Better Safe than Sorry

R2P and the Case for the Syrian Buffer Zone

By J. Trevor Ulbrick

To date, three million Syrians have fled the war in their country. The exodus has now
surpassed the Rwandan genocide as the largest refugee crisis since World War II. So
far, the single biggest displacement was triggered by the Islamic State of Iraq and alShams (ISIS) march into Kobani, which led 200,000 civilians to flee in just four
days. The United Nations has warned of another Srebrenica if Kobani is overrun.
Already teeming with 800,000 Syrian refugees, Turkey is now advocating the
establishment of a buffer zonean internationally administered safe haven on
Syrian territoryto protect major population centers along the Syrian border. The
United States, United Kingdom, and France are apparently considering the idea as
well.
Much of the commentary about the buffer zone has focused on the significant
political and military dilemmas involved. Would a buffer zone exacerbate the refugee
crisis, causing more Syrians to flee their war-torn cities on the promise of safety and
international aid? Would these civilians then need to be protected by a so-called
humanitarian corridor, a column of Western troops and fighter jets around the
territory, which could draw the West inexorably into Syrias brutal civil war? But the
most important question may be a legal one: How could NATO or a U.S.-led coalition
legitimately occupy part of a sovereign state?
To the extent that international law can shape and constrain military objectives, the
justification offered for a buffer zone would play an important role in marshalling
support from friendly statesand signaling intentions to unfriendly ones. Here,
evaluating the situation within the framework of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
norm could be key. R2P could give the West the international legitimacy it needs to
create a buffer zone around Kobani. But R2Ps focus on protecting civilians might

also raise uncomfortable questions about the Wests responsibility for Syrian
refugees fate, whether threatened by ISIS or the Bashar al-Assad regime.
R2P reflects an emerging consensus among countries that protecting civilians from
mass atrocities is both an essential component of sovereignty and is critical to
international security. When a state lacks the capacity or manifestly fails to protect
its population from genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, R2P
empowers the international community to step in. The situation in northern Syria,
where ISIS has attacked the citizens of Kobani with impunity, seems to fall squarely
under R2P. The Assad regime is either unwilling or unable to protect the Kurdish
civilians living there, who are now under imminent threat of being massacred by ISIS
on the basis of their ethnicity.
There are a number of reasons why the West might need to rely on R2P to justify a
buffer zone in Syria. In a letter to Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, the
United States supported its current air campaign against ISIS in Syria on the basis of
a collective defense of Iraq. But ISIS had taken over significant Iraqi territory, at
one point threatening Baghdad. It would be difficult to argue that ISIS poses a
similar threat to Turkey. Further, the focus of the buffer zone would be more about
saving Syrian civilians than protecting Turkey from ISIS itself, making the collective
defense justification an awkward fit. Without an explicit UN Security Council
resolution or authorization from the Syrian government (both extremely unlikely), a
buffer zone would need a legal basis beyond collective defense.
Another issue is that buffer zones have historically required much more than air
power to succeed. As the Srebrenica massacre illustrates, safe havens can end in
tragedy when they arent enforced by a substantial military presence. There, Serb
paramilitaries massacred 8,000 Muslim men and boys, as lightly-armed Dutch
peacekeepers watched helplessly, hamstrung by vague rules of engagement and
inconsistent NATO air support. In both Syria and Iraq, ISIS has proven itself to be
determined, ruthless, and effective. At a minimum, then, a buffer zone in Syria would

require substantial ground forces on Syrian soil backed by a no-fly zone and a clear
mandate to use force to protect civilians. Its hard to imagine Damascus remaining
silent as Western troops occupy its sovereign territory. And that makes securing
broad legal justification for the operation all the more important.
Still, military action on the basis of R2P is bound to be controversial, since Russia
will likely veto any Security Council resolution. There is no good answer to the
question of what the international community can do when the United Nations fails
to act in the face of imminent mass atrocities. When the United Kingdom argued last
August that using force to stop the Assad regimes chemical weapons attacks on
civilians would be legal even without Security Council authorization, many states
vigorously disagreed. Even so, the legal right to use force to prevent genocide and
crimes against humanity has arguably existed since the 1999 NATO intervention in
Kosovo. R2P refined the doctrine of humanitarian intervention by imposing a legal
framework that restricts military operations to those focused on protecting civilians.
Legality aside, another concern is that a buffer zone could lead to a broadening of the
Western mission in Syria. Although R2P wouldnt legally obligate the West to
intervene if the Assad regime, for instance, launched another chemical weapons
attack on civilians, it would make it much harder for the West to ignore. A buffer
zone would also force the West to confront Syrias disintegration, and, in some sense,
take responsibility for the fate of its people. Libyas post-Muammar al-Gaddafi
turmoil has left many disillusioned about the Wests ability to intervene and stabilize
countries in the region.
Perhaps this is why, despite the renewed interest in creating a buffer zone, its
ultimate aim remains murky. Some countries, such as France and the United
Kingdom, probably see it in largely humanitarian terms, as a way to provide
protection and relief to Syrians fleeing ISIS and Assad, and enable aid organizations
to deliver badly needed food, water, and medical supplies. Yet others, such as Turkey,
likely want it to also serve as a staging ground for moderate rebel groups to launch

attacks on the Assad regime. In Damascus, a buffer zone would almost certainly be
viewed as a provocation. Counterattacks could draw the United States and its allies
into the regions worst conflict in a generation.
Whether a Syrian buffer zone makes sense militarily and politically depends on
whom you ask. To be sure, a buffer zone presents serious risksbut the status quo is
fast becoming untenable. What Kobani has made clear is that Syrias humanitarian
crisis is quickly becoming Turkeys national security issue. If NATO or a U.S.-led
coalition decided to assist Turkey in establishing a buffer zone, many states would
undoubtedly object, but R2P could provide a sound legal basis for it.
Even so, R2P would not provide a blank check for intervention in Syria; it would only
permit the use of proportionate military force that is necessary for protecting
civilians in the buffer zone. In this sense, R2Ps legal framework could help mitigate
the risk of mission creep, as long as the Assad regime doesnt perpetrate any mass
atrocities in the future. But its also true that invoking R2P would send a message
that protecting Syrian civilians is now the Wests duty. And it isnt at all clear that
this is a responsibility the United States and its allies would welcome.