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MARK MjZOWER
Dark Continent:
Europe's Twentieth Century
PENGUIN BOO"'~
pubhoMdby,hrP.ngumG,oup
l'en1'''nlloohL<d.~7WriW>''Lom'.London''8
jTz.Enf,land
"""gUln ""'nam Inc.. l7S Hudwn S",,~', New York, Nr'" York '00'4, USA
l'.ngu'nlloobAum.li.L'd,Rin8"'ood.Vo<"m
..... u.. "'lia
r",,~u'nlloohCan.d.
L<d. ,0 ... 1<ornA.on...:, TuronlO,On,."o.Can.do
M4Y
J~~
PenSU'" Book. (NZ)l.tJ,
P""."II'g
IO~lIo~, N~MC, Auckl.nrl. New Ze.hrnd
Prnguon!look< L,d, Rtgi'lOr.d
Offi<co, HOfmQnd,,,,onn.
for Ruthie
lind in memory of
Copy,iW>,ClM ...
",nnw>"._",eJ
Tho .... hOl'.nd publis~
Frourna Malower
Ma"M:lIOWer
RegSh:lffer
Contents
Preface
I.
2..
.0
77
,06
367
'0'
Mapsa~d
Tables
Guide
Index
."
.. .1.6
Notes
10
FllrllJerReaJilrg
..6"'
."
DARK
CONTlNtNT:
EUROPE'S
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
6
Blueprints for the Golden Age
- 10
- J. Maritain,
Christitmisme d dimocrallt
The Second World War and the confrontation with the reality of a
Nazi New Order in Europe acted as a catalyst inside and outside Ihe
continent for a renewed attempt TO define the place of (he democranc
nation-state in the modern world. This chapter attempts TO describe
the vanous axes along which the wanimedehafc look placr,;I debate
whose core concerned the rerhmkmg of anorher New Europe 10 nv .aI
the authontarmn monst"r creared hy Berlin. It goes wlthoul s.il.yi~
~~~~u~:, ;~:~~~; ::;:;~
~r~;~:~s
a::;~::};~:r3:o
;~~~::;
,H,
In
0,0.111(
CONTINENT:
EUIIOPE'S
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
REVIVING
DEMOCRACY
the manner in which it shall be built'. Hitler could not win the war,
in his view, but he would have performed 'the perhaps indispensabk
Iuncnon of sweeping away the liner of the old order'. Thusthestrugle
was 'an episode in a revolution of social and political order'.'
At the very heart of this revolution were the preservation and
reasserrion of democratic values in Europe. 'Democracy! Perhaps no
word has ever been more devalued and ridiculed,' wrote the French
resistance paper Franc- Tireur in March 1944. 'Only yesterday it stood
for long-winded committee speeches and parliamentary impotence.'
Aware of the deep disaffection with the Third Republic in France,
General de Gaulle expressly avoided raising the subject in his early
broadcasts. 'At the moment,' he wrote in July '941, 'the mass of the
French people confuse the word democracy with the parliamentary
regime as it operated in France before the war ... That regime has
been condemned by events and by public npinion.' It was this wholesale
disillusionment with democracy in inter-war Europe which had led
commentators like Ambassador Joe Kennedy to predict after the fall
of France that 'democracy is finished in England'. 'The necessity for
re-stating the democratic idea,' asserted R. W. G. MacKay, author of
the best-selling Peace Aims and the New Order, 'is the most fundamental question for us all just now."
Chamberlain's uncertain presentation of the case against Hitler
typified for many critics the complacency, passivity and outmoded
style of the prevailing 'bourgeois' democratic tradition in wesrem
Europe. What was to become the wartime consensus rested upon [he
belief that in order to survive in Europe, democracy would have 10
be reinterpreted: the old liberal focus upon the value of political rights
and liberties had IIOt been enough to win the loyalty of the masses.
'Democracy', wrote a central European emigre in the USA ' ... must
set its values against new ideals; it must show that it rs able to
adapt its psychology and its methods to [he new tunes." from 'u~h a
perspective, the Arla"ti" Charter of August 1941 Sl'C'mN "'odully
cautious and even conKrvall~e In its promises. 'Nothing In the rnt
suggests that we are In the middle of the g~aresT ~~olutionary war 01
all time ... [This] h&$thedr:awb.t"k of suggesting thai the democracies
wish to preserve .nd nu.mam the methods of ,hO' jnst, white tM
OAIlK (:ONTINl'.NT:
l'.UIlOPE'S
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
'"
W;l.s
Iar-
D.4.R~ CONTINHIT:
EURore'S
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
This of course was nor entirely fair. Rather, the challenge of Nazism
was forcing democrats to look again at the question of sociaJ and
national solidarity. The process had starred already in the t9}ot,
notably in Sweden where the Social Democrats had pioneered an
explicit alternative 10 the prevailing authoritarian model of coercive
population policy. The Swedish welfare state which emerged in the
late 1930$ was a determinedly democratic programme, combining
pro-nalalist measures to encourage people to have more children with
an affirmation that the decision whether or not to have children was
an individual one which the state should respect. Sweden did maintain
sterilization of the mentally ill, but it also supported birth control
clinics, provided sex education in schools, liberalized abortion laws
and protected the rights of working mothers at the same time that it
introduced family allowances, universal free medical and dental care
and school meals.
For one of the architects of these policies, Alva Myrdal, the Swedish
model presented a contrast to the Nazi conception of the relationship
between state and individual. It was - she argued in Nation and
Family - a necessary amplification of the scope of modern democracy.
Finishing her book in August 1940, Myrdallooked forward cautiously
to a time when 'the present calamity' would be over and 'freedom
and progress would again have a chance in Europe'. But, she warned,
in what were fast becoming familiar terms,
Such Bnend of this war, even more than that of rhe earlier one, Will prc:senr
a challenge to democracy, again russerted,lo fulfill Its social obligation
Political freedom and fonnal equality will not be enough; real democt::l.cy.
socjaland~onomiedemocr3cy,willbeexacled
..
Europe will be impoverished. The fiscal Stlllctures of befhgerem and
nonbelligcrcm countries ahke wiH seem bankrupt whenmcasurcd by tra
dinonal norms of 1I",."cial solvency. Th.. rich will have seen Ihelr wealth
taxed away. The masses will be hungry. Whc:n,be StfllClU'Cof war-nme
~onomy hreaks down, the dtslocauoes of nonnal exchange ,md COm"",o.:e
will be left as enormouS malad,ullmen'~. Th.. demobdizcd m,ll1o""wdl "ave
employmCIIIand surllY. Bo,h cour,.... and wisdom ....ill be ~U, ......IU
preserve orderly fleedom anJ 10 avoid soc,al chaos. TheS<'(ll\:umst..,...,
.,.
DARK
CONTINENT:
EUII.OI'I'STWENTtETH
CENTURY
however,willnotpreveottheuodertak,ogofsocialrcforms;oothecontrary,
they win force reforms whether we wan! them or no(.'J
An this formed part of the more general debate about social justice
and democracy that the war had provoked. By i941., Nazi visions of
a more egaliranan New Order shielding Europe from the capitalist
'plutocracies' had lost any allure they once possessed. It was their
opponents who now stood for a fairer future. In France, for example,
Leon Blum's impassioned defence of the Popular Front during his trial
at Ricm in 1941.had won him many admirers. Another indication of
disaffection with Vichy was de Gaulle's call that November for a
'New Democracy' against the reactionary regime of Petain; by April
194}, the General was talking about the need to introduce state control
of economic affairs and social security."
EVidence abounds for the radicalization of ordinary people across
Europe living under Nazi rule. 'The last thing we want is a return to the
social conditions of 1939 with their economic chaos, social injustice,
spiritual laxity and class prejudices,' wrote a young Dutch lawyer in
an underground newslerrer in 1941. In Greece, inflation and food
shortages had led to 'a veritable social revolution' and 'the veering
towards the Left of elements of the public who, before the war, were
among the most conservative'."
Resistance and underground movements were naturally responsive
to this leftwards shift in popular attitudes, partly because many of
their leading cadres were drawn from the Left and partly because
resistance itself was an exercise in communal solidarity, whose values
lent themselves to an egalitarian and morally elevated vision of the
post-war world. After Stalingrad, people's minds turned more and
more to the Iucure; 'in the heat of the battle, amid the terror of the
Gestapo and of Vichy,' proclaimed La Revue libre in late 1943, 'essays,
pohncal theses, draft constitutions, programmes are springing up
almost everywhere, circulating, being read and discussed: The most
unlikely groups now tried to expound an 'ideology'. L.
It would be a rniscake 10 insist too strongly upon the similarities of
res'~tance ideologies across the continent: after all, resistance groups
were fragmented, localized and poorly informed of one another's
existence; they were drawn from very diverse political and social
elemems of the population; above all, they were wartime phenomma,
with all the flux, uncertainty and ideological confusion which the
conditionsof the war produced. In haly, where twenty years of Fascism
had made state intervention in socio-economic affairs less of a novelty
than in Britain or France, anti-Fascists stressed the themes ofiustice
and liberty above those of planning; in France, faith in dirigisme was
combined with a fervent patriotism only perhaps matched in Poland.
Such differences of emphasis, however, cannot obscure the remarkable
convergence of resistance aspirations. Whether inrerprered in teT.ms
of nationalization of major industries and banks, of State ptanrung
through price and production controls, or of vague and unspecified
demands for 'social justice', the goal of a fairer and 'SOClahzed'
economy was shared by the vast majority of resistants. '.Fi~ance is at
the service of [he Economy,' declared the plan which Emile Laffon
placed before the Conseil National de la Resistance in 194}. This was
the dream of Keynes and all those who had seen the prospects for
economic recovery in the 1930S sacrificed before the altar of the
balanced budget."
Slower to respond to the new mood because of their greater d!stance
from events, the exile governments of Europe also shaped th~lr posrwar aspirations to take account of the desire for a new domestic order.
Norwegian foreign minister Trygve Lie stated that the war'has made
necessary in all countries a national planned economy under rhe
direction of the State'. The Dutch governmem was rather reluctant
to consider what this might mean, but the Belgians, byconlfast,qu,.ckly
set up a Committee for rhe Study of Postwar Problems comm'tTed
to the extensive usc of 'national planning'; an 'organized national
economy' would allow the state to banish mass unemploymen~.
Benei's government was- rightly - proud of pre_warC~echoslovJk,a s
enlightened social policies but still envisaged Ihe nationah1al10n of
banks, insurance companies and heavy industry and rhe mrrodu<.:non
of a 'planned economy', Whar best revea.ls rhe.exleOi of the warteme
acceptance of radiClllIsocial and econo.mt<.:engmeenng were the ~ery
similar pronouncements of con5Ccvaflve. and traditionally mdlOeJ
politicians like Poland's General SikorskI, de Gaulle and the G~k
OAIlK CONTINENT:
EUIlOr~'S
TW~NTIETH
CENTURY
THE
INDIVIDUAL
AGAINST
THE
STATE
DARK
CONTINf.NT:
EUROPE'S
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
who had courageously stood by him through the Third Reich, despite
the misery this had brought her, alone and with no support or recognition for her courage.
To religiousrhinkers, this reassertion of the individual conscience
was perhaps the outstanding intellectual development of the war. At
the same time as the Church rediscovered its social mission - whether
Anglican in Britain, Catholic or Orthodox - so it reasserted the
primacy of the human spirit over totalitarian demands for total loyalty
to the state. Emmanuel Mounier's flirtation with Vichy, prompted by
the desire 10 pass from 'bourgeois man and the bourgeois Church'
led him and other religious reformers into a spiritual cul-de-sac.
Pointing to a way our was Jacques Marirain, a fellow Catholic intellectual. Like Mounier, Maritain believed that social reform was urgently
needed; but unlike him he argued that it was possible within a democratic context. ln Christianisme et Democratie (1943), Maritain
insisted that the inter-war retreat from democracy could now be seen
to have been a mistake: 'It is not a question of finding a new name
for democracy, rather of discovering its true essence and of realizing
It ... rather, a question of passing from bourgeois democracy.
. [Q
an integrally human democracy, from abortive democracy to real
democracy.'1l
Here in embryo was the source of post-war Christian democracy,
arleast in an idealized form. [n his 1942 work, Les Droils de /'homme
ella 101 tlatureIle, Maritaln developed the idea that the full spiritual
development of an Individual demanded contact with society. The
person existed as an 'open whole', and found fulfilment not in isolation
but in the community. '[ have stressed ... the rights of the civic
person; wrote Maritain, 'of the human individual as a citi~en.' This
conception of social responsibility as an individual duty, and of such
behaviour as a condition of political freedom, can be encountered
among other religious groups as well. Greek Orthodox Archbishop
DarnaskillOli called for less selfishness and a greater sense of solidarity
In the face of the famine m Greece. Wilham Temple, the Archbishop
of Canterbury, Cited Mantaln approvingly and echoed his call for a
~rou~
'Democracy of the Person' as opposed to an egotistical
'Democracy of IndIviduals'!'
",
The new emphasis upon the worth of the individual reached beyond
the sphere of moral philosophy and religion into that of the law.
St~rting with Churchill's bold declaration on 3 September t939 that
rhe war was being fought 'to establish, on impregnable rocks, the
rights of the individual', Allied propaganda emphasized the sanctity
of rights. 'In the course of World War Two,' wrote the distinguished
international lawyer Hersch Laurerpacht, 'vrhe enthronement of the
rights of man" was repeatedly declared to constitute one of the major
purposes of the war. The great conresr, in which the spiritual heritage
of civilization found itself in mortal danger, was imposed upon the
world by a power whose very essence lay in the denial of rhe rights
of man as against the omnipotence of the Srate.'2S
It was all very well, however, to proclaim a crusade in defence of
rights but which rights were at issue and for whom? Quincy Wright
was reflecting liberal American thought when he hazarded a definition
which focused upon civil liberties, equality before the law, and freedom
of trade. Bur others objected that this ignored the new social demands
generated by the war. Nazi occupation, according to the Pole Ludwik
Rajchman, 'was a process of levelling down entire populatio~s, which
creates a psychological atmosphere for compelling aurhorieies, the
powers that will be, to accept very far-reaching reforms'. He argued
that hundreds of millions of people were 'thinking today in terms of
the future exercise of human rights, which cannot but include the
tight to a minimum standard of social security'. Thus ar the curser
we find the debate under way between broad and narrow concepnons
of human rights: starting during the war, this argument would gam
~~i~~e~:~I~u::;:~~~~
~ho~~~~~:~:t
DAII.~
CONTINENT:
EVROPE'S
TWENTIETH
CENTVRY
.,s
That the Empire Crusade turned Out to be a complete flop may rell
us somethingabout the attitude of Europeans to their empires. During
thcwarthis~eemsrohavebeenbased
largely on indifference, at leasr
in Britain and France (though not perhaps in the Nerhertands). In all
these countries, domestic matters were of much livelier concern than
questions of imperial government. The cause of empire beat weakly
in British hearts. But so too did anti-imperialism. Most Europeans
seemed scarcely aware that any inconsistency was involved in
defending human liberties at home while acquiescing in imperial rule
overseas. One examines the resistance record in vain for indications
of an interest in the predicament of colonial peoples. In Italy, for
example, the retention of colonies was a question of amour propre.
In France, there was much discussion of remodelling the empire but
virtually none of dismantling it; the Left more or less ignored the
issue, and their silence at the Brazzaville Conference on imperial
reform in early I944 was entirely characteristic. Queen Wilhelmina
simply offered 10 turn the Dutch Empire into a commonwealth which
'would leave no room Ior discrlrninaricn according to race or nationality'. To the Indian Congress Party's demands for British withdrawal,
Whitehall countered by arresting Gandhi and offering Donvimon
status ..IO
To astute and sensitive observers of the Allied war effort, the
ambiguity of European ani tudes to race was one of the rnost striking
features of the war. The American anthropologist Robert Redfield
remarked on how, faced with Nazi theories, democracy had been
forced to a 'self-examination' of the inconsistency between what If
professed and practised: 'The ideal is now asserted as a program for
an entire world - a free world,' Redfield noted. 'And yet the le;aders
who announce this program are citizens of the countries in which
racial inequality is most strongly applied.' Redfield predicred m the
future 'a moderate reaction favourable to inlolerance' With a 'corte-
r:::~:~~!
=::;::"ra~~
:$n:!~~aS;;;:~~:t::~fi;~~
equality and human righrs, did n-c:nrually coptnbule to lhe ending of
European imperiab.m. il did noc do so aUlQmaucally' Europeans (and
white Americans) remained largely unmoved by the drama of their
O~II.~
CONTINENT:
EUROPE'S
TWENTIETH
CENTUR
THE NATION-STATE
INTERNATIONAL
AND
ORDER
In 194<4 the mtemational lawyer Raphael Lemkin called for the United
Nations, by their victory, to impel the Germans to 'replace their theory
of master race by a theory of a master morality, international law
and true peace'. But it was not only Lernkin who believed that the
revival of international law was essential to any future world peace
and moral order. The racial basis cf Nazi jurisprudence and Germany's
abandonment of the accepted principles of international law had been
regarded since the late 19300 as among rhe pnnclpal causes of the
breakdown of order in Europe. Nui aggression had undermined the
,'ery existence of an 'international community'. At rhe same rime, Nazi
treatment of the Jews persuaded many people that if the-Individual was
to be protected against the state, the traditional docnine of state
ecvereignry III domestic affairs would have to be reconsidered. A
revwal and relflYlgoration of international law rhus emerged as the
natural adjunct to liberal concern for world peace ancl, in particular,
for the safeguarding of human nghts."
'Effecuve International organisation is 1101 possible; wrote Quincy
WrIght 1111943,'unlessir protecrs basic human rights against encroachmenu by national States.' Wright observed that, unlike Poland or
Cz.et:ho~lovakla, Germany had not been obliged to conclude a mmoriue.ueaty wnh (he: League of Nauons, wnh the result that 'there was
no formal ground on whICh the League of Nations could protest
011 the
~n~7v~~ur~t~sc~I~,~~~e~n~:o~::::~:~aa~
quesnon
l'{
whelhe-r the
:~~::n
'~~:U;~II~
DAIIK
CONTIN(t<lT:
EUIIOPE'S
TIIVUoiTIETi'I
CENTUIIY
DAII
II: CONTINENT:
EUROPE'S
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
The New: Europe. This showed a map which divided Europe into
West European, Scandina~ian, Baltic, German, Central EUropean,
Balkan and Iberian federations. Only Italy escaped intact.R
Brirish and American officials engaged in post-war planning also
tended - as they had in 1jl'1-18 - to see federation as an attractive
solution to Europe's border problems. Austria, for example, posed
British Foreign Office clerks with no less of a dilemma than the
Habsburg Empire had done earlier. Few in Whitehall appear to have
believed that Austria could survive as an independent state, but even
fewer were happy to allow the Anschluss to stand: a surrogate empire
in the form of Danubian 'integration' was the answer. Reviving the
inter-war Balkan Union, and press-ganging Bulgaria into joining it,
was an analogous pepe-dream."
Churchill was drawn to the idea of a United States of Europe,
envisaging an arrangement by which Britain could exerr leadership
on a continental scale. From May 1940, US planners for the post-war
world came to believe that a new international organization, far from
being incompatible with regional or continental unions, would in fact
be more firmly based if they were created first. Indeed Newman's 1943
map was very similar to that envisaged by the US State Depanment
101940.-"
At the same time, though, we should keep these schemes in perspccrive. Federalism diminished in popularity inside and outside governman as the war Went on. One reason was the strong hosriliry of
the Soviet Union to arrangements which seemed intended to create
ann-Sevier blocs in eastern Europe. Another was the objection of
many small counrnes which - despite the examples of the wartime
Czech-Polish and the Greek-Yugoslav
alliances - worried about
disappearing mto a Europe more than ever dominated by the major
powers.
lnscde continenlal testseance movements, rhe idea of Europe stood
for an erhical hentage rather than a specific SCI of politico-economic
.arTlll1go:ment~.As.erting the exl~lenee of common European values
WaJ; a way of dtnymg the durabrluy
of Hitler's N~w Order. By talking
01 du~ "ruggle as a F."..ropell>1 CIVilwar, the Italian Partito d'Azione
KI U5 Hruggk for a 'democranc revolution' firmly in a continental
OARI(
CONT1N~NT:
EUROPE'S
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
\'(Ihen Polish resistance groups agreed that 'rhe Polish Republic will
be a member of the federation of free European nations', this was len
an expression of federalist faith than a desire to ensure the security
of an mdependenr
Poland after the war. In traditionally narionalisrie
countries like Greece, internationalist
sentiment never took hold.
There.es in Poland,Albania and Yugoslavia, a virtual civil warwirhin
the resistance led both left and Right to insist on its nationalist
credentials. In general, conservative and right-wing resisters to the
Germans were more hostile to the idea of surrendering national
sovereignty than were socialists or Christian Democrats; but even the
larter tended to attach greater importance to the cause of reform at
home. Federalism remained, in other words, a relatively weak element
of the wartime consensus."
THE
NEW CONSENSUS:
LIMITS
CONTRADICTIONS
AND
BLUEPRINTS
fOR
THE
GOLOEN
AGE
OJlII.K
CONTrNENT'
EUROPE'S
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
OAk!:
UTOPIAS
CONTINENT:
AND
THE
EUROPE'S
REALITIES:
TWENTIETH
THE
CENTUII,Y
EXTENT
OF
ACHIEVEMENT
BLUEPRINTS
AGE
DAItK CONTINtNT:
tU"OPt'S
TWENTllTH
CfNTUIlY
IHUtPIUNTS
the day shift. 'I'll get nghr OUtof it when the war is over,' said another.
older married woman. 'Straight OUIof 11. I've been here about fifteen
years now. 1 was married six years ago. 1suppose J'll goon fora time
till my hubby gets serded, and then I'll go home and mcrease the
population: 'For Deiter or worse: concluded [he hhss Observation
team, 'the larger number of opiruonared
women lI'unt to return to,
or star! on, domestic life when the war is ovcr.:"
In the case of attitudes to race, one can scarcely talk of a retreat
from wartime radicalism. European attitudes 10 race were slowly
changing anyway before the war; the war itself appears hardly to have
accelerated the process. Anti-Semitism did not disappear from Europe
after 1945: ro the contrary, it imensified across rhe connnenr immediately after the war ended as Jewish survivors returned home to find
their property inhabited b~ others and their goods plundered.
There were also few signs in 1945 that the European powers intended
to do anything other than cling on !O their colonies. Being subjected
to Nazi violence appears to have made them more rather than less
inclined to inflict imperial violence of their own: French forces killed
up to 40,000 Algerians in the aftermath of the Serif uprising in May
1945, and left perhaps as many as rcc.ccc dead in Madagascar in
1947. Decolonizarton, for all The efforts of the '945 Pan-African
Congress in Manchester, remained off the European political agenda
until forced back as nationalists raised the costs of hanging on to the
colonies. In so far as the European imperial powers had been humiliated by the war and were now overshadowed b~ the ami-imperialist
superpowers, (hey felt more rather than less inclined to reassert their
al1thoTlty overseas. It was hardly a coincidence that it was the one
imperial power which could have been said to have 'won' the WJrGreal Britain - which first accepted the netd for decoJ{lnil.3.tion.
The vision of a united Europe flickered on fitfully;u the nanon-srare
reasserted itself and adjuSled to the exigenciC'$of the Cold W;lr. EuIr
efforts to force the pace led to the creation of ,uch bureJtu:tJlI": drones
as the Council of Europe. a far cry from rhe ideall)ri.: visions of 1941
At the stan of the 19SOli.the failure of rhe EDe (European Defence
Community) marked the end of the federalist dream for three decades.
making Nato rarher thaD any purely European orgamaanon rhe
DARK
CONTINENT:
eUROPE'S
TWENTlETl-i
CENTUR
warchdog over the newly sovereign German Federal Republic. Thereafter, the Eueopeanisrs were a chastened but more realistic cohort,
following Einaudi's advice and adopting a gradualist programme
whICh, beginning with the ECSC in 1951,100 in turn to the Common
Market and the European Union.
As to the revival of international law, the realization of wartime
dreams was also patchy and unsatisfying. The United Nations' commitment to human rights was as weak as its overall position in power
politics. From the doctrinal point of view, human rights were given
pnorny over economic and social rights in the Charter. But in terms
of the protection of minorities the UN Charter represented a step
backwards from the League. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948 did symbolize the new status of the individual in
international law, and lasting mistrust of the Nazi doctrine of state
supremacy, but it contained no provisions for enforcement and remains
little more than a pious wish."
More far-reaching in its implications was the Genocide Convention
of the same year - passed after a remarkable one-man crusade by
Raphael Lemkin, who had been disappointed at the refusal of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to judge acts committed
by the Nazis before 19}9. Lemkin and others had seen the war-crimes
trials as an opportunity to secure world peace by increasing the powers
under mternationallaw
to take action against individuals as well as
states. The Genocide Convention added an important new crime to
th05C recognized under international law, and imposed obligations
upon ratifymg seares to act to prevent or punish its commission. Bur the
Convention's potential has been entirely ignored by the international
commumty and there has been little evidence to back the UN's
confident assertion that 'the feeling will grow in world society that
by protecung the national, racial, religious and ethnic groups everywhere m the world we will be protecting ourselves.' For four decades,
a 5Crle$of genocides went unpunished outside Europe; in [992 thai
mdifferen~ extended to Europe itself."
7
A Brutal Peace, 1943-9
~:mt'tJtary
Hislory
Cas
(New
Haven,
1993),
74Horwil1.,ap.
Death
Iht Germa"
(N~
199)),PzOj
TrevorRoper,
Conn.,
v.
7S
y_
55
Arad,
Camps
Brhee,
SOb,bo"
(Bloomington,
56 R. van
der
lnd.,
Pelt
and
Trebllnka:
The
OperatIon
Reinhard
'987)
D. Dwork,
Auschwlt"-,
'270
10 the
Present
Hnen,Conn.,I996J
der
58 van
of Ihe F'"al
Dwcrk,
Pelt and
op. cif.,
Fateful
Months.
op. ctr., p, H
Solu/ion,
pp. }z6,
Himmler's
Nat;o/llJI
J6
17
"Thedecrsron concernmg
57 BrownIng,
C.
t6S
cie., p-
Lumans,
Child,
Auxiliaries:
Minorities
t933-1945
354-,';
and
1965),
(Chapel
in Toynbce
Goebbels
Mrch..
(Ann Arbor,
Volludeutsche
'Administration',
E. K. Bramsred,
The
of Europe,
National
p. 303
_H6, 343
S9ibld.,p.}17
:heD~~I:::!~tl.:,
pp. 354-S1;
Yugosl,:1t/ Umly
1991),PP
~~o::,:,
on rhe Ustak
I:~
~~;c~:~:c~;;i~;;,;::~
genocide,
,,,,d Commu"ist
Rellolutlon,
6: Blueprints
The
Contested
'919-1953
CO'''',,),:
(Cambridge,
MaSii.,
IZS-7
6, Goebbds
Kohl
of the
Railway
Dept.
cited
In
Kogon,
Langbein
and
into
the Suppreuion
Rlickerl,op.Clf.,PPID_lt
61 W. Laqueur,
Terrible
Secret:
of Informl1l,on
I1bol1t Hillers
Final
The
The
Holoc""sl
63 Klee,Dressen
and
cit.,
Riess,op.
IS.! G. J Horwrrz,
In the
Mauthal1sen(New
York,
Shadow
1990),ch.
An Investigation
SOIUlion
eu.,
R,[l!g, ap.
fry Herbert,
e~used
op.
cit.,
by the murder
pp. 57,99,1
(london,
1980);
(Oxford,
T.
US Departmem
Jr.
III
On reports that
pohce
machine'
of Death:
Uving
outside
the
Lager (Frankfurt,
of Sl;Ile,
J<J9Q),pp .111-1
criticism
jews
of the economic
in the Ukraine,
Socialism:
had led
cu.,
p.119;
10
hann
see 32.S7.PS,
I!M1,
f..iberaliOtJ
World
jR.Acland,
The Forward
janu3Iy-May,
1945',
Mar(h
York,
1941),P
(ed.),
Documents
of Nau
Age
Rethinking
pp. 53-6;
R. W. G. MacKay,
COllunlralio"
LastHlg Peace
on
4S
101;
the War
(London,
1975),
T941),P.9;E.H.
of
the Muwtry
pp- 30-)1,
the
History
Unioll,
Times,
France:
(New
P.
Addison,
p. III
Carr,Conallloru
of Europelln
1939-194$
18 November
plans
for Renewal,
Peace
Aims
Victory
York,
1.942.),PP.
'War
Slat<! (Boston,
Mass.,
'Some
of social
aspects
J. Mommsen
Germ""),,
Modern
(New
p,
attd
Morak
1979),
(London,
Illtegratum,
(Serlin/New
on
'940;
1940-19,.6
is "ot
U.1-};
of[nformatian',Poi.tieIlIQua'teri)"I}
(london,
Camps
Front
1940),
York,
de Gaulle,
(Oxford,
OrMr(London,
A.
1!JlI9),
19-41
edn),P.7
repo"
the Vicious
York,
in The
Shennan,
ju",
Inside
and
p. 39, Kennedy
Home
Politics
4 W. Lip(;ens
Conlllle.llal
(New
/I (London,
o[Peace(New
I:
Order
of Morale:
War
10 '945' British
W.
T rever-Roper,
Ministry
in World
6 d. R. M. Titmuss,
june
71SeeHot"WI~,op.cil.,chs.7_8
Amn.eans
and
O:a:ford,198,)
New
5 E. Ranshof~n.Werrheimer,
NQ/lo",,1
mismanagement
op.
of
.,
of '51),000-2.00,000
see Dallm,
Gates
The
The Road
'98S),
73 Klukowsk"
McLaine,
1. [.
vel.
Cited
'n Ntlv G<!rma,,)"~ War against the Jell/s, cp. cir., [.50-51
68 Kamenel~ky, op. cit., p- 74; Kulischee, op. cit., p. 161
6, See SSlPoltce chlcfO. Globocnik
in the Kralr.auer Zeitung,
IS
70
Kushner,
(994)
'96-107
pp.
6SG.Schwan:,DI1!nalionulsouaitstischetJ
66j.
H. G. Wells,
Information
and
:h~5:~:~~r.
see A. Djilas,
Heart:
(Paris,
7Ciled
York!
8C'Jed
1944),
'940
(P~ns,
'970)
by Addison,
(ed.),
The
1957)
policy',
in Britain
f.lMrgn.ce
(London,
by Mass
social
pohcj
Str"'teg)'
for
11
'The: MIIII",'1
and
op. cil.,p.
N. Ollter.
of the
for lhe
see
J.
L'Exode:
118;Blumc,red
cit., p. 149
170-7'
In
and
during
Ob$cIVuion
by McLame,op.
9 Addison,op.eil.,pp.
and
(969),
1850-'.9$0
prepared
The
Enough:
'Metropoliu:cus',
(t.941I,P3O
Theloume,
Advert'Sln,.
VidalclK,
no'
ks
Ho ..... ~~
XlVII;<" Gu,1d
L Exode de .\{".I'OMte~
by LiP&Cns,op.
de 1"",,,...,
c".,pp.1~g
10
J. Harm,
~~~~~~:'
WilliJm
Bel,,,,,dgl':
10~2~',I;.P;;:7;
13 Harrts.op.
cit., p. 420;.for
:n~
A. Biography
W. Bevendge,
(Oxford,
parallelrhmkmg
e.
'977),
SOClallnsuranCl's
11
J66
and Allied
ServiUJ
J.
MariUlln,
Hambulgcr,
18 G.
Dtmocracy,
'Le
sIadt,I99I),Pp.71-92.
American
vel.
du
signific,'ioP
pp. 97-137
An
19 D. Thompson,
uwytr (Dover,
RR.S;'~!~~~~~'~~~.~',a~~~~o::~$!::a~i::~sh:::~:;:~:~il~~:g~D:::~
racisre er la vrale
droit
01"cir.,
Myrdal,
(New
The
',944),
pp- 1004,
York,
From
to Kenya:
Kingston
Mass.,
dr3wmg my attention
Dilemma:
1993),
45-7
10 this remarkable
1007-9
The
pp- 2.3-31,
P,obhm'"
Negro
Making
book);
II P(UloA{riultilf
of
(thanks
LewiI_
to Rupert
")-4-
McLaine,
Joc.Pavone,UnllgueITaCilll/e;saggioSlOticosU/14mortlliUlPJdltl~
~!:;I:~~~~p~;;;~;'n
a;:/j~7~~J::.
1-4 M. Sadoun,
!Pans,
Ll's$oc,aftsII'SSOus
'982.),
,dus
p. 136;
dans la gueITI'
ISllpgenS,
C.
p.
01" en.,
'35-40,
19 New
World
lorwin,
In Dl'mOCTatic
rhistanCl'
COmmun
1'1 co!labor
alion
de la ResistanCi.':
des
'984),pp.114f
(New
Inside
Haven,
Hiller's
CruCI':
Conn.,
Thl' up",_
19:93), p. 267
Order.
of the
United
Nations
(New
Wells,
and
nOI
Me',
of French
W,mime
(Toromo,
(IT. Sarah
York,
1943),
p. 58
Henry)
198t),
Mar"aIn,
p.
Mouni~r
180;
'986),p.
(Marlboro,
1985),
Vt,
~a~.~I~J!;;~npfC,~'~;
National
De5,my
p. 1',;
Laurerpachr,
(Chapel
Hill,
movemcars',
York,
Federation
1970),
NC,
J.
Marit3In,
'94SI,
d~ 14 e",dualtun
z.6 The
Worlds
De,ImJl
Rdauofl$)
Catholic
Christianity
and
1.930-1950
Ce"tral
Democracy
Chml,anily
(SIn
1945-1947
$pe(ial
issuc,
and
Social
Order
Calif.,
States,
in the
Hi510ry,
(New
1982),
E. Hamburger
(Ch'''~go,
,he future of
..-J
1'1'. ',4-1I
Sdnra
Pol.ticll/
fora
101-5
1..4111
Pl'a~e Ihrough
politicallhought
I (1968),
I. Jenning&,
Commrmwe4lrh
{6Junc
IW),pp
1,943). frontispiece;
federalism,
foran
R. SchIei.utFr.
..,.
S'illtS
~~7so;;
the
QIulrtnly,
14-15:B.
,mpo";ant
Fe.ur.,Ju,"
raClSle iI
SCIUliOn', Journal
39 H. NOller,
ofCenlt>l1
POIIWI"
~~aS~ubia:
Af(.nn
&.ro(JU"
For,;p
Po/xy
a survey
(january
p~.uion.
of plans
of Expert'!'
in
\Wnrpon,
Conn . '97S),PP4S8-60
:
~:,:~,n;:
;:~;c~;~:~s:~~::~~!':'r~~:':c~,t
41 F. A. von Hayek.
T'"
Ro.ul10
..: :.P;~119'
Sv(do,"
(Chlca~o,
of
'9J9-194f
194})
U",'td
HistoryofEurop'a,.llItegrillio",
in The New
York,
W.
1940), p. 10
York/Cambridge,
new wor!d',ColUns
(New
lowards
p, 10;
of resistance
(Harmonds-
~::n~:~::,~:~;e;'/~:;"::s
York,
aNllhe
1.9+41.p.:>tiro
and
p. 143, MacKlly,
Union?'
Europe
moves
law',
in W. Lipgens,A
(Oxford,
The New
sUlVcy of eaeher
of internalional
DC,
pp- 4'-2.
federation
'AngloFrench
v: ~ (April 1940)
J7G. T. Renner, 'Maps
civilisation
1938).
~~ ~ec:;~:~~I~S~";h!,::=,~N:.wK!~:i:
pp. v-v,;
(New
and Natural
esp.
cited
(Washmgton,
Europe
of Aims'
Huszar
(December
the United
European
for Western
vol. ':
Newman,
of Man
(944),
G. de
pp. n6-H
and
'European
Relliew
docrrine
Socialist
34 ibid.,
and Beyond:
(New
Europe
of European
Law
H The World's
/nJochirlil
Holborn,
in
RICC-MaxiIMa,
1944),Pp80-b
in Occupied
1939),
E.
142-};
Left,
Fre7lch
pp- 14-15;
problem',
dismtegration
Modern
W. Lipgen!;,
The
1986),
(Chicago,
Rule
(December
Defeat
In Lipgens,
~a~a:~:r;::~:,
l"a',,,ul
Intcmul<.mal
Helz, The
is
(1940-1945)
York,
cie., PI'
op.
ethnological
on Pesce
'The
Shennan,
Res;sta"cc:
(New
Friedman,
(Cambridge.Mess.,
11
Th~ Rights
Man
Writmg
de la Res!Slanc~,
Emmanuel
FranClKo,C~hf.,
J.
Pus(1I'Ctllles
}6'Stalemcnt
~~~~~:~:t;~.~i~~:t;~;:pmtuel
l.4
'The
Q"arlerly
21 j. D. Wilkinson,
The IlIIcllectual
Resistance
in Europe
198,), p. 47; Camus in G. Bree and G. Bernauer
(eds.),
23 j. Hellman,
and
War, '944-'954
R. Redfield,
imemarionallaw',
Plans
PIS7
An Anthology
pp. 347-9
Accommodation
W.
'44-5
vincnm, M~'I
pp- 2.0Z.-3;
1991),
JZ R.lcmkin,Axis
,8
Postular
[Tunn,
)1
569: M. Mazower,
194'-1944
17 Andrieu,op.cit.,p.
18 L W.
PI" !l8,
I'occupatlon:
LI' Program
Andrieu,
(Paris,
tnce ofOccupat,on,
16Shennan.op.m.,p.,6
20 E.
~;:~i::.~pmment
,.~
43
1\, MannJ.",m,
Man
and
Soci~ty
Ag~ of
an
In
Reconstruction
Ct"lral Europe
(Londoll,
45
Conditions
ofP~au,
Hayek,op.cit.,
p.
p. lop; ~
46 Ibid.,
srate federalism',
cu.,
op.
Imposi,ion
F. A. VOII Hayek,
'Economk
Commonwealth
cOlldilions
Quarurly,
of illier.
v: 1 (September
Total
Haven,
War
(New
How
Government:
Conn.,
Will
New
'944),
The
Rise
of the Total
State
and
p. 181i
the B~tter
be?
World
(New
York,
'944),
pp. v,
SO Pavone,
Home,
ch.,
op.
p.
5' M.
Higollllet
(New
Havell,Conn.,
S1Cf.
B.JancarWebs,er,
([Rnvcr,
Behind
Lmes:
th~
'Historical
in K. Vasak
(PariS,
J981),
Rights
Gender
and
(New
pp.
and Revolution
The Journey
the Two
WIl'J
World
of
foundations
(cd.)
York,
H.
1950),
of the United
human
The International
ll-41;
op.
rights
N. Robinson,
1_960},p.
51;
'941-19'41
California
'947),
The
Law
Report:
Genocide
Com,en/ion.-
H. Kelscn,
'Col1cctivc
with particular
Law Review,XXXI
subJcctsof
regard
POWs:
:~~~~,a:;~
i
Righls,
Facts
:fr.,c~t~.
6o-/i};
Welzel, Lcbensmut
LXIV
(january
A
and
Human
Commentary
individual
Law
1948),
19H},PP.
Rights,
{New
responsibi
of a R~volu/lonist:
York,
German
of the German
LXIlI
[Ocecber
Borderlands
) KullloCher.
No/
op. cir.,
(ivil war,
Darkntr
09. "1.,
pp.
see
Pavone,Gp.
(London,
174-81;
CII., and
Crili~ism
(New
York,
A.
J. Mayer,
Wiry Did
DPs
LalLondon,
Rou~,
(Camondl!lc,
111.,
A.
KOnlgKder
and}.
1m Nachltrregstkwlub-
(cd.),
Die Vertriebung
der Dewtschen
(London,
'990),
from
Nemesis
the
Nebr.lLondon,
fas;
(Lincoln:
Transfe,S
p. 197;
T. Schicdcr
the Territories
lit Potsda,'"
/dmtfty
in tM Poli~
(cd.), The
ExptJSf01l
Lme
from
The ExpJdsiorIoftltrw.--.u
'988
cdn), pp.
in Europe.
1945-1955
J. B.
104-~;
(PtllladclphlS,
Scbc<;hrrnan,
P~. ,w.~
~f~::;:;~'r:~-~r:~~,
~~:
p. H for
op. cit.,
estimates
~'.
forced
3::
for
civil
Hmorica/
At/liS
of
E.uI
!:~T~~j
andci:.n:.ryd:::;I::;
01)
movemmP
from
bn'o
HU(OTK.J
~,J.
8. R. Ml~
Pot.sh
Wcs,em
Iof(<lin,
I' I (I~).
pp.
)-)7,
S/<lf",US,
Z,oIkowskl,
~:~~::~I(:~:a:~~~F5
i.n Polish
l,.,a)
P. R. Magos<:l,
p. 3/i1;
Nario""l
~~.nM
n':~)i.~~::9
population
,he war as
E.iun~
19~5), p. '47
'9S7),P119
On
(Baron
1"945-1950
Die iiidi5chen
Benz
Pop .. lat;on
PostlVar Poplliatjon
pp. 97-IlIi
World
'9;9-19]'&:
S. E. Ambrose (eds.),
Rhine,
Proudfool,
:~:k~:~~::~:p~:t~;~n;0~9';;.
lit yin
of war criminals',
Review,
Post-War
p. H
1957),
of
530-71;H.laulerpachl,
QUllrterly
104/i-/i4
In the
Refugees,
Falsehood
on the
im Wartesaal:
:: ;i:~~h;;a;i:.:p~.c~~:
/h~ HI!"'~
and
agajnst
Allies
p~.
Refugee
European
(London,
Bischof
p. II";
image
75 (1970),
The
Proudfoot,
G.
The
~~t~~;''';eo~:~~:
:I.
Review,
1961),
Hllman
'Red
oa <Red
Fascism. rhe metger 01 NUl
of tolalllarlanlsm,
r,p
York,
1980),pl9
develop-
and
10 the pLmishment
(December
pp. H8-6o;
Dnd/he German
Parerson,.
Movement
see
&ut
Europe',
198-1[4
:~s:::i~:~;::;~:;~~r~~~i~::nGZ~!'
also
mrernaeicnallaw
Population
POWs,
German
central
(New
vernanr,
J.
p. 30; M.
Forced
in cast
Stalin
in the American
J.
d.
cil.,
The
preliminariC5
pp. H-Ii
of Huma"
Inlemational
H. Laurerpachr,
Nations
cit.,
and subsequent
Dimensions
Laulerpacht,
p. 353;
in Yugos/a"ia,
Hom~,
Mlln(Brussc!s,1948),P.U
'The
Historical
op.
'953),
1992.); E. Skrjabina,
Women
p. l/i};
T.
and
10 1~50S', American
6 Magosci,
7 On
1987)
L. Adler
Russia
S/IIdy;n
570
1990),
menes',
the Charter
pp. 4}-P
op. cit.,
(cd.),
Colo.,
53 I. Suoo,
S4
see
of war;
'989),PP
with
(london,
49 The Journey
regimes
,: 1 (sprmg
Conversations
(cd.),
'996)
consequences
of communist
SM. Djilas,
Fascism',
Omnipotent
'Social
Polili(sandSode1Y,
19.19),
pp. Ill-So
."
4SeeJ. T. cross,
pp. 156-61
2.0;
also,
The New
47 L. VOII Mises,
48 C. Becker,
(Se3ttle.
dltTu.'fntierhCentury
1910cdn),pp.6,}80
44 Carr,
W6lcrnwT~:ri~;::;;
qUOIe from
J.
1~,
'Tho: