relative positions of
different persons can best be compared by comparing their shares of resources available to them is
defective. Sen identifies two sources causing variations in peoples= abilities to attain their respective
ends:8 (i) inter-end variations, which can be equated with the idea that people have different
comprehensive conceptions of the good; and (ii) inter-individual variations, that is, the diversity of
peoples= needs and capacities or abilities to attain their ends, given similar bundles of goods. According to
Sen, Rawls=s theory of primary goods takes inter-end variation fully into account but fails to account for
inter-individual variation.
Human diversity causes a wide range of difference in the capabilities of individuals to convert resources
into achievements and is so pervasive that it cannot be dismissed as exceptional or as hard cases to be
dealt with on an ad hoc basis. As Sen puts it:
A[H]uman diversity is no secondary complication (to be ignored, or to be introduced >later on=); it is a
fundamental aspect of our interest in equality.@9

In subsequent sections these themes will crop up again because so much of Sen=s theory is an explicit
reaction to Rawls, and as it was necessary to take notice of how utilitarianism animated Rawls in the
development of his theory, it is equally useful to know what in large part motivated Sen.
9.2.2. Introduction to Sen=s Theory of Capability Equality

8
9

Sen (1992): p 85.

Idem: p xi.

229

Having provided a brief exposition of Sen=s main objections to Rawls=s theory, I now look at what Sen
proposes in its stead as a more satisfactory account of equality. Sen proposes what he calls the capabilities
approach. This approach focuses on the extent of freedom to pursue ends rather than just on the means to
freedom [the latter being associated with Rawls]. The extent of a person=s freedom is a function of his
Acapability set@,10 which in turn is defined by Sen as the individual=s set of Afunctionings@ he can achieve,
given the resources available to him, his needs and physical and mental abilities. A Afunctioning@ can be
anything from being healthy, being happy, having self-respect, taking part in one=s community and so
on.11 So conceived, functionings are states of being that a person has reason to value. The extent of an
individual=s freedom then, is the size of his capability set, that is, the set of functionings he is in a position
to achieve.
Of course, as a world-renowned development economist,12 Sen=s concerns cover a much wider field than
equal basic human capacities which is the topic of this research.13 However, it may be instructive to
briefly digress to Sen=s work on development as freedom,14 in order to appreciate how he uses a
conception of freedom as both an end and as a means to developing societies. Sen distinguishes between
two roles that freedom plays in the person=s life, namely what he calls, the constitutive role and the
instrumental role. The former=s role in development economic terms, he describes as follows:
AThe constitutive role of freedom relates to the importance of substantive freedom in enriching human life.
The substantive freedoms include elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations as
starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the freedoms that are
associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so
on. In this constitutive perspective, development involves expansion of these and other basic freedoms.
Development, in this view, is the process of expanding human freedoms, and the assessment of devel10
11
12
13
14

Sen (1992): pp 33 B 34; and 40.

Idem: p 39.
Sen received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1998.
Also see Section 9.2.6. in which an application is given as an example of Sen=s idea of development as freedom.
Sen A. (1999): Development as Freedom, New York: Random House.

230

opment has to be informed by this consideration.@

15

Sen (1999): p 36.

231

15

Under instrumental freedoms Sen lists the following:16 (1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3)
social opportunities, (4) transparency guarantees and (5) protective security. According to Sen, these
ends of development also act as means towards development. In this way the constitutive and the
instrumental roles of freedom reinforce each other:
AThe intrinsic importance of human freedom as the preeminent objective of development has to be
16

Sen (1999): p 38. My concern being much narrower than the role of freedom in development economics, I do not discuss these
instrumental freedoms in the text. Sen briefly explicates what he means by each as follows (Idem: pp 38 B 40): A(i) Political freedoms,
broadly conceived (including what are called civil rights), refer to the opportunities that people have to determine who should govern and on
what principles, and also include the possibility to scrutinize and criticize authorities, to have freedom of political expression and an
uncensored press, to enjoy the freedom to choose between different political parties, and so on. They include the political entitlements
associated with democracies in the broadest sense (encompassing opportunities of political dialogue, dissent and critique as well as voting
rights and participatory selection of legislators and executives). (ii) Economic facilities refer to the opportunities that individuals respectively
enjoy to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or exchange. The economic entitlements that a person
has will depend on the resources owned or available for use as well as on conditions of exchange, such as relative prices and the working of
the markets. Insofar as the process of economic development increases the income and wealth of a country, they are reflected in
corresponding enhancement of economic entitlements of the population. It should be obvious that in the relation between national income
and wealth, on the one hand, and the economic entitlements of individuals (or families), on the other, distributional considerations are
important, in addition to aggregative ones. How the additional incomes generated are distributed will clearly make a difference. The
availability and access to finance can be a crucial influence on the economic entitlements that economic agents are practically able to secure.
This applies all the way from large enterprises (in which hundreds of thousands of people may work) to tiny establishments that are run on
micro credit. A credit crunch, for example, can severely affect the economic entitlements that rely on such credit. (iii) Social opportunities
refer to the arrangements that society makes for education, health care and so on, which influence the individuals substantive freedom to
live better. These facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoiding preventable
morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and political activities. For example, illiteracy can
be a major barrier to participation in economic activities that require production according to specification or demand strict quality control
(as globalized trade increasingly does). Similarly, political participation may be hindered by the inability to read newspapers or to
communicate in writing with others involved in political activities. I turn now to the fourth category. In social interactions, individuals deal
with one another on the basis of some presumption of what they are being offered and what they can expect to get. In this sense, the society
operates on some basic presumption of trust. (iv) Transparency guarantees deal with the need for openness that people can expect: the
freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity. When that trust is seriously violated, the lives of many
peopleCboth direct parties and third partiesCmay be adversely affected by the lack of openness. Transparency guarantees (including the
right to disclosure) can thus be an important category of instrumental freedom. These guarantees have a clear instrumental role in preventing
corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings. (v) Finally, no matter how well an economic system operates, some people can
be typically on the verge of vulnerability and can actually succumb to great deprivation as a result of material changes that adversely affect
their lives. Protective security is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the affected population from being reduced to abject
misery, and in some cases even starvation and death. The domain of protective security includes fixed institutional arrangements such as
unemployment benefits and statutory income supplements to the indigent as well as ad hoc arrangements such as famine relief or emergency
public employment to generate income for destitutes.respectively enjoy to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or
production, or exchange. The economic entitlements that a person has will depend on the resources owned or available for use as well as on
conditions of exchange, such as relative prices and the working of the markets. Insofar as the process of economic development increases the
income and wealth of a country, they are reflected in corresponding enhancement of economic entitlements of the population. It should be
obvious that in the relation between national income and wealth, on the one hand, and the economic entitlements of individuals (or families),
on the other, distributional considerations are important, in addition to aggregative ones. How the additional incomes generated are
distributed will clearly make a difference. The availability and access to finance can be a crucial influence on the economic entitlements that
economic agents are practically able to secure. This applies all the way from large enterprises (in which hundreds of thousands of people
may work) to tiny establishments that are run on micro credit. A credit crunch, for example, can severely affect the economic entitlements
that rely on such credit. Social opportunities refer to the arrangements that society makes for education, health care and so on, which
influence the individuals substantive freedom to live better. These facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as
living a healthy life and avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and
political activities. For example, illiteracy can be a major barrier to participation in economic activities that require production according to
specification or demand strict quality control (as globalized trade increasingly does). Similarly, political participation may be hindered by
the inability to read newspapers or to communicate in writing with others involved in political activities. I turn now to the fourth category. In
social interactions, individuals deal with one another on the basis of some presumption of what they are being offered and what they can
expect to get. In this sense, the society operates on some basic presumption of trust. Transparency guarantees deal with the need for
openness that people can expect: the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity. When that trust is
seriously violated, the lives of many peopleCboth direct parties and third partiesCmay be adversely affected by the lack of openness.
Transparency guarantees (including the right to disclosure) can thus be an important category of instrumental freedom. These guarantees
have a clear instrumental role in preventing corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings. Finally, no matter how well an
economic system operates, some people can be typically on the verge of vulnerability and can actually succumb to great deprivation as a
result of material changes that adversely affect their lives. Protective security is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the
affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death. The domain of protective security
includes fixed institutional arrangements such as unemployment benefits and statutory income supplements to the indigent as well as ad hoc
arrangements such as famine relief or emergency public employment to generate income for destitutes@.

232

distinguished from the instrumental effectiveness of freedom of different kinds to promote human freedom.
Since the focus of the last chapter was mainly on the intrinsic importance of freedom, I shall now
concentrate more on the effectiveness of freedom as meansCnot just as end. The instrumental role of
freedom concerns the way different kinds of rights, opportunities, and entitlements contribute to the
expansion of human freedom in general, and thus to promoting development. This relates not merely to the
obvious connection that expansion of freedom of each kind must contribute to development since
development itself can be seen as a process of enlargement of human freedom in general. There is much
more in the instrumental connection than this constitutive linkage. The effectiveness of freedom as an
instrument lies in the fact that different kinds of freedom interrelate with one another, and freedom of one
type may greatly help in advancing freedom of other types. The two roles are thus linked by empirical
17
connections, relating freedom of one kind to freedom of other kinds.@

It must be remembered that it is the individual=s freedom that remains central to Sen=s work. As this brief
diversion into his macro-economics illustrates, the individual and his freedoms remain for Sen the best
indicator of equality and as an index of economic development (rather than the more traditional indices
such as growth in GNP or increase in median annual income). My second purpose in diverging from my
central topic in this chapter, which is a discussion of Sen=s conception of capability equality, is to point
out that Sen, in a certain sense, provides the bridge between Rawls=s theory and the CEOP model. Sen
supports the resourcism of Rawls and Dworkin (although he is much nearer to Dworkinian equality of
resources than to Rawlsian primary goods), but Sen also goes much further by stressing a conception of
freedom that is sometimes indistinguishable from the concept of equality of opportunity, a conception of
which is central to the CEOP model. Having made the two points that Sen views the development of
individuals= freedoms as the proper concern for macro economic policies and development aid and that his
conception of freedom may be viewed as a variant of equality of opportunity, I now return to the central
focus of this chapter, namely Sen=s conception of equality as capability equality.

17

Sen (1999): p 37.

233

Functionings may be weighed in terms of their respective values so that the Asize@ of an individual=s
capability set or the extent of his freedom is determined by the sum of the functionings in his set weighed
by their relative values. According to Sen, the importance of resources is derivative: we value them
because we can convert them into goal-achievements.18
Sen denies that his objection to Rawls=s notion of primary goods requires or presupposes a particular
comprehensive conception of the good, as Rawls=s rebuttal of Sen=s objection suggests. Primary goods are
not constitutive of freedom as such, but should rather be seen as means to freedom, or as means to obtain
Asubstantive equality of opportunity@, as that term is popularly understood. The same applies to Dworkin=s
Aequality of resources@. Since means can be evaluated only by reference to the ends they enable the agent
to achieve,19 it is not really possible to evaluate means without reference to their ends. It is this insight that
enabled Roemer to show that Aequality of resources implies equality of welfare@. Since resources are not
valued for their own sake but in relation to the value of the ends that they yield, Roemer could make this
connection between resource equality and equal welfare20 by simply postulating that the only ultimate end
is welfare. Central to Sen=s theory is his notions of Afunctionings@ and Acapability@, which may roughly be
described as Adoings@ or Aactivities@ and Aopportunities@, respectively.

18

Or, as Christoph Fehige puts it: AMeans receive their life from ends. Being preferred, or being conducive to what is preferred,
is precisely what turns things into goods@ [Fehige C.: AJustice Beyond Desires?@, in Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (Eds) (2000), pp 253 B
276: p 275].
19

Brown argues that justice must entail an identification of the good and Athrough practical reasoning determine how that good is
to be pursued@ (p 145). For Brown, Ajustice must be derived from the good@ (p 146) [Brown A. (1990): Modern Political Philosophy:
Theories of the Just Society, London: Penguin Books] B this is of course radically different from Rawls=s conception of justice.
20

Roemer (1986): pp 751-784.

234

An individual=s position in society may be judged from two different perspectives, namely his actual
achievements and his freedom to achieve, that is, the real opportunity that he has to pursue his ends.21 In
turn, the person=s actual achievements and his freedom to achieve may be measured in terms of a
particular space, e.g. utility, income or wealth, standard of living, or other proxy measurements of endstates. Some approaches to the assessment of the desirability of social arrangements conflates the distinct
concepts of actual achievements and freedom to achieve. An example of this is utilitarianism that makes
interpersonal comparisons on the basis of the actual achievement of utility, treating the freedom to
achieve as purely of instrumental value.
There has been a shift away from the emphasis on actual achievements [as is done in utilitarianism]
towards the means to achievement [e.g. Rawls=s Aprimary goods@ or Dworkin=s Aresources@]. These latter
approaches bring us nearer to evaluating the freedom to achieve, because the means to achieve obviously
enhance the freedom to achieve. However, according to Sen, these means to achievement approaches still
suffer from a serious omission, namely that they do not take into account the capability to achieve of
individuals,22 and thus do not account for the extent of freedom.23 Given equal resources it may well be
that two persons= freedom to achieve as well as their actual achievements may differ, owing to individual
differences in their respective abilities to convert resources into substantive opportunities and actual
achievements. Differential conversion capabilities are not only brought about by human diversity, it can
also result from intra and intergroup relations. Sen puts this point as follows:
ABut it must be recognized at the same time that equalizing ownership of resources or holdings of primary
goods need not equalize the substantive freedoms enjoyed by different persons, since there can be
significant variations in the conversion of resources and primary goods into freedoms. The conversion
problems can involve some extremely complex social issues, especially when the achievements in question
24
are influenced by intricate intragroup relations and interactions.@

Sen continues by pointing out that

Ain the assessment of poverty involving the failure to achieve some minimal social functionings such as
taking part in the life of the community@,

questions relating to the conversion of resources into freedoms are of particular importance.25
21
22

Idem: p 31.
Idem: p 33.

23

A... but the shift is not adequate to capture the extent of freedom. If our concern is with freedom as such, then there is no escape
from looking for a characterization of freedom in the form of alternative sets of accomplishments that we have the power to achieve@ [Sen
(1992): p 34].
24

Idem: p 33.

25

Op cit: n 6. See chapter 7 of Sen (1992); and, more generally Putnam R.D. (1993): Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions
in Modern Italy, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Putnam compares northen and southern Italy with each other and comes
to the conclusion, amongst other things, that a well-established and flourishing tradition of participation in institutions of civil society
correlates significantly with socio-economic well-being.

235

Rawls=s and Dworkin=s shift from actual achievements to the means to achieve, as the appropriate basis
for interpersonal comparisons, is partly motivated by a concern for the importance of freedom. This
however, is not enough according to Sen, for
A(f)reedom has to be distinguished not merely from achievement, but also from resources and means to
freedom@26

and an index of Rawlsian primary goods or control over Dworkinian resources may be very imperfect
indicators of the substantive freedom an individual enjoys to pursue his ends.27
9.2.3. Functionings and Capability
Sen describes a person=s well-being, in an Aristotelian28 way, as being dependent upon the manner in
which the person lives his life, or his activities, what Sen calls his Afunctionings@. On this view, a person=s
functionings [his Adoings@] are constitutive of his well-being as a human being. His depiction of wellbeing is also strongly reminiscent of that of Dworkin=s idea of a life well lived.29 Sen defines a person=s
capability set as reflecting the person=s freedom to choose his Afunctionings@ or the freedom to choose
from possible alternative ways of living, and thus being reflective of the person=s opportunities of wellbeing. According to Sen capabilities relate to achieved well-being in at least two ways: First of all, the
freedom to choose one=s life options may be of instrumental value in achieving well-being; and secondly,
the freedom of choice may itself constitute a good and hence directly contribute to a person=s well-being.30
26

Sen (1992): p 37.

27

A... the personal and social characteristics of different persons, which can differ greatly, can lead to substantial interpersonal
variations in the conversion of resources and primary goods into achievements. For exactly the same reason, interpersonal differences in
these personal and social characteristics can make the conversion of resources and primary goods into the freedom to achieve similarly
variable. If we are interested in the freedom of choice. then we have to look at the choices that the person does in fact have~ and we must not
assume that the same results would be obtained by looking at the resources that he or she commands. The moves towards resource based
interpersonal comparisons in contemporary political philosophy (such as those of Rawls and Dworkin) can certainly be seen as taking us in
the direction of paying attention to freedom, but the moves are substantially inadequate.20 In general, comparisons of resources and primary
goods cannot serve as the basis for comparing freedoms. Valuing freedom imposes exciting claims on our attention claims that cannot be
met by looking at something else@ [Sen (1992): p 38].
28
AThe philosophical basis of this approach can be traced to Aristotle's writings, which include a penetrating investigation of 'the
good of man' in terms of 'life in the sense of activity' (see particularly The Nicomachean Ethics, I 7). Aristotle had gone on to examine--both
in Ethics and in Politics--the political and social implications of concentrating on well-being in this sense, involving 'human flourishing'@
[Sen (1992): p 39, n 3].
29

See Dworkin, in Darwall (1995): pp 190 B 306.

30

AThe second connection between well-being and capability takes the direct form of making achieved well-being itself depend
on the capability to function. Choosing may itself be a valuable part of living, and a life of genuine choice with serious options may be seen
to be--for that reason--richer. In this view, at least some types of capabilities contribute directly to well-being, making one's life richer with
the opportunity of reflective choice@ [Sen (1992): p 41]. On freedom generally, see his further comments: AThe perspective of freedom is
much associated with the important works of libertarian writers (e.g. Hayek 1960, 1967; Nozick 1974; J. M. Buchanan 1975, 1986; among
recent contributors). But an early argument for concentration on the basic value of freedom can be found in Marx's political philosophy, with
his emphasis on bringing 'the conditions for the free development and activity of individuals under their own control'. In Marx's vision, the
liberated future society would 'make it possible for me to do one thing to-day and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or

236

critic' (Marx 1845-6: 22). This is, of course, an overall view of freedom (what one can, everything considered, do) in contrast with negative
rights (what one is not prevented from doing) emphasized in much of the libertarian literature, on this distinction, see Berlin (1969)@ [Sen
(1992): p 41, n 8].

237

Sen=s concept of capability seems identical to the general idea of Asubstantive freedom of opportunity@ as
distinct from merely formal freedom of opportunity. By linking functionings to well-being, his conception
of what it means to live a good life has a distinctly Aristotelian flavour, also reminiscent of Dworkinian
liberalism.31 Sen argues that achieved well-being is not only dependent on achieved functionings but also
on capability to function [rather than capability to function only being related to the freedom to achieve
well-being]. In making his argument, Sen first draws our attention to the fact that
Acapability is defined in terms of the same focal variables as functionings. In the space of functionings, any
point represents an n tuple of functionings. Capability is a set of such functioning n tuples, representing the
various alternative combinations of functionings from which the person can choose one combination. Since
an important part of the force of the capability approach lies in moving us away from the space of
commodities, incomes, utilities, etc., on to the space of the constitutive elements of living, it is particularly
important to note that there is no difference as far as the space is concerned between focusing on
functionings or on capabilities. A functioning combination is a point in such a space, whereas capability is
32
a set of such points@.
The relation between functionings and capability can be illustrated by considering the case of two
functionings in a particular space. In Figure 9.1. on the next page the relation between capability and
functionings is depicted for a leisure-wizard whose focal space is happiness, which in turn, is determined
by only two
functionings, namely Aeating@ [Ag@] and Asleeping@ [Af@].
This gives us a two-dimensional space for happiness [because n = 2] in which the wizard=s capabilities
lie. His capabilities are constituted by three different sets of feasible functionings [that is, three different
combinations of different levels of sleeping and eating], depicted by A(f , g )@, A(f , g )@ and A(f ,
g )@ respectively. Put differently, the wizard=s capability set, AC@, can be expressed as follows:, C = {(f ,
g ), (f , g ),(f , g )}.
Sen=s second step is to point out that the capability set contains information regarding the actual
functioning combination chosen by the person, this being among the feasible combinations in the
capability set. And therefore
Athat even if we are ultimately concerned only with ..., achievements, not with freedoms (except
instrumentally as means to the achievements), the capability set can, in fact, still be used for the evaluation.
The capability set gives us more information than we need, but the chosen combination is a part of the
capability set. In this sense, there is a case for seeing the theory of evaluation of well-being in terms of
capability in general, whether or not the elements other than the chosen one are actually invoked
31

ACapability is primarily a reflection of the freedom to achieve valuable functionings. It concentrates directly on freedom as
such rather than on the means to achieve freedom, and it identifies the real alternatives we have. In this sense it can be read as a reflection of
substantive freedom. In so far as functionings are constitutive of well-being, capability represents a person's freedom to achieve well-being@
[Sen (1992): p 49].
32

Sen (1992): p 50.

238

(depending on the importance that is attached to the process of choice)@.

33

Idem: p 51.

239

33

Sen supplements this argument by also raising the point that the freedom to choose may be of intrinsic
value to a person=s well-being. In other words, the freedom to choose may, quite apart from the choices
actually made, contribute directly to a person=s well-being, otherwise than in the rather obviously
instrumental way of making available more rather than fewer options to choose from.34 On this view, a
person=s well-being is negatively affected if, even if he would have chosen functioning x at any rate, all
the other feasible options are removed but x.35 As Sen puts it:
A[I]f choosing is seen as a part of living, and 'doing x' is distinguished from 'choosing to do x and doing it',
then even the achievement of well-being must be seen as being influenced by the freedom reflected in the
capability set@.36

Figure 9.1.: Example of the Relation Between Capabilities and Functionings

34

The importance of choice in the value of living has been emphasized by several authors, including Aristotle [Nicomachean
Ethics, books 11 and V, in Ross (1980); and Marx (1844, 1845).
35

Sen makes a further point: AIt is, in fact, possible to represent functionings in such a way that they already reflect the
alternatives available and thus the choices enjoyed. For example, >fasting= as a functioning is not just starving: it is choosing to starve when
one does have other options. In examining a starving person=s achieved well-being, it is of direct interest to know whether he is fasting or
simply does not have the means to get enough food. Similarly, choosing a life-style is not exactly the same as having that life-style no matter
how chosen, and one's well-being does depend on how that life-style happened to emerge@ [Sen (1992): p 52].
36

Sen (1992): p 52.

240

Sen admits that using the capability set approach to assess achieved well-being may not be possible owing
to problems of information gathering, but contends that if this is indeed the case, we should nevertheless
opt for a lesser variant37 of this to the extent that the information is accessible, for even
Athe informational base of functionings is still a much finer basis of evaluation of the quality of life and
economic progress than various alternatives more commonly recommended, such as individual utilities or
38
commodity holdings.@

Neither Rawlsian Aprimary goods@ nor Dworkinian Aresources@ can represent the capability a person
actually enjoys. Rawls does not account for differences in persons= abilities or conversion rates of
resources into the freedom to actually choose and pursue their ends. Although he does not say it, this line

of reasoning may lead one to conclude that Dworkin=s theory, because it does provide for equalization of
circumstances (including those that impede the person=s conversion capacity) will fare better than Rawls=s
theory, in terms of Sen=s conception of equality. In contrast to resourcist conceptions of equality, Sen
contends that capability represents (substantive) freedom whereas primary goods represents only the
means to freedom.39 Rawls takes inter-end variation seriously [different conceptions of the good], but his
theory ignores inter-individual variation in the relationship between resources and the freedom to pursue
ends. This inter-individual variation may be due to human diversity, but may also be the result of interend variation. Rawls=s assumption that his primary goods are equally effective in promoting one=s good,
whatever this may be, does not hold because it ignores differences in conversion capabilities or interindividual variations. That is, that the primary goods are less effective means for the pursuit of my

37

Or, settle for observable functionings: AThus, in practice, one might have to settle often enough for relating well-being to the
achieved--and observed--functionings, rather than trying to bring in the capability set (when the presumptive basis of such a construction
would be empirically dubious)@ [Sen (1992): p 52].
38
39

Sen (1992): p 53.

Idem: p 84.

241

comprehensive conception of the good than they are for yours. Or even if you and I hold the same
conception of the good life, the usefulness of the primary goods in your pursuit of the good may differ
from the usefulness that I am capable of deriving from the same bundle of primary social goods in pursuit
of the identical good. Sen therefore rejects Rawls=s assumption that his primary goods are equally
effective in promoting one=s good, irrespective of what this may be. According to Sen, we must accept the
possibility that the Rawlsian primary goods may be less effective means for the pursuit of my
comprehensive conception of the good than they are for you. Freedom can be distinguished both from the
means that sustain it and from the actual achievements that it sustains.40 The crux of Sen=s critique of
Aresourcist@ theories of equality (e.g. the theories of Rawls and Dworkin) is that

40

Idem: p 86.

242

A[e]quality of freedom to pursue our ends cannot be generated by equality in the distribution of primary
goods. We have to examine interpersonal variations in the transformation of primary goods (and resources,
more generally) into respective capabilities to pursue our ends and objectives. If our concern is with
equality of freedom, it is no more adequate to ask for equality of its means than it is to seek equality of its
41
results. Freedom relates to both, but does not coincide with either.@

9.2.4. Equality
All political theories that have stood the test of time propose some form of equality of something,42 that
something being regarded, in terms of a particular theory, to be somehow central to human beings and/ or
society. Sen locates the reason for the ubiquity of equality in moral theories in a deep human need for
impartiality between individuals. If he is correct in this, the real debate about equality revolves only

41

Idem: p 87.

42

Sen provides the following explanation for this universality of the equality norm: AThere is a reason for this apparently
ubiquitous >egalitarianism=. Ethical plausibility is hard to achieve unless everyone is given equal consideration in some space that is
important in the particular theory ... While it may be too ambitious to claim (as some have done) that this is a logical necessity, or simply a
part of the discipline of the language of morals, it is difficult to see how an ethical theory can have general social plausibility without
extending equal consideration to all at some level@ [Sen (1992): pp 3 B 4]. Also see Sen (1992): pp 16 B 19, particularly p 19: AOne
consequence of all this is the acceptance--often implicit--of the need to justify disparate advantages of different individuals in things that
matter. That justification frequently takes the form of showing the integral connection of that inequality with equality in some other
important-- allegedly more important--space. Indeed, it is equality in that more important space that may then be seen as contributing to the
contingent demands for inequality in the other spaces. The justification of inequality in some features is made to rest on the equality of some
other feature taken to be more basic in that ethical system. Equality in what is seen as the >base' is invoked for a reasoned defense of the
resulting inequalities in the far-flung 'peripheries'. ... This greater importance need not be seen as intrinsic to the space itself. For example,
equality of primary goods in Rawls's (1971, 1982, 1985, 1988a) analysis, or of resources in Ronald Dworkin's (1981, 1987) theory is not
justified on grounds of the intrinsic importance of primary goods or of resources. Equality in these spaces is seen as important because they
are instrumental in giving people equitable opportunity, in some sense, to pursue their respective goals and objectives. This distance does, in
fact, introduce -- I would claim -- some internal tension in these theories, since the derivative importance of primary goods or resources
depends on the respective opportunities to convert primary goods or resources into the fulfilment of the respective goals, or into freedoms to
pursue them. The conversion possibilities can, in fact, be very diverse for different people, and this does, I would argue, weaken the
rationale of the derivative importance of equality of holdings of primary goods or resources.@

243

around the appropriate space for the operation of the equality norm, or what he calls basal equality.43
Classical utilitarians insist on equal utility functionings for all, welfare-egalitarians on equal welfare,
libertarians on an equal bundle of individual rights and Rawls on equality of primary goods that each
individual controls. The insistence on equality of one variable inevitably causes inequalities in other
variables, regarded as of lesser importance by the theoretical model. For example, focusing on equality of
welfare levels will necessarily entail inequality in the allocation of resources between individuals. Neither
can a libertarian theory insist on both equality of individual rights and freedoms and equality of incomes.
This is not to say that the welfarist or the libertarian will insist on inequalities in the peripheral variables,
such as resources or incomes, they may be quite happy to accept such contingent equalities, should these
by happenstance arise. However, should the circumstances change, they will demand that the equality of
their central variable should be preserved, at the cost of rising inequalities in the peripheral variables.

43

Op cit.

244

It is because of the plurality of individual characteristics, such as talents and circumstances, that the
question of which variable should be equally distributed among persons, is of such importance and why
unanimity over this question is so difficult to achieve. Part of a comprehensive conception of equality will
have to account for at least two types of diversity, that of human diversity and that of the plurality of
possible focal variables44 in terms of which equality is to be judged.45
Arguments against egalitarianism, relying on Amerit@- or Adesert@- based notions of distributive justice,
such as propounded by Afree marketeers@, are themselves egalitarian even as they decry egalitarianism in
general. The only difference is that such libertarian arguments employ equality in a different space,
namely that of equality of rewards for equal deserts, from the space traditional egalitarian theories select
for the operation of the equality norm. This, what Sen calls the Astrategy of justifying inequality through
equality@, is exemplified by Nozick=s entitlement theory, which Sen refers to as a Alucid and elegant@
example of this general strategy.46
Each theory of social justice has its own interpretation of Abasal equality@, that is, equality in some
individual attribute that is regarded as fundamental in that theory=s ideal of what constitutes the best
political and social arrangement.
AThe need for ensuring the fulfilment of basal demands, including basal equality, necessitates the tolerance
of inequality in what are seen as the outlying >peripheries=@.47
A theory may also include more than one basal attribute as being worthy of an equal distribution, for
example liberty and welfare.

44

AEquality is judged by comparing some particular aspect of a person (such as income, or wealth, or happiness, or liberty, or
opportunities, or rights, or need-fulfilments) with the same aspect of another person. Thus, the judgement and measurement of inequality is
thoroughly dependent on the choice of the variable (income, wealth, happiness, etc.) in terms of which comparisons are made. I shall call it
the 'focal variable' -- the variable on which the analysis focuses, in comparing different people@ [Sen (1992): p 2].
45
46
47

Sen (1992): p 1.
Sen (1992): p 21.
Idem: p 131.

245

There is always a measurement problem in assessing equality, even in the same homogeneous space,
because different measures are frequently equally plausible, producing different rankings depending on
which feature of basal equality is measured. However, all of these suffer from some informational
incompleteness and it is better to admit this and reflect this in one=s theoretical model than to gloss over
the fact that one=s model may never may able to capture all the relevant information.48

48

Idem: p 134.

246

Sen argues that the import of the concept of equality in general, including his equality of capabilities
approach, cannot be adequately understood without taking aggregative or efficiency considerations into
account. Equality is required to do too much work if it also needs to Aproxy@ for efficiency considerations
that can be better accommodated elsewhere.49 The demand for equality competes with other demands,
such as efficiency and aggregative considerations. Compromises have to be made and this should not be
seen as a move to abandon the egalitarian ideal. Social policies entailing some inequalities in terms of
some variables may be defended without disputing the relevance of equality for social justice. These
justifications for inequality may rest on any of a number of arguments. For example, it may be argued
that the wrong space has been chosen for basal equality and that another space is the more appropriate.50
A second line of attack against prevailing social arrangements may be, not to dispute the focal variable [or
Aspace@] selected for equalizing, but to stress the alleged conflict between the value of equality and
efficiency considerations. Thus, it may be conceded that inequality in respect of the variable in question is
unfortunate, but it is said that the benefits to be derived from the efficiencies engendered by those
inequalities outweigh the disutilities that will follow on the elimination of the inequalities. The general
trend of the incentive argument is that people need incentives to work harder, to produce more, etc, and
that this greater effort will lead to greater effectiveness, thereby contributing to everyone=s benefit.

49

Idem: pp 7 B 10. This seems to be an allusion to Rawls=s difference principle.

50

Sen describes the Awrong space@ argument as justification for prevailing inequalities, as follows: A>The wrong space= argument
takes the form of claiming that the variable in question (i.e. income, or capability, or whatever) is not the right one in terms of which equality
should be sought. It does not provide, so it is suggested (usually implicitly), the right space for the demands of equality. Indeed, in this class
of arguments, the need for equality in some other space may be inter alia asserted, such as equality of libertarian rights (Nozick 1974), equal
rights to enjoy what one has 'produced' (Bauer 1981), equal and impartial treatments in terms of some procedures (Gauthier 1986), equal
weighting of utilities in the aggregate maximand (Bentham 1789; Harsanyi 1955; Hare 1981), and so on. And because of these demands-including demands of equality -- in the other space, equality cannot be insisted on in the particular space in dispute (e.g. incomes, or
capabilities, or utility levels, or some other field favoured by the egalitarians )@ [Idem: pp 138 B 139].

247

To fix ideas, the move from welfare egalitarianism to resource egalitarianism to capability egalitarianism,
may by summarized as follows. A person's position in society may be evaluated from two different
perspectives, namely (i) his freedom to achieve, and (ii) his actual achievement. Likewise, inequality may
be evaluated in terms of actual achievement or the real opportunity (freedom) to achieve. These two
variables need not be congruent, since individuals= ability to convert a freedom into actual achievement
will vary depending on their innate abilities, dispositions, et cetera. In evaluating the social justice of a
particular community, it will therefore make a great difference whether we distinguish between
achievement and freedom when applying the equality criterion. Some social theories, such as
utilitarianism, focus exclusively on achievement while affording freedom only an instrumental value. The
exclusive focus on achievement is challenged by a shift of focus towards the means to achievement rather
on achievement as such.51 Since the degree of freedom persons enjoy is a function of the means at their
disposal, the shift from evaluating persons' social positions in terms of actual achievement towards their
command over resources, entails a shift from achievement to the means of freedom.52 The third shift, as
represented by Sen=s theory, acknowledges that freedom must not be confused with the means to freedom
and that there exists great diversity in people's ability to convert primary goods or resources into
achievements.53 From this it follows that Acomparisons of resources and primary goods cannot serve as
the basis for comparing freedoms.@54'55
This is so because capability represents freedom, whereas primary goods represent only the means to
freedom.56 Sen therefore proposes what he calls the capabilities approach. This approach focuses on the
extent of freedom to pursue ends rather than purely on the means to freedom [the latter being associated
with Rawls]. So conceived, functionings are states of being that a person has reason to value. The extent
of an individual=s freedom, then, is the size of his capability set, that is, the set of functionings he is in a
position to achieve. Functionings may be weighed in terms of their respective values so that the Asize@ of
an individual=s capability set or the extent of his freedom is determined by the sum of the functionings in
his set weighed by their relative values. According to Sen, the importance of resources is derivative: we
51

Sen (1992): p 33. Examples are the Rawlsian concern with the distribution of "primary goods" and the Dworkinian focus on the
distribution of "resources".
52

Idem: pp 36-37.

53

"Equality of freedom to pursue our ends cannot be generated by equality in the distribution of primary goods. We have to examine
interpersonal variations in the transformation of primary goods (and resources, more generally) into respective capabilities to pursue our
ends and objectives. If our concern is with equality of freedom, it is no more adequate to ask for equality of its means than it is to seek
equality of its results. Freedom relates to both, but does not coincide with either" [Sen (1992): p 87].
54

Idem: p 38.

55

"Resources are important for freedom, and income is crucial for avoiding poverty. But if our concern is ultimately with freedom, we
cannot -- given human diversity -- treat resources as the same thing as freedom. Similarly, if our concern is with the failure of certain
minimal capabilities because of lack of economic means, we cannot identify poverty simply as low income, dissociated from the
interpersonally variable connection between income and capability. It is in terms of capability that the adequacy of particular income levels
has to be judged" [Sen (1992): p 112].
56

Idem: p 84.

248

value them because we can convert them into goal-achievements.

Freedom may be distinguished both from the means that sustain it and from the actual achievements that it
sustains.57 Sen=s conception of equality will therefore require, not equal resource allocations, nor
equalizing welfare levels, but the equalization of opportunity, in a substantive sense of the notion of
freedom to choose, by taking inter-person variations in conversion capabilities into account. It is believed
that the model proposed in Chapter 11 captures this idea, if not at the individual level, at least in its
recognition that people must be classified in terms of the most important types of capability sets (to use
Sen=s terminology).
9.2.5. Liberty And Equality
Libertarian thinkers are frequently seen as opposed to egalitarianism because of their overriding concern
with liberty. It should not be inferred from this, however, that equality and liberty are conflicting and
irreconcilable ideals; the libertarian must concern himself with the distribution of the individual liberties
and rights and typically these will be done on the basis of equality. Opposing views on, for example,
individual liberty as against equality of welfare, are not expressive of a conflict between equality and
liberty, but of a conflict between different views of the appropriate basal equality. As Sen puts it:

57

Idem: p 86.

249

AIndeed, strictly speaking, posing the problem in terms of this latter contrast reflects a 'category mistake'.
They are not alternatives. Liberty is among the possible fields of application of equality, and equality is
among the possible patterns of distribution of liberty@.58

In Rawls=s difference principle the analysis of efficiency and equality are both related to individual
holdings of primary goods. The difference principle=s concern with efficiency considerations is apparent
from the fact that any change that improves the position of all, including that of the worst-off, is regarded
as an improvement. The choice of primary goods as the object of basal equality in Rawls=s theory implies
that the distributive patterns in other spaces, such as welfare, may vary owing to individual and intergroup
differences in persons= abilities to convert the means (primary goods) into achievements or well-being.
Likewise, the relationship between primary goods and the freedom to pursue one=s conceptions of the
good may also vary. As is the case with Rawls=s primary goods, the deficiency of measuring inequality in
terms of income differentials is that that method ignores human diversity in the ability to convert income
into individual well-being and freedom. Such inequality indices equate income inequalities with wellbeing inequalities, for these are
Abased on the presumption of the same conversion relation (between income and achievement) for different
people@.59
However, the transition from one space to another, for example, from primary goods to freedoms, from
resource holdings to well-being, is not that smooth. The relation between the distributive patterns in
different spaces is not necessarily, or even frequently, linear; in fact the obverse may be true, namely, that
basal equality [i.e. the insistence on an equal distribution in the focal variable] causes the inequalities in
peripheral spaces.
9.2.6. Development as Freedom

58
59

Idem: pp 22 B 23.
Idem: p 29.

250

Sen is one of the most distinguished development economists of our time. In this capacity Sen has
researched and propounded the virtues of assisting third world countries to develop their resources and
their citizens= capacities, rather than for developed countries to provide welfare handouts to developing
countries (or for governments to provide welfare benefits to its indigent and marginalized citizens). Yet,
Sen is accused by some60 of trying to slip welfarist policies in by the backdoor, so to speak. This
accusation of welfarism disguised as Acapacity@ is not without superficial merit, yet is nevertheless
misguided. It is true that Sen=s theory goes, in certain respects, further towards the welfare side of
conceptions of equality (as depicted in Figure 1.1. on page 31 supra), yet Sen declares himself opposed
to welfarist notions and interventions (as illustrated by the examples and arguments on pages 242 to 243
infra). How is this apparent anomaly to be resolved? The answer lies, I think, in the terminology
employed by Sen in formulating his theory of equality. The emphasis he places on Acapacity@ and
Afreedom@ indicates that he is concerned with the individual=s ability to cope with the challenges of the
environment B the Acapacity to achieve@ and the Afreedom to achieve@ clearly refer to attributes adhering to
the individual. In this respect, Sen may be regarded as an adherent of the Aristotelian notion of the good
life as a skillful performance and he exhorts society (and the international community) to provide the
individual with resources and opportunities to become self-sufficient rather than dependent on welfare
payments or workfare. Sen=s frame of reference compels us to conceptualize well-being as something that
has its origins inside the person B in a word, individual autonomy B rather than something that can be
conferred on the individual from the outside. Space considerations prevent me from investigating Sen=s
numerous writings that has this as a sub-text and I will provide but one example of this. But before the
example, one other point first needs to be made. Sen recasts substantive equality of opportunity in the
language of Afreedom@. This is not surprising, given his life=s work in development economics, for it is a
truism that without adequate opportunities and the resources required to make use of these, people cannot
be said to be free, in the substantive sense, at any rate. Sen=s conception of freedom may be reduced to the
proposition that freedom is a function of the range of things from which a person is capable of choosing
what he or she wants to do, coupled with the resources to pursue the elected option(s). One may formulate
this conception of freedom as a two-stage comparison: If Person
Options B, C and D and Person
be said that Person

has the freedom to choose from

has the freedom to choose from Options B, C, D and E, then it cannot

has greater freedom than Person , unless it can also be shown that Person

the resources to actually pursue any of these chosen options. It may be that Person

has

has the resources to

pursue Options A and B, while Person has resources only for Option A, in which case Person has the
greater freedom. This is nothing but a restatement of the difference between formal and substantive
equality of opportunity. Maybe this reductionism goes too far, for Sen does acknowledge freedom as a
separate good in its own right. This means that one needs to add to the freedom-as-substantive-equalityof-opportunity view the rider that the Senian conception of freedom includes, additionally, the idea that

60

E.g. Dworkin (2000) B see Chapter 8 supra.

251

the mere range of substantive options available to the individual increases his or her freedom, irrespective
of the individual=s actual choices. Applying this to the previous example, even if both individuals only
want to pursue option A, Person

has the greater freedom of the two, because he has two substantive

options while Person only has Option A as a realizable option. And this remains true, even if both of
them wish only to pursue Option A.
As an illustration of Sen=s emphasis on individual capacity building and empowerment I use his
arguments against unemployment benefits in favour of job creation as an example. Sen rejects the
assumption that the provision of high unemployment benefits can neutralize the negative consequences of
being unemployed (through compulsory income transfers from the employed to the unemployed). Sen
shows convincingly that this is a fallacy because unemployment has many disadvantages that cannot be
made good by providing unemployment benefits. Sen points to the following negative consequences of
unemployment:61

(i)

Loss of current output and fiscal burden: Unemployment causes a wastage of productive
power in that the unemployed are not contributing to the national product. In addition
state support for the unemployed and their families causes the aggregate wealth and
income of the employed to decrease as well because of the need for income transfers
from the employed to the unemployed.

(ii)

Loss of freedom and social exclusion: Even if the loss of income associated with
becoming unemployed is alleviated through income transfers, the unemployed are
excluded, or exclude themselves, from many spheres of social interaction and
participation.

(iii)

Skills loss and long-run damage: By not being in a position to exercise his skills the
unemployed loses his skills and indeed some of his cognitive abilities as a result of his
loss of confidence and sense of control.

(iv)

Psychological harm: Unemployment is associated with higher levels of suicide and a

decrease in motivation, self-respect and morale. Feelings of inadequacy, rejection, crises
of identity and meaninglessness are all associated with being unemployed.
Unemployment among the youth is especially damaging in terms of the individual=s longterm sense of being responsible for his life and his confidence in being able to obtain a
61

Sen A.: AInequality, Unemployment and Contemporary Europe@, in International Labour Review ,Vol. 136, No. 2, Summer
1997, pp 155-172: pp 161 B 165.

252

job.
(v)

Ill health and mortality: Clinically identifiable illnesses and higher rates of mortality
through causes other than suicide are associated with unemployment.

(vi)

Motivational loss: The long-term unemployed tend to become demotivated and passive,
resulting in acceptance of their status as being unemployed which leads to a cessation to
look for employment. This increases the proportion of people who regard themselves as
not being part of the labour market, rather than being part of the labour market but
unemployed.

(vii)

Loss of human relations and family life: Unemployment can be very disruptive of social
relations and may weaken the harmony and coherence within the family.62

(viii) Racial and gender inequality: As the competition for scarce employment opportunities
increases different racial groups can become more polarized as they vie against each
other for jobs. Gender divisions are also hardened by high levels of unemployment as
women=s entrance to the job market is prone to be impeded by extensive unemployment.
(ix)

Loss of social values and responsibility: Extensive unemployment tends to weaken some
social values and the unemployed may become alienated from the social system, which
they view as somehow operating to their disadvantage and marginalization. Social
divisions and a loss of social cohesion are the inevitable results in a society characterized
by high levels of unemployment. Dependencies and a loss of individual responsibility
and a sense of self-reliance, are all associated with being unemployed.

62

Idem: p 163.

253

(x)

Organizational inflexibility: Increased productivity through better reorganization of

companies and the introduction of new technology are resisted, if these are seen as
leading to increasing the size of the unemployment ranks. In situations of high
employment the resistence to unemployment due to organizational restructuring and new
technology is much less because the retrenched workers are likely to find alternative
employment. The converse is true in situations of high unemployment and this resistance
to organizational change inevitably leads to a reduction in economic efficiency and
international competitiveness63 and thus contributes to a further decrease in the economic
system=s ability to create new jobs.

(xi)

Loss of the skilled older worker: Under situations of high employment there is very little
resistence to raising the compulsory retirement age and thus to retain the skills of the
older worker. However, with high levels of unemployment it is politically very difficult
to remove or raise the retirement age and this, coupled with the longer life expectancies
of the population, increases the dependency ratio [the ratio between those who are
employed and those who are dependent upon those that are employed].

With the exception of points (i) and (x), all of the above arguments relate directly to the
individual=s capacity to develop as a self-actualizing and independent entity and the inadequacy
of unemployment benefits to compensate for this, in the face of high unemployment rates. It is
hoped that the above examples and arguments clearly illustrate Sen=s opposition to welfarist
interventions and the welfare state, as these are traditionally understood, in favour of
Adevelopmental welfare@.

9.3. RELEVANCE OF SEN=S CAPABILITY APPROACH FOR THE CEOP MODEL

The first useful insight derived from Sen=s work is that means have only instrumental value: ends
do justify means, it cannot be otherwise. From this premise it follows that an individual=s ability
to convert means into ends will determine the value a particular resource has for him. The next
step follows logically on the preceding two: if one wants to equalize resources, one needs to take
the person=s conversion (from resources to ends) capacity into account, and this may well mean
unequal resource allocation. The CEOP model endorses this view to the extent that it categorizes
individuals into distinct Aopportunity groups@, and, depending on the sphere of life in question,
63

Idem: p 164.

254

either requires differential resource allocations (e.g. in the sphere of basic education) or different
standards of merit attribution (e.g. in the employment sphere, jobs may be allocated in
accordance with the individual=s level of achievement, subject to efficiency considerations, rather
than the individual=s actual achievement), or both (e.g. in education different standards may be
set, subject to efficiency constraints, in addition to allocating more resources to the children of
indigent families).
Secondly, Sen recognizes that equality is only one value amongst a number of worthwhile
competing values, such as efficiency considerations. The CEOP model makes use of the same
precept by indicating that the distributive rule requiring taking effort levels rather than actual
performance levels into account, may be deviated from, if third party interests (e.g. the spectators
at an international sports event) or efficiency considerations (e.g. an important managerial job)
justify such deviations.
Thirdly, the CEOP model implicitly endorses the notion that not all goods are equally valuable in
the quest for diverse ends by specifying that the selection of variables must be sphere-specific, in
the sense that Variable A may be predicative of success in one sphere but not in another, or it
may carry less weight in one sphere than it does in another. Therefore the predicates of success
in a sphere (however this may be determined) may be represented algebraically as a multiple
weighted regression equation:

= aX + bX

+ cX + dX

+ .............. + nX

where, a, b, c and d through to n are weights, and X through to X , are predicates for success
in a particular sphere.
Fourthly, the CEOP model fully embraces the notion that it is better to assist individuals to
achieve the maximum freedom to develop themselves as independent, self-actualizing agents.
This the model hopes to achieve by providing resources to enable the individual to develop up to
the point where he or she has to compete with others for social goods on an equal footing, at
which point the principle of formal equality of opportunity supplants the operation of the
substantive equality of opportunity principle. The underlying rationale is that the knowledge that
at some point one will have to compete against others on an equal footing and without the benefit
of supplementary resource allocations (to compensate for one=s relative disadvantaged
circumstances), will act as a motivating force to make the most of the developmental
opportunities provided during the Apreparatory phase@ of life (i.e. that phase of life during which
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it is assumed that the person is not accountable for the consequences of his or her actions and
hence entitled to greater substantive resource allocations).
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Sen=s capability approach is really an Aequal
opportunity@ approach (he even sometimes uses the terms Acapability@ and Aopportunity@
interchangeably), and as such forms a bridge between the resourcist theories of Rawls and
Dworkin and the explicit opportunities approach embodied in the CEOP model. Like all equality
of opportunity conceptions of equality, Sen=s theory may rightly be accused of collapsing into
equality of welfare, if the line up to which goods must be equalized is drawn too generously. The
CEOP model guards against this risk by specifying that for each sphere a canonical moment must
be identified when it is assumed that an individual ceases to be entitled to equalization measures
(i.e. when the individual is deemed to be responsible and accountable for the consequences of his
or her actions B this moment may, of course, differ from sphere to sphere). Sen=s theory is
deficient in this regard in that it seems to over emphasise a conception of substantive equality of
opportunity while ignoring formal equality of opportunity, whereas the CEOP model uses both
substantive equality of opportunity and formal equality of opportunity. The importance of the
latter increases during the course of a life64 (in respect of most, but not all spheres B for example,
in the sphere of health, substantive equality of opportunity may best be described by a curvilinear
curve, having its maximum values at the beginning and at the end of a life).

64

See Table 11.1. on page 304 infra, for a summary of the CEOP model=s treatment of the formal/substantive divide over a life-

time.

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Although I am sure that this is not what Sen intends (for some of his sharpest points of critique
are reserved for welfarist notions of equality), on purely logical grounds his theory of capability
equality must collapse into a type of equality of welfare, because, if individuals= conversion
capacities are equalized, all that remains to differentiate individuals is their choices of equally
attainable ends. But is this construal of Sen=s theory strictly correct? Sen identifies two sources
of inequality, given a situation of resource equality between individuals, namely human diversity
(as a converter of means into ends) and human agency (as a chooser of ends). Regarding human
diversity, Sen will have us allocating different bundles of resources to persons to compensate for
their different abilities to convert resources into ends. But, assuming that Person =s and
Person =s conversion capacities are equalized by giving Person

more resources that Person

to compensate for Person =s lesser ability to convert means into ends, all that remains for them
is to choose their ends. Both Person

and Person will have an equal chance of fulfilling their

ends, subject to the provision relating to Sen=s second source of inequality (arising from the
choice of ends). Leaving aside this second source of inequality for the present by assuming that
their bundles of resources are not ends-sensitive (i.e. that these resources are equally valuable as
means to ends, irrespective of what these ends are), both Person

and Person will attain their

desired ends. Now in this resides some ambiguity, because it may be that Person =s set of ends
does not give him the same amount of welfare as what Person

derives from his attained set of

ends. If this is what Sen intended, then his capability approach does not collapse into welfare
egalitarianism. If, however, he intends that all should have an equal chance of reaching their ends
and that these, whatever these may be, should result in the same welfare levels, then his theory is
indeed a form of welfarism. Given Sen=s often expressed disdain for welfarist approaches and to
save his theory from incoherence, I accept, against Dworkin,65 that the first interpretation reflects
Sen=s true intention and that his theory is not necessarily a form of welfare egalitarianism
disguised as something else.
Sen=s second source of inequalities derives from his critique of Rawls=s, namely the latter=s
assumption that his Aprimary goods@ are equally effective in the pursuit of ends, whatever these
ends may be. Sen quite rightly points out that Resource may be more useful in pursuing End
than it is in the pursuit of End . Once again, Sen presents us with an ambiguity: does his

65

See Dworkin (2000): p 286.

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capacity equality approach require qualitatively66 different bundles so that if Person

End and Person

selected

selected End , their chances of reaching their respective goals will be the

same or should they be given quantitatively different bundles which are qualitatively the same?
Given that Sen=s conception of equality requires an equalization of individuals= conversion
capacities, irrespective of their chosen ends, it is reasonable to assume that he intends
qualitatively different resource bundles, if these are required by persons= diversity of chosen ends
(because some ends need different resources than others for their attainment). If this
interpretation is correct, Sen=s remedy for the second source of inequality identified by him, is
indeed welfarist in nature. If the aim of Sen=s conception of equality is to equalize the attainment
of ends, irrespective of human diversity in capacity to achieve ends, and irrespective of the
usefulness of means to achieve different ends, then his theory is welfarist, unless we assume, as I
think that we must, that equal attainment of ends must not be confused with equal attainment of
welfare.

66

One way to interpret the Ahuman diversity@ problem in the preceding text, is to assume, as I did, that the resources are equally
effective as means to attain all ends, and therefore that there is only a quantitative difference required to equalize the chances of persons with
different conversion capacities. At this point in the text we drop this unrealistic assumption.

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There is a third problem imbedded in Sen=s conception of equality as equal capacity, which may
point towards an identity with equality of welfare. Certain ends, if chosen, may indeed require
equality of welfare, if their attainment is to be equalized. For example, happiness as an end may
require vast disparities in resource allocation, if it is chosen by two people who differ greatly in
their respective capacities to experience happiness. A less abstract example may be the end of
self-respect or respect by others. In both these two examples Sen=s suggested remedy may require
the same inegalitarian distribution that utilitarianism and welfarist theories are accused of
permitting or requiring. Dworkin suggests yet a different way in which Sen=s theory may be
interpreted, namely that what should be equalized is the personal and impersonal resources that
people command and not differences in their capacity to achieve their ends which arise from
different choices and personalities. On this interpretation Dworkin is correct that Sen=s theory is
similar to Dworkin=s theory of equality of resources.67 However, I think that Dworkin is mistaken
in this respect. The metric of Dworkin=s equality of resources is the extent to which individuals=
circumstances (that is, their holdings of personal and impersonal resources) are equalized, while
Sen=s metric is the extent to which the probabilities of reaching their ends are equalized. Sen
works with probabilities while Dworkin uses resource holdings (as defined by him) to measure
equality. As such Sen=s is clearly an equal opportunities approach, while Dworkin=s is not.
However, it must be admitted that Sen=s theoretical model is biased towards substantive equality
of opportunity and that it may well be true that on a close inspection and on a certain
interpretation,68 his theory collapses into an equality of welfare approach. Nevertheless, Sen=s
comments on equality and on other egalitarian theories (pre-eminently his comments on equality
of welfare and resourcist conception of equality), are acute and thought-provoking, even if his
suggested model may be flawed by placing too much emphasis on the attainment of ends. Of
special value to the CEOP model in this respect (and as discussed in the preceding paragraphs),
is the awareness that, unless substantive equality of opportunity is tempered by formal equality
of opportunity, it becomes nothing but a form of welfarism.

67

Dworkin (2000): p 303.

68

See, for example Dworkin=s discussion on Sen [Dworkin (2000): pp 301 B 303]. However, Dworkin goes on to argue that a
proper interpretation of Sen=s theory will show that his is nothing but an equality of resources approach, disguised in the terminology of
Afunctionings@ and Acapacity@ [op cit].

259