ART 476

Salao vs Salao L-26699, March 16, 1976

Facts:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot four children
named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son,
Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.
After Valentinas death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two
children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pampanga, in their names
The property in question is the forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao,
Pampanga, wherein Benita Salao-Marcelo daughter of Valentin Salao claimed 1/3 interest on the said
fishpond.
The defendant Juan Y. Salao Jr. inherited from his father Juan Y. Salao, Sr. of the fishpond and the
other half from the donation of his auntie Ambrosia Salao.
It was alleged in the said case that Juan Y. Salao, Sr and Ambrosia Salao had engaged in the fishpond
business. Where they obtained the capital and that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in
that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from
Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is
no documentary evidence to support that theory.
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951
informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when
Juani took possession thereof in 1945, in which he refused to give Benita and Victorinas children their

one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000. However, there was no mention
on the deeds as to the share of Valentin and Alejandra.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not
have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt
Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of
Ambrosias one-half share.
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr.
and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salaos supposed one-third
share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Issue :
Whether or not the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr.
and Ambrosia Salao.
Whether or not plaintiffs action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
Held:
1. There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan
Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no constructive trust
because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by
fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider
the Calunuran fishpond being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin
Salao.
Ratio:
A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. (Sec.
47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are

valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties
must be clear and convincing.
The plaintiffs utterly failed to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on
vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof. Where a trust is to be
established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of the
alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown. A trust cannot
be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive proof.
Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. In order to establish a trust in real
property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust
obligation were proven by an authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony
consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del
Rosario 50 Phil. 110).
The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already noted, allows an
implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied
trust because, oral evidence can be easily fabricated.
On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land referred to
therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that
they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the
parties must be clear and convincing.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. Once a title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su
casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
2. Reconveyance had already prescribed. Plaintiffs action is clearly barred by prescription or laches.
Ratio:

Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case, the
longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year.
The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance
was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty
years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept
on their rights if they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is
watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).
Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the claim, since it is
human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded.
Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only
persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself.
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran
fishpond, it is no longer to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S.
Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assil
that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to
Ambrosias share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within
the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal
heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not
represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation
takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is
(Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like
the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).

BARICUATRO V CA
On October 16, 1968, Severino Baricuatro, Jr., now deceased and substituted by his legal heirs, bought
two lots on an installment basis from Constantino M. Galeos, one of the private respondents in this
petition. The two lots, designated as Lot Nos. 9 and 10, are part of the Victoria Village (presently called

Spring Village), a subdivision project in Pakigne, Minglanilla, Cebu. Lot Nos. 9 and 10 were sold on an
installment basis for P3,320.00 and P4,515.00, respectively. Petitioner, however, was unable to pay the
full amount to respondent Galeos. At the time the original action for quieting of title was filed in the trial
court, petitioner had an unpaid balance of P1,000.00 as to Lot No. 9 and P3,020.00 as to Lot No. 10.
The titles to the said lots remained in the name of respondent Galeos. As emphasized by the Court of
Appeals, the contract of sale involving Lot No. 10 expressly provided that "the parties both agree that a
final deed of sale shall be executed, in favor of the buyer upon full and complete payment of the total
purchase price agreed upon."
After the sale, petitioner introduced certain improvements on the said lots and started to reside therein in
1970. Since then petitioner has been in actual and physical possession of the two (2) lots.
However, on December 7, 1968, about two (2) months from the date of the previous sale to petitioner,
respondent Galeos sold the entire subdivision, including the two (2) lots, to his co-respondent Eugenio
Amores. Subsequently, petitioner was informed by respondent Galeos about the sale to respondent
Amores and was advised to pay the balance of the purchase price of the two (2) lots directly to
respondent Amores.
After the sale of the entire subdivision to respondent Amores, he allegedly took possession thereof and
developed the same for residential purposes. Respondent Amores registered the deed of sale covering
the entire subdivision on February 13, 1969, secured the transfer of the title to the same in his name,
subdivided the entire land, and acquired individual titles to the subdivided lots in his name, including the
title of the two (2) lots. TCT No. 20016 was issued for Lot No. 9 and TCT No. 20017 for Lot No. 10, both
in the name of respondent Amores.
On December 27, 1974, respondent Amores sold the two (2) lots to the spouses Mariano and Felisa
Nemenio, two of the respondents herein. Prior to the sale, however, petitioner was informed through a
letter by respondent Amores about the impending sale of the two (2) lots but the former failed to
respond. The respondent spouses Nemenio caused the transfer of the titles to the said lots and the
issuance of tax declarations in their names. Thereafter, the respondent spouses Nemenio demanded
from petitioner to vacate the said lots but the latter refused to do so.
Thus, a complaint for quieting of title was filed by the respondent spouses Nemenio against petitioner in
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch V, docketed as Civil Case No. R-15442.
ISSUES:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANT AMORES VALIDLY ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP OF THE TWO (2) LOTS IN QUESTION
AND THAT HE WAS IN GOOD FAITH WHEN HE REGISTERED THE SALE OF THE TWO (2) LOTS IN
QUESTION IN THE REGISTRY OF PROPERTY;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFFS [SPOUSES
NEMENIO] WERE PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH;

HELD:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for
the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.[40]
Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure "...an adjudication that a claim of title to or an
interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those
claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim."[41] In an action for
quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and
other claimants, "...not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to
said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the
right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear
introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best
(citation omitted)."[42] Such remedy may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil
Code: Mse sm
"ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein."
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy.
In this petition, petitioner emphatically contends that respondent Amores, the second buyer, cannot be
categorized as a purchaser in good faith, arguing on the basis of the letter which the latter sent to the
petitioner, reminding the petitioner of his overdue account and warning him that if he could not come up
with the proper solution, it would be his last chance before respondent Amores does other remedies
before the law.[43] The respondent court, in its decision dated April 30, 1992, rejected this contention
and adopted the finding of the trial court that "...at the time of the sale to [respondent] Amores by the
previous registered owner Constantino Galeos sometime in 1968, [respondent] Amores found no
improvements established on the land subject of the sale, and [respondent] Galeos title to the lots was
clean and unencumbered, and that [respondent] Amores came to know of the sale by installment
executed between [respondent] Galeos and [petitioner] Baricuatro only after the sale of said lots to
him."[44] The respondent court discarded petitioners argument and ruled that "[t]he fact that
[respondent] Amores subsequently tried to collect the balance of the purchase price from [petitioner]
Baricuatro as shown by his letter to [petitioner] Baricuatro dated November 10, 1972 does not by itself
prove that he was aware of the previous transaction with [petitioner] Baricuatro at the time of the sale to
him in 1968, that would place him in the category of a buyer in bad faith."

MENDOZA V NAVARETTE
FACTS:

1. On 25 July 1985, petitioner filed a complaint 1 for Annulment of Title, Partition and Damages against
private respondents with Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 8307-M. Petitioner alleges therein:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

"2.

That the plaintiff and defendant Maria Mendoza-Navarette are the only legitimate children of

Spouses Tedoro (sic) Mendoza of Sto. Rosario, Paombong, Bulacan;

3.

That, after the death of the said mother, Narcisa Jumaquio, the said Teodoro Mendoza contracted

a second marriage with Eugenio (sic) Aquino, and they were blesses (sic) with two (2) children, but both
of them died before they became of age;
4.

That Teodoro Mendoza died intestate and without any debt whatsoever in Paombong, Bulacan on

March 19, 1952, leaving a parcel of land more particularly described as follows, together with the
improvement thereon, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A parcel of residential Lot (unregistered) located in Sto. Rosario, Paombong, Bulacan. Bounded in the
N., by Calsada del Barrio; on the E , by Daniel delos Santos and Fortunato Dionisio; on the S., by
Sapang Camachile; and on the W., by Carmen Crisostomo . . . Containing an area of (1,288) Square
meters, more or less, and assessed at P520 00 according to Tax Declaration No. 2941 of the land
records of Bulacan, a certified true copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" .
This parcel of land was surveyed during the Cadastral survey of Paombong (Paombong Cad-297) as Lot
668 with an actual area of (934) square meters and Lot 1024 (Road widening) with an area of 45 square
meters, or a total of 979 square meters, and not 1,288 square meters as stated in its tax declaration
(Annex "A").
5.

That the surviving legal heirs of the said Teodoro Mendoza at the time of his death are his wife,

Eugenia Aquino, and his two (2) children; the herein plaintiff Domingo Mendoza and defendant Maria
Mendoza, married to Leoncio Navarette;

6.

That, on or about April 18, 1963, the aforementioned legal heirs of Teodoro Mendoza executed

on (sic) Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the deceased Teodoro Mendoza where they had
agreed to inherit and partition the property left by him and described above as follows: three fourths (3/4)
to herein Domingo Mendoza, plaintiff, (966 Sq. Mtrs. per document but only 734 sq. meters if based on
actual survey), and the remaining one-fourth (1/4) to surviving wife Eugenia Aquino (322 square meters
per document but only 245 sq. meters if based on actual survey), with the herein Maria Mendoza,
Defendants, fully renouncing and waiving her right to any share or shares that she may be entitled in
(sic) the said property, xerox copy of which document is hereto attached as Annex "B" and hereby made
an integral part of this complaint;
7.

That, in accordance with the said extrajudicial settlement, the old tax declaration of the late

Teodoro Mendoza (Annex "A") was cancelled and two (2) new ones were issued, namely, Tax
Declaration No. 4728 for 966 square meters in favor of plaintiff Domingo Mendoza and Tax Declaration
No. 4729 for 322 square meters in favor of Eugenia Aquino, certified true copies of which are hereto
attached as Annex "C" and "D", respectively;
8.

That, it appears that on May 27, 1963 the said Eugenia Aquino, before she died, had sold her

said one-fourth share in the lot in question which she inherited under Annex "B" and declared in her
name for Taxation purposes under Annex "D", consisting of 322 square meters per document (but only
245 square meters if based on actual survey), to the herein defendant Maria Mendoza and his (sic)
husband Leoncio Navarette, certified xerox copy of which document is hereto attached as Annex "E" ;
9.

That, subsequently thereto, the said Leoncio Navarette and defendant Maria Mendoza caused

the transfer and declaration of the said one-fourth (1/4) they acquired from Eugenia Aquino in their
names, certified true copy of which tax declaration (No. 4738) is hereto attached as Annex "F" ;
10.

That Leoncio Navarette died and is survived by his wife, defendant Maria Mendoza-Navarette,

and three (3) children; namely, Emeterio, Benedicta and Geminiano, all surnamed Navarette, who are
the defendants named in this complaint;
11.

That it was recently discovered early this year by the plaintiff that the late Leoncio Navarette and

herein defendant Maria Mendoza-Navarette, knowingly (sic) well that they are not the owners of the
whole lot in question (Lot No. 668, Case I, Paombong Cad-297), consisting of 934 square meters, but

only one-fourth (1/4) portion thereof consisting of 245 square meters, based on the actual survey, and
the (sic) plaintiff is the owner of the three-fourths thereof consisting of 734 square meters, illegally,
fraudulently and evident (sic) show of bad faith, filed an application for Free Patent (No. III-6-000886)
with the Bureau (sic) of Lands and caused the said whole lot to be titled and declared in the name of
Leoncio Navarette, married to Maria Mendoza, as evidenced by O.C.T. NO. P-93-45 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Bulacan and Tax Declaration No. 3157, certified true copies of which
application, title and tax declaration are hereto attached as Annexes "G", "H" and "I", respectively;
12.

That the said title and tax declaration (Annexes "H" and "I") are null and void ab initio and should

be annulled or cancelled, for the said registered owners are not the real owners of the land covered by
them, and the plaintiff has been in the open, public, adverse and exclusive possession, in the concept of
an owner, of the three-fourths (3/4) portion thereof consisting of 734 square meters since the death of
his father in 1952 continuously (sic) and publicly up to the present."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PATENT AND THE CORRESPONDING OCT ISSUED COVERING
THE LOT IN CONTROVERSY ARE VALID.
HELD: CO-OWNERSHIP; DEEMED TERMINATED UPON EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT BY THE HEIRS; CASE AT BAR. Co-ownership is not at all involved
in this case. This is very clear from the allegations in the complaint which unmistakably show that
whatever co-ownership existed among the heirs of Teodoro Mendoza over the estate he left behind was
terminated on 11 April 1963 when said heirs executed the deed of extrajudicial settlement, with private
respondent Maria Mendoza Navarette waiving all her rights to the said estate. As a consequence
thereof, three-fourths (3/4) of the property was adjudicated to the petitioner while the remaining onefourth (1/4) share went to the surviving spouse, Eugenia Aquino, both of whom secured separate tax
declarations for their respective lots.
LAND REGISTRATION ACT; FREE PATENT; ISSUANCE THEREOF OVER A PRIVATE LAND; NULL
AND VOID. A Free Patent issued over a private land is null and void. In the 1952 case of Vital v.
Anore, (90 Phil. 855, 858-860 [1952]), this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, held:
"Whether a Torrens title, based on a free patent granted by the Government under the provisions of the
Public Land Act (Act 2874) and issued under the provisions of the Land Registration Act (Act 496), has
the validity and effect of a Torrens title issued as a result of judicial proceedings need not be passed

upon. The rule laid down in Ramoso v. Obligado, Et Al., 70 Phil. 86, that a homestead patent, once
registered under the Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title, . . . is only true and
correct if the parcel of agricultural land patented or granted as homestead by the Government, after the
requirements of the law has been complied with, was a part of the public domain. If it was not but a
private land, the patent granted and the Torrens title issued upon the patent or homestead grant are a
nullity. (Citing Rodriguez v. Director of Lands, 31 Phil. 272 [1915]; Zarate v. Director of Lands, 34 Phil.
416 [1916]; De los Reyes v. Razon, 38 Phil. 480 [1918]; PNB v. Ortiz Luis, 53 Phil. 649 [1929]; Monte de
Piedad v. Velasco, 61 Phil. 467 [1935]).
TORRENS TITLE; AS A RULE, MAY NOT BE CANCELLED AFTER THE LAPSE OF TEN YEARS
FROM THE DATE OF ITS REGISTRATION; EXCEPTION. A Torrens title issued upon a free patent
may not be cancelled after the lapse of ten years from the date of its registration because the statute of
limitations bars such cancellation. But if the registered owner, be he the patentee or his successor-ininterest to whom the free patent was transferred or conveyed, knew that the parcel of land described in
the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to another who together with his predecessors-in-interest
has been in possession thereof and if the patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in
possession thereof, then the statute barring an action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free patent
does not apply, and the true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to the land
judicially settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel of land
granted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his predecessor-ininterest were never in possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff and his predecessorsin-interest have been in possession thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the
defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be
the true owner thereof.
CONCEPT THEREOF. The quality of conclusiveness of a Torrens title is not available for use to
perpetrate fraud and chicanery. To paraphrase from Angeles v. Samia, (69 Phil. 497) the Land
Registration Act does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing and
vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. It cannot be a shield for the commission of
fraud. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Stated elsewise, the Torrens
system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to
confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land. Where the applicant possesses

no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens system of
registration. (Citing Municipality of Victorias v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]) Resort to the
provisions of the Land Registration Act does not give one a better title than he really and lawfully has.
(Citing Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, 77 SCRA 196 [1977]) Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode
of acquiring property. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give the
holder any better title than what he actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The
effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all." (Citing De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 156
SCRA 701 [1987])
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION; ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE; IMPRESCRIPTIBLE IN FAVOR OF
ONE IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY; RULE THEREON. The petitioners open, public,
adverse and exclusive possession of the three-fourths (3/4) portion of the property and its illegal
inclusion in the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title issued to Lorenzo Navarette give the former
a cause of action for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible in favor of a person in possession of the
property. The allegations in his complaint before the trial court are sufficient for such a cause of action.
In Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals, (133 SCRA 718, 724-725 [1984]) this Court, per Madame Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, ruled: "Prescription cannot be invoked against JULIANA for the reason that
as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in
effect, seeks to quiet title to the property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to
property in ones possession is imprescriptible. (Citing Sapto v. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683, 687 [1958]) Her
undisturbed possession over a period of fifty two (52) years gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of
a Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her own
title. (Citing Faja v. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441 [1977]) Besides, under the circumstances,
JULIANAs right to quiet title, to seek reconveyance, and to annul OCT No. 63 accrued only in 1966
when she was made aware of a claim adverse to her own. It was only then that the statutory period of
prescription may be said to have commenced to run against her, following the pronouncement in Faja v.
Court of Appeals, (75 SCRA 441) a case almost identical to this one."
Ernesto David et al v Cristito Malay GR No. 132644, November 19, 1999 (318 SCRA 711)
Facts:
Andres Adona, married to Leoncia Abad, applied for a homestead patent over a parcel of agricultural
land. When Leoncia died, he cohabited with Ma. Espiritu without the benefit of marriage. When Andres
died Ma. Espiritu succeeded in obtaining title over the land in her name. After Maria Espiritu died, her

children as well as descendants of Andres Adona by his marriage with Leoncia Abad, continued to be in
peaceful and quiet possession of the subject land. The petitioners executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement with sale over the property to Mrs. Ungson. Respondents protested contending they are the
true owners of the land. The sale was however rescinded because Mrs. Ungson failed to pay in full the
amount agreed upon. Subsequently, the petitioners executed another deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Sale, dividing equally among themselves the land and sold their respective shares to their copetitioner Ubago et al. where an Original Cert. of Title was issued in their favor on Nov. 27, 1992.
Respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale with restraining order, injunction and damages
against the petitioners contending that the Original Cert. of Title was obtained by Ma. Espiritu by false
representation as the widow of Andres Adona.
Lower court ruling: dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and on ground of prescription.
The action, being an annulment of sale based on fraudulent titling of the property constitutes a cause of
action of a collateral attack on the Torrens Title. Even if the action was treated as one of conveyance,
the suit will still fail because the action for reconveyance could be brought within 10 years from the date
of issuance of certificate of title and the action has already prescribed.
Court of Appeals ruling: set aside dismissal of lower court and ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of the Ubagos and reconveyance of the property of the estate of Andres
Adona. There was evidence that Ma. Espiritu concealed the existence of Adonas first marriage to
Leoncia from her executed affidavit filed with the Director of Lands. The attending fraud created an
implied or constructive trust in favor of the plaintiffs and notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens
Title issued in favor of Ma. Espiritu they can still be compelled to reconvey the title of the property to the
real owners. The Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud
or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not the certificate of title of the Ubagos may be collaterally attacked and the property
can be reconveyed to the respondents?
Ruling;
The issuance of a certificate of title of disposable public land and certificate of title issued under a judicial
registration proceeding is deemed indefeasible. Under the Land Registration Act, a Torrens title

becomes indefeasible after 1 year from the date of the decree of registration. The decree becomes
incontrovertible and binding on all persons whether notified or not being an in rem proceeding. The OCT
of Ma. Espiritu was issued in December 1933 and becomes indefeasible a year after the decree.
However, the attendance of fraud created an implied trust in favor of the respondents that gave them the
right of action to seek the remedy of reconveyance of a property wrongfully obtained if the property has
not yet been passed to an innocent purchaser for value. If the property has been passed into the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy would be an action for damages. The Court of Appeals
did not err to treat the action for annulment of sale with damages as one for reconveyance.
If the person who claims to be the owner of the property is in actual possession thereof, the right to
reconvey does not prescribe. An action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years.
However, the person who is in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His
undisturbed possession gives him continued right to seek the aid of court to ascertain the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party on his title. The prescription of 10 years on reconveyance based on
implied trust is applied only to persons who are not in actual possession of the property.
The Ubagos are not buyer in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of
another without knowledge that other persons may have right or interest to the property and pays a full
consideration of the same before he has notice of the claim or interest of others to the property. He buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could
convey title to the property. It is true that a person dealing with a registered land has the right to rely on
the face of a Torrens title and may dispense with the need to make further inquiry. An exception would
be when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances attending to the title that would
impel a reasonably prudent man to make an inquiry or he has some knowledge as to the defect on the
title or lack of right of the vendor. The court finds out that in the Register of Deeds their Transfer of
Certificate of Title has entry that provides that their ownership over the land is subject to prospective
claims by any possible heirs and creditors who might have been deprived of their lawful participation in
the estate. Rule 74, section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for 2 years after the settlement and
distribution of an estate for any person or heirs who may have been unlawfully deprived of their
participation in the distribution of an estate to bring action to compel the settlement of the estate in the
courts in the manner provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. The Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale was executed on December 15, 1990 while the plaintiffs complaint for
Reconveyance was filed on December 7, 1992. Hence, the two-year period has not yet elapsed.

HEIRS OF DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF DORONIO[2008]

Facts:
Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante deceased,were the registered owners of a parcel of land
located.
Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, deceased, were the children of the spouses and the parties in
this case aretheir heirs.
Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.
Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed before the
RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinana petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation" docketed as
Petition Case No. U-920.
No respondents were named in the said petition although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin
boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen. During the hearings, no one
interposed an objection to the petition. After
the RTC ordered a general default, the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993.
This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of anew
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.
Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners predecessors.
On April 28, 1994,the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition
in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC
that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order
be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481
be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No.
U-920 had already become final as it was not appealed.
Issue:

Can respondents be bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 even if they were not made
parties in the said case?
Held:
Petitioners cannot use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as a shield against the
verification of the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one
for quieting of title. In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the
Rules of Court. Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in
personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as
quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. Thus,
respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in
the said case. The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title
shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. That respondents filed a subsequent
pleading in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did not change
the fact that said decision became final without their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent
pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality of the decision.
Donation Propter Nuptias of Real
Property Made in a Private Instrument
Before the New Civil Code Took Effect
on August 30, 1950 is Void
We now focus on the crux of the petition, which is the validity of the deed of donation. It is settled that
only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later statutes,
unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Accordingly, the Old Civil Code
applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took
effect only on August 30, 1950.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the
property donated must be specifically described. Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts
propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the same Code. Article 633
of that title provides that the gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a public document.
It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public instrument.

In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. Neither did it create any right
because it was not made in a public instrument. Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question to
petitioners predecessors.
Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new TCT No. 44481 in favor of
petitioners predecessors have no legal basis. The title to the subject property should, therefore, be
restored to its original owners under OCT No. 352.
Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet been determined in a proper
proceeding who among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still
unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones entitled to the properties of spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante. As earlier intimated, there are still things to be done before the legal share
of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.
Titled Property Cannot Be Acquired
By Another By Adverse Possession
or Extinctive Prescription
Likewise, the claim of respondents that they became owners of the property by acquisitive prescription
has no merit. Truth to tell, respondents cannot successfully invoke the argument of extinctive
prescription. They cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive prescription of the portion of the property
they have been possessing. The reason is that the property was covered by OCT No. 352. A title once
registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious
possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. It is notice to the whole world and as such all
persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of
registration, but it cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered
land. The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. Certainly, it cannot be used to
divest the lawful owner of his title for the purpose of transferring it to another who has not acquired it by
any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich

himself at the expense of another. Where such an illegal transfer is made, as in the case at bar, the law
presumes that no registration has been made and so retains title in the real owner of the land.

ART 485
LAVADIA V COSME
DOCTRINE:
1. Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them may be the depository, and when he is, he is
subject to the same obligationsimposed by law on all depository with respect to the preservation
of the thing with the care, diligence and interest of a good father.
2. For the administration and better enjoyment of thing owned in common, according to article
398 of the Civil Code, it is mandatory thatthere be an agreement of the majority of the
participants (owners).
FACTS:
1880: Certain jewelry were manufactured through the efforts of 6 pious ladies of Pagsanjan, Laguna,
They were sisters Pia and Paula Lavadia, sisters Martina and Matea Lavadia, and sisters Elizabeth
Lavadia and Engracia Lavadia.
The ladies contributed their own jewelry in the making of the crown and also contributed money in the
cost of making them.
The jewelries consist of a golden crown encrusted with diamonds and a diamond choker, bright, also a
belt embedded with diamonds and diamonds, a gold necklace also completely embedded with glitter,
gold bracelet encrusted with diamonds and diamonds, iron silver gilt where the jewels are placed above,
and other various pieces of gold silver or gold for the decoration of the costumes of the image of Our
Lady of Guadalupe

They sent said jewelries to adorn and decorate the Image of Our Lady of Guadalupe, patroness of the
said township, retaining for themselves, the ownership of the same
When they were finished, its owners agreed that these jewels would be left with the taxpayer Pia
Lavadia. She had the jewelrys custody until her death in 1882.
Then, her sister Paula Lavadia succeeded her in the custody of the same.
At Paula Lavadia 's death, her husband Peter Rosales, succeeded her in the care, preservation and
custody of such jewelry
When he died, their daughter Paz Rosales, in turn succeeded him in the jewelrys custody, preservation
and care.
At Paz Rosales' death, the crown and jewels passed to the custody of her husband Baldomero Cosme.
After Baldomero Cosme, said jewelry passed to Manuel Soriano.
He was succeeded in the custody, preservation and management of the jewelry by the defendant herein
Rosario Cosme Mendoza.
Every year since 1980 to date, the jewels in question were used to decorate the image of Our Lady of
Guadalupe in Pagsanjan, and none of those who have been keeping or guarding these jewels had
intended exclusive possession as owner.
Feb. 9, 1938: Rosario, in her capacity as administrator of the deceased intestate Baldomero Cosme,
notified all persons interested in such gems, that she would do a formal delivery of such jewelry to the
Bishop of Lipa on February 12, 1938, informing them that they might witness the act of delivery without
the consent of the other co-owners
Feb. 12, 1938: Rosario and her husband did make formal delivery of the jewels, giving the document for
that purpose.

At this time, the original owners (6 pious ladies) have died, with the exception the plaintiff widow Dona
Engracia y Lavadia Fernandez. The other plaintiffs are the heirs of Isabel, Matea and Martina Lavadia
while the defendant Rosario Cosme de Mendoza and her co-defendants are legitimate heirs and
descendants of
Paula Lavadia.
Plaintiffs not in accord with such delivery designated Engracia Lavadia, one of the original owners, as
recamadora
plaintiff , to have in her care the crown and jewelry in question

June 21, 1938: The Bishop of Lipa, knowing the problem of possession, granted the administration
giving custody of such crown jewels
magulo tong fact na to, di ko matranslate
Plaintiffs then filed a case to claim the possession and custody of all the said jewelry. All these jewels
are locked now and deposited in the Bank of the Philippine Islands, for it was there that Rosario Cosme
had deposited the same.
Defendants Allegations:
Rosario and his co-defendants do not intend to be sole owners of the said jewelry.
On the intestacy of Baldomero Cosme, they have told the Court that they never claimed such dominion
of jewelry or any part thereof.
However, Rosario and her predecessors have complied faithfully in performing their duties as
repositories and therefore the court cannot withdraw the deposit of the jewelries
LOWER COURT:
Against Rosario and co-defendants

Plaintiffs are owners of said fourth-sixths of jewelry, and that the defendants are only owners of the
remainder or only two sixths
The one who had a perfect right to determine who was to take charge of the jewels custody, were the
plaintiffs and they entrusted such care to Engracia Lavadia, one of the primitive owners.
Rosario should deliver all of the jewels to the plaintiffs as she has been acting only as trustee and
fiduciary
Defendants filed an appeal, believing the court erred:
(1) in finding that the appellant Rosario Cosme de Mendoza, and her predecessors are in the
possession of the said jewels, but acted only as trustees, and fiduciaries ,
(2) stating that
appellees are owners of four sixths of jewelry, which for this reason, have the right to exercise the
designation of the person to whom to entrust their care,
(3) by failing to declare that appellant Rosario Cosme de Mendoza, being co-owner and fiduciary of such
jewelry cannot be deprived of her administration and custody, except for reasons that she is
incapacitated to do so, or performs acts contrary to the will of their primitive owners, or dispose of the
above jewels at will,
(4) to stop claiming that Pia Lavadia and their descendants, down to Rosario Cosme de Mendoza, who
had had the custody and possession of the said jewels, have played their duties faithfully
ISSUES:
1)Whether Ramona was a depositary and therefore obligated to return the jewelries to the
owners even if she is a co-owner? (YES)
2)Whether the plaintiffs constitute the majority of the co-owners and therefore can elect who has
custody of the property owned incommon? (YES)
3)Whether, assuming that Ramona is a depositary, the property cannot be withdrawn as she has
complied faithfully in performing their duties as repository? (NO, it can be withdrawn)

RATIO:
1) The contract which existed between the first owners of the jewels at issue and the first person who
had their custody, was a
contract of deposit.
According to this contract as defined in Articles 1758 and following the Civil Code, Pia Lavadia first, and
afterwards Paula Lavadia and then her descendants, one being Rosario, received and possessed, one
after the other, the said jewels, only for purposes of custody or such that they must not use them for their
own benefit.
If it was under a deposit agreement, it is clear that to those who received the jewelry has an obligation to
return them to their owners as soon as claimed by the latter.
Article 1766 of the Civil Code: "The, depositary is obliged to keep the thing and restore it, when so
requested, to the depositor, or his successors, or the person who has been designated in the contract.
Their responsibility for the care and the loss of the thing, is governed by the provisions of title I of this
book. "
The restitution must be made with all the fruits and accessions of the thing deposited, if any, without it
being given to the depositary who may not withhold, as Sanchez says Roman, (IV Sanchez Roman,
885), even under the pretext of obtaining compensation for other credits or compensated for expenses
incurred for preservation.
ROSARIO AND OTHERS:
Contract is not that of a deposit because the jewels cannot be considered as belonging to other persons
with respect to Rosario as she is also a co-owner as descendant of one of its early owners.
HELD:
The first owners of the jewelry concerned who came to entrust the custody of the same to some of them,
expressly reserved hem to their property

Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them may be the depository, and thus it is subject to the same
obligations imposed by law on all depository with respect to the conservation of the thing with the care,
diligence and interest of a good father.
"Joint owner. The fact that the depositary is a joint owner of the res does not alter the degree of diligence
required of him." (C. J. 18, 570).
2) Appellees are owners of said fourth-sixths of jewelry, and appellants only own the remaining portion
(2/6). Therefore, Engracia Lavadia must have the custody and administration of these jewels as she was
entrusted by the appellees, constituting the majority of the primitive owners
As there is no evidence of the contribution of the six primitive owners
in the making or acquisition of the jewels often mentioned in the same proportion, the conclusion, as
reasonable as it is - and this is supported by a presumption of law (Art. 393, Civil Code) -is that
the cost is the same and as such the portions corresponding to the participants of the community shall
be presumed of an equal share.
For the administration and better enjoyment of thing owned in common, according to article 398 of the
Civil Code, it is mandatory that there be an agreement of the majority of the participants.
3) The deposit agreement is such that allows the depositor to withdraw from the depository, the thing
deposited, any time he wanted, especially, when the latter, as in the case of Rosario Cosme Mendoza,
has executed an act against the order received in trying to entrust to another's custody and
administration the thing deposited, on their own without the consent of depositors or their heirs.
DISPOSITIVE:
Lower Court Affirmed

ART 486
PARDELL V BARTOLOME

FACTS:
Appeal by bill of exceptions.
Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively. Prior to
her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her
four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and
universal heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca were already deceased, leaving Vicenta and
Matilda as heirs.
In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial
agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and
collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicentas interest. Despite
repeated demands to divide the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde
had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt promises and
other excuses.
Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.
RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the revenues and the expenses
were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were
either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned,
Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the
evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That
motion was denied by the lower court. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned property.
RULING:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:

Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their
object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners
from utilizing them according to their rights.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of
joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any
detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from
utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor
were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and
enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the
reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and
every one of the coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde
Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last named,
assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said
province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is
not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents
and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during
several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside
from that founded on the right of co-ownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the
administration and care of the property of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and
improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might
have been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because
one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and
effects of common ownership between the litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with
her husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister
Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right
pertaining to her as a coowner of the property.

ART 493
RAMON MERCADO, BASILIA MERCADO joined by her husband, FRANCISCO RONQUILLO,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PIO D. LIWANAG, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
1. That the complaint filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant seeks to annul a Deed of Sale on the
ground of fraud and on the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code.
2. That on July 14, 1956, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the plaintiff Ramon Mercado and the
defendant Pio D. Liwanag executed a Deed of Sale, photostat copy of which is attached hereto marked
as Annex "A" and forming an integral hereof, covering a divided half and described in meter and bounds,
or an area of 2,196 square meters at P7.00 per square meter or for a total amount of P15,372.00, of a
parcel of land situated at Kangkong, Quezon City, covered Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20805 of the
Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal, now Quezon City:
3. That the said T.C.T. No. 20805 containing an area of 4,392 square meters, is issued in the name of
the plaintiffs Ramon Mercado and Basilia Mercado as co-owners PRO-INDIVISO, and the sale was
without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff Basilia Mercado;
4. That out of the total area of 4,392 square meters, an area consisting of 391 square meters was
expropriated by the National Power Corporation sometime in December 1953 at a price of P10.00 per
square meter, Civil Case No. Q-829 (Eminent Domain) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch, entitled "National Power Corporation, plaintiff, versus Brigido Almodoban, et als.,
defendants," but this fact of expropriation came to the knowledge of the defendant Pio D. Liwanag upon
the registration of the Deed of Sale Annex "A".
5. That pursuant to the Deed of Sale Annex "A" T.C.T. No. 32757 was issued in the name of Pio
Liwanag and Basilia photostat copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "B".

6. That defendant submits the receipt signed by plaintiff Ramon Mercado dated July 14, 1956 photostat
copy of which is attached hereto and marked as Annex "C" and promissory note of the same date for
P10,000.00, photostat copy of which is attached hereto and marked is Annex "D" which are both selfexplanatory, but plaintiff Ramon Mercado disclaims payment and receipt of such check and promissory
note, the check being uncashed and is still in the possession of Atty. Eugenio de Garcia;
7. That plaintiffs and defendant respectfully submit for resolution of this Honorable Court the issue of
whether or not the Deed of Sale Annex "A" court be annulled based in the foregoing facts in relation to
Article 493 of the Civil Code, setting aside all other issues in the pleadings.
ISSUE: Article 493 of the Civil Code the sale in question was valid
HELD:
Article 493 provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Appellants except to the application of this provision in this case for the reason that in the deed of sale
sought to be annulled the vendor disposed of a divided and determinate half of the land under coownership. The argument, as far as it goes, seems to be tenable. What a co-owner may dispose of
under Article 493 is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to divide the property into parts
and then convey one part by metes and bounds. Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Gonzales, et al. vs.
Itchon, et al., 47 O.G. 6290; Manresa, Vol. 3, 7th ed. p. 630.
The pertinent recitals in the disputed deed of sale read:

I hereby sell, transfer and convey absolutely and irrevocably unto said Pio D. Liwanag, his heirs,
successors, and assigns my rights, title and interest on my chosen portion of the above described
property which consist of one-half of aforesaid ownership bounded on the West by Pacifico Gahudo, on
the North by Hacienda de Piedad and on the South by Circumferential Road, consisting of 50 meters
more or less frontal length along Circumferential Road, and with a total area of 2,196 square meters as
indicated in Co-owners Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20805.
Nevertheless, upon registration of the sale and cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 20805 in the
names of the previous co-owners, the new transfer certificate that was issued (No. 32757) did not
reproduce the description in the instrument but carried the names of appellee Pio D. Liwanag and Basilia
Mercado as "co-owners pro-indiviso." There is no suggestion by any of the parties that this new
certificate of title is invalid, irregular or inaccurate. There is no prayer that it be canceled. As far as
Basilia Mercado is concerned she retains in all their integrity her rights as co-owner which she had
before the sale, and consequently, she has no cause to complain. Much less has Ramon Mercado, for it
was he who was responsible for whatever indicia there may be in the deed of sale that a determinate
portion of the property was being sold, as shown by the second paragraph thereof, quoted without
contradiction in appellee's brief as follows:
That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title was originally in my name, but was split into two equal
parts by virtue of my desire to donate to my sister-in-law Juana Gregorio an equal half thereof with the
understanding that I as donor would have the absolute power to choose from the property owned in
common that part which I would like to segregate for myself or my heir and assigns.
And of course appellee himself not only does not challenge the new certificate of title, wherein he
appears as co-owner of an undivided one-half share, but precisely relies upon it for his defense in this
action.
The title is the final and conclusive repository of the rights of the new co-owners. The question of
whether or not the deed of sale should be annulled must be considered in conjunction with the title
issued pursuant thereto. Since, according to this title, what appellee acquired by virtue of the sale is only
an undivided half-share of the property, which under the law the vendor Ramon Mercado had the
absolute right to dispose of, the trial court committed no error in dismissing the action. The end-result of
the transaction is in accordance with Article 493 of the Civil Code.

The other point raised by appellants refers to the statement in the dispositive portion of the decision
appealed from that "the stipulation with regards to the deed of sale based on the ground of fraud is
insufficient for all purposes and besides, no proof showing the allegation of such fraud exists in the
accord." It is contended that the trial court erred in making such statement, the same being contrary to
the stipulation in which the parties expressly eliminated the issue of fraud. From the entire context of the
decision, however, it can be gathered that the case was not decided on the basis of the said issue. In
any event, even if the court did err in considering the question of fraud in spite of the stipulation, the
error is not a prejudicial one. As far as the dismissal of the actions concerned, it makes no difference
whether fraud has not been proven or fraud has been abandoned as an issue by express agreement.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants in this instance.
SANTOS vs. BUENCONSEJO
CASE NUMBER: G.R. No. L-20136 DATE: June 23, 1965 PONENTE: CONCEPCION,
FACTS:
1.
Petitioner Jose A. Santos y Diaz seeks the reversal of an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay,
denying his petition
: a.
Cancellation of original certificate of title No. RO-3848 (25322), issued in the name of Anatolio
Buenconsejo, Lorenzo Bon and Santiago Bon, and covering Lot No. 1917 of the Cadastral Survey of
Tabaco, Albay, and b.
Issuance in lieu thereof, of a separate transfer certificate of title in his name.
2.

Lot No. 1917 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-3848 (25322) was originally owned in
common by Anatolio Buenconsejo to the extent of undivided portion and Lorenzo Bon and Santiago
Bon to the extent of the other (Exh. B)
3.
Anatolio Buenconsejo's rights, interests and participation over the portion abovementioned were by a
Certificate of Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Albay, transferred and conveyed to Atty. Tecla
San Andres Ziga, awardee in the corresponding auction sale conducted by said Sheriff
4.
By a certificate of redemption issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Albay, the rights, interest, claim and/or
or participation which Atty. Tecla San Andres Ziga may have acquired over the property in question by
reason of the aforementioned auction sale award, were transferred and conveyed to the herein
petitioner in his capacity as Attorney-in-fact of the children of Anatolio Buenconsejo
, namely, Anastacio Buenconsejo, Elena Buenconsejo and Azucena Buenconsejo (Exh. C).
5.
Petitioner Santos had redeemed the aforementioned share of Anatolio Buenconsejo, upon the authority
of a special power of attorney executed in his favor by the children of Anatolio Buenconsejo.
6.
Relying upon this power of attorney and redemption made by him,
Santos now claims to have acquired the share of Anatolio Buenconsejo in the aforementioned Lot No.
1917;
7.

As the alleged present owner of said share, Santos caused a subdivision plan of said Lot No. 1917 to be
made, in which the portion he claims as his share thereof has been marked as Lot No. 1917-A; and that
he wants said subdivision at No. 1917-A to be segregated from Lot No. 1917 and a certificate of title
issued in his name exclusively for said subdivision Lot No. 1917-A. 8.
Lower court: ruled in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Santos claim that he has acquired the share of Anatolio Buenconsejo
in Lot No. 1917 relying upon a power of attorney and redemption made by him is tenable?
RULING:
No! SC affirmed the lower courts decision that petitioner's claim is clearly untenable, for three reasons:
a. Said special power of attorney authorized him to act on behalf of the children of Anatolio
Buenconsejo, and, hence, it could not have possibly vested in him any property right in his own name;
b. The children of Anatolio Buenconsejo had no authority to execute said power of attorney, because
their father is still alive and, in fact, he and his wife opposed the petition of Santos;
c. In consequence of said power of attorney (if valid) and redemption, Santos could have acquired no
more than the share pro indiviso of Anatolio Buenconsejo in Lot No. 1917, so that petitioner cannot
without the conformity of the other co-owners (Lorenzo and Santiago Bon), or a judicial decree of
partition issued pursuant to the provisions of Rule 69 of the new Rules of Court (Rule 71 of the old Rules
of Court) which have not been followed By Santos adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate
portion of said Lot No. 1917, as his share therein, to the exclusion of the other co-owners. Inasmuch as
the appeal is patently devoid of merit, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with treble cost
against petitioner-appellant Jose A. Santos y Diaz.
It is so ordered.

LEONORA ESTOQUE vs. ELENA M. PAJIMULA

FACTS:
Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey of Rosario, was originally owned by the late spouses, Rosendo
Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were survived by her children, namely, Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez
and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On October28, 1951, Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania
sold her right and participation in Lot No. 802consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters
to Leonora Estoque. On October29, 1951, a deed of extrajudicial settlement was entered into wherein
Lorenzo Perez, EmiliaP. Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and
participation in LotNo. 802 to Crispina Perez. On December 30, 1959, Crispina Perez and her children
Rosita Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and Aurora
Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula, the remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot No. 802with an area of 958
square meters. Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co-owner of
Lot No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an area of 640 square meters as
evidenced by a deed of sale, which was executed on October 28, 1951 by Crispina Perez de Aquitania,
one of the co-owners, in her favor. On the other hand, the defendant, who on December 30, 1959
acquired the other 2/3portion of Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquitania and her children, claimed that the
plaintiff bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is definitely identified and segregated, hence there
existed no co-ownership at the time and after said plaintiff bought the aforesaid portion, upon which right
of legal redemption can be exercised or taken advantage of. Estoques stand is that the deed in her
favor was inoperative to convey the southeastern third of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre
notwithstanding the description in the deed itself, for the reason that the vendor, being a mere co-owner,
had no right to sell any definite portion of the land held in common but could only transmit her undivided
share, since the specific portion corresponding to the selling co-owner is not known until partition takes
place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528). From this premise, the
appellant argues that the sale in her favor, although describing a definite area, should be construed as
having conveyed only the undivided 1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at the time by the vendor, Crispina
Perez Vda. de Aquitania. Wherefore, when the next day said vendor acquired the 2/3 interest of her two
other co-owners, Lot 802 became the common property of appellant and Crispina Perez. Therefore,
appellant argues, when Crispina sold the rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the former
was selling an undivided2/3 that appellant, as co-owner, was entitled to redeem, pursuant to Article 1620
of the New Civil Code.ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. Should two or more

co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they
may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the deeds of sale show
that the lot acquired by plaintiff Estoque was different from that of the defendants Pajimula; hence they
never became co-owners, and the alleged right of legal redemption was not proper. Estoque appealed.
ISSUE:
WON right of redemption can be exercised by Estoque?
HELD:
NO. Appellant Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of lot 802on October 29,
1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an undivided interest in lot 802. And when eight years later
Crispina Perez sold to the appellees Pajimula the western two-thirdsof the same lot, appellant did not
acquire a right to redeem the property thus sold, since their respective portions were distinct and
separate.(1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object sold as
the southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of 840square meters,
more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could not have sold this
particular portion of the lot owned in common by her and her twobrothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez,
by no means does it follow that she intended to sell to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the
lot forementioned. There is nothing in the deed of sale to justify such inference. That the seller could
have validly sold her one-third undivided interest to appellant is no proof that she did choose to sell the
same.
.
(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been ineffective, for lack
of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed, the transaction was validated
and became fully effective when the next day (October 29,1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired
the entire interest of her remaining co-owners(Annex B) and thereby became the sole owner of Lot No.
802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey (Llacer vs. Muoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines clearly prescribes that .When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by
operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
CA decision affirmed

Si v CA

FACTS:
Spouses Armada transferred their property to the names of their three sons namely, Crisotomo, Jose
and Severo. Crisostomo through Cresencia (atty-in-fact) executed a deed of sale in favor Anita Si.
Spouses Jose Armada (other brother) filed a complaint to annul the sale on the ground that there was no
written notice of such sale whereas the deed stated that the co-owners are not interested in buying the
land. Further, there was misrepresentation on the citizenship of Cresencia is a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners claimed that there was really no co-ownership since the parents executed three deeds of
sale assigning specific properties to the brothers. Since there is no-ownership it follows that there is no
right to redemption. Petitioners pointed out that it was only because the brothers failed to submit a
subdivision plan which is the reason why there is only one certificate of title.
Lower court dismissed the petition. CA reversed and said that co-ownership still exists and that the land
was undivided. Petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the basis that there was annotation at the back
of the original TCT due to the sale in favor of the brothers. CA denied because the reglementary period
had lapsed and the decision has become final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are co-owners and that they are entitled to right of
redemption based on Art 1623 of NCC.

RULING:
1. Trial court was correct in finding that the parents already partitioned the property which was registered
with the RD. Every portion conveyed and transferred was definitely described and segregated with
corresponding technical description. After this division co-ownership already ceased. Hence, there is no
right to redemption available to the respondents.

2. There was an actual notice of the impending sale and Jode even acknowledged such when he told his
brother Crisostomo in a letter Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of
Leveriza. Written notice is no longer necessary when there is actual notice.
RATIONALE:
After the physical division of the lot among the co-owners, the community ownership is terminated, and
the right of preemption or redemption for each other was no longer available. There is no co-ownership
when the different portions owned by the different people are already concretely determined and
separately identifiable, even if not yet technically
described.

DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINOTOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO AFABLE, respondents.
FACTS: It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the
said land consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato Delgado. On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon
alone sold the remainder of the land consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de
Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square meters of land which the
latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. On December 3, 1975, John Lanuza, acting
under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two
parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the
provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. It appears that said land had been successively
declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the registered co-owners, then in
the name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in that of Donato Delgado in 1936, then in Ponciana de
Lanuza's name in 1962 and finally in the name of Celestino Afable, Sr. in 1983.
In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed that he had acquired the
land in question through prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty of laches.He later

filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a result of the sale
to him of the land.

ISSUE: whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such laches as may effectively bar their
present action.
HELD: The principal issue to be resolved in this case concerns the applicability of the equitable doctrine
of laches. Initially though, a determination of the effect of a sale by one or more co-owners of the entire
property held in common without the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the
aggrieved co-owners is required.
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code.Thus:
Art. 493.

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits

pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal
provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.[Ramirez v. Bautista, 14
Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are
valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the
sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed
parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the
buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and

void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a coowner of the property.
As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.
In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendant-appellee's defense of prescription is a vain
proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, '(n)o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.'
Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens System, the express
provision of Act No. 496 that '(n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession' is squarely applicable. Consequently,
prescription will not lie in favor of Afable as against the petitioners who remain the registered owners of
the disputed parcel of land.
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners.
Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1) conduct on the
part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
corporations complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred [Go China Gun, et al. v. Co Cho
et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)].
While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third elements are missing.
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights. However, the mere fact of
delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of
the conduct of defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an

opportunity to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned with the mere lapse
of time. Thus:
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy,
G.R. No. L-21450, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 29,35; Tendo v. Zamacoma, G.R. No. L-63048, August 7,
1985, 138 SCRA 78, 90].
The doctrine of "laches" or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted," [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, p. 35]. [Emphasis supplied.]
It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not attended
with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit.
The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge or notice on the part of
the defendant that the complainants would assert the right on which they base the suit. On the contrary,
private respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that the property was coowned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special
authorization to self was granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.
Even as the land here was misrepresented in the deeds of sale as "unregistered," the truth was that
Afable already had notice that the land was titled in the name of six persons by virtue of the Certificate of
Title which was already in his possession even before the sale. Such fact is apparent from his testimony
before the court a quo:
Such actual knowledge of the existence of other co-owners in whose names the lot subject of the sale
was registered should have prompted a searching inquiry by Afable considering the well- known rule in
this jurisdiction that:

... a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of
title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautions man to make such
inquiry. [Gonzales v. IAC and Rural Bank of Pavia, Inc., G.R. No. 69622, January 29, 1988).
Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a genuine gesture of good
faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who were still listed as co-owners in the certificate of title
which was already in his possession even before the sale. In failing to exercise even a minimum degree
of ordinary prudence required by the situation, he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own risk.
Hence any prejudice or injury that may be occasioned to him by such sale must be borne by him.
It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino Afable is not a buyer in
good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to the court with clean
hands.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
Del Campo v. CA
FACTS:The Bornales (Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita) were the
original co-owners of a lot in Capiz. Salome had sold her 4/16 share to Daynolo with Salome, Consorcia
and Alfredo signing the Deed of Absolute Sale, which had described the metes and bounds of the
property. Daynolo immediately took possession and mortgaged the portion to Regalado. Simplicio
Distajo, heir of Daynolo, had paid the mortgaged debt and redeem the lot from Regalado, who executed
a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Daynolos heirs (SimplicioDistajo, Rafael Distajo and
Teresita Distajo). They sold the redeemed portion to the spouses DelCampo and Quiachon.Meanwhile,
Regalado had cause the reconstitution of the OCT initially reflecting the share of theBornales but the title
was later transferred to Regalado, who had the entire property subdivided and titled into smaller lots.The
spouses Del Campo brought this complaint for the repartition, resurvey and reconveyance of lot against
the heirs of Regalado (deceased). Owned the portion of land erroneously included in the TCT in the
name of Regalado Had occupied the lot as a residential dwelling ever since their purchase of it from
the Distajos Had declared the land for tax purposes and paid the corresponding taxes Presented the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed between Soledad and Salome, Deed of Mortgage and Deed of

Discharge of Mortgage signed by Regalado and Deed of Absolute sale showing their purchaseThe trial
court dismissed the complaint. Salome could alienate her pro-indivisio share but could not have validly
sold an undivided portion of the lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, from whom the Del Campos had
derived their title. Del Campos could not have a better right to the property even if they were in
physical possession and had declared for tax purposes because mere possession cannot defeat the
right of Regalado, who had a Torrens title.CA had affirmed the decision.
ISSUES:W/N a sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common is
valid?
HELD:
YES. A sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common is valid but
only up to her proviso share.
it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that petitioners could not have acquired ownership of
the subject land which originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that their alleged right springs
from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad. The mere fact that Salome purportedly
transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not
per se render the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article 493[10] of the Civil Code and
pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et.al.[11] which
we find relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not
render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere
potest. (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have.)[12]
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by
Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even
exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale
executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be
taken from Salomes 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or
in part even without the consent of the other co-owners. Salomes right to sell part of her undivided
interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner
has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
substitute another person in its enjoyment[13] Since Salomes clear intention was to sell merely part of

her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be
given effect to the full extent.

IMPERIAL vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Eloy Imperial purchased a parcel of land from his father LeoncioImperial. Although the
transaction was denominated as a sale, both admit that it was adonation.Subsequently, Leoncio filed an
action for the annulment of the supposed deed of sale but a compromise agreement was then made by
both parties. When Leoncio died, hisadopted son, Victor, substituted him in the Compromise agreement.
When Victor also died,his heirs (herein private respondents) filed an action for annulment of the donation
on theground that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner Eloy impaired the legitimeof
Victor, their natural brother and predecessors-in-interest.Petitioner Imperial raises the defense that the
donation did not impair Victorslegitime and that the action of respondents has already prescribed.
Issue:
Was the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of petitioner Eloy Imperialinofficious and should be
reduced?
Held:
No. Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount toa claim of title. In the
recent case of Vizconde vs. CA, we declared that what is brought tocollation is not the donated property
itself, but the value of the property at the time it wasdonated. The rationale for this is that the donation is
a real alienation which conveysownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir of the done.

ART 494
AURORA DEL BANCO, EVELYN DEL BANCO, FEDERICO TAINO, SOLEDAD TAINO, JOVENCIO
TAINO, SAMSON TAINO, NOE TAINO, SOCORRO TAINO and CLEOFAS TAINO, petitioners,
vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Second Civil Cases Division), ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA,

LEONILA ENCALLADO, VEDASTO ENCALLADO, JOSE YEPES, et al., respondents.

FACTS:
In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February 11, 1859, three
brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr. Manuel Pena)
entered into an agreement which provided, among others:
(1)

That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the Island of

Cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban, Province of Tayabas
(now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares;
(2)

That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common property;

(3)

That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time

represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for them in the
proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island;
(4)

That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the co-owners

in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo
Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father, Manuel
Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).
On August 14, 1866, co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the Island
purchased by them from the Spanish Government. On April 11, 1868 they agreed to modify the terms
and conditions of the agreement entered into by them on February 11, 1859.
About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a special action for
partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court,
including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the

second contract of co-ownership dated April 11, 1968. In their answer some of the defendants,
petitioners herein, interposed such defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel
and laches.
ISSUE:
whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and
successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola.
HELD:
There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had
really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement
entered into in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island.
With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole, and in this sense,
over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion,
in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract,
because until physical division is effected such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely
determined (3 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 3rd Ed., page 486, cited in Lopez vs. Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601; De
la Cruz vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307 [1970]; Felices vs. Colegado, 35 SCRA 173 [1970],; Dultra vs. CFl 70
SCRA 465 [1976]; Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977].)
In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how the Island was to
be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that of January 20, 1907 reveals that
as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had as yet been done. The
second and fourth paragraphs of the agreement speaks of a survey yet to be conducted by a certain
Amadeo and a plan and description yet to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a son of the surveyor named
Amadeo who is referred to in the contract dated April 18, 1908 as the surveyor to whom the task of
surveying Cagbalite Island pursuant to said agreement was entrusted, however, testified that said
contracts were never implemented because nobody defrayed the expenses for surveying the same
(Record on Appeal, p. 225).
The issue in the aforementioned case which were tried together is not whether there has already been a
partition of the Cagbalite Island. The actions were brought by the plaintiff to recover possession of three

distinct parcels of land, together with damages. In fact the word partition was used in the metaphysical
or Ideal sense (not in its physical sense).
Commenting on the above ruling of the Court in connection with the instant case, the respondent Court
said:
Concededly, the Supreme Court decision in G.R. Nos. 21033-35 (Exh. X) did use or employ the word
"partition." A careful reading of the said decision will, however, reveal, and we so hold, that the
employment or use of the word "partition" therein was made not in its technical and legal meaning or
sense adverted to above, but, rather in its Ideal, abstract and spiritual sense, this is (at) once evident
from the bare statement in said decision to the effect that the property was divided into four parts,
without any reference to the specific parts of the property that may have been adjudicated to each
owner. There being no such reference in the decision and in the judgment affirmed therein to the
adjudication of specific and definite portions of the property to each co-owner, there is a clear and logical
inference that there was indeed no adjudication of specific and definite portions of the property made to
each co-owner.
It must be admitted that the word "partition" is not infrequently used both in popular and technical
parlance (Fule vs. Fule, 52 Phil. 750 [1929]). For purposes of the aforementioned case, evidently the
Court used the word "partition" to refer to the distribution of the Cagbalite Island agreed upon by the
original owners and in the later agreements, by the heirs and their subsequent successors-in-interest.
There need not be a physical partition; a distribution of the Island even in a state of indiviso or was
sufficient in order that a co-owner may validly sell his portion of the co-owned property. The sale of part
of a particular lot thus co-owned by one co-owner was within his right pro-indiviso is valid in its entirety
(Pamplona vs. Moreto, 96 SCRA 775 [1980]) but he may not convey a physical portion with boundaries
of the land owned in common (Mercado vs. Liwanag, 5 SCRA 472 [1962]). Definitely, there was no
physical partition of the Island in 1859. Neither could there have been one in 1894 because the manner
of subdividing the Island was only provided for in the later agreements entered into by the heirs in 1907
and 1908. There was a distribution of the Island in 1868 as agreed upon by the original co-owners in
their agreement of April 11, 1868. Any agreement entered into by the parties in 1894 could be no more
than another agreement as to the distribution of the Island among the heirs of the original co-owners and
the preparation of a tentative plan by a practical surveyor, a Mr. Jose Garcia, mentioned in the first

paragraph of the 1907 agreement, preparatory to the preparation of the real plan to be prepared by the
surveyor Amadeo, mentioned in the agreement of April 18, 1908.
What is important in the Court's ruling in the three aforementioned cases is that, the fact that there was a
distribution of the Island among the co-owners made the sale of Domingo Arce of the portion allocated to
him though pro-indiviso, valid. He thus disposed of all his rights and interests in the portion given to him.
It is not disputed that some of the private respondents and some of the petitioners at the time the action
for partition was filed in the trial court have been in actual possession and enjoyment of several portions
of the property in question (Rollo, p. 148). This does not provide any proof that the Island in question has
already been actually partitioned and co-ownership terminated. A co-owner cannot, without the
conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court (Rule 71 of the Old Rules), adjudicate to himself in fee simple a
determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other coowners (Santos, Jr. vs. Buenconsejo, 14 SCRA 407 [1965]; Carvajal vs. Court of Appeals, 112 SCRA
237 [1982]). It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership both under the present Civil Code as in the
Code of 1889 that no individual co- owner can claim any definite portion thereof (Diversified Credit
Corporation vs. Rosada 26 SCRA 470 [1968]). lt is therefore of no moment that some of the co-owners
have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the Island occupied by
them (Rollo, p. 10).
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan
drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in
the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]).
The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Maganon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]).
Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the
petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the Cagbalite
Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not been proven that
the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. While there is co-ownership, a coowner's possession of his share is co-possession which is linked to the possession of the other coowners (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).

Furthermore, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71 [1973], Tero
vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other coowners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners
(Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]).
An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497,
provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of the common
property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc,
79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co- owner (Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
On July 23, 1986, the Court through its Second Division denied the petition for the review of G.R. No.
72620, the petition for review on certiorari separately filed by Josefina Pansacola (Rollo, p. 151).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.

MARIA BICARME assisted by her husband JOSE BALUBAR, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISTINA BICARME, respondents.
FACTS:
(a)

That Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners and

entitled in equal shares over the parcel of land in litigation and described under paragraph 3 of the
complaint;

(b)

That the alleged deeds of Sale executed by Maria Bicarme covering and affecting the two parcels

of land in suit are declared null and void in so far (sic) as they affect and/or cover the one-half undivided
share and inheritance of plaintiff Cristina Bicarme;
(c)

Maria Bicarme is ordered to account and/or pay the value corresponding to the one-half ()

undivided shares of Cristina Bicarme in the yearly fruits of the land and to commence from the filing of
this complaint; that is seventy five bundles of palay valued at P375.00 with legal interest fully paid;
(d)

That the parties are hereby ordered within (15) days from receipt of this decision to amicably

agree upon a written partition and to submit the same for approval, parties shall appoint a Commissioner
to effect and carry out effectively the partition of the 2 parcels of land in equal parts between the plaintiff
and the defendant;
(e)

Defendant and her hirelings and representatives are forever ordered to refrain from molesting the

Commissioner in the discharge of his duty to partition said two (2) parcels of land in suit;
ISSUE: whether or not Maria has been in possession of the lands in question under the conditions
required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to uphold acquisitive prescription in her favor.

In the present case, Maria Bicarme disclaims the co-ownership by denying that subject properties are
the inherited properties. Other than the tax declarations in her name, there is no written evidence that
these were acquired/purchased from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. Payment of land taxes
does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's
rights. Moreover, Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her rights, was not even aware thereof.
Neither did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be
dead. Her refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the
yearly taxes. Acquisitive prescription cannot therefore apply in this case:
Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co- owners. A mere silent
possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings
and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of
exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive evidence that he exercised

acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other coowners. (Mangyan v. Ilan, 28 O.G. 62; Laguna v. Levantino, 40 O.G. (14th Suppl.) 136, cited in A.
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Ann., Vol. II, pp. 193- 194)
Additionally, it follows that neither can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription,
(i.e., where it has not been shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive
and opposed to the right of the others) the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on
imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply. Cristina's right to partition wig therefore prosper.
Finally, We eliminate the award on attorney's fees in the absence of any specific allegation thereon in
her complaint, or that the same is covered by any of the eleven (11) exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208
of the New Civil Code. Even if We were to concede exercise of judicial discretion in the award of
attorney's fees under Art. 2208, par. 11, this provision "demands a factual, legal or equitable justification.
Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture." (Mirasol v. De la Cruz, G.R. L-32552, July 31, 1978; 84 SCRA 337.)
Likewise, "the matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the
decision. The text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded" (ibid). In
the present case, the matter of such fees was touched but once and appears only in the dispositive
portion of the decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award on attorney's fees is eliminated.
Costs against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory.

Mallilin v Castillo
FACTS:
Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted. During their union,
they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business flourished and the couple
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to
irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or payment of
Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that coownership could not exist between them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-

ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and
wife but not married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting
marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved in Mallilin's
action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered
solely in her name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.
RULING:
Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated to marry
each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their
property regime falls under Article 148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties
acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed
to be equal.
ADILLE V. CA- Notice of Repudiation
Registration is not equivalent to notice of repudiation when it is done to defraud the others. Torrens title
cannot be used as shield for fraud.
FACTS:
There was a woman who had two husband. With the first husband, she produced the Petitioner. The
second husband, the Respondents. Meanwhile, this woman owned a land and sold the same to a third
person with right of repurchase. However, when the woman died, it was Petitioner who by himself
repurchased the land and later on he executed an affidavit of sole ownership and registered the land
unto himself alone. Eventually, the other heirs (Respondent) learned of the registration so they filed an
action to cancel the title.
Now Petitioner claims prescription almost on similar grounds with the previous case, i.e. the registration
constituted constructive notice to the other heirs, if not to the world.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is correct.
RULING:
NO! First of all, the redemption by Petitioner benefited all so that the ownership did not transfer to him
alone. The other heirs only need to reimburse him.
As to the notice, the registration by Petitioner cannot be considered as notice of the repudiation because
they were done in bad faith to deprive the other co-heirs. In fact, they were done clandestinely. One of
the co-heir in fact was in possession of the land and yet he was not informed of the pending registration
nor ousted by Petitioner. Hence, should there have been any notice, it would be during litigation when
the heirs finally learned of the registration. In that case, there is no prescription yet.
RATIONALE:
Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem the property entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto to his name. Even so, this doesnt mean that the redeeming coowner has the right to the entire property. It doesn't provide a mode of transferring co- ownership.
DELIMA V. CA
201 SCRA 641
FACTS:
Lino bought a lot from the friar lands. He died and was survived by his brothers and sisters. Galileo was
the caretaker of the property. He was able to execute an affidavit adjudicating to himself the parcel of
land and was able to secure the issuance of a TCT in his name. This prompted the heirs of his siblings
to file for reconveyance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the other heirs are still entitled to the land or are they barred by prescription.
HELD:

When the co-owner of the property executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof, obtained a
cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new title in his name as
owner, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter
seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and their rights thereafter. The issuance of a
new title constituted a clear act of repudiation of the trust and co-ownership.
RATIONALE:
Cancellation of old title and issuance of new one constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or
co-ownership which would start the running of prescription.
The other heirs are barred by prescription. How did this happen? Galileo was able to prove the 4
requirements: (1) clear and convincing evidence of repudiation (2) made known to the other owners (3)
adverse possession and open repudiation (4) for over 10 years.
What is important in this case is that the Court ruled that registration of the land would be sufficient
compliance with the notice requirement above.
Maria del Rosario Mariategui vs. CA
G.R. No. 57062, Jan. 24, 1992
FACTS:
This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging to Lupo Mariategui, who died without a
will.
During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The first wife died, so he contracted a second
marriage. The second wife also passed away so he contracted a third marriage. The third wife also
preceded Lupo in death.
The issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo left certain properties which he
acquired when he was still unmarried. Later, Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a certain lot of the
Muntinglupa Estate and title was issued. Now, Lupos children by his third marriage filed a complaint

with the lower court, contending that since they were co-heirs of Lupos estate they were deprived of
their respective shares in the lot mentioned. In answer, the other party said that the complaint was not
really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children.
The lower court ruled in favor of Lupos heirs from the first and second marriage. Thus, the case was
elevated to the CA, where they raised the issue of their parents lawful marriage and their legitimacy as
children.
CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the estate. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed
Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to successional rights over the said lot
HELD:
The case is really one for partition. The question of the status of the private respondents was raised only
collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased.
Existence of the Marriage
Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the
declaration communicated by Lupo to his son who testified that when his father was still living, he was
able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,

absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not
denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact.
Filiation
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacintos birth certificate
was a record of birth referred to in Article 172 of the Code. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove
facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private
respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents
required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same manner
as their brother Jacinto.
Prescription of Action for Partition
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate
children and heirs of Lupo and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action
for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private
respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit
prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words,

prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated
by the co-owner.

ART 497
PANGANIBAN V OAMIL
Facts: 2 properties are the subject of this case, the first one is the "21st portion" and the
second one, we refer to as "the Canda St. portion." Petitioners in this case and their father
(Partenio) are the co-owners of such property. 1/2 to the father, as his conjugal share, and 1/6 of
the remaining half to the petitioners as surviving heirs. Oamil was the buyer in this case and she
filed an action for specific performance in the trial court praying that the father be ordered to
execute a deed of sale of the parcel of land which is covered by their agreement. However,
there is a confusion as to what the subject of the agreement was (whether it was the 21st portion or the
Canda portion). In its decision the RTC ordered that the deed of absolute sale be executed, however
they did not state which portion of the property should be deeded. Acting on this decision, the
petitioners averred to the CA

that their properties were still being subject of a partition

proceeding and that their case is still pending with the Court of Appeals. Hence, the RTC cannot
yet decide on which property was the subject of the sale between Oamil and Paternio. When the
partition proceeding was decided, the Canda portion was awarded as the conjugal share of Paternio.
However, the CA still rendered a decision to the contrary and stated that the subject property in the
sale consists of the 21st portion thereby disregarding the decision in the parition proceeding.
Respondents here moved for reconsideration but it was denied for being dispensable parties to the case
despite their claims of co-ownership. They appealed to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are indispensable parties to the civil case for the reason that they
are co-owners of the subject property.

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the subject property of the sale was the 21st portion and
not the Canda portion despite the decision in the partition proceeding.
Ratio: They can intervene in this case since they are indispensable parties to the case. Under a coownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons and during
its existence, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community property until
the partition thereof. All that a co-owner has is an ideal or abstract or proportionate share in the entire
land or thing. Before partition, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in
the common property. In the event of a division, assignees of one or more of the co-owners may take
part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their
concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud,
or in case it was made, notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to
the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity. The

decision

in

the

partition

case

determines what Paternio, and the respondent (as his successor in interest) is entitled to in the civil
case. As the successor in interest, they cannot acquire any superior right in the property than
what Partenio is entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition. In the contract of sale,
what the vendee obtains by virtue of such sale are the same rights as the vendor had as coowner and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner. The decision of the
courts in the partition proceeding is the law of the case and is conclusive on the issue of which
specific portion of the property became the subject matter of the sale between Partenio and Oamil. The
effect of the transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of
the property, it cannot exceed the portion of Partenio. v The principle of conclusiveness should be
observed by the courts. In order that it can be conclusive, it must be of the same parties, and
that the issue must be identical.

Cruz v Catapang
Facts:
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land covering
an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.[5] With the

consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built
a house on a lot adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house intruded,
however, on a portion of the co-owned property.[6]
In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the property and was surprised to
see a part of respondents house intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then made
several demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion
encroaching on their property. The respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands.[7]
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint[8] for forcible entry against respondent before the
7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of
the co-owners is not sufficient to justify defendants construction of the house and possession of the
portion of the lot in question.[9] The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant or any person acting in her behalf
to vacate and deliver the possession of the area illegally occupied to the plaintiff; ordering the defendant
to pay plaintiff reasonable attorneys fees of P10,000.00, plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed the MCTCs ruling in a Decision dated October
22, 2001, the dispositive portion of which states:
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed] from is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, respondent filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTCs decision. The Court of Appeals held that there is no
cause of action for forcible entry in this case because respondents entry into the property, considering
the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy
or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry.[12] The Court of Appeals decision
further held that petitioners remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with
the appropriate forum. The Court of Appeals disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision
dated 22 October 2001 as well as the Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Taal,
Batangas, Branch 86, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another is entered
DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 71-T.
SO ORDERED.[13]
After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
June 11, 2004, she filed the instant petition.

ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A
VALID LICENSE FOR THE RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE
PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] COOWNER[.]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP
OVER THE PORTION OF THE LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT
GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO-OWNER.[14]
III.
. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION BY MEANS OF SIMPLE STRATEGY.[15]
Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the Court of Appeals decision.
Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land to a
person to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry
case filed by another co-owner against that person.
In her memorandum,[16] petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma
Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership
that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common
until partition.
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum[17] counters that the complaint for forcible entry
cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the
consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house
she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves
rights of co-owners to enjoy the property.
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a
forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who was given the consent to
construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote

common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.[18] In our
view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned
property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with
the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may
be changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the
consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may
afford adequate relief.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the
co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a
third person to construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership
and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the
thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the
other co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent,
in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.[19] The construction of a
house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article
491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct
her house on the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed
against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner
and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into
the property still falls under the classification through strategy or stealth.
The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondents entry into the property
was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot
give our imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the
permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-

owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected
clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by
stealth.[20] Moreover, respondents act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma
Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a
strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondents acts
constitute forcible entry.
Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year period for filing the
complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted
from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the oneyear period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about it.[21] Although respondent constructed
her house in 1992, it was only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the
property. Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to get a
favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year
period from the time petitioner learned of the construction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 16, 2003 and the Resolution
dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69250 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated October 22, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is
REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.