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CHINA,PAKISTAN,AND THE
"TALIBAN
SYNDROME"
M. Ehsan Ahrari
The "Taliban syndrome"-the movement to create an
Islamic orderin Afghanistan-is likely to threatenPakistan's strategicinterests and domestic stability. Ideologically, this syndrome is a blend of strict
observanceof Islam based on Saudi Arabia's salafiyya (puritanical)tradition.
Social practices observed by highly conservative elements of the Afghan
tribes and lower middle classes of the Subcontinentallow virtually no room
for interpretationor deviation.
Islamic forces of Pakistanhave created and nurturedthis syndromein the
madrasahs (religious schools) of Pakistan,where the Taliban ("students"in
Farsi) from Afghanistan received their education. Since the chief thrust of
this education is on Islam and the need for jihad (holy war) to establish an
Islamic government,the Talibanmembersbecome firm believers and fervent
practitionersof this training. During the formativeyears of their exposure to
power politics of Afghanistan,the Taliban had to fight a numberof military
battles to reunify that country. This fact validated the emphasis on militancy
in these madrasahs. The "Talibansyndrome"also refers to the ever-escalating role of radical Islamists in the domestic and foreign policy of Pakistan
and other contiguous states. Since this syndrome recognizes no borders, it
zealously seeks to establish an Islamic form of governmentanywhere in the
region. For instance, if the Taliban remains in power in Afghanistan and
their allies in the sporadic civil war in Tajikistangain an upper hand, then
Kazakhstanand Kyrgyzstanwould have ample reasons to worry aboutpolitical instability within their own borders. Uzbekistan, despite all its fervor
againstIslamist forces of change, also remainsvulnerable. It is worth noting
658
M. EHSANAHRARI 659
HistoricalBackground
Precise figures on the total Muslim population in China are not available.
Informationreleased for the years 1912-49 listed it to be around50 million,
but data issued in 1990 placed the total number of Muslims at around 17
million, a result of migrationto neighboringCentralAsian republics in part
spurredby the influx of Han Chinese promotedby the government. According to RichardDe Angelis, the Muslim population in China may be divided
into two large groups:Hui-who are descendents from CentralAsian, Arab,
and Persian Muslim immigrants who intermarriedwith Han Chinese-and
Turkic Muslims of China's Western province. These include Uighur,
Khazak, Tajik, and Kyrgyz groups.4
Muslims of Turkic origin primarilylive in Xinjiang ("the new frontier,"in
Chinese). The area is in the middle of Kazakhstan,Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan,Afghanistan,and Pakistan.The landmass of Xinjiang is one-sixth
1. "Russia: Security Council 'Assertive' on Doctrine, Caspian" (in Russian), Kominersant
(Moscow), in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report/CentralEurasia,
April 22, 2000.
2. "Police Battle Terrorists in China's Restive Northwest," Associated Press, August 29,
1998.
3. John Gittings, "Chinese 'Brutality' Used to Crush Ethnic Dissent," Guardian (London),
April 21, 1999.
4. RichardDe Angelis, "Muslims and Chinese Political Culture,"Muslim World 87:2 (April
1997), pp. 151-68.
660
M. EHSANAHRARI 661
ilation and one of autonomy [that] resulted in hardshipfor the Muslims and
their continued mistrust of the Han administrations."6
In the early years after the communist takeover, during the relaxation
phase of the HundredFlowers era in the PRC, a numberof secessionist Muslim rebellions erupted. China's Muslims suffered atrocities during the CulturalRevolution in the 1960s. As a result, many fled to the Turkicregions in
Soviet CentralAsia. The Shadian Incident that unfolded in 1967 led to the
closing down of several mosques and burning of Muslim religious books.
This incident formed part of a larger attemptto wipe out what the government termedthe Four Olds-old ideas, old culture,old customs, and old habits. Muslims in China, like MarranoJews under the Spanish Inquisition,
"prayedin secret at home. Their children pursued their study of the Quran
with their imams (Akhonds)in the evenings." Despite the repression, even
the fasting in the Muslim holy month of Ramadanwas observed. Conflicts
between the Han and Muslims escalated when the latter were compelled to
eat pork. According to some reports,"abominableacts of anti-religiouscoercion were perpetratedwhen pork bones were thrown into wells in order to
pollute irretrievablythe drinkingwater." Official reportssay 1,600 Hui Muslims were massacred and 4,400 Hui homes were destroyed in July 1975.
During the rampage, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) "used not only
guns and cannon, but also air bombings."7
After the fall of the Gang of Four in late 1976, the Chinese Communist
Party decided to ease tensions with Muslims. A documententitled "Circular
of Rehabilitationto the ShadianIncident"stated that this incident should not
have been dealt with as a "counterrevolutionaryrebellion." The circularadmitted that the use of militaryforce was "wrong"and declaredthat "the many
leaders and the people of Hui nationalitywho were involved in this incident
should be rehabilitated." The Chinese government also provided economic
assistance to widows and orphans of this brutal phase. In 1987, the party
committee of Yunnan "rectified the previous records" and exonerated the
leaders of the rebellion "from being treated as counterrevolutionaries."8
Nonetheless, afterthe emergence of five independentstates in CentralAsia
in the early 1990s, many Muslims in Xinjiang Province harbor their own
aspirations of independence. Moreover, the success of the Afghan mujahideen against the former Soviet Union has palpably encouragedthe Islamist
groups of Xinjiang.9 The increasedpoliticization of Uighurs in Xinjiang has
6. De Angelis, "Muslims and Chinese Political Culture,"pp. 156-160, passim.
7. The preceding discussion is extractedfrom RaphaelIsraeli, "A New Wave of Muslim Revivalism in China,"Journal of Muslim MinorityAffairs 17:2 (October 1997), pp. 269-82.
8. Ibid.
9. John Pomfret, "SeparatistsDefy Chinese Crackdown:Persistent Islamic Movement May
Have Help from Abroad,"WashingtonPost, January26, 2000.
662
caused a great deal of concern in China. The PRC has sought reassurances
from the Khazak and Kyrgyz governments and signed several agreements
ensuring border security. Despite these agreements,the leaders of the PRC
leaders remain wary of the potential escalation of Islamic resurgence in the
Muslim regions of their own country due to the continuing civil war in Afghanistanand the political instabilityin Tajikistan. There have been frequent
reports of clashes between Uighur separatists and Chinese government
forces. The most notable clash was the so-called Pinavuanjie Assault in
1992. The Chinese authorities,like their Soviet counterpartsin previous decades, described this incident as a battle with gangster groups. However,
since the clashing forces were identified as Hui Muslims, one cannot rule out
that this event was relatedto the separatistactivities. A year later, skirmishes
and turmoil broke out in 12 counties of Xinjiang. There was also a reportof
increased clashes between Chinese security forces and Uighur Islamist separatists in Xinjiang in January2000.
In light of these recurringincidents, a classified circularfrom government
sources in December 1999 discusses infiltrationof "Islamist militants from
Saudi Arabia, Iran, other Persian Gulf states, Turkey, and India." Hence,
Chinese officials stated that "they have strong reason to suspect that the
Uighur separatistsreceive help from abroad." They also suspect that explosives used in terroristincidents in Xinjiang were Chinese made but originally
"exportedto Pakistan and then re-exportedto Afghanistan.'"1
M. EHSANAHRARI 663
664
M. EHSANAHRARI 665
666
Its RegionalImplications
Notwithstandingthe growing instabilityof Pakistan,Islamic internationalism
seems to be popularizingthe Taliban syndrome in Pakistanand the contiguous areas of Central Asia and Xinjiang. This phenomenon is based on the
notion of a Muslim Ummah. It de-emphasizessuch exclusivistic characteristics of a modern-daynation-stateas nationality,ethnicity, and tribalidentity.
The Talibanpresumes that all Muslim men and women are brothersand sisters in faith and that all must work together to improve the welfare of the
Ummah. This theological position is common to all Islamist parties sympathetic to the Taliban.
In describing this theological emphasis, it should be pointed out that nationalism and ethnic or tribal identities have not dissipatedfrom the Muslim
world at large. Muslim unity was a scarce commodity in CentralAsia during
the so-called basmachi14 rebellion. Since then, ethnic differences and
ethnonationalismare still very much alive in CentralAsia. In the creationof
Bangladesh,ethnic and linguistic differences outweighed the commonalityof
the Islamic faith shared by the people of East and West Pakistan.
Despite this reality, Islamic internationalismcontinues to be emphasized
by the most radical Islamist parties in Muslim countries. This philosophical
outlook was effectively practiced during the Afghan war against the Soviet
occupation. It was not portrayedas a struggle of people of a Third World
country (Afghanistan) against a militarily powerful neighbor (the USSR).
Rather, it was depicted as a jihad of Muslims of Afghanistan against the
communist infidels. In the lexicon of Lake and Rothchild, Islamic internationalism was used to escalate the struggle between Islam and communism.
The involvement of Pakistan and the U.S. was also an example of the same
14. Basmachi means "bandit,"a highly pejorativeand contemptuousphrasegiven by the Soviet occupiers to the Muslim rebellion that eruptedbetween the Russian revolutionand the early
1930s.
M. EHSANAHRARI 667
phenomenon. During the initial phase of the war, the Soviet Union also tried
to use the Soviet Muslims-albeit unsuccessfully-in its propagandato gain
supportfor the puppet regime of Afghanistan. This escalatory aspect of Islam did not work for the Soviet Union largely because it was used to justify
the communistinvasion of a Muslim country. The Afghan use of the concept
of jihad duringtheir freedom struggle against the Soviet occupiers later "became part of the mass consciousness of the local peoples in CentralAsia and
greatly stimulatedIslamic revival."15 This was a good example of the diffusion of the conflict.
Another aspect of Islamic internationalismin Central Asia-diffusion of
conflict-is the role of the Islamic Resurgence Party (IRP) that was formed
in the Soviet Union in 1990. Its primaryagenda was the promotion of the
common bond of Islam among all the Islamist parties of CentralAsia. As
one authornotes, the IRP "stood for the ideal of revival of Islam, restoration
of Islamic culture and the maintenanceof Islamic traditions." According to
this report,IRP leaders describedaffairs among nations as "the age-old struggle between the ChristianWest and the Muslim East."16 They considered
Islam as the only power that could withstandthe Western and Russian imperialistic suppressionof Muslims. However, in orderto be victorious, the IRP
promotedthe idea that Muslim people of the former Soviet empire must educate themselves about becoming "real Muslims." Hence, Islam must be revived or should spreadto regions where it is unknown. Aside from rejecting
nationalism and differences based on language and ethnicity, the IRP also
rejects pan-Turkism,Pan-Arabism,and Pan-Iranianismas threatsto Islam. It
advocatesthatMuslim unity should be based solely on the greatercommunity
of believers, the Ummah.
The IRP established close ties with the Afghan mujahideen,and these ties
only grew stronger in 1992 with the onset of the Tajik civil war. Even
though the ostensible end of the Tajik civil war in 1997 resulted in a setback
for the Islamist forces in Tajikistan,the cross-borderbonds between Islamist
groups remained firm. The currentgovernments of Tajikistanand Uzbekistan are fearful of the growing power of the Islamist groups as the Central
Asian populace becomes more fervently-Islamic. The authoritariancharacter
of these two regimes might turnout to be catalytic for the popularityof other
reform groups. An idiosyncrasy of authoritarianrule is that it equates political dissent with treason,thereby disallowing legitimate protest activities. As
the Muslim character of the Central Asian societies becomes more pronounced, this authorpredicts that Islamist groups will enhance their promi15. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modem Islamic World (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995), p. 277.
16. PinarAkcali, "Islamas a 'CommonBond' in CentralAsia: Islamic RenaissancePartyand
the Afghan Mujahideen,"CentralAsian Survey 17:2 (June 1998), pp. 276-84.
668
Chinese Anxiety
The theological aspect of the Taliban movement worries the rulers of China.
Their chief concern stems from the Taliban's potential for becoming a catalyst for an Islamic revolutionin the Xinjiang Province, whereby this province
would become anotherindependentIslamic state in the region. Contactsand
military training among the Taliban groups, the IRP groups of Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Muslim separatists of Xinjiang Province are widely reported. 19
M. EHSAN AHRARI
669
against Yugoslavia. China's chief concerns were over the war's symbolic
aspects. First, ethnic cleansing was carried out under the auspices of
Slobodan Milosovic's government. In my view, the rulers of the PRC must
have been constantly reminded during that war of the similarity between
Milosovic's brutaltreatmentof independence-mindedKosovars and China's
own treatmentof the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang and Buddhist Tibetans.
There are also some differences between these conflicts. The fact that China
is a nuclearpower forecloses the probabilityof a multinationalmilitaryaction
against it. It is conceivable that Western industrialnations could take other
coercive measures, such as imposing economic sanctions, against China in
order to resolve the Tibetan issue. A potential use of economic sanctionsunlikely though it may be-continues to remind leaders in Beijing of the
potential vulnerabilityof their country to outside pressure.
Chinese reaction to NATO's war on Yugoslavia was an interesting study
of paradoxand contradictions. During the initial phase of that war, the official Chinese press defendedMilosovic's "right"to mercilessly crack down on
ethnic Albaniansin Kosovo. An analysis of the Chinese response to the conflict showed that Yugoslavia was portrayedas an innocent victim. Some Chinese publications portrayed President Bill Clinton wearing a Hitler-type
mustache. But later on the Chinese press softened its criticism of NATO.
The Chinese governmenteven allowed some press reportsdetailing the plight
of Albanian refugees. Nonetheless, the governmentreportedlyissued circulars to various universities "instructingprofessors to be careful when they
denounce the NATO operation."20 However, the most direct impact of
NATO's war on Yugoslavia in China was reportedto be "the establishment
within the communistparty of two committees to draftrecommendationsfor
policies in Tibet and Xinjiang."21The recommendationsof these committees
are likely to be scrutinizedby the internationalcommunity.
In the interim, China may produce discreet demands on the Pakistanigovernment-which relies heavily on military aid and political support from
Beijing-to control the activities of the Taliban groups operating from its
territory. It is likely that China was forced to see the India-Pakistanconflict
in a different light. India accused Pakistanof actively supportingthe border
skirmishes with Taliban mercenaries. If India's accusations are true, then it
is a clear-cut outcome of the Taliban syndrome. Hence, Beijing is likely to
be more sympathetic to the Indian perspective, especially since it is concerned about the portrayalof its treatmentof ethnic minorities. During the
height of the Kargil dispute, China reportedly rebuffed Pakistan's former
20. John Pomfret, "Shift Shows Sensitivity to Ethnic Tensions at Home," InternationalHerald Tribune,May 8, 1999.
21. Ibid.
670
prime minister,Nawaz Sharif, when he visited Beijing to seek political support of that country's involvement in the ongoing conflict.
China will have to consider its crucial strategic interests vis-a'-vis India.
Given the increasingly intricate web of strategic interests that the PRC is
developing in the Islamic Middle East and CentralAsia, Beijing will continue
to be trappedbetween the many competing interests in the domestic and international political arenas. Notwithstanding these contradictions, SinoPakistani strategic ties will probably remain unaffected. After all, other
payoffs for China are too high to abandona nuclear Pakistan.
Synthesis
Islamist groups in Pakistanare directly responsiblefor creatingand nurturing
the Taliban syndrome. It is tempting to think that these groups quite wittingly created this syndrome so that they could use it for an Islamic revolution in the contiguous area. However, one has to be excessively charitableto
give Pakistani Islamists credit for being so farsighted. Farsightednessrequires cool-headed calculation, a pragmaticapproachto planning for future,
and a ready willingness to alter plans. Extremistsbelonging to any religion
or ideology have little use for these traits.
In all likelihood, this phenomenon was fortuitous. It happened at a time
when Pakistanhad a dictator,GeneralZia, who was also interestedin Islamizing Pakistan. After the eventual implosion of the Soviet Union, Pakistan
and Afghanistanwere alreadybeing governed underthe bannerof an Islamic
republic. One should ask why the Muslims of CentralAsia do not enjoy the
fruits of the Taliban syndrome. One should also ask why there is no cooperation between the Taliban and Islamist groups of other predominantlyMuslim
states of CentralAsia and Xinjiang. There are great similaritiesbetween the
Afghan struggle against the Soviet occupiers in the 1980s and the struggle of
the Uighur Muslims and their Chinese rulers.
Pakistanfaces a dilemma regardingthe Taliban syndrome. It wants to use
it againstIndia in Kashmir,but leaders in Islamabadare genuinely concerned
about stemming its tide within their country. These hard-line,jihadi Islamic
groups want to wage a military battle against India to solve the Kashmir
dispute. Domestically, though, these groups want to purify their society by
eliminating the Shias and followers of the Ahmadya sect. The educated and
secular-mindedPakistanis are increasingly alarmedabout the future of their
country. They do not wish to be citizens of a nuclear state where forces of
traditionand obfuscation are growing strong. The military coup of October
12, 1999, did not diminish the level of internalviolence or Islamic militancy.
At the moment, Pakistan does not seem to be in firm control of its strategic
affairs. As the Taliban syndrome gathers momentum in Pakistan's contiguous areas,Beijing is bound to demandthat Islamabadcontrol the activities of
M. EHSANAHRARI 671
its allies. An extreme scenario of a Taliban alliance with the Islamist groups
in Xinjiang might not be farfetched. Even if the Taliban are defeated in Afghanistan, the attemptedIslamization of Pakistan and its neighboring areas
would only slow down or be postponed. Islamizationis a politico-religious
phenomenonthat is based on Islamic internationalism. Whether a moderate
or a hard-lineversion of Islamizationmaterializesin Pakistanand elsewhere
in CentralAsia will depend on how the existing governmentstreat political
dissent within their borders. Equally important,the state of economic development of these countries will also influence the modality of Islamizationin
these countries. A steady pace of economic development, along with a potential lessening of authoritarianrule (which means increased tolerance of
political dissent), would enable the moderateIslamist groups to compete for
power and influence with other groups in the coming months and years.
Under such circumstances the potential emergence of religious extremism
promises to be minimal.
How China deals with these developments within the Xinjiang Province
will also affect the course of political stability and economic developmentin
that province. If the past behaviorof the Chinese leadershiptowardpolitical
dissent, that is, the brutal suppressionof protestersin TiananmenSquare or
the more recent suppressionof the Falun Gong religious sect-were to continue in the future,then Xinjiang Province would only edge towardincreased
political turbulenceand instability.