ABUNGAN VS

Before us is an appeal filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50,[2] in Criminal Case
No. V-0447, in which he was convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased. With the assistance of Atty. Simplicio Sevilleja, appellant pleaded
not guilty upon his arraignment on April 30, 1993.
On January 9, 1999, he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in
Muntinlupa. However, In a letter dated August 7, 2000, Joselito A. Fajardo,
assistant director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that
Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Attached
to the letter was Abungan's Death Certificate. Issue
The only issue before us is the effect of Appellant Abungan's death on the
case and on the appeal.
This Court's Ruling
The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal
extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict
(civil liability ex delicto).
In the present case, it is clear that, the death of appellant extinguished his
criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the
appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability
arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also
extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based
on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may
file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law
and procedural rules.
Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the
dismissal of the criminal case against him.[11]Necessarily, the lower court's
Decision -- finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased -- becomes ineffectual.
against Pedro Abungan is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed Decision SET
ASIDE. Costs de oficio

LEUNG BEN VS OBRIEN

This is an application for a writ of certiorari, the purpose of which is to quash
an attachment issued from the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
under circumstances hereinbelow stated. An action was instituted in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by P. J. O'Brien to recover of Leung
Ben the sum of P15,000 alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the
defendant in a series of gambling, banking and percentage games conducted
ruing the two or three months prior to the institution of the suit. In his
verified complaint the plaintiff asked for an attachment against the property
of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was about to depart from the
Philippine islands with intent to defraud his creditors. This attachment was
issued; and acting under the authority thereof, the sheriff attached the sum
of P15,000 which had been deposited by the defendant with the International
Banking Corporation.
The defendant thereupon appeared by his attorney and moved the court to
quash the attachment. Said motion having dismissed in the Court of First
Instance, the petitioner, Leung Ben, the defendant in that action, presented
to this court his petition for the writ of certiorari directed against P. J. O'Brien
and the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. The prayer
is that the action in said court be required to certify the record to this court
for review and that the order of attachment which had been issued should be
revoked and discharged with costs.
The contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to recover money
lost at gaming is no such an action; that the Court of First Instance acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in granting the writ of attachment; that the
petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise; and that consequently the writ of certiorari supplies the
appropriate remedy for his relief.
ISSUE (1) Supposing that the Court of First Instance has granted an
attachment for which there is no statutory authority, can this court entertain
the present petition and grant the desired relief? (2) Is the statutory
obligation to restore money won at gaming an obligation arising from
"contract, express or implied?"
RULING We are of the opinion that the answer to the first question should be
in the affirmative. Under section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction by the writ of certiorari over the
proceedings of Courts of First Instance, wherever said courts have exceeded

their jurisdiction and there is no plaint, speedy, and adequate remedy. In

section 220 of the same Code, we have a provision relative to the final
proceedings in certiorari, and herein it is stated that the court shall
determine whether the inferior tribunal has regularly pursued its authority it
shall give judgment either affirming annulling, or modifying the proceedings
below, as the law requires. Indeed the repeated use of expression excess of
jurisdiction shows that the lawmaker contemplated the situation where a
court, having jurisdiction should irregularly transcend its authority as well as
the situation where the court is totally devoid of lawful power. The writ of
certiorari can not be used to reverse an order denying a motion for a
preliminary injunction is of course not to cavil. (Somes vs. Crossfield and
Molina, 8 Phil. Rep., 284.) But it will be said that the writ of certiorari is not
available in this cae, because the petitioner is protected by the attachment
bond, and that he has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy appeal. To
postpone the granting of the writ in such a case until the final hearing and to
compel the petitioner to bring the case here upon appeal merely in order to
correct the action of the trial court in the matter of allowing the attachment
would seem both unjust and unnecessary.
Passing to the problem propounded in the second question it may be
observed that, upon general principles,. recognize both the civil and common
law, money lost in gaming and voluntarily paid by the loser to the winner can
not in the absence of statue, be recovered in a civil action. But Act No. 1757
of the Philippine Commission, which defines and penalizes several forms of
gambling, contains numerous provisions recognizing the right to recover
money lost in gambling or in the playing of certain games (secs. 6, 7, 8, 9,
11).In the case now under consideration the duty of the defendant to refund
the money which he won from the plaintiff at gaming is a duty imposed by
statute. It therefore arises ex lege.By all the criteria which the common law
supplies, this a duty in the nature of debt and is properly classified as an
implied contract. It is well- settled by the English authorities that money lost
in gambling or by lottery, if recoverable at all, can be recovered by the loser
in an action of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received. (Clarke vs.
Johnson. Lofft, 759; Mason vs. Waite, 17 Mass., 560; Burnham vs. Fisher, 25
Vt., 514.)
the cause of action stated in the complaints in the court below is based on a
contract, express or implied and is therefore of such nature that the court
had authority to issue writ of attachment. The application for the writ of
certiorari must therefore be denied and the proceedings dismissed. So
ordered.

PEOPLES CAR VS COMMANDO SECURITY

On April 5, 1970 at around 1:00 A.M., defendant's security guard on duty at
plaintiff's premises, "without any authority, consent, approval, knowledge or
orders of the plaintiff and/or defendant brought out of the compound of the
plaintiff a car belonging to its customer, and drove said car for a place or
places unknown, abandoning his post as such security guard on duty inside
the plaintiff's compound, and while so driving said car in one of the City
streets lost control of said car, causing the same to fall into a ditch along J.P.
Laurel St., Davao City by reason of which the plaintiff's complaint for
qualified theft against said driver, was blottered in the office of the Davao
City Police Department." 5 As a result of these wrongful acts of defendant's
security guard, the car of plaintiff's customer, Joseph Luy, which had been
left with plaintiff for servicing and maintenance, "suffered extensive damage
in the total amount of P7,079." 6 besides the car rental value "chargeable to
defendant" in the sum of P1,410.00 for a car that plaintiff had to rent and
make available to its said customer to enable him to pursue his business and
occupation for the period of forty-seven (47) days (from April 25 to June 10,
1970) that it took plaintiff to repair the damaged car, 7 or total actual
damages incurred by plaintiff in the sum of P8,489.10. Plaintiff claimed that
defendant was liable for the entire amount under paragraph 5 of their
contract whereas defendant contended, without questioning the amount of
the actual damages incurred by plaintiff, that its liability "shall not exceed
one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos per guard post" under paragraph 4 of their
contract. RULING The defendant relies on Par. 4 of the contract to support its
contention while the plaintiff relies on Par. 5 of the same contract in support
of its claims against the defendant. For ready reference they are quoted
hereunder: 'Par. 4. Party of the Second Part (defendant) through the
negligence of its guards, after an investigation has been conducted by the
Party of the First Part (plaintiff) wherein the Party of the Second Part has been
duly represented shall assume full responsibilities for any loss or damages
that may occur to any property of the Party of the First Part for which it is
accountable, during the watch hours of the Party of the Second Part,
provided the same is reported to the Party of the Second Part within twentyfour (24) hours of the occurrence, except where such loss or damage is due
to force majeure, provided however that after the proper investigation to be
made thereof that the guard on post is found negligent and that the amount
of the loss shall not exceed ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS per guard
post.' 'Par. 5 The party of the Second Part assumes the responsibility for
the proper performance by the guards employed, of their duties and (shall)

be solely responsible for the acts done during their watch hours, the Party of
the First Part being specifically released from any and all liabilities to the
former's employee or to the third parties arising from the acts or omissions
done by the guard during their tour of duty.' Paragraph 4 of the contract,
which limits defendant's liability for the amount of loss or damage to any
property of plaintiff to "P1,000.00 per guard post," is by its own terms
applicable only for loss or damage 'through the negligence of its guards ...
during the watch hours" provided that the same is duly reported by plaintiff
within 24 hours of the occurrence and the guard's negligence is verified after
proper investigation with the attendance of both contracting parties.
Defendant is therefore undoubtedly liable to indemnify plaintiff for the entire
damages thus incurred, since under paragraph 5 of their contract it
"assumed the responsibility for the proper performance by the guards
employed of their duties and (contracted to) be solely responsible for the
acts done during their watch hours" and "specifically released (plaintiff) from
any and all liabilities ... to the third parties arising from the acts or omissions
done by the guards during their tour of duty." Plaintiff was in law liable to its
customer for the damages caused the customer's car, which had been
entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making
good such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract
and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had been caused
directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant's security guard in
breach of their contract. As ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code, "obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith." ACCORDINGLY, the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of
P8,489.10 as and by way of reimbursement of the stipulated actual damages
and expenses, as well as the costs of suit in both instances. It is so ordered.

LUIS PICHEL, petitioner, vs. PRUDENCIO ALONZO, respondent.

This case originated in the lower Court as an action for the annulment of a
"Deed of Sale" executed by Prudencio Alonzo, as vendor, in favor of Luis
Pichel, as vendee. :
That the VENDOR for and in consideration of the sum of FOUR THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P4,200.00), hereby sells transfers, and conveys, by
way of absolute sale, all the coconut fruits of coconut land, designated as Lot
No. 21 - Subdivision Plan No. Psd- 32465, situated at Balactasan Plantation,
Lamitan, Basilan City, Philippines; That for the herein sale of the coconut
fruits are for all the fruits on the aforementioned parcel of land presently
found therein as well as for future fruits to be produced on the said parcel of
land during the years period; which shall commence to run as of SEPTEMBER
15,1968; up to JANUARY 1, 1976
However, After the pre-trial conference, the Court a quo issued an Order
dated November 9, 1972 which in part read thus:
That the land awarded was cancelled by the Board of Liquidators on January
27, 1965 on the ground that, previous thereto, plaintiff was proved to have
alienated the land to another, in violation of law hence, plaintiff's rights to
the land were reinstated.
Even as of the date of sale, however, the land was still under lease to one,
Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that part of the consideration of the
sale, in the sum of P3,650.00, was to be paid by defendant directly to Ramon
Sua so as to release the land from the clutches of the latter. Pending said
payment plaintiff refused to snow the defendant to make any harvest.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the respondent had the right or authority to execute the "Deed
of Sale" in 1968, his award having been cancelled previously by the Board of
Liquidators on January 27, 1965
(2) Whether the contract is one for lease of the land, or for sale of coconut
fruits
(3) Whether the contract is an encumbrance as contemplated by R.A. 477
RULING

1. A cancellation of an award granted pursuant to the provisions of Republic

Act No. 477 does not automatically divest the awardee of his rights to the
land. Such cancellation does not result in the immediate reversion of the
property subject of the award, to the State "until and unless an appropriate
proceeding for reversion is instituted by the State, and its reacquisition of the
ownership and possession of the land decreed by a competent court, the
grantee cannot be said to have been divested of whatever right that he may
have over the same property."
2. We do not agree with the trial court that the contract executed by and
between the parties is "actually a contract of lease of the land and the
coconut trees there. The Court's holding that the contract in question fits the
definition of a lease of things wherein one of the parties binds himself to give
to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain and for a period
which may be definite or indefinite (Art. 1643, Civil Code of the Philippines) is
erroneous. The essential difference between a contract of sale and a lease of
things is that the delivery of the thing sold transfers ownership, while in
lease no such transfer of ownership results as the rights of the lessee are
limited to the use and enjoyment of the thing leased.
The contract was clearly a "sale of the coconut fruits." The vendor sold,
transferred and conveyed "by way of absolute sale, all the coconut fruits of
his land," thereby divesting himself of all ownership or dominion over the
fruits during the seven-year period. The possession and enjoyment of the
coconut trees cannot be said to be the possession and enjoyment of the land
itself because these rights are distinct and separate from each other, the first
pertaining to the accessory or improvements (coconut trees) while the
second, to the principal (the land). A transfer of the accessory or
improvement is not a transfer of the principal. It is the other way around, the
accessory follows the principal. Hence, the sale of the nuts cannot be
interpreted nor construed to be a lease of the trees, much less extended
further to include the lease of the land itself.
3. We find after a close and careful examination of the terms of the first
paragraph of Section 8 hereinabove quoted, that the grantee of a parcel of
land under R.A. No. 477 is not prohibited from alienating or disposing of the
natural and/or industrial fruits of the land awarded to him. What the law
expressly disallows is the encumbrance or alienation of the land itself or any
of the permanent improvements thereon. While coconut trees are permanent
improvements of a land, their nuts are natural or industrial fruits which are
meant to be gathered or severed from the trees, to be used, enjoyed, sold or

otherwise disposed of by the owner of the land. Herein respondents, as the

grantee of Lot No. 21 from the Government, had the right and prerogative to
sell the coconut fruits of the trees growing on the property.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower Court is hereby set
aside and another one is entered dismissing the Complaint. Without costs.

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a
parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that
of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and
eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action,for destruction by means
of inundation and a civil case, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction
caused by respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
RULING
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil
action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by
the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for

the recovery of damages. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged
presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil
Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo
vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the
hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against respondent corporation.

BENIGNO DEL RIO, plaintiff-appellant,

TANGUINLAY, defendant-appellee.

vs.

CARLO

PALANCA

This suit was brought to recover money which plaintiff alleges to have
furnished from December, 1942 to February, 1945 for the support and
subsistence of defendant's five minor natural children.
"For one to recover under the provisions of article 1894 of the Civil Code, it
must be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished as
dependent of one bound to give support but who fails to do so; second, that
the support was supplied by a stranger;and third, that the support was given
without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty."
With reference to the first requisite, the record reveals that in a case for
support instituted by Maria Dolores Cuartero in behalf of her children against
the defendant, whereby the defendant promised to pay the mother of the
minors P1,500 a month for their maintenance. Besides P1,500 a month, he
sent the children extra cash and foodstuffs, shoes and clothings.
And the plaintiff admittedly was aware of the foregoing arrangement. What
he say is that P1,500 a month was utterly insufficient. The remedy in that
case was to ask the court to increase the allowance.
The third requirement of the law is also lacking. The plaintiff made the
alleged advances not only with the knowledge but apparently against the
wishes of the defendant. Del Rio informed Palanca that up to December 31,
1942, he had bande Maria Dolores Cuartero P750 as a loan for the support
and education of the defendant's children and requested that that amount be
paid.
In the face of this attitude of the defendant, the plaintiff was not justified in
continuing supplying money to the mother of the children, unless he wanted
to give it out of charity or without the expectation of recovering it from the
defendant. His remedy is against Maria Dolores Cuartero.
This conclusion makes unnecessary a discussion of the second requirement.
It suffices to estate that the plaintiff and one of the children were engaged
and were married afterward.

CLEMENTE BRIAS, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, which found
the accused Clemente Brias guilty of the crime of DOUBLE HOMICIDE THRU
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE prior the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita
Gesmundo. That on or about the 6th day of January, 1957, in the Municipality
of Tiaong, Province of Quezon, Philippines, the said accused Victor Milan,
Clemente Brias and Hermogenes Buencamino, respectively, wilfully and
unlawfully drove and operated the train in a negligent, careless and
imprudent manner and failed to take the necessary precautions for the
safety of passengers and to prevent accident to persons and damage to
property, two of its passengers, Martina Bool, an old woman, and Emelita
Gesmundo, a child about three years of age, fell from the passenger coach of
the said train, as a result of which, they were over run, causing their
instantaneous death. The Court of First Instance of Quezon convicted
defendant-appellant Clemente Brias for double homicide thru reckless
imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor Millan. On
appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.
During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon, the heirs of the deceased victims filed with the same court, a
separate civil action for the recovery of P30,350.00 from the Manila Railroad
Company as damages resulting from the accident.
The accused-appellant alleges that the Court of Appeals made the following
errors in its decision:
I t.hqw
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERAPPELLANT UNDER THE FACTS AS FOUND BY SAID COURT; and
II t.hqw
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INCLUDING THE PAYMENT OF
DEATH INDEMNITY BY THE PETITIONER- APPELLANT, WITH SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY, AFTER THE HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED HAVE ALREADY COMMENCED A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR

DAMAGES AGAINST THE RAILROAD COMPANY ARISING FROM THE SAME

MISHAP.
We see no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the
conclusion drawn from those findings. It was negligence on the conductor's
part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was still a full three
minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of Appeals correctly observed, "the
appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and
erroneous announcement of petitioner' appelant Brias. This announcement
prompted the victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said
announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their
respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection
between the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant
and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any
intervening efficient causes.
The source of the obligation sought to be enforced is culpa contractual, not
an act or omission punishable by law. A perusal of the records clearly shows
that the complainants in the criminal action for double homicide thru
reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file an independent
civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila Railroad
Company.
The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of
the separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still
awarded death indemnity in the judgment of conviction against the
petitioner-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award for
death indemnity is increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina Bool
instead of P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for the death of Emelita Gesmundo
instead of P3,000.00, but deleting the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency imposed by the lower court. The judgment is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.