Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 145

SECTION 16

Soriano III v. Lista


399 SCRA 437

Topic: Commission on Appointments


Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality and
legality of the permanent appointments, made by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, of public respondents to different positions in the
Philippine Coast Guard and their subsequent assumption of office
without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the
1987 Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their
names to the Commission on Appointments (CA) for confirmation, all of
the said respondent officers of the PCG had assumed their duties and
functions. According to petitioner, their respective appointments are
illegal and unconstitutional for failure to undergo the confirmation
process in the CA. Thus, they should be prohibited from discharging
their duties and functions as such officers of the PCG.
Issue:

Whether or not the appointment in PCGs falls upon the officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which requires the confirmation by
the Commission of Appointments.

Held:
No. Due to the exercise of statutory authority of the President to
reorganize the Office of the President, the PCG is now under the DOTC
and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of
the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that
matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.

The clause officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain refers to military officers alone.

Pobre vs. Mendieta


[G.R. No. 106677, July 23, 1993]

Facts: These consolidated petitions under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules


of Court were filed by Hermogenes Pobre to set aside the decision
dated August 5, 1992 and writ of prohibitory injunction dated August
19, 1992 issued by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Corona IbaySomera, in Civil Case No. 92-60272 entitled, "Mariano A. Mendieta,
petitioner v. Hermogenes P. Pobre, respondent," annulling the
appointment extended by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
petitioner, Hermogenes Pobre, as Commissioner/Chairman of the
Professional Regulation Commission (hereafter PRC for brevity) and
enjoining him from discharging the duties and functions of that office.

The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of


Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At
that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner
and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of
the PRC.
Issue: Whether the president may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman
of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than
the Senior Associate Commissioner.

Held:
THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT CANNOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE POINT
THAT THE OFFICER LOSES THE DISCRETION. The Court finds
unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except
the position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by
"succession" or by "operation of law" for that would deprive the
President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and
Associate Commissioners "all to be appointed by the President"
under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion
for the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the
position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant.
We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he
deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of
the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of only
the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in
that agency. Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court
should so construe the law as to avoid it.

"The duty devolves on the court to ascertain the true meaning where
the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, or where an
adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, absurdity, or
contradictory provisions, since an ambiguity calling for construction
may arise when the consequence of a literal interpretation of the

language is an unjust, absurd, unreasonable, or mischievous result, or


one at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole; and the
real meaning of the statute is to be ascertained and declared, even
though it seems to conflict with the words of the statute." (82 CJS 589590; Emphasis supplied.)

Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)

FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known
as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which
respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the
President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided
that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be
appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision
of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no

elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any


capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The
petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the
discretionary power of the President to appoint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional
prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.

RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold
multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a
full time job to let them function without the distraction of other
governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it


cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the
operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship.
The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives

to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the


President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his
choice.

Luego v. Civil Service Commission


(G. R. No. L-69137)

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the


City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983.
The appointment was described as permanent but the Civil Service
Commission approved it as temporary. On 22 March 1984, the Civil
Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than
the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed
herein private respondent in place of petitioners position. The private
respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor;
Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier
permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service
Commissions order and the private respondents title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to
disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another

person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this
finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service
Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified
and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commissions resolution is set
aside.
Matibag vs. Benipayo
G.R. No. 149036

April 2, 2002

Facts:
The case is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner questions the
constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold office of the
following: Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as

COMELEC Commissioners. Petitioner also questions the legality of the


appointment of Velma J. Cinco as Director IV of the COMELECs
Education and Information Department.

Petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and


the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner
claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments
and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also
assails as illegal her removal as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. Simultaneously, petitioner
challenges the designation of Cinco as Officer-in-Charge of the EID.
Petitioner, moreover, questions the legality of the disbursements made
by COMELEC Finance Services Department Officer-in-Charge Gideon C.
De Guzman to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason by way of salaries and
other emoluments.

Issue:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President

amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),


Article IX-C of the Constitution

Ruling:
No, An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the
President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution provides as follows:

"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such


disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be
withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can
withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim
appointment is utterly without basis.

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office


becomes at that moment a government employee and therefore part
of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that "[n]o
officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law. Thus, an ad interim appointment
becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified
into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment
is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the
moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified,
he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by
statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause,
after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due
process.

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified


in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim

appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is


the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments
acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions
expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments.
These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles
over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can
complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of
Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except


as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or
acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the
appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any
security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of
appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making
to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the
COMELEC. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall
be independent", this provision should be harmonized with the
Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on
Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to
make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It

will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.

Wherefore petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


EDUARDO ERMITA

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional
the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo through
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita et al,. as acting secretaries of
their respective departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit
respondents from performing the duties of department secretaries.

The Senate and the House of Representatives (Congress) commenced


their regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on

Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was


constituted on 25 August 2004.

Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as


acting secretaries of their respective departments. Arthur C. Yap for
Department of Agriculture, Alberto G. Romulo for Department of
Foreign Affairs, Raul M. Gonzalez for Department of Justice, Florencio B.
Abad for Department of Education, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. for Department
of National Defense, Rene C. Villa Department of Agrarian Reform,
Joseph H. Durano Department of Tourism, Michael T. Defensor
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Respondents took
their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries.

Petitioners averred that PGMA cannot appoint without the consent


of the Commission on Appointments that in accordance with section 10
chapter 2 Book IV of the EO no. 292, only the undersecretary of the
respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity
and not anyone else.
On the contrary, Executive Secretary Ermita averred that the
president eis empowered by section 16 of Article VII of the constitution
to issue appointment in an acting capacity to department secretaries
without the consent of the COA even while congress is in session.

During the pendency of the case, congress adjourned and PGMA issued
an ad interim appointment re-appointing those previously appointed in
acting capacity.

Issue:
Whether President Arroyos appointment is valid even without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments and while the Congress is
in session?

Ruling:

Yes, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the


legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power
except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed
strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures
interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power
to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications
to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty
to appoint any particular person to an office.

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of


members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not
legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when
it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments.
The President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session. Respondents point to
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 16 reads:

SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Respondents also rely on EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the
Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title
I, Book III of EO 292 read:

SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power
to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.

SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
(a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his
duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there
exists a vacancy[.]
(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to
the position, unless he is already in the government service in which
case he shall receive only such additional compensation as, with his

existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the
position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of
the funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned.
(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.
(Emphasis supplied)
In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an
acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has
observed:
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in
an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But
ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time
there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices
but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Matibag vs. Benipayo

208 SCRA 254 Political Law Appointment List of Appointees


Requiring COA Confirmation Cannot Be Expanded by Law

In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442
or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall
all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed
Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however not
submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon
questioned the appointment saying that without the confirmation by
the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon
insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he asserted that RA 6715
is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive
contained in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by
law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other
officers appointed by the President in addition to those mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public
officers required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointment
as listed in the Constitution.

HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are
four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four
(4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other


public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are


not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by
the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments,

ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces


from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as
the members of the various Constitutional Commissions (first group).
With respect to the other officers (second to fourth group) whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.

Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of


officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the
phrase and other officers required by law at the end of the first
sentence, or the phrase, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our
Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.

This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art


7 of the Constitution

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only


for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like
sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other
government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior
offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an
unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are
considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law.

Tarrosa vs Singson
Appointing Power, Commission on Appointments, Confirmation Power

Facts:

Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by


President Fidel V. Ramos in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a
"taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the appointment
of Singson for not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments as required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No.
7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary
Authority of the Philippines. The Secretary of Budget and Management
was impleaded for disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries
and emoluments of respondent Singson. In their comment,
respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
requiring the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the
Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to
the said position is not among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs
confirmation.

Held:

No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the


confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the
BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA under Section
16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the
confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of
the Constitution. (Tarrosa vs. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994)

RAMON P. BINAMIRA VS.PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR

FACTS:
Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General
Manager of the Philippine TourismAuthority from which he claims to
have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of
tenure. The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication
addressed to him by theMinister of Tourism on April 7, 1986.Persuant
thereto, petitioner assumed office on the same date.Binamira claims
that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA
General Manager andVice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had
been acknowledged as such by various governmentoffices, including

the Office of the President. He complains that his resignation was


demanded byrespondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism.On
January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a
memorandum stating that petitioner's designation is invalid since it
was designated not by the President but only by the Secretaryof
Tourism. Garrucho is then designated as General Manager until the
President can appoint a person toserve in the said office in a
permanent capacity. Garrucho took over as the General Manager of the
PTAand thereafter Pres. Aquino appointed Jose A. Capistrano as
General Manager of PTA.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner had been removed without just cause in
violation of security of tenure

HELD: No, the designation is considered only on an acting or temporary


appointment which does not confer security of tenure. Petitioner was
not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated
by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between
appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested
with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a

given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the


appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law
of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case
before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under
the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by
the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially
executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it


likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public
office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where
the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the
designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment,
which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the


designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been

illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that
the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any
other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which
because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not
possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion
as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of
the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could
be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this
case to be a member of the Cabinet.

Sarmiento v Mison

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power
in appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the
CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority
and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads,
ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with
the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to
appoint;

4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law


vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention.
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of


Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments
is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments

QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL


COMMISSIONS
Posted by kaye lee on 11:16 PM
G.R. No. 83216 September 4 1989 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:
This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with
injunction seeking to compel CoA to allow Quintos-Deles to perform
and ischarege her duties as HoR member representing Women's Sector
and to restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the
confirmation process. Quintos-Deles ad three others were appointed
Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16
p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the HoR to be confirmed by the CoA.

RULING:

Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,


Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by
express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution, referred to in the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison,
supra)
Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2
which gives the President the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress. The records show that Deles appointment was made on
April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April
17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16,
Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
G.R. No. 86439 April 13 1989 [Appointing Power]
FACTS:

The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of


the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in
Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they
are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may
be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No.
163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged
ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her
refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's
confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim
appointment.

RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution,
which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the

confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President,


vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that
she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its
constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments,
cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has
reserved to the President alone.
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not
apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim
appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution,
extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to
remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for
the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
SECTION 17
Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. v. Dominguez
Facts: Petitioners question the validity of the order of then Secretary of
Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over
by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the petitioner

Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong


Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the
Departments regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of
P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2)
the creation of a Management Committee which shall assume the
management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the
disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the turn over of all
assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM the Management
Committee.
The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis
is the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM
requesting the Department for assistance in the removal of the
members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the
general membership of the cooperative and that the ongoing financial
and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors
shows that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that
cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by
DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also
professed therein that the Order was issued by the Department in the
exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of
P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113.
Issue: whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture
is illegal

Held: Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing


P.D. No. 175) provides the procedure for the removal of directors or
officers of cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by
a vote of majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual or
special general assembly. The person involved shall have an
opportunity to be heard.
A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the
KBMBPMs by-laws, reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. Any elected
director or committee member may be removed from office for cause
by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at the
annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having
been given the opportunity to be heard at the assembly.
Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of
both the annual general assembly and a special general assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of
directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the
right to due process is respected by the express provision on the
opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners
cannot be deprived of that right.

The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of


Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the
KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning
directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D.
No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all
cooperatives. This section does not give him that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly
granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond
what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision
is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1)
generally oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they
are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without
interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of
reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance
evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as

may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions,


including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such
agencies but may not increase or add to them.
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be
inferred from any of the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws
of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and
officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better
than to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the
general membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by
Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he
does not have, expressly or impliedly. We cannot concede to the
proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that the Secretarys
power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted to
suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative
includes the milder authority of suspending officers and calling for the
election of new officers. Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation
includes the take-over and ouster of incumbent directors and officers,
otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated. Secondly, even
granting that the law intended such as postulated, there is
the requirement of a hearing. None was conducted.

BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION 2010,

G. R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)


TOPIC: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE
FACT: E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of
2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch
formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration and submit their findings
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties.
Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and
make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such
facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds
that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress
to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated

authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the


President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like
the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth
Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding
those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.


RULING: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the
equal protection clause. The Chief Executives power to create the Ad
hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to
which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the
law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that
the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry.

ANG-ANGCO v. CASTILLO
The power of control of the President extends to the power to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
[President] for that of the [subordinate officer]. This may be extended
to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and
employees who belong to the executive department if they are
presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for
such can be justified that the power to remove is inherent to the power
to appoint. The same cannot be done to officers or employees who
belong to the classified service. The procedure laid down in the Civil
Service Act of 1959 must be followed for their removal.

Facts:
The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola
concentrates which were notcovered by any Central Bank release
certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Ang-Angco to
secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the
counsel to secure the releasecertificate from the No-Dollar Import
Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angcowhich
stated that his office had no objection to the release of the

concentrates but could not take action onthe request as it was not in
their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary of Finance
whoexpressed his approval of the release on the basis of said
certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally releasedthe concentrates. When
Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an
administrativecomplaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For
three years Ang-Angco had been discharging theduties of his office.
Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President,
rendered his judgment against the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees
in the classified civilservice.
Holding:
The President does not have the power to remove officers or
employees in the classified civil service.
It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of
1959, the case of petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the
procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and
disposition of his case, itmay be said that he has been deprived of due
process as guaranteed by said law.The Power of control of the
President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or

removeofficers and employees who belong to the executive


department if they are presidential appointees but notwith regard to
those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as
to them that inherentpower cannot be exercised.This is in line with the
provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by
lawvest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone,
in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3],
Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointmentsare
vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a
procedure for their removalprecisely in view of this constitutional
authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.
It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct
action on the administrative case of an employee under classified
service even with the authority of the President without submitting the
case to the Commissioner of Civil Service
Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994

FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary
of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,

declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue


Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari
filed by the City of Manila, the RTC declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in
violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution
and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. In
this case, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187
unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to
review tax ordinances. He cited the familiar distinction between control
and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to
see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is
constitutional and whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise
control, rather than supervision, over the local government

HELD:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to
revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or
modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what
the Code should be. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he
did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners
were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the
grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government
Code. As the court sees it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision. Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only
on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure.
As regards the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court has carefully
examined every one of the exhibits and agree with the trial court that
the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of
the public hearings were sent to interested parties. The minutes of the

hearings are found in the exhibits and such show that the proposed
ordinances were published.

JOSE D. VILLENA, petitioner,


vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, respondent.
Facts: The Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice upon
request of the Secretary of Interior (respondent) conducted an inquiry
of the conduct Mayor Jose Villena. As a result, the latter was found to
have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and
unauthorized practice of law profession. The respondent recommended
to the President of the Philippines to suspend the petitioner so as to
prevent possible coercion of the witnesses. The recommendation was
verbally approved by the President. Thereafter, the Secretary of the
Interior move to suspend Mayor Villena from office and instructed the
Provincial Governor to inform the petitioner of the said suspension.
The respondent wrote the petitioner a letter specifying the many

charges against him and notifying him of the designation of a special


investigator to investigate the charges.

Mayor Jose Villena filed an action of prohibition with a prayer for


preliminary injunction against Secretary of the interior to suspend the
investigation against him. Mayor Jose Villena contends that the
Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend and
to give administrative charges against him since the power to suspend
municipal elective officials is the duty of other government agencies,
which in this case is the Governor- pursuant to section 2188 of the
Administrative Code. Furthermore, even if the respondent Secretary of
the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that
power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance
with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of
charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in
section 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or


authority to suspend and order investigation over Jose Villena.

Ruling: Yes, the respondent has the jurisdiction to suspend the


petitioner although there is no clear and express grant of power to the
former to suspend the latter who is under investigation. On the
contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by
section 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that the
provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction
by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. The fact,
however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section
2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not
mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the
Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. This is under
the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that the acts
of the department secretaries, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the President, presumptively the acts of the President. The power to
suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that the heads of
the Department may also exercise the same, unless the law required
the President to act personally or that situation demanded him so,
because the heads of the departments are assistants and agents of the
President.
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.

JOSE PAO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive


Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendantsappellees.

FACTS: Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used
for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later
declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of
land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of
Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the
Office of the President.

Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that
the earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive
hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the
Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution,
LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential
power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is
argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act
personally upon the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the


Executive Secretary.

HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his
constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate
certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The
president may delegate powers which are not required by the
Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this
allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in
person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The
office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the
President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under
our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in
behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction
to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may
issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the
President, shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated
by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the
decision granting the land to Pao cannot be reversed.

CITY OF ILIGAN v DIRECTOR OF LANDS


1. President issued Proclamation 335:
a. Withdrawing certain parcels of public land in Iligan from sale or
settlement and
b. Reserving such for the use of NPC (Natl Power Corporation)
2. By virtue of said proclamation, NPC constructed a fertilizer plant
named Maria Cristina
3. Later, NPC:
a. Sold the fertilizer plant to Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corp with
all the machineries, right of occupancy, and use of land
b. Covenanted to collaborate with DANR in facilitating sale and
right to lease for at least 25 years, the lands where plant is
erected
4. Proclamation 20 and 198 were issued:
a. Proc. 20 excluding from operation of Proc. 335 certain areas
occupied by Ma. Cristina and Employees Housing and
declaring such lands for OPEN DISPOSITION
b. Proc. 198 changing the technical description of said areas (6
lots)
5. Marcelo Steel and Ma. Cristina filed a Msc. Sales Application with
the Bureau of Lands
a. Marcelo Tire and Ma. Cristina are sister corporations.
b. Purchaser was Marcelo Tire but another sister corp. Marcelo
Steel operated said plant
6. In the notice of sale issued in Manila, Director of Lands advised that
Bureau will sell in an auction said lands of Marcelo Steel

7. President then issued Proc. 469 excluding from the reservation


made in favor to NPC certain lands in Iligan (Lot 1, 1-a, 3, and 4) and
DONATING said lands in favor of Iligan City.
8. Mayor of Iligan wrote to Director of Lands informing him that City is
the owner of said lands and foreshores in auction.
9. BUT no action was taken on said request for exclusion and so City
filed a complaint for injunction in CFI against Director. Injunction
temporarily issued.
10. Pending case, President Marcos issued Proc. 94 excluding from
the donation in Proc. 469 certain lands (Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3) and
declaring same for open disposition.
11. CFI dismissed the complaint of City and dissolved injunction.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON President has the authority to grant a portion of public
domain to any government like the City of Iligan.

Held: YES
1. Section 60 of Public Land Act states that tracts of land can be
disposed of by grant, donation or transfer made to a province,
municipality, branch, or subdivision of government for purposes
conducive to public interest.
a. Who has authority to donate? Secretary of Agriculture and
National Resources through Director of Lands (Sec 60)
2. Can President donate instead of Secretary and Director? YES

a. Director has direct executive control of lands (e.g. lease, sale,


concession, disposition of land of public domain)
b. Director SUBJECT to control of Secretary of Agriculture.
c. Secretarys control is SUBJECT to control of PRESIDENT
d. Under Art VII Sec 17: President shall control ALL executive
departments, bureaus, and offices.
e. Hence, President has the same authority to dispose of portions
of public domain as his subordinates.
f. Such authority to dispose is also granted to the President under
Section 69 of the Public Land Act.
3. Since, President has the authority to donate lands of public domain
for residential, commercial, & industrial purposes. Questioned
Proclamation 469 is VALID and binding:
a. Ownership of lands now vested in City of Iligan.
b. Mayor of City upon proclamation immediately had the lots
surveyed and entered into negotiation with National Investment
and Development Corp. and those interested in developing the
Coco-Chemical Plant in order to accelerate economic expansion
in the City.
4. Proclamation 94 is NULL and VOID as said parcels had been
segregated and had become property of Iligan.
5. Decision of CFI REVERSED.
Gascon vs. Arroyo
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Expropriation
Facts:

Lopez family is the owner of 2 television stations, namely: Channels 2


and 4, which they have operated through the ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation
When martial law was declared on Sept 21, 1972, Ch. 4 was closed by
the military and its facilities were taken over by Kanlaon Broadcasting
System (KBS) which operated it as a commercial TV station
In 1978, KBS was taken over by the National Media Production Center
(NMPC), which operated it under Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4
(MBS-4)
After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, the PCGG sequestered the TV
stations and the Office of Media Affairs took over the operation of Ch. 4
On. April 17, 1986, the Lopez family requested Pres. Aquino to order to
return to them Chs. 2 and 4
On October 18 1986, Ch 2 was returned to the Lopez family
Upon the Lopez family's request, the respondent Executive Secretary,
by the authority of the President, entered into with ABS-CBN,
represented by its Pres. Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate"
Arbitration Committee was created composed of Atty. Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., for RP and Atty. Pastor del Rosario for ABS-CBN, and
retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman

Issue:
Note: There wasn't exactly an issue, as the court dismissed the case
because the petitioners did not have locus standi. If the need arises, I
would say the issue is "Whether or not the Agreement to Arbitrate, as
an alternative to a lawsuit against the State, is valid"; to which, the
answer is yes. Either way, I'll just enumerate below the court's
statements regarding the expropriation topic.
The Executive Secretary, in entering into the "Agreement to Arbitrate,"
was acting for and in behalf of the President when he signed it. Hence,
the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the
Philippines.
Where the government takes property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
The government's immunity cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
Note: In a separate opinion, Justice Feliciano remarks that the above
comments as obiter dicta.

NATIONAL MARKETING CORP. v. ARCA


Facts: Respondent Arive was the Manager of the Traffic-Storage
Department of the National Marketing Corp.
(NAMARCO). He was investigated by a committee for
violating Management Memo Order directing the allocation and
deliveries of merchandise imported under the Trade Assistance
Program to its designated beneficiaries be stopped. He had caused the
improper release of shipments intended for delivery upon full payment
by the Federation of United NAMARCO Distributors.
After hearing, Arive was found guilty but the commission left the
imposition of the penalty to the discretion of the General Manager and
the Board of Directors. The GM dismissed him from the service, which
was adopted by the Board, with prejudice to his reinstatement in the
NAMARCO and to all benefits to which he would have been entitled to.
Arive appealed the decision to the President of the Philippines.
Executive Secretary (presumably acting for the President) reinstated
Arive to his former position. He pointed out that the order of the
NAMARCO stopping the delivery of imported commodities under the
trade assistance program was subsequently declared illegal by the SC
on the ground that the order was a violation of the contract of sale. It
would be improper to hold Arive administratively liable for his failure to
comply with said order.
NAMARCO asked for reconsideration with the President. It
contended that the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to review
any decision of the NAMARCO Board removing, suspending, or
disciplining any of its subordinate employees because the NAMARCO

charter (RA 1345) does not provide for an appeal to any governmental
body. The President refused to reconsider. However, the GM did not act
on the order of reinstatement. Arive filed a complaint with the CFI for
reinstatement and damages. Judge Arca ruled that the President
exercised supervision and control over all GOCCs including NAMARCO;
hence, he may review,
revise, alter modify or nullify the decision of the Board and substitute
his judgment for that of the latter.
Issue: Does the President of the Philippines have the
authority to reverse the decision of the Board of Directors of the
NAMARCO? YES
Ratio: The Presidents authority to review and reverse the decision of
the NAMARCO Board falls within the
constitutional power of the President over all executive departments,
bureaus and officers. GOCCs partake of the nature of government
bureaus or offices. EO No. 386 (Reorganization Act of 1950) provides
that government bureaus and offices are administratively supervised
by the Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, who has
the rank of a Department head and shall perform his functions under
the control of the President. The fact that
the NAMARCO Charter does not provide for an appeal from the GMs
decision does not mean that no appeal lies to the President.

JOSE MONDANO vs. FERNANDO SILVOSA


[G.R. No. L-7708. May 30, 1955.]

Facts:
The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954
Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape
committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for
cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal
dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the
complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate
investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner
appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons
and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial
governor with the provincial board. On the same day, the provincial
governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner
from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the
charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.
Issue:

Whether the Assistant Executive Secretary, as agent of the Chief


Executive, can exercise control over local governments, most
specifically a town mayor in this case.

Held:
No. The department head as agent of the President has direct
control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any
act or conduct of any person in the person in the service of any bureau
of office under his department is confined to bureaus under his
jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over the
President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by
law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the
provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head
direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments
and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of
a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would

be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, article VII, of


the Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath
against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or
other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." 2 And if the charges
are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused
either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case
suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action
by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question." 3 Section 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be
exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . .

municipalities . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional


power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by
section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional
power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10(1),
Article VII, of the Constitution.

SECTION 18
. Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a
state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the


Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commanderin-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided
in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State
of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017,


directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on


the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the

constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it


violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and of assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from
illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of
PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of
the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The
petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important
provisions, thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18,
Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion

Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to


all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first


provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an
act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised
Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these
cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or

suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on


Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power
to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an
exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to
assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.


The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17,
Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as
it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of

a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial


Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to
declarea state of national emergency and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such
power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But
to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is
evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during
grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress
to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national


policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17
states that the the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether
or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by
President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without authority
from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a
state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional

circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the


President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President
has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by


which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism
have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature,
such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

IBP vs Zamora
(G.R. No. 171396, August 15, 2000)

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of


the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP
questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUES:

1. The President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the


armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. The calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the


civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility
to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise,
their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and
render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it
cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over
civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist

the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the
task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution

Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo


(G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012)

THE FACTS
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling
Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage,
President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a
state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring


martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her
report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint

session to review the validity of the Presidents action. But two days
later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the
President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

II.

THE ISSUES

Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
[privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and
academic?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that


they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]
YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
[privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and
academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government


dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that
assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the
Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue
of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not


unavoidable for two reasons:

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and


suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint
houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and
validate or invalidate the same. xxx.
[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not
only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can
maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme


Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court
must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is
automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should
the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional
validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint


houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the
same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot
and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.

Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law


and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just

eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The


military did not take over the operation and control of local
government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law
or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those
who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly
charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed
with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point
is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a
relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the
rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a
determined and amply armed government presence.
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took
off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it
having become moot and academic.

SANLAKAS vs. Reyes


(G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006)

Facts: In the wee hours of 27 July 203 some 300 junior officers and
enlisted men of AFP, heavily armed stormed the Oakwood Premiere in
Makati demanding for the resignation of the President, Secretary of
Defence and Chief of the PNP. By virtue of Proclamation 427 dated 27
July 2003, state of rebellion was declared and General Order No 4 of
the same date, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police were directed to suppress and quell the rebellion
pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the Constitution. The soldiers
returned to barracks on the same night and the declaration of state of
rebellion was lifted on 1 August 2003 by virtue of Proclamation No 435.
In the interim, several petitions were filed before the Court challenging
the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4. Sanlakas
contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require
the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces.
Because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no
sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state
of rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General argues that the
petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.
Issue: Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare
General order No 4?
Decision: Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist
and has rendered the case moot.

Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is


capable of repetition yet evading review. The case at bar is one such
case. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then
it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion
could not bring about these conditions. The presidential issuances
themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to
constitutional rights
GUANZON VS. DE VILLA
[181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]

Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial


target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to
besearch and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest
served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse
from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses.
The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like
cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to
examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're

homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their


valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after
the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spotbeatings and maltreatment. Those who weredetained also suffered
mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies.
Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the
power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance
of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush
out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities
were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have
intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual
operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to
witness and record such event.
Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of
violation of human rights.
Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited
rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even
hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it
appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or
warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals
roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be
achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income families are

fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a


tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is
properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is
no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In
the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were


committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which
are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

Olaguer vs Military Commission


FACTS: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of
subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP created a
military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal
case against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted and have
been imposed a penalty of death penalty. Thereafter, petitioners filed a
petition to enjoin the military tribunal from taking further action on
their case for the tribunal should be considered null and void.
Respondents invoked that the creation of Military Commission is
constitutional as ruled upon in a previous case Aquino v. Military

Commission No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court. However,


petitioners contend that such ruling must be overturned because the
ruling is now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been lifted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be


abandoned and/or modified in so far as the case at bar is concerned?

HELD: Yes. First, the Court considered that since the martial law has
been lifted during the case is still pending, military tibunals, which
were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void already
since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting
views of some justices in AQUINO V. MILCOMM, stating that Civilians
like the petitioner placed on tiral for civil offenses under general law
are entited o trial by judicial process, not by executive or military
processxxx..Judicial power exist only in courts.1Moreover, the Court
emphasized thatReverence for precedent, simply as precedent,
cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand
otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified
should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after all, more important
than anything else is that this Court should be right.
Ruffy vs Chief of Staff

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military


men were assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the
country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and
his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call
it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow
petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new
authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command.
Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow
petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at


the time the offense was committed, which was at the time of war and
the Japanese occupancy.

HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military
law since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the
National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an
occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is
considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to
military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers,
which makes them even more eligible for the military court's
jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should


be dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Quillona vs General Court Martial


The petitioner, a policeman, was charged before respondent General
Court Martial with the crime of murder on two (2) counts, under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 14 December 1990, petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter
President Corazon C. Aquino, expressing his desire to be tried by a
civilian court and sought a waiver of a military jurisdiction, for the
reason, among others, that the "enactment of the Philippine National
Police Law creates his honest belief that he should now be under the
actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court.
Petitioner has filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, alleging that
respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his
motion for inhibition and that there is no appeal, nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru
the present petition.
Acting on the petition as well as the comment of the Solicitor General,
the Court resolved to (1) treat the respondents' comment as answer to

the petition; (2) give due course to the petition; and (3) consider this
case calendared for deliberation. Hence, this decision. The petition is
meritorious.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
Held: yes, petition should be granted.Clearly, under the circumstances
obtaining in the present case, respondent court martial acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to or excess of jurisdiction in
proceeding with the arraignment of the petitioner on 28 December
1990.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his
comment Section 46 should be read in the light of the policy of the
State declared under Section 2 of the act, which says:
Sec. 2 Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to promote peace and order, ensure public safety and further
strengthen local government capability aimed towards the effective
delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the
establishment of a highly efficient and competent police force that is
national police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.
Towards this end, the State shall bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated
law enforcement and public safety agencies created under this Act.

The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for
the performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian
character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be
military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is
declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in line herewith, the law
mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian
courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED; the proceedings held on 28


December 1990 before respondents are declared NULL and VOID. The
respondent court martial is hereby ORDERED to TRANSFER the subject
criminal case against the petitioner to the appropriate city or provincial
prosecutor for expeditious action. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by the Court is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

Gudani vs. Senga


G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006

(Political Law, Constitutional Law, E.O. 464)


FACTS
Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are highranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior
officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate
Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing
of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation
between the President and then Commission on Elections
Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen.
Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a
member, of Joint Task Force Ranao by the AFP Southern Command.
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga
were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation
from Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col.
Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon.
Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a
Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt. Col.
Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee
hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the
hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their

respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA


Superintendent.
However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per
instruction from the President that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR
BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER
APPROVAL. `

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the
office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had
appeared before the Senate Committee in spite of the fact that a
guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought
prior to such an appearance; that such directive was in keeping with
the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command; and that the
two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar]
65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected
to General Court Martial proceedings x x x Both Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.
On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order
(E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O.
enjoined officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval.

Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President


enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before
Congress without the Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for
injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against
them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated
within the military justice system in connection with petitioners
violation of the aforementioned directive.
The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to
military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the
AFP Chief of Staff.
ISSUE
Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP
PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE
HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional?
RULING
The Petition is dismissed.
Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member
of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?
Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek
prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the
notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The

impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military


official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains
to wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority
the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and
jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not
encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may
attach to executive privilege or executive control.

We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by


virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence
a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress
which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of
the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify
before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is
not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have
the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute.
Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-

in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed


forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The
commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as
Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that
[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as
those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause
vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over
the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such
authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel,
movement and speech of military officers, activities which may
otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col.
Kapunan was ordered confined under house arrest by then Chief of
Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as
a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press
statements or give any press conference during his period of
detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:
to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the
effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law
depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its
ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and
rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's

personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the


restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have
to be considered.

As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldiers


speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander.
The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even
more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political
matters. For there is no constitutional provision or military
indoctrination will eliminate a soldiers ability to form a personal
political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the
public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord
among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of
fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of
the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an
atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the
President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are
constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust.
Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to
obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel to
Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.

Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters


such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank
promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the
title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline
and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to
control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation
affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who
is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Judicial relief as remedy:
The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for
Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-inchief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere
with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did
not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts.

Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on


the constitutional scope and limitations on the constitutional power of

congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, with process to


enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the
legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials
on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that
subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that
information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts


certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. To
avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public
officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible
needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21,
Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the
legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be
done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of
procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an
inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section
21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to
adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a
blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before

Congress without the Presidents consent notwithstanding the


invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. Should
neither branch yield to the other branchs assertion, the constitutional
recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the
courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or nonattendance in legislative inquiries.

Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial


review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive
branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of
power. By this and, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders
of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance
of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has
earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the
legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to
comply with the final orders of the courts.

Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the
jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his retirement last 4
October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408,
which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, all
officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP], and points out
that he is no longer in the active service. However, an officer whose

name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be


outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice
proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his
service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it
continues until his case is terminated.
Ampatuan vs Puno Case Digest
G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011

FACTS:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then
Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a
state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named
places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG.
She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the
term transfer used in AO 273 was amended to delegate, referring
to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs


autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong,
and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the Presidents
proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMMs autonomy as
these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs
operations and to seize the regional governments powers. They also
claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an
invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked
that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the
principle of local autonomy under the Constitution and The Expanded
ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency
powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

HELD:
1The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did
not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into
custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the
ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on
10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12
Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner SahaliGenerale,
Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take
over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.
2The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to

exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to


prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.
The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. x x x
3While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for
the Presidents exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to
her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that
the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out
the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is
shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the
President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake
an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual

necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable
for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out
the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be
done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of
emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and
Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out
power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all
areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it

follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had
no basis too.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President
issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act
to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these
places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to
the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the
situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out
the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and
dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace
and security in the affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of
state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have
clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions
(Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011).
Legazpi vs Minister

Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa,


petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty
and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other

purposes unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was


promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution The
Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1,
Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President (PM) can issue such decrees.

HELD: It is to be observed that the original text mentions President


(Prime Minister). This is so because . . . The incumbent President of the
Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise
all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized
and ready to discharge its functions, and likewise he shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and
the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this
Constitution.

Parenthetically, the term Incumbent President employed in the


transitory provisions could only refer to President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275). After the April 7
amendments there exists no longer a President (Prime Minister) but A

President and A Prime Minister. They are now two different offices
which cannot be held by a single person not a transitory one but a
regular one provided for and governed by the main provisions of the
newly amended Constitution. Subsequent events accept the reality
that we are no longer governed by the transitory provisions of the
Constitution. This form of government is essentially parliamentary
with presidential features.
Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183

FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having
been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation
1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General
Order No.2 of the President "for being participants or for having given
aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in
the country and to take over the Government by force..." General
Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he
assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country
under martial law.
ISSUES:

1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the


power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?; and
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the
declaration of martial law?
HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject
to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable
one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of
martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of
martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the
basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against
imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national
survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial law
automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons
referred to in this case.

LANSANG VS. GARCIA [


42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971]

Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the
Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were
thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were.
Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889
was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas
corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in
order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas
corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a
warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it
is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally,
Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually
staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege
in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued
restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in
Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and
4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose
privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No.
889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or

rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and


academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public
safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that
there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension
of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the
courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged JulyAugust Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that
the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is nonexistent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the
Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such
extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively


arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of
the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court
resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has
arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and


conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.

(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial


review. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the
authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be
"invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and
(b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.
President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed
forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
(c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He
had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the
two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least
harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the
killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there
were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila
Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control
nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or

youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively


advancing the CPP.
SECTION 19

TORRES v. GONZALES
PARTIES:
Petitioner: WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG
Respondents: HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the
president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws
again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against
in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional
pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982,
Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring
that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions

of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet
final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a


court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his
pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial
act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for
the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted

and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the


penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief
Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the
Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon
has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government
[has] such power been entrusted.

Wilfredo Torres vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales


152 SCRA 272 Political Law Constitutional Law Pardon Not
Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was
pardoned by the president with the condition that he shall not violate
any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes
of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali

Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the


president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the
Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in
convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the
estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they
were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a
court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and
conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are
not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a
pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts
to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that

a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional


pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and
because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded
judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which
he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to
proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has
chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny
LLAMAS v. EXEC. SEC. ORBOS, OCAMPO III
October 15, 1991 (G.R. No. 99031)

FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with
some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo
III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was
found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice
governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however,
Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence
he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension
imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency
only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase after
conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no
other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone
who has been convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because
the word conviction refers only to criminal cases.

ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant
executive clemency in administrative cases.

HELD:

Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered


under criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish,
so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish
between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the
President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it
would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded
inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It
is the courts considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal
cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all
administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or
Legislative branches of the government.

In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an


individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in
administrative cases, the quantum of evidence require

GARCIA v. COA
September 14, 1993 (G.R. No. 75025)
FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the
Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of
qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an
executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of
salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March
1984 but the records do not show whether petitioners reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after


having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD:

The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public


office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense.
But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement
because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled
to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this


innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not
been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given
pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act,
thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and
unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was
founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioners innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of
executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner

need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is


restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government service
entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner
who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has
suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to
back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and
were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the
charges against them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975
(date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to
the petitioner.

SABELLO VS DECS
Facts: Sabello, an elementary school principal and the assistant
principal of the Talisay Brgy. High School together with their barrio
captain were charged of the violation of RA 3019(Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). They were both convicted and sentenced 1yr &
disqualification to hold office. Petitioner is alleged that he gravely erred
in depositing 840.00 to the City Treasurer's office in the name of Talisay
Barrio H.S to cover up for the teachers salary. The amount of 840 came
from the aid given by the Pres. in the amount of 2,000 for each barrio.

The Barrio Council believing in good faith that the barrio H.S was a
barrio project therefore it is entitled to its share with the funds given by
the pres. Petitioner then appealed to the C.A of MNL. Court of appeals
then modified the penaly by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency in the payment of 1/2 of the amount being involved.
Petitioner could no longer appeal to the Supreme court so then
judgment became final. Afterwards, the pres granted the petitioner
ABSOLUTE PARDON restoring him full civil and political rights.
Petitioner then applied for the reinstatement of his employment; he
was reinatated but not as a Principal rather a classroom teacher. He
then appealed for the relief of the Supreme Court to grant his requesr
of being reinstated to his former position and for the payment of his
backwages.

ISSUE: whether petitioner merits reappointment to the position he held


prior to his conviction that of Elementary Principal I.

HELD: The DECS did not act on the request of the petitioner because
they contended through the Sol.Gen that there is no justiceable
controversy to be resolved.

The Court believed otherwise.There is here a justiciable controversy.


Petitioner claims he must be restored to the same position he was in
before he was convicted on a mere technical error and for which he
was given an absolute pardon, under the circumstances of this case, if
the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of' what is rightfully his, the
discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to the
petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports cannot be sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued
for alleged grave errors in their official acts. Again, We ignore
technicality by considering this a suit against the officials of this
government agency.
In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 3 this Court held that the absolute
disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part
of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon
frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon restores his
eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic
reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office.There
are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank,
justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of
Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom
teacher.

However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from
September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto 4 this
Court said he is not entitled to automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was
lawfully separated from the government service upon his conviction for
an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had been duly authorized,
it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is afforded only
to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and/or his duly
authorized representative is hereby directed to appoint petitioner to
the position of Elementary School Principal I or it equivalent, without
pronouncement as to cost. This decision is immediately executory.

PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR

Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellants
seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court
accepted the appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant Francisco
Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw his Appeal. They were

granted a conditional pardon that with their acceptance of the


conditional pardon, the appellants will be released from confinement,
the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their
sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed.They were
discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty.
Lao further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for
his province without consulting her. She then prays that the Court
grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn
upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal.

ISSUE: Whether Mengotes conditional pardon is valid.

HELD: No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final,
pardon has no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby
allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a motion to
withdraw his appeal. WHEREFORE, counsel for accusedappellantRicky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days
from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional
pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only
upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections

must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said
appellant, forwhich purpose he may seek the assistance of the
Philippine National Police or the NationalBureau of Investigation.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
February 9, 1989 (G.R. No. 78239)
FACTS:

In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion


A. Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and to
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the
balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.

She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she


accepted.

Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as


assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked
for the backpay for the entire period of her suspension.

Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her


position without the necessity of a new appointment

The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute
pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement

to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries,


benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.

In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a


reappointment before he can reassume his former position. And a
pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her


case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency
while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There
having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore
as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or
forfeited.

The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still
be the same

ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon

(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by
the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.

HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases
the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye
of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores
him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded on
the persons innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no


amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by
the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to
make reparation for what has been suffered.

(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken


notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of
estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to
anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms
part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa
thru falsification of public documents.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her


disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she
must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment
.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL vs COMELEC and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA,
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case
No. 26558, entitled People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, et al.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way
of pardon, to former President Estrada. On October 26, 2007, at 3:35
p.m., former President Estrada received and accepted6 the pardon
by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for local elective post of Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification
against former President Estrada before the COMELEC.). Risos- Vidal
anchored her petition on the theory that [Former President Estrada] is
Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for
Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Sentencing Him
to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute

Disqualification. She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government


Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC). The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that having taken
judicial cognizance of the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028
(DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution
affirming it, this Commission will not belabor the controversy further.
Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse
the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring
categorically that [former President Estradas] right to seek public
office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by
former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has already
spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled matter lest
indulged in wastage of government resources.
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Courts jurisdiction by filing
the present petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former
President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office
as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
HELD:

The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada was
granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office,
the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended
to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a
way that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the
President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that
may serve to impair or diminish the import of the pardon which
emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed by the Chief
Executive himself/herself. The said codal provisions must be construed
to harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the
penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to grant
executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the
pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of
the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said
accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential
prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to
pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or
to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the

pardon so decided upon by the President on the penalties imposed in


accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua
and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first
sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former
President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder
and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal
penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence
that followed, which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if
we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable
from the text of the pardon that the accessory

MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROCLAMATION NO. 80
GRANTING AMNESTY IN FAVOR OF ALL PERSONS WHO, IN THE
FURTHERANCE OF THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, MAY HAVE COMMITTED
ACTS PENALIZED BY EXISTING LAWS

WHEREAS, certain persons or group/s of persons continue to oppose


the government;
WHEREAS, these persons may have committed an act or acts in
violation of existing laws in furtherance of their political beliefs;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of the nation to forgive these individuals
and forego their prosecution in order that all may be reunited and
peace and order established in our land, and so that they can
contribute their energy and talents to the achievement of political and
social reforms within the framework of the laws and democracy;
WHEREAS, the unity of the Filipino people is necessary so that the
nation can recover from the ravages of dictatorships; cdt
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 6, Art.
XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim full and
complete amnesty in favor of all persons who have or may have
committed any act penalized under existing laws in furtherance of their
political beliefs and who, not being in the custody of, or charged by,
undergoing investigation by, the authorities of the present
administration, as of the date, the 28th of February 1987, and for six
months thereafter, return their own free will to the fold of the law for
the following crimes: treason; conspiracy or proposal to commit the
crime of treason; misprision of treason; espionage; rebellion or
insurrection; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or

insurrection; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to


commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assemblies; illegal
associations; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such person or
persons; subversion; and illegal possession of firearms and explosives.
This shall not, however, apply to crimes or acts committed from purely
personal motives or outside of the foregoing enumerations.
It is further declared that in order to determine those persons who may
come within the terms of this amnesty, an Amnesty Committee is
hereby created in each province or city composed of the Provincial/City
Citizens Attorney, as Chairman, and four members, namely: the AFP
Judge Advocate designated by the Secretary of National Defense, the
Provincial/City Secretary, an IBP representative designated by the
Provincial/City IBP Chapter and the fourth to be chosen by the
Chairman and the herein three named members, which shall examine
the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. The Committee
shall decide each case within ten (10) working days from receipt of the
application, and upon finding that it falls within the terms of this
Proclamation, it shall so declare and the amnesty shall immediately be
effective as to said person. Should the Amnesty Committee fail to
make its decision within the given ten day period, such inaction shall
be construed as an automatic grant of amnesty in favor of the
applicant concerned. casia

Any person who desires to avail of the amnesty provided herein may,
at anytime within six (6) months from date of issuance of this
Proclamation, file an application for amnesty with the Bayanihan
Center organized in each province or city. The Bayanihan Center
immediately forward the application to the Amnesty Committee, which
shall then evaluate and pass upon the application in accordance with
the Guidelines that may be issued by the National Reconciliation and
Development Council to implement this Proclamation and shall make
the necessary decision in each particular case.
This Proclamation take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 28th day of February, in the year of
Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

SECTION 21
Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern
Sea Trading
October 29, 2011 No comments
3 SCRA 351 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaties vs Executive
Agreements

Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from
Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner
of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods
because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44
and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On
the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and
Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between
the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among
others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines
should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by
EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.

EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive
agreement that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon
by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and
the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the


concurrence by the Senate.

HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject
to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are
commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less
common in our scheme of government than are the more formal
instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the
form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated agreements or protocols.

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other


governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive
agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may
sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to
undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as
such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements,
other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have
been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of
1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and
that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain
classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without
the approval of the Senate.

They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues,


income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs
matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims,
postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc.
Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional
authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of
Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff
acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement
of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently
of any legislation.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest


G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of


the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to

transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International


Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence
pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will
have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by
the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The
provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic


and international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty
of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate
to allow it to exercise its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute
signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without
the signature of the President.

The Supreme Court held NO.


1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized
in the external relations and he is also the country's sole
representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect
to the country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate


with other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the
Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the
Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the


executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit
of political maturity and growth.
Bayan Muna vs. Romulo
(G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011)

Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established


to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F.
Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the
period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was
impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court having a key determinative bearing on
this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be
complimentary to the national criminal jurisdiction. The serious crimes
adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such
as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states.
As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory
countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and
concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

Issue :
Whether the agreement is valid, binding, and effective without the
concurrence by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
senate

Held:
Evidently, there is, as yet, no overwhelming consensus, let alone
prevalent practice, among the different countries in the world that the
prosecution of internationally recognized crimes of genocide, etc.
should be handled by a particular international criminal court.

Absent the widespread/consistent-practice-of-states factor, the second


or the psychological element must be deemed non-existent, for an
inquiry on why states behave the way they do presupposes, in the first
place, that they are actually behaving, as a matter of settled and
consistent practice, in a certain manner. This implicitly requires belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of
a rule of law requiring it. Like the first element, the second element has
likewise not been shown to be present.

Further, the Rome Statute itself rejects the concept of universal


jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated therein as evidenced by it
requiring State consent. Even further, theRome Statute specifically and
unequivocally requires that: This Statute is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by signatory States. These clearly negate the
argument that such has already attained customary status.

More importantly, an act of the executive branch with a foreign


government must be afforded great respect. The power to enter into
executive agreements has long been recognized to be lodged with the
President. As We held in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, [t]he power to enter into an
executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. The rationale behind this principle is the
inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative,
executive and judicial branches of the government. Thus, absent any
clear contravention of the law, courts should exercise utmost caution in
declaring any executive agreement invalid.
In light of the above consideration, the position or view that the
challenged RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement ought to be in the form of
a treaty, to be effective, has to be rejected.

SECTION 23
Soliven Vs. Makasiar
Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when

informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2)
whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot
and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima
facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners'
contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.

Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when


respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause
Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact
that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not
require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counteraffidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All
that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be


searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and
the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law,"
has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be


unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent
judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to
the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be
sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents,
through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the
Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in
the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Hidalgo vs. Marcos
(G.R. No. L-47329 December 9, 1977)
Presidents Immunity From Suit
In December 1977, a referendum was scheduled to be held. The
purpose of which was to merge the office of the Prime Minister and the

Office of the President. At that time, Marcos was serving as the


president and at the same time he was wielding legislative powers. The
referendum was to ask the people whether or not they still want
Marcos to serve as the president (and at the same time Prime Minister)
after an interim Batasan Pambansa will be organized. Ernesto Hidalgo
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme
Court to enjoin COMELEC and the president from proceeding with the
said referendum as he averred that the referendum will effectively
amend the C0nstitution, which he says is unconstitutional and
improper.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can be sued and compelled


through a mandamus by the SC.

HELD: The Supreme Court did not pass upon the issue of the suability
of the President in this case considering that the COMELEC, the body
tasked to implement the referendum, was impleaded.

The SC however ruled that the referendum is valid and that the same
will merely ask the people if they want Marcos to stay in power or not

and that the referendum will not amend the Constitution as Hidalgo
avers.
DECISION
CASTRO, C.J.:
Considering the allegations, issues presented, and arguments adduced
(a) in the petition for mandamus and/or prohibition, (b) in the Solicitor
Generals Comment on the petition, (c) in the petitioners reply to the
Comment, and (d) at the hearing on December 1, 1977, the Court,
without passing upon the question of the suability of the President,
considering that the Commission on Elections, which is the government
entity called upon to implement Presidential Decree No. 1229, is
impleaded, Resolved NOT to give due course to the petition and to
DISMISS the same, for the reasons hereunder set forth.
(1) The President cannot be compelled by mandamus or otherwise to
convene the Interim National Assembly because, inter alia, this body
was abrogated and supplanted by the interim Batasang Pambansa by
virtue of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution, particularly
Amendment No. 1, which partly provides that There shall be, in lieu of
the interim National Assembly, an Interim Batasang Pambansa.

(2) The 1976 amendments to the Constitution ratified by the people in


the October 16-17, 1976 referendum-plebiscite and now form part of
the Constitution, hence, the December 17, 1977 referendum, contrary
to the petitioners posture, may not be said to be designed to
effectuate their ratification. The holding of the coming referendum is
an exercise authorized by one of those amendments, i.e., Amendment
No. 7, which provides that a referendum may be called at any time
the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people
regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest.

(3) No constitutional infirmity attaches to Presidential Decree No. 1229


because the referendum call for therein will not result in an
amendment to the Constitution. The question, Do you vote that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent
President and be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976
Amendments to the Constitution?, to be submitted to the people in
the December 17, 1977 referendum, is in neither the nature nor the
form of an amendment. It merely asks the people to either reaffirm or
repudiate the confidence in the President which they had previously
expressed. If the people vote yes, Amendment No. 3, which provides,
inter alia, that The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the
Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even
after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to

discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his


powers and prerogatives under the Nineteen Hundred and Thirty Five
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution, will simply be reaffirmed and
reinforced. If the people vote no, the President, as he has
categorically announced, will in deference to the will of the people
and exercising a public officers prerogative, resign. The cessation in
office, for any reason, by the incumbent President will not result in an
amendment to the Constitution, the provisions of which will remain
unaltered.

It is clear from the above that the petition does not pose any question
of sufficient importance or significance to warrant the further attention
of the Court.
The dismissal of the instant petition is immediately executory.