SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS

1. FULE v. CA

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40502
November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch VI, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS * , PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, Respondents.

G.R. No L-42670

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, Respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over
by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging,
inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in
the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places,
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment
as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has
been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,
therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and
as regular administratrix after due hearing.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May
29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional
ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through
erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest
against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule
with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the
Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator" filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four
aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as
Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G.
Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the
regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for
the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of
which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for
letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take
possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia
opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special
administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the estate of
the deceased."cralaw virtua1aw library

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on
July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,
1973.chanrobles law library

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the
petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid;
and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado
G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before the court that she is a fullblooded sister of Pablo G. Alcaide, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcaide, with whom the deceased Amado
G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting
outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the
motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1
subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties
subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association
should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a
previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and
personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was
ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like
"married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcias
motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the
failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of
residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B.
Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to
be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the
foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion
to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcias
motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power
allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the
estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28,
1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a)
legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification
and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers
and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcias motion for
reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned
orders one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final
liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another,
directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the
estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to
Amado Garcia." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G.
Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death
was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for
1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also
testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari
and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one
dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three
others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix,
Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge
Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the
matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia
had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate
of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as
special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B.
Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the
office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the
proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her
willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it
being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa
B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay
Estate Obligations."cralaw virtua1aw library

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction"
reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention
that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had
been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is
still pending before the Court.

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting
Preciosa B. Garcias "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for
the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12, 1976.

On February 4, 1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary
restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao
from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.chanrobles law library :
red

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons
and considerations hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of

administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section
2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such
as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets,
intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin,
creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the
country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets
in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes." 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure
is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the
subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority
shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it
means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous
Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however purposedly fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of
estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the
Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the
term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given

place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile.
10 No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration
before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated" (t)hat on April 26,
1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in
Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in
other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcias
"last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to
prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows
that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this,
the deceaseds residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two
parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of
Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show
in bold documents that Amado G. Garcias last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fules petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is
that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case
before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule
fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcias challenge to Virginia G. Fules appointment as special administratrix is another issue
of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of
Rule 80 provides that" (w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the
delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special
administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules,
however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not y be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the

consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the
estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she
would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of
kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of
a property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G.
Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with
Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional
rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue
of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of
Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa
B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla
as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late. Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court
under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case
was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City courts exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latters
estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from
continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pao of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition
for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter
of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix
the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R.
No. L-42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

1. "Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special administrator shall take possession
and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for
the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain

suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A
special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the
court."cralaw

13. A special administrator is a representative of decedent, appointed by the probate court to care for and
preserve his estate until an executor or General administrator is appointed. (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer R.
Co., 121 NW 606, cited in Jacinto, Special Proceedings, 1965 ed., at 106.

19. Article 992 of the Civil Code provides: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. EUSEBIO vs. EUSEBIO

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8409

December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO, oppositorsappellants.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died
on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953,
Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating
that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been
improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said
petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her
aforementioned sister and brothers.

The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75,
section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch
as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A Espaa
Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr.
Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST
Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage
in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he
died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of
seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at Espaa
Extention.

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such
domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled
that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70;
Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have
been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently
(Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624;
Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was
juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise.
Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested his wish
to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify
thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that
"the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee
did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio,
upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A Espaa Extention was purchased, and
who, therefore, might have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This
notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is
"manifest" from the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.lawphil.net

The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do so
"due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable in fact, its is very likely
that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more
effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place
merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on
account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton
vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).

Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some
of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then,
again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A Espaa Extention, Quezon City,
was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San
Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the
decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to
Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise,
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the
legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the
children of the deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion
and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from
appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City,
the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 which is particularly strong when the domicile
is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent has not been
offset by the evidence of record.

The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused to
entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in
rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:

Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever action
oppositors may want to take later on because until now the personality of the oppositors has not been
established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass upon this
question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these
proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)

In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before
appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation.
When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as
his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:

Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now trying to
prove the status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point here is your contention that the
deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to cross-examine. If you are
trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t.
s. n.)

Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because of
their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from
doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either
the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances
surrounding the case.

To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he
declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent,
for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by
cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.

What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower court,
appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the
purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said
counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected
thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction
of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection,
unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel
refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court
rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court
and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record
that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of
assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a
fact.

At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to
appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged
relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have
admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue
under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on
November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants
herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres
Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3,
section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953,
which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all
surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for
the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in an order dated December 21,
1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts."

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass
upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking
cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently
refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have
intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar
case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would
then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to nonresident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their
respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not
only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of
the case shall exclude the other courts but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1
of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which
deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in
which they have properties.lawphil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts,
and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been
improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may,
thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator
of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have
sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs
against the appellee. It is so ordered.

1 "There is a presumption in favor of the continuance of an existing domicile. Therefore, then burden of
proving a change lies in all cases upon those who alleged that he change has occurred. This presumption
may have a decisive effect, for it the evidence is so conflicting that it is impossible to elicit with certainly
what the resident's intention is, the Court, being unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion one way or the
other, will decide in favor of the existing domicile." (Private International Law by Cheshire, pp. 218-219.)

"In the absence of any circumstances from which the courts may infer the animus, they are accustomed to
fall back on two legal presumptions, without which it would in some cases be impossible to arrive at any
conclusions as to a party's domicile.

"The first of these is the presumption that the party has retained the last domicile known to have been
possessed by him. This follows from the principle that a domicile acquired is retained until another is
gained, and from the other principle growing out of it that the burden of proof is on him who alleges a
change of domicile." (Conflict of Laws by Minor, p. 123.)

2 "It is often said, particularly in the English cases, that there is a stronger presumption against change
from a domicile of origin.

3 Which was not been categorically denied, appellee's counsel having limited themselves to alleging, in an
unsworn pleading, that they have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief on said claim the appellants
than there is against other changes of domicile. "'Domicile of origin. . . . differs from domicile of choice
mainly in this that is character is more enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off.' The
English view was forcibly expressed in a Pennsylvania case in which Lewis, J., said: "The attachment which
every one feels for his native land is the foundation of the rule that the domicile of origin is presumed to
continue until it is actually changed by acquiring a domicile elsewhere. No temporary sojourn in foreign
country will work this change.' In a federal case in Pennsylvania the same point was emphasized." (The
Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, p. 129.)

3. MALIG v. BUSH

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22761

May 31, 1969

ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed BUSH, represented in this suit by their
attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH MALIG, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIA SANTOS BUSH, defendant-appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
51639, the first dismissing the complaint and the second denying the motion to reconsider the order of
dismissal.

On September 19, 1962 the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural
children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush, having been born of the
common-law relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August, 1941; that said John
T. Bush and Apolonia Perez, during the conception of the plaintiffs, were not suffering from any disability to
marry each other; that they lived with their alleged father during his lifetime and were considered and
treated by. him as his acknowledge natural children; that said John T. Bush, at the time of his death, left
several real and personal properties; that the defendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal wife of
the deceased was able to secure her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased in
Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; that she submitted to the court for
approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased left a will whereby he bequeathed his
estate to three persons, namely: Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger; that the defendant
then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of the deceased; and that they
discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in July, 1962. They prayed
that the project of partition be annulled; that the defendant be ordered to submit a complete inventory and
accounting of all the properties left by the deceased and another project of partition adjudicating to the
plaintiffs their legal participation in the said estate and/or in the event that the defendant had disposed of
all or part of the estate, that she be ordered to pay them the market value thereof; and that the defendant
be ordered to pay for the value of the fruits received, damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of limitations.
The plaintiffs opposed and the defendant filed a reply to the opposition. On January 10, 1963 the lower
court denied the motion, "it appearing that the grounds upon which said motion is based are not
indubitable." In time, the defendant filed her answer specifically denying all the material averments of the
complaint and invoking laches, res judicata and statute of limitations as affirmative defenses.

After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on the date thereof the hearing was
postponed upon the defendant's manifestation that she would file a written motion to dismiss. The motion,
when filed, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that since the action was one to annul a project
of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could take cognizance of the
case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the

motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied upon by the defendant but because the
action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this appeal.

The procedural question posed by appellants is: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not
alleged in the motion to dismiss?

It must be remembered that the first motion to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and
statute of limitations, was denied because those grounds did not appear to the court to be indubitable. The
second motion reiterated none of those grounds and raised only the question of jurisdiction. In dismissing
the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower court in effect did so motu proprio, without offering
the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point. In fact the court did not even state in its order why in its opinion
the action had prescribed, and why in effect, without any evidence or new arguments on the question, it
reversed its previous ruling that the ground of prescription was not indubitable.

In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et al., 88 Phil. 94, it was held:

Section 1 of Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, and it specifically
ordains that a motion to this end be filed. In the light of this express requirement we do not believe that
the court had power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly presented. The fact that the
parties filed memoranda upon the court's indication or order in which they discussed the proposition that
the action was unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and independently of the case for libel did
not supply the deficiency. Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides for the cases in which an action may be
dismissed, and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other, under the familiar maxims,
inclusio unius est exclusivo ulterius. The only instance in which, according to said Rules, the court may
dismiss upon the court's own motion an action is, when the 'plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial
or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to comply with the Rules or any order of
the court.

The foregoing ruling is applicable in this case, because although a motion to dismiss had been presented
defendant the resolution of the court granting the same was based upon a ground not alleged in said
motion. But assuming that the lower court could properly consider the question of prescription anew, the
same still did not appear to be indubitable on the face of the allegations in the complaint. The defendant
cites Article 137 of the Civil Code, which provides that an action for acknowledgment of natural children
may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, except in two instances not obtaining
in this case, and that the present action was commenced after the death of the putative father of the
plaintiffs. The said provision is not of indubitable application, since the plaintiffs do not seek
acknowledgment but allege as a matter of fact that they "are the acknowledged natural children and the
only heirs in the direct line of the late John T. Bush." Whether or not this allegation is true will, of course,
depend upon the evidence to be presented at the trial.

The defendant insists in this instance on the jurisdictional ground posed in her motion to dismiss, citing
Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court formerly in force (now Rule 73, Section 1), which says:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration

granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.lawphi1.et

It will be noted that the foregoing rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited
indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so,
the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition already made and approved by
the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for
recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through fraud, they have
been deprived.

Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant, this Court believes that the
plaintiffs' cause should not be foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings. Costs
against the defendant-appellee in this instance.

4. JIMENEZ v. IAC

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75773

April 17, 1990

TOMAS JIMENEZ, VISITACION JIMENEZ, DIGNO JIMENEZ, ANTONIO JIMENEZ, AMADEO JIMENEZ, MODESTO
JIMENEZ and VIRGINIA JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. AMANDA VALERA-CABIGAO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXVII, Lingayen, Pangasinan, LEONARDO JIMENEZ, JR. and
CORAZON JIMENEZ, respondents.

FERNAN, CJ.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated May 29, 1986 which dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus in AC-G.R. No.
06578 entitled "Tomas Jimenez, et. al. vs. Hon. Amanda Valera-Cabigao."

The facts are as follows:

The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced four (4) children, namely:
Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired
five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.

After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot the seven
petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginia, all surnamed Jimenez.
Lino Jimenez died on August 11, 1951 while Genoveva Caolboy died on November 21, 1978.

Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch V, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 5346, praying to be appointed as administratrix of the
properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the supposed
heirs of the deceased spouses which included herein co-petitioners and the four children of Lino Jimenez
by Consolacion Ungson, his previous wife.2

In October, 1979, herein private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr., filed a
motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra, and Angeles from the
petition, inasmuch as they are children of the union of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of
Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and because they have already received their inheritance consisting
of five (5) parcels of lands in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.3

On March 23, 1981, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the Intestate Estate of Lino
Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy.4 On May 21, 1981, she filed an inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino
Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy wherein she included the five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. As a consequence, Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the
inventory on the ground that these had already been adjudicated to Leonardo Sr., Alberto, Alejandra and
Angeles by their deceased father Lino Jimenez. Private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. presented
testimonial and documentary evidence in support of his motion while petitioner Virginia Jimenez, other
than cross-examining the witnesses of Leonardo, presented no evidence of her own, oral or documentary.

On September 29, 1981, the probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land from the
inventory on the basis of the evidence of private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. which consisted among
others of: (1) Tax Declaration showing that the subject properties were acquired during the conjugal
partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson; and, (2) a Deed of Sale dated May 12, 1964 wherein
Genoveva Caolboy stated, that the subject properties had been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his children
by a previous marriage, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles.5 The motion for
reconsideration of said order was denied on January 26, 1982.6

Petitioner Virginia Jimenez then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. SP-13916, seeking the annulment of the order dated September 29, 1981
as well as the order of January 26, 1982. On November 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition because (1) Genoveva Caolboy, petitioners' mother, had admitted that the subject parcels of land
had been adjudicated to the children of the previous nuptial; (2) the subject properties could not have
been acquired during the marriage of Lino Jimenez to Genoveva Caolboy because they were already titled
in the name of Lino Jimenez even prior to 1921, long before Lino's marriage to Genoveva in 1940; (3) the
claim of Virginia Jimenez was barred by prescription because it was only in 1981 when they questioned the
adjudication of the subject properties, more than ten (10) years after Genoveva had admitted such
adjudication in a public document in 1964; and, (4) petitioner Virginia Jimenez was guilty of laches. This
decision became final and executory.7

Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December 10, 1984 before the Regional
Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 16111, to recover
possession/ownership of the subject five (5) parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez and
Genoveva Caolboy and to order private respondents to render an accounting of the produce therefrom.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by
prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-13916 dated November 18, 1982 and by prescription and laches.
However, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending that (1) the action was not barred by prior
judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of
ownership of the lots which must be ventilated in a separate action; and, (2) the action instituted in 1981

was not barred by prescription or laches because private respondents' forcible acquisition of the subject
properties occurred only after the death of petitioners' mother, Genoveva Caolboy in 1978.

On February 13, 1985, the trial court resolved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. 8 On
May 31, 1985, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution was denied. As earlier intimated,
the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners before the appellate court was likewise denied
due course and dismissed in a decision dated May 29, 1986.9

Hence, this recourse.

The issue in this case is whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has
jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to bar petitioners' present
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. In the negative, is the
present action for reconveyance barred by prescription and/or laches?

We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed
because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the
probate, court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is necessary to
establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. 11

The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in
a separate action. 12

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a
dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. 13

The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a contested property was again reiterated in
the following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 14 Junquera vs. Borromeo,
15 Borromeo vs. Canonoy, 16 Recto vs. de la Rosa. 17 It has also been held that in a special proceeding for
the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality. 18 This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding
as in the case at bar.

Res judicata 19 does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions. Specifically in S.P. No.
5346, the action was for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy
while Civil Case No. 16111 was an action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5)
parcels of land. Moreover, while admittedly, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V in S.P. No.
5346 had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court as to
title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in a separate proceeding. Civil Case No. 16111, on the
other hand. was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the exercise of the

court's general jurisdiction. It was, in fact, such "separate or ordinary proceedings" contemplated by the
rules for a final determination of the issue of ownership of the disputed properties. To repeat, since the
determination of the question of title to the subject properties in S.P. 5346 was merely provisional,
petitioners are not barred from instituting the appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.

Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion to dismiss do not appear to be
indubitable.1wphi1 Res judicata has been shown here to be unavailable and the other grounds of
prescription and laches pleaded by private respondents are seriously disputed. The allegation in the
complaint is that the heirs of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr. (referring to private respondents,) forcibly intruded into
and took possession of the disputed properties only in 1978, after the death of Genoveva Caolboy. Since
the action for reconveyance was instituted in 1984, it would appear that the same has not yet prescribed
or otherwise barred by laches.

There are a number of factual issues raised by petitioners before the lower court which cannot be resolved
without the presentation of evidence at a full-blown trial and which make the grounds for dismissal
dubitable. Among others, the alleged admission made by petitioners' mother in the deed of sale is
vehemently denied, as well as the fact itself of adjudication, there being no showing that the conjugal
partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson had been liquidated nor that a judicial or extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of Lino Jimenez was undertaken whereby such adjudication could have been
effected.

The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss not being indubitable, the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 16111.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby REVERSED. Civil Case
No. 16111 is reinstated and the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII is directed to proceed in
said case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

19 For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a prior final judgment
or order; (2) the court rendering the judgment or order must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties; (3) the judgment or order must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the two
cases, the earlier and the instant, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of
action. (Lorenzana vs. Macagba, 154 SCRA 723).

5. ALIPIO v. CA

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 134100

September 29, 2000

PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,
respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection
of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled
in the affirmative. We reverse.

The facts are as follows:

Respondent Romeo Jaring[1] was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa,
Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he
subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and
the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in
two installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on June 30,
1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.

The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only satisfied a portion
thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply
with their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses
for the collection of the said amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the
alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the
balance.

Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had
passed away on December 1, 1988.[2] She based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
then provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, 20 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant
dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death,
it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these
Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.

The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the
sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and
that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.[3] The Manuel spouses failed
to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared in default.

On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering petitioner and the Manuel
spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of
P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in denying her motion
to dismiss. In its decision[4] rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held:

The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be dismissed when the
defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial court, does not apply where there are other
defendants against whom the action should be maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy,
wherein the Supreme Court held:

Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause of action against the persons
named as defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a
sum of money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of
the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

xxxxxxxxx

However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was also named defendant in the
complaint. Obviously, therefore, the order appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case
against Co. (Underlining added)

Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were signatories to the contract of
sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the
parties to the contract has totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David:

We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence, when the obligation is a
solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum.
Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is
independent of and separate from her husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be
error to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the
decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).[5]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4, 1998.[6] Hence this petition
based on the following assignment of errors:

A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA
858, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
AGAINST REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR PAYMENT AGAINST HER
AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY CLAIM.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v.
DAVID, 133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND
THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT JARING.[7]

The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an
ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and
that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.

First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months before private respondent
filed the collection suit in the trial court on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of
Rule 3, 21 which deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant during the
pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of
claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, 20 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner
especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. The issue
to be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file this case against petitioner.

Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the sublease contract binding
themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the
Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code,
the conjugal partnership is liable for

All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.[8]

When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved[9] and debts
chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2
which states:

Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

As held in Calma v. Taedo,[10] after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection of
indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse.
Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal
property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the
surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over
the settlement of estate proceedings.[11] Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator
such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of
the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.[12]

The ruling in Calma v. Taedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura v. Militante.[13] In that case, the
surviving wife was sued in an amended complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly
contracted by her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to dismiss the case,
opposed the admission of the amended complaint on the ground that the death of her husband terminated
their conjugal partnership and that the plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable against the partnership,
should be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. The trial court nevertheless admitted
the complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, that since the defendant was also a party
to the obligation, the death of her husband did not preclude the plaintiff from filing an ordinary collection
suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that

as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse. . . .
Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable
against said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in
the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.

In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there is no liquidation of
the conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And
private respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court,
he may apply in court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the
deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request
that administration be granted to some other person.[14]

The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling, namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy[15] and
Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,[16] are based on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants,
Carlos Siy Uy and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact
the claim was not against any conjugal partnership, it was one which does not survive the death of
defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining
defendant Manuel Co.

With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally executed an indemnity
agreement which became the basis of a collection suit filed against the wife after her husband had died.
For this reason, the Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the surviving spouse could be
independently sued in an ordinary action for the enforcement of the entire obligation.

It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation
entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the
partnership which is primarily bound for its repayment.[17] Thus, when the spouses are sued for the
enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint
or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true, the
nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely
joint, making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.

From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit against petitioner.
Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of
letters of administration[18] or for the allowance of will,[19] depending on whether petitioner's husband
died intestate or testate. Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim
against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of
authority to represent their conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary
before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains to the
court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any other court.

Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid
balance of the agreed rent in the amount of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be
paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides:

The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same obligation does
not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to
render, entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an
obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are
debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another.[20]

Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that when there are two or more
lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the
lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the lease period and
despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the
property. The basis of their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they
have become joint tortfeasors.[21] In the case at bar, there is no allegation that the sublessees refused to
vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to

be collected by private respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before the
sublease expired on September 12, 1990.

Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there are more than two lessees or
sublessees their liability is solidary. On the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this
case reads:[22]

2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of three (3) years and two (2)
months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P485,600.00) PESOS, including all the
improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well all fishing equipment,
paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the
following manner, to wit:

A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract; and

B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (P185,6000.00) Pesos to be paid on June 30, 1989.

Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses
is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be
divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the
amount of P25,300.00, the attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The
complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a claim by private respondent in
the proceedings for the settlement of estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio
spouses in the unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of P25,300.00.

SO ORDERED.

[1] Although in the Court of Appeals Rollo and in the pleadings in this Court private respondent is referred
to as Romeo Jaring, it appears that his correct name is Romero Jaring as indicated in a document signed by
him.

[12] Corpuz v. Corpuz, 97 Phil. 655 (1955). See also Ocampo v. Potenciano, 89 Phil. 159 (1951). Under the
Family Code (Art. 124), both the husband and the wife now act as co-administrators of the conjugal
partnership property.

6. HEIRS OF OSCAR REYES v. REYES

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 139587

November 22, 2000

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES,
petitioners, vs. CESAR R. REYES, respondent.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46761[1] which affirmed the Order[2] dated January 26, 1994 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, in Special Proceeding No. 89-2519, a petition for issuance of letters of
administration, and the resolution dated July 28, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration.[3]

Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated in
Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303).
The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo,
all surnamed Reyes.

On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in
Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40
and since no payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by TCT No.
4983 was levied[4] sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the
government.[5]

Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able
to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 4983[6] upon payment of the reduced tax liability in the
amount of about P18,000.[7]

On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes
informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to
settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981.[8]

On December 15, 1986, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise
agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes.[9]

On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of
letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat
properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598.[10] Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on
the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had
acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase.[11]

The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter
was ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of the
deceased and the special powers of attorney executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA and that of
Aurora Reyes-Dayot conforming to his appointment as administrator.[12] Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of
real and personal properties of the deceased which included the Arayat properties with a total area of
1,009 sq. meters.[13] On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that
the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and he was the one who subsequently
redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.[14]

A hearing on the inventory was scheduled where administrator Cesar Reyes was required to present
evidence to establish that the properties belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes and the oppositor to adduce
evidence in support of his objection to the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory.[15] After hearing
the parties respective arguments, the probate court issued its Order dated January 26, 1994, the
dispositive portion of which reads:[16]

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing findings, the Court hereby modifies the inventory submitted by the
administrator and declares to belong to the estate of the late Ismael Reyes the following properties, to wit:

1. One half (1/2) of the agricultural land located in Montalban, Rizal containing an area of 31,054 square
meters, covered by TCT 72730 with an approximate value of P405,270.00;

2. One half (1/2) of two (2) adjoining residential lots located on Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City, with
total area of 1,009 square meters, more or less, covered by TCTs No. 4983 AND 3598 (39303), with an
approximate value of P3,027,000.00; but this determination is provisional in character and shall be without
prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper Court on the issue of
ownership of the properties; and,

3. The building constructed by and leased to Sonny Bernardo and all its rental income from the inception of
the lease, whether such income be in the possession of oppositor, in which case he is hereby directed to
account therefor, or if such income be still unpaid by Bernardo, in which case the administrator should
move to collect the same.

Consistent with the foregoing things, either of the administrator oppositor, or heir Felisa R. Reyes, in her
personal capacity as apparent co-owner of the Arayat Street properties, may commence the necessary
proper action for settling the issue of ownership of such properties in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City and to inform the Court of the commencement thereof by any of them as soon as possible.

The administrator is hereby directed to verify and check carefully on whether other properties, particularly
the real properties allegedly situated in Montalban, Rizal; in Marikina, Metro Manila (near Boys Town); and
in Bulacan, otherwise referred to as the Hi-Cement property truly pertained to the estate; to determine
their present condition and the status of their ownership; and to render a report thereon in writing within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order.

The motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor Oscar Reyes is hereby denied for being
unwarranted, except whatever incomes he might have received from Sonny Bernardo, which he is hereby
directed to turn over to the administrator within thirty (30) days from finality of this Order.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied in an Order dated May 30, 1994.
[17] He then filed his appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, Oscar
died and he was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.

On May 6, 1999, the respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the probate courts order.
It ruled that the probate courts order categorically stated that the inclusion of the subject properties in the
inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes is provisional in character and shall be without
prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of
ownership of the properties; that the provisional character of the inclusion of the contested properties in
the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of intestate court. It further stated that
although the general rule that question of title to property cannot be passed upon in the probate court
admits of exceptions, i.e. if the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudication, such has no
application in the instant case since petitioner-appellee and oppositor-appellant are not the only parties
with legal interest in the subject property as they are not the only heirs of the decedent; that it was never
shown that all parties interested in the subject property or all the heirs of the decedent consented to the
submission of the question of ownership to the intestate court.

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated July 28, 1999.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the respondent Court erred (1) in ruling that the
court a quo correctly included one half (1/2) of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598
(39303) in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes (2) in upholding that the court a quo
has no jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership.

Petitioners argue that a probate courts jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are
and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person since the probate court has the
power and competence to determine whether a property should be excluded from the inventory of the
estate or not, thus the Court a quo committed a reversible error when it included the Arayat properties in
the inventory of the estate of Ismael Reyes despite the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioneroppositor Oscar Reyes proving his claim of ownership. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership
over the Arayat properties as testified to by their predecessor Oscar Reyes was based on two (2) grounds,
to wit (1) his redemption of the Arayat properties and (2) the abandonment of the properties by his coheirs; that his act of redeeming the properties from the BIR in 1976 and therefter from the City Treasurer of

Quezon City using his own funds have the effect of vesting ownership to him. Petitioners claim that private
respondent is already barred from claiming the Arayat properties since he only filed this petition 16 years
after the death of Ismael Reyes and after the prices of the real properties in Cubao have already escalated
tremendously.

We find no merit in this argument.

The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators,
executors, guardians and trustees.[18] The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which
the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.[19] Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.[20]

We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties
to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought
thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are still
titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the
law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law.[21]
The declaration of the provisional character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as
stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.

Petitioners next claim that as an exception to the rule that the probate court is of limited jurisdiction, the
court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership when the parties interested are all heirs of the
deceased and they submitted the question of title to the property, without prejudice to third persons.
Petitioners allege that the parties before the probate court were all the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes and
they were allowed to present evidence proving ownership over the subject properties, thus private
respondent cannot argue that he did not in any way consent to the submission of the issue of ownership to
the probate court as the records of this case is replete with evidence that he presented evidence in an
attempt to prove ownership of the subject properties.

We are not persuaded.

Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction,
thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third
person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.[22]

The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It
bears stress that the purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership
was for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory
which is within the probate courts competence. Thus, when private respondent Cesar Reyes was appointed
as administrator of the properties in the courts Order dated July 26, 1989, he was ordered to submit a true

inventory and appraisal of the real and personal properties of the estate which may come into his
possession or knowledge which private respondent complied with. However, petitioner Oscar Reyes
submitted his objection to the inventory on the ground that it included the subject properties which had
been forfeited in favor of the government on April 21, 1975 and which he subsequently redeemed on
August 19, 1976. The Court resolved the opposition as follows:

At the hearing today of the pending incidents, it was agreed that the said incidents could not be resolved
without introduction of evidence.

Accordingly, the hearing on the inventory of real and personal properties is hereby set on April 24, 1990 at
10:00 A.M. at which date and time the petitioner/administrator shall be required to present evidence to
establish that the properties stated in the inventory belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes. The oppositor
shall thereafter adduce his evidence in support of his objection to the inclusion of certain properties of the
estates in the inventory.

Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the merits of
accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar Reyes to the inventory as
well as the respective evidence of the parties to determine for purposes of inventory alone if they should
be included therein or excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate court in its Order stated that for resolution
is the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to consider what properties should be included in the
inventory and what should not be included. There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the
issue of ownership for its final resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively.

In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its determination of the ownership
was merely provisional and suggested that either the administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may
commence the proper action in the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the court admitted that it was not
competent to pass upon the ownership of the subject properties, thus:

Although the testimony of the oppositor should have greater persuasive value than that of the
petitioner/administrator, mainly because it agrees closely with the recitals of facts found in the several
public documents submitted as evidence in this case and is corroborated to the greatest extent by the fact
that the properties were, indeed, abandoned in his possession since 1975 until the present, his alleged
ownership of the Arayat Street properties cannot still be sustained in a manner which would warrant their
exclusion from the administrators inventory.

To begin with, there are portions in the records which show that the oppositor himself was somehow
uncertain about his rights on the properties and the basis therefor. During his cross-examination (tsn, Oct.
4, 1991), he gave the following statements:

xx xx xx

(Atty. Habitan)

Q: And if we will add the other taxes you have paid, (you) are now claiming to be the owner of the Arayat
property because you have paid all these taxes?

A: The amounts I have paid and all the expenses I have and if I had not paid all these amounts the
property in question would have been lost, sir.

Q: So, in effect, you are now claiming ownership over the property, I want a categorical answer, Mr.
Witness?

A: If I am going to sum up all these expenses, my share in the Hi-Cement property, my share in the
Bulacan property, the amount of the property in Cubao is small and also all my sufferings because of the
property in Cubao, this cannot be paid in terms of money, sir. (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991, pp. 10-12)

On re-direct examination (tsn, Sept. 18, 1992), he clarified his statements as follows:

xx xx xx

(Atty, Javellana)

Q: Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, you were asked by the petitioners counsel whether because you had
paid the BIR P17,872.44 you are now claiming to be the owner of the property in Arayat Street to which
you answered no, will you explain your answer?

A: When I paid almost P18,000.00, it does not mean that I claim the property already; on the contrary, I
have my own reasons to claim it now on other conditions which are the following: number one, there was a
levy by the BIR on the property, it was forfeited due to delinquency of real estate taxes; number two, for
abandonment, when my mother, brother(s) and sisters left the property, they told me it is my problem and
I should take care of it. Number three, the disposition, my mother, my brothers and sisters sold the
property of my father, the Hi-Cement and the property in Visayas Street without giving my share. And
another thing I have to sell my own property, my own assets so that I can redeem from the BIR the Arayat
property and which I did with my personal funds, and number five, nobody helped me in my problems
regarding those properties, I was alone and so I felt that the property in Arayat is mine.

xx xx xx

(tsn, Sept. 18, 1992, pp. 2-3)

Notwithstanding his clarifying statements on redirect examination, the impression of the Court on the issue
is not entirely favorable to him. Apart from the absence of a specific document of transfer, the
circumstances and factors he gave may not suffice in and by themselves to convey or transfer title, for, at
best, they may only be the basis of such transfer. They may be considered as proof of the intention to
dispose in his favor or as evidence of a set off among the heirs, which seems to be what he has in mind.
There might also be substance in his assertions about the abandonment in his favor, which, if raised in the
proper action, could constitute either prescription or laches. It is hardly needed to stress, therefore, that
more than these are required to predicate the exclusion of the properties from the inventory.

Another obtrusive reality stands out to invite notice: the BIR levy was only made on the property covered
in TCT 4983 and did not include the property covered in TCT 3598 (39303). This somehow detracts from
the logic of the oppositors assertion of ownership of the entire Arayat Street properties; even if his
assertion is valid and true, it can encompass, at most, only the property subject of the BIRs levy and
declaration of forfeiture (i.e., TCT 4983), not the property covered by TCT 3598 (39303).

These pronouncements should not by any means diminish or deprive the oppositor of whatever rights or
properties he believes or considers to be rightfully his. Although the circumstances and factors he has
given to the Court herein may have legal consequences that could have defeated opposing-claims and
rendered oppositors claim on the properties unassailable, this Courts competence to adjudicate thus in this
proceedings is clearly non-existent. In Baybayan vs. Aquino (149 SCRA 186), it was held that the question
of ownership of a property alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction.

This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the present and existing legal ownership of the
properties. Whatever is declared herein ought not to preclude oppositor from prosecuting an ordinary
action for the purpose of having his claims or rights established over the properties. If he still cares
hereafter to prosecute such claim of ownership adversely to the estate and the apparent co-owner, his
mother Felisa. As stated in Valera, et al. vs. Judge Inserto, et al. (149 SCRA 533), this Court, acting as a
probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction; accordingly, its determination that property should be
included in the inventory or not is within its probate jurisdiction, but such determination is only provisional
in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted
by the parties.

xx xx xx

The aforecited findings clarify that there were several reasons for having the issue of ownership ventilated
elsewhere. Apart from the fact that only one-half of the two lots known as the Arayat property (i.e., the half
that could pertain to the estate) could be settled herein, there was the realization that the evidence
adduced so far (including that bearing on the oppositors basis for excluding from the estate the property)
was inadequate or otherwise inconclusive.

A practical way of looking at the problem is that this Court, sitting herein as an intestate court, does not
consider itself competent to rule on the ownership of the entire Arayat property.

Finally, anent private respondents allegation that the instant petition was filed one day late, hence should
be dismissed, we find the same to be devoid of merit. Petitioners received copy of the decision denying
their motion for reconsideration on August 13, 1999, thus they have until August 28, 1999 within which to
file petition for review. Petitioners filed their motion for extension on August 27, 1999 praying for 30 days
extension from August 28, 1999 or until September 27, 1999 to file their petition which this Court granted.
Petitioners filed their petition on September 27, 1999, which is within the period given by the Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.

7. BAYAGAS v. BAYAGAS

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517

September 18, 2013

HILARIA BAGAYAS, Petitioner,

vs.
ROGELIO BAGAYAS, FELICIDAD BAGAYAS, ROSALINA BAGAYAS, MICHAEL BAGAYAS, and MARIEL BAGAYAS,
Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions2 dated January 6, 20093 and Order4
dated March 16, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68 (RTC) which dismissed on
the ground of res judicata the twin petitions of Hilaria Bagayas (petitioner) for amendment of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 375657 and 375658,docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) Nos. 08-34
and 08-35.

The Facts

On June 28, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint5 for annulment of sale and partition before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 04-42, claiming that Rogelio, Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel, all
surnamed Bagayas (respondents) intended to exclude her from inheriting from the estate of her legally
adoptive parents, Maximino Bagayas (Maximino) and Eligia Clemente (Eligia), by falsifying a deed of
absolute sale (deed of absolute sale) purportedly executed by the deceased spouses (Maximino and Eligia)
transferring two parcels of land (subject lands) registered in their names to their biological children,
respondent Rogelio and Orlando Bagayas6 (Orlando).7 Said deed, which was supposedly executed on
October 7, 1974,8 bore the signature of Eligia who could not have affixed her signature thereon as she had
long been dead since August 21, 1971.9 By virtue of the same instrument, however, the Bagayas brothers
were able to secure in their favor TCT Nos. 37565710 and 37565811 over the subject lands.

As a matter of course, trial ensued on the merits of the case. Petitioner presented herself and five other
witnesses to prove the allegations in her complaint. Respondents likewise testified in their defense denying
any knowledge of the alleged adoption of petitioner by Maximino and Eligia, and pointing out that
petitioner had not even lived with the family.12 Furthermore, Rogelio claimed13 that after their parents
had died, he and Orlando executed a document denominated as Deed of Extra judicial Succession14 (deed
of extra judicial succession) over the subject lands toeffect the transfer of titles thereof to their names.
Before the deed of extra judicial succession could be registered, however, a deed of absolute sale
transferring the subject lands to them was discovered from the old files of Maximino, which they used by
"reason of convenience" to acquire title to the said lands.15

In a Decision16 dated March 24, 2008 dismissing the case a quo , the RTC summarized the threshold
issues for resolution, to wit:

[1] Whether or not petitioner is an adopted child of the late spouses Maximino Bagayas and Eligia
Clemente;

[2] Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 7, 1974 is valid;

[3] Whether or not plaintiff can ask for partition of the subject properties assuming that she is an adopted
child of the late spouses Maximino Bagayas and Eligia Clemente and assuming further that the subject
deed of sale is invalid; and

[4] Is the prevailing party entitled to damages?17

With respect to the first issue, the RTC declared petitioner to be anadopted child of Maximino and Eligia on
the strength of the order of adoption, which it considered as more reliable than the oral testimonies of
respondents denying the fact of adoption.18 On the issue of the validity of the questioned deed of absolute
sale, the RTC ruled that Eligia's signature thereon was a mere surplusage, as the subject lands belonged
exclusively to Maximino who could alienate the same without the consent of his wife.19

The RTC further held that, even though petitioner is an adopted child, she could not ask for partition of the
subject lands as she was not able to prove any of the instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute

sale. Moreover, the action for annulment of sale was improper as it constituted a collateral attack on the
title of Rogelio and Orlando.20

Insisting that the subject lands were conjugal properties of Maximino and Eligia, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration21 from the aforesaid Decision, which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution22 dated
June 17,2008 holding that while it may have committed a mistake in declaring the subject lands as
exclusive properties of Maximino (since the defendants therein already admitted during the pre-trial
conference that the subject lands are the conjugal properties of Maximino and Eligia), the action was
nevertheless dismissible on the ground that it was a collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando.23
Citing the case of Tapuroc v. Loquellano Vda.de Mende,24 it observed that the action for the declaration of
nullity of deed of sale is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title.25

No appeal was taken from the RTCs Decision dated March 24, 2008or the Resolution dated June 17, 2008,
thereby allowing the same to lapse into finality.

Subsequently, however, petitioner filed, on August 1, 2008, twin petitions26 before the same RTC,
docketed as LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35, for the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 to include her
name and those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as registered owners to the extent of one-third of
the lands covered therein.27 The petitions were anchored on Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1529,28 otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree," which provides as follows:

Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be
made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and
the attestation of the same be [sic] Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance.
A registered owner [sic] of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the
[sic] Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition
to the court upon the ground that x x x new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been
created; x x x; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition
after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry
or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant of any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this
section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration,
and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a
purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their
written consent. x x x.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

To substantiate her "interest" in the subject lands, petitioner capitalized on the finding of the RTC in its
Decision dated March 24, 2008that she is the adopted child of Maximino and Eligia, and that the signature
of the latter in the deed of absolute sale transferring the subject lands to Rogelio and Orlando was
falsified.29

The petitions were dismissed30 by the RTC, however, on the ground of res judicata . The RTC ruled that the
causes of action in the two cases filed by petitioner are similar in that the ultimate objective would be her

inclusion as co-owner of the subject lands and, eventually, the partition thereof.31 Since judgment had
already been rendered on the matter, and petitioner had allowed the same to attain finality, the principle
of res judicata barred further litigation thereon.32

Dissatisfied, petitioner argued in her motion for reconsideration33 that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 0442 (for annulment of sale and partition)on the ground that it was a collateral attack on the title of Rogelio
and Orlando did not amount to a judgment on the merits, thus, precluding the applicability of res
judicata.34 The motion was resolved against petitioner, and the dismissal of LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 (for
amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658) was upheld by the RTC in an Order35 dated March16, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the dismissal of the earlier complaint on the ground that
it is in the nature of a collateral attack on the certificates of title constitutes a bar to a subsequent petition
under Section 108 of PD 1529.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that Civil Case No. 04-42 was a complaint for annulment of sale and
partition. In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the
subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. An action for partition is at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
properties involved.36 The determination, therefore, as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in
the resolution of an action for partition. As held in the case of Municipality of Bian v. Garcia:37

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a
co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does
in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to
agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm
the partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or
accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.38
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In dismissing Civil Case No. 04-42, the RTC declared that petitioner could not ask for the partition of the
subject lands, even though she is an adopted child, because "she was not able to prove any of the
instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale"39 purportedly executed by Maximino and Eligia.
This conclusion came about as a consequence of the RTCs finding that, since the subject lands belonged

exclusively to Maximino, there was no need to secure the consent of his wife who was long dead before the
sale took place. For this reason, the forgery of Eligia's signature on the questioned deed was held to be
inconsequential. However, on reconsideration, the RTC declared that it committed a mistake in holding the
subject lands as exclusive properties of Maximino "since there was already an admission by the defendants
during the pre-trial conference that the subject properties are the conjugal properties of the spouses
Maximino Bagayas and Eligia Clemente."40 Nonetheless, the RTC sustained its dismissal of Civil Case No.
04-42 on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack upon the title of Rogelio and Orlando.

In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr.41 (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the existence or nonexistence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the
issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack.
It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not
material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to bylaw means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.42 (Emphases supplied)

Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioners petition for annulment of sale on the ground that it
constituted a collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlandos title to the subject
lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over the same.

Be that as it may, considering that petitioner failed to appeal from the dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42,
the judgment therein is final and may no longer be reviewed.

The crucial issue, therefore, to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal of LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 on
the ground of res judicata.

It must be pointed out that LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 praying that judgment be rendered directing the
Registry of Deeds of Tarlac to include petitioner's name, those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as
registered owners to the extent of one-third of the lands covered by TCT Nos. 375657and 375658, were
predicated on the theory43 that Section 108 of PD 1529 is a mode of directly attacking the certificates of
title issued to the Bagayas brothers. On the contrary, however, the Court observes that the amendment of
TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 under Section 108 of PD 1529 is actually not the direct attack on said
certificates of title contemplated under Section 4844 of the same law. Jurisprudence instructs that an
action or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a certificate of title when its objective is to nullify the
same, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the certificate of title was decreed.45 Corollary
thereto, it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the certificate of title was procured by
falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. As explicated in
Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc.:46

It is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the certificate of title was procured by falsification
or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked
only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack
must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. The certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.47 (Citations omitted)

Contrary to the foregoing characterization, Section 108 of PD 1529 explicitly states that said provision
"shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration." In
fact, based on settled jurisprudence, Section 108 of PD 1529 is limited only to seven instances or
situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created
which do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of any person
on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as
married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be
affected; (f) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed
the same within three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of title.48 Hence, the same cannot be said to constitute an attack on a certificate
of title as defined by case law.1wphi1 That said, the Court proceeds to resolve the issue as to whether or
not the dismissal of petitioners twin petitions for the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 was
proper.

Petitioner claims that the determination of the RTC in Civil Case No.04-42 that she is an adopted child and
that the signature of her adoptive mother Eligia in the deed of absolute sale transferring the subject land
to Rogelio and Orlando was forged amounts to a new interest that should be reflected on the certificates of
title of said land, or provides a reasonable ground for the amendment thereof.

The Court disagrees for two reasons:

First. While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioner's adoption, as well as the forgery of
Eligia's signature on the questioned deed, no partition was decreed, as the action was, in fact, dismissed.
Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally adopted child of Maximino and Eligia did not
amount to a declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which petitioner may institute an action for the
amendment of the certificates of title covering the subject land. More importantly, the Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action, for
matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.49

Second. Petitioner cannot avail of the summary proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 because the
present controversy involves not the amendment of the certificates of title issued in favor of Rogelio and
Orlando but the partition of the estate of Maximino and Eligia who are both deceased. As held in Philippine
Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela,50 the prevailing rule is that proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 are
summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but
certainly not controversial issues.51 Relief under said legal provision can only be granted if there is
unanimity among the parties, or hat there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party
in interest. This is now the controlling precedent, and the Court should no longer digress from such
ruling.52 Therefore, petitioner may not avail of the remedy provided under Section 108 of PD 1529.

In fine, while LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 are technically not barred by the prior judgment in Civil Case No.
04-42 as they involve different causes of action, the dismissal of said petitions for the amendment of TCT
Nos.375657 and 375658 is nonetheless proper for reasons discussed above. The remedy then of petitioner
is to institute intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses Maximino and
Eligia.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

6 Deceased. Survived by wife, respondent Rosalina, and children, respondents Michael and Mariel.

14 There is no copy of the deed of extra judicial succession in the records.

44 SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
(Emphasis supplied)

8. URIARTE v. CFI of NEGROS

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-21938-39

May 29, 1970

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.

DIZON, J.:

On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. L21938 against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance
of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and
the Manila Court, respectively praying:

... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and
11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No.
6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying petitioner's
omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both
special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and
consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent
Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.

For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and
Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this Court.

Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:

6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to
declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan
Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in
failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.

The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.

On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 praying, for the reasons therein
stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963
and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for
reconsideration, and further commanding said court to approve his record on appeal and to give due
course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition
until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.

On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention
that the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in
the petition for certiorari.

It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of
the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia,

that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent,
petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as
such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as
special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date for the hearing of the
petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses,
however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special
administrator.

On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to
the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had
"executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and
which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's
capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.

On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding
No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a
motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had
left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner
Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an
acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were
attached to the Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed
the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having
been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on
appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on questions of law. The administrator
with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the
approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the
following order:

Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having
been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was
approved by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled
Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938,
bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount to
petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.

WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby
disapproved.

In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned
heretofore.

On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the
Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of
the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1
of the same year.

It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court,
Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to
obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is
that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he
had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to
that effect appears to have been rendered.

The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than
the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated
heretofore, failed to qualify.

On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No.
51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y
Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated
heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's
Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.

Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros
Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the
petition filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of
Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the
aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.

The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court
erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila
Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior
filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.

Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive
jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of deceased persons whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject
matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance
in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be

settled is that of a non-resident alien like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite the Courts of First
Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of
First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite left considerable properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first
taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special
Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding
No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that
consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court
similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his
will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that
in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has
been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance
it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace
the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to,
this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the
petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court particularly in
Special Proceeding No. 6344 or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as
he did, in the Manila Court.

The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have
submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an
appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first
place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the
result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent
Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of
which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan
Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the
Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio
Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a
special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased
person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's
petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the
Negros Court.

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan
Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's
contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say
that it was not the proper venue therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner
has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to
consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite
since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the
alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since
August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No.
6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to
appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction
over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this
Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the
proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other
court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.

In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court
said that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein
petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action
justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities
cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the
testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila
instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the
decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory
acknowledgment."

We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142
until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still
open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination
the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its
capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether
or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of
Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs.
Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).

Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the
said supplemental petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due
course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and
February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the
second being an order denying petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said
orders being, as a result of what has been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the
conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still,
would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said orders.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for
and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition for

mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162956

April 10, 2008

FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., Petitioners,
- versus
DEBORAH ANN C. ENRIQUEZ, and SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

PUNO, C.J.:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV No. 68147, entitled Peter B.
Enriquez, et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch XI dated June 29, 2000, which dismissed the complaint filed by the respondents herein.[1]

The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate
area of 2,017 square meters located in Talisay, Cebu.[2]

According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are
the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial
Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and the
known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the
Segregation and Confirmation) over the same property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No.
RT-35551 (T-8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-98576 in the name of Anacleto
Cabrera covering Lot 1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in the name of petitioner Eutiquio
Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. T-98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino Reyes; (4) TCT No. T98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580 covering Lot
1851-E in the name of petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581 covering Lot 1851-F in the name of
Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.[3]

Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his minor daughter Deborah Ann C.
Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that
their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera Cabrera (collectively the
Spouses Cabrera) owned pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They further allege
that Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters Graciana, who died single and without issue, and
Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother of respondent Deborah Ann who succeeded their parents
rights and took possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of land. During her lifetime, Graciana
sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making the latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the
subject parcel of land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to petitioners Peter and
Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and
Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina
Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in the case at bar. After the sale, Spouses
Fernandez took possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land.[4]

When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they discovered that certain
documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating
that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia
Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to
Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and
Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17,
1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real
Estate and Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and
Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents
filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for damages. [5]
They likewise prayed for the repartition and resubdivision of the subject property.[6]

The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the ground that the respondentsplaintiffs were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they can
not demand the partition of the real property without first being declared as legal heirs and such may not
be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically instituted
for the purpose.[7]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the trial court to proceed with the
hearing of the case.[8] The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners was similarly denied.
[9]

Hence this petition.

The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify
the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate
of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the
heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates
of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents.

We answer in the affirmative.

An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.[10] A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.[11]

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in
court.[12] A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof.[13] Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must be
one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.[14] A plaintiff is a real party in interest when he is the one who has
a legal right to enforce or protect, while a defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who has

a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or
omission which had violated the legal right of the former.[15] The purpose of the rule is to protect persons
against undue and unnecessary litigation.[16] It likewise ensures that the court will have the benefit of
having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case.[17] Thus, a plaintiffs right to
institute an ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to recover the
said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and
partition,[18] or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,
[19] this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action
since the matter is within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding. [20] In the recent
case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[21] the Court had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at
hand, to wit:

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances
of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised
and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in
the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action
can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution
or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.[22]

In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the Declaration of NonExistency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc., a review of the allegations
therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the
documents the respondents sought to annul. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the
case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario[23] is applicable in the case at bar. In the said
case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for
annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the
ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners predecessor and by virtue of
succession have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:

...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown
any proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchays that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance.[24]

In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their
claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there
anything in the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have themselves
declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the

case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in
interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations
therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the
registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they
seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.

Furthermore, in Portugal,[25] the Court held that it would be superfluous to still subject the estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of the parties' status as heirs could be achieved in the
ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from the records of the case that the only property left by the
decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have already presented evidence to
establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In the present case, however, nothing in the records of this
case shows that the only property left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had
respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any evidence to establish their rights as heirs, considering
especially that it appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this case
that had signed one of the questioned documents. Hence, under the circumstances in this case, this Court
finds that a determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
in a special proceeding is necessary.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 2000 DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED.

JIMENEZ v. IAC

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163604
May 6, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTCBR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria
Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29,

1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report2 and accordingly declared the
absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.

In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family
Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the
spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order by filing a
Notice of Appeal.3

By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served "as
required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being
a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.

The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval having been denied by
Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending that
the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special
proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.

By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on procedural and
substantive grounds in this wise:

At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition
a certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration
of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal]. Moreover, the petition questioned the
[trial courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a
copy could be found in the records. On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright
in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive issue of
the validity/nullity of the assailed order.

The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is
in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must,
in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise,
if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or final order
appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).

As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" while a special
proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March
2, 1999).

Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court
of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a
cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly
issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition
to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.

Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the enumeration, petitioner
contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.

By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004 Resolution9
requiring respondent to file her comment on the petition was returned unserved with postmasters
notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.

The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of
Court entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read:

RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the
following:

(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in
disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in
like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxx

By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria
Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a
valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following abovequoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains
the following provision, inter alia:

xxx

Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

x x x,

there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding
under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for
the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal
from the trial courts order sufficed.

That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the
Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all
laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent
therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), seals the case in petitioners favor.

Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate court. Petitioners failure
to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial courts order denying its motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure
are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate
court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.

As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, contrary to the appellate courts observation that petitioner was also assailing it,
petitioners 8-page petition10 filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order
disapproving the Notice of Appeal.

WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,

G.R. No. 157912

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

- versus -

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,

REYES, JJ.

VICTORIA S. MEDINA-

Administratrix,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

December 13, 2007

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all
the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on
October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately
P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of
P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim
against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and
served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim
based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per
Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum
shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay
the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a
written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?[2]

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of
docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that
rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court,
pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[3]

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil
actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done
or accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be
applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for nonpersonal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in
any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent
money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification
against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The
RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory
pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting
letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are
mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims;
otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be
recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza
v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter
arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is
collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.
[7] (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate;
more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere
contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does
not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to
the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate
docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.
[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate.
Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the
grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is
squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to
be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise,
personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to
the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel
off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an
opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the
pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming
the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading
or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no
written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of
discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with
the clause whenever practicable.

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances
of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is
not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the
plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the
case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and
liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:

As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done
personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be
practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the
petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort
and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In
any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives
the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules
are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11,
Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonias counsels is
Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service
impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally might have
been superfluous.

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed
where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and
the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken
judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to
serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of
petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as
superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the
money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit
of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid.[13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was further
explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in
the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off
its debts and distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written
explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated
January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's
money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1] Penned by Presiding Judge Valerio M. Salazar, rollo, pp. 35 and 40.

[2] Rollo, pp. 12-13

[3] Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 2(c).

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal.

xxxx

(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be
to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

[4] Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 1780

[5] Rules of Court, Rule 86, Sec. 5.

Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, bated; exceptions. All claims for money
against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise,
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor
or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an
action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set
forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the
court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claims had been presented directly before the court in the
administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at the present value.

[6] G.R. No. 160479, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 753.

[7] Id. at 762-763.

[8] G.R. No. 120575, December 16, 1998, 300 SCRA 214.

[9] Pascual v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8, at 228-229.

[10] G.R. No. 164947, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 415.

[11] Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay, supra note 10, at 423-425.

[12] Medina v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34760, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 206.

[13] Medina v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 215.

[14] G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 228.

[15] Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez, id. at 240-241.

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 16680

September 13, 1920

BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner,

vs.
ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET AL., respondents.

Block, Johnston & Greenbaum for petitioner.

The respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for the other respondents.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the
petition are admitted by a demurrer. The only question presented is, whether or not a judge of the Court of
First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of
fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care,
management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act No. 190 permit him to
appoint assessors in "special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in law exists for the
appointment of assessors in such proceedings.

The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors are the following; (a) Section
57-62 of Act No. 190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267; (d) section
2477 of Act No. 2711; and (e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.

Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to the city of Manila only. Act
No. 2369 provides for the appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62 of Act No. 190
provide for the appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the peace. Therefore, the only provisions
of law which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in "special proceedings" are
sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.

Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit
in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . . ."

Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is expressly authorized by
said section 154 to appoint assessors. But we find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, which
gives us an interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction is made between an "action" and
a "special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an "action" means an ordinary suit in a court of justice,
while "every other remedy furnished by law is a 'special proceeding."

In view of the interpretation given to the words "action" and "special proceeding" by the Legislature
itself, we are driven to the conclusion that there is a distinction between an "action" and a "special
proceeding," and that when the Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special proceeding."

There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding. "An action is a formal
demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is
the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. (People vs. County Judge, 13
How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106, 110; Chapin vs.
Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the
statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally granted upon an application
or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction to actions, may be given: Proceedings
for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to perpetuate testimony; to
change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar, etc., etc. (Bliss on Code Pleading, 3d
ed., sec. 1.)

From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the judge
of the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is hereby
overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby granted, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the
order of the respondent judge appointing the assessors described in the petition be and the same is
hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

Araullo, Malcolm, Avancea, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001]

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA
S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S.
MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, et. al., seeking to
annul the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] affirming the Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court and
the Resolution[4]which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts[5] are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14,
1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme,
Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo,
Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila
and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalos Machine Shop with
offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio
Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition[6]
with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila[7] for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11,
1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs
named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order declaring the
whole world in default, except the government, and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein
on March 16, 1993. However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of
herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who
were granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filing
of an Omnibus Motion[8] on July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial
court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2) to
set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the
immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order[9] which resolved, thus:

A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the
purpose of considering the merits thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for
the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose
and issue of the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate
of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after their motion for reconsideration of the Order dated July
30, 1993 was denied by the trial court in its Order[10] dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for
certiorari with the appellate court, they contend that: (1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving
spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward
compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was
attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution[11] promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the
said resolution was likewise dismissed.[12]

The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which
denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the
failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of
the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action
involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments which, according
to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

xxx

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had
not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father, TROADIO
MANALO.

Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without
proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.

xxx

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO
MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their coheirs xxx.

xxx

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and
were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than,
P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and for
attorneys fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx.[13]

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground

that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners
therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article
222[14] of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments[15] and the character of the relief sought[16] in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at
bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners claim that the
same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts
required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late
Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said
death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.[17] The petition in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the
reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
Troadio Manalo, to wit:

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

(a) That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the
administration of the estate of the deceased TORADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such
reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.

(b) That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses
and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said
estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.

c) That the litigation expenses o these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorneys fees in the
amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of
this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.[18]

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an
ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the
petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an
Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims
for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs[19] in an apparent effort to make

out a case of an ordinary civil action an ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the
Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant
and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court,
has limited and special jurisdiction[20] and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which
may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the
effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the
averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would
not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
strategem.[21] So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a
special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of
Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the
dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. Petitioners contend that the term
proceeding is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1,
Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for
the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the
latter provision is clear enough, to wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in Article 2035 (underscoring supplied).[22]

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the
term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice
in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.[23] A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of
justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.[24] Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the
intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same
family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed
to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than strangers.[25]

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 9263626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of
Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special
proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact.[26] The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the
fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said
deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1] In CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851 promulgated on September 30, 1996, Petition, Annex G, Rollo, pp. 52-59.

[2] Galvez, J., ponente, Martinez and Aquino, JJ., concurring; Rollo, pp. 52-59.

[3] In SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 respectively dated July 30, 1993 and September 15, 1993, Petition, Annexes
D and F, Rollo, pp. 35-44; 51.

[4] In CA-G.R. S.P. No. 39851 promulgated on May 6, 1997, Petition, Annex K, Rollo, pp. 70-77.

[5] Petition, Annex G, Rollo, pp. 52-59.

[6] Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 18-25.

[7] Branch 35, Presided by Judge Ramon P. Makasiar.

[8] Petition, Annex C, Rollo, pp. 27-34.

[9] Petition, annex D, supra.

[10] Petition, Annex F, supra.

[11] Petition, Annex G, supra.

[12] Petition, Annex K, supra.

[13] Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 21-23.

[14] Now Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

[15] De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. 112 SCRA 243, 248 (1982).

[16] Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, 317 SCRA 327, 335
(1999).

[17] Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Dumlao, 206 SCRA 40, 46 (1992).

[18] Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 23-24.

[19] Petition, Annex D, Rollo, pp. 39-43.

[20] Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 61, 62 (1917); Borja vs. Borja, et al., 101 Phil 911, 925 (1957) cited in the
Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Volume V-A Part I, 1970 Ed. By Vicente J. Francisco.

[21] Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33, 36 (1998).

[22] Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines now reads:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

[23] Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., 1990, citing Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 375, 23 L.Ed. 449; Weston v.
Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 464, 7 L.Ed. 481; Syracuse Plaster Co. v. Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corporation,
169 Misc. 564, 7 N.Y. S.2d 897.

[24] Rule 1, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Court.

[25] Report of the Code of Commission, p. 18 cited in the Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 1995 Ed. By Arturo M. Tolentino, p. 505.

[26] Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133000

October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL
RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL
ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..

BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside
and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of
defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and
reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.

"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon
the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael,
Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February
1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the
agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said
property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the
name of Graciano and the Six children.1wphi1.nt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of ConsolidationSubdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share
alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square
meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of
TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90
square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square
meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but
retained ownership over the second lot.3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano
sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was
issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six
children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein
private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of
fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT
No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have
been impaired.

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to
Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the
latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance,
properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's
estate or against herein petitioner's property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996
holding:8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited
by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon
in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between
them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law
under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded
as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter
alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its
jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the
court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts
of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this
wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

"XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules.
The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion."9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and

that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted
and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A
special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular
relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11 contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present
circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to
validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife,
herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the
estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined
the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate
of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the
Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot
resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules.
Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13
and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court

(then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is
not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a
mode of practice "which may be waived".15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the
six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction,
to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle
that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then
the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment
as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited
the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may
be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the
partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that
the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these wellentrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of
advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's
estate.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnote

1 C.A. Decision in C.A. GR No.CV No. 51390, promulgated on 09 December 1997, penned by Justice
Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and concurred in by JJ. Ruben T. Reyes and Hilarion L. Aquino; Rollo, pp. 23-31.

2 TCT No.107442.

3 TCT No.107443.

4 Annex "C"; Records, p. 5.

5 Records, pp.1-7.

6 Exhibit E; Decision in Civil Case No. 94-71075; p. 205.

7 Records, pp. 20-23.

8 Rollo, p. 25.

9 Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880 [1920].

10 Francisco, V.J., Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. V-A, 1970 ed., p. 596 citing 1 CJS 10941095.

11 Section 2, Rule 90.

12 Rollo, p.30; CA Decision, p.8.

13 81 SCRA 278 [1978].

14 269 SCRA 764 [1997].

15 Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 [1948].

16 Coca vs. Borromeo, supra; Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 [1942]; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-1883,
August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892 [1965]; Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil 227 [1948]; 3 Moran's Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 473.

17 269 SCRA 764, 769 [1997].

18 Pagkatipunan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 718 [1991].

19 Mateo vs. Laguna, 29 SCRA 864 [1969].

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.

Francisco Carreon for petitioners.

Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided
over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C,
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved

ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973,
Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has
been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,
therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and
as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on
May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was
obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has
adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as
officer of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G.
Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four
aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as
Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G.
Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the
regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for
the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of
which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for
letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take
possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia
opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special
administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the
deceased."

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only
on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May
18,1973.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the
petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid;
and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado
G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is
a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased
Amado G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting
outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the
motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1
subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties
subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association
should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a
previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and
personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was
ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like
"married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the
failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of
residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B.
Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to
be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the
foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion
to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power

allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the
estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November
28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her:
(a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment,
qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks
and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion
for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned
orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final
liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another,
directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the
estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to
Amado Garcia."

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia
G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his
death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent
for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also
testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari
and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one
dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three
others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix,
Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge
Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the
matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B.
Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate
of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as

special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B.
Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the
office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the
proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her
willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it
being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until
Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals.
This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to
Pay Estate Obligations."

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction"
reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention
that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had
been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is
still pending before the Court.

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting
Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for
the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with
temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani
Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the
reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall

not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section
2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such
as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets,
intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin,
creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the
country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets
in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure
is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the
subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority
shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it
means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous
Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of
estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the
Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the
term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.
10 No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration
before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April
26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in
Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in
other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's
"last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate
of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B.
Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of
his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the
Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal,
the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the
long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia
G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the
jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere
practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another

issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1
of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the
delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special
administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules,
however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the
estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she
would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of
kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of
a property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G.
Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with
Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional
rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue
of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of
Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa
B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla
as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court
under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case
was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's
estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from
continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition
for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter
of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix
the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in
G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Muoz Palma, J., took no part.

Footnotes

* Court of Appeals, Special First Division, composed of JJ. Reyes, L.B., Gaviola, Jr. and De Castro.

1 Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special administrator shall take possession
and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for
the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain
suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A
special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

2 July 2, 1973, July 26, 1973, August 9, 1973, July 17, 1974, July 25, 1974, at 270-391, Rollo of No. L40502.

3 Diez v. Serra, 51 Phil. 286 (1927).

4 See Malig v. Bush, L-22761, May 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 453-454.

5 Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 530-32 (1911).

6 In re Kaw Singco. Sy Oa v. Co Ho, 74 Phil. 241-242 (1943); Rodriguez v. Borja, L-21993, June 21, 1966,
17 SCRA 442.

7 McGrath v. Stevenson, 77 P 2d 608; In re Jones, 19 A 2d 280.

8 See 92 C.J.S. 813-14; See also Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, L-24742, October 26,1973, 53 SCRA 377.

9 See 77 C.J.S. 286.

10 Kemp v. Kemp, 16 NYS 2d 34.

11 See 92 C.J.S. 816.

12 See Rules of Court, Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 Ed., at 32; Manzanero v. Bongon, 67 Phil. 602 (1939).

13 A special administrator is a representative of decedent, appointed by the probate court to care for
and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. (Jones v. Minnesota
Transfer R. Co., 121 NW 606, cited in Jacinto, Special Proceedings, 1965 ed., at 106.

14 See Proceedings of the Institute on the Revised Rules of Court, UP Law Center, 1963, at 99.

15 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281 (1956); Hon. Alcasid v. Samson, 102 Phil. 736
(1957).

16 Ozaeta v. Pecson, 93 Phil. 419-20 (1953).

17 Roxas v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 410 (1948).

18 Idem, at 411.

19 Article 992 of the Civil Code provides: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child.

20 Fernandez v. Maravilla, L-18799, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 597.

21 Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, L-17091, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 113.

22 Vide, Rollo of No. L-40502, at 219, Annex "SS" to Petition for certiorari and/or Prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction by Preciosa B. Garcia in CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP.

23 Vide, Rollo of No. L-40502, at 268; Annex 5 to Answer filed by Virginia G. Fule to petition of Preciosa
B. Garcia in C.A.-G.R. No. 03221-SP.

24 See Perido vs. Perido, L-28248, March 12, 1975, Makalintal, C.J. ponente, First Division, 63 SCRA 97.

25 53 SCRA 381.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8409

December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,
oppositors-appellants.

Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.

Filemon Cajator for appellants.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who
died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4,
1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition,
stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had
been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted
said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her
aforementioned sister and brothers.

The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75,
section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch
as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A Espaa
Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr.
Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST
Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage
in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he
died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of
seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at Espaa
Extention.

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such
domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled
that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70;
Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have
been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently

(Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624;
Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was
juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise.
Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested his
wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify
thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that
"the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee
did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio,
upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A Espaa Extention was purchased, and
who, therefore, might have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This
notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is
"manifest" from the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.lawphil.net

The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do so
"due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable in fact, its is very likely
that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more
effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place
merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on
account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton
vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).

Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover,
some of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality.
Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A Espaa Extention, Quezon
City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave
San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the
decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to
Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise,
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the
legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the
children of the deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion
and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from
appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City,
the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 which is particularly strong when the domicile
is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent has not been
offset by the evidence of record.

The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused to
entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in
rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:

Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever action
oppositors may want to take later on because until now the personality of the oppositors has not been
established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass upon this

question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these
proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)

In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before
appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation.
When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as
his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:

Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now trying to
prove the status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point here is your contention that the
deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to cross-examine. If you are
trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t.
s. n.)

Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because
of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from
doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either
the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances
surrounding the case.

To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he
declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent,
for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by
cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.

What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower
court, appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for
the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein,
said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected
thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction
of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection,
unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel
refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court
rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court
and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record
that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of
assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a
fact.

At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to
appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged
relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have
admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue
under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on
November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants
herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres
Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3,
section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953,
which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all
surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for
the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in an order dated December 21,
1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts."

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass
upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking
cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently
refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have
intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar
case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would
then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to nonresident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their
respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not
only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of
the case shall exclude the other courts but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1
of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which
deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in
which they have properties.lawphil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more
courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs.
Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had
been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings
may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator
of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have
sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs
against the appellee. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 "There is a presumption in favor of the continuance of an existing domicile. Therefore, then burden of
proving a change lies in all cases upon those who alleged that he change has occurred. This presumption
may have a decisive effect, for it the evidence is so conflicting that it is impossible to elicit with certainly
what the resident's intention is, the Court, being unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion one way or the
other, will decide in favor of the existing domicile." (Private International Law by Cheshire, pp. 218-219.)

"In the absence of any circumstances from which the courts may infer the animus, they are accustomed
to fall back on two legal presumptions, without which it would in some cases be impossible to arrive at any
conclusions as to a party's domicile.

"The first of these is the presumption that the party has retained the last domicile known to have been
possessed by him. This follows from the principle that a domicile acquired is retained until another is
gained, and from the other principle growing out of it that the burden of proof is on him who alleges a
change of domicile." (Conflict of Laws by Minor, p. 123.)

2 "It is often said, particularly in the English cases, that there is a stronger presumption against change
from a domicile of origin.

3 Which was not been categorically denied, appellee's counsel having limited themselves to alleging, in
an unsworn pleading, that they have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief on said claim the appellants
than there is against other changes of domicile. "'Domicile of origin. . . . differs from domicile of choice
mainly in this that is character is more enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off.' The
English view was forcibly expressed in a Pennsylvania case in which Lewis, J., said: "The attachment which
every one feels for his native land is the foundation of the rule that the domicile of origin is presumed to
continue until it is actually changed by acquiring a domicile elsewhere. No temporary sojourn in foreign
country will work this change.' In a federal case in Pennsylvania the same point was emphasized." (The
Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, p. 129.)

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Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1578

September 30, 1947

PEREGRINA REBONG, petitioner,

vs.
FIDEL IBAEZ, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, respondent.

Zosimo D. Tanalega for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent judge.

FERIA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari against the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna on
the ground that the latter acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petition for cancellation of the lien or annotation on the certificate of title issued to the petitioner, of a land
extrajudicially inherited by him as the only heir of her predecessors in interest to the effect that the
property described in the title is subject to the claims of the creditors and other heirs of the deceased Jose
Rebong and Maria Rebong within two years from July 9, 1947, in accordance with sections 1 and 4, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner based on her petition on section 112 of Act No. 496 and offered to file a bond of P5,000,
the estimated value of the above mentioned property to answer for such contingent claims.

The pertinent part of said section 112 of Act No. 496 provides:

SEC. 112. ... Any registered owner or other person in interest may at any time apply petition to the
court, upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or been created
which do not appear upon the certificate; ... and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security if necessary, as it may deem proper; . . . .

According to the above quoted provisions, the court "may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry
or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security if necessary," upon application of a registered owner on "the ground that
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased, or that new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the
certificate." Applying these provisions to the present case, it is evident that, since the registered or
annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs of the petitioner's predecessors in interest,
established by section 4 of Rule 74 has not yet terminated or ceased, for the period of two from July 9,
1947, have not yet elapsed, the respondent judge had no jurisdiction or power to order the cancellation of
said lien or annotation as prayed by the petitioner. Neither section 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court, nor
section 112 of Act No. 496 authorizes interest of substitution of a bond for a lien or registered interest of
any description, whether vested, expedient, inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated or
ceased.

In view of the foregoing it is plan that the respondent judge has not acted in excess of jurisdiction nor
with grave abuse of discretion, but in conformity with the law, in denying the petitioner's petition, and the
petition for certiorari is therefore denied.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Hilado, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Although the title of the petition indicates that what is prayed for is a writ of certiorari, in effect, the
petition, is for a writ of mandamus, because what is sought by petitioner is that the lower court be ordered
to excercise its discretion in allowing petitioner to file a bond of P5,000 and to order the cancellation of the
lien appearing at the back of the Torrens title of the property of petitioner.

There being no law under which the lower court is duty bond to excercise its discretion in the sense
prayed for by petitioner, in our opinion that petition should be denied.

Petitioner want that the lien in the title making the property subject to the claims of the creditors and
heirs of the deceased original owners, Jose Rebong and Maria Rebong, within two years from July 9, 1947,
be cancelled and in lieu thereof that a bond in the sum of P5,000 be authorized to answer for any such
claim of the creditors and heirs of said original owners.

While no provision of law is invoked by petitioner in support of her prayer, she alleges as reasons, (a)
that the rights of third persons whose claims are cancelled by the lien are merely contingent, expectant
and inchoate; (b)that the dominical rights of petitioner would greatly be hampered and she cannot
transact or deal with the real estate property with third persons; and (c) that the bond, in the event that
there exist claims against it within a period of two years will answer for such eventuality, so much so that
no right of third persons will really be prejudiced.

Petitioner alleges that when she filed the petition on July 14, 1947, with the lower court she alleged that
she desired to cancel the annotation of the lien "in order to mortgage the property to a bank."

Petitioner's reasons are unconvincing.

If her intention in seeking the cancellation of the annotated lien is to have an opportunity to mortgage
the property to a bank so as to obtain a loan, the purpose can be accomplished without the cancellation
prayer for. If petitioner can secure sureties willing and able to answer for the amount of P5,000, we do not
see any reason why she cannot obtain from a bank a loan with the same sureties. If they can offer a good
guarantee for the bond of P5,000, surely they can offer a good guarantee in favor of a bank for a loan that
petitioner may apply for.

For all the foregoing, we concur in the dismissal of the petition.

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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-273

March 29, 1947

CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants.

Pedro Paganiban y Tolentino for appellants.

Vicente Reyes Villavicencio for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia
Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from
their father a parcel of land of which he died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral
survey.

On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion which is
particularly described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's
wife in consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the combined shares of the intervenors in the
larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the
five brother and sisters.

After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not now important, the
plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her original complaint, dated
February 3, 1944, she offered the purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this being, according to that
complaint, the amount Andal had paid for Maria Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it
is alleged, refused to part with the property.

On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that when the cause was called for
trial on March 8, she announced in open court that she was willing to repurchase her sister's share from
Andal for P860 and reimburse Andal for his expense; that Andal asked for continuance until the 29th
stating that he had made other expenses; that on 29th she brought P860 to repurchase the land in
question but the case was again postponed because the plaintiff's sisters had intervened; and that
meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold the land fictitiously to the vendors for P970.

It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for P970 in favor of the
intervenors, an amount which included Andal's expenses as well as the normal sale price. The document of
repurchase gave as reason for the transaction the fact that it had been agreed that in the event trouble
should arise the sellers should return to the buyer what they had received and pay the latter his expenses.

On February 14, 1944, the defendant filed his answer alleging that Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had
sold him their respective portions of the inherited land for P860 and that he had no objection to disposing
of those portions in favor of the plaintiff for P860 plus the expenses he had incurred in the execution of the
deed of sale amounting to P50, but that he was unwilling to accept P150, which was all the plaintiff offered
him besides his expenses.

On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention was filed. The intervenors
alleged that there had been a partition among them and their brother and sisters "with the share of each
delineated and marked, and after partition and delineation everyone took exclusive, separate and
independent possession of his portion in the partition." They charged the plaintiff with bad faith in that "it
was upon her request for chance that the sale to the defendant, about to take place last November, was
delayed till January of this year when she finally informed the intervenors that they could sell to the
defendant, or she could pay only P150 and could not raise the amount of P860 offered by the defendant."

Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own behalf. Substantially she
reiterated the allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the defendant, also testified. He said that
he was in possession of the land in question until he returned it to the intervenors. He declared that the
plaintiff offered to repurchase the land from him long after he had bought it, that is, when she was about to
file her action. He stated that after he came from Candelaria, Tayabas, with the document of sale he
showed it to the plaintiff: that was on the 23rd of January. He was able to do this because he lived near
Cresencia and passed by her house on his way home from Candelaria. He said that Cresencia Hernandez
upon being shown the document merely exclaimed, "Oh, so you already have a document." When asked
whether the land "described in the complaint of the herein plaintiff has been the object of partition among
the co-owners Pedro, Basilia, Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed Hernandez," counsel for the plaintiff
objected on the ground that the best evidence was the document of partition, and the objection was
sustained. The same objection and the same ruling were made on the same ground when the witness was
queried how it was that the land he had bought from Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had been specified in
the deed of sale, Exhibit A.

In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors did not call any more witnesses
but only announced that he had witnesses ready to prove that a parol partition among the five brother and
sisters had been made, mentioning the names of six such witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff again
objected asserting that "under the Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved
except by means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the proof is offered. "Upon this
objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as

under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to decide the
case it had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties.

Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land by Zacarias Andal in
favor of Maria and Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad faith. It, however, did not seem to have found
as a fact the allegation that the resale was simulated. The court then made this judgment:

(a) declarando y sin valor alguno el documento de reventaotorgado por el demandado Zacarias Andal en
26 de marzo de 1944, a favor de Maria y Aquilina Hernandez sobre el terrenocuestionado que se presento
como Exhibito 2 de dichodemandado, y consiguientemente se anulan tambien todas lastransacciones
posteriores que las mencionadas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez hayan hecho sobre el terreno cuestionado
despuesdel 26 de marzo de 1944, asi como tambien cualquiera anotacionen la Oficiana del Registrador de
Titulos de Batangas que hayaanotado dicha reventa por el demandado Zacarias Andal a favorde las
terceristas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez en el citado dia 26 de marzo de 1944; y

(b) se ordena al aqui demandado Zacarias Andal, que otorgue unaescritura de reventa a favor de la aqui
demandante Cresencia Hernandez, de las participaciones de las terceristas en el terrenodescrito en la
demanda suplementaria previo pago de P860 mas lacantidad de P50 como gastos de documentacion. Se
absuelve al demandado de los daos y perjuicios que reclama la demandante. Se absuelve tambien a la
demandante de la contra-demanda de lasterceristas.

Sin especial pronunciamento en cuanto a las costas.

The defendant and the intervenors are appealing from the foregoing decision and in their joint brief
made one assignment of error:

The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a contract of partition among the
heirs on the ground that it was not admissible.

Before proceeding with a discussion of the questions raised we are tempted to point up some seeming
incongruities in the above-quoted judgment. Although Zacarias Andal is no longer interested in the case,
as far as the land is concerned, and even though the intervenors have become again the absolute owners
and are now in full possession of the property, while Andal has already gotten his money back, the
judgment would have Andal execute a deed of resale in favor of the plaintiff and received from her the
price of repurchase. The judgment is silent as to the intervenors with reference to the execution of the
deed of sale or the receipt of the sale price. And the lower court made no finding and expressed no opinion
as to whether the offer of P150 instead of P860, not to mention Andal's expenses, by the plaintiff as price
of repurchase was sufficient compliance with article 1067 of the Civil Code on which the court rested the
plaintiff's cause of action.

However, in this decision we are concerned mainly with the application of section 21 of Rule 123 and
section 1 of Rule 74 both of the Rules of Court. Article 1248 of the Civil Code has no bearing on the case.

There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a contract as is required

to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds the affirmative view; other
authorities say no. The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of
frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that part of the land
which belongs to each tenant in common. (27 C.J., 206.) The differences in the conclusions reached are
"due perhaps to varied phraseology of the statutes" in the several states. (40 Amer. Jur., 15.) However the
case may be, as enacted in the Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, and
now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a long line of
cases to be applicable to executory and not to completed or executed contracts. (27 C.J., 206.) In this
jurisdiction performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26
Phil., 485; Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil., 67.) The statute of frauds does not declare the
contracts therein enumerated void and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffective the action for specific
performance. (Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat, supra.) In the United States, even in those states where
the affirmative view of the question has been followed, "the weight of authority upholds the rule that an
oral partition is effective when several possession is taken under it by the respective parties to the
agreement." (27 C.J., 206.)

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced
oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.

Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity
will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession
in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held
or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession,
exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will
confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of
estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of the land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised.
And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose
of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or
otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part
performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been
held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court
of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. (40 Amer. Jur., 15-18.)

It is on the effects of Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition that there are sharp
divergences of opinion among the members of this Court. This section reads:

If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument file in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.

It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be validated by any acts
of the parties short of the execution of a public document and its registration.

As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be reduced to
writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions.
Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan
vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The decisions of this Court which we have noticed were predicated on this
assumption. The Civil Code, too, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument,
not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the
acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the document.
(Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs .Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)

Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of partition? In other words, is writing the
act that confers legal validity upon the agreement? There are no indications in the phraseology of this rule
which justify an affirmative answer to these questions. It must be noted that where the law intends a
writing or other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in clear
and unequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as originally enacted in England and as enacted in
some of the states, uses the words "utterly void" with statute transactions required to be in writing are
absolutely void and not merely voidable if not made in the manner indicated. Again article 633 of the Civil
Code says that donation may be valid only when made in a public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage
Law makes known its intention to have the execution of a public instrument and its registration in the
registry indispensable to the validity of the contract by using this phrase: "in order that voluntary
mortgages may be legally created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the
same purpose similar expression with reference to the execution of a public document: "in order that
mortgage may be validly constituted." And with respect to the formalities of last wills and testaments,
section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will shall be valid to pass upon any estate
real or personal nor change or affect the same, unless it be written etc." Other examples might be
mentioned.

Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public instruments is
to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the
parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as
between the parties dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. On the other
hand, the opposite theory is not without reasonable support. We can think of possible factors against the
proposition that a public document and its registration were contemplated as necessary ingredients to give
life to a contract of partition so that without them no oral partition can bind the parties.

1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a part were
promulgated by the Judicial Department under authority to deal with matters of procedure exclusively. For
this court to prescribe what is to be a binding agreement between co-heirs in the settlement of their

private affairs which in no way affect the rights of third parties would be to transcends its rule-making
power. We bring out this limitation upon the authority of this court to make rules, as an aid to
interpretation, as a method of arriving at the conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was meant to be
remedial and not a rule of substantive law of far-reaching importance and serious juridical and practical
implications. It is to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court realized the bounds of this court's
functions and did not intend to trespass on purely substantive rights of the parties to the partition. To the
extent the execution and registration of a notarized instrument are made essential elements to validity to
protect innocent third parties, the rule is legitimate and necessary; legitimate because decedent's estate
are placed under the jurisdiction of the courts to administer and distribute. The interests of third parties
eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and practice and invades the realm of
substantive law.

Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 Rule 74, is enlightening and instructive.
The former after stating that heirs may apportion and divide the estate among themselves as they may
see fit by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds the words "and not otherwise." These
words, in our opinion, were expressive of an intention to make the written formality inherent element of
the validity of a parol partition. But what is far more to the point is that by logical process of deduction the
elimination from the new rule of the words "and not otherwise" imports the casting away from the
prescribed public document of its jural character which the document enjoyed in the former code. At the
same time, the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old provision serves to emphasize the necessity of a
positive and clear language if a given contractual formality is to be the exclusive basis of the contract's
binding effect on the parties. It is of course unnecessary to say that the attaching of jural character to the
prescribed public instrument in section 596 of Act No. 190 is no argument for contending that such
document must be clothed with the same raiment in the new Rules. Act No. 190 was a mixture of
procedural and substantive provisions, having been enacted by the legislative body itself which, unlike this
court, was unhampered and untrammelled, except by the fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects of
legislation.

2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments in acts and contracts with greater liberality with
a view to better adaptation to human frailties and idiosyncracies. In their blind faith in friends and
relatives, in their lack of experience and foresight, and their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and
continue to make verbal contracts. The advantages of an air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall far
short of compensating for the resulting damage, injustice, inconveniences and confusion. So even though
articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code have made provisions for public instrument for all
transactions and contracts whose object is the creation, modification or extinction of real rights in
immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be effective between the parties.
A leading case on this subject is Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Williard writing the
decision. It was said in that case that when the essential requisites for the existence of a contract are
present, the contract is binding upon the parties, and, although required to be in writing by article 1280 of
the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action under article 1279 to compel the execution of a written
instrument. It says that "article 1279 does not impose an obligation, but confers a privilege upon both
contracting parties, and the fact that the plaintiff has not made use of same does not bar his action." It
further says that article 1279, far from making the enforceability of the contract dependent upon any
special intrinsic form, recognizes its enforceability by the mere act of granting the contracting parties an
adequate remedy whereby to compel the execution of public writing or any other special form whenever
such form is necessary in order that contract may produce the effect which is desired according to
whatever its object. This doctrine was iterated and reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps longer than
that on any other legal topic. And it has been extended even to verbal contracts involving land registered
under the Torrens Act. Do the Rules of Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can perceive no sufficient
ground for the new Rules to depart from it. No considerations of public policy enter into a partition of
hereditary estate among co-heirs greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which
operates to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land. If as between strangers the
creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights may be lawfully effected by parol
agreement notwithstanding the requirement that it be put in writing, the new rule could not be more
intransigent when the transaction is between co-heirs and there is no change of ownership but simply
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.

The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion, for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against
tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as
in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by law.

It is said that the findings, conclusions and judgment in the appealed decision are not assigned as errors
and that for this reason the appeal should be dismissed. We do not think that the premise of this objection
is exactly correct. The evidence on parol partition tendered by the defendant and intervenors was ruled out
and they specifically complain of this exclusion as error. In this manner the assignment of error squarely
meets and attacks the opinion and judgment of the trial court. A superficial analysis of the case will show
that on the validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of the entire litigation, and on that validity
depends in turn the competence of the excluded evidence. These two interrelated points are the core of
the whole case. All other points are incidental to and revolve around them. If a completed oral partition
may be enforced, as the defendant and the intervenors contend and as we opine, their evidence should be
allowed, and if allowed and it establishes their allegation, the plaintiff's cause of action vanishes.

If the appellant's assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge to the decision of the court
below, we still believe that the objection takes a narrow view of practice and procedure contrary to the
liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court. The first injunction of the new Rules (Rule 1, section 2) is
that they "shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." In line with the modern
trends of procedure, we are told that, "while an assignment of error which is required by law or rule of
court has been held essential to appellate review, and only those assigned will be considered, there are a
number of cases which appear to accord to the appellate court a broad discretionary power to waive the
lack of proper assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned. And an unassigned error closely
related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error
properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to
assign it as error." (4 C.J.S., 1734; 3 C.J., 1341, footnote 77.) At the least, the assignment of error, viewed in
this light, authorizes us to examine and pass upon the decision of the court below.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceeding and a
new decision not incompatible with this decision, with costs of this appeal against the appellee.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

FERIA, J.:

I reserve the right to express my view and write a dissenting opinion later.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., with whom concurs PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Is oral evidence admissible to prove partition of land? The answer of the appellants is in the affirmative.
Thus their only assignment of error is as follows: "The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence
for proving a contract of partition of the land among the heirs on the ground that it was not admissible."
Since no other question, either of fact or of law, is raised by the appellants, I deem it unnecessary, under
the circumstances of this case, to pass upon said assignment.

A small parcel of land containing some 5,568 square meters was inherited by four sisters and a brother.
It was surveyed and is still assessed as a single lot, not in the name of the co-owners, but in that of an
uncle. It appears that on January 23, 1944, two of the sisters sold a portion of the lot to defendant Andal
who was neither a relative nor an adjoining owner. The vendors stated:

Este terreno es parte del terreno referido en la declaracion Tax No. 53379 en nombre de nuestro tio Juan
Dimasacat y estaamillarado todo el terreno en P290. El referido terreno yase vio en el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Batangas en 29 de Septiembre de 1941, at nagcaro-on ng decreto noong ika-6 ng Noviembre,
1941, na doon ay ipinasiya ang pagbibigay ng Titulo sa aming magcacapatid. (Exhibit A.)

Upon learning of the sale one week thereafter, a third sister expressed her desire to repurchase said
portion of land and, upon refusal of the buyer, she filed a complaint for the purpose of being subrogated to
the rights acquired by Andal. The latter, in his answer, is agreeable to the prayer provided that he be
reimbursed in the total sum of P910 which he had actually paid. In the meantime, the other two sisters
(vendors) intervened in the case, alleging that, before the sale was made to Andal, the plaintiff had been
given the option to acquire the lot in question. By way of counterclaim, it was alleged that they had
repurchased the lot from Andal at a higher price.

After hearing, the lower court held that inasmuch as the plaintiff is willing to buy, and Andal to sell, the
lot at the price fixed by the latter, there is no reason why the former's complaint should not prosper, and
Andal was accordingly ordered to convey the property to the plaintiff upon payment by the latter of the
total sum of P910. As regards the contention of the intervenors, the court held that their alleged
repurchase was fraudulent and, therefore, null and void.

As these pronouncements, necessarily based on findings of fact, have not been assailed, they should be
considered final. Hence, it is absolutely futile to decide the question of law raised in appellant's assignment
of error, the same having become academic.

Even so, the point whether the sale to Andal took place after a partition is immaterial, in view of his
willingness to resell to the plaintiff, not to mention the fact that the latter's right to redeem, as an adjoining
owner, maybe based on article 1523 of the Civil Code which provides: "The owners of the adjacent lands
shall also have the right of redemption in case of the sale of a rural estate whose area does not exceed
one hectare."

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

July 30, 1947

TUASON, J.:

Plaintiff and appellee has filed a motion for reconsideration. She maintains that she is entitled to
judgment because the defendant has no objection to reselling her the land and she is, on the other hand,
ready to reimburse him the purchase price. She argues that the buyer having led her to believe that he
would make the resale in her favor is estopped from going against his own acts.

Superficially, the decision is obscure as to the relation which Andal's signification in his answer, that he
was willing to sell the land to the plaintiff, bears to the dispositive part or judgment. But read in its
entirety, analyzed closely, the decision reveals in no uncertain manner that it is anchored on articles 1067
and 1522 of the Civil Code and that all other matters discussed therein revolve around this basic
conclusion. With particular reference to Andal's signification abovementioned, the court does not appear to
have made or intended to make it an affirmative, separate basis of the judgment. Roughly, the judgment
was evolved along this process of reasoning: the plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under the abovecited provisions of the Civil Code was evident, in the court's opinion. But, the court said in the same
breath, a complication emerged. The confusion was brought about by the resale of the property by Andal
to the original owners. The court seemed puzzled. Then it saw a way out of the perplexity; the resale was
illegal and mala fide and hence ineffective. It was illegal, mala fide and ineffective because the defendant
had stated in his answer that he had no objection in allowing the plaintiff to buy the land, and because the
resale to the intervenors had been consummated during the pendency of the action. Andal's signification
in his answer estopped him from alienating the land in favor of others.

It was estoppel that the court invoked Andal's expression of his willingness to sell the land, citing section
68 (a), Rule 123, Rules of Court. The court looked upon this expression not as a cause of action standing on
its own feet but merely as an equitable aid to keep the defendant and intervenors from making a mockery
of the plaintiff's right under the aforecited articles of the Civil Code. The Court found that the transaction
between the defendant and the intervenors had been entered into "con el proposito de desorientar al
Juzgado y frustrar en cierto modo la administracion de justicia." The appellee both in her brief and motion
for reconsideration treats Andal's willingness to sell in the same light.

To put it differently, the central principle of the case, as the court saw it, was that the evidence on the
oral partition was inadmissible and so the plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under articles 1067 and
1522 of the Civil Code was in order. Andal's expression of willingness to sell the land to the plaintiff came
into play not as a generator of a new obligation in favor of the plaintiff, separate and distinct from the right
of co-heirs to repurchase shares in property inherited in common and sold to strangers by other heirs, but
simply as a factor to prevent the defendant's and intervenor's attempt to nullify that right.

Estoppel, in the sense in which the court regarded Andal's manifestation that he was willing to sell the
land to the plaintiff, partakes of the nature of the rule of evidence. Certainly, it belongs to the adjective
branch of the law, and the court regarded it under this criterion. The court's reference in its decision to
Andal's signification cannot have a meaning other than that the court assigned thereto a subordinate role,
subordinate to the asserted right of the plaintiff under the provisions of the Civil Code referred to.

The sole assignment of error in appellant's brief thus inevitably comprehends that part of the appealed
decision and judgment which relates to the defendant's expression of willingness to sell land to the
plaintiff. A review of the error specifically assigned necessarily carries with it the consideration of all
matters related to and dependent upon that error. Specifically, if there was a lawful partition and the
partition bars the plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under the articles relied upon, the proposition
formulated in the assignment of error then Andal's previous willingness to sell loses its raison d'etre as
estoppel; it disappears with the right which it was intended to uphold and with which it was inextricably
bound up.

It should be made clear that we are only construing the decision of the lower court. We have explained
the ratio decidendi as it appeared to the court, not the theory of the parties in their pleadings. If the
supplemental complaint was intended to present Andal's offer to sell the land to the plaintiff as
constituting a new and separate cause of action a point which cannot be determined with a fair degree
of certainty from a reading of that complaint the court did not see or consider it in that light. And, it
should be remembered, it is what the court decided or how the court decided a case that we have to look
as a test for judging whether the questions for review have been formulated in the right manner.

If Andal's statement in his answer was alleged by the plaintiff to serve as an independent cause of
action, that is all the more reason, for his own benefit, why the cases should be remanded for further
proceeding. The new trial as ordered in our decision leaves the door open for the admission of evidence on
the allegations in the supplementary complaint as well as on the alleged parol partition. As matters now
stand, the plaintiff could ask for judgment on the supplementary complaint only on the untenable
hypothesis that no assignment of error has been made relative to this feature of the case. Without the
benefit of this technicality, the plaintiff has not made out a case on the supplementary complaint. The
evidence is very meager to the point of nullity; many of the allegations have been left untouched, and
there are essential points that badly need amplication or clarification. It would be extremely improper, for
obvious reasons, to go into these defects and deficiencies in detail in this resolution in anticipation of the
new trial.

The motion is denied.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., reserves his vote.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

We are of opinion that, as suggested by plaintiff-appellee in her motion for reconsideration, dated April
5, 1947, there is no need for ordering a new trial of the case, and that rather the appealed decision should
be affirmed.

This litigation is about a parcel of land very much less than two hectares in area located in a barrio, and
assessed for taxation purposes at P290 only, and the amount for redemption of said land is much less than
P1,000 of worthless Japanese paper money. The litigation started on February 3, 1944, more than three
years ago. It is high time that we put an end to such a litigation, to fight which the parties might have
spent more money than the value of the thing in litigation.

Plaintiff and appellee Cresencia Hernandez filed the complaint to compel defendant Zacarias Andal to
sell the property to her. In his answer of February 14, 1944, Zacarias Andal stated that he was willing to
sell the property to plaintiff, provided the latter would pay him P800 plus expenses amounting to P50. The
appealed decision ordered Zacarias Andal to sell the property to plaintiff who was ordered to pay P860,
plus P50 for expenses, which is P60 more than the amount demanded by Andal in his answer of February
14, 1944. Plaintiff did not appeal, thus showing her willingness to pay the amount.

Under the circumstances, we do not see any reason why ununderstandable legal technicalities should
block the ending of a litigation which, in substance ceased to exist since plaintiff and appellee manifested
her willingness to pay to defendant Andal even more than the amount he demanded.

The legal discussion entered into the majority opinion to support the further delay in finishing the suit
might be highly interesting in a law academy, but it will never satisfy the simple sense of justice of the
common man.

We vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

PARAS, J.:

I concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147468. April 9, 2003]

SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO & JOSEFINA CHAVEZ DOMINGO, petitioners, vs. LILIA MONTINOLA
ROCES, CESAR ROBERTO M. ROCES, ANA INES MAGDALENA ROCES TOLENTINO, LUIS MIGUEL M. ROCES,
JOSE ANTONIO M. ROCES and MARIA VIDA PRESENTACION ROCES, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 22, 2000
in CA-G.R. CV No. 62473,[1] as well as the resolution dated March 15, 2001, denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[2]

The facts are not in dispute.

The spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous parcels of land located on Arayat
Street, Mandaluyong, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 57217 and 57218.[3] On November 13,
1962, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) caused the annotation of an affidavit of adverse
claim on the titles alleging that the spouses have mortgaged the same to it.[4]

Subsequently, GSIS wrote a letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the owners duplicates of
titles. When Roces failed to comply, GSIS filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
docketed as Civil Case No. R-1359, praying that the owners duplicates in Roces possession be declared null
and void and that the Register of Deeds of Pasig be directed to issue new owners duplicates to GSIS.[5] On
September 5, 1977, the Court of First Instance issued an order granting the petition.[6] The order became
final and executory, and TCT Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664) were issued in the name of GSIS.[7]

Cesar Roces died intestate on January 26, 1980.[8] He was survived by his widow, Lilia Roces, and their
children: Cesar Roberto Roces, Ana Ines Magdalena Roces Tolentino, Luis Miguel M. Roces, Jose Antonio
Roces and Maria Vida Presentacion Roces, all of whom are the respondents in this case.

On July 22, 1992, Reynaldo L. Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication
over the Arayat properties. He alleged that the properties were owned by the spouses Cesar and Lilia
Roces, both of whom died intestate, on September 13, 1987 and June 27, 1989, respectively; that the
properties were acquired during the existence of their marriage; that the spouses left no heirs except the
brother of Lilia Roces, who was his father; that neither of the spouses left any will nor any debts; and that
he was the sole heir of the Roces spouses.[9]

On January 5, 1993, Montinola filed a petition against GSIS with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed
as Civil Case No. R-4743, praying for the cancellation of TCT Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664).[10]
During the trial, GSIS failed to produce any document evidencing the alleged real estate mortgage by
Roces of the properties. Hence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Montinola, declaring the
owners duplicates of TCT No. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664) as null and void and ordering the Registry
of Deeds of Mandaluyong to issue new owners duplicates of the said titles.[11]

GSIS did not appeal the aforesaid judgment; thus, the same became final and executory. Accordingly, the
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong issued TCT No. 7299 in the name of Montinola in lieu of TCT No. 57218
(11664).[12]

Sometime in July 1993, Montinola executed a deed of absolute sale of the property covered by TCT No.
7299 in favor of petitioner spouses Eduardo and Josefina Domingo.[13] Thereafter, TCT No. 7673 was
issued in the names of petitioners.

Both TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673 contained the following annotation:

Subject to the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to the inheritance left by
the deceased SPS. CESAR ROCES & LILIA MONTINOLA.[14]

When respondents learned of the sale of the property to petitioners, they filed a complaint against
Montinola and petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. They argued that the affidavit of selfadjudication was fraudulent because Montinola was not an heir of the Roces spouses and it was not true
that Lilia Roces was dead. Therefore, the affidavit of self-adjudication, as well as the deed of absolute sale,
TCT No. 7299, and TCT No. 7673, all covering the subject property, were null and void.[15]

In their answer, petitioners alleged that they were buyers in good faith and that their action was barred by
estoppel and laches.[16]

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendant Reynaldo L.
Montinola who is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiffs the following sums:

a) P1,200,000.00 as actual damages, with interest thereon at the legal rate of six (6) per centum per
annum until fully paid;

b) Moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00;

c) Exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00;

d) Attorneys fees in the reasonable amount of P30,000.00; and costs.

The counterclaim of defendant spouses Eduardo and Josefina Domingo is dismissed and the complaint
against the Register of Deeds is likewise dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, reiterating the reliefs prayed for in their complaint below.
[18] On November 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of
which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court a quo appealed
from is SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. Another Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the Appellants as
follows:

1. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication (Exhibit G), Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7299 (Exhibits N and 22,
Domingo), the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit 20) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7673 (Exhibit 21) are
hereby declared null and void.

2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57218 (11664), under the names of Cesar P. Roces and Lilia Montinola, is
hereby reinstated.

3. The Appellees are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the Appellants the amount of
P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees.

4. Appellants claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages are dismissed.

5. The Appellee Reynaldo Montinola is hereby ordered to pay to the Appellees Spouses Domingo the
amount of P1,800,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the

Decision of this Court until the said amount is paid in full by the said Appellee, the other cross-claims of the
Appellees, inter se, are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[20] which was denied in a Resolution dated March 15, 2000.
[21] Hence this petition, raising the following errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ANNOTATION IN THE TITLE REGARDING SEC. 4,
RULE 74 IS AN ENCUMBRANCE WHICH DISQUALIFIES PETITIONERS FROM BEING INNOCENT PURCHASERS
FOR VALUE;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT WAS RESPONDENTS WHO MADE IT POSSIBLE
FOR REYNALDO MONTINOLA TO PERPETUATE THE FRAUD AND, THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD BE THE ONE TO
BEAR RESULTING DAMAGE;

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE NO EXISTING INTEREST IN
THE PROPERTY SINCE IT WAS PREVIOUSLY MORTGAGED AND FORECLOSED BY THE G.S.I.S.; AND

4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE TO RESPONDENTS FOR ATTORNEYS
FEES, THEREBY ADDING MORE INJURY TO THEIR MISFORTUNE.[22]

The petition lacks merit.

It is true that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the
same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the title. However, this principle does not apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the
purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. One who falls
within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good
faith.[23]

As stated above, the titles, namely, TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673, contained annotations which made reference
to the provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections

of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate,
such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of
two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been
paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money,
the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount
of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall
contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond
provided in the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond
and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full
period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have
been made.[24]

The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the deprived heir or
creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of the settlement and distribution of estate.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the effects of this provision are not limited to the heirs or original
distributees of the estate properties, but shall affect any transferee of the properties.

In David v. Malay,[25] it was held that the buyer of real property the title of which contain an annotation
pursuant to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value. In
the same vein, the annotation at the back of TCT No. 7299 in this case referring to Rule 74, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court was sufficient notice to petitioners of the limitation on Montinolas right to dispose of the
property. The presence of an irregularity which excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee to
look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face thereof.[26]
Purchasers of registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title.[27]

Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and cannot now avoid the consequences
brought about by the application of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners claim that respondents were guilty of laches and estoppel is likewise untenable. Laches is the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the
part of defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) delay in
asserting complainants right after he had knowledge of the defendants conduct and after he has an
opportunity to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant.[28]

On the other hand, estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.[29]

In the case at bar, only four months elapsed from the time respondents discovered Montinolas fraudulent
acts, sometime in May 1993, to the time they filed their complaint on September 6, 1993. This relatively
short span of time can hardly be called unreasonable, especially considering that respondents used this
period of time to investigate the transfers of the property.[30] Delay is an indispensable requisite for a
finding of estoppel by laches, but to be barred from bringing suit on grounds of estoppel and laches, the

delay must be lengthy and unreasonable.[31] No unreasonable delay can be attributed to respondents in
this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 62473 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1] CA Rollo, pp. 228-229.

[2] Id., p. 254.

[3] Exhibits 7-M and 7-N.

[4] Exhibit 7-0.

[5] Exhibit 7-C.

[6] Exhibit 7-Y.

[7] Exhibit 10 (Domingo) and 11 (Domingo).

[8] Exhibit B.

[9] Exhibit G.

[10] Exhibit 17.

[11] Exhibit 18.

[12] Exhibit N, 22 (Domingo).

[13] Exhibit 21 (Domingo).

[14] Exhibits N-4 & O-4.

[15] CA Rollo, pp. 211-212.

[16] Id., p. 212.

[17] Records, pp. 545-546; penned by Judge Ramon R. Buenaventura.

[18] Id., p. 247.

[19] CA Rollo, pp. 228-229 (emphasis in the original). Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
(now a member of this Court); concurred in by Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr.

[20] Id., p. 230.

[21] Id., p. 254.

[22] Rollo, p. 20.

[23] Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 48 (1996); citations omitted.

[24] Rules of Court, Rule 74, Sec. 4 (italics ours).

[25] G.R. No. 132644, 19 November 1999.

[26] Id., citing Pino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94114, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 434 and Centeno v. CA,
G.R. No. 40105, 11 November 1985, 139 SCRA 545, citing Anderson v. Garcia, 64 Phil. 506 (1937) and Fule
v. Legare, 117 Phil. 367 (1963).

[27] Vazquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83759, 12 July 1991, 199 SCRA 102, citing Bel Air Village
Association, Inc. v. Dionisio, G.R. No. 38354, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 589, citing Tanchoco v. Aquino, G.R.
No. 30670, 15 September 1987, 154 SCRA 1 and Constantino v. Espiritu, 150-A Phil. 953 (1972).

[28] Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109803, 20 April 1998, 289 SCRA
178.

[29] Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 366 Phil. 678
(1999), citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556 (1968) and Medija v. Patcho, 210 Phil. 509 (1983).

[30] Rollo, p. 85.

[31] Pio Barreto Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132362, 28 June 2001, 360
SCRA 127, citing R. Agpalo, Trademark Law & Practice in the Philippines, (1990), 32, citing La Insular V. Jao
Oge, 47 Phil. 75 (1924); La Insular v. Yu So, 45 Phil. 398 (1923).

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998

RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F.

MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F. MARQUEZ, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In our society, tradition and law enshrine the family as a basic social institution. In prose, poetry and
song, it is lyrically extolled. What a person becomes in adulthood, for good or ill, is attributed to the
influence of the home and family during his formative years. In the family one imbibes desirable values
and personality traits. No matter how far one roams, he invariably turns to his family for security,
approbation and love. Against the whole world, members of the family stand solid as Gibraltar. It is thus
heartrending to find members of the same family at odds with each other, each playing one against the
other.

The facts of the instant case illustrate the inglorious and unedifying spectacle of a "family feud." all
because of a property dispute.

During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children,
namely: (1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio;
(8) Rafael, Jr., (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio. Sometime in 1945, the spouses
acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more
particularly described in TCT No. 47572, 1 wherein the constructed their conjugal home.

In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an
"Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572.
Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No. 33350 2 was issued in his name on June 16,
1982.

Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" 3
covering the land described in TCT No. 33350, as well as the house constructed thereon to three of this
children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to
the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein. As a result of the donation, TCT No. 33350 was
cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was issued in private respondents' name.

From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land. However, when
petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572, they immediately demanded that since they are
also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective shares over the land in question.
Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute proved unavailing since private respondents ignored petitioners'
demands.

In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on
May 31, 1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial court 4 alleging that both
the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent since the private
respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him execute the said
documents.

In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of
limitations since the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the
alleged fraud. 5

After due proceedings, the trial court, on April 29, 1993, rendered its decision 6 in favor of the
petitioners, in this wise:

Prescription cannot set in because an action to set aside a document which is void ab initio does not
prescribe. Both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and the "Donation Inter Vivos" did not produce any legal
effect and did not confer any right whatsoever. Equally, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 33350 and 46461
issued pursuant thereto, are likewise null and void ab initio. Therefore, the inexistence of these documents
and certificates of title is permanent and cannot be the subject of prescription.

Private respondents, dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling, sought recourse before the Court of
Appeals. On April 29, 1996, the said court reversed the trial court's finding, thus: 7

In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Gerona v. de Guzman, 11 SCRA 143, 157, the action
therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to
have taken place in the case at bar on June 16, 1982, when the affidavit of self-adjudication was filed with
the Register of Deeds and new certificate of title (No. 33350) was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez, Sr.
(Exhibits E and 5, page 16, record). Considering that the period from June 16, 1982, when TCT No. 33350
was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez Sr., to May 31, 1991, when appellees' complaint was filed in
court, is eight (8) years, eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days, appellants' action to annul the deed of
self-adjudication is definitely barred by the statute of limitation.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration proved unavailing. 8 Hence, they are now before this Court to
raise the issue of whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed.

Petitioners, in contending that the action had not yet prescribed, assert that by virtue of the fraudulent
"Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation" wherein they were allegedly deprived of their just share
over the parcel of land, a constructive trust was created. 9 Forthwith, they maintain that an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years.

It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is governed by the
present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners
and private respondent therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr.
decided to adjudicate the entire property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he is the
sole surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez. 10

As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit
that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a
transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established. 11
Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to
intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal, right to
property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. 12 Prescinding from the foregoing
discussion, did the action for reconveyance filed by the petitioners prescribe, as held by the Court of
Appeals?

In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the isuance of the Torrens title over the property. 13 For the purpose of this
case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16,
1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine
years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.

To bolster the foregoing position, the Court of Appeal's reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman, 14 is
misplaced. In Amerol v. Bagumbaran, 15 we ruled that the doctrine laid down in the earlier Gerona case
was based on the old Code of Civil Procedure 16 which provided that an action based on fraud prescribes
within four years from the date of discovery. However, with the effectivity of the present Civil Code on
August 30, 1950, the provisions on prescriptive periods are now governed by Articles 1139 to 1155. Since
implied or constructive trusts are obligations created by law then the prescriptive period to enforce the
same prescribes in ten years. 17

Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was conjugal property of the spouses Rafael, Sr. and
Felicidad, ownership of the same is to be equally divided between both of them.

Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's share, validly donate this portion
to the respondents? Obviously, he cannot, as expressly provided in Art. 736 of the Civil Code, thus:

Art. 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.

Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to

him. 18

Be that as it may, the next question is whether he can validly donate the other half of the property
which he owns? Again, the query need not detain us at length for the Civil Code itself recognizes that one
of the inherent rights of an owner is the right to dispose of his property. 19

Whether this donation was inofficious or not is another matter which is not within the province of this
Court to determine inasmuch as it necessitates the production of evidence not before it.

Finally, while we rule in favor of petitioners, we cannot grant their plea for moral damages and
attorney's fees 20 since they have not satisfactorily shown that they have suffered "mental anguish" as
provided in Article 2219 and Article 2290 of the Civil Code.

Similarly, the plea for attorney's fees must likewise be denied because no premium should be placed on
the right to litigate. 21

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41214 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Except as to the award of attorney's fees which is hereby DELETED, the
judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 60887 is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 37.

2 Ibid., p. 44.

3 Id., pp. 45-47.

4 Id., pp. 29-35.

5 Id., pp. 61-70.

6 Per Judge Alfredo C. Flores, Rollo, pp. 91-102.

7 Rollo, pp. 104-115.

8 Ibid., p. 117.

9 Rollo, Petition, pp. 17-18.

10 Annex "B," Rollo, pp. 38-39.

11 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, p. 680, citing Baysa, et al. v. Baysa, 53 Iff. Gaz., 7828,
October 1957.

12 Morales v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 282 (1997).

13 Sta. Ana v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 624 (1997); Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA
339 (1997).

14 11 SCRA 153.

15 154 SCRA 396 (1987).

16 Act No. 190.

17 Art. 1149, Civil Code.

18 Esquezo v. Fortaleza, 13 SCRA 187 (1965).

19 Art. 428, Civil Code.

20 Petition, Rollo, p. 25.

21 Philippine Airlines v. Miano, 242 SCRA 235 (1995).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23638

October 12, 1967

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,

vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. L-23662

October 12, 1967

MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

Jose D. Villena for petitioners.

Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 31221-R) affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding No. 831 of said Court, admitting to probate the alleged last will and testament of the
deceased, and overruling the opposition to the probate.

It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to
the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los
Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner as the
sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio
Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all
surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked.
Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of
the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate
made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set
aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3, 1954, in cases G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L5620 (unpublished).

After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of June 20, 1958, found that
the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and
revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or
when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues
of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled
the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties
the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."

On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole
purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.

On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the
testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943
and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2)
of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors
and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had become
final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied
revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the
execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee
herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.

Oppositors then appealed to this Court.

In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three main issues: (a) whether or not the decree
of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal; (b) whether
or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositorsappellants had likewise become final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had
been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26,
1943 and April 3, 1944.

As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate should be
considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in
their opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is untenable. It is
elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs. Santos,
66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it
is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or
judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."

Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of
their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the

higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six
different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.

There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the
same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor
review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree
was correctly dismissed.

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the
testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was
duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of
revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke.
Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied
from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to
bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the
revoked testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).

As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the
presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect
the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's
ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a
will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised
Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether
or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently
unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.

The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950
(Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:

Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:

(1) . . . .

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it
being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to
the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by
reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition
shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;

xxx

xxx

xxx

It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of the quoted provision is a
presumed change of intention on the part of the testator. As pointed out by Manresa in his Commentaries
on Article 869 of the Civil Code (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 743)

Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. Si este, despues de legar, se desprende de la
cosa por titulo lucrativo u oneroso, hace desaparecer su derecho sobra ella, dando lugar a la presuncion de
que ha cambiado de voluntad, y no quiere que el legado se cumpla. Mas para que pueda presumirse esa
voluntad, es necesario que medien actos del testador que la indiquen. Si la perdida del derecho sobre la
cosa ha sido independiente de la voluntad del testador, el legado podraquedar sin efecto, mas no en virtud
del numero 2 del articulo 869, que exige siempre actos voluntarios de enajenacion por parte del mismo
testador.

As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original
intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the
subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba.
In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point
by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on
July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers,
thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix
merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an
alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that
in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply
to the case at bar.

Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not necessarily
result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing
the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also that

it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only cause for
the execution of Exhs. A and B (the 1943 and 1944 conveyances). (Decision, L-5618 and L-5620).

If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor was
not expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded,
either, that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the original legacy.

True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of the alienated property "even if it
be by reason of the nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola
(Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the contract" can not be taken in an absolute
sense.2 Certainly, it could not be maintained, for example, that if a testator's subsequent alienation were
avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at the time, the revocatory effect ordained by the
article should still ensue. And the same thing could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will) were
avoided on account of physical or mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue influence in no way
differs from one made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing his
real intent,3 and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of
the anterior bequest.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez. So ordered.

Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Bengzon, J.P., J., are on leave, took no part.

Footnotes

Scaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., p. 378) aptly remarks:

"Cuando el testador, a sabiendas de la disposicion contenida en su ultima voluntad, enajena al legatario

la cosa legada, si bien esta sale del poder de aquel, va a parar al del legatario, acto que no puede
interpretarse como mudanza del a voluntad, puesto que transmits la cosa a la persona a la que deseaba
favoreer con ella. Por esta circunstancia y por la de no revocar el legado, mas bien parece que persiste en
su intencion de beneficiar al legatario, ya que no con la propia cosa, con el derecho que le concede el art.
878. Si al donar el testador al futuro legatario la cosa que le dejaba en el testamento, indica solo una
realizacion anticipada de la ultima voluntad, el venderia sin derogar la disposicion dellegado parece
indicae tambien que no ha habido idea modificadora de la intencion, sino que porsigue en la de favorecer
al instituido, y ya que no es posible conseguirlo con la cosa misma,se impone el verificarlo en la manera
determinada por el articulo, o sea mediante la entrega del precio."

2 "Deciamos anteriormente que necesitaba alguna explicacion la frase del num. 20.o del art. 869,
"aunque sea por la nulidad del contrato," para no apartarla de sus verdaderos y prudentes limites.
Literalmente entendida, autorizaria el que fuese revocado un legado por enajenacion que hubiese
realizado el testador con vicio en el consentimiento. Dice con razon eljurisconsulto frances Demante,
"quese llegaria a consecuencias contrariasa los principios mas elementales del Derecho y de la razon si,
exagerandodicha doctrina, se diese efecto revocatorio a una enajenacion nulapor vicio de consentimiento."
Como una voluntad impotente para transferirla propiedad podria tener la fuerza de revocar un legado? Si
la enajenacionlleva el vicio de violencia o de error, sera posible artibuir algun efectoa acto semejante? Es
logico deducir entonces que el testador se arrepintio, como dicen las partidas del otorgamento de la
manda?" (Scaevola, op. cit.)

Cf. Torres vs. Lopez, 48 Phil. 772; Coso vs. Deza, 42 Phil.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA
RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.

Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.

Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.

RELOVA, J.:

This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

As found by the Court of Appeals:

... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate
of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine
Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:

(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death
and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will

(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it
would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and

(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by
law.

The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275).
Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977.

On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss
the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:

(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and

(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.

Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its order of February
23, 1979.

The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary to law
and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition
for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:

... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof
cannot stand in lieu of the original.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic
wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity
of said wills.

MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while
Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located
shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it
is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.

On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal does
not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A
COPY THEREOF;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH
THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.

The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the
allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be
uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is
available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required.
However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not
be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL.
509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not
be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic
or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court,"

Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because
then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for
reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve
the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 128314

May 29, 2002

RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died
intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other
personal properties.

On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be
appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the
assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering
any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and disposing of the cash
and valuables therein.

Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.2 He argued that the
deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths.
The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and
operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfos
residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment
and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously executed by the decedents,
consisting of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax
payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent residence was in
Angeles City, Pampanga.1wphi1.nt

In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfos house in
Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death
certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4 Rodolfo
himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his
own signature on the said document.

Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents residence on the
death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference,
considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General Hospital in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same way that they were
taken at different times for the same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard.
The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents residence in
light of the other documents showing otherwise.5

The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.6 Both failed to
comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.7

Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8 After the parties submitted the
names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special
administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9

On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:

A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989,
respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the decedents.
Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant,
Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own
representation by taking an inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit movants motion
to dismiss.

SO ORDERED.10

Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having been shown,
the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in
toto.

SO ORDERED.11

Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution dated
February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.

II

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE
OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE
IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH
IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.

IV

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF

RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.

VI

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH
CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO
ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.

VII

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE
OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP.
PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13

The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where
the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their
demise?

Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted
in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.

Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that the
situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence or
domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence
at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents
in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that
they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.1wphi1.nt

The contention lacks merit.

The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio,
passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was
then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City
residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio
died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and
hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence
because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.

In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioners Quezon
City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondents assertion that their elderly parents
stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.

Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon
City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mothers death
certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his
deceased mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in
Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.

The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered
and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate courts observation that since
the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents death.

The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the time of death, over the
numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by
petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to
permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:

xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile.
No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.17

Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with
petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be
substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to
petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents physical presence in Quezon
City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was more than temporary. In the
absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings stemmed from an erroneous
apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,18 on ordinary
civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that
while venue in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving

summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1.
Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or
domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of the
decedents properties are located.

Petitioners argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the place where he
permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons properties can be found mostly in the
place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that
where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No
generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary
civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of
Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than
a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the
settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Footnote

1 Rollo, p. 87.

2 Ibid., p. 91.

3 Id., p. 95.

4 CA Rollo, pp. 34 & 35.

5 Rollo, p. 101.

6 Record, p. 50.

7 Ibid., p. 51.

8 Id., p. 55.

9 Id., p. 108.

10 Rollo, p. 110; penned by Presiding Judge Felix M. de Guzman.

11 Ibid., p. 71; penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera; concurred in by Associate Justices
Jaime M. Lantin and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.

12 Id., p. 73.

13 Id., pp. 23-24.

14 100 Phil., 593 (1956).

15 Ibid., at 596, citing Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla v.
Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; and Zuellig v. Republic of the Philippines, 46 O.G. Supp. No. 11, p. 220.

16 74 SCRA 189 (1976).

17 Ibid., at 199-200.

18 SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

19 166 SCRA 50 (1988).

20 169 SCRA 566 (1989).

21 Ibid., at 571, citing Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, supra, and Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Sarmiento et al., 75 SCRA 124 (1977).

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO,
CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA
CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R,
promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was
survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus
Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by
his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all
of legal age and residing in Cebu.

On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging
among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a
resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon
City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964,
directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite
publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released
on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of
the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes

Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for
the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:

It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try
this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with.
Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for
the issuance of letters of administration. 2

In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein
petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for
the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in
said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to
Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court
issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be
the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court
deferring to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by
respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by
certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April
1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain
petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the
alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said
respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.

In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal
reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further
found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal,
Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:

On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss
reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at
the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed
with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of
Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not
mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in
Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the
probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu
City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this
Court, that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of
the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at
69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the
will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident

of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his
first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be
deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or which
appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court,
follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate
proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others. 5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11
April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court
was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise
denied.

On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of
the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the
oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that
respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following
grounds:

(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;

(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did
not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6

The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been
duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the
testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr.
Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified
the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax
return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y
Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15
May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and
voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow
as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to
bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.

On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners
therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:

Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed
ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which
can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave
a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.

Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the
petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The
said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of
invoking the jurisdiction of another court.

The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the
Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was
"not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon,
it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this
connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to
jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and
determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.

The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain
perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said
respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and
respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore
issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated
8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.

The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing
the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission
to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the
issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate

proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in
deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should
first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor
challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed
without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the
probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the
petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and
authenticity.

The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and
testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased
testator's express wish, for the following considerations:

1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all
matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules
of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent
conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the
Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) 8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice
Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho 9 as follows:

We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the
deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this
view because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good
faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the parties,
however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the
case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said
court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of
jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such
question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect
shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in
court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of
the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of
justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December

31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall
be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law
of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is
one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad
Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts
of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure,
Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of
residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue.
And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled is properly called "venue".

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with
his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it
stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the
petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before
it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and
deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit
in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then
it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown
to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of
all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve
the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon
City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu
court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead
defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition
and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon
City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first
take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts,
which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of
venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the
estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction
over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left
now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition
to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City
court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to
probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the
testator's testamentary disposition.

4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts
analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate
proceedings in this wise:

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his
will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that
in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has
been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance
it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently
appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected
or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City
court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein
respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court]
either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already
pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan
Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's
contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say
that it was not the proper venue therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner
has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to
consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite
since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the
alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since
August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No.
6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to
appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction
over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this
Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the
proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other
court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late. 16

5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's
estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City
was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein with
the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from said
court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:

... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably
be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not
appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of
the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.

6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate
court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.

... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the
exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically,
we note that the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and
legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the
first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu

and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that
this matter requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja
vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.

In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first
filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the
Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and
testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City.
The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts at the behest and with the
deference and consent of the Cebu court that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent
who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It
would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held
applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the
decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at
the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on
documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual
residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of
waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.

7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration
that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional
facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo
18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province."

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive
notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon
everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive
as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if
it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving
way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for
supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be
sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the
Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance
therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the
net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As
stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of
considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole
proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in
another province "is too obvious to require comment."

8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets
first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the
Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the
administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who
unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster
in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard

of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the right of his
surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the
Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.

9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of
venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate
petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court
where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25,
1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled
to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed
decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in
a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding
when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as
already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had
their conjugal domicile.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the
decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the
rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to
have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to
take up with the probate court.

It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since
petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and
conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue
of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and
exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper
exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in
Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and conjugal estate
with the decedent.

10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and
designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and
motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died
without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings
the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court,
thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and
admit the decedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor
with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as
executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the
provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964
admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has
jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be
overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all
inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly
assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance
of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the
decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last
will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the
decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be
approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and
duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court
should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of
the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by
respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.

I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question within a reasonable time the
laying of the venue in the Quezon City Court of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that
court, after the Court of First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the holding therein
of any proceeding and trial, and their having filed therein a formal opposition to the probate of the will,
makes them guilty of laches, for which reason they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in the
present petition.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.

I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question within a reasonable time the
laying of the venue in the Quezon City Court of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that
court, after the Court of First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the holding therein
of any proceeding and trial, and their having filed therein a formal opposition to the probate of the will,
makes them guilty of laches, for which reason they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in the
present petition.

Footnotes

1 1964 was a leap year.

2 Cited in Annex "C", page 42, Record.

3 Cited in Annex "C", page 46, Record.

4 Cited in Annex "C", page 47, Record.

5 Id., Id., Id., emphasis supplied.

6 Order of 11 May 1964, Annex B, p. 36, Record.

7 Republic Act No. 2961, sec. 44 (e).

8 Emphasis supplied.

9 74 Phil. 239, 241 (1943), notes in parenthesis and emphasis supplied. See 3 Moran's Rules of Court,
1970 Ed. 370-372.

10 Source of Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75), section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.

11 Superseded by the Judiciary Act, R.A. 296 as amended.

12 33 SCRA 252 (May 29, 1970).

13 The minor factual difference of that case is that there, the Negros court granted the testamentary
heirs' motion to dismiss the intestate petition first filed before it by the therein petitioner who claimed to
be an acknowledged natural child, and that said petitioner's attempt to intervene in the probate
proceedings subsequently filed in Manila by the testamentary heirs, was declared too late. Here, the Cebu
court acceded in part to petitioner-widow's motion to dismiss by declining to take cognizance of the first
intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court which it asked to act first on the second petition
for probate, and while opposition was filed against probate, oppositors failed to appear at the hearing
despite due notice.

14 33 SCRA at p. 259, emphasis supplied.

15 Idem, at p. 260, notes supplied.

16 Idem, at pp. 260-261, emphasis copied..

17 97 Phil. 330 (1955).

18 90 Phil. 585 (1951); see also 3 Moran's 1970 Ed., p. 400.

19 3 Moran's Comments 1970 Ed., p. 395.

20 Rule 78, section 6.

21 "SEC. 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved by a
death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated,
and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
(Rule 73, emphasis supplied).

22 See People vs. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (Nov. 26, 1970) and Article X, sec. 5, par. 4 providing that the
Supreme Court shall have the power to "order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice."

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10474

February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.

Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.

Moises B. Ramos for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight modification a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four
parcels of land described in the complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered in an action instituted
by Felisa Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants one-half
share of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete.

According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He
left for parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel,
Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of
deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an
affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de
Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above properties" (Record
on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On the
same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the
sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June
17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this
sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C",
attached to the complaint).

In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro
Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix,
brought the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of
Deeds and said notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26, 1950.
This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup,
which took place on June 17, 1950.

The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of
adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had
Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer
alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the
statute of limitations; that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint is
malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and inconvenience the defendants.

After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that
the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are
all null and void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in question, and
finally declaring that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated. The case
was appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication,
Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar
as one-half of the properties, conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs
of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are null
and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia
de Leon. Therefore, it ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of
the estate of Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-half of the lands described in the
complaint, but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure adjudication in his favor of
whatever portion of said properties may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action
for the damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo.

Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have assigned the
following errors in their brief:

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her
and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover
was filed.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for value.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial.

In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years
after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of
Pangasinan, the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not
brought within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as
decided in the cases of McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.

Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:

SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within two years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections
of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation of the such heir or
such other person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .

Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:

SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. If the decedent left no debts and the
heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the
entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that
the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after
the death of the decedent.

It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring to a case in
which there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in which
there is only one heir. The section was taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows:

SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. Whenever all the heirs of a
person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate,
or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and
not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
proceedings in court.

We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if
there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This
requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the
clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the
persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also
significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who
did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who
took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear
that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the

extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both
the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the
persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights within the twoyear period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the
decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they
also be required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the
settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal
provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. In the case of
Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we held:

It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be had upon the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no provision is made
for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and
purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held
that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the
court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who
are not represented therein.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte

proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect
third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement
or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. We have
examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the circumstances on
which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.

Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the
opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting
to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable
only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in
addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all
the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found
that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.

The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The
origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596
of Act No. 190, fails to support the contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source
which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar
against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not
Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No.
190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would
naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.

But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The
action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit
of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which
is based on fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil
Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in
March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any

case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations, which is their
defense, and they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four years had already elapsed
from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.

The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for value
was rejected as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court said.

The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of the
heirs of Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the evidence of
record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de Leon
and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased who are claiming
the property are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny Sampilo
did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they were nephews and nieces,
children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny
Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public
Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A",
and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date she conveyed to Sampilo all the
property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she acknowledged before said notary public,
coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the consideration for the conveyance of
P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased
Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof to
him was a strategem concocted to defeat the former's rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the
claim that no notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to Benny Sampilo
when he acquired the property might be true, for he purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the
notice of lis pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim
that he was a purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that
a purchaser of registered lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and
investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and
investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a valid title
thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.

Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 117417

September 21, 2000

MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO A. RESELVA, respondents.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision dated September 9, 1994 of
the Court of Appeals1 in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 33826;

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and the assailed order of October 18,
1993, issued by the respondent court in Special Proceeding No. 90-54955 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared NULL and VOID. With costs against the private respondent."2

and the reinstatement of the order of the probate court, thus:

"WHEREFORE, Menandro Reselva and all those acting for or through him, is/are ordered to vacate
forthwith the house and lot of the estate situated in 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, and to deliver to the
executrix Milagros R. Cortes the possession thereof as well as the owner's duplicate certificate of the title
thereof."3

The following facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed:

"Herein petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent (petitioner in this petition) Milagros R.
Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T.
Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and May 13, 1987, respectively. During
their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house and lot consisting of 100 square meters, more
or less, with address at 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. As can be gleaned from the records, Lucrecia
Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a holographic will which was
probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed Executrix. After having
been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion before respondent probate court praying that
Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the property, be ordered to vacate the property at No. 173 Ilaw St.,
Balut, Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possession thereof (Annex 'D'). This is the motion
which the respondent court granted in the assailed order of October 18, 1993."4

In the Appellate Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was set aside for having been issued beyond the
latter's limited jurisdiction as a probate court.5

The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties.6 Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of possession of,
personal or real property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made
by third persons, cannot be entertained by the (probate) court."7

In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacate the house
and lot being eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an "outside
party" for he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much involved in the
settlement of Teodoro's estate.8 By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are
all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to
property."9 Here, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the
opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate action would be most expensive and
inexpedient.101wphi1

In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent since the
former's theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter.11 In the same way, when the controversy is
whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the same
is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs.12

More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court,
thus:

"RULE 73

"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is dissolved by the death of
the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have
died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either."

Hence, in the 1991 case of Vita vs. Montanano we ruled:

"(I)t is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of
Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In the present case,
therefore, the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the
testate proceedings of the latter."13

Consequently, this case before us should be returned to the probate court for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of Teodoro and Lucrecia Reselva prior to the settlement of the estate of Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, without reinstating the assailed order of the trial court, the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals dated September 9, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33826 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case
REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 CA Decision/ Annex "K," p. 52, ROLLO.

2 CA Decision/ Annex "K," p. 55, ROLLO.

3 RTC Order/ Annex "E," p. 31, ROLLO.

4 CA Decision/ Annex "K," p. 54, ROLLO.

5 CA Decision/ Annex "K," p. 54, ROLLO.

6 Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647, 672-673 [1997]; previous citations omitted; underscoring
supplied.

7 COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT, M. V. Moran, Vol. III, 1997 edition, p. 620; underscoring
supplied.

8 Comments to the Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 61, ROLLO.

9 Sebial vs. Sebial, 64 SCRA 385, 392 [1962].

10 Coca vs. Borromeo, 81 SCRA 278, 283-284 [1978].

11 Comments to the Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 62, ROLLO.

12 Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367, 372 [1963].

13 194 SCRA 180, 189 [1991].

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL
VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND,
PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Guimba, Branch V in
Special Proceedings No. 812, Testate of the late Gregorio Venture, dated October 5, 1965, removing the
appellant Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the estate of the late Gregorio Ventura, and in
her place appointing the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura as joint administratrices of the
estate. (Record on Appeal, pp. 120-131.)

Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura while Miguel
Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and saving spouse who are also the brother and mother of Maria
Ventura. On the other hand, appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate
children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano (Record on Appeal, p. 122) but the paternity of
appellees was denied by the deceased in his will (Record on Appeal, p. 4).

On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include
the appellees and the petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 812 (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-3). In
the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the
testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate (Record on Appeal, p. 7).

In due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,1954 (Record on Appeal, pp. 8-10).
Gregorio Ventura died on September 26,1955. On October 10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a
motion for her appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor (Record
on Appeal, pp. 10-11). On October 17, 1955, Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding
letters testamentary was issued in her favor (Record on Appeal, pp. 11-12).

On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate of Gregorio Ventura
(Record on Appeal, pp. 12-20).

On June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive. (Record
on Appeal, pp. 20-27). Said account of administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and
Pedro Corpuz on July 25, 1960 (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-33) and by Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura
on August 5,1963 (Record on Appeal, pp. 46-50). Both oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as not
reflecting the true income of the estate and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses.
But on January 25, 1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of
administration or to have their approval without the opposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro
Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura and Exequiel Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity of
Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination before the Supreme Court and
that should they be adjudged the adulterous children of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to
inherit nor to oppose the approval of the counts of administration (Record on Appeals, pp. 33-36). Spouses
Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz filed on February 2, 1961 their opposition to the motion to hold in
abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration on the ground that Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura had already been declared by the Court of First Instance in Civil Cases No. 1064 and 1476, which
cases are supposed to be pending before the Supreme Court, as the legitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura, hence, they have reason to protect their interest (Record on Appeal, pp. 36-39). On February
9,1961, the motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts was denied (Record on Appeal, pp.
39-40).

It appears that on July 12, 1963, the Court set the case for pre-trial on August 7, 1963 in connection with
the accounts of the executrix Maria Ventura dated June 17, 1960 and the Motion to Annul Provision of Will
dated July 14,1962 of Mercedes Ventura (Record on Appeal, p. 45).

On October 22, 1963, four motions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura, namely: (1)
motion to remove the executrix Maria Ventura which was supplemented on April 27, 1965; (2) motion to
require her to deposit the harvest of palay of the property under administration in a bonded warehouse; (3)
motion to render an accounting of the proceeds and expenses of Administration; and (4) motion to require
her to include in the inventory of the estate certain excluded properties (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53; 71).
An opposition to said motions was filed by the heirs Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura and by the
executrix Maria Ventura herself (Record on Appeal, pp. 56-61; 61-70 and 71).

On motion of counsel for Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura the joint motions to require an Up-todate Accounting and to Require Executrix Ventura to Include Excluded Properties in Her Inventory were
ordered withdrawn (Order dated February 2, 1965, Record on Appeal, p. 73). The other two motions were
however set for hearing.

The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura are: (1) that she is grossly
incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the
inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the

appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order
of the Court of December 12, 1963, requiring her to file her accounts of administration for the years 1961
to 1963 (Record on Appeal, pp. 70 and 75-76) and the Order of June 11, 1964, reiterating aforesaid Order
of December 12, 1963 (Record on Appeal, p. 76); and (5) that she is with permanent physical defect
hindering her from efficiently performing her duties as an executrix (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53 and 7479).

On May 17, 1965, the executrix Maria Ventura finally submitted her accounts of administration covering
the period 1961 to 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 79-84) which were again opposed by the spouses Exequiel
Victorio and Gregoria Ventura on September 21, 1965 and by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro
Corpuz on September 29, 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 106-120). On June 2, 1965, the executrix filed her
supplemental opposition to the aforesaid four motions, and prayed that the joint supplemental motion to
remove the executrix be denied or held in abeyance until after the status of Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as heirs of the testator is finally decided (Record on Appeal, pp. 85-1 01). On June 3, 1965, the
Court, finding that the estate taxes have not been paid, ordered the administratrix to pay the same within
thirty (30) days. On September 13, 1965, the lower court denied the suspension of the proceedings and
deferred the resolution of the joint motion to remove executrix Maria Ventura until after the examination of
the physical fitness of said executrix to undertake her duties as such. Also, it ordered the deposit of all
palay to be harvested in the next agricultural year and subsequent years to be deposited in a bonded
warehouse to be selected by the Court and the palay so deposited shall not be withdrawn without the
express permission of the Court (Record on Appeal, pp. 103-105). On September 21, 1965, spouses
Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura filed their opposition to the accounts of administration of Maria
Ventura dated May 17, 1965, while that of spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz was filed on
September 29, 1965, both oppositions alleging among others that said accounts do not reflect the true and
actual income of the estate and that the expenses reported thereunder are fake, exhorbitant and
speculative (Record on Appeal, pp. 106-120).

On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds
of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the
matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the
estate, rendered the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Maria Ventura is hereby removed as executrix and administratrix of the estate and in her
place Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are hereby appointed joint a tratrices of the estate upon
filing by each of them of a bond of P 7,000.00. Let letters of administration be issued to Mercedes Ventura
and Gregoria Ventura upon their qualification.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

(Record on Appeal pp. 120-131).

Hence, this appeal.

In their brief, appellants Maria Ventura and spouses Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura assign the
following errors allegedly committed by the probate court:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

The lower court erred in ordering the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the will
and estate of the deceased Gregorio Ventura without giving her full opportunity to be heard and to present
all her evidence.

II

The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Ventura had squandered and dissipated the
funds of the estate under her administration.

III

The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Ventura was inefficient and incompetent.

IV

That, considering the circumtances surrounding the case, the lower court erred in finding that the failure
of Maria Ventura to submit her periodical account had justified her removal as executrix.

The lower court erred in considering as an established fact that the appellees Mercedes Ventura and
Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate daughters of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.

VI

The lower court erred in finding that the devises and bequests in favor of Maria Ventura and Miguel
Ventura as specified in paragraph 8 of the last Will and Testament of the late Gregorio Ventura have ipso
facto been annulled.

VII

The lower court erred in allowing the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to intervene in
the hearing of the accounts of administration submitted by the executrix Maria Ventura and/or in not
suspending the hearing of the said accounts until the said appellees have finally established their status as
legitimate children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.

VIII

The lower court erred in appointing (even without a proper petition for appointment and much less a
hearing on the appointment of) the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura who have an
adverse interest as joint administratrices of the estate of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.

IX

The lower court erred in not appointing the surviving widow, Juana Cardona, or Miguel Ventura, as
administratrix of the estate of Gregorio Ventura in case the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix and
administratrix thereof is legally justified.

Considering that there are in fact two (2) factions representing opposite interests in the estate, the lower
court erred in not appointing Juana Cardona, or Miguel Ventura, as one of the two (2) administratrices.'
(Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 1-4)

On July 19,1967, Atty. Arturo Tolentino (representing appellees Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz) and
Atty. Jose J. Francisco (representing Gregoria and Exequiel Victoria), having failed to submit their respective
briefs within the period for the purpose, which expired on July 2 and May 29,1967, respectively, the
Supreme Court Resolved to consider this case submitted for decision WITHOUT SAID APPELLEES' BRIEF
(Rollo, p. 152).

The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally
justified. This issue has, however, become moot and academic in view of the decision of this Court in
related cases.

At the outset, it is worthy to note that aside from the instant special proceedings, there are two other
civil cases involving the estate of the deceased Gregoria Ventura, namely, Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476.
Civil Case No. 1064 was filed on December 2, 1952 by herein appellee Gregoria Ventura in the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch I, against the other appellees herein Mercedes Ventura and their
father, Gregorio Ventura. Later Mercedes Ventura joined cause with Gregoria Ventura. (Record on Appeal,
p. 95). Gregoria and Mercedes Ventura claimed that they are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura
and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who died in 1943, and asked that one-half of the properties described in
the complaint be declared as the share of their mother in the conjugal partnership, with them as the only
forced heirs of their mother Paulina (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 53-68).

Subsequently, Civil Case No. 1476 was filed by Alipio, Eufracia and Juliana, all surnamed Simpliciano,
against Gregorio Ventura and the two sisters, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, before the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch I. They alleged that as the only children of Modesto Simpliciano, sole
brother of Paulina Simpliciano, they, instead of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, whom they claimed are
adulterous children of Paulina with another man, Teodoro Ventura and as such are not entitled to inherit
from her, are the ones who should inherit the share of Paulina Simpliciano in the conjugal Partnership with
Gregorio Ventura (Joint Brief For The Appealant,pp.69-79)

It appears that on November 4, 1959, after a joint hearing of Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476, the lower
court rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to be the
ligitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano and Gregorio Ventura; declaring that as such ligitimate
daughters of Paulina Simpliciano they are entitled to 1/2 of the properties described in paragraph six of the
complaint; ordering the defendant Maria Ventura, as administratrix of the estate of Gregorio Ventura to pay
to Mercedes Ventura and Gregorio Ventura the amount of P 19,074.09 which shall be divided equally
between Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura declaring Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz are the exclusive
owners of the property describe in the certificate of Title Nos. T-1102, 212, T-1213, T-1214, Exhibits 32, 33,
34 and 35, respectively; ordering Mercedes Ventura and Pedro D. Corpuz to pay to the conjugal partnership
of Gregorio Ventura and Paulina Simpliciano the sum of P100,000.00, one-half of which shall pertain to the
estate of Gregorio Ventura and the other half to the estate of Paulina Simpliciano to whom Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura have succeeded, to be divided between Mercedes and Gregoria in equal parts; and
dismissing Civil Case No. 1476. The parties are urged to arrive at an amicable partition of the properties
herein adjudicated within twenty days from receipt of this decision. Upon their failure to do so, the Court
shall appoint commissioners to divide the properties in accordance with the terms of the decision. Without
pronouncements as to costs. (Emphasis supplied). (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 3738.)

Thereafter, on July 14, 1962, Mercedes Ventura filed a motion to annul the provisions of the will of the
deceased Gregorio Ventura in Special Proceedings No. 812, which motion was opposed by Miguel Ventura
and Juana Cardona and later by Maria Ventura. They claimed that the decision dated November 4,1959 in
Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 was not yet final.

On February 26,1964, the court annulled the institution of the heirs in the probated will of Gregorio
Ventura. The motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order filed by executrix Maria Ventura was denied
on June 11, 1964.

Accordingly, Maria Ventura appealed the February 26, 1964 and June 11, 1964 orders of the probate
court in Special Proceedings No. 812 before the Supreme Court and was docketed as G.R. No. L-23878. On
May 27,1977, this Court, through then Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo, ruled, as follows:

And so, acting on appellees' motion to dismiss appeal, it is Our considered opinion that the decision in
Civil Cases Nos.1064 and 1476 declaring that appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the ligimate
children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano, and as such are entitled to the
annulment of the institution of heirs made in the probated will of said deceased became final and
executory upon the finality of the order, approving ther partition directed in the decision in question. We
need not indulge in any discussion as to whether or not, as of the time the orders here in question were
issued by the trial court said decision had the nature of an interlocutory order only. To be sure, in the case
of Miranda, aforementioned, the opinion of the majority of the Court may well be invoked against
appellant's pose. In any event, even if the Court were minded to modify again Miranda and go back to
Fuentebella and Zaldariaga and it is not, as of now there can be no question that the approval by the
trial court in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 of the partition report of the commissioners appointed for the
purpose, one of whom, Emmanuel Mariano, is the husband of appellant, put a definite end to those cases,
leaving nothing else to be done in the trial court. That order of approval is an appealable one, and
inasmuch as no appeal has been taken from the same, it is beyond dispute that the decision in controversy
has already become final and executory in all respects. Hence, the case at bar has become moot and
academic. (Ventura vs. Ventura, 77 SCRA 159, May 27,1977)

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous appointment of Maria
Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This would now necessitate the appointment of another
administrator, under the following provision:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the executor
or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition
shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;"

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the
next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been
defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property
(Cooper vs. Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest

in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class
the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin,
the nearest of kin is to be preferred." (Cabanas, et al. vs. Enage et al., 40 Off. Gaz. 12 Suppl. 227; citing 12
Am. Jur. Sec. 77, p. 416, cited in Francisco Vicente J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. V-B
1970 Ed., p. 23).

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are
the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the
nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6
of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving
spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal interposed by appellants Maria Ventura, Juana Cardona and Miguel
Ventura is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Disenting:

Consistent with my "concurrence in the result" in Acain vs. IAC, et als., G.r. No. 72706, October 27, 1987,
preterition results in total intestacy if it was mistakenly made or through inadvertence. In this case there
was no mistake nor oversight whatsoever. The testator himself sought the probate of his Will during his
lifetime wherein he not only excluded his "forced heirs" but even denied paternity.

Under the circumstances, the omission being obviously intentional, the effect is a defective
disinheritance covered by Article 918 of the Civil Code under which the institution of heir is not wholly void
but only in so far as it prejudices the ligitimes of the persons disinherited. The nullity is partial unlike in
true preterition where the nullity is total.

This conclusion further finds support in the prevailing spirit in the codal provisions, which is to make the
intention of the testator prevail (e.g., Articles 783, 790, 848, 852, 861, Civil Code).

Yap, C.J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Disenting:

Consistent with my "concurrence in the result" in Acain vs. IAC, et als., G.r. No. 72706, October 27, 1987,
preterition results in total intestacy if it was mistakenly made or through inadvertence. In this case there
was no mistake nor oversight whatsoever. The testator himself sought the probate of his Will during his
lifetime wherein he not only excluded his "forced heirs" but even denied paternity.

Under the circumstances, the omission being obviously intentional, the effect is a defective
disinheritance covered by Article 918 of the Civil Code under which the institution of heir is not wholly void
but only in so far as it prejudices the ligitimes of the persons disinherited. The nullity is partial unlike in
true preterition where the nullity is total.

This conclusion further finds support in the prevailing spirit in the codal provisions, which is to make the
intention of the testator prevail (e.g., Articles 783, 790, 848, 852, 861, Civil Code).

Yap, C.J., dissent.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-7019

May 31, 1955

In the matter of the intestate estate of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. EULOGIO S. EUSEBIO,
administrator-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO VALMORES, oppositor-appellant deceased.
JACINTA SISCAR, widow of deceased, oppositor-appellant.

Javier and Javier for appellee.

A. G. Gavieres for appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

On July 31, 1952, the above-entitled proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
upon petition of Francisco Valmores, who claims to be the adopted son of the spouses Domingo Valmores
and Rosalia Saquitan. The petition alleges that Rosalia Saquitan died in Pasig, Rizal on October 1, 1950,
without leaving any decendant or ascendant; that the nearest relatives of said decedent are the husband,
Domingo Valmores, and the petitioner Francisco Valmores; and that the surviving spouse Domingo
Valmores is more than 80 years of age and physically unfit to discharge the duties of administrator, so the

petitioner recommends the appointment of Eulogio Eusebio as administrator. On the same day of the
presentation of the petition, the Clerk of court issued a notice setting a date (August 29, 1952) for the
hearing of the petition and ordering the publication of the notice in the newspaper "La Opinion." On the
day set for the hearing, no one appeared except counsel for the petitioner Francisco Valmores. Francisco
Valmores himself did not appear. Counsel for the petitioner proved the publication of the notice of hearing
and, afterwards, presented his witness, one by the name of Raymundo Delmindo, who declared that he is
the brother of Francisco Valmores that his brother had been adopted by the spouses Domingo Valmores
and Rosalia Saquitan, that Rosalia Saquitan did not leave any will, that her nearest relative is her surviving
husband who is 80 years of age and incapable of administering the estate. Counsel for petitioner also
explained to the court that on June 23, 1952 the surviving spouse Domingo Valmores had filed an affidavit
adjudicating to himself all the estate left by the deceased wife, evidently under the provisions of Section 1
of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Upon the presentation of the said testimony and the above manifestation
of counsel for petitioner, the court entered an order that same date, August 29, 1952, appointing Eulogio
Eusebio administrator of the estate of the deceased. Thereafter the following proceedings for the
settlement of the estate took place in rapid succession: (1) September 3, 1952, oath of administrator and
filing of bond by him; (2) September 5, 1952, issuance of letters of administration; (3) September 6, 1952,
notice issued by Clerk of Court to creditors to file their claims; (4) November 29, 1952, inventory filed by
administrator; (5) March 6, 1953, supplemental inventory filed by the administrator; (6) March 17, 1953,
final accounts presented by administrator; (7) March 17, 1953, project of partition filed by the
administrator; (8) March 23, 1953, opposition of Domingo Valmores; and (11) November 23, 1953,
approval of accounting and project of partition.

On March 23, 1953 the surviving spouse Domingo Valmores presented an opposition dated March 20,
1953, impugning the appointment of Eulogio Eusebio as administrator on the ground that he is a stranger
to the family and to himself, and praying that he be appointed administrator of the properties of the
deceased, and that the case be set for hearing so that he can present his evidence. On April 4, 1953 he
presented an amended opposition, alleging that Rosalia Saquitan had died more than two years before,
that he had been administering the properties of her deceased wife, that he is now the owner and
possessor of the properties in question, which was valued at P45,914. The opposition must have been
denied because on April 29, 1953 counsel for Domingo Valmores filed a motion for reconsideration.
Opposition to this motion for reconsideration was filed by counsel for the administrator, and this was
sustained on May 14, 1953. Thereupon, counsel for Domingo Valmores presented an "Excepcion" and filed
a Record of Appeal, and asked that the case be certified to this court.

The oppositor-appellant has filed a brief and the first assignment of error made therein is that the trial
court deprived him of the right to present evidence to support his allegations, in violation of Sections 1, 3,
5 and 6 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. In the second assignment, it is claimed that the trial court erred in
appointing a stranger as administrator of the properties for the reason that the person to be appointed
should be her surviving spouse. The administrator-appellee has also filed a brief.

Since the pendency of the case before this Court, the following events have happened: Domingo
Valmores died on May 13, 1954. (According to the certificate of death, he was 85 years old at the time of
his death. It appears that the said oppositor was married for the second time to Jacinta Siscar on January 6,
1952). Upon being notified of the death of Domingo Valmores, this Court ordered the widow substituted for
the deceased appellant. This Court also granted the request of Atty. A. G. Gavieres to be separated as
counsel for the deceased Domingo Valmores. On July 23, 1954 Atty. Vicente Francisco entered his
appearance for the widow, Jacinta Siscar, who was substituted for the deceased Domingo Valmores. On
permission of the Court, counsel for said Jacinta Siscar filed a memorandum with the following annexes;
Annex A and A-1, an order of the court finding Atty. A. G. Gavieres to be physically unfit to handle the
defense in civil case No. 2103, Lati vs. Gavieres, et al. because of age; Annex B, the affidavit of
adjudication of Domingo Valmores; Annex C, transcript of the stenographic notes during the trial and
hearing of the petition for the appointment of administrator; and Annex D, certification of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig, Rizal to the effect that there is no record of adoption of one Francisco Valmores by
Domingo Valmores.

On January 26, 1955 Maximo Saquitan filed a petition in this Court, alleging that he is a nephew of the
deceased Rosalia Saquitan and is her nearest heir; that the real name of Francisco Valmores, who filed the
petition, is Francisco Delmindo; that Francisco Delmindo changed his name and surreptitiously filed the
petition for administration; that movant is the only nephew of Rosalia Saquitan and is the heir at law of the
latter and Delmindo knew these facts; that despite said knowledge, Francisco Delmindo failed to give
notice to him of the proceedings as required by the Rules; and that the newspaper La Opinion is not a
newspaper of general circulation in the province of Rizal (supporting said allegation with an affidavit of two
newspaper agents of Pasig, Rizal). He, therefore, prayed that the proceedings in the Court of First Instance,
be set aside and the petition be reinstated for a trial de novo, and that the records be remanded to the
court of origin for said purpose.

A careful perusal of the records of the case discloses the following irregularities: The person who filed
the original petition, whose real name appears to be Francisco Delmindo, never appeared in court to prove
the supposed adoption of him by the spouses Rosalia Saquitan and Domingo Valmores. The supposed
adoption was also only testified to by the brother and no competent evidence thereof was presented as
required by law (Sec. 41, Rule 123, Rules of Court). If adoption was legally made, the records thereof
should have existed in the Court of First Instance. No such record were presented at the hearing, or
subsequent thereto. Neither was evidence submitted to prove that the records of the adoption proceedings
were lost or destroyed. On the other hand, there is the certification of the Local Civil Registrar to the effect
that there is no record of adoption of Francisco Valmores by Domingo Valmores. These circumstances
engender the belief in our minds that the person who instituted the petition, Francisco Delmindo, was not
at all adopted by the deceased Rosalia Saquitan, or had any interest in her properties. Section 2 of Rule 80
of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:

(Emphasis Ours)

The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the petitioner was legally
adopted; hence, he did not have any interest in the properties of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. Under
ordinary circumstances, such defect would authorize the dismissal of the proceedings especially in view of
the fact that the surviving spouse of Rosalia Saguitan had filed an affidavit of adjudication under the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules. Counsel for Domingo Valmores, however, had not objected
to the application for the appointment of an administrator; he only objected to the appointment of the said
stranger Eulogio Eusebio as administrator, claiming to have the right as surviving spouse to be appointed
as such administrator. By this act of Doming Valmores, surviving spouse of the deceased, therefore, the
fatal defect in the petition may be considered, as cured. In other words, the filing of the petition for the
appointment of an administrator may be considered as having been ratified by the surviving husband,
Domingo Valmores, and for this reason the proceedings may not be dismissed.

A study of the records also discloses fatal irregularities in the notice required to be given. Thus nowhere
does it appear from the record that Domingo Valmores was ever personally notified of the filing of the
petition or of the time and place for hearing the same. His first opposition shows that he was not aware of
the hearing at all. He was notified of the proceedings for the first time when the inventory was sent him on
November 29, 1952. Section 3 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides:

When a petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a
time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and
creditors of the decedent and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the
manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 77. (Emphasis supplied.)

The known heir in this case was Domingo Valmores and notice should have been given him in
accordance with Section 3 and 4 of Rule 77. Section 4 of Rule 77 specially provides:

The Court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the known heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their
place of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage prepaid at least twenty days before
the hearing, if such places of residence be known.

. . ..Personal service of copied of the notice at least ten days before the day of hearing shall be
equivalent to mailing.

Section 5 of the same rule also requires:

At the hearing compliance with the provisions of the last two preceding sections must be shown before
the introduction of testimony in support of the will. All such testimony shall be taken under oath and
reduced to writing.

The records of the hearing do not show that the notices as above required had been given to Domingo
Valmores or Maximo Saquitan.

We, therefore, find that the error imputed to the trial court in oppositor-appellant's brief that the court
has failed to comply with the provisions of Section 3 and 5 of Rule 80 had not been complied with, was
actually committed. The requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the proceedings in order
that no person may be deprived of his right or property without due process of law. The absence of notice
to heirs becomes the more apparent in the case at bar, where evidently a stranger has been able to
railroad the proceedings in court without opportunity of the person most interested in the estate of the
deceased to appear and contest in due time the right of the petitioner or the appointment of the person
recommended as administrator. In a way, the failure of Domingo Valmores to receive better treatment at
the hands of the court a quo may be attributed to the unfortunate condition of the lawyer to whom he had
entrusted the defense of his rights. (Atty. A. G. Gavieres, who represented Domingo Valmores, had been
found to be too old and thus unfit to handle a civil case [Annexes A and A-1 attached to the Memorandum
of counsel for Jacinta Siscar]). On the other hand, the failure on the part of the trial judge to exercise care
in the consideration of the evidence adduced at the hearing and in following the procedure outlined by the
rules had contributed to the irregularities. Perhaps, also counsel for the appellee had taken advantage of
the carelessness of the court and the incompetence of adverse counsel to bring these proceedings to a
stage where real heirs or persons in interest have been deprived of their rights. Be it as it may, there is still
time to correct the errors committed and right the wrongs and injustices caused to the parties legally
entitled to the estate.

After consideration of the circumstances as above set forth, the Court finds that all the proceedings
subsequent to the petition are void and should be, as they hereby are, annulled, and it is ordered that the
case be remanded to the court of origin for the hearing of the original petition together with the opposition
thereto of Domingo Valmores, with previous notice to all parties interest, including the widow of Domingo
Valmores and Maximo Saquitan, as required by the Rules. Without cost.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ.,
concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23372

June 14, 1967

IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE PIO DURAN. CIPRIANO DURAN and MIGUEL DURAN, petitionersappellants,
vs.
JOSEFINA B. DURAN, movant-oppositor and appellee.

A. C. Aguilar, N. J. Quisumbing and E. Quisumbing-Fernando for petitioners-appellants.

Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for movant-oppositor-appellee.

BENGZON J.P, J.:

Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in Guinobatan Albay. Among his alleged heirs
are Josefina Duran, as surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces.

Subsequent to his death, on June 2, 1962, Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a
public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of
Josefina Duran, for the consideration of P2,500.00.

A year later, on June 8, 1963, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition for
intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. An
ex parte motion to be appointed special administrator was also filed by him.

Against said petition, Josefina Duran filed on August 9, 1963 an opposition, praying for its dismissal upon
the ground that the petitioner is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer
and renunciation the estate, in view of afore-stated, attaching a copy of the same; in the alternative, she
asked to be appointed administratrix.

Replying to this, Cipriano alleged, on September 11, 1963, alleged in his opposition to the motion to
dismiss, that Josefina Duran was not the decedent's wife. Anent the deed of assignment, he contended
that the same was procured thru fraud, with gross inadequacy of price and vitiated by lesion.

Still later, another brother of the decedent, Miguel Duran, filed on September 14, 1963, a petition to be
joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina Duran moved to strike out said petition as an improper attempt
to intervene in the case. She also filed a reply to Cipriano's opposition to her motion to dismiss. In turn,
Miguel filed an opposition to Josefina's motion to strike out.1wph1.t

Acting on said motions, on June 3, 1964, the Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing the
petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest in the estate. Said lack of interest was premised on the deed of
transfer executed by Cipriano, regarding which the court declared itself without power to examine in said
proceedings, collaterally, the alleged fraud, inadequacy of price and lesion that would render it rescissible
or voidable. And with the petition's dismissal, Miguel's petition to be joined as co-petitioner was deemed
without leg to stand on.

Appeal to Us directly, on questions of law, was taken by Cipriano and Miguel Duran.

The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and settlement of an estate must be filed
by an "interested person" (See. 2, Rule 79). Appellants contend that the deed of assignment executed by
Cipriano did not operate to render him a person without interest in the estate. Relying on In re Irene
Santos, L-11848, May 31, 1962, they argue that an assignment by one heir of his share in the estate to a
co-heir amounts to a partition needing approval by the settlement court to be effective; and that the
assigning heir does not lose his status as a person interested in the estate, even after said assignment is
approved by the court.

The situation in the Santos case involves an assignment between co-heirs pendente lite, during the
course of settlement proceedings, properly and validly commenced. At the time of said assignment,
therefore, the settlement court had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate. As a result,
any assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court. And since the approval the court is
not deemed final until the estate is closed the assigning heir remains an interested person in proceedings
even after said approval, which can be vacated is given.

In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings was pending.
The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court.
Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same
does not need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid as
between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not followed,
since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only (Hernandez v.
Andal, 78 Phil. 196). Should it be contended that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or
inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that purpose. And in the
meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is
annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is left without that "interest"
in the estate required to petite for settlement proceedings.

Anent appellant Miguel Duran, he sought in his petition below to "join petitioner Cipriano Duran as copetitioner in the latter's petition . . . and incorporates herein by adoption all the allegations made in said
petition." (Record on Appeal, pp. 45-46). The same, therefore, amounted to a petition to intervene in the
settlement proceedings. As aptly ruled by the court a quo, since there was really no settlement
proceedings in the first place, the petition to intervene must be denied.

Finally, although Josefina Duran prayed to be appointed administratrix, her doing so did not amount to
ratification of the petition for settlement under the ruling in Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163, since she did
so merely by way of an alternative prayer, should her motion to dismiss fail. And said motion to dismiss
was properly sustained.

Wherefore, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

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Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988

PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC BRANCH 58, MAKATI, METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY
SHERIFFS JOSE B. FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN, respondents.

Bautista, Picazo, Cruz, Buyco and Tan for private respondent.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Bautista, Picaso and Reyes, collaborating counsel for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

May a probate court act on and/or grant motions for the appointment of a special administrator, for the
issuance of a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person, and for assistance to
preserve the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate even before the court has
caused notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules
of Court?

On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case
was docketed as Special Proceedings .No. M-1436.

The petition alleges that: (1) on March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in Makati, Metro Manila; (2) at
the time of his death, the decedent was a resident of Makati, Metro Manila; (3) decedent left personal and
real properties as part of his estate, listed in Annexes "A," "B," "C" and "D;" (4) the properties were
acquired after the marriage of the petitioner to the decedent and therefore are included in their conjugal
partnership; (5) the estate of -the decedent has a probable net value which may be provisionally assessed
at P4,000,000.00 more or less; (6) the possible creditors of the estate, who have accounts payable. and
existing claims against the firm C. SANTOS Construction are listed in Annex "E;" (7) the compulsory heirs
of the decedent are the as the surviving spouse and their two (2) minor children namely: Charmane Rose
de Guzman 11 years and Peter Brian de Guzman, 9 years old; (8) after diligent search and inquiry to
ascertain whether the decedent left a last will and testament, none has been found and according to the
best knowledge information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died intestate; and (9) the
petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of the decedent, is most qualified and entitled to the grant of
letters of administration.

On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) vehicles
registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's
but which are at present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner
Pedro de Guzman. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent must have the
possession of said vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late husband. On the same day, the lower
court issued an order setting for hearing the motion on May 27, 1987 directing the deputy sheriff to notify
petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the expense of the private respondent.

The scheduled May 27, 1987 hearing was postponed on motion of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Ricardo
Fojas. The petitioner was also given three (3) days from May 27, 1987 to give his comment on the motion
for a writ of possession. The hearing was reset to June 5, 1987 at 3:00 p.m.

On May 29, 1987, the petitioner's counsel filed a notice of appearance and an "Urgent Motion For
Extension of Time to File an Opposition and for Resetting of the Hearing."

The motion was granted and the petitioner was given five (5) days from receipt of the order within which
to file his opposition to the motion for a writ of possession. The hearing was reset to June 15, 1987 at 2:00
in the afternoon.

In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint
Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman."

In an order dated May 28,1987, the aforesaid motion was set for hearing on June 5, 1987. In this same
order, the lower court directed that all parties in the case be notified. However, no notice of the order was
given to the petitioner.

In an order dated June 5, 1987, the lower court granted the private respondent's motion to be appointed
as special administratrix, to wit:

Finding the motion for appointment of special administratrix, on the ground alleged therein to be wellfounded, and finding further that it is to be the best interest of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman that
petitioner-movant Elaine G. de Guzman, be appointed as Special Administratrix in this case, said motion is
granted.

WHEREFORE, Elaine G. de Guzman, petitioner-movant, is hereby appointed as Special Administratrix of

the Estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman, pending appointment of a regular administrator. The bond
for the said special administratrix is hereby fixed in the amount of P200,000.00. (Rollo, p. 40)

On June 8, 1987, the lower court issued another order, to wit:

Acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Assistance" filed by Petitioner-Special Administratrix Elaine de
Guzman for appointment of Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B. Flora together with some military
men and/or policemen to assist her in preserving the estate of Manolito de Guzman, the motion is granted
and the Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B. Flora are hereby appointed for that purpose, provided
that the subject matter of the motion for writ of possession pending before this Court shall not be affected.
(Rollo, p. 41)

Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the above order. The petitioner resisted when
Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos tried to take the subject vehicles on the ground that they
were his personal properties. According to the petitioner, this resulted in a "near shoot-out between
members of the Makati Police, who were to maintain peace and order, and the CAPCOM soldiers who were
ostensibly aiding respondent sheriffs and Elaine G. de Guzman" and that "the timely arrival of Mayor
Jejomar Binay of Makati defused the very volatile situation which resulted in an agreement between the
parties that the bulldozer, sought to be taken, be temporarily placed in the custody of Mayor Binay, while
the parties seek clarification of the order from respondent Judge Zosimo Angeles the next day, June 9,
1981 at 10:30 a.m."

In the conference held before the respondent court attended by the counsels for both parties, the June
8, 1987 order was clarified to the effect that the order "must be merely to take and preserve assets
admittedly belonging to the estate, but not properties, the ownership of which is claimed by third persons."

The petitioner then filed a manifestation listing properties which he claimed to be his own.

Thereafter, the instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's orders dated June 5, 1987 and June 8,
1987.

In a resolution dated June 10, 1987, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent
court from enforcing the two questioned orders. In another resolution dated October 28, 1987, we gave
due course to the petition.

The petitioner contends that the June 5, 1987 order is a patent nullity, the respondent court not having
acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the petition for the settlement of the
estate of Manolito de Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks, as
mandated by the Rules of Court. The petitioner also stresses that the appointment of a special
administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion for having been made without giving petitioner and other
parties an opportunity to oppose said appointment.

Anent the June 8, 1987 order, the petitioner alleges that the immediate grant of the motion praying for
the court's assistance in the preservation of the estate of the deceased, "without notice to the petitioner
Pedro de Guzman, and its immediate implementation on the very same day by respondent Elaine G. de
Guzman with the assistance of respondents deputy sheriffs, at no other place but at the home of the
petitioner Pedro de Guzman, are eloquent proofs that all the antecedent events were intended solely to
deprive petitioner de Guzman of his property without due process of law." He also prays that the
respondent Judge be disqualified from further continuing the case.

As stated earlier, the pivotal issue in the instant petition hinges on whether or not a probate court may
appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the
preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased
person even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to
section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

As early as March 18, 1937, in the case of Santos v. Castillo (64 Phil. 211) we ruled that before a court
may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of the properties left
by a deceased person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased and other indispensable
facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the will or is the person who had
custody of the will to be probated.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent
since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the
possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the probate court over the proceedings for
the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in the settlement of

the estate of the deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased
person but the determination of the properties comprising that estate must follow established rules.

Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for letters of administration is filed in
the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause
notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons
believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the
petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within
the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world. (Manalo v. Paredes,
47 Phil. 938; Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court Volume 3,1980 Edition) Where no notice as required
by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the
estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and should be
annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may
be deprived of his right to property without due process of law. (Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163).

Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition
void and subject to annulment. (See Eusebio v. Valmores, supra)

In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was
caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be
appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased
person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de
Guzman.

The "explanation" which we required of the respondent Judge for his apparent haste in issuing the
questioned orders, states:

xxx xxx xxx

10. In issuing the subject Orders, undersigned acted in the honest conviction that it would be to the best
interest of the estate without unduly prejudicing any interested party or third person. Any delay in issuing
the said Orders might have prejudiced the estate for the properties may be lost, wasted or dissipated in
the meantime. (Rollo, p. 86)

xxx xxx xxx

This explanation while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently explain the disregard of the Rule. If
indeed, the respondent court had the welfare of both the estate and the person who have interest in the
estate, then it could have caused notice to be given immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of
Court. All interested persons including herein petitioner who is the biggest creditor of the estate listed in
the Petition (P850,240.80) could have participated in the proceedings especially so, because the
respondent immediately filed a motion to have herself appointed as administratrix. A special administrator
has been defined as the "representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and
preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed." (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer R.
Co. 1965 ed., at 106 cited in Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189). The petitioner as creditor of the estate
has a similar interest in the preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be the
widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of
Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an
administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties were given notice of the proposed
action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.

As argued by the petitioner:

The position of special administrator, by the very nature of the powers granted thereby, is one of trust
and confidence. It is a fiduciary position and, therefore, requires a comprehensive determination of the
suitability of the applicant to such position. Hence, under Philippine jurisprudence, it has been settled that
the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should be taken
in choosing the special administrator (Francisco, Vol. VB, page 46 citing the cases of Ozaeta v. Pecson, Ibid.
and Roxas v. Pecson, Ibid.)

In order to fully and correctly ascertain the suitability of the applicant to the trust, a hearing is obviously
necessary wherein the applicant can prove his qualifications and at the same time affording oppositors,
given notice of such hearing and application, the opportunity to oppose or contest such application.

The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all the known heirs and other interested parties as
to the date thereof is essential to the validity of the proceeding for the appointment of an administrator "in
order that no person may be deprived of his right or property without due process of law" (Eusebio v.
Valmores, 97 Phil. 163). Moreover, a hearing is necessary in order to fully determine the suitability of the
applicant to the trust, by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors, if
any, to contest the said application. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 770; emphasis supplied).

Since the position of special administrator is a very sensitive one which requires trust and confidence, it
is essential that the suitability of the applicant be ascertained in a hearing with due notice to all oppositors
who may object precisely to the applicant's suitability to the trust. (Rollo, pp. 103-104)

If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate justify a court's
immediately taking some kind of temporary action even without the required notice, no such emergency is
shown in this case. The need for the proper notice even for the appointment of a special administrator is
apparent from the circumstances of this case.

The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the preservation of the estate was limited to
properties not claimed by third parties. If certain properties are already in the possession of the applicant
for special administratrix and are not claimed by other persons, we see no need to hurry up and take
special action to preserve those properties. As it is, the sheriffs took advantage of the questioned order to
seize by force, properties found in the residence of the petitioner which he vehemently claims are owned
by him and not by the estate of the deceased person.

The petitioner also asks that the respondent Judge be disqualified from continuing with the proceedings
of the case on the ground that he is partial to the private respondent.

In view of the fact that the respondent Judge in his "Explanation" requests that he be inhibited from
further active on the case, this issue has now become academic. We accept Judge Angeles" voluntary
inhibition in line with our ruling in Pimentel v. Salanga (21 SCRA 160). As we stated in Query of Executive
Judge Estrella T. Estrada, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan on the conflicting views of Regional Trial
CourtJudges Manalo and Elisaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954 M Administrative Matter No. 87-9-3918RTC, October 26, 1987:

xxx xxx xxx

... A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of
justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice
against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the
frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to
act or withdraw from a suit Where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself
where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned
to others involved thereon. On the result of his decisions to sit or not sit may depend to a great extent that
all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his
action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.

Considering the foregoing, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
58 of Makati are hereby set aside. The case is ordered remanded to the lower court for the hearing of the
petition with previous notice to all interested parties as required by law. In view of the voluntary inhibition
of the respondent Judge, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati is directed to re-raffle the
case to another branch of the court. The Temporary Restraining Order dated June 10, 1987 is made
permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-48585 March 3, 1980

FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V,
Gapan, and JULIAN VILLEGAS, NATIVIDAD VILLEGAS, GEMINIANO VILLEGAS, CESAR VILLEGAS, MAXIMO
MATIAS, ROSARIO VILLEGAS MATIAS, ANA MARIE V. MATIAS, and LOURDES V. MATIAS, respondents.

C. C. Paralejo for petitioner.

A.R. Reyes respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari instituted b Feliciano de Guzman against Honorable Teofilo Guadiz, Jr.
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, and Julian Villegas, Natividad Villegas,
Geminiano Villegas, Cesar Villegas, Maximo Matias, Rosario Villegas Matias, Ana Marie V. Matias, and
Lourdes V. Matias, seeking the following relief.

WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectively prays:

a) That respondents be ordered to answer this petition;

b) That after hearing the Order of respondent Judge dated December 23, 1977 denying petitioner's
Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator and consequently, the Order dated July 15, 1978
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration be annulled and that said respondent Judge be declared to
have committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing the
appointment of the Special Administrator;

c) That respondent Judge be directed to appoint a Special Administrator pending the probate of the Last
Will of Catalina Bajacan.

Petitioner respectfully prays for such other relief just and equitable in the premises.

Manila, Philippines, August 14, 1978. 1

On August 31, 1978, without giving due course to the instant petition, this Court adopted a resolution
directing the respondents to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 2

The respondents filed on October 10, 1978 their comment dated October 9, 1978. 3

Meanwhile, on September 29, 1978, the petitioner submitted a Constancia manifesting that the
respondent judge cancelled the hearing on the petition for probate of the will scheduled on September 20,
1978 "pending the outcome of the case before the Supreme Court." 4

On October 18. 1978, this Court resolved: a) to GIVE DUE COURSE to the petition; and b) to REQUIRE (1)
the petitioner to deposit P80.40 for costs and clerk's commission within five (5) days from notice thereof,
and (2) both parties to submit simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. 5

Both petitioner and respondents having filed their respective memoranda, 6 on December 6, 1978, this
Court resolved to declare this case submitted for decision. 7

The record discloses that on March 16, 1977, the petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 865 8 for the probate of a
will alleged to have been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and
universal heir and naming him as executor; that Catalina Bajacan died on February 3, 1977; that on May
10, 1977, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition contending, among others,
that all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation
Intervivos executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; 9 that on
September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on the said motion to dismiss until
the parties shall have presented their evidence; 10 that a motion for the appointment of a special
administrator 11 was filed by the petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved motion to
dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor; that the
decedent's estate consists of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural rice land, more or less, yielding
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested twice a year; that somebody representing the
estate should collect and receive the palay harvests pending the probate of the will; that on December 23,
1977, the respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for appointment of a special administrator,
the pertinent portion of which reads:

The appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the necessity of enabling somebody to take
care of the properties where there is a considerable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator. In
the present case, since the properties covered by the will are undoubtedly in the possession of the
oppositors who claim to be the owners thereof, the Court sees no necessity of appointing a special
administrator.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby denies the motion for the appointment of a
special administrator filed by the petitioner dated September 22, 1977 ... 12

that on June 5, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated December 23,
1977 13 ; that said motion was also denied by the respondent judge in an order dated June 9, 1978 which
states:

In a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on June 5, 1978 praying for a reconsideration of
the Order dated Dec. 23, 1977, which denied the motion for appointment of a Special Administrator filed
by him, it is alleged that the Court made a premature determination of ownership and possession of the
oppositors over the properties of the estate of Catalina Bajacan. This assertion is not accurate. What the

Court merely stated in said Order is that the oppositors, who claim to be the owners, are in possession of
the properties covered by the Will.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) denies the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on June 5, 1978. 14

The main issue in this case is whether the respondent judge presiding the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch V. Gapan, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the order dated December 23, 1977 denying petitioner's motion for the appointment
of a special administrator and the order dated June 9, 1978, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

It is the petitioner's contention that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because the facts warrant the appointment of a special
administrator of the estate of Catalina Bajacan.

Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1 Appointment of Special Administrator When there is delay in granting letters

testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of
a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.

Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special administrator 15 should there be a delay
in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator
lies in the discretion of the Court. 16 This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or
Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. 17

The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or
reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will
is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the
proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree
among themselves. 18 Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately
granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.

It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which transpired in the instant case
clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary
will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator.

The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are:

(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win.

(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina Bajacan and opposition to the
probate of the will is a deed of donation dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina
Bajacan and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor. 19

There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such deed of donation in behalf of the
estate. Precisely, the petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
Branch V, against the herein private respondents. The case was dismissed by the respondent judge in an
order dated June 9, 1978 on the ground that the petitioner has no personality to file the action because
although he is named heir in the will, the said will is not yet probated. 20 In the meantime there is nobody
to sue in order to protect the interest of the estate considering that the probate of the will and the
appointment of an executor will take time.

Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion of the private respondents, postponed
the hearing of the probate of the will which was then scheduled on August 23, 1978 to September 20,
1978. Again, in view of the motion for reconsideration of the private respondents dated September 4,
1978, the respondent judge issued an order dated September 12, 1978, which in part reads: ... the hearing
of this case scheduled on September 20, 1978 is hereby cancelled pending the outcome of the case before
the Supreme Court. 21

The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:

The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact that estates of
decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and
losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The
occasion for such an appointment usually arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit
concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is .delayed. No temporary administration can be
granted where there is an executor in being capable of acting, however. 22

Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve estate until it can pass into
hands of person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs. 23

It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens system in the name of the
deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed
that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an
immediate need for a special administrator to protect the interests of the estate as regards the products.

All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1
of the Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.

The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the appointment of a special administrator in this
case because the respondents are already in possession of the properties covered by the will. The
respondent judge has failed to distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants from that of the
neutral possession of the special administrator under the Rules of Court. When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment,
but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. 24 The
accountability which the court. which attaches to the office of a special administrator to be appointed by
the court is absent from the personal possession of private respondents.

The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of the private respondents is to appoint
a special adiu administrator who will have the personality to file the corresponding action. In view of all the
foregoing, respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for
appointment of a special administrator.

WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby granted and the Order of the respondent judge
dated December 23, 1977, denying petitioner's motion for appointment of a special administrator and the
order dated June 9, ,978 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are set aside. The respondent
judge is ordered forthwith to appointment a special administrator pending the probate of the last will of
Catalina Bajacan in Special Proceeding No. 865, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee A.C.J., Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 10-11.

2 Rollo. p. 45.

3 Rollo pp. 60-79.

4 Rollo pp. 49-50.

5 Rollo, p. 159. For Petitioner,

6 Rollo, pp. 161-169; and for Respondents, Rollo pp, 171-186.

7 Rollo, p. 189.

8 Annex "A", Petition, Rollo. p. 12,

9 Annex "B ",Petition, Rollo p. 17.

10 Rollo, p. 7.

11 Annex "C", Petition, p. 30.

12 Annex "D", Petition, Rollo, pp. 32-33.

13 Annex "E ",Petition, Rollo, p. 34.

14 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, pp. 38-40.

15 A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care for
and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. (Jones vs. Minnesota
Transfer R. Co. NW 606, cited in Jacinto, Special Pro ceedings 1965, ed., p. 106, cited in Garcia Fule vs. CA,
74 SCRA 189, 201.)

16 Relucio s San Jose, 91 Phil, 365: Junquera vs. Borromeo, 99 Phil., 276; Alcasid vs, Samson, 102 Phil.,
735; Garcia Fule vs. CA, 74 SCRA 189,

17 Ozaeta vs. Pecson, 93 Phil. 416: Garcia Fule vs. CA, 74 SCRA 189.

18 Garcia Fule vs. CA, 74 SCRA 189.

19 Exhibit "FFF" Memorandum for Respondents, Rollo, pp, 179- 186.

20 Annex "G ", Petition, Rollo, pp. 41-42.

21 Constancia of Petitioner, Rollo, pp. 49-50; Annexes "B" and "C", Rollo, pp. 53-57, respectively.

22 Griffith vs. Frazier 8 Cranch (U.S.) 9 3L ed. 471 (South Carolina Law Applied); 21 Am. Jur. 831, in
Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. V-B, pp. 45-46.

23 Barfield v. Miller, Tex. Giv. App. 70 S. W 2d 632, ibid.

24 21 Am. Jur. 832 in Francisco. Revised Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol. V-B, p. 45.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10907

June 29, 1957

AUREA MATIAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PRIMITIVO L. GONZALEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

J. Gonzales Orense for petitioner.

Venancio H. Aquino for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Aurea Matias seeks a writ of certiorari to annul certain orders of Hon. Primitivo L. Gonzales, as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, in connection with Special Proceedings No. 5213 of said
court, entitled "Testate Estate of the Deceased Gabina Raquel."

On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the probate of a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single on May
8, 1952, at the age of 92 years. The heir to the entire estate of the deceased except the properties
bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely, Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud,
Santos Matias and Rafael Matias is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea Matias, likewise, appointed
therein as executrix thereof, without bond. Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the
probate of her alleged will, and, after appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respondent
Judge, issued an order, dated February 8, 1956, sustaining said opposition and denying the petition for
probate. Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on appeal to this Court (G.R. No. L-10751), where
it is now pending decision.

Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as
special administrator of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. The
motion was set for hearing on February 23, 1956, on which date the court postponed the hearing to
February 27, 1956. Although notified of this order, Rodriguez did not appear on the date last mentioned.
Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for additional time within which to answer the charges preferred

against him by Basilia Salud and for another postponement of said hearing. This motion was not granted,
and Basilia Salud introduced evidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondent Judge by an
order, dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence, and,
accordingly, relieved him as special administrator of the estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia
Salud as special administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece, Miss Victorina Salud,"
who "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that
"Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed as co-administrator."

On March 8, 1956, Aurea Matins asked that said order of February 27, 1956, be set aside and that she
be appointed special co-administratrix, jointly with Horacio Rodriguez, upon the ground that Basilia Salud
is over eighty (80) years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the duties of said
office, and that said movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the person appointed by the
latter as executrix of her alleged will. This motion was denied in an order dated March 10, 1956, which
maintained "the appointment of the three above named persons" Basilia Salud, Ramon Plata and
Victorina Salud "for the management of the estate of the late Gabina Raquel pending final decision on
the probate of the alleged will of said decedent." However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud tendered her
resignation as special administratrix by reason of physical disability, due to old age, and recommended the
appointment, in her place, of Victorina Salud. Before any action could be taken thereon, or on March 21,
1956, Aurea Matias sought a reconsideration of said order of March 10, 1956. Moreover, on March 24,
1956, she expressed her conformity to said resignation, but objected to the appointment, in lieu of Basilia
Salud, of Victorina Salud, on account of her antagonism to said Aurea Matias she (Victorina Salud)
having been the principal and most interested witness for the opposition to the probate of the alleged will
of the deceased and proposed that the administration of her estate be entrusted to the Philippine
National Bank, the Monte de Piedad, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, or any other similar institution
authorized by law therefor, should the court be reluctant to appoint the movant as special administratrix of
said estate. This motion for reconsideration was denied on March 26, 1956.

Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud requested
authority to collect the rents due, or which may be due, to the estate of the deceased and to collect all the
produce of her lands, which was granted on June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said respondents filed
another motion praying for permission to sell the palay of the deceased then deposited in different rice
mills in the province of Cavite, which respondent judge granted on June 10, 1956. Later on, or on July 10,
1956, petitioner instituted the present action against Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon
Plata, for the purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of respondent Judge, upon the ground that
the same had been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In support of this pretense, it is argued that petitioner should have preference in the choice of special
administratrix of the estate of the decedent, she (petitioner) being the universal heiress to said estate and,
the executrix appointed in the alleged will of the deceased, that until its final disallowance which has
not, as yet, taken place she has a special interest in said estate, which must be protected by giving
representation thereto in the management of said estate; that, apart from denying her any such
representation, the management was given to persons partial to her main opponent, namely, Basilia Salud,
inasmuch as Victorina Salud is allied to her and Ramon Plata is a very close friend of one of her (Basilia
Salud's) attorneys; that Basilia Salud was made special administratrix despite her obvious unfitness for
said office, she being over eighty (80) years of age and blind; that said disability is borne out by the fact
that on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud resigned as special administratrix upon such ground; that the Rules
of Court do not permit the appointment of more than one special administrator; that Horacio Rodriguez
was removed without giving petitioner a chance to be heard in connection therewith; and that Ramon Plata
and Victorina Salud were authorized to collect the rents due to the deceased and the produce of her lands,
as well to sell her palay, without previous notice to the petitioner herein.

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with the scope of his
jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion; that petitioner can not validly claim any special interest in
the estate of the deceased, because the probate of the alleged will and testament of the latter upon
which petitioner relies has been denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly notified of the proceedings for
his removal; and that Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata have not done anything that would warrant their
removal.

Upon a review of the record, we find ourselves unable to sanction fully the acts of respondent Judge, for
the following reasons:

1. Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the motion for his removal, dated February
17, 1956, the record shows that petitioner herein received copy of said motion of February 24, 1956, or the
date after that set for the hearing thereof. Again, notice of the order of respondent Judge, dated February
23, 1956, postponing said hearing to February 27, 1956, was not served on petitioner herein.

2. In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, and
the appointment of Ramon Plata, as special administrator of said estate. Petitioner had, therefore, no
notice that her main opponent, Basilia Salud, and the latter's principal witness, Victorina Salud, would be
considered for the management of said. As a consequence, said petitioner had no opportunity to object to
the appointment of Basilia Salud as special administratrix, and of Victorina Salud, as her assistant and
adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956, to this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.

3. Said order was issued with evident knowledge of the physical disability of Basilia Salud. Otherwise
respondent Judge would not have directed that she "be assisted and advised by her niece Victorina Salud,"
and that the latter "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud."

4. Thus, respondent Judge, in effect, appointed three (3) special administrators Basilia Salud, Victorina
Salud and Ramon Plata. Indeed, in the order of March 10, 1956, respondent Judge maintained "the
appointment of the three (3) above-named persons for the management of the estate of the late Gabina
Raquel."

5. Soon after the institution of said Special Proceedings No. 5213, an issue arose between Aurea Matias
and Basilia Salud regarding the person to be appointed special administrator of the estate of the deceased.
The former proposed Horacio Rodriguez, whereas the latter urged the appointment of Victorina Salud. By
an order dated August 11, 1952, the Court, then presided over by Hon. Jose Bernabe, Judge, decided the
matter in favor of Horacio Rodriguez and against Victorina Salud, upon the ground that, unlike the latter,
who, as a pharmacist and employee in the Santa Isabel Hospital, resides In the City of Manila, the former, a
practicing lawyer and a former public prosecutor, and later, mayor of the City of Cavite, is a resident
thereof. In other words, the order of resident thereof. In other words, the order of respondent Judge of
February 27, 1956, removing Rodriguez and appointing Victorina Salud to the management of the estate,
amounted to a reversal of the aforementioned order of Judge Bernabe of August 11, 1952.

6. Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of Gabina Raquel was denied by respondent
Judge, the order to this effect is not, as yet, final and executory. It is pending review on appeal taken by
Aurea Matias. The probate of said alleged will being still within realm of legal possibility, Aurea Matias has

 as the universal heir and executrix designated in said instrument a special interest to protect during
the pendency of said appeal. Thus, in the case of Roxas vs. Pecson* (46 Off. Gaz., 2058), this Court held
that a widow, designated as executrix in the alleged will and testament of her deceased husband, the
probate of which had denied in an order pending appeal, "has . . . the same beneficial interest after the
decision of the court disapproving the will, which is now pending appeal, because the decision is not yet
final and may be reversed by the appellate court."

7. The record shows that there are, at least two (2) factions among the heirs of the deceased, namely,
one, represented by the petitioner, and another, to which Basilia Salud and Victorina Salud belong.
Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, justice
and equity demands that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.

The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson (supra), to the effect that "only one special administrator may be
appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be considered in the light of the
facts obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein one special administrator for some
properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties thereof. Thus, there
were two (2) separate and independent special administrators. In the case at bar there is only one (1)
special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. In
short, the Roxas case is not squarely in point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of
courts to appoint several special co-administrators (Lewis vs. Logdan, 87 A. 750; Harrison vs. Clark, 52 A.
514; In re Wilson's Estate, 61 N.Y.S. 2d., 49; Davenport vs. Davenport, 60 A. 379).

Wherefore, the orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside. The lower court should re-hear
the matter of removal of Horacio Rodriguez and appointment of special administrators, after due notice to
all parties concerned, for action in conformity with the views expressed herein, with costs against
respondents Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L. and Felix,
JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR.,

Petitioners,

- versus -

RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 187879

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 5, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside
the Decision[2] dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution[3] dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683. The Decision annulled and set aside the Order dated March 13,
2008[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, in Sp. Proc. No. B-3089; while the
Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of the Decision.

The Antecedents

Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and
Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo
(Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo
(Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente
and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively.
Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Bian, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no
will and no debts.

On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate
proceedings, entitled In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima
Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo, in the RTC, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. B-3089.[5] The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their
brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under such
circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income
generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession,
control and management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the
settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the
appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of
the decedents.

Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated October 7, 2004,[6] contending that the
petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. They
argued that the settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the same being dependent only upon
the determination of his hereditary rights in the settlement of his parents estate. In their counter-petition,
respondents prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and
Maxima.

In an Order dated March 4, 2005,[7] the RTC denied respondents opposition to the settlement proceedings
but admitted their counter-petition. The trial court also clarified that the judicial settlement referred only to
the properties of Vicente and Maxima.

Through a Motion for Appointment of Joint Special Administrators dated October 11, 2005,[8] respondents
reiterated their prayer for appointment as special joint administrators of the estate, and to serve as such
without posting a bond.

In their Comment dated November 3, 2005,[9] petitioners argued that, since April 2002, they had been
deprived of their fair share of the income of the estate, and that the appointment of respondents as special
joint administrators would further cause injustice to them. Thus, they prayed that, in order to avoid further
delay, letters of administration to serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be issued to
respondents and Dalisay.

In another Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator dated December 5, 2005,[10] petitioners
nominated the Bian Rural Bank to serve as special administrator pending resolution of the motion for the
issuance of the letters of administration.

In its June 15, 2006 Order,[11] the RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the
estate of the deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond of P200,000.00 each.[12]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 1, 2006[13] of the Order, insisting that
Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be appointed as administrator of the estate, considering that she
even failed to take care of her husband Leonardo when he was paralyzed in 1997. They also contended
that petitioners prayer for Dalisays appointment as special administrator was already deemed abandoned
upon their nomination of the Bian Rural Bank to act as special administrator of the estate.

In their Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration,[14] respondents asserted their priority in right to be
appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima, whereas Dalisay was a mere
daughter-in-law of the decedents and not even a legal heir by right of representation from her late
husband Leonardo.

Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a Motion to Submit Inventory and
Accounting dated November 20, 2006,[15] praying that the RTC issue an order directing respondents to
submit a true inventory of the estate of the decedent spouses and to render an accounting thereof from
the time they took over the collection of the income of the estate.

Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation dated January 15, 2007,[16] claiming that they could
not yet be compelled to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the income and assets of the
estate inasmuch as there was still a pending motion for reconsideration of the June 15, 2006 Order
appointing Dalisay as co-special administratrix with Renato.

In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special
administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents
were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even manifested
in open court their desire for the speedy settlement of the estate.

On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents appointment as joint special administrators,
petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate,[17] reiterating their stance
that respondents, as joint special administrators, should be directed to submit a true inventory of the
income and assets of the estate.

Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond[18] on May 22, 2007, praying
that they be allowed to enter their duties as special administrators without the need to file an
administrators bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount. They alleged that, since
petitioners manifested in open court that they no longer object to the appointment of respondents as
special co-administrators, it would be to the best interest of all the heirs that the estate be spared from
incurring unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums. They also assured the RTC that they
would faithfully exercise their duties as special administrators under pain of contempt should they violate
any undertaking in the performance of the trust of their office.

In an Order dated June 29, 2007,[19] the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective comments or
oppositions to the pending incidents, i.e., petitioners Motion for Inventory and to Render Account, and
respondents Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond.

Respondents filed their Comment and/or Opposition,[20] stating that they have already filed a comment on
petitioners Motion for Inventory and to Render Account. They asserted that the RTC should, in the
meantime, hold in abeyance the resolution of this Motion, pending the resolution of their Motion for
Exemption to File Administrators Bond.

On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007 Order appointing respondents as
special joint administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration
and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator.[21] Petitioners contended that
the special administration was not necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of
the estate being identified and undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating the
representation of special administrators. Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents had been
resorting to the mode of special administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was
due them. Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property for P2,700,000.00,
which the latter represented to petitioners to have been sold only for P1,500,000.00, and respondents
alleged misrepresentation that petitioners owed the estate for the advances to cover the hospital
expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid.

Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment[22] on March 10, 2008, to which, in turn, petitioners filed
their Reply to Opposition/Comment[23] on March 17, 2008.

In its Order dated March 13, 2008,[24] the RTC granted petitioners Motion, revoking and terminating the
appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to comply
with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as
special administrators, i.e., the submission of an inventory of the properties and of an income statement of
the estate. The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in
the amount of P200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the properties and an income
statement of the subject estate. The RTC likewise found that judicial partition may proceed after Melinda
had assumed her duties and responsibilities as regular administratrix.

Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari[25] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in (a) declaring them to have failed to enter the
office of special administration despite lapse of reasonable time, when in truth they had not entered the
office because they were waiting for the resolution of their motion for exemption from bond; (b) appointing
Melinda as regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of Vicente and Maxima, instead of them who,
being the surviving children of the deceased spouses, were the next of kin; and (c) declaring them to have
been unsuitable for the trust, despite lack of hearing and evidence against them.

Petitioners filed their Comment to the Petition and Opposition to Application for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,[26] reiterating their arguments in their Motion for the
revocation of respondents appointment as joint special administrators. Respondents filed their Reply.[27]

On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition based on the finding
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents appointment as joint special
administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as
regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as
such. According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could enter their
duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators, particularly their submission of an inventory of
the properties of the estate and an income statement thereon.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision.[28] The CA, however, denied it. Hence, this
petition, ascribing to the CA errors of law and grave abuse of discretion for annulling and setting aside the
RTC Order dated March 13, 2008.

Our Ruling

The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of the decedents estate under the Rules of
Court provide

Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court
may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.[29]

Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special administrator shall take possession and
charge of goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits
as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.[30]

Sec. 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. Before an executor or
administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration issue,
he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows:

(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to
the possession of any other person for him;

(b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to the will of the testator, all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his possession or to the
possession of any other person for him, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies,
and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed by the court;

(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court;

(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.[31]

Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. A special administrator before entering upon the duties of his trust
shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true
inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession
or knowledge, and that he will truly account for such as are received by him when required by the court,
and will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other person as
may be authorized to receive them.[32]

Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator of the estate of
Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special
administrators pending the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration may
be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such disagreement caused undue delay in the
issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the
RTC, on June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing upon each
of them the obligation to post an administrators bond of P200,000.00. However, taking into account the
arguments of respondents that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a special
administratrix and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners nominated Bian Rural
Bank as special administrator, the RTC, on February 16, 2007, revoked Dalisays appointment and
substituted her with Erlinda.

A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control, expected to
work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy
settlement.[33] When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties
suggesting the appointment.[34] The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is
to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.[35]

While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their
appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It
has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.[36] The probate court may appoint or remove
special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such
that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness[37] and the application of the
order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78,[38] as would be proper in the case of a regular
administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on
reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.[39] The
appointment or removal

of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[40]

Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking
respondents appointment as joint special administrators, and for failing to first resolve the pending Motion
for Exemption to File Administrators Bond, ratiocinating that the posting of the administrators bond is a
pre-requisite to respondents entering into the duties and responsibilities of their designated office. This
Court disagrees.

It is worthy of mention that, as early as October 11, 2005, in their Motion for Appointment as Joint Special
Administrators, respondents already prayed for their exemption to post bond should they be assigned as
joint special administrators. However, the RTC effectively denied this prayer when it issued its June 15,
2006 Order, designating Renato and Dalisay as special administrators and enjoining them to post bond in
the amount of P200,000.00 each. This denial was, in effect, reiterated when the RTC rendered its February
16, 2007 Order substituting Dalisay with Erlinda as special administratrix.

Undeterred by the RTCs resolve to require them to post their respective administrators bonds, respondents
filed anew a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond on May 22, 2007, positing that it would be to
the best interest of the estate of their deceased parents and all the heirs to spare the estate from incurring
the unnecessary expense of paying for their bond premiums since they could not raise the money
themselves. To note, this Motion was filed only after petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to
Render Account of the Estate on April 23, 2007. Respondents then argued that they could not enter into
their duties and responsibilities as special administrators in light of the pendency of their motion for
exemption. In other words, they could not yet submit an inventory and render an account of the income of
the estate since they had not yet posted their bonds.

Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents appointment as special administrators for failing to post their
administrators bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing
to comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of respondents plea to assume their
office sans a bond. The RTC rightly did so.

Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an
administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3)
to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make
an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is
conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the decedents estate requiring the special
administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of
the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him
when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular
administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them.

Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the
administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations
incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore,
the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not
being included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate.
Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration.[41]

Hence, the RTC revoked respondents designation as joint special administrators, especially considering
that respondents never denied that they have been in possession, charge, and actual administration of the
estate of Vicente and Maxima since 2002 up to the present, despite the assumption of Melinda as regular
administratrix. In fact, respondents also admitted that, allegedly out of good faith and sincerity to observe
transparency, they had submitted a Statement of Cash Distribution[42] for the period covering April 2002
to June 2006,[43] where they indicated that Renato had received P4,241,676.00, Erlinda P4,164,526.96,
and petitioners P2,486,656.60, and that the estate had advanced P2,700,000.00 for the hospital and
funeral expenses of Leonardo.[44] The latter cash advance was questioned by petitioners in their motion
for revocation of special administration on account of the demand letter[45] dated June 20, 2007 of Asian
Hospital and Medical Center addressed to Dalisay, stating that there still remained unpaid hospital bills in
the amount of P2,087,380.49 since January 2004. Undeniably, respondents had already been distributing
the incomes or fruits generated from the properties of the decedents estate, yet they still failed to post
their respective administrators bonds despite collection of the advances from their supposed shares. This
state of affairs continued even after a considerable lapse of time from the appointment of Renato as a
special administrator of the estate on June 15, 2006 and from February 16, 2007 when the RTC substituted
Erlinda, for Dalisay, as special administratrix.

What is more, respondents insincerity in administering the estate was betrayed by the Deed of Conditional
Sale dated January 12, 2004[46] discovered by petitioners. This Deed was executed between respondents,
as the only heirs of Maxima, as vendors, thus excluding the representing heirs of Leonardo, and Spouses
Marcus Jose B. Brillantes and Amelita Catalan-Brillantes, incumbent lessors, as vendees, over a real
property situated in Bian, Laguna, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-332305 of the Registry
of Deeds of Laguna, for a total purchase price of P2,700,000.00. The Deed stipulated for a payment of
P1,500,000.00 upon the signing of the contract, and the balance of P1,200,000.00 to be paid within one (1)
month from the receipt of title of the vendees. The contract also stated that the previous contract of lease
between the vendors and the vendees shall no longer be effective; hence, the vendees were no longer
obligated to pay the monthly rentals on the property. And yet there is a purported Deed of Absolute
Sale[47] over the same realty between respondents, and including Leonardo as represented by Dalisay, as
vendors, and the same spouses, as vendees, for a purchase price of only P1,500,000.00. Notably, this
Deed of Absolute Sale already had the signatures of respondents and vendee-spouses. Petitioners claimed
that respondents were coaxing Dalisay into signing the same, while respondents said that Dalisay already
got a share from this transaction in the amount of P500,000.00. It may also be observed that the time of
the execution of this Deed of Absolute Sale, although not notarized as the Deed of Conditional Sale, might
not have been distant from the execution of the latter Deed, considering the similar Community Tax
Certificate Numbers of the parties appearing in both contracts.

Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it
revoked the appointment of respondents as joint special administrators, the removal being grounded on
reason, equity, justice, and legal principle. Indeed, even if special administrators had already been
appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.[48]

On the other hand, the Court finds the RTCs designation of Melinda as regular administratrix improper and
abusive of its discretion.

In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator, the following provisions of
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, state

Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No person is competent to serve as
executor or administrator who:

(a)

Is a minor;

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness,
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude.

xxxx

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.

Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of administration, the following provisions of
Rule 79 are pertinent

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a)

The jurisdictional facts;

(b)
The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors,
of the decedent;

(c)

(d)

The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for letters of administration is filed in
the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause

notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons
believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration. Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition,
contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency of the person for whom letters are prayed therein,
or on the ground of the contestants own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to
himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.

Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition, it must first be shown that
notice has been given as herein-above required, and thereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the
parties in support of their respective allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left no will, or that there
is no competent and willing executor, it shall order the issuance of letters of administration to the party
best entitled thereto.

Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as the prayer for her
appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the motion for the termination of the special
administration. Although there was a hearing set for the motion on November 5, 2007, the same was
canceled and reset to February 8, 2008 due to the absence of the parties counsels. The February 8, 2008
hearing was again deferred to March 10, 2008 on account of the ongoing renovation of the Hall of Justice.
Despite the resetting, petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion dated February 29, 2008,[49] reiterating
their prayer for partition or for the appointment of Melinda as regular administrator and for the revocation
of the special administration. It may be mentioned that, despite the filing by respondents of their
Opposition and Comment to the motion to revoke the special administration, the prayer for the
appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the estate was not specifically traversed in the said
pleading. Thus, the capacity, competency, and legality of Melindas appointment as such was not properly
objected to by respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed
out by the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the above mentioned Rules.

However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima,
with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into account the fact that Melinda,

pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008, already posted the required bond of P200,000.00 on
March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of Administration were issued to her the following day, and that
she filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated April 15, 2008.[50] These acts clearly
manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents estate, but her appointment
should be converted into one of special administration, pending the proceedings for regular administration.
Furthermore, since it appears that the only unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardos estate,
which is not subject of this case, judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 2008 and the
Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna,
with respect to the revocation of the special administration in favor of Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M.
Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The appointment of Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET
ASIDE. Melinda is designated instead as special administratrix of the estate under the same administrators
bond she had posted. The trial court is directed to conduct with dispatch the proceedings for the
appointment of the regular administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial partition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 12-33.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and
Magdangal M. de Leon, concurring; id. at 34-51.

[3] Id. at 52-53.

[4] Id. at 54-55.

[5] Id. at 35-36.

[6] Id. at 36.

[7] Id. at 36-37.

[8] Id. at 37.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] As admitted by respondents in their Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction; id. at 86.

[13] Id. at 38.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id. at 39.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 40.

[19] Id.

[20] Id. at 40-41.

[21] Id. at 56-63.

[22] Id. at 71-75.

[23] Id. at 76-80.

[24] Id. at 54-55.

[25] Id. at 81-107.

[26] Id. at 108-132.

[27] Id. at 142-145.

[28] Id. at 146-155.

[29] Rule 80.

[30] Id.

[31] Rule 81.

[32] Id.

[33] Co v. Rosario, G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 225, 229.

[34] Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA
747, 757; Valarao v. Pascual, 441 Phil. 226, 238 (2002).

[35] Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., G.R. No. 166520, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 528, 537.

[36] Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at 228; Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., supra, at 536; Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A.
Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, supra note 34, at 760; Pijuan v. De Gurrea, 124 Phil. 1527, 1531-1532 (1966);
Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407, 410 (1948).

[37] Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at 228; Rivera v. Hon. Santos, et al., 124 Phil. 1557, 1561 (1966).

[38] Infra.

[39] Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at 228; Fule v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785, 800 (1976).

[40] Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., supra note 35, at 536; Jamero v. Melicor, 498 Phil. 158, 165-166 (2005).

[41] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 397, 409 (2000); Moran Sison v.
Teodoro, 100 Phil. 1055, 1058 (1957); Sulit v. Santos, 56 Phil. 626, 630 (1932).

[42] Annex N to the Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

[43] Per respondents Petition for Certiorari before the CA; rollo, p. 96.

[44] Per petitioners Comment to the petition before the CA; id. at 114.

[45] Id. at 64-65.

[46] Id. at 66-67.

[47] Id. at 68-70.

[48] Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at 228-229.

[49] Rollo, p. 41.

[50] As admitted by respondents in their Comment; id. at 165-166.

THIRD DIVISION

VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO JAKE TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS,

Petitioners,

- versus -

THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY
ROMUALDO LIM,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 166520

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 14, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision[1] dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[2] dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc
City in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003 whereby it appointed
Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to the estate of the late Gerardo Tan.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private respondents,
who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters
of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch
12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a
special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardos estate until the Petition can be resolved
by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact,
Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to
private respondents Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be
appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend
further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-

petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his
death.

On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to
Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix, to wit:

b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the fiduciary account of the Court all
money and or cash at hand or deposited in the bank(s) which rightfully belong to the estate of the
decedent within five (5) days from receipt hereof;

b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane
harvest or any crop harvest, if any, done in the past or is presently harvesting or about to undertake, which
belong to the estate of the decedent;

b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required to submit a financial report
to the Commission as regards the background of the cash at hand or deposited in bank(s), if any, the
expenses incurred in course of her administration and other relevant facts including that of the proceeds of
the sugarcane/crop harvest, which submission will be done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court as
above-required.[3]

More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents Urgent Ex-parte
Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty.
Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order[4] appointing Romualdo as
special administrator of Gerardos Estate, the fallo of which states:

Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby GRANTED. Mr.
Romualdo D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special Administrator and shall immediately take possession and
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon his filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 and
upon approval of the same by this Court.[5]

Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that
petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of
the deceased.

On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC Executive Judge,
issued an Order[6] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the 17 July
2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner Vilmas right to be appointed as special administratix. Petitioners
likewise prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) to
enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as special administrator thereof.

On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners Petition. On 6 December 2004,
the Court of Appeals similarly denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING and
DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special Proceeding No.
4014-0.[7]

On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assigning the following
errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA
TO BE GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR FATHERS ESTATE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.[8]

On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution[9] denying the Petition on the ground of late filing,
failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and proof of such
service, failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay the deposit for the Salary Adjustment for
the Judiciary (SAJ) fund and sheriffs fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, however, this
Court issued on 18 July 2005 a Resolution[10] reinstating the Petition.

Petitioners contend[11] that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since they are
allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are purportedly
Gerardos illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose
interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedents estate.

Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or their attorney-in-fact to
administer Gerardos estate. Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo Jake Tan (Jake) claim to have lived for a long
time and continue to reside on Gerardos estate, while respondents are not even in the Philippines, having
long established residence abroad.

Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the administratrix of the estate since
Gerardos death on 14 October 2000 and is thus well steeped in the actual management and operation of
the estate (which essentially consists of agricultural landholdings).[12]

As regards the denial of petitioners plea for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO,
petitioners argue that such denial would leave Romualdo, private respondents attorney-in-fact, free to
enter Gerardos estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to the prejudice of petitioners.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator.[13] The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to
the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the
latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.[14]

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari,
however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[15]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavezs appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge
Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special administratrix of Gerardos estate,
but decided against her appointment for the following reasons:

Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma Tan in the
latters capacity as de fact[o] administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the court all money and
cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to the estate within five days from receipt of
the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all
sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the decedent. She was likewise directed to submit a
financial report as regards the background of the cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in the course
of her administration. The directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo on March 18, 2002 or more than a year ago.
On May 23, 2003, this Court, acting on the urgent ex parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma
Tan another ten days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all heirs be that
heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the
requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially administer the estate of Gerardo
Tan for the best interest of all the heirs.[16] (Emphases supplied.)

Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as special
administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as special administrator
of Gerardos estate, the latters appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of judgment and would
certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.[17] The Court of Appeals could not have reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari
petition.

Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-petitioner Vilma
would have been the more competent and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of
Gerardos estate. Contrary to petitioners bare assertions, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that
the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the lapse of a
considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.

We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as regards
their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special administrator.
It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally administer Gerardos estate.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over
administration of Gerardos estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a regular administrator
and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The
appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters,
testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent
leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause.[18] The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a
person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.[19]

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special
administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the
court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still appointed special
administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of the lawful
orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable
to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the court the income of Gerardos estate and to
provide an accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardos estate had no income. This defense is
clearly specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilmas non-compliance. If the estate truly did
not have any income, petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of
continuing to disregard the courts orders.

Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is no longer any need to
discuss petitioners arguments regarding the denial by the appellate court of their prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June
2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the estate of Gerardo Tan, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Ramon
M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 22-26.

[2] Issued by public respondent Executive Judge Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr. Records, p. 130.

[3] Id. at 82.

[4] Id. at 112-113.

[5] Id. at 113.

[6] Id. at 130.

[7] Rollo, p. 26.

[8] Id. at 15.

[9] Id. at 110-111.

[10] Id. at 135.

[11] Petitioners state in their Memorandum:

Petitioner Vilma Tan is Gerardos biological daughter; Jake and Geraldine Tan, together with their late
brother Christopher, are petitioner Vilma Tans biological children who were adopted by Gerardo Tan via
adoption proceedings docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1386 at the Regional Trial Court Branch VII, Tacloban City,
Leyte.

The late Christopher Tan died on October 28, 1994, when he was only seventeen (17) years old. He was
single when he died, he had no children and did not leave a last will and testament. For this reason, his
interests in the estate of the late Gerardo Tan are represented by his biological mother, herein Petitioner
Vilma Tan. (Rollo, p. 176.)

[12] Id. at 8.

[13] Ozaeta v. Pecson, 93 Phil. 416, 419-420 (1953); Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407, 410 (1948); Heirs of
Belinda Dalhlia Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 757.

[14] Pijuan v. De Gurrea, 124 Phil. 1527, 1531-1532 (1966).

[15] Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 411, 416;
Banal III v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA 164, 174.

[16] Records, p. 113.

[17] Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 477 (1998).

[18] Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Appointment of special administrator.When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of

administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court
may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.

[19] De Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr., G.R. No. L-48585, 31 March 1980, 96 SCRA 938, 945.

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21917

November 29, 1966

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO PIJUAN, special
administrator-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant.

Marcos S. Gomez for petitioner and appellee.

Ricardo B. Teruel for respondent and appellant.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is an appeal, taken by Manuela Ruiz Vda. de Gurrea, from two (2) orders of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental.

In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea and Carlos Gurrea were
married in Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with their son
Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two (2) children.
Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines, in June, 1960; but, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her to his
residence in said municipality. Hence, she stayed with their son, Teodoro, in Bacolod City.

Presently, or on July 29, 1960, she instituted, against Carlos Gurrea, Civil Case No. 5820 of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, for support and the annulment of some alleged donations of conjugal
property, in favor of his common-law wife, Rizalina. In due course, said court issued an order granting Mrs.
Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which, on May 17, 1961, was reduced by the Court
of Appeals to P1,000.00.

Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in
which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro.
Soon thereafter, or on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, for the probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion,
appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the will were
filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter of the
deceased.

On July 16, 1962, Mrs. Gurrea filed in said Special Proceedings No. 6582, a motion alleging that the
aforementioned alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had been suspended upon the death of Carlos
Gurrea, and praying that the Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the final
determination of the case. This motion having been denied in an order dated February 2, 1963, Mrs.
Gurrea moved for a reconsideration thereof. Moreover, on February 27, 1963, she moved for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased. In an order dated April 20, 1963, said motion
for reconsideration was denied. The lower court, likewise, denied, for the time being, the motion of Mrs.
Gurrea for her appointment as administratrix, in view of the provision of the will of the deceased
designating another person as executor thereof. Hence this appeal from said orders of February 2 and April
20, 1963.

Mrs. Gurrea assails as erroneous the order of the lower court denying her petition for support, as well as
that denying its reconsideration. Both were predicated upon the theory that, pursuant to Article 188 of our
Civil Code (Article 1430 of the Spanish Civil Code) the support of a surviving spouse constitutes, not an
encumbrance upon the estate of the decedent, but merely an advance from her share of said estate, and
that Mrs. Gurrea is not entitled to such advance, there being neither allegation nor proof that she had
contributed any paraphernal property to said estate or that the same includes properties forming part of
the conjugal partnership between her and the deceased. In support of this view, His Honor, the trial Judge
cited the opinion of Manresa to the effect that

. . . Probado que ni en concepto de capital propio, ni como gananciales corresponde haber alguno al
conjuge sobreviviente o a los herederos del premuerto, no cabe la concesion de alimentos, pues estos, en
efecto, con arreglo el articulo 1430, son solo un anticipo del respectivo haber de cada participe.

This has, however, been misconstrued by the lower court. The foregoing view of Manresa is predicated
upon the premise that it has been proven that none of the properties under administration belongs to the
surviving spouse either as paraphernal property or as part of the conjugal partnership. Upon the other
hand, the lower court denied support to Mrs. Gurrea because of absence of proof as regards the status,
nature or character of the property now under the custody of the Special Administrator. Precisely, however,
on account of such lack of proof thereon, we are bound by law1 to assume that the estate of the deceased
consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership,2 one-half of which belongs presumptively to
Mrs. Gurrea,3 aside from such part of the share of the deceased in said partnership as may belong to her
as one of the compulsory heirs,4 if his alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if probated, if the
provision therein disinheriting her were nullified. Inasmuch as the aforementioned estate is worth
P205,397.64, according to the inventory submitted by the special administrator, it is clear to us that the
continuation of the monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000, authorized in said Civil Case No. 5820, is
fairly justified.

It is next urged by Mrs. Gurrea that the lower court erred in denying her petition for appointment as
administratrix, for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78
of the Revised Rules of Court. In the language of this provision, said preference exists "if no executor is
named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos
Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be
said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof,
and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust,
but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his
appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the
preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers
to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that
the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court,5 and is not appealable.6

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby modified, in the sense that Manuela Ruiz Vda. de
Gurrea shall receive from the estate of the deceased a monthly allowance of P1,000.00, by way of support,
from March 7, 1962, and that, in all other respects, said orders are hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Art. 160, Civil Code of the Philippines.

2 Viloria v. Aquino, 28 Phil. 258; Sison v. Ambalada 30 Phil. 118; Coingco v. Flores, 82 Phil. 284; Harden
v. Pea, 87 Phil. 620; Cruz v. De la Paz, 47 O.G. 3419; Laperal v. Katigbak, L-16991, March 31, 1964;
Alfonso v. Natividad, 6 Phil. 240; Mariaga v. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107; Ahern v. Julian, 39 Phil. 607; Flores v.
Flores, 48 Phil. 288; Guingguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 114.

3 Article 142 of the same code.

4 Articles 887 and 892, Civil Code of the Philippines.

5 Roxas v. Pecson, 46 Off. Gaz. 2058; Junquera v. Borromeo, 52 Off. Gaz. 7611; De Gala v. Gonzales, 53
Phil. 106; Garcia v. Flores, L-10392, June 28, 1957; Hon. Alcasid, et al. v. Samson, et al., 54 Off. Gaz. No.
15, p. 4479.

6 Samson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198; Borja v. Tan, G.R. No. L-6476, Nov. 18, 1956; Manila Electric Co. v.
Artiaga and Green, 50 Phil. 144; Garcia v. Hon. Flores, etc., 54 Off. Gaz. No. 13, pp. 4049, 4052; Hon.
Alcasid, et al. v. Samson, et al., 54 Off. Gaz. No. 15, p. 4479.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-9282. May 31, 1956.]

EMILIO ADVINCULA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE TEODORO, SR., Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, and ENRIQUE A. LACSON, Respondents.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Emilio Advincula seeks a writ of certiorari, to annul certain orders of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental.

Said Petitioner was, on November 22, 1954, appointed, special administrator of the estate of his deceased
wife, Josefa Lacson Advincula, in special proceeding No. 3245 of said court. In due course, he was, on
February 12, 1955, appointed regular administrator of said estate. After Advincula had qualified as such,
the brothers of the deceased, who left no issue, submitted to the court, for allowance, a document
purporting to be her last will and testament. Petitioner opposed the probate thereof upon the ground that it

did not bear the signature of the deceased; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the signature thereon, if hers,
was secured through fraud and duress; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, the instrument had not been
executed with the requisite formalities. On May 4, 1955, Respondent Enrique Lacson, one of the brothers of
the deceased, filed a motion praying that he be appointed administrator of said estate, in lieu of Petitioner
herein, for the reason that said Respondent is the executor named in the aforementioned alleged will. On
or about May 16, 1955, Attys. Jose Y. Torres and Antonio Lozada, as counsel for Advincula, filed an
opposition to said motion. When the latter was called for hearing on May 18, 1955, Atty. Lozada was
served, in open court, copy of an amended motion, of Respondent Lacson, for change of administrator,
dated May 14, 1955. It was alleged therein, in addition to the ground set forth in the first
motion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

5. That the present administrator is incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to the discharge of the trust,
he being foreign to the estate, and without changing or removing him as such would be disastrous to the
estate and to the heirs named in the will of the decedent.

Atty. Lozada asked a postponement of the hearing upon the ground that Advinculas main counsel, Atty.
Torres, was in Manila, but his request was denied. Then, after hearing the argument of opposing counsel,
the court, presided over by Respondent, Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr., Judge, issued, on the same date (May
18, 1955), an order the pertinent parts of which read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court, after hearing the oral arguments of both parties, finds the motion for postponement not welltaken and hereby denies the same; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand finding the motion dated May 4, 1955
as amended by the amended motion dated May 14, 1955, well-founded and the opposition thereto dated
May 16, 1955 not well-founded, said motion is hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the preservation of the property for the heirs, the
appointment of Emilio Advincula as administrator is hereby revoked and in his stead, the Oppositor,
Enrique A. Lacson, is hereby appointed administrator of this intestate estate, and same may qualify by
filing a bond in the sum of P5,000 and taking and subscribing the corresponding oath of Office. Once said
Enrique A. Lacson has qualified, let letters of administration issue in his favor.

The former administrator, Emilio Advincula, is hereby ordered to submit within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof, his final account covering the entire period of his administration and should it appear that any
deficiency has been incurred by him during his incumbency, his bond shall answer for said deficiency.

Thereupon, Lacson gave the requisite bond, letters of administration was issued to him, and he tried to
take possession of the estate of the deceased. A reconsideration of said order of May 18, 1955, having
been denied by another order, dated May 30, 1955, Petitioner instituted the present action for certiorari,
against Lacson and Judge Teodoro, to annul his aforesaid orders of May 18 and 30, 1955, upon the ground
that the same were issued with grave abuse of discretion. Upon the filing of a bond by Advincula, we
issued, as prayed for in his petition, a writ of preliminary injunction restraining Respondent Lacson and his
agents from interfering, molesting and harassing the Petitioner in the administration of the estate of the
deceased, during the pendency of this case.

The writ of certiorari prayed for is in order. Lacsons appointment, in lieu of Advincula, as administrator of
the estate of Josefa Lacson Advincula, is predicated upon the fact that the former is named executor in the
alleged will of said deceased. The provision therein to this effect cannot be enforced, however, until after
said document has been allowed to probate, for section 4 of Rule 79 of the Rules of Court
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person
named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trusts, and gives bond as required by these
rules. (Italics supplied.)

Besides, the discovery of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased, after the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of the latter, upon the assumption that he or she had died
intestate, does not ipso facto nullify the letters of administration already issued or even authorize the
revocation thereof, until the alleged will has been proved and allowed by the court. Rule 83, section 1, of
the Rules of Court, is plain and explicit on this point.

If after letters of administration have been granted on the estate of a decedent as if he had died
intestate, his will is proved and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be revoked and all
powers thereunder cease, and the administrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to the court, end
render his account within such time as the court directs. Proceedings for the issuance of letters
testamentary or of administration under the will shall be as hereinbefore provided. (Italics supplied.)

The amended motion for change of administrator endeavored to justify the removal of Advincula by
alleging that he is incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to the discharge of the trust, he being foreign to
the estate of the deceased. By holding, in its order of May 18, 1955, that said motion is well-founded
with nothing, absolutely nothing else, to indicate the basis of this conclusion Respondent Judge has
impliedly adopted the line of argument followed in the above quoted allegation of the amended motion to
change administrator. Said argument is, however, devoid of merit.

It is untenable from the viewpoint of logic and experience, because a stranger to deceased may be
competent, capable and fit to administer her estate, in much the same as a member of her immediate
family could be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. At any rate, Advincula is not a stranger, either
to her or to her estate, he bring her surviving spouse and, as such, one of her forced heirs (Arts. 887, 888,
892, 893, 894, 897 to 900, and 995 to 1001, Civil Code of the Philippines), whether she died testate or
intestate. What is more, he is prima facie entitled to one-half of all property subject to the authority of the
administrator of said estate, apart from his share of the other half thereof, as heir of the deceased, for all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of which he is its
administrator (Article 165, Civil Code of the Philippines) unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife (See Articles 160 and 185, Civil Code of the Philippines). Lastly, Advincula
has not been found guilty of any specific act or omission constituting one of the legal grounds, enumerated
in Rule 83, section 2, of the Rules of Court, for the removal of an executor or administrator. Hence, it is
clear that Respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in removing Advincula and appointing Lacson as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Josefa Lacson Advincula.

Wherefore, the aforementioned orders of Respondent Judge, dated May 8 and 30, 1955, are reversed, and
the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case hereby made permanent, with costs against
Respondent Enrique A. Lacson. It is SO ORDERED.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., and
Endencia, JJ., concur.

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984

LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PASTOR T. QUEBRAR and FRANCISCO KILAYKO, defendants-appellants.

Tolentino & Garcia & D. R. Cruz for plaintiff-appellee.

Zoilo V. dela Cruz, Jr. for defendants-appellants.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 52790
dated November 3, 1964 which was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
March 20, 1975.

On August 9, 1954, plaintiff-appellee issued two administrator's bond in the amount of P15,000.00 each,
in behalf of the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in Special Proceedings Nos. 3075
and 3076 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, entitled " Re Testate Estate of A. B. Chinsuy,"
and Re Testate Estate of Cresenciana Lipa," respectively, (pp. 8-12, 17-21, ROA; p. 9 rec.). In consideration
of the suretyship wherein the plaintiff-appellee Luzon Surety Company, Inc. was bound jointly and severally
with the defendant appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, the latter, together with Francisco Kilayko, executed two
indemnity agreements, where among other things, they agreed jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffappellee "the sum of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) in advance as premium thereof for every 12 months
or fraction thereof, this ... or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect" and to indemnify plaintiffappellee against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps taxes, penalties, charges and expenses,
whatsoever, including the 15% of the amount involved in any litigation, for attomey's fees (pp. 12-16, 2125. ROA; p. 9, rec.).

For the first year, from August 9, 1954 to August 9, 1955, the defendants-appellants paid P304.50 under
each indemnity agreement or a total of P609.00 for premiums and documentary stamps.

On June 6, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental approved the amended Project of
Partition and Accounts of defendant-appellant (p. 87, ROA; p. 9, rec.).

On May 8, 1962, the plaintiff-appellee demanded from the defendants-appellants the payment of the
premiums and documentary stamps from August 9,1955.

On October 17, 1962, the defendants-appellants ordered a motion for cancellation and/or reduction of
executor's bonds on the ground that "the heirs of these testate estates have already received their
respective shares" (pp. 69-70, ROA, p. 9, rec.).

On October 20, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental acting on the motions filed by the
defendants-appellants ordered the bonds cancelled.

Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted to P2,436.00 in each case, hence, a total of P4,872.00 for the
period of August 9, 1955 to October 20, 1962. The defendants-appellants to pay the said amount of
P4,872.00.

On January 8, 1963, the plaintiff-appellee filed the case with the Court of First Instance of Manila During
the pre-trial the parties presented their documentary evidences and agreed on the ultimate issue "whether or not the administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and after the year that they were

filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled." The defendants-appellants offered
P1,800.00 by way of amicable settlement which the plaintiff-appellee refused.

The lower court allowed the plaintiff to recover from the defendants-appellants, holding that:

We find for the plaintiff it is clear from the terms of the Order of the Court in which these bond were
filed, that the same were in force and effect from and after filling thereof up to and including 20 October,
1962, when the same werecancelled. It follows that the defendants are liable under the terms of the
Indemnity Agreements, notwithstanding that they have not expressly sought the renewal of these bonds
bemuse the same were in force and effect until they were cancelled by order of the Court. The renewal of
said bonds is presumed from the fact that the defendants did not ask for the cancellation of the same; and
their liability springs from the fact that defendant Administrator Pastor Quebrar, benefited from the bonds
during their lifetime.

We find no merit in defendants' claim that the Administrator's bonds in question are not judicial bonds
but legal or conventional bonds only, since they were constituted by virtue of Rule 82, Sec. 1 of the Old
Rule of Court. Neither is there merit in defendants, claim that payments of premiums and documentary
stamps were conditions precedent to the effectivity of the bonds, since it was the defendants' duty to pay
for the premiums as long as the bonds were in force and effect. Finally, defendants' claim that they are not
liable under the Indemnity Agreements is also without merit since the under of defendants under said
Indemnity Agreements; includes the payment of yearly pre for the bonds.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering
the tsn the defendant to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P6,649.36 plus interest at
the legal rate from 27 July 1964 until fully paid and the sum equivalent to 10% of the total amount due as
and or attorney's fees, and costs (pp. 92-94, ROA; p. 9, rec.).

Defendants-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 20, 1975, the Court of Appeals in a
resolution certified the herein case to this Court after finding that this case involves only errors or
questions of law.

1. The proper determination of the liability of the surety and of the principal on the bond must depend
primarily upon the language of the bond itself. The bonds herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of
the Rules of Court. While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it is required by statute (Midland Co. vs.
Broat 52 NW 972), said statutory bonds are construed in the light of the statute creating the obligation
secured and the purposes for which the bond is required, as expressed in the statute (Michael vs. Logan,
52 NW 972; Squires vs. Miller, 138 NW 1062). The statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a
part of the bond and imparts into the bond any conditions prescribed by the statute (Scott vs. United
States Fidelity Co., 252 Ala 373, 41 So 2d 298; Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. vs. Lunt, 82 Ariz 320,
313 P2d 393).

The bonds in question herein contain practically the very same conditions in Sec. 1, Rule 81 of the Rules
of Court. Pertinent provision of the administrator's bonds is as follows:

Therefore, if the said Pastor T. Quebrar faithfully prepares and presents to the Court, within three
months from the date of his appointment, a correct inventory of all the property of the deceased which
may have come into his possession or into the possession of any other person representing him according
to law, if he administers all the property of the deceased which at any time comes into his possession or
into the possession of any other person representing him; faithfully pays all the debts, legacies, and
bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever dividends which the Court may decide should be
paid, and renders a just and true account of his administrations to the Court within a year or at any other
date that he may be required so to do, and faithfully executes all orders and decrees of said Court, then in
this case this obligation shall be void, otherwise it shall remain full force and effect (p. 9, 18, ROA p. 9,
rec.).

Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the
purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful
performance of the administrator's trust (Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 134).

Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the administrator's
bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of
the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he
is called upon to perform in the course of administration (Deobold vs. Oppermann, 111 NY 531, 19 NE 94),
it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by
him in consideration of the suretyship

It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had something to do as an

administrator/executor even after the approval of the amended project of partition and accounts on June 6,
1957.

The contention of the defendants-appellants that the administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force
and effect with the approval of the project of partition and statement of accounts on June 6, 1957 is
without merit. The defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957,
for administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the
heirs and legatees. And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of
all the debts and expenses (Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 982). It appears that there were still debts and
expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957.

And in the case of Montemayor vs. Gutierrez (114 Phil. 95), an estate may be partitioned even before
the termination of the administration proceedings. Hence, the approval of the project of partition did not
necessarily terminate the administration proceedings. Notwithstanding the approval of the partition, the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental still had jurisdiction over the administration proceedings of the
estate of A.B. Chinsuy and Cresenciana Lipa.

2. The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring during the term
covered by the bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until the administration has been
closed and terminated in the manner directed by law (Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. vs. White, 115
SW 2d 249). Thus, as long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
continuing liability (Deobold vs. Oppermann, supra) notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the
defendants-appellants.

It must be remembered that the probate court possesses an all-embracing power over the
administrator's bond and over the administration proceedings and it cannot be devoid of legal authority to
execute and make that bond answerable for the every purpose for which it was filed (Mendoza vs.
Pacheco, 64 Phil. 1-05). It is the duty of the courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estate of
the deceased persons by intervening in the administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury
that may be done thereto (Dariano vs. Fernandez Fidalgo, 14 Phil. 62, 67; Sison vs. Azarraga, 30 Phil. 129,
134).

3. In cases like these where the pivotal point is the interpretation of the contracts entered into, it is
essential to scrutinize the very language used in the contracts. The two Indemnity Agreements provided
that:

The undersigned, Pastor T. Quebrar and Dr. Francisco Kilayko, jointly and severally, bind ourselves unto
the Luzon Surety Co., Inc. ... in consideration of it having become SURETY upon Civil Bond in the sum of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) ... in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in Special Proceeding ...
dated August 9, 1954, a copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof (emphasis
supplied; pp. 12-13, 21, ROA p. 9, rec.),

To separately consider these two agreements would then be contrary to the intent of the parties in
making them integrated as a whole.

The contention then of the defendants-appellants that both the Administrator's Bonds and the Indemnity
Agreements ceased to have any force and effect, the former since June 6, 1957 with the approval of the
project of partition and the latter since August 9, 1955 with the non-payment of the stated premiums, is
without merit. Such construction of the said contracts entered into would render futile the purpose for
which they were made.

To allow the defendants-appellants to evade their liability under the Indemnity Agreements by nonpayment of the premiums would ultimately lead to giving the administrator the power to diminish or
reduce and altogether nullify his liability under the Administrator's Bonds. As already stated, this is
contrary to the intent and purpose of the law in providing for the administrator's bonds for the protection
of the creditors, heirs, legatees, and the estate.

4. Moreover, the lower court was correct in holding that there is no merit in the defendants' claim that
payments of premiums and documentary stamps are conditions precedent to the effectivity of the bonds.

It is worthy to note that there is no provision or condition in the bond to the effect that it will terminate
at the end of the first year if the premium for continuation thereafter is not paid. And there is no clause by
which its obligation is avoided or even suspended by the failure of the obligee to pay an annual premium
(U.S. vs. Maryland Casualty Co. DCMD 129 F. Supp; Dale vs. Continental Insurance Co., 31 SW 266;
Equitable Insurance C. vs. Harvey, 40 SW 1092).

It was held in the case of Fourth and First Bank and Trust Co. vs. Fidelity and Deposit Co. (281 SW 785),
that "at the end of the first year, the bond went on, whether or not the premium was paid or not ... Even on
a failure to pay an annual premium, the contract ran on until affirmative action was taken to avoid it. The
obligation of the bond was therefore continuous." And in United States vs. American Surety Co. of New York
(172 F2d 135), it was held that "under a surety bond securing faithful performance of duties by postal
employee, liability for default of employee occurring in any one year would continue, whether or not a
renewal premium was paid for a later year."

The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as part of the consideration, and not as a
condition Woodfin vs. Asheville Mutual Insurance Co., 51 N.C. 558); for the payment was not made a
condition to the attaching or continuing of the contract (National Bank vs. National Surety Co., 144 A 576).
The premium is the consideration for furnishing the bonds and the obligation to pay the same subsists for
as long as the liability of the surety shall exist (Reparations Commission vs. Universal Deep-Sea Fishing
Corp., L-21996, 83 SCRA 764, June 27, 1978). And in Arranz vs. Manila Fidelity and Surety Co., Inc. (101
Phil. 272), the "premium is the consideration for furnishing the bond or the guaranty. While the liability of
the surety subsists the premium is collectible from the principal. Lastly, in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Villarama (107 Phil. 891), it was held that "the one-year period mentioned therein refers not to the
duration or lifetime of the bond, but merely to the payment of premiums, and, consequently, does not
affect at all the effectivity or efficacy of such bond. But such non- payment alone of the premiums for the
succeeding years ... does not necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the counter-bond in the
absence of an express stipulation in the contract making such non-payment of premiums a cause for the
extinguishment or termination of the undertaking. ...There is no necessity for an extension or renewal of
the agreement because by specific provision thereof, the duration of the counter-bond was made
dependent upon the existence of the original bond."

5. It is true that in construing the liability of sureties, the principle of strictissimi juris applies (Asiatic
Petroleum Co. vs, De Pio, 46 Phil. 167; Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. vs. Cho Siong, 53 Phil. 205); but with the
advent of corporate surety, suretyship became regarded as insurance where, usually, provisions are
interpreted most favorably to the insured and against the insurer because ordinarily the bond is prepared
by the insurer who then has the opportunity to state plainly the term of its obligation (Surety Co. vs. Pauly,
170 US 133, 18 S. Ct. 552.,42 L. Ed. 972).

This rule of construction is not applicable in the herein case because there is no ambiguity in the
language of the bond and more so when the bond is read in connection with the statutory provision
referred to.

With the payment of the premium for the first year, the surety already assumed the risk involved, that
is, in case defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar defaults in his administrative duties. The surety became
liable under the bond for the faithful administration of the estate by the administrator/executor. Hence, for
as long as defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar was administrator of the estates, the bond was held liable
and inevitably, the plaintiff-appellee's liability subsists since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with
that of the administrator.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1964
IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. WITH COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992

NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL
GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL
GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and
ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19797 promulgated on August 23, 1991, 1 respondent Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioners assailing the orders of the lower court in
Special Proceeding No. 88-44589 thereof which effectively sustained the appointment of private
respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as administrator of the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.

Petitioners' present appeal by certiorari would have this Court set aside that decision of respondent
court, hence the need to examine the chronology of antecedent facts, as found by respondent court and
detailed hereunder, pertinent to and which culminated in their recourse now before us.

On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, private respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, a petition for letters of administration alleging,
among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and is fully
capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. Private respondent mentioned eight (8) of
herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the decedent. 2

On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order 3 setting the hearing of the petition on June 29, 1988,
on which date all persons interested may show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The
court further directed the publication of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general circulation, once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed despite such publication of the
notice of hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate
court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988, appointing private respondent as administrator of the intestate
estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00. 4

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of the decedent was
published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private respondent, filed
a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that the decision in a
civil case between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said
estate. 5

On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and
Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent at P18,960,000.00, which incident was
set for hearing on January 16, 1989. 6

On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed Gabriel,
filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued to private
respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter
of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein petitioners. 7 After some exchanges and
on order of the court, petitioners filed an "Opposition to the Petition and Motion," dated May 20, 1989,
alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for administration; (2)
petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be preferred over private respondent; (3)
private respondent has a conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer
the claims of his mother and (4) most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by

way of transfer of ownership to petitioners and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to
be administered by private respondent. 8

On September 21, 1989, the probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners on the
ground that they had not shown any circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that
(1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a legitimate daughter of the
deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the person who was appointed administrator is unworthy,
incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable under these
circumstances. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated
December 22, 1989. 10

From said orders, herein petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, on
the following grounds:

1. The orders of September 21, 1989 and December 22, 1989 are null and void, being contrary to the
facts, law and jurisprudence on the matter;

2. Respondent judge, in rendering the aforesaid orders, gravely acted with abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction, hence said orders are null and void ab initio; and

3. Private respondent is morally incompetent and unsuitable to perform the duties of an administrator as
he would give prior preference to the claims of his mother against the estate itself. 11

As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing that petition for certiorari on
the ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court
which may not be interfered with unless abused; that the fact that there was no personal notice served on
petitioners is not a denial of due process as such service is not a jurisdictional requisite and petitioners
were heard on their opposition; and that the alleged violation of the order of preference, if any, is an error
of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, correctible by appeal and not by the special civil action of
certiorari. 12

In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver that under Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of
an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving spouse of the deceased
Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over private respondent who is one of the illegitimate
children of the decedent by claimant. Aida Valencia. Secondly, they claim that assuming that the widow is
incompetent, the next of kin must be appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the
former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over
private respondent who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it is contended that the non-observance or violation
per se of the order of preference already constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in not following the order of preference because the same is not absolute and the choice of who
to appoint rests in the sound discretion of the court. He calls attention to the fact that petitioners Nilda
Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never applied for appointment despite the lapse of more than nine (9)
months from the death of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible for the probate court to have
considered them for appointment. Besides, it is not denied that several properties of the deceased have
already been relinquished to herein petitioners, hence they would have no interest in applying for letters of
administration. Lastly, private respondent submits that it has not been shown that he is incompetent nor is
he disqualified from being appointed or serving as administrator.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select. (Emphases ours.)

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of
letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors,
and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of
discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any
valid and sufficient reason therefor.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration
reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 13

This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference
of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to
have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. 14 Under the law, the widow would have
the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the
conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the
entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. 15 On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel,
the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the
administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to
another who has less. 16

Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed
administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the
death of her husband, as required under the rules.

It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or next
of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for
thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not
sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very
strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration. 17

In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from
appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is not
absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause 18 despite the mandatory tenor in the opening sentence
of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in
paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors."

On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as
administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a
great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is
not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. 19 Administrators have such a
right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from
removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing
the probate court to remove an administrator.

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator,
it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence
of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the
orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. 20
In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and
substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to
state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an
administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. 21

On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of the
estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is both

legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of
administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of
kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise when there is only one
administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the
extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may
further be expected from private respondent for the same estate.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been
upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented; 24 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions
be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; 25
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; 26 (4) to have
all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the
estate; 27 and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another
competent person associated with him in the office. 28

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a coadministration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent
Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of
their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that
in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the
estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the
representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the validity of the
appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and ORDERING the
appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special Proceeding No. 88-4458 of
Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo R. Bengzon, with Associate Justices Fidel P. Purisima and Salome
A. Montoya, concurring; Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 16.

2 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 19797, 12-13.

3 Ibid., id., 14-15.

4 Ibid., id., 16-17.

5 Ibid., id., 18-19.

6 Ibid., id., 20-23.

7 Ibid., id., 25-26.

8 Ibid., id., 32-33.

9 Ibid., id., 35-36.

10 lbid., id., 56.

11 Ibid., id., 6.

12 Rollo, 16-21.

13 Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, et al., 190 SCRA 112 (1990).

14 De Guzman vs. Limcolioc, 67 Phil. 404 (1939).

15 Fule, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 74 SCRA 189 (1976).

16 Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, etc. vs. Escolin, et al., jointly decided with Testate Estate of
the Late Linnie Jane Hodges, et al. vs. Carles, et al., 56 SCRA 266 (1974).

17 1 ALR 1247.

18 Capistrano, et al. vs. Nadurata, et al., 46 Phil. 726 (1922); Arevalo, etc. vs. Bustamante, et al., 69
Phil. 656 (1940).

19 Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 190 SCRA 421 (1990).

20 Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, et al., supra.

21 Alabama vs. Hill, 76 S.E. 1001; Re Weaver, 119 N.W. 69.

22 Matute vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 26 SCRA 768 (1969).

23 The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who entitled under the statute of distribution to
the decedent's property (Cooper vs. Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341).

24 Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, et al., supra.

25 Matias vs. Gonzales, et al., 101 Phil. 852 (1957); Corona vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 116 SCRA 316
(1982); Vda. de Dayrit vs. Ramolete, et al., 117 SCRA 608 (1982).

26 Copeland vs. Shapley, 100 NE. 1080, cited in 34 C.J.S., Executors & Administrators, 1316.

27 In re Drew's Estate, 236 N.W. 701.

28 In re Fichter's Estate, 279 N.Y.S. 597.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973

NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner,

vs.
HECTOR LAGUNA, HON. VALERION ROVIRA, Judge, Court of First Instance and HON. JUDGE ROSENDO
BALTAZAR, Judge, City Court of Iloilo, respondents.

Nicanor D. Sorongon for petitioner.

Apeles L. Padilla for respondents.

ESGUERRA, J.:

I.

Nature of the Case

The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul an Order of Hon. Rosendo
Baltazar, as Judge of the City Court of Iloilo, dated June 30, 1966, ordering the demolition of the residential
house of petitioner. 1 Assailed likewise is an Order, dated August 25, 1966, of Hon. Valerio V. Rovira, as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, stationed at Iloilo City, approving said demolition. 2

II.

Facts of the Case

The record of this case discloses the following facts:

Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land known as lot No. 3508
situated at La Paz, Iloilo City 3 many years back, petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, with
the acquiescence of private respondent Laguda, constructed a residential house on a portion of said lot
fronting Huevana Street, paying a monthly rental of P80.00. 4 Unable to pay the lease rental from July
1959 to September 1961, totalling P2,160.00, an action for ejectment (Civil Case No. 6823) was filed by
private respondent Laguda against petitioner in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of her
late husband, Dr. Bacaling, in the City Court of Iloilo City. 5 The filing of said case spawned various court
suits.

Petitioner on July 23, 1962, filed certiorari proceedings in this Court (G.R. No.
L-20061) but was dismissed for lack of merit on August 3, 1962. 6 With this setback, petitioner on
November 12, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction (Civil Case No. 6162) but the same was dismissed on December 1, 1962. 7 Unsuccessful in her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 31882R) but her petition was dismissed by that Court on March 7, 1967. 8

Suffering from these series of legal reverses, the petitioner entered into a compromise agreement on
July 29, 1964, with private respondent Laguda relative to Civil Case No. 6823. 9 Said agreement inter alia,
provides as follows:

1. Defendant (petitioner herein) agreed to vacate the premises and remove ... the residential house
therefrom ... before December 31, 1966;

2. For the use and occupation ... of the said premises ... from June 1964 to December 31, 1969, the said
defendant will pay plaintiff a monthly rent ... of Eighty (P80.00) Pesos per calendar month ...;

3. Upon failure of defendant to comply with any ... provision of the amicable settlement within ... fifty
(50) days ... the plaintiff shall be entitled to "immediate execution to restore plaintiff in possession of the
premises and to recover all the unpaid monthly rents from June 1, 1964 until said premises are vacated" by
defendant;

4. Defendant "waive her right, under Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court, to bar enforcement of the execution
of the judgment in the case at anytime within one year from December 31, 1969".

In a decision dated July 30, 1964, the City Court of Iloilo City approved the amicable settlement and
enjoined the parties to comply with its terms. For failure of the petitioner to satisfy the conditions of the
settlement within the 50-day period, private respondent Laguda moved for execution which the Court
granted on July 7, 1965. 10

On July 14, 1965, petitioner moved for reconsideration to quash the writ of execution, but before the
Court could resolve the motion, petitioner on July 19, 1965, served notice of her intention to take the case
to the Court of Appeals. 11 Meanwhile on July 23, 1965, respondent Laguda filed an opposition to the
petitioner's July 14, 1965, motion, alleging that as judicial administratrix as of July 29, 1964, she was
legally authorized to enter into the amicable settlement which was the basis of the decision dated July 30,
1964, of the City Court of Iloilo sought to be executed and, therefore, her act was binding upon the present
judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who replaced petitioner upon her discharge as such on
November 28, 1964. 12

Denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of execution on September 30,
1965, the City Court however, held in abeyance the enforcement of the alias writ of execution until the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo stamped its imprimatur considering the pendency of Special Proceedings No.
1469 and of the fact that the properties involved therein are in custodia legis. 13 Thereafter, on October
25, 1965, private respondent Laguda moved the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No.
1469 for the approval of the City Court's order of execution which was granted despite petitioner's
opposition. 14 With the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration on December 4, 1965, a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction was brought before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 36939-R)
which dismissed the same on January 18, 1966. 15

On April 14, 1966, the respondent City Judge of Iloilo City issued an alias writ of execution upon
representations of private respondent Laguda, copies of which were served sheriff upon the petitioner and
Atty. Roberto Dineros in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Dr. Ramon
Bacaling, in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 16

On June 30, 1966, a Special Order of Demolition was issued by the respondent City Judge upon motion of
private respondent Laguda and over petitioner's opposition, subject, however, to the approval of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 17 Upon the denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, respondent Laguda on July 12, 1966, filed a manifestation in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469, praying for the confirmation of the Order to demolish the house
under custodia legis. 18

On August 4, 1966, petitioner interposed an opposition alleging:

1. That she was no longer in control of the estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the amicable
settlement became due and payable;

2. That the residential house to be demolished is worth P35,000.00 for which she is entitled to
reimbursement as a builder in good faith, in addition to reasonable expenses they may incur in transferring
the same to another place; and

3. That the guardian ad litem of the minor children was not notified of the motion for the issuance of an
order of demolition; 19

On August 25, 1966, respondent Laguda by way of reply disputed petitioner's claim and supported the
legality of the court's ruling. 20 On the same date, the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 1469
approved the order of demolition of the house in controversy. 21 Impugning the said Order as violative of
the provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, and of the constitutional mandate on due process,
petitioner moved to reconsider the same but the motion was denied by the Court on September 26, 1966.
22 Frustrated in her effort to set aside the Order of Demolition, petitioner brought this present action of
certiorari with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due course to the petition, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order on October 21, 1966, to prevent the enforcement of the order of demolition in Special
Proceedings No. 1469 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, but when served upon the respondents, the
building in question was already partially demolished. 23 Upon petitioner's posting a bond of P1,000.00,
this Court on November 10, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the herein respondents
from proceeding with the order of demolition, until further orders. 24

III.

Issues of the Case

The issues raised in the instant petition boil down to the following:

1. Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial administratrix prior to her discharge or removal
are valid and binding upon her successor;

2. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement, and/or
reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place;

3. Whether or not due process was denied to the minor children of deceased Ramon Bacaling, and
petitioner in connection with the motion for the issuance of the order of demolition.

IV.

Discussion

Petitioner claims before this Court that since she was no longer the judicial administratrix of the estate
of her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, and was no longer in control of estate funds when the stipulated
obligations in the amicable settlement became due and payable, the special order of demolition could not
be enforced.

Such a view is not tenable. Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioner's lawful acts before
the revocation of her letters of administration or before her removal shall have the same validity as if there
was no such revocation or removal. It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or
of administration is to terminate the authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor
or administrator, done in good faith prior to the revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar
protection will be extended to rights acquired under a previous grant of administration. 25

In connection with the petitioner's contention that she be considered a builder in good faith and,
therefore, entitled to reimbursement in addition to reasonable expenses that may be incurred in
transferring the house to another place, the same cannot stand legal scrutiny. The rule is well-settled that
lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their occupancy of the
premises continues only during the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value
of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed. Their
rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half
of the value of their improvements if the lessor so elects. 26

It is next urged by petitioner that there was a denial of process for failure of private respondent to notify
the guardian ad litem of the minor children of the deceased Ramon Bacaling, of the motion for execution.

A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the burden of
demonstrating that there was denial of due process. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that Acting
Fiscal Alfonso Illemberger guardian ad litem of the minor children of the late Ramon Bacaling, has been

duly apprised of the issuance of the assailed special order to demolish, as shown by the certification of the
counsel for petitioner at the foot of his opposition dated August 4, 1966, 27 filed with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, and as also shown by the certification of private respondent's counsel at the foot of his
opposition dated September 15, 1966, 28 likewise filed with the same Court.

V.

Conclusion

The petitioner is not entitled to the writ of certiorari. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no showing
that the respondent courts acted so "arbitrarily", "despotically" or "capriciously" as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders.

"Grave abuse of discretion" which is a ground for certiorari means "such capricious and arbitrary
exercise of judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction." 29 Even mere abuse of
discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. For that purpose the abuse
of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that it was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically, which is not the case made out by the present petition. 30

There is something more to be said about the nature and apparent purpose of this case which has its
genesis in the case for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823) brought before the Iloilo City Court. What
transpired therein presents a glaring example of a summary proceeding which was deliberately protracted
and made to suffer undue delay in its disposal. It was originally filed on September 13, 1960; 31 it reached
the appellate courts five (5) times, twice before the Court of Appeals 32, Once before the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo 33, and twice before this Court. 34 The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a
frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to
prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counsel deserves the
vigorous condemnation of this Court, 35 because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari
which should only be resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by a inferior
court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the
precious time that they could well devote to really meritorious cases.

VI.

Judgment

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby,
dismissed.

The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on November 10, 1966, is immediately set aside.
36

Treble costs against the petitioner for the reasons above set forth. 37

Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Record, p. 14.

2 Id., pp. 26-27.

3 Id., p. 15.

4 Record, p. 15.

5 Id., p. 73.

6 Id., p. 54-55.

7 Id., pp. 55; 76.

8 Id., p. 55; 78-80.

9 Record, p. 55; 66.

10 Id., pp. 81-83; 84.

11 Record, p. 56; 85-87.

12 Id., p. 56; 88-89.

13 Id., pp. 56-57.

14 Record, p. 57; 91.

15 Id., p. 58; 101; 102-106.

16 Id., p. 59; 72.

17 Id., p. 2; 14.

18 Record, p. 3; 19.

19 Id., p. 4; 22-23.

20 Id., p. 5; 22-25.

21 Id., p. 5; 26-29.

22 Record, p. 6; 37.

23 Id., pp. 41-42.

24 Id., pp. 43-44.

25 Rebhan v. Mueller, 114 Ill. 343, 2 N.E. 75, 55 Am. Rep. 869, cited in 21 Am. Jur. 465; Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court, Vol. V-5, p. 91.

26 Racaza v. Susana Realty, Inc., 18 SCRA 1172, 1177-1178, citing Lopez, Inc. v. Phil. & Eastern Trading
Co., 98 Phil. 348.

27 Record, pp. 22-27.

28 Id., pp. 69-71.

29 Abad Santos v. Prov. of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Hamog v. Sec. of Agriculture, G.R. No. L-13456, Jan. 30,
1960.

30 Tavera Luna, Inc. v. Nable, 72 Phil. 278; Palma & Ignacio v. Q & S Inc., et al., 17 SCRA 97, at p. 100. to
the same effect: Villa-rey Transit, Inc. v. bello, 7 SCRA 735; Albig v. Constantino, 2 SCRA 299.

31 Record, p. 54.

32 Id., p. 55; 58.

33 Id., p. 55.

34 Id., pp. 54-55.

35 Uypuanco V. Equitable Bank, 27 SCRA 1272; J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. v. Lianga Industries, Inc., 28 SCRA
807; Pajares v. Abad Santos, 30 SCRA 748; Orbe v. Inting, 37 SCRA 584.

36 Record, p. 43.

37 Atlas Consolidated Mining & Dev. Corp. v. WCC, 33 SCRA 132.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118671

January 29, 1996

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN
RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated November 10, 1994
and the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.

The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs
his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of
Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and
named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.2

On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For
unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will.

On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes
who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of
Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond
opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.

On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street,
Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline4 was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.

On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the
rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56,
representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on
the estate.5

In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00.6

On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate
court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were
issued on June 23, 1993.

On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "ExParte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release
of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes
prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline
and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.

On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent
payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and
possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the
filing of a bond of P50,000.00.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes's
motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise
reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.

On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for
release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed
for another year.7

Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the
funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from
their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent
Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the
notice to creditors.8 The court stated thus:

xxx

xxx

xxx

After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties the court resolves to allow
Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk of Court,
Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli,
which are subject to collation and deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and insofar as
they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to them.

As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-named
heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the
date of first publication of Notice to Creditors.

WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses
necessary for administration including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice
Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be withdrawn and cause the
publication of the notice to creditors with reasonable dispatch.9

Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court's
order in a decision dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution dated January 5, 1995.11

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that:

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE
COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE
ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN
PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS
BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12

The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before
payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds
of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain
heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased
person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.

Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He
contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they are not
incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the
provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which excludes the latter's grandchildren.

It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or
incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive
law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the
fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority.15

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the

deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.

Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties
to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order
releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is
allowed only under the following conditions:

Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or

appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such
terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the
controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set
forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.17

And Rule 90 provides that:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses
of administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and
such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.18

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after
all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in
a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.19

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the
Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of
debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid
before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make
such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the

inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.

It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after
admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity21 and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.23

The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate court
in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration
of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the
devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and allegedly
impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as
to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court
shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.26

Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take
possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to
the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and
can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:

Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not
willed. An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real
as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses for administration.28

When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been
previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the
properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the
release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to
require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any
further money in his favor.

It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the
one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after
renewal of the lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.

Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere
trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the
duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and
possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal

of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the
expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a
determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.32

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming
the order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are
affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order granting an allowance to the testator's
grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors are
annulled and set aside.

Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Predeceased by his wife who died on August 4, 1986.

2 Annex "D" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 46-60.

3 SP Proc. No. 10259.

4 Holographic Will, p. 10; Rollo, p. 55.

5 Comment to the Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 97-98.

6 Reply to Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 114.

7 Comment, Annex "1;" Rollo, p. 110.

8 Petition, Annex "C;" Rollo, p. 45.

9 Id.; Emphasis as copied.

10 CA-G. R. SP No. 33045, Annex "A" to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 36-42.

11 Id., Annex "B" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 44.

12 Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p. 17.

13 "Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to
the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered;
but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds fruits or rents pertaining
to them"

Article 188 is now Article 133 of the Family Code.

14 Santero v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 153 SCRA 728 [1987].

15 Id., pp. 733-734; Article 290, Civil Code of the Philippines.

16 Babao v. Villavicencio, 44 Phil. 921 [1922].

17 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 109, Section 2.

18 Emphasis supplied.

19 Castillo v. Castillo, 124 Phil. 485 [1966]; Edmands v. Philippine Trust Co., 87 Phil. 405 [1952].

20 Prieto v. Valdez, 95 Phil. 46 [1954].

21 Rule 75, Section 1.

22 Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Pastor v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA
885 [1983]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982].

23 Maninang v. Court of Appeals supra.; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369 [1967]; Cacho v. Udan,
13 SCRA 693 [1965]; Montanano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680 [1909].

24 Reply to Opposition of Funds and Opposition to Omnibus Motion, pp. 1-3,; Rollo, pp. 69-71.

25 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 14; Rollo, p. 66.

26 Rule 90, Section 1, paragraph 1; Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436 [1905]; II Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 88 [1989].

27 Mananquil v. Villegas, 189 SCRA 335 [1990].

28 Emphasis supplied.

29 Comment to the Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 98.

30 Salvador v. Sta. Maria, 20 SCRA 603 [1967].

31 Noel v. Court Of Appeals, 240 SCRA 78, 89 [1995]; 3 Martin, Rules of Court of the Philippines 545-546
[1986] citing 21 Am. Jur. 370-371.

32 Rule 81, Section 1; Rule 85, Sections 1 to 9.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29276 May 18, 1978

Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de Guzman. VICTORINO G. DE GUZMAN, administrator-appellee,

vs.
CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN and HONORATA DE GUZMAN-MENDIOLA,
oppositors-appellants.

Emiliano Samson & R. Balderama-Samson for appellants.

Cezar Paralejo for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the propriety of allowing as administration expenses certain disbursements made by
the administrator of the testate estate of the late Felix J. de Guzman of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

The deceased testator was survived by eight children named Victorino, Librada, Severino, Margarita,
Josefina, Honorata, Arsenio and Crispina. His will was duly probated. Letters of administration were issued
to his son, Doctor Victorino G. de Guzman, pursuant to the order dated September 17, 1964 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Special Proceeding No. 1431.

One of the properties left by the dent was a residential house located in the poblacion. In conformity
with his last will, that house and the lot on which it stands were adjudicated to his eight children, each
being given a one-eighth proindiviso share in the project of partition dated March 19, 1966, which was
signed by the eight heirs and which was approved in the lower court's order of April 14, 1967 but without
prejudice to the final outcome of the accounting.

The administrator submitted four accounting reports for the period from June 16, 1964 to September,
1967. Three heirs Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola and Arsenio de Guzman
interposed objections to the administrator's disbursements in the total sum of P13,610.48, broken down as
follows:

I. Expense for the improvement and renovation of the decedent's residential house.

1. Construction of fence P3,082.07

2. Renovation of bathroom P1,389.52

3. Repair of terrace and

interior of house P5,928.00 P10,399.59

II. Living expenses of Librada de Guzman while occupying the family home without paying rent:

1. For house helper P1,170.00

2. Light bills 227.41

3. Water bills 150.80

4. Gas oil, floor wax

and switch nail 54.90 P 1,603.11

III. Other expenses:

1. Lawyer's subsistence P 19.30

2. Gratuity pay in lieu

of medical fee 144.00

3. For stenographic notes 100.00

4. For food served on

decedent's first

death anniversary 166.65

5. Cost of publication of

death anniversary

of decedent 102.00

6. Representation

expenses 26.25 P558.20

IV. Irrigation fee P1.049.58

TOTAL P13,610.48

It should be noted that the probate court in its order of August 29, 1966 directed the administrator "to
refrain from spending the assets of the estate for reconstructing and remodeling the house of the
deceased and to stop spending (sic) any asset of the estate without first during authority of the court to do
so" (pp. 26-27, Record on Appeal).

The lower court in its order of April 29, 1968 allowed the d items as legitimate expenses of
administration. From that order, the three oppositors appealed to this Court. Their contention is that the
probate court erred in approving the utilization of the income of the estate (from rice harvests) to defray
those expenditures which allegedly are not allowable under the Rules of Court.

An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and
settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent's real and personal estate as
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He is accountable
for the whole decedent's estate which has come into his possession, with all the interest, profit, and
income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it
was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).

One of the Conditions of the administrator's bond is that he should render a true and just account of his
administration to the court. The court may examine him upon oath With respect to every matter relating to
his accounting 't and shall so examine him as to the correctness of his account before the same is allowed,
except when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily
established by competent proof. The heirs, legatees, distributes, and creditors of the estate shall have the
same privilege as the executor or administrator of being examined on oath on any matter relating to an
administration account." (Sec. 1[c] Rule 81 and secs. 8 and 9, Rule 85, Rules of Court).

A hearing is usually held before an administrator's account is approved, especially if an interested Party
raises objections to certain items in the accounting report (Sec. 10, Rule 85).

At that hearing, the practice is for the administrator to take the witness stand, testify under oath on his
accounts and Identify the receipts, vouchers and documents evidencing his disbursements which are

offered as exhibits. He may be interrogated by the court and crossed by the oppositors's counsel. The
oppositors may present proofs to rebut the ad. administrator's evidence in support of his accounts.

I. Expenses for the renovation and improvement of the family residence P10,399.59. As already
shown above, these expenses consisted of disbursements for the repair of the terrace and interior of the
family home, the renovation of the bathroom, and the construction of a fence. The probate court allowed
those expenses because an administrator has the duty to "maintain in tenantable repair the houses and
other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or
devises" when directed to do so by the court (Sec. 2, Rule 84, Rules of Court).

On the other hand, the oppositors-appellants contend that the trial court erred in allowing those
expenses because the same did not come within the category of necessary expenses of administration
which are understood to be the reasonable and necessary expenses of caring for the property and
managing it until the debts are paid and the estate is partitioned and distributed among the heirs
(Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil. 124).

As clarified in the Lizarraga case, administration expenses should be those which are necessary for the
management of the estate, for protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the
production of fruits. They are expenses entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and its
management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of the residue among the
persons entitled thereto.

It should be noted that the family residence was partitioned proindiviso among the decedent's eight
children. Each one of them was given a one-eighth share in conformity with the testator's will. Five of the
eight co-owners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for repair and improvement of the family
home. It is obvious that the expenses in question were incurred to preserve the family home and to
maintain the family's social standing in the community.

Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of an the co- owners. They were necessary for the
preservation and use of the family residence. As a result of those expenses, the co-owners, including the
three oppositors, would be able to use the family home in comfort, convenience and security.

We hold that the probate court did not err in approving the use of the income of the estate to defray
those ex

II. Expenses incurred by Librada de Guzman as occupant of the family residence without paying rent
P1 603.11 The probate court allowed the income of the estate to be used for those expenses on the
theory that the occupancy of the house by one heir did not deprive the other seven heirs from living in it.
Those expenses consist of the salaries of the house helper, light and water bills, and the cost of gas, oil
floor wax and switch nail

We are of the opinion that those expenses were personal expenses of Librada de Guzman, inuring y to
her benefit. Those expenses, not being reasonable administration expenses incurred by the administrator,
should not be charged against the income of the estate.

Librada de Guzman, as an heir, is entitled to share in the net income of the estate. She occupied the
house without paying rent. She should use her income for her living expenses while occupying the family
residence.

The trial court erred in approving those expenses in the administrator's accounts. They should be, as
they are hereby, disallowed (See 33 C.J.S 1239-40).

III. Other expenses P558.20. Among these expenses is the sum of P100 for stenographic notes
which, as admitted by the administrator on page 24 of his brief, should be disallowed. Another item,
"representation expenses" in the sum of P26.25 (2nd accounting), was not explained. it should likewise be
disallowed.

The probate court erred in allowing as expenses of ad. administration the sum of P268.65 which was
incurred during the celebration of the first death anniversary of the deceased. Those expenses are
disallowed because they have no connection with the care, management and settlement of the decedent's
estate (Nicolas vs. Nicolas 63 Phil 332).

The other expenses, namely, P19.30 for the lawyer's subsistence and P144 as the cost of the gift to the
physician who attended to the testator during his last s are allowable expenses.

IV. Irrigation fee P1,049.58. The appellants question the deductibility of that expense on the ground
that it seems to be a duplication of the item of P1,320 as irrigation fee for the same 1966-67 crop-year.

The administrator in his comment filed on February 28, 1978 explained that the item of P1,320
represented the "allotments" for irrigation fees to eight tenants who cultivated the Intan crop, which
allotments were treated as "assumed expenses" deducted as farming expenses from the value of the net
harvests.

The explanation is not quite clear but it was not disputed by the appellants. The fact is that the said sum
of P1,049.58 was paid by the administrator to the Penaranda Irrigation System as shown in Official Receipt
No. 3596378 dated April 28, 1967. It was included in his accounting as part of the farming expenses. The
amount was properly allowed as a legitimate expense of administration.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of April 29, 1968 is affirmed with the modifications that the sum of
(a) P1,603.11 as the living expenses of Librada de Guzman. (b) P100 for stenographic notes, (c) P26.25 as

representation expenses, and (d) P268.65 as expenses for the celebration of the first anniversary of the
decedent's death are disallowed in the administrator's accounts. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990

BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro Manila and TERESA F.
OLBES, respondents.

Andres V. Maglipon for petitioner.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the
Order of the respondent Judge, dated 15 January 1985, cancelling the appointment of the petitioner Beatriz
F. Gonzales as a co-administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis," Branch 143, RTC, Makati, Metro Manila; and the Order of 15
May 1985 denying reconsideration of the same.

The facts are:

Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the court a quo, is an intestate proceeding involving the
estate of the deceased Doa Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis. Doa Ramona is survived by her four (4)
children who are her only heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia
Favis-Gomez.

On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and private respondent
Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.

On 11 November 1984, while petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States accompanying her
ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that country, private respondent Teresa Olbes filed
a motion, dated 26 November 1984, to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, on the ground that
she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to
the interest of the estate and the heirs. Copy of said motion was served upon petitioner's then counsel of
record, Atty. Manuel Castro who, since 2 June 1984, had been suspended by the Supreme Court from the
practice of law throughout the Philippines. 1

After the filing of private respondent's aforesaid motion, respondent Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo issued an
Order dated 4 December 1984 which required Beatriz F. Gonzales and the other parties to file their
opposition, if any, thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of Beatriz F. Gonzales as coadministratrix, as the latter was still in the United States attending to her ailing husband.

In an Order dated 15 January 1985, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to
Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona
Gonzales. The Court, in explaining its action, stated:

. . . In appointing them, the court was of the opinion that it would be to the best interest of the estate if
two administrators who are the children of the deceased would jointly administer the same. Unfortunately,
as events have shown, the two administrators have not seen eye to eye with each other and most of the
time they have been at loggerheads with each other to the prejudice of the estate. Beatriz F. Gonzales has
been absent from the country since October, 1984 as she is in the United States as stated in the motion
and opposition of Asterio Favis dated December 11, 1984, and she has not returned even up to this date so
that Teresa F. Olbes has been left alone to administer the estate. Under these circumstances, and in order
that the estate will be administered in an orderly and efficient manner, the court believes that there should
be now only one administrator of the estate. 2

Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of 15 January 1985. Her motion was opposed separately by
private respondent Teresa Olbes and another co-heir Cecilia Gomez. In her manifestation and opposition to
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, Cecilia Gomez stated that it would be pointless to re-appoint
Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of Teresa Olbes, as the former would be leaving soon for the United
States to attend to unfinished business. Moreover, she expressed satisfaction with the manner respondent
Teresa Olbes had been managing and administering the estate.

In his Order dated 7 May 1986, a part of which is hereunder quoted, respondent Judge denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. He said:

xxx xxx xxx

After a consideration of the motion for reconsideration and the oppositions thereto, the court believes
and so holds that it should be denied. The court in its discretion has issued its order dated January 15,
1985 cancelling the appointment and the letters of administration issued to Beatriz F. Gonzales and it
reiterates the same for the best interest of the estate of the deceased. It is noteworthy that of the four
heirs of the deceased, one of them being the movant Beatriz F. Gonzales, two of them, namely, Cecilia F.
Gomez and Teresa F. Olbes, opposed the motion. The other heir Asterio Favis, did not file or make any
comment to the motion. As can be gathered from the oppositions of Cecilia F. Gomez and Teresa F. Olbes,
the reappointment of Beatriz F. Gonzales as a co-administratrix would not be conducive to the efficient and
orderly administration of the estate of the deceased Ramona Gonzales vda. de Favis. 3

Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge's Order dated 15 January 1985 should be
nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown by respondents to be
anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death,
resignation or removal If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by
these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust,
the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. . . .

While appellate courts are generally disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the probate court in
the matter of removal of an administrator, 4 we find, in the case at bar, sufficient cause to reverse the
order of the probate court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate.

The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of
the estate of the deceased 5 who shall act as representative not only of the court appointing him but also
of the heirs and the creditors of the estate. 6 In the exercise of its discretion, the probate court may
appoint one, two or more co-administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented. 7

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration
reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 8 This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 9

Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to protection from
removal without just cause. 10 Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the legal and
specific causes authorizing the court to remove an administrator. 11

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator,
it however must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of
an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the
orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In
making such a determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.

In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix on
any of the causes specified in respondent's motion for relief of the petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor
determine the validity of the charges brought against petitioner by respondent Olbes. The court based the
removal of the petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and
misunderstandings have existed between petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes which allegedly have
prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that petitioner had been absent from the country since
October 1984, and up to 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned order.

Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with harmonious
relations between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without
misconduct, one's removal is not favored. 12 Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally, and, perhaps
inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved
by the co-administrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the estate and its
heirs.

We, like petitioner, find of material importance the fact that the court a quo failed to find hard facts
showing that the conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrices were unjustly caused by
petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the
management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing
that her continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.
Petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales is as interested as respondent Olbes and the other heirs in that the
properties of the estate be duly administered and conserved for the benefit of the heirs; and there is as yet
no ground to believe that she has prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate to warrant the probate court
into removing petitioner as co-administratrix.

Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the estate also on the
ground that she had been absent from the country since October 1984 and had not returned as of 15
January 1985, the date of the questioned order, leaving respondent Olbes alone to administer the estate.

In her motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January 1985, petitioner explained to the court a
quo that her absence from the country was due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband
to the United States for medical treatment. 13 It appears too that petitioner's absence from the country
was known to respondent Olbes, and that the latter and petitioner Gonzales had continually maintained
correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the estate during the petitioner's
absence from the country. 14 As a matter of fact, petitioner, while in the United States, sent respondent
Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank of the Philippines dated 14 November 1984, and duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect
the interests accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the payment
of accounts necessary for the operation of the administration. 15

The above facts, we note, show that petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the
estate nor had she been remiss in the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the
state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's Will, a
temporary residence outside of the state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family,
is not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.

. . . It seems quite clear that a temporary absence from the state on account of ill health, or on account
of business or for purposes of travel or pleasure, would not necessarily establish the fact that an executor
"has removed" from the estate, within the intent of the statute. The learned surrogate was evidently
satisfied that the sojourn of these executors in New Jersey was nothing more than a departure from the
state for the benefit of relatives, not designed to constitute a permanent change of abode, and
contemplating a return to New York as soon as the purpose of their absence should be accomplished. In
this view, I am inclined to think that he was right in refusing to hold that he was constrained to revoke the
letters by the provisions of the Code to which I have referred. I therefore advise an affirmance of the order.
16

Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other three (3) heirs of
the estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have opposed the retention or reappointment of petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the removal of an
administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate,
nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration. In re William's
Adm'r., the court held:

A county court having appointed a stranger administrator as expressly authorized by Ky. St. 3897, after
the relatives of decedent had lost their right of precedence, could not remove the appointee merely
because of the request of relatives and the belief upon the part of the court that the best interest of
deceased would be thereby subserved, since the administrator had such an interest as entitled him to
protection from removal without cause. 17

As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her removal
was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her. Stated differently, petitioner
Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her removal was therefore improper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo dated 15 January 1985 removing
petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021, entitled "In the Matter of
the Intestate Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis" and the Order of the same Court dated 15 May
1985 denying reconsideration of said Order, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered
reinstated as co-administratrix of said estate.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 159.

2 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

3 Ibid., p. 13.

4 Borromeo v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-6363, September 15, 1955, 97 Phil. 549.

5 Sec. 6, Rule 78, Rules of Court which states:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.

6 San Diego v. Nobre, G.R. No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165; Chua Tan v. Del Rosario, 57 Phil.
411.

7 In re Drews Estate, 236 N.W. 701, 702.

8 Nicolasa de Guzman v. Angela Limcolioc, 67 Phil. 404.

9 Cooper v. Cooper, 88 NE 341, 342.

10 Rieke's Adm'r v. Rieke, 208 SW 764, citing Dunlap v. Kennedy, 10 Bush 539, Ex-parte Williams'
Adm'r., 158 Ky. 61, 164 SW 307, and Davis' Adm'r v. Ruth Davis, 162 Ky. 318, 17 SW 665.

11 Section 2, Supra.

12 Bronson v. Bronson, 48 How Pr. (NY) 482; Oliver V. Frisbie, 3 Denn Surr. (NY) 22; Fairbairn v. Fisher, 57
N. C., cited in Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. 5, p. 89.

13 Rollo, pp. 148, 150.

14 Ibid., pp. 151-153.

15 Ibid., p. 154.

16 In re Mc Knight's Will, 80 New York Supplement 251.

17 In re Williams' Adm'r., 164 SW 307.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983

ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, as represented by JOSE S. MATUTE, Judicial Co-Administrator in Sp.
Proc. No. 25876, Court of First Instance of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Davao, Davao
City; SOUTHWEST AGRICULTURAL MARKETING CORPORATION also known as (SAMCO); CARLOS V. MATUTE,
as another Administrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876 CFI, Manila; and
MATIAS S. MATUTE, as former Co-Administrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876,
CFI, Manila, respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.

Wingerfortis F. Escudero for respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, represented by Jose S. Matute, Judicial
Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, assails the Order, dated
November 10, 1967, of the respondent judge, approving the "Amicable Settlement" submitted by the
parties in Civil Case No. 4623 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, Branch III,
and prays that the said Order be set aside.

The petition alleged that the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of
land containing an area of 293,578 square meters, situated in sitio Tibambam, barrio Tibambam,
municipality of Sigaboy (now Governor Generoso), province of Davao, and covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-27 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao Province; that in April 1965 herein private respondent
Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO), as plaintiff, filed Civil Case No. 4623 with the
respondent Court of First Instance of Davao against respondents, Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute, as
defendants, in their capacities as co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the
collection of an alleged indebtedness of P19,952.11 and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02; that on May 8,
1965, defendants Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute in said Civil Case No. 4623, filed an answer
denying their lack of knowledge and questioning the legality of the claim of SAMCO; that on October 25,
1966 in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, issued an order directing
the administrators to secure the probate court's approval before entering into any transaction involving the
seventeen (17) titles of the estate, of which the property described in OCT No. 0-27 is one of them; that on
October 20, 1967, the parties (plaintiff and defendants) in Civil Case No. 4623 of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, submitted to the respondent court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate
covered by OCT No. 0-27 of Davao was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim; that the
said Amicable Settlement signed by the herein respondents was not submitted to and approved by the
then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, nor notice thereof made to the
beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings; that on November 10, 1967, respondent court, despite
the opposition of the other parties who sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 4623 and despite the utter
lack of approval of the probate court in Manila, approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same
the enforceability of a court decision which, in effect, ceded the property covered by OCT No. 0-27,

containing an area of 293,578 square meters and with an assessed value of P31,700.00 to SAMCO in
payment of its claim for only P19,952.11; and, that if the said Order of respondent dated November 10,
1967 is not set aside, the same will operate as a judgment that "conveys illegally and unfairly, the
property of petitioner-estate without the requisite approval of the probate court of Manila, which has the
sole jurisdiction to convey this property in custodia legis of the estate. (par. 16, Petition).

Made to answer, herein respondent SAMCO and respondent judge, among others, contend that the
Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court, "the same having been entered into in
another independent action and in another court of co-equal rank. Article 2032 of the Civil Code applies
only to extrajudicial compromise entered into by the administrators of the estate. In the alternative, lack of
approval of the probate court of the Amicable Settlement does not render it null and void, but at most
voidable, which must be the subject matter of a direct proceeding in the proper Court of First Instance." (p.
60, Rollo)

In said Civil Case No. 4623 for sum of money, plaintiff SAMCO and defendants Carlos V. Matute and
Matias S. Matute, in their capacities as judicial administrators of the estate of Amado Matute Olave in
Special Proceeding No. 25876, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, submitted the following
Amicable Settlement:

1. That defendants in their capacity as judicial administrators of the Estate of Amadeo Matute, hereby
submit and acknowledge that the said Estate of Amadeo Matute is justly indebted to plaintiff in the total
sum of P28,403.02 representing the principal account of P19,952.11 and in the sum of P8,450.91 as
attorney's fees, damages, interest and costs;

2. That at present the defendant estate is devoid of or does not have any funds with which to pay or
settle the aforestated obligation in favor of the plaintiff, and that being so, the defendant estate through
the undersigned administrators, decides to pay the plaintiff by way of conveying and ceding unto the
plaintiff the ownership of a certain real property owned by the defendant estate now under the
administration of the said undersigned administrators;

3. That plaintiff hereby accepts the offer of defendants of conveying, transferring and ceding the
ownership of the above described property as full and complete payment and satisfaction of the total
obligation of P28,403.02;

4. That the defendant estate, through the undersigned administrators hereby agree and bind the
defendant estate to pay their counsel Atty. Dominador Zuho, of the Zufio Law Offices the sum of Eight
Thousand (P8,000.00) Pesos by way of Attorney's Fee;

5. That the parties herein waive an other claims which they might have against one another.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court approves the
foregoing settlement and that judgment be rendered transferring the said real property covered by

Original Certificate of Title No. 0-27 to plaintiff Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation and that a
new transfer certificate of title be issued to said plaintiff. (pp. 25-26, Rollo)

Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money
or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; ..." The claim of
private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the
administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Sp. Proc. No. 25876) for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period
prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).

The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect
the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each
claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the
provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of
the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata
portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate
is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of
them shag share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased.

It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil Case No. 4623 in the then
Court of First Instance of Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which eventually
ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate
of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave in payment of its claim, without prior authority of the probate court
of Manila, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute
Olave. It was a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623,
much less issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
(Emphasis supplied). The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject
of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it
without prior approval of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the Order, dated November 10, 1967, of the
respondent court approving the Amicable Settlement of the parties in Civil Case No. 4623 of the then Court
of First Instance of Davao, is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Vasquez, J., is on leave.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18936

May 23, 1967

INTESTATE ESTATE OF ENCARNACION ELCHICO Vda. de FERNANDO, deceased.

NATIVIDAD E. IGNACIO and LEONOR E. ALMAZAN, administratrices-appellants,
vs.
PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC., claimant appellee.

Paterno R Canlas for administratrices-appellants.

Manuel O. Chan and A G. Martinez for claimant-appellee.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The present case has its roots in the proceedings hereinafter to be recited:

August 29, 1951. Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (referred to herein as Pambusco) lodged its complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against two (2) defendants Valentin Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico
Vda. de Fernando. The suit was to collect P105,000.00 upon a contractual obligation.1

January 23, 1955. Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando died. By this time, Pambusco in the foregoing
civil case had already presented its evidence and submitted its case.

March 23, 1955. Intestate proceedings were filed.2 Notice to the estate's creditors was given for them to
file their claims within six (6) months from this date, the first publication of the notice.

April 16, 1955. On Pambusco's motion, the court in the civil case ordered Jose Nicolas, then
administrator, to substitute for the deceased Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando as one of the
defendants. No objection to this order was registered.

July 15, 1955. Pambusco amended its complaint in the civil case naming therein administrator Jose
Nicolas and original defendant Valentin Fernando, as defendants. The court, without objection, admitted
this amended complaint on August 27, 1955.

Jose Nicolas, as such administrator, filed an amended answer with counterclaim against Pambusco. The
date of filing said answer is not of record. In due course, Nicolas presented his evidence.

December 11, 1958. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in
the civil case (Civil Case 14578), as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering
the latter to pay the former the sum of NINETY-THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P93,000.00) together with the
costs of these proceedings. Defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed.

The two defendants appealed.

May 28, 1960. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, thus

As plaintiff's complaint is well founded and meritorious and the evidence of record justify the award of
P93,000.00 in its favor, it stands to reason that defendants' counterclaims were correctly dismissed.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed without pronouncement as to costs.3

Both defendants appealed by certiorari to this Court. Valentin Fernando's appeal4 was dismissed for
having been filed out of time. The appeal of the estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando,5 raising
issues of fact, likewise dismissed.

February 25, 1959. We go back to Special Proceeding 25256, Intestate Estate of Encarnacion Elchico
Vda. Fernando. On this day, while defendants in Civil Case 14576 were perfecting their appeal from the
judgment the Court of First Instance, Pambusco registered its contingent claim in these special
proceedings for whatever money judgment may be rendered in his favor in the civil suit.

January 25, 1961. The judgment in the civil case having reached finality, Pambusco moved in the
intestate proceedings that the heirs and/or the present joint administratrices, Natividad E. Ignacio and
Leonor E. Almazan, be ordered to pay P46,500.00, the share of the deceased in the judgment debt.

The administratrices opposed. Ground: Pambusco's claim is time-barred.

March 13, 1961. Resolving Pambusco's motion, the probate court (in Sp. Proc. 25256) issued an order,
the dispositive part of which is as follows:

Wherefore, the Court hereby allows said amount of P46,500.00 to be paid by the heirs and/or the joint
administratrices; but no payment thereof shall be made until after the administratrices shall have informed
the Court in writing as to the existence of other unsettled money claims against the estate and of the
sufficiency of the assets available for payment of all the debts.

In harmony with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders said administratrices to inform the Court, within
ten (10) days from the notice of this order, of the other unsettled money together with the amount of each,
and of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the assets available for payment of all the debts.

By order of May 24, 1961, the probate court denied the motion to reconsider the foregoing order.

The administratrices came to this Court on appeal.

Given the facts just recited, was Pambusco's claim properly admitted by the probate court?

It will be remembered that at the time Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando died, the civil case against
her and the other defendant Valentin Fernando had not yet been decided by the Court of First Instance of
Manila. That case, however, was prosecuted with the assent of the administrator of her estate to final
conclusion.

1. This situation brings to the fore a consideration of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,6 which
reads:

SEC. 21. Where claim does not survive. When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.

The Philosophy behind the rule which provides for the dismissal of the civil case is that, upon the death
of defendant, all money claims should be filed in the testate or interstate proceedings "to avoid useless
duplicity of procedure."7 Obviously, the legal precept just quoted is procedural in nature. It outlines the
method by which an action for recovery of money, debt or interest may continue, upon the terms therein
prescribed. Whether the original suit for the recovery of money as here proceeds to its conclusion, or
is dismissed and the claim covered thereby filed with the probate court, one thing is certain: no substantial
rights of the parties are prejudiced.

But is there justification for the civil case to go on in spite of the death of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de
Fernando "before final judgment in the Court of First Instance?"

2. At the time of the death of defendant Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco had
already closed its evidence and submitted its case. Her administrator substituted. By this substitution, the
estate had notice of the claim. The estate was thus represented. The administrator did not complain of the
substitution. At no time did the estate of the deceased impugn the authority of the regular courts to
determine the civil case. Much less did it seek abatement of the civil suit. On the contrary, its
administrator took active steps to protect the interests of the estate. He joined issue with plaintiff. He filed
an amended answer. He counterclaimed. He went to trial. Defeated in the Court of First Instance, he
appealed to the Court of Appeals. He even elevated that civil case to this Court. Now that the judgment
has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said judgment reached after a full dress trial
on the merits will now go for naught. The estate has thus waived its right to have Pambusco's claim relitigated in the estate proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is generally
understood that it may be waived by the estate's representative.8 And, waiver is to be determined from
the administrator's "acts and conduct."9 Certainly, the administrator's failure to plead the statute of
nonclaims, his active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to such
waiver. 10

3. Courts are loathe to overturn a final judgment. Judicial proceedings are entitled to respect. Non quieta
movere. 11 Plaintiff's claim has passed the test in three courts of justice: the Court of First Instance, the
Court of Appeals and this Court. The judgment in plaintiff's favor should be enforced. Appellants' technical
objection after judgment had become final in the civil case that plaintiff's claim should have been
litigated in the probate court does not impair the validity of said judgment. For, such objection does not go
into the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter.

In Laserna vs. Altavas, 68 Phil. 703, suit was started by Jose Altavas against Jose Laserna Paro to recover
P4,500.00 as attorney's fees. The Court of First Instance decided in plaintiff's favor. During the pendency of
Laserna's appeal in this Court, he died. Aristona Laserna, the administratrix of Laserna's estate,
substituted. This Court affirmed the judgment. Altavas subsequently filed in the estate proceedings a
motion to direct the administratrix to pay the judgment for P4,500.00 in his favor. The court granted this
motion. On appeal, the administratrix urged that Altavas' claim "was definitely barred by the statute of
nonclaim," because of his failure "to present it before the committee on claims and appraisal."12 This
Court there stated.13

x x x we are of the opinion and so hold that, upon the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
claim of Jose Altavas, although it did not survive the deceased, need not have to be presented before the
committee on claims and appraisal principally because that claim is already an adjudicated claim by final
pronouncement by this Court in G.R. No. 40038. To countenance appellant's theory would be to convert a
claim duly passed upon, and determined not only by the Court of First Instance but by this Court into a
contested claim, once again, . . . and "obliging a creditor whose claim had already been passed upon by
the Court to submit himself to the committee on claims and to pass over again through the endless
process of presenting his evidence which he had already done." ... It also appears that the substitution of
the defendant in civil case No. 2961, for the recovery of attorney's fees, was effected at the instance of the
defendant and appellant therein, Aristona Laserna. She had an opportunity to contest that claim, and when
her contention was overruled she did not impugn the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Neither does it
appear that during the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court she moved for the abatement or
suspension of the proceedings because of the provisions of sections 119, 700 and 703 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Under the circumstances it is unjust to defeat the claim of the appellee and to hold that it had
been barred by the statute of nonclaim.14

4. Of course, it is correct to say that upon the demise a defendant in a civil action planted on a claim
which does not survive, such claim should be presented to the probate court for allowance, if death occurs
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance. But, procedural niceties aside, the revival of the civil
action against the administrator, the decedent's representative, "is generally considered equivalent to
presentation" of such claim in probate court, 15 "dispenses with the actual presentation of the claim." 16
The soundness of this proposition commands assent. Because, the administrator represent the deceased's
estate itself, is an alter ego of the heirs. More than this, he is an officer of the probate court.17 In the
circumstances, presentment of Pambusco's 1950 claim ad abundantiorem cautelam was at best reduced to
a mere formality.

5. It matters not that Pambusco's said claim was filed with the probate court without the six-month
period from March 25, 1955, set forth in the notice to creditors. For, Section 2, Rule 86, permits acceptance
of such belated claims. Says Section 2: 18

SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in the preceding section, the
court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve
(12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time
before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within
the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such
claim to be filed within a tune not exceeding one (1) month.

Here, the claim was filed in the probate court on February 25, 1959, while the defendants in the civil
case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show that the administrator objected
thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case, we are persuaded to say,

is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim. 19 And, the order of final distribution is still to be
given.

Besides, the order of the lower court of March 18, 1961 allowing payment of appellee's claim "impliedly
granted said appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim." 20 The probate court's
discretion has not been abused. It should not be disturbed. 21

For the reasons given, we vote to affirm the order of the lower court of March 13, 1961 and May 24,
1961, under review. Costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Civil Case No. 14576, Court of First Instance of Manila.

2Special Proceedings 25256, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Intestate Estate of Encarnacion
Elchico Vda. de Fernando, deceased," the present case.

3CA-G.R. No. 24458-R.

4G. R. No. L-17184.

5G. R. No. L-17100.

6A reproduction of Section 21, Rule 3 of the 1940 Rules of Court.

7Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1963 ed. pp. 180-181.

821 Am. Jur., p. 578; 34 C.J.S., pp. 679-680; 34 A.L.R., pp. 393-395.

921 Am. Jur., p. 618.

1034 C.J.S., p. 680.

11Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 942.

12The committee on claims and appraisal has been abolished. Money claims are now presented directly
to the court.

13At Pp. 706-707, emphasis supplied.

14The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) provides:

"SEC. 119. Death of party. In case a party to an action dies while the action is pending, the action
shall not abate reason thereof, but the court on motion may allow the action proceeding to be continued
by or against his executor, administrator, or other legal representative, and the judgment, if it for the
payment of costs and against the executor, administrator, or other legal representative, shall be that he
pay in due course of administration: Provided, nevertheless, That if the action for the recovery of money,
debt, or damages against the deceased, it shall be discontinued, and the claim thereafter be prosecuted as
provided in section six hundred and eighty-six.

"SEC. 686. Committee to be sworn and may administer oaths. The committee appointed to appraise
the estate and, allow claims as hereinbefore provided, shall act under oath, and may administer oaths to
parties and witnesses upon the trial questions before them. They may try and decide upon claims which by
law survive against executors or administrators, except claims for the possession of or title to real estate;
and examine and allow claims at their present value, which are payable at a future day, although such
claims are payable in specific articles and they may set off demands in favor of the estate against
demands against the estate, and determine the balance due either way."

"SEC. 700. Suits pending against the estate to be discontinued. All actions commenced against the
deceased persons, the recovery of money, debt, or damages, and pending at time the committee are
appointed, shall be discontinued, and the property, if any therein attached, shall be discharged from
attachment, and the claim embraced in such action may be presented to the committee, who shall allow
the party prevail the costs of such action to the time of its discontinuance."

"SEC. 703. Certain actions survive. Actions to recover the title or possession of real estate, buildings,
or any interest therein, action to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal and
actions to recover the possession of specific articles of personal property, shall survive, and may be
commenced and prosecuted by or against the executor on administrator; but all other actions commenced

against the deceased before his death shall be discontinued, and the claims therein involved presented
before the committee as herein provided."

1521 Am. Jur 578; emphasis supplied.

1634 C.J.S., p. 160; emphasis supplied.

17Lat vs. Court of Appeals, L-17591, May 30, 1962.

18Which was formerly Section 2 of Rule 87.

19In pari materia: De Rama vs. Palileo, L-18935, February 26, 1965.

20Quisumbing vs. Guison, 76 Phil. 730, 1733.

21Id., at p. 735, citing In re Estate of Tiangco, 39 Phil. 967, 968.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8235

March 19, 1914

ISIDRO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LEANDRA MANARANG, administratrix, defendant-appellee.

W. A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.

Ramon Salinas for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal property
which, by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of
this will reads as follows:

I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be
religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.

Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due
on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates are
not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly
appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate as might be presented. This committee
submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14, 1908, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented
a petition to the court asking that the committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims
against the estate which were recognized in the will of testator. This petition was denied by the court, and
on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the present proceedings against the administratrix of the
estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court below, and now
appeals to this court.

In his first assignment of error, the appellant takes exception to the action of the court in denying his
petition asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claim. In support of this alleged error
counsel say that it does not appear in the committee's report that the publications required by section 687
of the Code of Civil Procedure had been duly made. With reference to this point the record affirmatively
shows that the committee did make the publications required by law. It is further alleged that at the time
the appellant presented his petition the court had not approved the report of the committee. If this were

necessary we might say that, although the record does not contain a formal approval of the committee's
report, such approval must undoubtedly have been made, as will appear from an inspection of the various
orders of the court approving the annual accounts of the administratrix, in which claims allowed against
the estate by the committee were written off in accordance with its report. This is shown very clearly from
the court's order of August 1, 1912, in which the account of the administratrix was approved after reducing
final payments of some of the claims against the estate to agree with the amounts allowed by the
committee. It is further alleged that at the time this petition was presented the administration proceedings
had not been terminated. This is correct.

In his petition of July 14, 1909, asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claims, plaintiff
states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it was
unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and
directed that they should be paid. The inference is that had plaintiff's claims not been mentioned in the will
he would have presented to the committee as a matter of course; that plaintiff was held to believe by this
express mention of his claims in the will that it would be unnecessary to present them to the committee;
and that he did not become aware of the necessity of presenting them to the committee until after the
committee had made its final report.

Under these facts and circumstances, did the court err in refusing to reconvene the committee for the
purpose of considering plaintiff's claim? The first step towards the solution of this question is to determine
whether plaintiff's claims were such as a committee appointed to hear claims against an estate is, by law,
authorized to pass upon. Unless it was such a claim plaintiff's argument has no foundation. Section 686
empowers the committee to try and decide claims which survive against the executors and administrators,
even though they be demandable at a future day "except claims for the possession of or title to real
estate." Section 700 provides that all actions commenced against the deceased person for the recovery of
money, debt, or damages, pending at the time the committee is appointed, shall be discontinued, and the
claims embraced within such actions presented to the committee. Section 703 provides that actions to
recover title or possession of real property, actions to recover damages for injury to person or property,
real and personal, and actions to recover the possession of specified articles of personal property, shall
survive, and may be commenced and prosecuted against the executor or administrator; "but all other
actions commenced against the deceased before his death shall be discontinued and the claims therein
involved presented before the committee as herein provided." Section 708 provides that a claim secured
by a mortgage or other collateral security may be abandoned and the claim prosecuted before the
committee, or the mortgage may be foreclosed or the security be relied upon, and in the event of a
deficiency judgment, the creditor may, after the sale of mortgage or upon the insufficiency of the security,
prove such deficiency before the committee on claims. There are also certain provisions in section 746 et
seq., with reference to the presentation of contingent claims to the committee after the expiration of the
time allowed for the presentation of claims not contingent. Do plaintiff's claims fall within any of these
sections? They are described in the will as debts. There is nothing in the will to indicate that any or all of
them are contingent claims, claims for the possession of or title to real property, damages for injury to
person or property, real or personal, or for the possession of specified articles of personal property. Nor is it
asserted by the plaintiff that they do. The conclusion is that they were claims proper to be considered by
the committee.

This being true, the next point to determine is, when and under what circumstances may the committee
be recalled to consider belated claims? Section 689 provides:

That court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case require for the creditors to present
their claims the committee for examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more than twelve
months, or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be stated in the commission. The court may
extend the time as circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed eighteen months.

It cannot be questioned that thus section supersedes the ordinary limitation of actions provided for in
chapter 3 of the Code. It is strictly confined, in its application, to claims against the estate of deceased
persons, and has been almost universally adopted as part of the probate law of the United States. It is
commonly termed the statute of nonclaims, and its purpose is to settle the affairs of the estate with
dispatch, so that residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards
called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet
prescribed.

The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to insure the
speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate in
the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. (Estate of De Dios, 24 Phil. Rep., 573.)

Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation applying to such claims as
compared with the ordinary statute of limitations, the statute of nonclaims has not the finality of the
ordinary statute of limitations. It may be safely said that a saving provision, more or less liberal, is annexed
to the statute of nonclaims in every jurisdiction where is found. In this country its saving clause is found in
section 690, which reads as follows:

On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if made within six months after the time
previously limited, or, if a committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such application
is made before the final settlement of the estate, the court may, for cause shown, and on such terms as
are equitable, renew the commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month, for the committee
to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally notify the parties of the time and place of hearing,
and as soon as may be make the return of their doings to the court.

If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for reconvening it for further
consideration of claims which may not have been presented before its final report was submitted to the
court. But, as stated above, this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee did give the notice
required by law. Where the proper notice has been given the right to have the committee recalled for the
consideration of a belated claim appears to rest first upon the condition that it is presented within six
months after the time previously limited for the presentation of claims. In the present case the time
previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed the plaintiff until January 23, 1908, to
present his claims to the committee. An extension of this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of
the court. (Estate of De Dios, supra.) In other words, the court could extend this time and recall the
committee for a consideration of the plaintiff's claims against the estate of justice required it, at any time
within the six months after January 23, 1908, or until July 23, 1908. Plaintiff's petition was not presented
until July 14, 1909. The bar of the statute of nonclaims is an conclusive under these circumstances as the
bar of the ordinary statute of limitations would be. It is generally held that claims are not barred as to
property not included in the inventory. (Waughop vs. Bartlett, 165 III., 124; Estate of Reyes, 17 Phil. Rep.,
188.) So also, as indicated by this court in the case last cited, fraud would undoubtedly have the same
effect. These exceptions to the operation of the statute are, of course, founded upon the highest principles
of equity. But what is the plea of the plaintiff in this case? Simply this: That he was laboring under a
mistake of law a mistake which could easily have been corrected had he sought to inform himself; a lack
of information as to the law governing the allowance of claims against estate of the deceased persons
which, by proper diligence, could have been remedied in ample to present the claims to the committee.
Plaintiff finally discovered his mistake and now seeks to assert his right when they have been lost through
his own negligence. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. We conclude that the learned trial court made no
error in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's claims against the
estate.

In his second assignment of error the appellant insists that the court erred in dismissing his petition filed
on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the
amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him. We concede all that is implied in the maxim, dicat testor
et erit lex. But the law imposes certain restrictions upon the testator, not only as to the disposition of his
estate, but also as to the manner in which he may make such disposition. As stated in Rood on Wills, sec.
412: "Some general rules have been irrevocably established by the policy of the law, which cannot be
exceeded or transgressed by any intention of the testator, be it ever so clearly expressed."

It may be safely asserted that no respectable authority can be found which holds that the will of the
testator may override positive provisions of law and imperative requirements of public policy. (Page on
Wills, sec. 461.)

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law and good morals shall be considered as not
imposed, . . . (Art. 792, Civil Code.)

Conceding for the moment that it was the testator's desire in the present case that the debts listed by
him in his will should be paid without referring them to a committee appointed by the court, can such a
provision be enforced? May the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the settlement of
claims against an estate by a committee appointed by the court be superseded by the contents of a will?

It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure has
established a system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. Those are at least two
restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and which pro tanto
restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for all legal obligations incurred
by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of law. The
former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.) In case his estate is sufficient they must
be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they must be paid in the order named in section 735.
It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid would not
entitle it to preference over other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will requires the
administrator to pay it without reference to the committee, what assurance is there, in the case of an
insolvent estate, that it will not take precedence over preferred debts?

If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not applicable. It
is not barred until from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, establishing questions upon actions. Under such circumstances, when then the legal portion is
determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been distributed, what security have the differences
against the interruption of their possession? Is the administrator required to pay the amount stipulated in
the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what authority has he to vise the claim? Section 706 of
the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with
a debtor of deceased for a debt due the estate, But he is nowhere permitted or directed to deal with a
creditor of the estate. On the contrary, he is the advocate of the estate before an impartial committee with
quasi-judicial power to determine the amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to
equitably adjust the amounts due. The administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor
appear before this body as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the
court is their remedy. To allow the administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would
put him in the dual role of a claimant and a judge. The law in this jurisdiction has been so framed that this
may not occur. The most important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by will are
those provisions of the Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal portions due to heirs by force

of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force by sections 614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. But if a debt is expressly recognized in the will must be paid without its being verified, there is
nothing to prevent a partial or total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under a guise of
a debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be determined.

We are aware that in some jurisdictions executors and administrators are, by law, obligated to perform
the duties which, in this jurisdiction, are assign to the committee on claims; that in some other jurisdictions
it is the probate court itself that performs these duties; that in some jurisdictions the limitation upon the
presentment of claims for allowance is longer and, possibly, in some shorter; and that there is a great
divergence in the classification of actions which survive and actions which do not survive the death of the
testator. It must be further remembered that there are but few of the United States which provide for heirs
by force of law. These differences render useless as authorities in this jurisdiction many of the cases
coming from the United States. The restriction imposed upon the testator's power to dispose of his
property when they are heirs by force of law is especially important. The rights of these heirs by force law
pass immediately upon the death of the testator. (Art. 657, Civil Code.) The state intervenes and
guarantees their rights by many stringent provisions of law to the extent mentioned in article 818 of the
Civil Code. Having undertaken the responsibility to deliver the legal portion of the net assets of the estate
to the heirs by force of law, it is idle to talk of substituting for the procedure provided by law for
determining the legal portion, some other procedure provided in the will of the testator. The state cannot
afford to allow the performance of its obligations to be directed by the will of an individual. There is but
one instance in which the settlement of the estate according to the probate procedure provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure may be dispense with, and it applies only to intestate estates. (Sec. 596, Code Civ.
Proc.) A partial exemption from the lawful procedure is also contained in section 644, when the executor or
administrator is the sole residuary legatee. Even in such case, and although the testator directs that no
bond be given, the executor is required to give a bond for the payment of the debts of the testator. The
facts of the present case do not bring it within either of this sections. We conclude that the claims against
the estate in the case at bar were enforceable only when the prescribed legal procedure was followed.

But we are not disposed to rest our conclusion upon this phase of the case entirely upon legal grounds.
On the contrary we are strongly of the opinion that the application of the maxim, "The will of the testator is
the law of the case," but strengthens our position so far as the present case is concerned.

It will ordinarily be presumed in construing a will that the testator is acquainted with the rules of law,
and that he intended to comply with them accordingly. If two constructions of a will or a part thereof are
possible, and one of these constructions is consistent with the law, and the other is inconsistent, the
presumption that the testator intended to comply with the law will compel that construction which is
consistent with the law to be adopted. (Page on Wills, sec. 465.)

Aside from this legal presumption, which we believe should apply in the present case as against any
construction of the will tending to show an intention of the testator that the ordinary legal method of
probating claims should be dispensed with, it must be remembered that the testator knows that the
execution of his will in no way affects his control over his property. The dates of his will and of his death
may be separated by a period of time more or less appreciable. In the meantime, as the testator well
knows, he may acquire or dispose of property, pay or assume additional debts, etc. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, it is only proper to presume that the testator, in his will, is treating of his estate
at the time and in the condition it is in at his death. Especially is this true of his debts. Debts may accrue
and be paid in whole or in part between the time the will is made and the death of the testator. To allow a
debt mentioned in the will in the amount expressed therein on the ground that such was the desire of the
testator, when, in fact, the debt had been wholly or partly paid, would be not only unjust to the residuary
heirs, but a reflection upon the good sense of the testator himself. Take the present case for example. It
would be absurd to say that the testator knew what the amount of his just debt would be at a future and
uncertain date. A mere comparison of the list of the creditors of the testator and the amounts due them as

described in his will, with the same list and amounts allowed by the committee on claims, shows that the
testator had creditors at the time of his death not mention in the will at all. In other instances the amounts
due this creditors were either greater or less than the amounts mentioned as due them in the will. In fact,
of those debts listed in the will, not a single one was allowed by the committee in the amount named in
the will. This show that the testator either failed to list in his will all his creditors and that, as to those he
did include, he set down an erroneous amount opposite their names; or else, which is the only reasonable
view of the matter, he overlooked some debts or contracted new ones after the will was made and that as
to others he did include he made a partial payments on some and incurred additional indebtedness as to
others.

While the testator expresses the desire that his debts be paid, he also expressly leaves the residue of
his estate, in equal parts, to his children. Is it to be presumed that he desired to overpay some of his
creditors notwithstanding his express instructions that his own children should enjoy the net assets of his
estate after the debts were paid? Again, is the net statement of the amount due some of his creditors and
the omission all together of some of his creditors compatible with his honorable and commendable desire,
so clearly expressed in his will, that all his debts be punctually paid? We cannot conceive that such
conflicting ideas were present in the testator's mind when he made his will.

Again, suppose the testator erroneously charged himself with a debt which he was under no legal or
even moral obligation to pay. The present case suggests, if it does not actually present, such a state of
affairs. Among the assets of the estate mentioned in the will is a parcel of land valued at P6,500; while in
the inventory of the administratrix the right to repurchase this land from one Isidro Santos is listed as an
asset. Counsel for the administratrix alleges that he is prepared to prove that this is the identical plaintiff in
the case at bar; that the testator erroneously claimed the fee of this land in his last will and stated Santos'
rights in the same as a mere debt due him of P5,000; that in reality, the only asset of the testator regard to
this land was the value of the right to repurchase, while the ownership of the land, subject only to that
right of redemption, belonged to Santos; that the right to repurchase this land expired in 1907, after the
testator's death. Assuming, without in the least asserting, that such are the underlying facts of this case,
the unjust consequences of holding that a debt expressly mentioned in the will may be recovered without
being presented to the committee on claims, is at once apparent. In this supposed case, plaintiff needed
only wait until the time for redemption of the land had expired, when he would acquired an absolute title to
the land, and could also have exacted the redemption price. Upon such a state of facts, the one item of
P5,000 would be a mere fictitious debt, and as the total net value of the estate was less than P15,000, the
legal portion of the testator's children would be consumed in part in the payment of this item. Such a case
cannot occur if the prescribed procedure is followed of requiring of such claims be viseed by the committee
on claims.

The direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does not mean that he shall pay them
without probate. There is nothing in the will to indicate that the testator in tended that his estate should be
administered in any other than the regular way under the statute, which requires "all demands against the
estates of the deceased persons," "all such demands as may be exhibited," etc. The statute provides the
very means for ascertaining whether the claims against the estate or just debts. (Kaufman vs. Redwine, 97
Ark., 546.)

See also Collamore vs. Wilder (19 Kan., 67); O'Neil vs. Freeman (45 N. J. L., 208).

The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be
compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be nothing
more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the administratrix for the recovery of the sum

of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to real property or specific articles of
personal property.

When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall be commenced or prosecute
against the executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to recover a debt due from the state;
but actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate and personal chattels claimed by the
estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)

The sum of money prayed for in the complaint must be due the plaintiff either as a debt of a legacy. If it
is a debt, the action was erroneously instituted against the administratrix. Is it a legacy?

Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first assignment of error he
alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim against the
estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as a
legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release), or to a third person. But this
case can only arise when the debt is an asset of the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a testator's
leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy depends upon
the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding force until his death, and may be
avoided in whole or in part by the mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an
obligation recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be extinguished in a
lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and
often do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to
collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a
legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt, it is an
anomaly to urge now it is a legacy.

Was it the intention of the testator to leave the plaintiff a legacy of P7,454? We have already touched
upon this question. Plaintiff's claim is described by the testator as a debt. It must be presumed that he
used this expression in its ordinary and common acceptation; that is, a legal liability existing in favor of the
plaintiff at the time the will was made, and demandable and payable in legal tender. Had the testator
desired to leave a legacy to the plaintiff, he would have done so in appropriate language instead of
including it in a statement of what he owed the plaintiff. The decedent's purpose in listing his debts in his
will is set forth in the fourth clause of the will, quoted above. There is nothing contained in that clause
which indicates, even remotely, a desire to pay his creditors more than was legally due them.

A construction leading to a legal, just and sensible result is presumed to be correct, as against one
leading to an illegal, unnatural, or absurd effect. (Rood on Wills, sec. 426.)

The testator, in so many words, left the total net assets of his estate, without reservation of any kind, to
his children per capita. There is no indication that he desired to leave anything by way of legacy to any
other person. These considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the testator intended to leave
plaintiff any thing by way of legacy. His claim against the estate having been a simple debt, the present
action was improperly instituted against the administratrix. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)

But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy and
disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all debts had
been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable
result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the
debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the first instance, can not be had before
the court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must present their claims to the committee,
otherwise their claims will be forever barred.

For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MORELAND, J., dissenting:

The decision of the court in this case produces, in my humble opinion, a serious miscarriage of justice. It
causes the appellant to lose more than P7,000, a debt against the respondent estate, which debt, but a
few months before his death, was specifically recognized by the testator in his will as a debt due and owing
to petitioner and which he, in said will, ordered and directed his executor to pay "religiously."

If I could find justification for such a decision either in the proceedings as they are unfolded by the
record or in the law as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, I would, of course, acquiesce. Far from
finding such justification, I am met so far as my judgment can discern, with facts of record which
demonstrate conclusively that the decision is erroneous in fact.

The opinion seeks to demonstrate that a creditor, whose claim is recognized by the highest possible
authority, the debtor himself, in the most solemn instrument known to the law, his last will and testament,
as legal, just and valid, must lose that claim because the validity thereof has not been established by the
committee. And this inspite of the fact that, upon the record of the case, no one interested in the estate
disputes the claim or challengers its validity. Take this proposition in connection with the fact that the
committee to hear claims had not been discharged, that the estate has not been finally closed but is still
pending settlement, and that, therefore, there exist not a single reason, in equity or justice, why the
claimant should not be permitted to present his claim, if that is necessary, and we have before us a
situation which indicates how far the decision has gone.

It should be carefully observed that the petitioner Isidro Santos, was defeated in this litigation upon the
ground, and the sole ground, that he did not present his claim to the committee, in pursuance of a notice
to creditors published under an order dated July 23, 1907, and that he, therefore, lost the right to enforce
the claim; that the notice having been published from July 25, 1907, to August 16, 1907, petitioner's
application on July 14, 1909, for the extension of time for the presentation of claims to the old committee
or the appointment of a new committee for that purpose, was too late and was properly denied, and that

his motion made November 21, 1909, praying that the executor be compelled to carry out the wishes of
the testator and pay the claim, was also properly denied.

In my judgment the decision is erroneous from whatever point viewed:

1. Even if it be assumed that the notice to creditors should have been published in accordance with the
order of July 23, 1907, the record is entirely lacking in legal evidence to establish the publication which the
law requires under that order. That being so the claim is not barred.

2. I contend, and the record shows, that the notice should not have been published in accordance with
the order of July 23, 1907, but in pursuance of an order of January 8, 1908, which was an order for a new
publication, and, being later order, necessarily vacated and annulled the order of July 23, 1907, and all
proceedings thereunder relative to the matters included in said order of January 8, 1908; that publication
was concededly never made under and in pursuance of that order and that, for that reason, the
petitioner's claim is not barred.

3. The claim was not one that must be submitted to a committee, being recognized as a legal and valid
debt by the will and the testator having ordered his executor to pay it. The motion made to require the
executor to pay the claim should have been heard by the court.

The facts of this case, as shown by the record, are:

Don Lucas de Ocampo made a will July 26, 1906. He died November 18, 1906. The will specifically
named Isidoro Santos, the petitioner, a creditor of the testator, set out the specific amount due him,
named an executor, and directed him to pay the claim "religiously."

The will was probated July 15, 1907, and Leandra Manarang, the widow, appointed temporary
administratrix. Her administration was terminated on July 23, 1907, and Cosme Naval, the person named
in the will as executor, was, on that date, duly appointed executor. On the same day Pedro Abad Santos
and Marcos Tancuaco were named the committee of appraisal and to her claims presented against the
estate, the court making the following order:

There having been heard the petition presented by Seor Cosme Naval, praying that he be appointed
executor of the above named estate as provided in the will of the deceased Lucas de Ocampo; and also
praying the appointment of a committee of appraisal consisting of Seores Pedro Abad Santos and Marcos
Tancuaco:

It is ordered that the said Cosme Naval may be and he hereby is appointed executor of the will of Lucas
de Ocampo, deceased, the clerk being authorized to issue in favor of said Cosme Naval letters

testamentary, the petitioner being first required to take the oath prescribed by law and to file a bond in the
sum of P500 Philippine currency, with two sureties satisfactory to the court.

It is also ordered that the special letters of administration issued temporarily in favor of the widow of the
deceased, Leandra Manarang, remain without effect from this day.

It is further ordered that Seores Pedro Abad Santos and Marcos Tancuaco be and they hereby appointed
the committee of appraisal and claims of this estate.

On the 28th of September, 1907, Naval was removed from office and Leandra Manarang named in his
place. On December 3, same year, Pedro Abad Santos resigned from the committee to become the
attorney for the estate and Donato Iturralde was appointed in his stead.

Following these changes both in the office of executor and in that of the committee, on January 8, 1908,
the court made an order which, in itself, is, in my judgment, a complete refutation of the decision in this
case and demonstrates that a contrary judgment should have been rendered. That order, dated, as I have
said, on January 8, 1908, and promulgated on that day, reads as follows:

Whereas, the Hon. Julio Llorente, in decree dated December 3, 1907, appointed Seor Donato Iturralde,
a resident of this city, to the office of committee of appraisal in the above-entitled proceeding:

Therefore, and in compliance with the above-mentioned decree, Seor Donato Iturralde, a resident of
this city, is appointed a member of the committee of appraisal and to hear the claims that may be
presented against the property of this estate, which committee within thirty days from the date of said
decree shall deliver a copy of the inventory to this court and another to the administratrix Seora Leandra
Manarang, and within sixty days shall post a notice at the main door of this courthouse and in three public
places in the municipality where the property of the said deceased is located, in which shall be stated the
dates and places when and where the meetings of the committee will be held and notifying that creditors
that they should present their claims within six months counting from the date of said notice; said notice,
furthermore, to be published during three consecutive weeks in the newspaper "El Imparcial," having
general circulation in this province.

Given to-day, the 8th of January, 1908, by order of the Hon. Julio Llorente, Judge of the Fourth Judicial
District and of this Province of Pampanga.

On July 14, 1908, the committee filed a report, the only report in the record, in which appears the
following statement:

The undersigned, committee of appraisal and claims against the above estate, presents a to the court
the following list of all claims presented against the said estate since the 25th day of July, 1907, in which
date the first publication to creditors was made.

The publication under which committee was reporting was begun under the order of July 23, 1907,
which was vacated and annulled by the order of January 8, 1908, which, by reason of the changes in the
offices of executor and committee, ordered a new and different notice to the creditors.

On July 14, 1909, petitioner herein made an application to the court to reopen the sessions of the
committee and permit him to present the claim mentioned in the will. This was denied November 27, 1909,
the court simply saying:

This cause having been heard and the parties having presented their arguments, the motion is denied
by reason of the lapse of time.

On November 21, 1910, the petitioner moved the court that, the testator having recognized and
legalized the debt in his will and having ordered his executor to pay the same to the petitioner, said
executor be ordered and directed to pay said claim to the petitioner pursuant to the testator's directions.
This motion was denied April 26, 1911, upon the same ground as the other motion.

The appeal is from both of these orders and brings up so much of the record as is pertinent to these
questions.

The court has held on this appeal:

1. That the motion last mentioned is an action. The opinion says: "The petition of the plaintiff filed on
November 21, 1910, . . . appears to be nothing more or less than a complaint instituting an action against
the administratrix for the recovery of the sum of money." After discussing this phase of the case the court
concludes: "His claim against the estate having been a simple debt, the present action was improperly
instituted against the administratrix (sec. 699, Code of Civ. Proc.)." This is one of the grounds of the
decision.

2. That the recognition of the debt in the will and the direction of the testator to pay the same have no
significance in the law.

3. That, notwithstanding this recognition and direction, the claim should have been presented to the
committee appointed to hear and determine claims against the estate.

4. That the claim was not presented to the committee.

5. That all of the formalities required by law relative to the notice to the creditors t present their claims
were fully observed, the court saying that "the record affirmatively shows that the committee did make the
publications required by law."

6. That the court below did not err in denying the motion to extend the time of the old committee or
appoint a new one to the end that the claim in question might be presented.

7. That the court did not err in denying the motion to compel the executor to pay the claim in pursuance
of the direction contained in the will.

Laying aside for a moment those holdings of the court which declare that the claim is one which must be
presented to and passed upon by a committee. I am compelled to differ from every other propositions and
statement of fact appearing in the decision pertinent to the issue involved, except the single one that the
claim was not presented to a committee. That it was not presented is conceded; indeed, that fact that it
was not is the whole cause of this proceeding.

I am compelled to believe that the statement of the decision that "the record affirmatively shows that
the committee did make the publications required by law," is not quite in accordance with the record as I
read it.

The opinion does not refer me to any evidence of record which supports its statement. Where is this
evidence, where is this record which "affirmatively shows?" I have been unable to find it. Here is all the
evidence, if it may be called evidence, which I am able to find it in the record relative to the publication of
the notices to the creditors:

(a) An affidavit of the publisher of "El Imparcial" setting out that the notice to creditors attached to the
affidavit and signed by Pedro Abad Santos (who before the completion of the publication, resigned) and
Marcos Tancuaco, dated July 23, 1907, was published "three weeks from the 25th of July to the 16th of
August, 1907."

The notice referred to is as follows:

The undersigned committee of appraisal hereby notifies the creditors of Lucas de Ocampo, deceased,
and all other persons who have claims against the estate of said deceased, to present the same with
vouchers within six months from the date of this notice to the committee, every Monday, between 4 and 5
o'clock p. m., at the dwelling house of Pedro A. Santos, Sagasta Street, San Fernando, Pampanga. Dated
San Fernando, Pampanga, P. I., July 23, 1907. Signed: Pedro Abad Santos, committee. Marcos Tancuaco,
committee.

The defectiveness of the affidavit is apparent. It does not show whether the newspaper was daily,
weekly, biweekly or monthly, or the day of the week or month on which published. It does not show that
the notice was published three weeks successively, that is, once each week for three successive weeks, as
required by law and the order of the court. So ambiguous is it that is might mean that the notice was
published once, namely, three weeks from July 25. Passing, however, these defects, I note that the notice
to creditors requires them to present their claims at the dwelling house of Pedro Abad Santos. It should be
noted, as before stated, that this commissioner resigned before the expiration of the six months, thus
making it necessary for creditors to present their claims and their proofs thereof to one who was not a
member of the committee and to a man who, immediately on his resignation, became the attorney of the
estate. This will become important when we later discuss the significance of the fact that the court, as
already seen, on January 8, 1908, made a new order requiring that a new notice be given to creditors, to
be published thereafter, thereby revoking the order of July 23, 1907, and annulling the notice to creditors
above set out and then in course of publication.

(b) The remaining item of evidence which it is claimed tends to show that the notice to creditors was
duly published is the reference made by the commissioners in their report to the court, above quoted, in
which they say, referring to July 25, 19076, "on which date the first publication to creditors was made."

This reference cannot be called evidence of publication, although the court accepts it as such. At most it
refers and is limited, in terms, to the first publication. It has not the slightest reference to the other
publications, if any.

This, (a) and (b), is all evidence in the whole record relative to the publication of the notice to creditors.
Admitting it all to be true and giving it all weight possible, does it establish "affirmatively that the
committee did make the publications required by law?" I am of the opinion not The law requires, in addition
to the publication in the newspapers, that "the committee . . . shall post a notice in four public places in
province stating the times and places of their meetings, and the time limited for creditors to present their
claims . . . and give such other notice as the court directs.

Where is there in the record evidence showing that this was done? Nowhere. As I read the record, there
is not a syllable of such evidence in all the case.

I, therefore, am forced to the conclusion that the declaration of the court that "the record affirmatively
shows that the committee did make the publications required by law" is without sufficient evidence to
support it.

After a thorough reading of the record, I am reluctantly forced to a further conclusion, namely, that
instead of there being evidence in the case showing the publication required by law. there is evidence
showing the precise contrary.

Let us remember that the first order of the court directing the committee to publish notice to creditors
was issued July 23, 1907. It conceded that publication in a newspaper of some sort was started under that
order. But, the court, evidently becoming satisfied that, under all the circumstances, the publication under

that order would not be sufficient to give creditors fair notice, on January 8, 1908, and before the
publication under the first order, if there was ever started in reality a publication under that order, was
completed, made a second order of publication. The reason for this order was evidently that, during the six
months succeeding the date of the notice which it is claimed was published under the first order, three
persons held the office of executor, the complexion of the committee itself was changed, and the member
of the committee at whose house the notice required the claims and vouchers to be presented resigned
from the committee and became the attorney for the estate. Pedro Abad Santos having ceased to be a
member of the committee and having become the attorney for the estate, and the notice to the creditors
requiring that claims with their vouchers to be presented at his house, there was no longer a proper place
designated where creditors could present their claims. Furthermore, the continual change in the
executorship already noted may have resulted in grave prejudice to the estate if the estate were to be held
responsible for all claims presented during the time those changes were taking place, it being the duty of
the executor, under the law, to be present at the hearing on claims and defend the estate against those
which deemed unjust, and the frequent change in the office, thereby bringing the persons unfamiliar with
what had gone before, certainly not tending to efficiency.

All these facts, taken in connection with the defectiveness of the affidavit of the publication of the
notice, and the fact that there was no posting of the notices as required by law, that the notice itself was
defective in that it required the claims to be presented within six months from the date of the notice
instead of the date of the last publication thereof, as the law, properly interpreted, requires, all these facts,
I say, undoubtedly led the court to believe that the previous proceedings relative to claims should be
annulled and that a new order of publication should be made. Accordingly, on January 8, 1908, as
aforesaid, an order was made and entered as above set forth, requiring a new publication by a new
committee. This order had the effect, of course, of vacating and annulling the previous order covering the
same subject matter.

It is undisputed that no publication has ever been made or even attempted under this order of January
8, 1908. The only publication referred to in the record or in the opinion in this case is that under the order
of July 23, 1907. No one contends that any other publication has ever been made or attempted.

That this order of January 8, 1908, was considered the governing order in the case and that it was an
annullment of all prior proceedings and orders relative to the same subject matter, is clear. If notice had
been given as provided by the order, the six months' term, according to the order, would have expired
some time in July, 1908. This, of course, was clearly understood by the court, and we find the court, ever
anxious to have the estate settled as quickly as possible under the law, making the following order on the
2d day of April, 1908:

It is hereby ordered that the administratrix present her inventory before the 1st day of May and the
committee its report within the time provided by law, and that the administratrix present her account
before the 1st day of August, 1908.

This order demonstrates conclusively that the court believed that the committee was giving the notice
to creditors as provided by order of January 8, 1908, and not that of July 23, 1907; for, if the notice was to
be given under the latter and the publication began July 25, 1907, then the time within which the
committee was to report expired in January, 1908 (see opinion), long before the order of April 2, 1908, was
issued (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 693) and the requirement therein that the committee report "within the time
provided by law" was idle. The court evidently believed that the notice was being published under the
order of January 8, 1908, that the six months' period would expire in July, that the committee could
therefore report to the administratrix the number and amounts of the claims presented and allowed, and
that she could, therefore render her account before the 1st day of August, as in the order of April 2

required. This order is strictly inconsistent from every point of view with the idea that the order of July 23,
1907, was in force and that publication of the notice to creditors was proceeding thereunder.

I, therefore, say that the record demonstrates not only that the declaration of the court that "the record
affirmatively shows that the committee did make the publications required by law" is without sufficient
foundation in fact, but also that the contrary is true, namely, that no publication was ever made under the
only order under which it could be legally made.

I contend, furthermore, that this proceeding is not an action against an executor to recover a debt
against the estate of his testator. The decision of the court that it is an action and not being one of those
which, under the Code, can be brought against an executor and must be dismissed for that reason is, in
my judgment, erroneous. I do not understand how a motion to compel an executor to comply with the
directions in a will can be called an action to recover a debt in a sense that such motion is prohibited by
law.

Dealing with the second branch of the case, wherein the court holds that the debt should have been
presented to a committee:

The proposition that a debt which is recognized by the highest possible authority, the debtor himself, in
then most solemn instrument known to the law and the one whose provisions are the most sacredly
carried out by the courts, his last will and testament, which debt the testator, in his will, expressly ordered
his executor to pay to the creditor by name, must be presented to the committee for them to determine
whether it is a valid claim and whether it ought to be paid, is a proposition which appeals neither to my
reason nor my sense of justice. There is no statute expressly requiring such presentation. There is none
which by necessary implication requires it. To bring such a debt within the law requiring presentation to the
committee, interpretation and construction must be invoked to such an extent as to shock if not violate the
ordinary canons applicable thereto. This is particularly true when such interpretation and construction are
resorted to deprive a creditor of a claim, the validity and justice of which is not only undisputed but
unquestioned.

There is no provision of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly requiring the presentation of any claim to
a committee. Provision is made for the appointment of a committee which is authorized to hear certain
classes of claims but nowhere is there an express provision requiring a creditor to present his claim. There
is, to be sure, a section which provides (sec. 695) that if the creditor fails to present his claim, if it is a
certain kind of claim, within the time provided in the law, it will be barred. It is therefore, gathered by
implication that every creditor having a certain kind of claim must present it; but there is no provision
expressly requiring it. Moreover, it must be carefully noted that only certain claims need to be presented to
the committee and that only certain claims are barred provided they are not exhibited. Section 686 confers
upon the committee whatever jurisdiction it may have with respect to the hearing of claims, apart from
those which actions were begun against decedent in his lifetime. It provides that "they may try and decide
upon claims, which by law survive against executors or administrators, except claims for the possession of
or title to real state;" and under section 695 only those claims are barred which are " proper to be allowed
by the committee."

We see then that the committee is authorized to take jurisdiction over those claims only which survive
against an executor or administrator. The code does not define or declare "what claims survive against
executor or administrators." It refers to certain actions which, having been commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, may be continued after his death by his executor or administrator. It nowhere tells us "what

claims survive against executors or administrators, " or what claims are " proper to be allowed by the
committee." We are unable to say, therefore, from the context of the Code itself what the authors thereof
meant by the use of the phrases "claims which survive against executors or administrators" and which are
"proper to be allowed by the committee." All that is clear is that it was the intention of the law to restrict
the jurisdiction of the committee and keep it within certain limitations, and to that end used these limited
expressions. It should be noted, however, that these limitations refer to claims and have no reference to
actions begun against the deceased before his death. The distinction made in the Code between claims
and actions begun against the decedent during his lifetime, and the respective provisions referring to
those two subjects, is entirely lost sight of in the decision of the court. This being so, the following
reasoning found in the decision, based upon the failure to distinguish between claims and actions begun
against the deceased in his lifetime, involves a conclusion in no sense related to the premises from which
it is deduced:

Do plaintiff's claims fall within any of these sections? They are described in the will, as debts, There is
nothing in the will to indicate that any or all of them are contingent claims, claims for the possession of or
title to real property damages for injury to person or property, real or personal, or for the possession of
specified articles of personal property. Nor is it asserted by the plaintiff that they do. The conclusion is that,
they were claims proper to be considered by the committee.

That there is no necessary relation between those two subjects is apparent. That an action for "money,
debt, or damages" begun against the decedent in his lifetime must, under section 710, be discontinued
upon his death "and the claim embraced in such action may be presented to the committee, who shall
allow the party prevailing the cost of such action to the time of its discontinuance," does not necessarily
mean that such claim, if no action had been begun upon it, is one which must be exhibited to the
committee. Whether an action begun against the decedent in his lifetime survives or does not survive, has
no necessary relation with the necessity of presenting a claim to the committee. Would it be logical to
argue that because an action begun against the deceased did not survive, the claim upon which it is based
cannot, therefore, be presented to the committee, or that because in action begun against the deceased in
his lifetime did survive, that, therefore, the claim upon which it was based could and must be presented to
the committee? Assuredly not.

No general requirement that all claims must be presented to the committee appearing in the Code, and
it affirmatively appearing that there was an intention to restrict the power of the committee in the hearing
of claims, it necessarily follows that the conclusion reached by the court that all claims must be exhibited
to the committee is pure inference and one but at all warranted by the provisions of the Code or by the
rules of interpretation and construction, To me it is a conclusion absolutely necessary from the language of
sections 686 and 695 that not all claims need to be exhibited. By express language these sections restrict
the committee to the hearing of such claims as survive against executors or administrators and only those
are barred which are proper to be presented to the committee.

The answer to the question, does not claim at bar survive against executors or administrators, brings us
to an exposition of the various fundamental error made by the court in holding that the debt in question is
one which must be presented to the committee. One of them is involved in the declaration that the debt in
question is a claim within the meaning of the law. In cases such as this it is proper and necessary to make
a distinction between a claim and a debt. A debt is a claim which has been favorably passed upon by the
highest authority to which in can in law be submitted and has been declared to be a debt. A claim, on the
other hand, is a debt in embryo. It is a mere evidence of a debt and must pass through the process
prescribed by law before it develops into what is properly called a debt. The debt in the case at bar never
was a claim. By the act of the testator himself, it was raised to the dignity of a debt and it remains such
and must be acted upon as such by the courts as well as by all other. It was by the testator selected from
the mass of his obligations, which are correctly called claims, and treated to a process which developed it

into a thing called a "debt" over which no committee has jurisdiction and with the due course of which it
has no authority to interfere.

The second fundamental error, following naturally from the first, is found in the declaration of the court
that the debt in question is a claim which survives against the executors or administrator and must,
therefore, be exhibit to the committee. This error involves, in my humble opinion, a misunderstanding of
the nature of a will imposes upon all persons executing it. A will is the testator speaking after death. Its
provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before
the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the
special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men
wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to
do so. It is a upon this theory and around this purpose that there has grown that body of the law which
uniformly and universally declares that the words of the testator spoken in his will shall be sacredly
attended by his executor and enforced by the court. It has been declared a fundamental maxim, the first
greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect to the will, that the intention of the testator
as expressed in the will shall be fully and punctually observed. If by the use of clear and certain, his will
explains itself, and all that the court can do is to give it effect. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
testator's having meant just what he said. His purpose may seem unjust, unnatural or absurd to us; yet, to
refuse to execute it is to destroy it. As Chief Justice Marshall said: "That intent of the testator is the cardinal
rule in the construction of wills; and if that intent can be clearly perceived, and is not contrary to some
positive rule of law, it must prevail." (3 Peters, 346.)

The intention of the testator is said in the recent Virginia case to be "the life and soul of a will" and if this
intention is clear it must be govern with absolute sway. A will is not like a promissory note or a judgment or
any other instrument which acknowledges or incorporates an obligation. Those instruments are mere
evidences of a debt. A will is not, primarily, evidence of anything; it is the thing itself. It is not so much the
evidence of what the testator did or intended to do; it is then testator himself. The court has failed in this
case to distinguish between a will and a promissory note, or a mortgage, so far as their legal effects are
concerned, and the statement which I made early in this opinion, that the court has given no legal
significance whatever to the fact that the instrument in which this debt was acknowledged and in which it
was ordered paid was a last will and testament, is literally true. It has given the testamentary directions of
the testator no more force, effect or significance than it gives to the words of a promissory note or a
mortgage.

The third fundamental error which the decision has fallen is that it is misconceives the duties of an
executor and of a court relative to the provisions of the will. It is, of course, axiomatic that is the duty of
the executor, under the direction of the court, to carry out punctually and with the utmost care every
provision of the will. That is why he is named "executor." He is an "executor" of a will because he
"executes" the will. When he refuses or neglects to perform that function he ceases to be an executor and
becomes a perverter or destroyer. Section 640 provides that the estate of the decedent shall be disposed
of according to his will and the bond to be given by an executor, prescribed in section 643, must contain a
clause in which the executor agrees, and his bondsmen assure, that he will administer "according to the
will of the testator" the estate which comes into his hands.

Under the provisions of this will it is as much the duty of the executor to pay the debt here in litigation
as it is to pay a legacy bequeathed by the will or to carry out a devise found therein. Of course, as we shall
see later, if it appear to the executor that the debt in suit was paid, in whole or in part, as the case may be.
In such case his refusal to pay will not be a refusal to carry out the will, but will be grounded in fact that
the testator himself executed it prior to his demise. The proposition remains that the will must be
executed; and the only excuse the executor can give for a refusal to execute it is that it has already been
executed.

It is nowhere claimed in this case, and it cannot be, for no proceeding has reached far enough to involve
the fact, that this debt has been paid, and nowhere in the record has its validity or binding force upon the
estate been challenged or even disputed. That being the case, upon the facts, as they stand before us,
there is no excuse which the executor of the court can now offer why the debt in suit has not been paid.

The fourth fundamental error into which the court has fallen in its decision is that it submits to the
jurisdiction of a committee to hear claims the question of whether or not the provisions of the will are to be
executed. This, although, it seems to me, is strange upon its face, is precisely what the court has, in effect,
done in its decision; for, if a debt expressly acknowledged in the will and specifically ordered paid therein,
must be submitted to a committee, it means that they may, in the excercise of their judgment, refuse its
payment. This, in turn, means that the provision of the will in relation thereto is annulled. By this process
the committee may, therefore, annul an express and mandatory provision of a will which is as binding as a
provision giving legacy or making a devise. It is to the probate court, and to it alone, that the law confides
the power to annul and set aside provisions in wills. The executor himself may not do so. And the court
itself may do so only after the very clearest demonstration that the provision violates a positive provision
of law or is against the public policy of the state. In spite of this, it is the decision of this court that a
committee of two or more persons, none of whom is a lawyer, none of whom may be even a business man,
all of whom may be ignorant and inexperienced, may sit in an informal way, and with all the imperfections
inherent in such a tribunal and the practice which governs its deliberations, may revoke a mandatory
provision in the most solemn instrument known to law. The bare statement of such a proposition is, it
seems to me, its clearest refutation.

The fifth fundamental error into which the court has fallen follows naturally. As we have said, the
decision give no significance to the fact that the debt at bar appears acknowledged and legalized in a last
will and testament and that the testator therein solemnly ordered and directed his executor to pay it.
Instead, the decision remands the creditor to the committee in exactly the same condition as any other
creditor. He goes there with the burden of proof on him, with the necessity of establishing affirmatively and
by a fair preponderance of the evidence the existence of the claim, the consideration therefore, and the
fact that it has not been paid. There are laid upon him the restrictions and limitations imposed by section
383 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which stop his mouth as a witness under certain conditions. He is there
with every burden, with every restriction upon him under which another creditors labors who has not a
scrap of written evidence to support his claim. It is no adequate reply to say that he can put the will in
evidence. He could do that with any other evidence that he might have. Moreover, that reply is a full
admission of all that I have maintained, that the will is given no significance or value, as such, but is
reduced to the mere function of being evidence to be passed upon by the committee. Furthermore, it is
incumbent upon him to prove that the claim has not been paid and this is the very point which may be the
thing most difficult to establish; and it is in relation to this that the restrictions and limitations imposed by
the section referred to produce their greatest effect. This certainly cannot be law. It cannot be that the
creditor whose debt is recognized as is the one at bar occupies a position no different from that of a
creditor whose debt is not recognized. To contend the contrary, it seems to me, flies in the face not only of
law and justice, but of common sense as well.

The fact that a debt is mentioned in the will as one not satisfied has, at least, the effect of changing the
burden of proof from the creditor to the estate. Instead of the creditor being required to establish the
validity of the claim and the fact of nonpayment, it is incumbent upon the estate to show payment
affirmatively. At the very least, recognition by the testator in his will should be given that much
significance. The court does not even concede this. The provision before us, while not a provision for a
legacy, has nevertheless the same force and effect; and as a legatee is not bound to show affirmatively his
right to the legacy and as it is the duty of the executor to seek out the legatee and pay him the legacy, so
it is not the duty of the creditor in this case to show affirmatively his right to the payment of the debt, but
it is the duty of the executor, knowing nothing to the contrary, to seek out the creditor and pay him as the
testator has ordered him to do. If he knows anything to the contrary the burden is on him to demonstrate
it.

These considerations naturally lead us to the point so strongly urged in the decision, and which I regard,
for the purpose urged, without force, that the debt may have been paid between the time of the making of
the will and the death of the testator; and that, therefore, it ought not to be paid by the executor until the
question of payment is properly determined. No one is disputing that proposition. But its admission does
not all mean that, to determine whether the claim has been paid or not, it must be presented to the
committee. If it is the duty of the court, through the executor, to see if the will is conscientiously executed,
what more natural, if not absolutely necessary, than to submit to the court whether the provision
recognizing a debt ordering its payment should be carried out. What argument can be adduced, which
does not fly squarely in the face of reason, to establish the proposition that a court has no business to
determine whether a particular provision of a will shall be carried out or not, when its supreme duty is to
require the punctual and precise execution of the whole will? How can it be maintained that, whether or
not a particular provision in a will shall be carried out must be submitted not to the court, which has
exclusive jurisdiction of the whole will, but to a committee of two or more ignorant and inexperienced
persons? If it is the duty of the court to see that the will is executed as a whole, then there must go with
that duty the power to determine whether a particular provision ordering the payment of a specific debt
shall be executed or not. But the determination of this question is the determination of the question of
payment. Why take from the court, which is the whole body that has the power to determine whether
provisions in wills shall be carried out, the determination of whether a debt recognized in a particular
provision has or has not been paid and turn it over to a committee such as I have described?

It is thus seen that the proposition given so great weight in the decision, namely, that the debt should
be submitted to the committee in order to determine whether it has bee paid, is without point or force. The
court should make that determination far better than a committee. The practice leading to the
determination by a court as to whether or not a given provision in a will shall be carried out is very simple,
much simpler than is the proceeding before a committee. The executor finding that the will orders him to
pay a certain debt and having no knowledge of his own that such debt has already been paid, presents his
final account to the court, in which he asserts that he is going to pay the debt in accordance with the
provision of the will. Notice is given to all parties interested in the estate. They appear. If they or any of
them know of any reason why the provision of the will should not be carried out, they may manifest it.
Upon that manifestation a hearing will be had and the court will determine whether or not the provision of
the will has already been executed, in the whole or in part, and upon that determination he will rest a
judgment in which he will order the executor to carry out the provision of the will by the payment of the
debt or he will declare that the provision has already been carried out by payment. What simpler than this
and what more conducive to justice? Who can say that the submission of the same question to a
committee is better than the submission to a court? It might as well be urged that the legalization of the
will, itself were better left to a committee than to a court; for, if whether or not the provisions of a will are
to be carried out must be left to a committee, then whether it is a will at all or not may as well be left to
the same authority.

The attempt of the court to meet the proposition that the will of the testator is the law of the case does
not satisfy my judgment. It is claimed that the will of the testator is not the law of the case where it is in
direct violation of a provision of law; and that the Court of Civil Procedure requiring that all claims shall be
presented to the committee, the testator has no right to except a particular debt or any debt from the
operation of the Code.

In the first place, the Code of Civil Procedure does not require that all claims shall be presented to the
committee. It expressly limits the claims which must be exhibited. In the second place, the claim that there
is anything contradictory between the will of the testator in this particular case and the provision of the
Code of Civil Procedure is, in my judgment, rather fanciful than real. What is the purpose of requiring the
exhibition of a claim to a committee? Simply to save the estate from being defrauded. There is absolutely
no other reason which is behind the law requiring such a presentation. Is it claimed that a debtor may not
pay a claim during his lifetime? If not, and the will is but a testator speaking after death, may he not pay a
debt in that manner? If the man who is the estate solemnly acknowledges a debt and offers to pay it, who

shall say that the estate is defrauded if the debt be paid? And if the estate is not defrauded, neither the
spirit nor the letter of the law which has for its object the protection of the estate has been violated or
evaded, but has, on the contrary, been fully observed.

I do not discuss or express an opinion relative to the proposition that the statute of nonclaims runs
against a provision of a will, or suggests the results which may follow such doctrine.

The judgment should be reversed and the probate court ordered to hear petitioner's motion of the 21st
of November and decide it upon the merits.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88602

April 6, 1990

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the Deceased ALFREDO E. JACOB,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BICOL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, JORGE CENTENERA, AND
LORENZO C. ROSALES, respondents.

G.R. No. 89544

April 6, 1990

THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALFREDO JACOB, represented by its Administrator, TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB,
petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AND UNITED BICOL SAVINGS BANK, respondents.

Benito P. Fable for petitioner.

Contreras & Associates for private respondents.
Rosales & Associates Law Office for private respondent Rosales.
Ramon Quisumbing, Jr. for private respondent Centenera.

GANCAYCO J.:

The question of whether or not an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage may proceed even after the
death of the mortgagor and whether or not a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession may be
barred by estoppel, are the issues presented in this petition.

Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob was the registered owner of a parcel of land described under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1433 of the Register of Deeds of Naga City. 1 Sometime in 1972 Jorge Centenera was appointed
as administrator of Hacienda Jacob until January 1, 1978 when the Special Power of Attorney executed in
his favor by Dr. Jacob was revoked by the latter. 2 The land in question is located at Liboton, Naga City and
has an area of approximately 3,376 square meters. Because of the problem of paying realty taxes, internal
revenue taxes and unpaid wages of farm laborers of the hacienda, Dr. Jacob asked Centenera to negotiate
for a loan. For this purpose, a special power of attorney was executed and acknowledged by Dr. Jacob
before notary public Lorenzo Rosales the material portions of which read as follows:

That I, ALFREDO E. JACOB, Filipino, of legal age, widower, address at Tigaon, Camarines Sur, have
named, constituted and appointed and by these presents do name, constitute and appoint JORGE
CENTENERA, Filipino, of legal age, married to Judith E. Centenera, resident of and with postal address at
Naga City, to be my true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for me and in my name, place and stead. and to do
and perform all the necessary acts and deeds, to wit:

1. To mortgage and/or, hypothecate with any banking institution in the City of Naga or elsewhere in the
Philippines, the following described properties of which I am the absolute owner, as follows:

A parcel of land (Plan Ps-80014, Lot 818 of Naga Cad. 290 Case No. M 472 L.R.C. Rec. No. N-5986)
located at Liboton, Naga City. Bounded on the NE, by Alfredo Cleto (Lot 383); Martin Perez (Lot 385) and
Benedicto Naz (Lot 394), SE. by Benedicto Naz (Lot 394); S. by Pedro San Juan (Lot 317); SW by Margarita

Narciso vs. Simeon Ty Ganco (Lot 319); and NW by the Calawag Street, containing an area of 3,376 square
meters covered by TCT No. 1433.

A parcel of land (Lot 15, Block 4 of the subdivision plan Psd-46484, being a portion of Lot 1105-now of
the Cad. survey of Naga, L.R.C. Cad. Rec. N. N-78), situated in Tinago, Naga City. Bounded on the SE.,
along line 1-2 by Lot 17, Block 4; along line 2-3 by road lot 4; along line 3-4 by Lot 13, Block 4; and along
line 4-1 by Lot 14, Block 4 all of the subdivision plan. Containing an area of 236 square meters, covered by
TCT No. 393.

A parcel of land (Lot 14, Block 4 of the subdivision plan Psd-46464, being a portion of Lot 1106-now Cad.
survey of Naga, L.R.C. Cad. Rec. No. N-78), situated in Tinago, Naga City, Bounded on SW., along line 1-2
by Lot 15; Block 4; along line 23 by Lot 12, Block 4; along line 3-4 by road lot 3; and along line 41 by Lot
16, Block 4, all of the subdivision plan, containing an area of 239 square meters, covered by TCT No. 397.

2. To receive cash in any amount made in payment of the mortgage of the above described properties;
to sign checks, drafts, money orders, treasury warrants, to indorse the same, to cash and make deposits
with any bank here or elsewhere and to withdraw such deposit; to execute, sign and deliver any or all
documents of mortgage, contracts, deeds or any instrument necessary and pertinent for purposes of
mortgaging and/or encumbering said properties in favor of any banking institution in the City of Naga or
elsewhere and lastly, to do and perform any and all acts and deeds which to him may seem most to my
own benefit and advantage.

HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said attorney-in-fact full power and authority to do and perform
any and every act and thing whatever requisite or necessary or proper to be done in and about the
premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as I might or could do if personally present and acting in
person and I hereby ratify and confirm all that my said attorney shall do and had done lawfully or cause to
be done under any by virtue of these presents. 3

Consequently, Centenera secured a loan in the amount of P18,000.00 from the Bicol Savings & Loan
Association sometime in September 1972. Centenera signed and executed the real estate mortgage and
promissory note as attorney-in-fact of Dr. Jacob.4 When the loan fell due in 1975 Centenera failed to pay
the same but was able to arrange a restructuring of the loan using the same special power of attorney and
property as security. Another set of loan documents, namely: an amended real estate mortgage and
promissory note dated November 27, 1975 was executed by Centenera as attorney-in-fact of Dr. Jacob. 5
Again, Centenera failed to pay the loan when it fell due and so he arranged for another restructuring of the
loan with the bank on November 23, 1976. The corresponding promissory note was again executed by
Centenera on behalf of Jacob under the special power of attorney.

The mortgage was annotated on the title 6 and when the loan was twice re-structured, the proceeds of
the same were not actually given by the bank to Centenera since the transaction was actually nothing but
a renewal of the first or original loan and the supposed proceeds were applied as payment for the loan.
The accrued interest for sixty (60) days was, however, paid by Centenera.

Centenera again failed to pay the loan upon the maturity date forcing the bank to send a demand
letter.7 A copy of the demand letter was sent to Dr. Jacob but no reply or denial was received by the bank.

Thus, the bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage and the corresponding provisional sale of the
mortgaged property to the respondent bank was effected. On November 5, 1982 a definite deed of sale of
the property was executed in favor of the respondent bank as the sole and highest bidder. 8

Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who was subsequently named administratrix of the estate of Dr. Jacob and who
claimed to be an heir of the latter, conducted her own investigation and therefore she filed a complaint in
the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur alleging that the special power of attorney and the documents
therein indicated are forged and therefore the loan and/or real estate mortgages and promissory notes are
null and void. After trial on the merit a decision was rendered on July 30, 1987, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is ordered DISMISSED for lack of a cause of action and/or her failure to
prove the cause(s) of action alleged in the complaint; and judgment is rendered against the Estate of the
late Dr. Alfredo Jacob in favor of the defendants on their respective counterclaim, ordering payment from
said estate of the following:

(a) actual damages in the sum of P30,000.00; exemplary damages in the sum of P20,000.00; and
attorney's fees of P10,000.00; to defendant Bicol Savings and Loan Association;

(b) actual damages in the sum of P30,000.00; exemplary damages in the sum of P20,000.00; moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00; attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00 to defendant Jorge Centenera;

(c) actual damages in the sum of P30,000.00; exemplary damages in the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's
fees in the sum of P10,000.00 to defendant Atty. Lorenzo Rosales.

with interest at the legal rate from the time of the filing of the complaint, until full payment.

Costs against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.9

Not satisfied therewith the plaintiff appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals wherein on May 30, 1989
a decision was rendered affirming in toto the decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal for lack
of merit. 10

Hence, the herein petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 88602 that was filed by plaintiff therein and
which raises two issues, to wit:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed and completely neglected to exercise appellate determination
on material issues which, independently of what said Court determined, would cause nullification of the
mortgage deed and amendment thereto, as well as extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and sale thereof.

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals likewise ignored to resolve, nay, pass upon, the issue of excessive
and unfounded award of damages, which certainly calls for appellate determination as it was squarely
raised on appeal. 11

However, while the action for annulment of mortgage, etc. aforestated was pending in the trial court, on
November 5, 1982, a definite deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of respondent bank. Without
redemption having been exercised within the prescribed period, the title in the name of Dr. Jacob was
cancelled and in its place, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14661 was issued on August 9, 1983 in favor of
respondent bank. Respondent bank then filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City which was opposed by petitioner. In due course a writ of possession was
issued by the trial court in a decision dated July 21, 1987 in favor of the respondent bank, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petitioner UNITED BICOL SAVINGS BANK being entitled to possession of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14661 (registry of Naga City) let a Writ of Possession issue
addressed to the respondent ESTATE OF THE LATE ALFREDO JACOB, by its administratrix Tomasa Vda. de
Jacob, directing the said respondent to deliver the possession of said property to the petitioner United Bicol
Savings Bank within thirty (30) days from the date this judgment becomes final; and for the Provincial
Sheriff to enforce said writ and to place said petitioner United Bicol Savings Bank in possession of said
property, with costs against the said respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Not satisfied therewith petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on June 27, 1989 affirming the decision appealed from without pronouncement as to costs. 12 A
motion for reconsideration of said decision which was filed by the petitioner was denied tied in a resolution
dated July 28, 1989.

Hence the petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 89544 wherein petitioner contends that the writ of
possession may not validly issue where from the admitted facts the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction
sale is patently void.

The petition in G.R. No. 89544 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No. 88602 hereinabove
discussed being closely related to each other.

The petition in G.R. No. 88602 is devoid of merit.

Petitioner contends that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and the sale of the property
mortgaged under the amended real estate mortgage after the mortgagor died are null and void. It is
pointed out that Dr. Jacob died on March 9, 1979 and that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were
effected after his death, that is, the public auction sale was made on May 11, 1979. Petitioner argues that
such extrajudicial foreclosure can only be prosecuted during the lifetime of Dr. Jacob for the reason that
such kind of foreclosure under Act No. 3135, as amended, is authorized only because of the special power
of attorney inserted in the mortgage deed; and that said special power of attorney cannot extend beyond
the lifetime of the supposed mortgagor.

Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

Sec. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by
mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute claim in the manner
provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose
his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the
property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his
deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or
other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and
in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the
other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from
redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under
the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudge it to be for the best interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made

From the foregoing provision of the Rules it is clearly recognized that a mortgagee has three remedies
that may be alternately availed of in case the mortgagor dies, to wit:

(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary
claim;

(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and;

(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same at anytime, before it is
barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency.

From the foregoing it is clear that the mortgagee does not lose its light to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage even after the death of the mortgagor as a third alternative under Section 7, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.

The power to foreclose a mortgage is not an ordinary agency that contemplated exclusively the
representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for
the latter's own protection. That power survives the death of the mortgagor. 13

The right of the mortgagee bank to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage after the death of the
mortgagor, acting through his attorney-in-fact, did not depend on the authority in the deed of mortgage
executed by the latter. That right existed independently of said stipulation and is clearly recognized in
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court aforecited. 14

The other issues raised in the petition are questions of fact which cannot be considered in this
proceeding.1wphi1 The findings of facts of the appellate court are conclusive and cannot be reviewed at
this level.

Likewise, the petition in G.R. No. 89544 is devoid of merit.

It is premised on the assumption that the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale was patently void
and was without basis. On the contrary the appellate court found and so does this Court, that the
extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale was regular and in accordance with law.

While it is true that the question of the validity of said mortgage and consequently the extrajudicial
foreclosure thereof was raised in a separate proceeding before the trial court the pendency of such
separate civil suit can be no obstacle to the issuance of the writ of possession which is a ministerial act of
the trial court after a title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. 15

WHEREFORE, petitions in G.R. Nos. 88602 and 89544 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit C.

2 Exhibits D and D-1.

3 Pages 41 to 43, Rollo, G.R. No. 88602.

4 Exhibits A-1 to I-C and 8-Bisala.

5 Exhibit 1-Bisala.

6 Exhibits 10, 11 and 12.

7 Exhibits 14,15 and 16-Bisala.

8 Exhibits 17 and 18-Bisala.

9 Page 46, Rollo, G.R. No. 88602.

10 Mr. Justice Manuel C. Herrera, was the ponente, concurred in by Justices Minerva Reyes and Alicia B.
Sempio Diy.

11 Page 17, Rollo, G.R. No. 88602.

12 Justice Jose A.R. Melo, ponente, concurred in by Justices Ricardo Province and Alfredo Benipayo.

13 Bicol Savings and Loan Association vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 85302, March 31, 1989,
citing Perez vs. PNB, 17 SCRA, 833- 839 (1966).

14 Bicol Savings and Loan Association vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Ibid, at note 13.

15 Section 7, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; Section 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, and ANTONIO J. HENSON,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 159130

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

carpio MORALES,

TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 22, 2008

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J:

We review in this petition[1] the Decision of the Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Division) dated February 11,
2003[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 71844.

THE ANTECEDENTS

Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999 a petition for the allowance of the will of her late
mother, Luz J. Henson, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
99-92870.

Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceaseds daughters and also a respondent in this petition, opposed Rubys
petition. She alleged that Ruby understated the value of their late mothers estate and acted with
unconscionable bad faith in the management thereof. Lilia prayed that her mother's holographic will be
disallowed and that she be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.

Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special Administrator of the estate of her late
mother, praying that the Prudential Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch be appointed as Interim Special
Administrator. The trial court granted the motion but designated Jose V. Ferro (Senior Vice-President and
Trust Officer, Trust Banking Group of the Philippines National Bank) as the Special Administrator. Ferro,
however, declined the appointment.

The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of the estate.
Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of the
estate. The significant highlights of his administration are listed below:

1.
On November 22, 1999, the trial court directed the heirs of Luz J. Henson to turn over the possession
of all the properties of the deceased to the Special Administrator.

2.
On February 16, 2000, Atty. Briones moved that the trial court approve Special Administrators fees of
P75,000.00 per month. These fees were in addition to the commission referred to in Section 7, Rule 85 of

the Revised Rules of Court. The trial court granted the motion but reduced the fees to P60,000.00 per
month, retroactive to the date Atty. Briones assumed office.

3.
Atty. Briones filed a Special Administrators Report No. 1 dated September 8, 2000 which contained an
inventory of the properties in his custody and a statement of the income received and the disbursements
made for the estate. The trial court issued an Order dated March 5, 2001 approving the report.

4.
On September 17, 2001, the heirs of Luz J. Henson submitted a project of partition of the estate for
the trial courts approval.

5.
On January 8, 2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrators Final Report for the approval of
the court. He prayed that he be paid a commission of P97,850,191.26 representing eight percent (8%) of
the value of the estate under his administration.

6.
The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that they be granted an
opportunity to examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of income and
disbursements. They likewise asked the trial court to deny the Atty. Briones claim for commission and that
he be ordered to refund the sum of P134,126.33 to the estate.

7.
On February 21, 2002, the respondents filed an audit request with the trial court. Atty. Briones filed
his comment suggesting that the audit be done by an independent auditor at the expense of the estate.

8.
In an Order dated March 12, 2002, the trial court granted the request for audit and appointed the
accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit.

9.
The respondents moved for the reconsideration of Order dated March 12, 2002, alleging that in view
of the partition of the estate there was no more need for a special administrator. They also clarified that
they were not asking for an external audit; they merely wanted to be allowed to examine the receipts,
vouchers, bank statements, and other documents in support of the Special Administrators Final Report and
to examine the Special Administrator under oath.

10. The trial court handed down an Order dated April 13, 2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby:

1.
Reiterates its designation of the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately
conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson,
the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate.

2.
Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his
commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.

3.
Directs the special administrator to deliver the residue to the heirs in proportion to their shares. From
the shares of Lilia J. Henson-Cruz, there shall be deducted the advances made to her.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

On April 29, 2002, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus which was raffled to the CAs Ninth Division and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349. The petition
assailed the Order dated March 12, 2002 which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors
and the Order dated April 3, 2002 which reiterated the appointment.

Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari in CA G.R. SP No. 70349, the heirs of Luz Henzon filed on April 9,
2002 a Notice of Appeal with the RTC assailing the Order dated April 3, 2003 insofar as it directed the
payment of Atty. Briones commission. They subsequently filed their record on appeal.

The trial court, however, denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on May 23, 2002 on the
ground of forum shopping. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

On July 26, 2002, the respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus with the appellate court, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 71844. They claimed that the trial court unlawfully refused to comply with its ministerial duty
to approve their seasonably-perfected appeal. They refuted the trial courts finding of forum shopping by
declaring that the issues in their appeal and in their petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349) are not
identical, although both stemmed from the same Order of April 3, 2002. The appeal involved the payment

of the special administrators commission, while the petition for certiorari assailed the appointment of an
accounting firm to conduct an external audit.

On the other hand, the petitioner insisted that the respondents committed forum shopping when they
assailed the Order of April 3, 2002 twice, i.e., through a special civil action for certiorari and by ordinary
appeal. Forum shopping took place because of the identity of the reliefs prayed for in the two cases. The
petitioner likewise posited that the trial courts error, if any, in dismissing the appeal on the ground of
forum shopping is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, and hence is not correctible by certiorari.

On February 11, 2003, the Court of Appeals decided the respondents petition for Mandamus (CA-G.R. SP
No. 71844) as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent Judge is directed to give due course to the appeal of
petitioners from the Order dated April 3, 2002 insofar as it directed the payment of commission to private
respondent. [Emphasis supplied.]

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had neither the power nor the authority to deny the appeal
on the ground of forum shopping. It pointed out that under Section 13, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, the authority of the trial court to dismiss an appeal, either motu proprio or on
motion, may be exercised only if the appeal was taken out of time or if the appellate court docket and
other fees were not paid within the reglementary period.

Atty. Briones moved for the reconsideration of this decision. The appellate court denied his motion in its
Resolution dated July 17, 2003. Thereupon, he seasonably filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
on September 4, 2003 on the ground that the CA refused to resolve the issue of forum shopping in its
Decision of February 11, 2003 and its resolution of July 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71844 (Petition for
Mandamus to give due course to the appeal).

In the interim, on August 5, 2003, the Court of Appeals (Ninth Division) handed down its Decision[3] in CAG.R. SP No. 70439 (Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus on the appointment of the auditing
firm), whose fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated March 12, 2002
and April 3, 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Public respondent Judge Artemio S. Tipon is hereby
COMMANDED to allow petitioner-heirs: 1) to examine all the receipts, bank statements, bank passbook,
treasury bills, and other documents in support of the Special Administrators Final Report, as well as the
Statement of the Income and Disbusement Made from the Estate; and 2) to cross-examine private
respondent Briones, before finally approving the Special Administrators Final Report. [Emphasis supplied.]

SO ORDERED.

THE PARTIES POSITIONS

The petitioner faults the appellate court for refusing to resolve the forum shopping issue in its Decision of
February 11, 2003 and the Resolution of July 17, 2003, thereby deciding the case in a way not in accord
with law or with applicable decisions of this Court. On the matter of forum shopping, the appellate court
simply stated in its decision that In view of the fact that respondent Judge had no power to disallow the
appeal on the ground of forum shopping, we deem it unnecessary to discuss whether or not petitioners
committed forum shopping. Neither did the appellate court pass upon the issue of forum shopping in its
ruling on the petitioners motion for reconsideration, stating that forum shopping should be resolved either
in the respondents appeal or in their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No.
70349).

As basis, the petitioner cites Section 3 of this Courts Circular No. 28-91 which provides that (a) Any
violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint;
and (b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his lawyer with the filing of multiple
petitions and complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court.

To prove that forum shopping transpired, the petitioner cites the respondents petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349) that prayed for the annulment of the assailed Order of
April 3, 2002 in its entirety. To the petitioner, the attack on the entire Order meant that even the payment
of the special administrators commission which was the subject of a separate appeal was covered by the
petition. The petitioner further alleged that to conceal the attempt at forum shopping, respondents
deliberately failed to mention the existence of their ordinary appeal of the same Order of April 3, 2002 in
the certification against forum shopping attached to their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in CA-G.R. SP No. 70349.

The petitioner cites in support of his position the cases of Silahis International, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[4] Tantoy Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[5] and First Philippine International Bank v. Court
of Appeals.[6] Silahis was cited for the proposition that only one recourse the appeal should have been
filed because the issues were inter-related. Tantoy, Sr. spoke of related causes or the same or substantially
the same reliefs in considering whether there is forum shopping. On the other hand, First Philippine
International Bank was cited to emphasize that the key to a finding of forum shopping is the objective of
the relief; though differently worded, there is violation of the rule against forum shopping if the objective in
all the actions filed involves the same relief in this case, the setting aside of the Order of April 3, 2002. The
petitioner noted that the respondents had succeeded in obtaining this relief in their petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349) and the ruling in this petition already constituted res
judicata on the validity of the Order of April 3, 2002.

The respondents, for their part, claim that the mere failure to specify in the decision the contentions of the
appellant and the reason for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the
provisions of the law and the Constitution.[7] In support of the twin recourses they took, they cite Argel v.
Court of Appeals[8] where this Court rejected the ground for objection similar to present petitioners
because the special civil action for certiorari and the appeal did not involve the same issue. The
respondents saw as ineffective the argument that the petition for certiorari prayed for the annulment of
the entire Order of April 3, 2002 since the petition and the appeal were very specific on the portions of the
Order that were being assailed. They pointed, too, to the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 which only
passed upon the issues specified in the petition for certiorari, leaving untouched the issue that they chose
to raise via an appeal. As their last point, the respondents claimed they saw no need to mention the
pendency of the appeal in their non-forum shopping certification because the appeal dealt with an issue
altogether different from the issues raised in the petition for certiorari, citing for this purpose the specific
wordings of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court.

THE ISSUE

The sole issue presented to us for resolution is: Did the Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Division) err in not
dismissing the respondents petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 71844) on the ground of forum
shopping?

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit as the discussions below will show.

The Order of April 3, 2002

An examination of the RTC Order of April 3, 2002 shows that it resolved three matters, namely: (1) the
designation of the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit of the administration of Atty.
George S. Briones of the estate of Luz J. Henson, at the expense of the estate; (2) the payment of the
petitioners commission as the estates Special Administrator; and (3) the directive to the petitioner to
deliver the residue of the estate to the heirs in their proportional shares. Of these, only the first two are
relevant to the present petition as the third is the ultimate directive that will close the settlement of estate
proceedings.

The first part of the Order (the auditors appointment) was the subject of the petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus that the respondents filed before the appellate court (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349).
Whether this part is interlocutory or one that fully settles the case on the merits can be answered by the
test that this Court laid down in Mirada v. Court of Appeals: The test to ascertain whether or not an order is
interlocutory or final is Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of
the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not it is final. [9]

The terms of the trial courts order with respect to the appointment or designation of the accounting firm is
clear: to immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of the
late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate.

To audit, is to examine and verify (as the books of account of a company or a treasurers accounts). An
audit is the formal or official examination and verification of books of account (as for reporting on the
financial condition of a business at a given date or on the results of its operations for a given period).[10]
Blacks Law Dictionary defines it no differently: a systematic inspection of accounting records involving
analyses, tests and confirmations; a formal or official examination and authentication of accounts, with
witnesses, vouchers, etc.[11]

Given that the subject matter of the audit is Atty. Briones Final Report in the administration of the estate of
the decedent, its preparatory character is obvious; it is a prelude to the courts final settlement and
distribution of the properties of the decedent to the heirs. In the context of what the courts order
accomplishes, the courts designation of an auditor does not have the effect of ruling on the pending estate
proceeding on its merits (i.e., in terms of finally determining the extent of the net estate of the deceased
and distributing it to the heirs) or on the merits of any independently determinable aspect of the estate
proceeding; it is only for purposes of confirming the accuracy of the Special Administrators Final Report,
particularly of the reported charges against the estate. In other words, the designation of the auditor did
not resolve Special Proceedings No. 99-92870 or any independently determinable issue therein, and left
much to be done on the merits of the case. Thus, the April 3, 2002 Order of the RTC is interlocutory in so
far as it designated an accounting firm to audit the petitioners special administration of the estate.

In contrast with the interlocutory character of the auditors appointment, the second part is limited to the
Special Administrators commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. To quote from the

Order: the court hereby. . . 2. Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the
payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. Under these terms, it
is immediately apparent that this pronouncement on an independently determinable issue the special
administrators commission is the courts definite and final word on the matter, subject only to whatever a
higher body may decide if an appeal is made from the courts ruling.

From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrators commission is no less a claim against
the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when it
provides for Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.[12] Under Section 13 of the same Rule,
the action of the court on a claim against the estate is appealable as in ordinary cases.[13] Hence, by the
express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrators commission effectively, a
claim by the special administrator against the estate is the lower courts last word on the matter and one
that is appealable.

Available Recourses against

the April 3, 2002 Order

We bring up the above distinctions between the first two parts of the Order of April 3, 2002 to highlight
that the directives or determinations under the Order are not similarly final and appealable in character. In
this regard, Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Rules of Court lays down the rules on what are or are
not subject to appeal and it provides:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal shall be taken from:

xxx

(c) An interlocutory order.

xxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Under these terms and taking into account the previous discussion of the nature of the various parts of the
Order of April 3, 2002, the lower courts determination of the special administrators commission is clearly
appealable while the auditors appointment is not. The latter, under the express terms of the above
provision, can be the subject of an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Rulings abound on when an appeal or a petition for certiorari is the appropriate recourse to take from a
lower court ruling.[14] The twist in the present case is that the losing party took two available recourses
from the same Order of the lower court: an appeal was made with respect to that portion of the Order that
is final in character, and a petition for certiorari was taken against the portion that, again by its nature, is
interlocutory. It was under these circumstances that the petitioner posited that forum shopping had been
committed as the respondents should have simply appealed, citing the interlocutory aspect as an error in
the appeal of the final aspect of the Order of April 3, 2002.

While the petitioners position may be legally correct as a general rule, it is not true in the present case
considering the unique nature of the case that gave rise to the present petition. The petitioner is the
special administrator in a settlement of estate, a special proceeding governed by Rule 72 to 109 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 109 in part states:

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

xxxxxxxxx

(c) allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) constitutes, in the proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person x x x a
final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be
allowed from the appointment of a special administrator.

The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.[15] In
this multi-appeal mode, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but
retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further
remedies the parties may avail of.[16]

Where multi-appeals are allowed, we see no reason why a separate petition for certiorari cannot be
allowed on an interlocutory aspect of the case that is separate and distinct as an issue from the aspect of
the case that has been adjudged with finality by the lower court. To reiterate, the matter appealed matter
was the special administrators commission, a charge that is effectively a claim against the estate under
administration, while the matter covered by the petition for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor
who would pass upon the special administrators final account. By their respective natures, these matters
can exist independently of one another and can proceed separately as envisioned by the Rules under Rule
109.

The Forum Shopping Issue

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if
not in one court, then in another.[17] It is directly addressed and prohibited under Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and is signaled by the presence of the following requisites: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of the rights
asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (3) identity of the two
preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[18] In simpler terms, the test to determine whether
a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[19]

We see no forum shopping after considering these standards as neither litis pendentia nor res judicata
would result in one case from a ruling in the other, notwithstanding that the appeal that subsequently
became the subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 71844 and the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 70439 both
stemmed from the trial courts Order dated April 3, 2002. The simple reason as already discussed above is
that the petition and the appeal involve two different and distinct issues so that a ruling in either one will
not affect the other.

Forum shopping is further negated when the nature of, and the developments in, the proceedings are
taken into account i.e., an estate proceedings where the Rules expressly allow separate appeals and where
the respondents have meticulously distinguished what aspect of the RTCs single Order could be appealed
and what could not. Thus, the petitioner cannot take comfort in the cases it cited relating to forum
shopping; these cases, correct and proper in their own factual settings, simply do not apply to the
attendant circumstances and special nature of the present case where the issues, although pertaining to
the same settlement of estate proceedings and although covered by the same court order, differ in
substance and in stage of finality and can be treated independently of one another for the purposes of
appellate review.

Did the Court of Appeals err in refusing to resolve the issue of forum shopping?

Given our above discussion and conclusions, we do not see forum shopping as an issue that would have
made a difference in the appellate courts ruling. Nor is it an issue that the appellate court should, by law,
have fully ruled upon on the merits. We agree with the respondent that the appellate court is not required
to resolve every contention and issue raised by a party if it believes it is not necessary to do so to decide
the case. [20]

The reality though is that the appellate court did rule on the issue when it stated that it becomes
unnecessary to discuss whether the latter engaged in forum shopping. Apparently, the issue on forum
shopping was also raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 and private respondent can again raise the same in the
appeal from the order dated April 3, 2002, where the issue should be properly resolved.[21] To the
appellate court faced with the task of ruling on a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to allow
the respondents appeal forum shopping was not an issue material to whether the trial court should or
should not be compelled; what was material are the requisite filing of a notice of appeal and record on
appeal, and the question of whether these have been satisfied. We cannot find fault with this reasoning as
the forum shopping issue i.e., whether there was abuse of court processes in the respondents use of two
recourses to assail the same trial court order has specific pertinence and relevance in the sufficiency and
merits of the recourses the respondents took.

In sum, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in refusing to resolve forum shopping as an issue in
its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 71844.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition and, accordingly, AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 11, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71844. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1] Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

[2] Rollo, pp. 44-51; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justice Josefina GuevaraSalonga and Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine concurring.

[3] Rollo, pp. 92-100; penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz, with Associate Justice Jose L.
Sabio, Jr. and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid concurring.

[4] G.R. No. 104513, August 4, 1993, 225 SCRA 94.

[5] G.R. No. 141427, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 329.

[6] G.R. No. 115849, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 259.

[7] Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R, No. L-21438, September 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155.

[8] G.R. No. 128805, October 12, 1999, 316 SCRA 511.

[9] G.R. No. L-33007, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 295.

[10] Websters Third International Dictionary (1993 ed.), p. 143.

[11] Fifth Ed. (1979), p. 120.

[12] Section 8. Claim of executor or administrator against an estate. If the executor or administrator has a
claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof in writing, to the court, and the court
shall appoint a special administrator, who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and
be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims.
The court may order the executor or administrator to pay the special administrator necessary funds to
defend such action.

[13] Section 13. Judgment appealable. The judgment of the court approving or disapproving a claim, shall
be filed with the record of the administration proceedings with notice to both parties, and is appealable as
in ordinary cases. A judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in due course of
administration, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not create any lien upon the property of the
estate, or give to the judgment creditor any priority of payment.

[14] See People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 393.

[15] Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111324, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA
186.

[16] Valarao v. Pascual, G.R. No. 150164, November 26, 2002, 392 SCRA 695.

[17] Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 123332, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 487. See also:
Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corp. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 427 SCRA 585 (2044), citing TBoli
Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) v. Solidapsi, 394 SCRA 269 (2002).

[18] Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Catalan, G.R. Nos. 159590-91, October 18, 2004, 440
SCRA 498, 513-514, citing Phil. Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 406 SCRA 575 (2003).

[19] Velasquez v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 150732 & 151095, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 357, 367, citing
Bangko Silangan Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 322 (2001), Phil. Economic Zone
Authority v. Vianzon, 336 SCRA 309 (2000), Progressive Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA
637 (1999).

[20] Air France v. Carrascoso, supra note 7.

[21] Rollo, pp. 54-55.

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51151 July 24, 1981

PAZ G. ROMUALDEZ, BELEN A. GUECO, assisted by her husband, JOSE TINSAY, and CATALINA A. GUECO,
assisted by her husband JOSE SIOPONGCO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ANTONIO P. TIGLAO, ERNESTO TIGLAO, BERNARDO TIGLAO and JUANA TIGLAO, defendants, ESTATE OF
FELISA TIGLAO, defendant-appellant.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an appeal by the Estate of Felisa Tiglao from a decision in Civil Case No. Q-14424 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal which revived a judgment rendered in Civil Case No.Q-5055 also of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.

Originally appealed to the Court of Appeals, that court certified the case to us on the ground that it
involves questions of law only.

The relevant facts are the following:

On March 15, 1960, Paz G. Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao for the payment of unpaid rentals
for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota. Included in the suit were Felisa Tiglao and others who had
guaranteed the payment of the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao. The suit was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-5055 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On May 31, 1960, a decision was rendered with
the following dispositive portion:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, by ordering said defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of
P22,767.17 representing the unpaid rentals on the sugar quota, to pay P5,000.00 as liquidated damages
and the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs.

The judgment was not satisfied notwithstanding a writ of execution to enforce it. Accordingly, on May
18, 1970, Paz G. Romualdez, et al. filed Civil Case No. Q-14424 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against Antonio Tiglao and his sureties in order to revive the judgment above quoted.

It should be stated that when the suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa F. Tiglao had died and her
estate was being settled in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Accordingly,
the one who was made defendant was her estate represented by the Special Administratrix Maningning
Tiglao-Naguiat, In her Motion to Dismiss, dated October 5, 1970, Answer dated April 5, 1971, and still
another .Motion to Dismiss, dated September 25, 1973, the administratrix questioned the jurisdiction of
the court a quo to entertain the suit to revive judgment. She invoked Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
that, "No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; ... "

Brushing aside the posture of the administratrix, the court a quo rendered a decision on January 21,
1974, with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs ordering the revival of the judgment of this court in Civil Case No. 5055, which runs as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, by ordering the said defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of
P22,767.17 representing the unpaid rental on the sugar quota, to pay P5,000.00 as liquidated damages
and the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs.

without pronouncement as to costs.

The Estate of Felisa Tiglao filed a separate appeal which is now before us.

The decision reviving the judgment states: "For the estate of Felisa Tiglao, no evidence was presented, it
having been declared in default previously." But as can be gleaned from the facts stated above, the Estate
of Felisa Tiglao filed an Answer, dated April 1, 1971, and a second Motion to Dismiss, dated September 25,
1973. The reason for the mistake is that the case was handled by several judges (Judges Lorenzo Relova
and Santiago O. Tatiada) before it was decided by Judge Augusta L. Valencia. However, the mistake is not
fatal for the Estate of Felisa Tiglao did not raise any factual issue in the court below. It raised a question of
law only which we now resolve in this appeal.

The appellant argues that the present action is one for the recovery of a sum of money so that it is
barred by Sec. I of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court and that the remedy of the appellees is to present their
claim in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

This argument is simply answered thus: the original judgment which was rendered on May 31, 1960, has
become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years. (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.) Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by
action. This is precisely why the appellees have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the
Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said
judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate in Special Proc.
No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment insofar as the Estate of Felisa Tiglao is concerned, its
appeal is hereby dismissed with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.:, concuring:

Felisa Tiglao died on December 4, 1966. Special Proceeding No. Q-10731 of Branch V of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of her estate, was filed on
January 18, 1967 (p. 3, Appellant's brief).

It is a fact that when the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment of Judge Nicasio Yatco dated May
31, 1960 against the Tiglao defendants was about to expire, there was as yet no notice to creditors in
Special Proceeding No. Q-10731 and no regular administrator had been appointed. hence, the judgmeat
creditors could not file a claim against the testate estate for the amount of the unsatisfied judgment.

The judgment creditors had no alternative but to file an action for revival of judgment to prevent its
extinguishment by prescription.

It is true that, as a general rule, "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator" because the creditor's remedy is to file
the proper claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the deceased debtor's estate within the period
fixed in the Statute of Nonclaims (Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 87, Rules of Court).

But the instant case, because of the singular circumstances recounted above, is an exception to that
general rule.

At any rate, the judgment creditors filed on August 20, 1971 in the testate proceeding already
mentioned the corresponding claim (p. 44, Record on Appeal).

The lower court's judgment in this case, which is being assailed on appeal, is simply a confirmation of
that claim which was based on Judge Yatco's 1960 judgment. The confirmation was necessary to forestall
extinctive prescription of the judgment

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.:, concuring:

Felisa Tiglao died on December 4, 1966. Special Proceeding No. Q-10731 of Branch V of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of her estate, was filed on
January 18, 1967 (p. 3, Appellant's brief).

It is a fact that when the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment of Judge Nicasio Yatco dated May
31, 1960 against the Tiglao defendants was about to expire, there was as yet no notice to creditors in
Special Proceeding No. Q-10731 and no regular administrator had been appointed. hence, the judgmeat
creditors could not file a claim against the testate estate for the amount of the unsatisfied judgment.

The judgment creditors had no alternative but to file an action for revival of judgment to prevent its
extinguishment by prescription.

It is true that, as a general rule, "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator" because the creditor's remedy is to file
the proper claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the deceased debtor's estate within the period
fixed in the Statute of Nonclaims (Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 87, Rules of Court).

But the instant case, because of the singular circumstances recounted above, is an exception to that
general rule.

At any rate, the judgment creditors filed on August 20, 1971 in the testate proceeding already
mentioned the corresponding claim (p. 44, Record on Appeal).

The lower court's judgment in this case, which is being assailed on appeal, is simply a confirmation of
that claim which was based on Judge Yatco's 1960 judgment. The confirmation was necessary to forestall
extinctive prescription of the judgment

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 129008

January 13, 2004

TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA,

ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P.
ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA,
respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an
administrator is the issue in this case.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as its
Resolution2 dated March 26, 1997, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and
real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City.3 He also left a widow, respondent
Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are
the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. OrfinadaHappenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and
Angelo P. Orfinada.4

Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their
children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into an extramarital relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and
co-petitioners Veronica5, Alberto and Rowena.6

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29,
1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan
City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984
and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and
Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of
P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.7

On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that
letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.8

On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related Documents with
Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.9

On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense
that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties
originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero10 and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as
an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name.11 Petitioners also
raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of

Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.12 On April 29, 1996,
petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing13 on the aforesaid ground.

The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents,
as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be
appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration15 but the motion was likewise
denied.16

This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053.17 Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that
the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents.18

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision19 dated January 31, 1997, stating that it discerned
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge
when he denied petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its discretionary
nature.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.20 Hence, the petition before this
Court.

The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal standing to
prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration
proceedings.21

Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for preliminary
hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent
and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative
defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this
rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be
had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.22 (Emphasis supplied.)

Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional
character of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect.23 Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond cavil by the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase "in the discretion of the Court", apart from
the retention of the word "may" in Section 6,24 in Rule 16 thereof.

Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts doorstep for not hearing
petitioners affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the
respondents as heirs to bring the suit.

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring
suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil
Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The
provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent
and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will
or by operation of law.25

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence
to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 326 and Section 2, Rule 8727 of
the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,28 this Court recognized the legal standing of the
heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment
of an administrator. Thus:

The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits
on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically
addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to
wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would
care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do
nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the
executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged
to have participated in the act complained of31 and he is made a party defendant.32 Evidently, the
necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there
is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either
disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.

All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of
the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when
there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.

As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower court, recourse
to this Court is not warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 17-20.

2 Id, at 21-22.

3 Id. at 95.

4 Ibid.

5 The Complaint for Annulment/Rescission of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of a Deceased
Person dated December 2, 1995 contains an allegation under paragraph 9 that Veronica is not one of the
illegitimate children of the decedent Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. by Teodora Riofero but of one Alonzo Orfinada.

6 Rollo, p. 95.

7 Id. at 95-96.

8 Id. at 96.

9 Id. at 28-37.

10 CA Rollo, p. 38.

11 Id. at 10.

12 Id. at 38.

13 Rollo, pp. 107-108.

14 CA Rollo, pp. 113-116.

15 Id. at 32-34.

16 Id. at 39-40.

17 Id. at 1-12.

18 Id. at 7.

19 Rollo, pp. 17-20.

20 Id. at 21-22.

21 Id. at 124.

22 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It is Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which reads:

Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the
grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer
and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had
been filed.

The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the
same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer. (Emphasis supplied)

23 Republic Planters Bank v. Agana, Sr., G.R. No. 51765, 269 SCRA 1, 12 (1997).

24 Supra note 22.

25 Coronel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996, 263 SCRA 15.

26 Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a

representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express
trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent
acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.

27 Section 2 of Rule 87:

Sec. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive. For the recovery or
protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend, in
the right of the deceased, actions for causes which survive."

28 G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 207.

29 Supra, note 26.

30 Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 (1942).

31 Velasquez v. George, G.R. No. L-62376, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 456.

32 Borromeo v. Borromeo, 98 Phil 432 (1956).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21034

April 30, 1966

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE, ESTATE OF THOMAS FALLON, and ANNE FALLON MURPHY, deceased,
IGNATIUS HENRY BEZORE, ET AL., petitioners.
MARTINIANO O. DE LA CRUZ, administrator-appellant,
vs.
EMILIO CAMON, oppositor-appellee.

Martiniano O. de la Cruz, for administrator-appellant.

Hilado and Hilado, for oppositor-appellee.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy1 was owner of two-fourths (2/4) share pro-indiviso
of Hacienda Rosario in Negros Occidental. That whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon since
long before the present intestate proceedings were commenced.

On October 23, 1962 the administrator of the estate moved the court for an order to direct Emilio
Camon to pay the estate's two-forths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for the crop years 19481949 through 1960-1961, viz: on the sugar land, P62,065.00; and on the rice land, P2,100.00. On
December 3, 1962, Emilio Camon challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his person. The court
ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made "by mere motion by the administrator but by
independent action." The administrator appealed.

The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental over the subject matter herein is
beyond debate. The organic act creating courts of first instance, amongst others, allocates within its
jurisdictional boundaries "all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or value of property in
controversy, amounts to more than ten thousand pesos."2 But here, the court sits as a probate court. Said
court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. For these
purposes, property in the hands of the estate's administrator comes within the power of the probate court.

With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the administrator's claim for rentals allegedly due. The
amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated. Conceivably, the lessee may interpose defenses.
Compromise, payment, statute of limitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to defeat
the administrator's case. Here, appellee's opposition to the motion served a warning that at the proper
time he will set up the defense that the administrator, as attorney-in-fact of the declared heirs, had
theretofore sold the estate's two-fourths share in Hacienda Rosario together with "all the rights, title and
interest (including all accrued rents) that said heirs had inherited from the said deceased." Appellant
administrator in his reply to the opposition admits the fact of sale of the land, but not of the rentals due.
Accordingly, the right to collect the rentals is still in a fluid state. That right remains to be threshed out
upon a full-dress trial on the merits. Because of all of these, the money (rentals) allegedly due is not
property in the hands of the administrator; it is not thus within the effective control of the probate court.
Neither does it come within the concept of money of the deceased "concealed, embezzled, or conveyed
away", which would confer upon the court incidental prerogative to reach out its arms to get it back and, if
necessary, to cite the possessor thereof in contempt.3 At best that money is debt to the estate not
against the estate. Recovery thereof, we are persuaded to say, should be by separate suit commenced by
the administrator.4 With reason, because of the absence of express statutory authorization to coerce the
lessee debtor into defending himself in the probate court.5 And, we are confronted with the unyielding
refusal of appellee to submit his person to the jurisdiction of the probate court.

By no means may it be said that this is untrodden ground. Paula vs. Escay, et al., teaches that: "When
the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not
under the court's jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an
independent action against the third person."6 The line drawn in the Escay case gives us a correct
perspective in the present. The demand is for money due allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person.
Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings.
We are fortified in our view by the more recent pronouncement of this court7 that even "matters affecting
property under judicial administration" may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of
intestate proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229,
232).1wph1.t

The appealed order is in accord with the law. It is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1Special Proceedings No. 6056, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, started on February 16,
1961.

2Section 44(c), The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

3Section 6, Rule 87, Rules of Court.

4Section 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court, reads: "SEC. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend
actions which survive.For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an
executor or administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for causes which
survive."

5Cf. 33 C.J.S., p. 1143, citing In re Cheley's Estate, 298 P. 942, expresses the view that -- "In the absence
of statutory authorization, the probate court cannot adjudicate the existence of any indebtedness owed to
the estate by a distributee beyond the amount of the distributee's share in the estate."

697 Phil. 617, 620; italics supplied. To the same effect: Tagle, etc., et al., vs. Manalo, et al., 56 O.G. No.
46, pp. 7053 where this Court said: "... the remedy being sought by the executor, that is, the declaration of
nullity of the certificate of title issued in favor of the deed of sale and the consequent cancellation of the
certificate of title issued in favor of the vendee-petitioner Pastor Manalo cannot be obtained through a
mere motion in the probate proceedings over the objection of a third party adversely affected and over
whom the probate court had no jurisdiction."

7Bernardo, etc., et al. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. L-18148, February 29, 1963 (emphasis
supplied), cited with approval in: Alvares et al., vs. Espiritu, G.R. L-18833, August 14, 1965, where this
Court declared: "It is only when the parties interested are all heirs and they agree to submit to the probate
court the question as to title to property that the probate court may definitely pass judgement thereon."

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Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48140

May 4, 1942

SINFOROSO PASCUAL, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PONCIANO S. PASCUAL, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Celedonio Bernardo for appellant.

Ortega & Ortega for appellees.

MORAN, J.:

On September 14, 1940, while the proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda de
los Santos were pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal plaintiff, Sinforoso Pascual, instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Ponciano S. Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of
a contract of sale of a fishpond situated in Lubao, Pampanga, supposedly executed without consideration
by said deceased in her lifetime in favor of the defendants. The complaint alleges that plaintiff and
defendants are all residents of Malabon, Rizal, and are legitimate children of the testratix, Eduarda de los
Santos. Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause of action, limitation of action,
wrong venue and pendency of another action. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the
action should have been brought by the executor or administrator of the estate left by the deceased, and
directed the plaintiff to amend his complaint within five days. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the
amendment consisting in that "el demandado Miguel S. Pascual ha sido nombrado por el Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Rizal albacea testamentario de los bienes de la finada Eduarda de los Santos. en el
asunto de la testamentaria de dicha finada." The trial court declaring that such amendment did not cure

the insufficiency of the complaint, dismissed the action. It is from this order of dismissal that plaintiff
interposed his appeal.

Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or protection of the
property or rights of the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his
executor or administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings the heirs have
no standing in court in actions of the above character, except when the executor or administrator is
unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may act in his place. (Pomeroy on Code
Remedies, p. 158, 11 R C. L. p. 262; 21 Am. Jur., 940) Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made
to the defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual, being the executor appointed by the probate court.
Such executor naturally would not bring an action against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His refusal
to act may, therefore, be implied. And this brings the case under the exception. It should be noted that in
the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond be delivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor, thus
indicating that the action is brought in behalf of the estate of the deceased.

Appellees contend that there is here a wrong venue. They argue that an action for the annulment of a
contract of sale is a personal action which must be commenced at the place of residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant, at the election of the plaintiff (Rule 5, sec. 1, Rules of Court), and, in the instant
case, both plaintiff and defendants are residents of Malabon, Rizal, but the action was commenced in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga. It appearing, however, that the sale is alleged to be fictitious, with
absolutely no consideration, it should be regarded as a non-existent, not merely null, contract. (8 Manresa,
Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, 2nd ed., pp. 766-770.) And there being no contract between the
deceased and the defendants, there is in truth nothing to annul by action. The action brought cannot thus
be for annulment of contract, but is one for recovery of a fishpond, a real action that should be, as it has
been, brought in Pampanga, where the property is located (Rule 5, sec. 3, Rules of Court.)

Appellees argue further that the action brought by the plaintiff is unnecessary, the question involved
therein being one that may properly be raised and decided in the probate proceedings. The general rule is
that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate proceedings. (Bauermann vs. Casas,
10 Phil., 386; Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil., 273; Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil., 61; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.,
664; Adapon vs. Maralit, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Sup., p. 84.) The court is, however, of the opinion and so holds
that, when as in the instant case, the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased claiming title under
him, the question as to whether the transfer made by the latter to the former is or is not fictitious, may
properly be brought by motion in the testate or intestate proceedings on or before the distribution of the
estate among the heirs. This procedure is optional to the parties concerned who may choose to bring a
separate action as a matter of convenience in the preparation or presentation of evidence, and
accordingly, the action brought by the appellant is not improper.

Order is reversed, and the case is remanded the trial court for further proceedings, with costs against
appellees.

Yulo, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27876 April 22, 1992

ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Margarita
Suri Santos, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL., defendants. CITY OF DAGUPAN, defendant-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The issue presented in this case is the validity of a sale of a parcel of land by the administrator of an
intestate estate made pursuant to a petition for authority to sell and an order granting it which were filed
and entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the decedents.

The records disclose that on 12 June 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Severo Maneclang and nine (9) children. On 30 July 1947, a petition for the settlement of her
estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate children, with the Court of First Instance at
Dagupan City, Pangasinan; the case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 3028. At the time of the filing of the
petition, the ages of her children were as follows:

Hector Maneclang 21 years old

Cesar Maneclang 19
Oscar Maneclang 17
Amanda Maneclang 16
Adelaida Meneclang 13
Linda Maneclang 7
Priscila Maneclang 6
Natividad Maneclang 3
Teresita Maneclang 2

No guardian ad litem was appointed by the court for the minor children.

Margarita left several parcels of land, among which is Lot No. 203 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan
City containing an area of 7, 401 square meters, more or less , and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1393.

On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate estate of Margarita, filed a
petition in SP Proc. No. 3028 asking the court to give him "the authority to dispose of so much of the estate
that is necessary to meet the debts enumerated" in the petition. While notice thereof was given to the
surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, no such notice was sent to
the heirs of Margarita.

On 9 September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court issued an Order
"authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the properties of the estate for the purposes
(sic) of paying off the obligations" referred to in the petition.

Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator of the intestate estate, executed on 4
October 1952 a deed of sale 1 in favor of the City of Dagupan, represented by its mayor, Angel B.
Fernandez, of a portion consisting of 4,415 square meters of the aforementioned Lot No. 203 for and in
consideration of P11,687.50. This sale was approved by the intestate court on 15 March 1954.

The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and constructed thereon a public market,
known as the Perez Boulevard Public Market, at a cost of P100,00.00, more or less. It has been in
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property since the construction of the market. 2

Some other parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate were sold by the administrator pursuant of
the same authority granted by the 9 September 1949 Order. 3

On 28 September 1965, the new judicial administratrix of the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang,
daughter of the late Margarita Suri Santos, filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action for
the annulment of the sales made by the previous administrator pursuant to the order of 9 September
1949, cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and
Amparo Baun, Marcelo Operaa and Aurora Pagurayan, Crispino Tandoc and Brigida Tandoc, Jose Infante
and Mercedes Uy Santos, Roberto Cabugao, Basilisa Callanta and Fe Callanta, Ricardo Bravo and Francisca
Estrada, the City of Dagupan, and Constantino Daroya and Marciana Caramat. 4 The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. D-1785. The cause of action against the City of Dagupan centers around the
deed of sale executed in its favor on 4 October 1952 by former judicial administrator Oscar S. Maneclang.
In its Answer filed on 5 November 1965, 5 the City of Dagupan interposed the following affirmative
defenses: (a) the sale in its favor is valid, legal and above board; (b) plaintiff has no cause of action against
it, or that the same, if any, had prescribed since the complaint was filed thirteen (13) years after the
execution of the sale; (c) plaintiff is barred by estoppel and laches; (d) it is a buyer in good faith; and (e) it
has introduced necessary and useful improvements and contructed a supermarket worth P200,000.00;
hence, assuming arguendo that the sale was illegal, it has the right to retain the land and the
improvements until it is reimbursed for the said improvements.

On 30 March 1966, plaintiff and the City of Dagupan entered into a Stipulation of Facts wherein they
agreed on the facts earlier adverted to. They, however, agreed: (a) to adduce evidence concerning the
reasonable rental of the property in question and other facts not embodied therein but which are material
and vital to the final determination of the case, and (b) to request the court to take judicial notice of SP
Proc. No. 3028.

The evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang was induced by its then incumbent
Mayor, Atty. Angel B. Fernandez, to sell the property to the City of Dagupan and that the said City has been
leasing the premises out to numerous tenants at the rate of P0.83 per square meter per month, or a total
monthly rental of P3,747.45, since 4 October 1952. 6

On 9 November 1966, the trial court rendered a partial decision in Civil Case No. D-1785 against the City
of Dagupan, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment:

(a) Annulling (sic) the Deed of Sale executed by the Administrator on October 4, 1952 (Exh. F) being null
and void ab initio;

(b) Ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Title issued in favor of the defendant City of Dagupan
by virtue of said Deed of Sale, and directing the Register of Deeds of said City to issue a new Certificate of
Title in favor of the plaintiff as Administratrix covering the property in question;

(c) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to restore the possession to the plaintiff in her capacity as
Judicial Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Margarita Suri Santos of the parcel of land in question,
together with all the improvements thereon existing;

(d) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan City to pay the plaintiff the sum of P584,602.20 as
accumulated rentals or reasonable value of the use of the property in question from October 4, 1952 up to
the filing of the complaint in 1985, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from the later date;

(e) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay a monthly rental or reasonable value of its
occupation of the premises in the amount of P3,747.45 from October 9, 1985 up to the date the possession
of the premises is delivered (sic) the plaintiff by said defendant, and

(f) Ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant City of Dagupan the sums of P100,000.00 and
P11,687.50 both amounts to be deducted from the amount due the plaintiff from said defendant.

Defendant shall also pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 7

In arriving at the said disposition, the trial court held that:

(a) Under Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, 8 which is similar to the provisions of Section 722 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, it is essential and mandatory that the interested parties be given notices of the application
for authority to sell the estate or any portion thereof which is pending settlement in a probate court. As
held in the early case of Estate of Gamboa vs. Floranza, 9 an order issued by a probate court for the sale of
real property belonging to the estate of a deceased person would be void if no notice for the hearing of the
petition for such sale is given as required by said Section 722. Under this section, when such a petition is
made, the court shall designate a time and place for the hearing and shall require notice of such hearing to
be given in a newspaper of general circulation; moreover, the court may require the giving of such further
notice as it deems proper.

In the instant case, no notice of the application was given to the heirs; hence, both the order granting
authority to sell and the deed of sale executed in favor of the City of Dagupan pursuant thereto, are null
and void.

(b) Estoppel does not lie against plaintiff as no estoppel can be predicated on an illegal act and estoppel
is founded on ignorance. In the instant case, the nullity is by reason of the non-observance of the
requirements of law regarding notice; this legal defect or deficiency deprived the probate court of its
jurisdiction to dispose of the property of the estate. Besides, the City of Dagupan was represented in the
transaction by lawyers who are presumed to know the law. This being the case, they should not be allowed
to plead estoppel; finally, estoppel cannot give validity to an act which is prohibited by law or is against
public policy. 10

(c) Laches and prescription do not apply. The deed of sale being void ab initio, it is in contemplation of
law inexistent and therefore the right of the plaintiff to bring the action for the declaration of inexistence of
such contract does not prescribe. 11

(d) The City of Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith and for value as the former judicial
administrator, Oscar Maneclang, testified that he was induced by then incumbent Mayor of the City
Councilor Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, Sr. to sell the property; moreover, the City Fiscal signed as witness to the
deed of sale. These lawyers are presumed to know the law.

Not satisfied with the decision, the City of Dagupan appealed to this Court 12 alleging that said decision
is contrary to law, the facts and the evidence on record, and that the amount involved exceeds
P500,000.00.

In its Brief, the City of Dagupan submits the following assigned errors:

FIRST ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE EXECUTED BY THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR TO
THE CITY OF DAGUPAN IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

SECOND ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN ESTOPPEL FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF THE SALE.

THIRD ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES AND
PRESCRIPTION.

FOURTH ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT DEFENDANT CITY OF DAGUPAN IS NOT A PURCHASER IN
GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.

FIFTH ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT CITY OF DAGUPAN TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM
OF P584,602.20 AS ACCUMULATED RENTALS OR REASONABLE VALUE OF (sic) THE USE OF THE PROPERTY
IN QUESTION FROM OCTOBER 4, 1952 UP TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN 1965, PLUS INTEREST
THEREON AT THE RATE OF 6% PER ANNUM FROM THE LATER DATE.

SIXTH ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT CITY OF DAGUPAN TO PAY A MONTHLY
RENTAL OR REASONABLE VALUE OF (sic) ITS OCCUPATION OF THE PREMISES IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,747,45
FROM OCTOBER 9, 1965 UP TO THE DATE THE POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES IS DELIVERED TO THE
PLAINTIFF BY SAID DEFENDANT.

We shall consider these assigned errors sequentially.

1. In support of the first, appellant maintains that notice of the application for authority to sell was given
to Severo Maneclang, surviving spouse of Margarita. As the designated legal representative of the minor
children in accordance with Article 320 of the Civil Code, notice to him is deemed sufficient notice to the
latter; moreover, after Oscar Maneclang signed the deed of sale 13 in his capacity as judicial administrator,
he "sent copies of his annual report and the deed of sale to Severo Maneclang, and his brothers Hector
Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang and sister Amanda Maneclang, all of legal ages (sic), while the other
minor heirs received theirs through his lawyer." 14 Besides, per Flores vs. Ang Bansing, 15 the sale of
property by the judicial administrator cannot be set aside on the sole ground of lack of notice.

These contentions are without merit.

Article 320 of the Civil Code does not apply. While the petition for authority to sell was filed on 2
September 1949, the Civil Code took effect only on 30 August 1950. 16 Thus, the governing law at the
time of the filing of the petition was Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain which provides as follows:

The father, or in his default, the mother, shall be the legal administrator of the property of the children
who are subject to parental authority.

However, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on guardianship impliedly repealed those of the
Civil Code relating to that portion of the patria potestad (parental authority) which gave to the parents the
administration and usufruct of their minor children's property; said parents were however entitled, under
normal conditions, to the custody and care of the persons of their minor children. 17

Article 320 of the present Civil Code, taken from the aforesaid Article 159, incorporates the amendment
that if the property under administration is worth more than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), the father or
the mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. This provision then
restores the old rule 18 which made the father or mother, as such, the administrator of the child's property.
Be that as it may, it does not follow that for purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under
Rule 89 of the Rules of the Court, notice to the father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said
Rule state explicitly that the notice, which must be in be writing, must be given to the heirs, devisees, and
legatees and that the court shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be
given to the interested parties.

There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or by a guardian ad litem in
the case of the minors, the notice may be given to such counsel or guardian ad litem. In this case,
however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs,
Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not represented by counsel.
The remaining seven (7) children were still minors with no guardian ad litem having been appointed to
represent them. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set forth in the
aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale
itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio. 19 The reason behind this requirement is
that the heirs, as the presumptive owners 20 since they succeed to all the rights and obligations of the
deceased from the moment of the latter's death, 21 are the persons directly affected by the sale or
mortage and therefore cannot be deprived of the property except in the manner provided by law.

Consequently, for want of notice to the children, the Order of 9 September 1949 granting the
application, the sale in question of 4 October 1952 and the Order of 15 March 1954 approving the sale are
all void ab initio as against said children. Severo Maneclang, however, stands on different ground
altogether. Having been duly notified of the application, he was bound by the said order, sale and approval
of the latter. However, the only interest which Severino Maneclang would have over the property is his
right of usufruct which is equal to that corresponding by way of legitime pertaining to each of the surviving
children pursuant to Article 834 of the Civil Code of Spain, the governing law at that time since Margarita
Suri Santos died before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

2 Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the administratrix of the estate and against the
children.

As to the former, this Court, in Boaga vs. Soler, supra, reiterated the rule "that a decedent's
representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land; 22
and if this be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not be estopped to
question the acts of his predecessor are not conformable to law." 23 Not being the party who petitioned
the court for authority to sell and who executed the sale, she cannot be held liable for any act or omission
which could give rise to estoppel. Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, through estoppel an admission or

representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon. In estoppel by pais, as related to the party sought to be estopped, it is
necessary that there be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) conduct amounting to false
representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (b)
intent, or at least expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the other
party; and (c) knowledge, actual or constructive of the actual facts. 24 In estoppel by conduct, on the other
hand, (a) there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts; (c) the party to whom it
was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and (d) it must have been made with the
intention that the other party would act upon it. 25

As to the latter, considering that, except as to Oscar Maneclang who executed the deed of sale in his
capacity as judicial administrator, the rest of the heirs did not participate in such sale, and considering
further that the action was filed solely by the administratrix without the children being impleaded as
parties plaintiffs or intervenors, there is neither rhyme nor reason to hold these heirs in estoppel. For
having executed the deed of sale, Oscar Maneclang is deemed to have assented to both the motion for
and the actual order granting the authority to sell. Estoppel operates solely against him.

3 As to prescription, this Court ruled in the Boaga case that "[a]ctions to declare the inexsistence of
contracts do not prescribe (Art. 1410, N.C.C.), a principle applied even before the effectivity of the new
Civil Code (Eugenio, et al. vs. Perdido, et al., supra, citing Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67, and Sabas vs.
Germa , 66 Phil. 471 )."

4. Laches is different from prescription. As the court held in Nielsen & Co. Inc . vs. Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Co., 26 the defense of laches applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned
with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches
is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on
some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches
is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time,
laches is not.

The essential elements of laches are the following: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint
seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant
in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. 27

In the instant case, from time the deed of sale in favor of the City of Dagupan was executed on 4
October 1952, up to the time of the filing of the complaint for annulment on 28 September 1965, twelve
(12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-four (24) days had elapsed.

The respective ages of the children of Margarita Suri Santos on these two dates were, more or less, as
follows:

Upon execution At the filing

of the deed of sale of the complaint

Hector Maneclang 26 39
Cesar Maneclang 24 37
Oscar Maneclang 22 35
Amanda Maneclang 21 34
Adelaida Maneclang 18 31
Linda Maneclang 12 25
Priscila Maneclang 11 24
Natividad Maneclang 8 20
Teresita Maneclang 7 20

It is an undisputed fact that the City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the property and
constructed thereon a public market; such possession was open, uninterrupted and continuous. Obviously,
Hector, Cesar, Oscar and Amanda were already of legal age when the deed of sale was executed. As it was
Oscar who executed the deed of sale, he cannot be expected to renounce his own act. With respect to
Hector, Cesar and Amanda, they should have taken immediate steps to protect their rights. Their failure to
do so for thirteen (13) years amounted to such inaction and delay as to constitute laches. This conclusion,
however, cannot apply to the rest of the children who were then minors and not represented by any
legal representative. They could not have filed an action to protect their interests; hence, neither delay nor
negligence could be attributed to them as a basis for laches. Accordingly, the estate is entitled to recover
5/9 of the questioned property.

5. In ruling out good faith, the trial court took into account the testimony of Oscar Maneclang to the
effect that it was Mayor Fernandez of Dagupan City and Councilor Teofilo Guadiz, Sr., both lawyers, who
induced him to sell the property and that the execution of the sale was witnessed by the City Fiscal.

We are unable to agree.

While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was actually issued on 9 September 1949, the
same was secured during the incumbency of the then judicial administrator Pedro Feliciano. Even if it is to
be assumed that Mayor Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz induced Oscar Maneclang to sell the property, the
fact remains that there was already the order authorizing the sale. Having been issued by a Judge who was
lawfully appointed to his position, he was disputably presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction and that his official duty was regularly performed. 28 It was not incumbent upon them to go
beyond the order to find out if indeed there was a valid motion for authority to sell. Otherwise, no order of
any court can be relied upon by the parties. Under Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is
one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it;

furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. It implies
freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. 29 We find no
circumstance in this case to have alerted the vendee, the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or defect in
the authority of the judicial administrator to sell the property. Since good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof, 30 it was incumbent
upon the administrator to established such proof, which We find to be wanting. However, Article 528 of the
Civil Code provides that: "Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case
and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the
thing improperly or wrongfully." The filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause
for cessation of good faith.

In Tacas vs. Tobon, 31 this Court held that if there are no other facts from which the interruption of good
faith may be determined, and an action is filed to recover possession, good faith ceases from the date of
receipt of the summons to appear at the trial and if such date does not appear in the record, that of the
filing of the answer would control. 32

The date of service of summons to the City of Dagupan in Civil Case No. D-1785 is not clear from the
record. Its Answer, however, was filed on 5 November 1965. Accordingly, its possession in good faith must
be considered to have lasted up to that date. As a possessor in good faith, it was entitled to all the fruits of
the property and was under no obligation to pay rental to the intestate of Margarita for the use thereof.
Under Article 544 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the
possession is legally interrupted. Thus, the trial court committed an error when it ordered the City of
Dagupan to pay accumulated rentals in the amount of P584,602.20 from 4 October 1952 up to the filing of
the complaint.

6. However, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan already became a possessor in bad faith.
This brings Us to the issue of reasonable rentals, which the trial court fixed at P3,747.45 a month. The
basis thereof is the monthly earnings of the city from the lessees of the market stalls inside the Perez
Boulevard Supermarket. The lesses were paying rental at the rate of P0.83 per square meter. Appellant
maintains that this is both unfair and unjust. The property in question is located near the Chinese
cemetery and at the time of the questioned sale, it had no access to the national road, was located "in the
hinterland" and, as admitted by the former judicial administrator, Oscar Maneclang, the persons who built
houses thereon prior to the sale paid only P6.00 to P8.00 as monthly rentals and the total income from
them amounted only to P40.00 a month. Appellant contends that it is this income which should be made
the basis for determining the reasonable rental for the use of the property.

There is merit in this contention since indeed, if the rental value of the property had increased, it would
be because of the construction by the City of Dagupan of the public market and not as a consequence of
any act imputable to the intestate estate. It cannot, however, be denied that considering that the property
is located within the city, its value would never decrease; neither can it be asserted that its price remained
constant. On the contrary, the land appreciated in value at least annually, if not monthly. It is the opinion
of this Court that the reasonable compensation for the use of the property should be fixed at P1,000.00 a
month. Taking into account the fact that Severo Maneclang, insofar as his usufructuary right is concerned,
but only until his death, is precluded from assailing the sale, having been properly notified of the motion
for authority to sell and considering further that the heirs, Hector, Cesar, Oscar and Amanda, all surnamed
Maneclang, are, as discussed above, barred by laches, only those portions of the monthly rentals which
correspond to the presumptive shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all surnamed
Maneclang, to the extent untouched by the usufructuary right of Severo Maneclang, should be paid by the
City of Dagupan. There is no showing as to when Severo Maneclang died; this date of death is necessary to
be able to determine the cessation of his usufructuary right and the commencement of the full enjoyment
of the fruits of the property by the unaffected heirs. Under the circumstances, and for facility of
computation, We hereby fix the presumptive shares in the rentals of the aforenamed unaffected heirs at

P500.00 a month, or at P100.00 each, effective 5 November 1965 until the City of Dagupan shall have
effectively delivered to the intestate estate 5/9 of the property in question. The latter, however, shall
reimburse the City of Dagupan of that portion of the real estate taxes it had paid on the land
corresponding to 5/9 of the lot commencing from taxable year 1965 until said 5/9 part is effectively
delivered to the intestate estate.

Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the City of Dagupan may retain possession of the property until
it shall have been fully reimbursed the value of the building in the amount of P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the
purchase price amounting to P6,493.05

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision in all respects, except to the extent
as above modified. As modified, (a) the sale in favor of the City of Dagupan, executed on 4 October 1952
(Exhibit "F"), is hereby declared null and void; however, by reason of estoppel and laches as abovestated,
only 5/9 of the subject property representing the presumptive shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad
and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang, may be recovered; (b) subject, however, to its right to retain the
property until it shall have been refunded the amounts of P100,000.00 and P6,493.05, the City of Dagupan
is hereby ordered to reconvey to the intestate estate of Margarita Suri Santos 5/9 of the property in
question, for which purpose said parties shall cause the appropriate partition thereof, expenses for which
shall be borne by them proportionately; and (c) the City of Dagupan is further ordered to pay reasonable
compensation for the use of 5/9 of the property in question at the rate of P500.00 a month from 5
November 1965 until it shall have effectively delivered the possession of the property to the intestate
estate of Margarita Suri Santos. Upon the other hand, said intestate estate is hereby ordered to refund to
the City of Dagupan that portion of the real estate taxes the latter had paid for the lot corresponding to 5/9
thereof effective taxable year 1965 and until the latter shall have delivered to said intestate estate.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit "F".

2 Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties in Civil Case No. D-1787, Record on Appeal, 17-21.

3 Id., 24.

4 Record on Appeal, 2-11.

5 Id., 13-17.

6 Decision of the trial court, Record on Appeal, 32-33.

7 Record on Appeal, 33-35.

8 Now Rule 89.

9 12 Phil. 193 [1908]; see also Boaga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755 [1961].

10 Citing Eugenio vs. Perdido, L-7083, 19 May 1955.

11 Citing Article 1410, Civil Code; Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67 [1906]; Asturias vs. Court of Appeals, 9
SCRA 131 [1963].

12 Record on Appeal, 35-36.

13 Op. cit., Exhibit "F".

14 Brief for Appellant, 7-8.

15 C.A.-G.R. No. 22746-R, 16 July 1959.

16 Lara vs. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778 [1954].

17 Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228 [1915].

18 PARAS, E.L. Civil Code of the Philippines Annonated, vol. I, eleventh ed., 1984, 742.

19 Boaga vs. Soler, supra., citing Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718 [1946] and Gabriel vs. Encarnacion, L6736, 4 May 1954. See also The Estate of Luis Gamboa Carpizo vs. Floranza, 12 Phil. 191 [1908], applying
and interpreting a similar provision of the Code of Civil Procedure.

20 Ortaliz vs. The Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Occidental Negros, 55 Phil. 33 [1930].

21 Buenaventura and Del Rosario vs. Ramos, 43 Phil. 704 [1922].

22 Citing Chase vs. Cartwright, 22 Am. St. Rep. 207, and cases cited; Meeks vs. Olpherts, 25 L. Ed. (U.S.)
735; 21 Am. Jur. 756, s. 667.

23 Citing Cf. Walker vs. Portland Savings Bank, LRA 1915 E. p. 840; 21 Am. Jur. p. 820, s. 785.

24 Kalalo vs. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 [1970].

25 De Castro vs. Ginete, 27 SCRA 623 [1969].

26 18 SCRA 1040 [1966], citing 30 C.J.S. 522; Pomeroy's Equity Jurispendence, vol. 2, 5th ed., 177.

27 Go Chi Gun vs. Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622 [1955]; Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298 [1962]; Vergara
vs. Vergara, 5 SCRA 53 [1962]; Yusingco vs. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589 [1971].

28 Section 3(n) and (m), Rules of Court.

29 TOLENTINO, A., Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. II, 1983 ed., 217.

30 Article 527, Civil Code.

31 53 Phil. 356 [1929].

32 TOLENTINO, op. cit., 226.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND ALEJANDRO LOPEZ respondents .

Filemon Cajator for petitioner.

Eligio G. Lagman for respondent Alejandro Lopez.

MAKASIAR, J.:p

It appears from the records that Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of Guagua, Pampanga was married to
Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no children.

On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor
(pp. 20-21, rec.).

In a Resolution dated October 26, 1953 in Sp. Proc. No. 894 entitled "En el Asunto de la Adopcion de la
Menor Juanita Lopez y Limson" (pp. 92-94, 103, rec.), herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now
married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta
and Alejandro. After adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doa Jacinta did not
execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.

In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, the aforementioned will was admitted
to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed executor without bond by
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Annexes "A" and "B", pp. 18-23, rec.). Accordingly, Alejandro took
his oath of office as executor (Annex "C", p. 24, rec.).

Nevertheless, in a project of partition dated March 19, 1960 executed by both Alejandro Lopez and
Juanita Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos. 3368
and 3441 (Jacinta's paraphernal property), described and embraced in Original Certificate of Title No.
13092, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga Lot 3368 with an area of 68,141 square meters and Lot 3441
with an area of 163,231 square meters, then assessed respectively at P3,070.00 and P5,800.00 (Annex
"D", pp. 27-36, rec.) were adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her share free from all liens,
encumbrances and charges, with the executor Alejandro Lopez, binding himself to free the said two parcels
from such liens, encumbrances and charges. The rest of the estate of the deceased consisting of 28 other
parcels of lands with a total assessed valuation of P69,020.00 and a combined area of 743,924.67 square
meters, as well as personal properties including a 1953 Buick car valued at P2,500.00 were allotted to Don
Alejandro who assumed all the mortgage liens on the estate (Annex "D", pp. 25-37, rec.).

In an order dated April 23, 1960, the lower court approved the said project of partition and directed that
the records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes (Annex
"E", p. 38, rec.). Upon ex-parte petition of the adjudicatees Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez-Guilas dated
August 25, 1961 (Annex "F", pp. 39-40, rec.), the lower court in an order dated August 28, 1961, approved
the correction of clerical errors appearing in the project of partition (Annex "G", p. 41, rec.).

On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and
annul the project of partition, which case was docketed as Civil Case 2539 entitled "Juanita Lopez-Guilas

vs. Alejandro Lopez" in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and
fraud, and pray further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the crops
and to deliver immediately to Juanita lots nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, which were
allocated to her under the project of partition (p. 132, rec.).

Meanwhile, in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, Juanita filed a petition dated July 20, 1964 praying that
Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots nos. 3368 and 3441 as well
as the 1,216 caverns of palay that he collected from the ten (10) tenants or lessees of the said two lots
(Annex "H", pp. 42-44, rec.).

In his opposition dated August 5, 1964 to the said petition, Alejandro Lopez claims that, by virtue of the
order dated April 23, 1960 which approved the project of partition submitted by both Alejandro and Juanita
and directed that the records of the case be archived upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes,
and the order of December 15, 1960 which "ordered closed and terminated the present case", the testate
proceedings had already been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the
executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing
the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate, when she could have filed
a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60) days from December 15, 1960 under Rule 38 of the old
Rules of Court (Annex "I") citing A. Austria vs. Heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, L-100808, Sept. 18, 1956 (pp. 4548, rec.).

In her reply dated November 17, 1965 to said opposition, Juanita contends that the actual delivery and
distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed and
terminated the proceedings, determines the termination of the probate proceedings (citing Intestate estate
of the deceased Mercedes Cano, Timbol vs. Cano, 59 O.G. No. 30, pp. 46-73, April 29, 1961, where it was
ruled that "the probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of
all the taxes, and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same"); that
the executor Alejandro is estopped from opposing her petition because he was the one who prepared, filed
and secured court approval of, the aforesaid project of partition, which she seeks to be implemented; that
she is not guilty of laches, because when she filed on July 20, 1964, her petition for he delivery of her
share allocated to her under the project of partition, less than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961
when the amended project of partition was approved, which is within the 5-year period for the execution of
judgment by motion (Annex "J", pp. 49-52, rec.).

In its order dated October 2, 1964, the lower court after a "pre-trial" stated that because the civil action
for the annulment of the project of partition was filed on April 13, 1964, before the filing on July 2, 1964 of
the petition for delivery of the shares of Juanita Lopez, "the parties have agreed to suspend action or
resolution upon the said petition for the delivery of shares until; after the civil action aforementioned has
been finally settled and decided", and forthwith set the civil action for annulment for trial on November 25,
and December 2, 1964 (Annex "K", pp. 53-54, rec.).

On June 11, 1965, Juanita filed an amended complaint in Civil Case 2539 (pp. 78-110, rec.), where she
acknowledges the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as the allocation in her
favor of the Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441, the delivery of which she is seeking (pp. 106-107, rec.).

In her motion dated November 17, 1965, Juanita sought the setting aside of the order dated October 2,
1964 on the ground that while the said order considered her action for annulment of the project of partition
as a prejudicial question, her filing an amended complaint on June 11, 1965 in civil case No. 2539 wherein

she admitted the partial legality and validity of the project of partition with respect to the adjudication to
her of the two lots as her share, rendered said civil case No. 2539 no longer a prejudicial question to her
petition of July 20, 1964 for the delivery of her share (Annex "L", pp. 55-59, rec.).

Alejandro filed his opposition dated December 1, 1965 to the aforesaid motion of Juanita to set aside the
order dated October 2, 1964 (Annex "M", pp. 60-61, rec.), to which Juanita filed her rejoinder dated
December 6, 1965 wherein she stated among others that pursuant to the project of partition, executor
Alejandro secured the cancellation of OCT. No. 13093 covering the two parcels of land adjudicated to her
under the project of partition and the issuance in his exclusive name on August 4, 1961 TCT No. 26638-R
covering the said Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre (Annex "N", pp. 62-71, rec.).

In an order dated April 27, 1966, the lower court denied Juanita's motion to set aside the order of
October 2, 1964 on the ground that the parties themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for
the delivery of her shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition has been
finally settled and decided (Annex "O", p. 72, rec.).

Juanita filed a motion dated May 9, 1966 for the reconsideration of the order dated April 27, 1966
(Annex "P" pp. 73-77, rec.), to which Alejandro filed an opposition dated June 8, 1966 (Annex "Q", pp. 112113, rec.).

Subsequently, Alejandro filed a motion dated July 25, 1966 praying that the palay deposited with
Fericsons and Ideal Rice Mill by the ten (10) tenants of the two parcels in question be delivered to him
(Annex "R", pp. 114-116, rec.),to which Juanita filed an opposition dated July 26, 1966 (Annex "S", pp. 117121, rec.). In an order dated September 8, 1966, the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of
the order dated April 27, 1966, and directed Fericsons Inc. and the Ideal Rice Mills to deliver to Alejandro or
his representative the 229 cavans and 46 kilos and 325 and 1/2 cavans and 23 kilos of palay respectively
deposited with the said rice mills upon the filing by Alejandro of a bond in the amount of P12,000.00 duly
approved by the court (Annex "T", pp. 122-127, rec.). Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

The position of petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas should be sustained and the writs prayed for granted.

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the
debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the
approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol vs.
Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong vs. Tecson, 89 Phil., pp. 28-30). As long as the
order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however,
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it
had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or
Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil., 730,
741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).

Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the heirs or
legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the aforecited doctrines.

The case of Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla (99 Phil. 1068) does not control the present controversy;
because the motion filed therein for the removal of the administratrix and the appointment of a new
administrator in her place was rejected by the court on the ground of laches as it was filed after the lapse
of about 38 years from October 5, 1910 when the court issued an order settling and deciding the issues
raised by the motion (L-10018, September 19, 1956, 99 Phil., 1069-1070). In the case at bar, the motion
filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years
from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23,
1960 when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots allocated
to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated December 15, 1960 of
the probate court closing and terminating the probate case did not legally terminate the testate
proceedings, for her share under the project of partition has not been delivered to her.

While it is true that the order dated October 2, 1964 by agreement of the parties suspended resolution
of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the decision in the civil action for the annulment of
the project of partition (Civil Case 2539) she filed on April 10, 1964; the said order lost its validity and
efficacy when the herein petitioner filed on June 11, 1965 an amended complaint in said Civil Case 2539
wherein she recognized the partial legality and validity of the said project of partition insofar as the
allocation in her favor of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 in the delivery of which she has been insisting all along
(pp. 106-107, rec.).

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Granting the writs prayed for;

2. Setting aside the orders of the respondent court dated October 2, 1964 and April 27, 1966, as null
and void; and, without prejudice to the continuance of Civil Case No. 2539, which, by reason of this
decision, involves no longer Lots 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, .

3. Directing.

(a) the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT No. 26638-R covering the aforesaid lots Nos. 3368
and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre and to issue anew Transfer Certificate of Title covering the said two lots
in the name of herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas; and

(b) the respondent Alejandro Lopez

(1) to deliver to herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas the possession of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441;

(2) to deliver and/or pay to herein, petitioner all the rents, crops or income collected by him from said
lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 from April 23, 1960 until the possession of the two aforementioned lots is actually
delivered to her, or their value based on the current market price; and

(3) to pay the costs.

So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.

Salas & Villareal for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV
No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:

a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for
the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the
burial, mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the
expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial
Foundation;'

b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not limited
to, specific items already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of the property of the
estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to
plaintiff;

c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees plus costs.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war
Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers,
sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia
Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December,
1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a
teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo
covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife
(p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a
house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all
these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close
friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving
students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without
having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties.
Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his
mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling.
Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to
Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special
Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:

4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein
movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late
Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they
have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record;
Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation
of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
(Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to
her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole
heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because
the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's
nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the
estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.

On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr.
Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and
proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98,
Rollo).

Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was
an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81,
Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months
later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia JavellanaVillanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.

On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and
required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration
of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to,
and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied
her motions for reconsideration.

In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On
January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
trial court in toto. Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:

1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition
and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate
proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;

2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic
fraud;

3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative
within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and

4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the
Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said
agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to
it.

I. The question of jurisdiction

After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of
her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the
settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for
the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of
the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far
relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of
the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of
the order are quoted below:

2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated
March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these
proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant
proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late
Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.

During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the
late Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest
relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom
he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.

xxxxxxxxx

2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of
the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.

The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be
terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)

In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC,
Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to
have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was
properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate
the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she
filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold
that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to
make a just and legal distribution of the estate.

In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's
estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule
in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117,
where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed between her and her
father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the
debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the
approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has
power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine
the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a
just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is
necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding
multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)

A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the
range of the administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action. (Litam v.
Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)

A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)

partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276,
L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated
Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not

elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his
share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings,
or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long
ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v.
Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107
Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)

In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action
in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese
woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage
to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children
of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera,
and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that
Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and,
will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).

However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for
over three years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering
that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her
right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss
the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.

The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate
proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia
Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and
requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were
improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the
probate court.

II. The question of extrinsic fraud

Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by
Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil
Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged
for the first time.

Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing party
which prevented a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which
prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon
matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so
much so that there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent
machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented from
presenting an available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such
that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief

against such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine
Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)

A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic
fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from
presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
(Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694,
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)

The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:

1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted
in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary
proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:

6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the
lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall
initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything
else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff,
[although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the
estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by
choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and
she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.

2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the
petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of
the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and
9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977
for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light)
issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the
proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to
intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out
by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:

... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after Celedonia Solivio was
declared as the sole heir. ... .

Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required by law, despite
which the present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged
right. (p. 22, Record)

The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from
judgment nor a motion for new trial.

The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:

Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in rem
no subsequent errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)

Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his
mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the
properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving
relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and inconsistent
with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to
so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.

Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or
defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing
Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v.
Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)

It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any
"interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude
Concordia from filing her own.

III. On the question of reserva troncal

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva
troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The
reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who inherits by operation of
law property from his descendants.

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the
third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came.

3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his
other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr.
was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his
aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal
applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another
ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.

Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate
are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.

ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship
by the whole blood.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:

Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree
in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or

preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share
and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)

IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share

However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in
honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which
she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which
she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:

4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia
Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are
not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)

she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in
favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.

Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive
and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v.
Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968,
24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).

The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in
the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the
trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her
husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by
alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323,
Record).

The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal
purposes:

1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving students as the
Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State
College, and the University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.

2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist Community for a
deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a priest.

3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and enrichment of the
various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this
foundation may be named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions.

4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community needs and be
able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.

5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-Javellana
mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West
Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S.
Javellana which has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and
those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be offered every February and October, and
Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their death anniversaries, as part of this provision.

6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loans from
whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the
income or such part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be
necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.

7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer,
or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every
kind and description or any interest herein.

8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishments of any of
the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit
of the corporation, including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of like
nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)

As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:

The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars
graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with
honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being
the most outstanding student teacher.

The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which was
donated by the Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.

The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He studied at
St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the
Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to become
Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban
Javellana Award.

Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West
Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious civic and
cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated
to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled
to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir,
Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each
shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the
Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as
administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of
the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989

NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual capacity and as judicial guardian of the
minors ANTONIO ALBERTO, JR. and LOURDES ALBERTO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR., assisted by his mother as his natural
guardian, ANDREA JONGCO, respondents.

Taada, Carreon & Taada for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 34750-R'* entitled "Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., thru his mother as his natural guardian, Andrea Jongco,
plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, in her individual capacity and as judicial
guardian of the minors, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr., defendants-appellees", reversing the
August 10, 1964. Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila.

The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on September 8, 1960 with
the then Court of First Instance of Manila by the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age,
assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the herein petitioners (Record on
Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his alleged
father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband and wife and as a
result of which, he was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time that his alleged father and
mother lived together as husband and wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had no

legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother continued living together
as husband and wife, his father supporting them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that
even the family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his father and
mother separated, and subsequently, his father married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a
result of the marriage, two (2) children were born herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto,
Jr.; that although his father was separated from his mother, he continued to support him and recognized
him as his own child; that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad
del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Manila an
intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as Special Proceedings No.
9092; that in the said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and
for this reason they succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned
among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his
father left properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of his father, he is entitles to
at least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings and
came to know about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners who refused to
give him his share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the
natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to him; and that petitioners be
sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee and the cost of suit (Record on Appeals, pp.
2-9).

On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the cause of action
is barred by prior judgment; and (2) that the cause of action is also barred by the statute of limitation (Ibid,
pp. 9-19). To this motion, private respondents filed an opposition on October 22, 1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58).

On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss (Ibid, pp. 97-98).

On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint (Ibid, pp. 98-102).

On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer to Defendants' counterclaim (Ibid, pp. 102104). On August 10, 1964, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104- 123).
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the dismissal of the complaint without pronouncement as
to the costs. The counterclaim is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent Court, and in a Decision
promulgated on August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court reversed the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, reads:

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another rendered declaring
plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., an acknowledged Natural Child of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring

said plaintiff the owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5) of the hereditary estate of Antonio C. Alberto; and
ordering the defendants to deliver to plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his one-fifth (1/5) share in said estate,
subject to the usufructuary rights of defendants Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto pursuant to Articles
834 of the Old Civil Code, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo, p. 77). Hence, the instant petition.

This Court, in a resolution dated November 27,1968, resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p.
91).

Petitioners assigned the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE.

II

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO
JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.

III

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO
JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD NOT YET PRESCRIBED.

IV

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
ALBERTO, JR., IN NOT BRINGING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME, WAS
GUILTY OF LACHES.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT BY BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO AND OTHER WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE
THE SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES AS
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CATEGORICALLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.

VI

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED PETITIONERS' EVIDENCE.

VII

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR.,
WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED ALBERTO AND IN DECLARING HIM OWNER
PRO-INDIVISO OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE HEREDITARY ESTATE OF THE DECEASED.

I.

It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was filed on September 8, 1960,
almost five (5) years after the enactment of R.A. No. 1401 creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, the questions of paternity and acknowledgment fall beyond the jurisdictional pale of the Court of
First Instance of Manila and instead comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court. While petitioners admitted that this objection to lack of jurisdiction by the Court
of First Instance of Manila over the subject matter of the present action had not been raised either in the
said court or in the Court of Appeals and is brought to this Court for resolution for the first time on appeal,
they contend that a party may object to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action
at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal since lack of jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter cannot be waived. Such contention is untenable.

This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised
on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who
had voluntarily participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the issue of the
court's lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299
[1986]; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
29 [1968]). Moreover, there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today. Under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have been transferred to
the Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356 [1986]).

II.

Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of the deceased Antonio
C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had already been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order
of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto and that in
said proceedings the court also declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant case
which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased in order to establish his rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment (Petitioners'
Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's insistence that he had no knowledge or notice of the intestate
proceedings of his alleged natural father (Record on Appeal, p. 21).

Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.

This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are
both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the
subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs.
Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the
publication of the notice prescribed ... and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of
them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled
further that a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributees; and that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure
relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an
independent action, the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or
judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres
45 Phil. 895).

III.

As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides:

Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time the
partition was made.

Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that
said four years prescriptive period expired on November 9,1957. Hence, the present action filed on
September 8, 1960 and which has for one of its objects the rescission of the agreement of partition among
the petitioners, as approved by the intestate court, is already barred by prescription.

That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory
heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in
this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil Code as follows:

Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless
it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; ...

It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided in Article 1100 of the Civil Code
(formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code) should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of
partition by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the case at bar, it is evident that the
action to rescind the Agreement of Partition which was approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had
already prescribed when respondent filed the complaint in the case at bar on September 8, 1960.

While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the coownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never
recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on
non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case
at bar.

Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the effects of prescription on the plea of
minority under the New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against: (1) Minors and other incapacitated
persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives:

xxxxxxxxx

Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the
complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision.

Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased Antonio Alberto, Sr., the action for
recognition of natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the
presumed father or mother died during the minority of the child, the latter may file the action within four

(4) years from the attainment of majority (Art. 285 [1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this
case, prescription runs against him even during minority (Wenzel etc., et al. vs. Surigao Consolidated
Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]). In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four
(4) years after the death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795
[1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment
and partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set in.

Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for recovery of property in order to
avoid the consequences of prescription, for as correctly stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to the
recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution
approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not
possible. Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the
Statute of Limitations.

Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply and there is an injury to
the rights of plaintiff, tills action would still not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same Code
which provide that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the
right of action accrues.

IV

Petitioners' claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court in its findings clearly and unmistakably
declared that respondent Alberto, Jr. is guilty of laches as follows:

About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of Antonio Alberto's marriage to Natividad del Rosario. Yet,
she took no steps to protect the interests of her child, Antonio, although she was already confronted with
the incontrovertible proof of Antonio's infidelity and the hallowness of his promises.

It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying on Antonio Alberto's not denying that Alberto, Jr. was his
child, if such was the case. If this was so, however, how can we explain her inaction even after the death of
Antonio Alberto in 1949, or until September 8, 1960, when she filed this action, Andrea kept silent, took no
action to have her child recognized as the son of the alleged father. Her laches, as well as the inherent
improbabilities in her testimony rendered it unworthy of belief.

... It is evident that the plaintiff's case is adversely affected by his long delay in bringing this action.
'Undue delay in the separate enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of lack of merit in this claim,
since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or
invaded. (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435-440). (Record on Appeal, pp. 108-109).

This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA

541 [1985]; Tendo vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78 [1985]; De Castro vs. Tan, 129 SCRA 85 [1984]; Medija vs.
Patcho, 132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Phil., 133 SCRA 800
[1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA, 120 SCRA 687 [1983]).

As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for the surprising delay in the filing
of the complaint in the case at bar except perhaps, the fact that during the lifetime of the deceased
Antonio Alberto, private respondents were receiving support until the latter died in 1949; but thereafter,
they allowed more than ten years to elapse or until September 8, 1960 before they filed the present action
to assert their rights despite Andrea Jongco's allegation that they stopped receiving support after Alberto,
Sr.'s death.

On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners' allegations that such delay is prejudicial to them. Private
respondents could have filed the action in 1944 when Andrea Jongco learned of the marriage of the
deceased with petitioner Natividad del Rosario instead of waiting for 16 years when the supposed father's
lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses like Antonio Alberto, Sr.'s mother had become too
old to give coherent testimony.

On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:

The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the courts. Time inevitably tends
to obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses, and even where the recollection appears to be
entirely clear, the true clue to the solution of a case may be hopelessly lost. These considerations
constitute one of the pillars of the doctrine long familiar in equity jurisprudence to the effect that laches or
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want
of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Vigilantibus non
dormientibus equites subvenit (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1
SCRA 227 [1961]).

The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr. at the time of his supposed
father's death. But such explanation as discussed earlier is unavailing even in case of prescription under
Article 1108 of the Civil Code where minority does not stop the running of the prescriptive period for
minors who have parents, guardians or legal representatives.

Thus, it is well established that "The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who
sleep when the law requires them to act (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 610; Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154)." The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he...
must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings (Samson vs. Yateo, August 28,1958; 104
PMI. 378).

V.

Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court review and reverse the conclusions
of fact of the Court of Appeals. As a general rule, this is a function this Court does not undertake. The
established principle is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed
on appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
Court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both the apellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary
to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based (Manlapaz vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A., 139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593 [1986]).

It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, specifically
that the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court.

At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence presented by the complainants is of the view that
the testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is sufficient to totally discredit not only her testimony but also her
entire case. Aside from being inherently improbable and the merit of her claim being adversely affected by
her testimony and her long delay in bringing action, her testimony is contradicted by the testimonies of
Jose, Zoilo and Pilar who are brothers and sister of the deceased Antonio Alberto and who have no
pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome of the controversy. They testified that during the period
Andrea Jongco claimed that Antonio Alberto, Sr. lived with her, the deceased in fact lived with his mother
and brothers at the family residence except for his brief stint with the army (Decision, Civil Case No.
44164; Record on appeal, pp. 111-112).

More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco has had five children (aside from
her son Antonio) with four different men. The assumption, therefore, is that she lived with at least four
different men without being married to any of them. Thus, the trial court aptly ruled that his propensity to
promiscuous relationship with different men, render it unjust to state with definiteness that any particular
person is the father of any one of her children." (Ibid, p. 121).

Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of Antonio, the father, since the latter was a
child and then of Antonio, the alleged son, and Encarnacion Peralta, an alleged former lessor of Andrea
Jongco and Antonio Alberto. Their testimonies were, however, found by the trial court to be inherently
improbable, inconsistent with human experience and deliberately invented to conform with the testimony
of Andrea Jongco (Ibid, pp. 109-117).

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more credence to the testimonies of
Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta and declared that their testimonies have sufficiently established
the fact that Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. is the son of the late Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco which finds
further proof in the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of Alberto, Jr. (Rollo, pp. 6-11).

In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439
(1985), this Court, citing the cases of Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid
vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434; Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135,
ruled that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is
not competent evidence of paternity.

In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad's testimony, the Court of Appeals pointed
out her serious inconsistency on material points such as her claim that she was married to the deceased in
1941 and her later admission in the answer that they were married in 1944.

The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first marriage was a secret civil
marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the second was a religious ratification of the former. The lack of
marriage certificate as evidence was also considered by the Court of Appeals as an impairment of
credibility despite a certification to the effect that all pre-war records in the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal
were destroyed during the last war. Said Appellate Court is of the view that if they did plan to marry
secretly at that time, they could have chosen a city or municipality near Manila and that Pililla must have
been chosen as the place of the supposed marriage so that petitioners could have an apparent good
reason for the non-presentation of the marriage certificate.

As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely conjectural. Besides petitioners' reasons for
the choice of that place, the celebration of the marriage was positively confirmed by Damaso Herrera, one
of the sponsors thereof.

In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled
to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the
trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying in the case (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30 [19871; People vs. Grefiel, 125
SCRA 108 [1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 381 [1985]; People vs. Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248
(1983]; Olangco vs. C.F.I. of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129 SCRA 479
[1984]).

After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the contending parties, no cogent
reasons could be found to justify the reversal of the findings of the trial court.

In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss the last two assignments of errors.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the decision of the
trial court is Reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

** Penned by Justice Carmelino J. Alvendia and concurred in by Justices Julio Villamor and Ruperto G.
Martin.

*** Penned by Judge Francisco Arca.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17818

January 25, 1967

TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y
Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.

Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant.

Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Civil Case No. 1084,
dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to the defendantappellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, the properties receivea by his deceasea wife under the terms of the
will of the late Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more
than P200,000.

The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:

"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the
share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes,
guardian of said minors."

It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast
estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T337.

When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of these
properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small
portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew an nieces The
usufruct o the fishpon situate i barrio Sa Roque Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was
reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo I the meantime Maria Gerardo was appointe administratrix. By
virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as
guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of
the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and
secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.

Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the distribution of
the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was discovered
that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed
Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of
Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will
presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was
not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed
to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.1

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria
Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which
was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion,
thereof.

This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the
fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a
spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the
validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.

The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question
is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did not acquire
any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'

Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared the project of
partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No.
49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because
the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the
spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis
of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .

A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be
null and void.

The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano Barretto was
free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud
Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as defendant
Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the
latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the
provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that property acquired by
fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. Hence, as stated at the
beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to
return the properties received under the project of partition previously mentioned as prayed for in
defendant Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied defendant's prayer for damages. Hence,
this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant.

Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the
present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir
in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition
had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really
being one, and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of
children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and
the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the
heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his

estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of
Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.

Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime
invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a
forced heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all applicable, that
case involving an instance of preterition or omission of children of the testator's former marriage.

Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil status of Salud in
violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the
settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809;
Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano
Barretto, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There
can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a compromise over civil status is prohibited,
the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to
the estate.

At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a proposal
for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the
distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is
entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised
Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If
the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been
corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other
judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.

It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the
same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the estate of the late Bibiano
Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud Barretto and the widow, Maria
Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto), and since no evidence
was taken of the filiation of the heirs, nor were any findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution
can have no greater validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being in the
nature of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is invoked in
support of the proposition. That case is authority for the proposition that a judgment by compromise may
be set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud, upon petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief
was filed before the compromise agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436). In the
case before us, however, the agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of
distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased were
cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long before the decree was attacked. Hence,
Saminiada vs. Mata does not apply.

Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that the sole basis for
the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could
stand, since it was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the provisions whereof
no objection had been made. In fact it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force in 1939,
provided: .

SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as
such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of
estates in these Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis
supplied)

That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed the estate of her
father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of
distribution. Passing upon a like issue, this Court ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp. 741 and
742:

If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene, still they would be
concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the
estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The proceeding for probate is
one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the
publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein is
binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final order of distribution of
the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees". (Santos vs.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary
doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings.

The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is
reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent
action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to
throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of.

It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes vs. Barretto Datu, 94 Phil.
446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that:

... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the partition, and that Maria
Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as guardian
of the minor. (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere statement in the project of partion that the
guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean
that the guardian had not yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet
been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a guardian, Maria
Gerardo must have been already appointed when she signed the project of partition. There is, therefore, no
irregularity or defect or error in the project of partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings,
which shows that Maria Gerardo had no power or authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of
the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention that the order
approving the project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked collaterally in these
proceedings.

So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a party by publication
but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through her guardian: she, therefore, can not
escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance which settled her father's estate.

Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo) could not have
ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said widow in agreeing to the oft-cited
partition and distribution was a fraud on appellees rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place, there
is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants'
predecessor, Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was
committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor
children, appellants herein, can be held liable therefor. In the second placegranting that there was such
fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that
this period had elapsed long ago.

Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old (Exhibit 24), she became
of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud
the court decree distributing her father's estate and the four-year period of limitation started to run, to
expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts
in 1946 (Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the action was
already barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of
distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.

In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that appellant Tirso
Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to reconvey the properties received by
his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable evidence of the alleged promise, which rests exclusively on
the oral assertions of Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court made no mention of such
promise in the decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise was made, the same
can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the real parties in interest. An abdicative
waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his
wards, being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs.
Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).

In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in
1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil
Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is
barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in
bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee
Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in
the complaint should have been given due course.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is reversed and set
aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties
enumeracted in said decision, and the same is affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to
accounting. Let the records be returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action
for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits thereof, as prayed for in the complaint No
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Reyes vs. Barretto, G.R. No. L-5831, Jan. 31, 1956.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They
were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe
sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a
private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in
a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina
Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition
and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter.
Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April
1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950
private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the
distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the
six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court
required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being
submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither
did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3
On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent
and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the
deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27
November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly,
equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the
recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as
his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6

partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to
one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private
respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that
she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of
Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of
the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April
1996 it denied reconsideration. 9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is
no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan
children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition
based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary
shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after
the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the
motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the
submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue
as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a
divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule.
11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite
of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer
a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to
conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the
matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim
in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner
opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not
grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that
both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained
that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage
as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed.
The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very
well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought
anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court.
When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19
Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner
however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the
time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently,
respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to
the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship
was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void
from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt
of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum
shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial
courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand
of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding
petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate
court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan
children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all
surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of
petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* The name of private respondent Blandina Dandan appears as Blandina Padlan in the proceedings
before the lower courts.

1 No. L-19671, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 355.

2 Id., p. 367.

3 Then Art. 190 of the Civil Code provided that in the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlement, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in
virtue of a judicial order. Quite in relation thereto, then Art. 191, par. 4 of the same Code provided that the
husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval.

4 Decision penned by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo Jr. of RTC- Br. 105, Quezon City; Appendix "A" of Brief for the
Oppositors-Appellants; CA Rollo, p. 15.

5 Art. 1001 of the Civil Code provides that should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half.

6 Appendix "B" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; See Note 4.

7 Art. 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such
as widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or their
descendent, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.

8 Decision penned by Justice Pacita Caazares-Nye with the concurrence of Justices Romeo J. Callejo Jr.
and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis; Rollo, p. 39.

9 Id., p. 42.

10 Id., p. 180.

11 Rollo, p. 196.

12 CA Rollo, p. 29.

13 G.R. No. 68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

14 CA Rollo, p. 30.

15 Record on Appeal, pp. 24-26.

16 Rollo, p. 206.

17 Brief of Oppositors-Appellant, p. 13; CA Rollo, p. 15.

18 Brief of Appellee: Id., p. 17.

19 Rollo, pp. 225-226.

20 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1979 Ed.,
Vol. III, p. 264.

21 Rollo, pp. 129-132.

22 Professional Regulation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117817, 9 July 1998.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005]

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in
death, a persons estate remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds.
Before us is another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are
locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela
Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated September 25, 1996
and Resolution[2] dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.[3] The Appellate Court affirmed the
Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioners
motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for
reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5
million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in
certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.

Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition[4] for the settlement of
Miguelitas estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net
residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.

Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to

petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is
incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas estate is
composed of paraphernal properties. Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her
instead.[5] Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.[6]

Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material
interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the
preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.[7]

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her
inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them would undertake whatever business
endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.[8]

In her omnibus motion[9] dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as
special administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular
administrators of the estate.[10] Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and
posting the requisite bond.

Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19,
and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules
of Court.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate.[11] Emmanuel did
not submit an inventory.

On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory
heirs of Miguelita.[12]

On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion[13] praying, among others,
that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate
among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees.

Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is
premature and precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether the properties specified
in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.[14] Respondent claimed that she
owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and co-owner. Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.

On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorneys fees but
denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed premature.
The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:

On the partition and distribution of the deceaseds properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the
prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her
opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine whether the properties listed in the amended
complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a coownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside
the intestate courts Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied
petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating that it
(intestate court) will first resolve respondents claim of ownership.

The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and
Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court ruled:

Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining private respondents unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no
indication that the probate court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in
probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which

can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to
schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondents claim, is being extremely cautious
in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of
discretion.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:

RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR
BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS
MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

II

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER TO
CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS
OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER AND RESOLUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHINGS OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND
BASELESS.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass
upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates
only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.[15] The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.[16]

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and
pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,[17] we held:

x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title.

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate
court to conduct a hearing on respondents claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the
key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon
questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.

First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition[18] dated September 18,
1995, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:

6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6,
1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the
Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate
properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each.

Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties
which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.

And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of Miguelitas estate, did not
submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is to submit within three (3) months after his
appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have
come into his possession or knowledge.[19] He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom
those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one
shows that he acquiesced with petitioners inventory.

Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties
should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the
intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of
Miguelitas estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its
Resolution[20] dated May 7, 1996, thus:

On petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is
believed that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in
favor of the heirs could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to
determine the propriety of oppositors claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the
bulk of the properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience,

Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in
Court.

It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was
actually to determine the propriety of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to the intestate court, if it
is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties, then it means that she has
a material and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she should be given her day in court. The intended
day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondents contention that she is the
true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.

Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of
resolving her blanket claim against Miguelitas estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent
was to determine the accuracy of petitioners inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the
pleadings reveals her real intention.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should
have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned
and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged
to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and
his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The
intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to
the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.[21] Jurisprudence teaches us
that:

[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so.[22]

Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate
court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties
ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie
determination of the issue of ownership, still respondents claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the
bulk of Miguelitas estate, as stated in petitioners inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens
System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are
considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action. We find this Courts pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid[23] relevant, thus:

It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of
ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself,
which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x

x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title
is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of
strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly,
when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x

Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, The Property Registration Decree, proscribes collateral attack
against Torrens Title, hence:

Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to
bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:

Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which
I quote: In accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal
heirs, we decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son
Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family
despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?

A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.

Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?

A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to
Emmanuel.

Q: What went to Emmanuel was also , is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?

A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.

xxxxxx

Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita,
is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with
respect to the estate of your late husband?

A: If I only knew that this will happen

Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?

A: Wala po.[24]

She further testified as follows:

Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and
deposits both here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies,
Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties be
partitioned or what should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for
the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?

A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.

Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San
Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat
na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?

A: Kung ano ang sa akin

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong
paghahatian or hindi?

A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir.[25]

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioners inventory
belong to her. Neither could she present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently
changing basis of her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of
Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties.[26] Sensing that such assertion could not
strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita
were business partners and that she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in a joint business
venture.[27] Respondent must have realized early on that if the properties listed in petitioners inventory
are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death, such
properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children.[28]

At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of
whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question
of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction.[29]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., on leave.

[1] Rollo at 9-14.

[2] Id. at 16-17.

[3] Entitled Emilio B. Paciolis, Jr. versus The Honorable Judge Felix De Guzman, as Presiding Judge of RTC
Quezon City, Branch 99 and Miguela Ching.

[4] Records at 1-9. The case was filed and docketed as SP No. Q-92-131555.

[5] See Opposition, Records at 27-29.

[6] See Motion for the Appointment of Oppositor as Special Administratrix, Records at 30-32.

[7] See Motion to Strike-Out Opposition, Records at 91-99.

[8] See Opposition to Petitioners Motion to Strike-Out Opposition dated December 21, 1992, Records at
101-106.

[9] Records at 137-140.

[10] The order, insofar as Emmanuel Ching is concerned as co-administrator, is the subject of an appeal
before the 10th Division of the Court of Appeals docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 46763.

[11] Records at 337-346. Amended Inventory at 347-353.

[12] May 17, 1995, Records at 360.

[13] Records at 366-371.

[14] See Manifestation/Opposition to Omnibus Motion dated July 20, 1995, Records at 383-387.

[15] Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647; Ramos vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 635.

In Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 367, the Court
ruled: It is hornbook doctrine that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot pass upon with finality. This
pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding x x x.

[16] Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 139587, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 541; Jimenez vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, ibid.

[17] G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 885.

[18] Records at 383-387.

[19] Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.

[20] Records at 437-440.

[21] Baybayan vs. Aquino, No. L-42678, April 9, 1987, 149 SCRA 186.

[22] Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Morales vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, G.R. No. L-47125,
December 29, 1986; 146 SCRA 373; Cuizon vs. Ramolete, L-51291, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 495.

[23] L-45494, August 31, 1978, 85 SCRA 213.

[24] TSN, February 26, 1993.

[25] TSN, May 20, 1993.

[26] Respondents Opposition dated October 28, 1992 reads:

b) the bulk of the estate of the deceased consists of paraphernal property of the deceased most of which
were donations coming from the herein Oppositor, and therefore, the herein Oppositor has a better right to
its administration. (Records at 27-29)

[27] Opposition to Petitioners Motion to Strike-Out Opposition dated January 5, 1993, reads:

3. That, the Petitioner cannot deny the fact that majority of the estate left by the decedent came from the
Oppositor by way of donation, and this was brought about by the fact that when the father of the decedent
died, the latter did not receive any kind of inheritance, as Chinese custom and tradition dictate that female
children inherit nothing from their deceased parents and the only heirs entitled to inherit are the surviving
spouse and the male children, which happens to be the herein Oppositor and the only brother of the
decedent in the person of Emmanuel Ching. But the herein Oppositor, in the exercise of her liberality and
sound direction, and with the end in view of giving the decedent a share of the estate of her deceased
husband, gave half of her inherited property to the decedent, with an undertaking that the latter herein
Oppositor and they will undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business
partners. (Records at101-106)

[28] Pisuea vs. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. No. 132803, August 31, 1999, 313 SCRA 384; Bongalon vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142441, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 553.

[29] Baybayan vs. Aquino, supra.

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-43191

November 13, 1935

PAULINO GULLAS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.

Gullas, Lopez, Tuao and Leuterio for plaintiff-appellant.

Jose Delgado for defendant-appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:

Both parties to this case appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which
sentenced the defendant to return to the account of the plaintiff the sum of P5098, with legal interest and
costs, the plaintiff to secure damages in the amount of P10,000 more or less, and the defendant to be
absolved totally from the amended complaint. As it is conceded that the plaintiff has already received the
sum represented by the United States treasury, warrant, which is in question, the appeal will thus
determine the amount, if any, which should be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant.

The parties to the case are Paulino Gullas and the Philippine National Bank. The first named is a member
of the Philippine Bar, resident in the City of Cebu. The second named is a banking corporation with a
branch in the same city. Attorney Gullas has had a current account with the bank.

It appears from the record that on August 2, 1933, the Treasurer of the United States for the United
States Veterans Bureau issued a Warrant in the amount of $361, payable to the order of Francisco
Sabectoria Bacos. Paulino Gullas and Pedro Lopez signed as endorsers of this check. Thereupon it was
cashed by the Philippine National Bank. Subsequently the treasury warrant was dishonored by the Insular
Treasurer.

At that time the outstanding balance of Attorney Gullas on the books of the bank was P509. Against this
balance he had issued certain cheeks which could not be paid when the money was sequestered by the On
August 20, 1933, Attorney Gullas left his residence for Manila.

The bank on learning of the dishonor of the treasury warrant sent notices by mail to Mr. Gullas which
could not be delivered to him at that time because he was in Manila. In the bank's letter of August 21,
1933, addressed to Messrs. Paulino Gulla and Pedro Lopez, they were informed that the United States
Treasury warrant No. 20175 in the name of Francisco Sabectoria Bacos for $361 or P722, the payment for
which had been received has been returned by our Manila office with the notation that the payment of his
check has been stopped by the Insular Treasurer. "In view of this therefore we have applied the
outstanding balances of your current accounts with us to the part payment of the foregoing check",
namely, Mr. Paulino Gullas P509. On the return of Attorney Gullas to Cebu on August 31, 1933, notice of
dishonor was received and the unpaid balance of the United States Treasury warrant was immediately paid
by him.

As a consequence of these happenings, two occurrences transpired which inconvenienced Attorney

Gullas. In the first place, as above indicated, checks including one for his insurance were not paid because
of the lack of funds standing to his credit in the bank. In the second place, periodicals in the vicinity gave
prominence to the news to the great mortification of Gullas.lawphil.net

A variety of incidental questions have been suggested on the record which it can be taken for granted as
having been adversely disposed of in this opinion. The main issues are two, namely, (1) as to the right of
Philippine National Bank, and to apply a deposit to the debt of depositor to the bank and (2) as to the
amount damages, if any, which should be awarded Gullas.

The Civil Code contains provisions regarding compensation (set off) and deposit. (Articles 1195 et seq.,
1758 et seq. The portions of Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place when two persons
are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other (Civil Code, article 1195). In his connection, it has been
held that the relation existing between a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor. (Fulton Iron
Works Co. vs. China Banking Corporation [1933], 59 Phil., 59.)

The Negotiable Instruments Law contains provisions establishing the liability of a general indorser and
giving the procedure for a notice of dishonor. The general indorser of negotiable instrument engages that if
he be dishonored and the, necessary proceedings of dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount
thereof to the holder. (Negotiable Instruments Law, sec. 66.) In this connection, it has been held a long line
of authorities that notice of dishonor is in order to charge all indorser and that the right of action against
him does not accrue until the notice is given. (Asia Banking Corporation vs. Javier [1923] 44 Phil., 777; 5
Uniform Laws Annotated.)

As a general rule, a bank has a right of set off of the deposits in its hands for the payment of any
indebtedness to it on the part of a depositor. In Louisiana, however, a civil law jurisdiction, the rule is
denied, and it is held that a bank has no right, without an order from or special assent of the depositor to
retain out of his deposit an amount sufficient to meet his indebtedness. The basis of the Louisiana doctrine
is the theory of confidential contracts arising from irregular deposits, e. g., the deposit of money with a
banker. With freedom of selection and after full preference to the minority rule as more in harmony with
modern banking practice. (1 Morse on Banks and Banking, 5th ed., sec. 324; Garrison vs. Union Trust
Company [1905], 111 A.S.R., 407; Louisiana Civil Code Annotated, arts. 2207 et seq.; Gordon & Gomila vs.
Muchler [1882], 34 L. Ann., 604; 8 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, 4th ed., 359 et seq., 11
Manresa pp. 694 et seq.)

Starting, therefore, from the premise that the Philippine National Bank had with respect to the deposit of
Gullas a right of set off, we next consider if that remedy was enforced properly. The fact we believe is

undeniable that prior to the mailing of notice of dishonor, and without waiting for any action by Gullas, the
bank made use of the money standing in his account to make good for the treasury warrant. At this point
recall that Gullas was merely an indorser and had issued in good faith.

As to a depositor who has funds sufficient to meet payment of a check drawn by him in favor of a third
party, it has been held that he has a right of action against the bank for its refusal to pay such a check in
the absence of notice to him that the bank has applied the funds so deposited in extinguishment of past
due claims held against him. (Callahan vs. Bank of Anderson [1904], 2 Ann. Cas., 203.) The decision cited
represents the minority doctrine, for on principle it would seem that notice is not necessary to a maker
because the right is based on the doctrine that the relationship is that of creditor and debtor. However this
may be, as to an indorser the situation is different, and notice should actually have been given him in
order that he might protect his interests.

We accordingly are of the opinion that the action of the bank was prejudicial to Gullas. But to follow up
that statement with others proving exact damages is not so easy. For instance, for alleged libelous articles
the bank would not be primarily liable. The same remark could be made relative to the loss of business
which Gullas claims but which could not be traced definitely to this occurrence. Also Gullas having
eventually been reimbursed lost little through the actual levy by the bank on his funds. On the other hand,
it was not agreeable for one to draw checks in all good faith, then, leave for Manila, and on return find that
those checks had not been cashed because of the action taken by the bank. That caused a disturbance in
Gullas' finances, especially with reference to his insurance, which was injurious to him. All facts and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that Gullas should be awarded nominal damages because
of the premature action of the bank against which Gullas had no means of protection, and have finally
determined that the amount should be P250.

Agreeable to the foregoing, the errors assigned by the parties will in the main be overruled, with the
result that the judgment of the trial court will be modified by sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P250, and the costs of both instances.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45460

February 25, 1938

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., applicants-appellants,

vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

Juan S. Rustia for appellants.

Araneta, Zaragoza and Araneta for appellee Colegio de San Jose, Inc.
Francisco Alfonso for appellee Young.

IMPERIAL, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna of October 29, 1936, which
denied the applicants motion questioning the appearance and intervention in the case of the oppositors
Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young, and from the resolution of the 30th of the same month which denied
the petition for escheat filed by the said petitioners, with the costs against the latter.

This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in behalf of the municipality
of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of
escheat. The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., appeared specially and assailed the petition upon the grounds that
the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide the case and that the petition does not allege
sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy prayed for; and asked that the petition be finally
dismissed. Carlos Young intervened and filed a motion asking for the dismissal or the petition upon the
ground that the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the same was filed, is not applicable because it was
not yet in force when the original owner of the hacienda died, which was in April, 1596, and that the
petition was irregularly docketed as the applicants had paid at the docket fees which the clerk of court
should collect. Subsequently the attorneys for both parties filed another motions of minor importance,
almost all of which contains the arguments advanced in support of their contentions. On October 29, 1936,
the court overruled the objection to the appearance and intervention in the case by the Colegio de San
Jose and Carlos Young, entering the order which is one of those appealed from. And on the 30th of the
same moth the court entered the resolution, also appealed from, dismissing the petition for escheat, with
the costs to the petitioners.

The petitioners attribute to the court the following errors: "(1) In overruling the objection of the
appellant of September 2, 1936, and in not excluding the appellees Carlos Young and Colegio de San Jose,
Inc., from these proceedings. (2) In sustaining definitely the appellees' petitions to dismiss, without
previous hearing and in derogation of the right to amend in any case. (3) In improperly and unseasonably
taking judicial notice of certain facts in other judicial records to reinforce the appealed resolutions, and in
erroneously distorting those facts judicially taken notice of. (4) In holding that the municipality of San Jose
has neither right standing to file a petition for escheat; that the petition does not state facts sufficient a
cause of action and that the same does not lie, and that the Court of First Instance of Laguna is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide said petition. (5) In finally dismissing the petition upon the
dilatory exceptions thereto, and the ordering the payment of costs when no hearing has yet taken place."

1. The sworn petition which gave rise to the proceeding is based upon the provisions of section 750 and
751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the English text of which reads:1vvphl.nt

SEC. 750. Procedure when person dies intestate without heirs. When a person dies intestate, seized of
real or personal property in the Philippines Islands, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same,
the president and municipal council of the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an
inhabitant of these Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Islands,
may, on behalf of the municipality, the file a petition with the Court of First Instance of the province for an
inquisition in the premises; the court shall there upon appoint a time and place of hearing, and deciding on
such petition, and cause a notice thereof to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the
province of which the deceased was last an inhabitant, if within the Philippines Island, and if not, some
newspaper of general circulation in the province in which he had estate. The notice shall recite the
substance of the facts and request set forth in the petition, the time and place at which persons claiming
the estate may appear and be heard before the court, and shall be published at least six weeks
successively, the last of which publication shall be at least six weeks before the time appointed by the
court to make inquisition.

SEC. 751. Decree of the court in such case. If, at the time appointed for the that purpose, the court
that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Islands, leaving no heirs or person
entitled to the same and no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary, the court shall order and decree that
the estate of the deceased in these Islands, after the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat;
and shall assign the personal estate to the municipality where he was last an inhabitant in the Islands, and
the real estate to the municipality in which the same is situated. If he never was a inhabitant of the
Islands, the whole estate may be assigned to the several municipalities where the same is located. Such
estate shall be for the use of schools in the municipalities, respectively, and shall be managed and
disposed or by the municipal council like other property appropriated to the use of schools.

Accordingly to the first of the said sections, the essential facts which should be alleged in the petition,
which are jurisdiction because they confer jurisdiction upon the Court of First Instance, are: That a person
has died intestate or without leaving any will; that he has left real or personal property; that he was the
owner thereof; that he has not left any heir or person who is by law entitled to the property; and that the
one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased had his last residence, or in case
should have no residence in the country, the municipality where the property is situated.

The following section provides that after the publications and trial, if the court finds that the deceased is
in fact the owner of real and personal property situated in the country and has not left any heirs or other
person entitled thereto, it may order, after the payments of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat,

and in such case it shall adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his
last place of residence and the real property to the municipality or municipalities where they are situated.

Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a
deceased person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs
(21 C.J., sec. 1, p. 848; American L. & T. Co. vs. Grand River Co., 159 Fed., 775; In re Miner, 143 Cal., 194;
Johnston vs. Spicer 107 N.Y., 185; Wright vs. Methodist Episcopal Church, Hoffm. [N.Y.], 201; In re Linton's,
198 Pa., 438; State vs. Goldberg, 113 Tenn., 298). It is not an ordinary action contemplated by section 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, but a special proceeding in accordance with the said section and Chapter
XXXIX, Part II, of the same Code. The proceeding, as provided by section 750, should be commenced by
petition and not by complaint.

In a special proceeding for escheat under section 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and
exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to
be escheated is likewise and interest and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for
escheat. In the present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a
material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa; and the former because it claims to be the
exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claim to be the lessee thereof under a contract
legality entered with the former. In view of these allegations it is erroneous to hold that the said parties are
without right either to appear in case or to substantiate their respective alleged right. This unfavorably
resolves the petitioners' first assignment of error.

2. The final dismissal of the petition for escheat decreed by the court is assigned by the petitioners as
the second error committed by it upon the contention that the demurrer, to which amount the motions for
dismissal, is not a pleading authorized by law in this kind of proceeding and because, in any event, the
court should have given them an opportunity to amend the petition.

Chapter XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to the escheat of properties, does not in fact
authorize the filing of a demurrer to the petition presented for that purpose, and section 91 and 99
permitting the interposition of demurrers to the complaint and answer, respectively, are not applicable to
special proceedings. But is no reason of a procedure nature which prevents the filing of a motion to dismiss
based upon any of the grounds provided by law for a demurrer to a complaint. In such case, the motion to
dismiss pays the role of a demurrer and the court should resolve the legal question raised therein. When,
for instance, a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed
from and even admitting them hypothetically it is clear that there are nor grounds for the court to proceed
to the inquisition provided by law, we see no reason to disallow an interest party from filing a motion to
dismiss the petition which is untenable from all standpoints. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained
upon this ground, the petition may be dismissed unconditionally and the petitioner is not entitled, as in the
case of a demurrer, to be afforded an opportunity to amend his petition.

3. The petitioners assign as third error the judicial notice which the court took of the complaint filed in
civil case No. 6790, docketed and pending in the same court, wherein the petitioner recognized the
personality Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young and the latters' interest in said action of
interpleader and in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan which is the same subject matter of the instant
proceedings.

In general, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before
them, of the contents of the records of the other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are

pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending before the same judge. (U.S. vs. Claveria, 29 Phil., 527.) The rule is squarely applicable to
the present case, wherefore, we hold that the assignment of error is tenable.

4. In the appealed resolution the court held that the municipality of San Pedro, represented by the
petitioners, has no personality to institute the petition for escheat that the latter does not state sufficient
facts, and that the court is without jurisdiction either to take cognizance of the proceeding or to grant the
remedy sought. These legal conclusions are the subject matter of the fourth assignment of error.

According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their right to the escheat upon the fact
that the temporal properties of the Father of the Society of Jesus, among them, the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan, were confiscated by order of the King of Spain and passed from then on the Crown of Spain. The
following allegations of the petition are important and specific and clearly the theory maintained by the
petitioners: "11. As a result of the perpetual expulsion of the Jesuits in their dominions, the King also
decreed the confiscation of all their properties, estate, rents, foundation, etc., in favor of the Crown of
Spain, and the order of the King was thus complied with here in the Philippines. The Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasa from then on passed to the Crown of Spain under the administration and management on its
respective here, the Governor-General of the Philippines Islands. 12. As a result of the war between Spain
and the United States, the latter acquired by way of transfer, all the properties of the Crown of Spain in the
Philippines, under articles III and VIII of the Treaty of Peace entered into in Paris on December 10, 1989,
and among which properties was included the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. 13. That the said hacienda
thereafter passed to the Government of the Philippines Islands by virtue of the Act of the United States
Congress of July 1, 1992 (Philippine Bill), by mere administration for the benefit of the inhabitant of the
Philippines; and there after, under the Tydings-McDuffie law approved by the same Congress on March 24,
1934, section 5, the United States, in turn, have ceded to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, upon its
inauguration, all the properties, estate, etc., ceded by Spain to the United States as above stated, among
them being the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. Said Commonwealth was inaugurated on November 15,
1935."

If the hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,, which is the only property sought to be escheated and
adjudicated to the municipality of San Pedro, has already passed to the ownership of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners cannot claim that the same be escheated to the said
municipality, because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not
left any heirs or person who may legality claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and
without which a petition for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was confiscated by the
Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa,
the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father, and became the property of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the petition. If the municipality of
San Pedro believes that it has some other right to the hacienda, distinct from the escheat relied upon in its
petition which gave rise to this proceeding, it should bring the proper action, but it cannot avail itself
successfully of the remedy provided by section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We, therefore, hold that
the court did not commit the error assigned in ruling that the petition does not allege sufficient facts
justifying the escheat of the hacienda in favor of the municipality of San Pedro and in finally dismissing the
same. Having reached this conclusion we do not believe it necessary to go into further considerations
regarding the personality of the municipality of San Pedro and the court's lack of jurisdiction.

5. The last assignment of error does not require any further consideration. The questions raised therein
have already been passed upon in the preceding considerations, with the exception of the order to pay
costs. With respect thereto, there is no reason why they should not be taxed against the petitioners, they
being defeated party (section 487, Code of Civil Procedure). That no trial was had is not a bar to the
imposition of costs under the provisions of section 492.

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order and resolution are affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the petitioners and appellants. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-14157. October 26, 1960.]

In the matter of escheat proceedings of the estate of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon
married to Julia Fallon. MUNICIPALITIES OF MAGALLON, ISABELA and LA CASTELLANA, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, Petitioners-Appellees, v. IGNATIUS HENRY BEZORE, ET AL., oppositors-heirs appellants.

Martiniano O. de la Cruz for Appellants.

Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. ESCHEAT PROCEEDINGS; JURISDICTION; COURTS; CONVERSION; TO DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTIES.

The jurisdiction acquired by a court to hear a petition for escheat by virtue of its publication can not be
converted into one for the distribution of the properties of the decedents. For the latter proceedings to be
instituted, the proper parties must be presented and the proceedings should comply with the requirements
of the Rules of Court.

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

These are escheat proceedings instituted by the Municipalities of Magallon, La Castellana and Isabela,
Province of Negros Occidental, in the Court of First Instance of that province, praying that the estates of
the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon, the latter married to Julia Fallon, consisting of
agricultural lands and residential lots, as well as accrued rentals deposited with the Warner, Barnes & Co.,
Ltd., be escheated in favor of the above-named municipalities, respectively, wherever the real estates are
situated. Finding that the petition was in order, the judge of the court ordered the publication of the
petition and set the same for hearing before itself on October 9, 1957.

The evidence shows that the properties sought to be escheated originally belonged to Charles J. Fallon, an
American citizen, married to Rosario Santaromana. Fallon died in Manila on March 25, 1935, so his wife
acquired by inheritance one-half of the said properties as owner, and the other half as usufructuary. The
value of the properties of Charles J. Fallon in 1936 is estimated at P46,105.41 (Exhibit "H"). His wife Rosario
Santaromana died in 1943, and thereupon the properties which she held in usufruct were transmitted to
the brother and sister of her deceased husband, namely, Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy. The value
of the estate belonging to both Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy is P23,052.70. Thomas Fallon and
Anne Fallon Murphy were residents of the United States and as nothing was known about them from their
relatives in the United States, the petitioning municipalities believed that they had died without heirs.
Hence the petition for escheat.

At the hearing of the petition, evidence was submitted that Anne Fallon Murphy died on March 12, 1936 in
San Francisco, California (ROA p. 21), while Thomas Fallon, died on May 26, 1936, also in San Francisco,
California (ROA p. 25). Julia Fallon, on the other hand, died in San Francisco, California on December 2,
1944 (ROA p. 26).

Opposition to the petition for escheat was filed by Ignatius Henry Bezore, Elwood Knickerbocker and Mary
Irene Fallon McCormick. Ignatius Henry Bezore claims that he is a nephew of the decedents because his
mother was their sister. Elwood Knickerbocker also claims to be the sole legatee of his wife Loreta
Knickerbocker, who in turn, was the residuary legatee of Anne Fallon Murphy. Mary Irene Murphy
McCormick likewise claims that she is the niece of the decedents as her father was a brother of said
decedents. Conformably to their petitions, all the oppositors pray that the petition for escheat be
dismissed and that the properties of the decedents be distributed among them.

The court, after hearing, found that Anne Fallon Murphy died in San Francisco on March 12, 1936 and
Thomas Fallon, also in the same city on May 26, 1936; that Thomas Fallon was survived by his wife Julia
Fallon, who in turn, died in San Francisco on December 22, 1944; that Anne Fallon Murphy executed a will
on February 7, 1935, which was admitted to probate on May 7, 1937. Considering these facts the court
denied the petition for escheat of the properties of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon,
for the reason that Thomas Fallon died with an heir his wife Julia Fallon, and Anne Fallon Murphy, for her
part, died leaving a will, in which she disposed of all her properties.

As to the prayers contained in the opposition asking that the oppositors be declared heirs of the deceased
Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy, the court declared that the evidence submitted was not competent
or sufficient to sustain the claim of the oppositors and, therefore, denied said prayers.

The petitioning municipalities presented no appeal, but the oppositors did appeal, claiming that the lower
court erred in not rendering judgment in their favor and in not declaring them heirs of the decedents Anne
Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon.

This appeal can not be entertained. While it is possible for the estates of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy
and Thomas Fallon, who at the time of their death were residents of San Francisco, California, to be settled
here, or more specifically in Negros Occidental where they had properties, these proceedings were
instituted as escheat proceedings and not for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. The court
acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for escheat by virtue of the publication of the petition for escheat.
The jurisdiction acquired can not be converted into one for the distribution of the properties of the said
decedents. For such proceedings (for the distribution of the estate of the decedents) to be instituted, the
proper parties must be presented and the proceedings should comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Hence, the Court of First Instance did not have the power to order, or to proceed with, the distribution of
the estates of the decedents in these escheat proceedings, and adjudicate the properties to the
oppositors.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, as it hereby is, affirmed, without costs.

Paras C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ.,
concur.

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44347 September 29, 1988

VICENTE TAN, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF DAVAO, respondent.

Occea Law Office for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer for respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

This 26-year old case involves what is probably now a valuable lot in the City of Davao whose owner left
for China with her entire family in 1923 and never returned. Like all such estates facing escheat
proceedings, it is fair game for poseurs and fakers claiming to be the missing heir of the deceased owner.

The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia, during their lifetime, were residents of Davao City. As
they were childless, they adopted a three-year old girl whom they named Dominga Garcia and brought up
as their own. At the age of nineteen years, Dominga Garcia married a Chinaman, Tan Seng alias Seng Yap,
with whom she had three children, named Vicente, who was born in 1916, Mariano who was born in 1918,
and Luis who was born in 1921. In 1923, Dominga Garcia and her three children emigrated to Canton,
China. In less than a year, Tan Seng followed his family to his country of origin.

According to the petitioner, Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1955 (Extra-judicial Settlement of the
Estate of Dominga Garcia dated May 27, 1966, p. 8, Rollo). She left in the Philippines a 1,966-square-meter
lot on Claveria Street, Townsite of Davao, District of Davao, registered in her name under T.C.T. No. 296 (T2774) of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City. Since her departure for China with her family, neither she,
nor her husband, nor any of their children has returned to the Philippines to claim the lot.

Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro, died in May 1936. In 1948, her nephew, Ramon Pizarro,
occupied a part of Dominga's property and collected the rentals from the owners of other houses
occupying the land. Another nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, in a burst of civic spirit, informed the
Solicitor General about the property. The City Fiscal and NBI agents, Antonio Gonzaga and Felix Valencia,
investigated Segundo Reyes, Ramon Pizarro and Aurelio Pizarro regarding the whereabouts of Dominga
Garcia, Tan Seng, and their children.

During the investigation, Ramon Pizarro alleged that Vicenta Tan, daughter of Dominga, was married and
living in Bacolod City, but he did not know her exact address. Aurelio Pizarro, on the other hand,
controverted that statement because as far as he knew, Vicenta Tan left for China with her mother and
brothers in 1923.

On September 12,1962, the City of Davao filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I
(Special Civil Case No. 1220) to declare Dominga Garcia's land escheated in its favor. It alleged that
Dominga Garcia and her children are presumed to be dead and since Dominga Garcia left no heir person
by law entitled to inherit her estate, the same should be escheated pursuant to Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court (pp. 1-5, Record on Appeal).

The court set the petition for hearing and directed the City to cause (as it did ) the publication of its
petition in the 'Mindanao Times," a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Davao, and
in the Official Gazette, once a week for six (6) consecutive weeks (pp. 6-8, Record on Appeal).

Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition on the ground that courts are not authorized to declare that
a person is presumed to be dead and that Dominga Garcia's being in Red China is not a sufficient ground
to deprive her of her property by escheat proceedings (pp. 8-9, Record on Appeal).

On June 15, 1966, Pizarro filed a motion to dismiss the escheat petition (pp. 13-15, Record on Appeal),
but he withdrew his motion three days later (p. 15, Record on Appeal).

Numerous incidents delayed the trial of the case, among them: (1) the court's order denying the
oppositor's motion to dismiss the escheat petition, which reached the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court (L-38423); (2) the court's order requiring Pizarro to render an accounting which also reached the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court (L-38642); and (3) the court's order for receivership which reached
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court (L-39224).

At the trial, the petitioner's evidence on the Identity of the land; the fact that the registered owner,
Dominga Garcia, and her children and husband had left for China in 1923; that she died intestate in 1955;
and that none of her heirs is found in the Philippines, were not seriously disputed.

The controversy centers on whether Dominga's daughter, Vicenta Tan, is alive in China or in Hongkong,
as alleged by Pizarro who tried to prove it through: (1) supposed pictures of the missing heir (Exhs. 1, 2,
and 3); (2) an Extrajudicial Settlement and Adjudication of Dominga's Estate (Exh. 19, pp. 8-9, Rollo)
allegedly executed by Vicenta in Hongkong on May 27, 1966; and (3) a Special Power of Attorney (Exh. 20)
that she supposedly signed (thumbmarked) in favor of Pizarro on the same date also in Hongkong (pp. 5356, Rollo).

Pizarro testified that his aunt Cornelia Pizarro gave him the papers pertaining to the land and told him to
take care of it before she died in 1936.

On cross-examination, he alleged that in 1960 he met Vicenta on Claveria Street, that she told him to
take care of her property because she would come again later; that they met again in Hongkong in 1966;
and he recognized her from her pictures
(Exhs. 1, 2, and 3).

On still another occasion, Pizarro testified that the title of the land was given to him by Dominga Garcia
when she and her husband returned to Davao before the war and borrowed money from him for their trip
to China.

Pizarro's witness, a septuagenarian Arsenio Suazo, who claimed to be a distant relative of Cornelia
Pizarro and Dominga Garcia, testified that the last time he saw Vicenta was when she was 5 years old. He
Identified her as the woman with buck teeth in the pictures (Exhs. 1, 2 and 3) because he remembered
that, even as a 5-year-old, "her teeth were not in good form and were somewhat protruding."

Another witness, Ramon Regino, a nephew of Pizarro, calculated that Vicenta was 7 years old when he
last saw her. He testified that the pictures (Exhs. 1, 2, and 3) bore a similarity to Vicenta whose face, he
recalled, was "somewhat long."

The trial court found Suazos testimony "not credible" or "improbable" for it was impossible for him to
Identify the woman in the picture as Vicenta on the basis only of his recollection that she had protruding
teeth as a child, because, the court argued, "it is a matter of common knowledge ... that the teeth of
children of five years of age are temporary, and are replaced by permanent teeth at the age of seven or
eight years."
(p. 185, Record on Appeal.)

The court also found Regino's testimony "Incredible, patently incredible" (p. 185, Record on Appeal).

Neither did the trial court believe Pizarro's allegation that the pictures, Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, were those
of Vicenta Tan. The court observed that the woman in the picture, who supposedly made the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Special Power of Attorney (Exhs. 19 and 20) did not know how to sign her name, thus
contradicting Pizarro's statement that Vicente, at age 7, already knew how to write and that when they
met in Hongkong, they conversed in Chavacano and in English. On the other hand, the court pointed out,
since Vicenta left for China in 1923 when she was only 7 years old, and as she grew up in China, it could
not be true that she spoke Chavacano and could write in the Roman alphabet
(p. 194, Record on Appeal).

The Court did not believe that Pizarro and Vicenta met in Davao in 1960, for if that were true, he did not
need to be shown the scar on Vicenta's thigh in order for him to recognize her. Furthermore, it is

improbable that a woman whom he had not seen for 43 years would bare her thigh to him. The trial court
pointed out in its decision that:

... There is no proof that Vicenta Tan, daughter of Dominga Garcia, was the one who in fact sent the
picture other than the claim of Pizarro that he received the same from her. Likewise, there is no proof that
the woman in Exhibit I is Vicenta Tan, daughter of Dominga Garcia, except the testimony of Pizarro that he
received the picture from her. An impostor might have sent her picture to Pizarro foist herself upon him as
the daughter of Dominga Garcia. And this is the woman whom Pizarro met in Hongkong (p. 196, Record on
Appeal.)

The trial court found that Pizarro's testimonies "ring with untruthfulness; they are replete with
inconsistencies" (p. 17, Record on Appeal) and the witnesses who corroborated him were "unworthy of
belief" (p. 198, Record on Appeal).

On March 23, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment whose dispositive portion is quoted below:

WHEREFORE, the land in the name of Dominga Garcia covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 296 (T2774) of the Register of Deeds of Davao City, as well as the rentals thereon, shall escheat and the same
are hereby assigned to the City of Davao for the benefit of public schools and public charitable institutions
and centers in the said city.

Ramon Pizarro shall make an accounting of the income he collected from himself and those who are
occupying the land from the time he took possession of it in 1936 when his aunt Cornelia Pizarro died until
the City of Davao takes possession of the property and shall deliver the same to the city.

Ramon Pizarro shall likewise deliver to the City of Davao the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 296 (T-2774) which is in his possession, without costs. (p. 198, Record on Appeal.)

Pizarro appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. L-51786-R). He passed away on June 16, 1975
during the pendency of the appeal.

On August 19,1975, a certain Luis Tan, alias Chen Yek An claiming to be the long missing son of
Dominga Garcia, filed a motion for intervention in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that he had been living
in mainland China; that he failed to come to the trial because of a government prohibition barring his entry
to the Philippines; that after diplomatic relations with China were restored, he returned to this country to
oppose the escheat proceedings on the properties of his mother, Dominga Garcia.

The City of Davao opposed the motion for intervention for tardiness. The Court of Appeals disallowed it
because the trial had long been terminated, and the intervention, if allowed, would unduly delay the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties

(p. 26, Rollo).

On April 2, 1976, the Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision of the trial court. Vicenta Tan
and/or her attorney-in-fact, Ramon Pizarro, appealed by petition for certiorari to this Court, alleging that
the Court of Appeals erred:

1. in ruling that the city of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition; and

2. in declaring that petitioner Vicenta Tan may be presumed dead.

We find no merit in the petition for review.

With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the SolicitorGeneral, may file the escheat petition under Section 1, Rule 91 of the Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the
Appellate Court correctly ruled that the case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on
September 12,1962, when the applicable rule was still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court which provided:

Sec. 1. When and by whom,petition filed.When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal
property in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person by law entitled to the same, the municipality or city
where the deceased last resided, if he resided in the Philippines, or the municipality or city in which he had
estate if he resided out of the Philippines, may file a petition in the court of first instance of the province
setting forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Rule 91 of the Revised rules of Court, which provides that only the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Solicitor General, may commence escheat proceedings, did not take effect until January 1, 1964.
Although the escheat proceedings were still pending then, the Revised Rules of Court could not be applied
to the petition because to do so would work injustice to the City of Davao. Rule 144 of the 1964 Rules of
Court contains this "saving" clause:

These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases brought after they take
effect, and also all further proceedings in cases pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the
court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure
shall apply.

The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of Vicenta Tan and Ramon Pizarro earlier
because the records show that Vicenta was never a party in the escheat proceedings. The trial court's
order dated February 4, 1972 ordering that she be substituted for Ramon Pizarro as oppositor (p. 16,
Record on Appeal) was set aside by the same court in its Order of March 23, 1972 (p. 178, Record on
Appeal) which was not appealed.

Vicenta Tan, if she still exists, was never served with summons extra-territorially under Section 17, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court. She never appeared in the trial court by herself, or counsel and never filed a
pleading therein, hence, she never submitted to the court's jurisdiction.

Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest (Sec. 2, Rule 3,
Rules of Court; Ferrer vs. Villamor, 60 SCRA 106; Filipinas Industrial Corp. vs. San Diego, 23 SCRA 706; 1
Moran 144). Ramon Pizarro, the alleged administrator of Dominga Garcia's property, was not a real party in
interest. He had no personality to oppose the escheat petition.

The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's ruling that Dominga Garcia and her heirs
may be presumed dead in the escheat proceedings as they are, in effect, proceedings to settle her estate.
Indeed, while a petition instituted for the sole purpose of securing a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead cannot be entertained if that were the only question or matter involved in the case,
the courts are not barred from declaring an absentee presumptively dead as an incident of, or in
connection with, an action or proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of such absentee. Thus
ruled this Court in In re Szatraw 81 Phil 461:

... This presumption ... may arise and be invoked and trade in a case, either in an action or in a special
proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for-decision to, competent court. Independently of
such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the
subject of an action or special proceeding. (Emphasis added.)

Direct evidence proving that Dominga Garcia, her husband and her children are in fact dead, is not
necessary. It may be presumed under Article 390 of the New Civil Code which provides:

ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years ...

The Court of Appeals found that the City of Davao was able to prove the facts from which the
presumption arises. It said:

... Its evidence preponderantly shows that in 1923 Dominga Garcia and her family left the Philippines
bound for China. Since then until the instant petition was filed on September 12, 1962, a period covering
about 39 years, nothing had been heard about them. It is not known whether all or any of them is still alive
at present. No heir, devisee or any other person entitled to the estate of Dominga Garcia has appeared
and claimed the same up to this time except Luis Tan whose status as alleged heir has still to be proven in
the proper court.

The assertion of appellant Pizarro that in 1960 he met and talked with Vicenta Tan in Claveria, Davao
City, before she went to China, and again in 1966, when he went to Hongkong, was not believed by the
court below. After assessing and evaluating the evidence, we find no sufficient cause to disturb the
conclusion of the trial court made on a finding of fact based on conflicting testimony and depending largely
upon the credibility of witnesses who testified before it. In our review of the evidence, we have not come
across any material fact or circumstance which the court a quo has overlooked and failed to consider, or
has misunderstood and misapplied, and which if properly appreciated and accurately were held would
change the result of this litigation.

For one thing, if it is true that Vicenta Tan left the Philippines only in 1960, as oppositor Pizarro would
like the court to believe, it has not been explained why he omitted to secure copies of her departure
papers from either the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration or the former Chinese
Embassy, and present them to the court to establish her existence as late as 1960.

For another, if it is also true that he met her in Hongkong in 1966, we are at a loss why he failed to
arrange for her return to the Philippines. We do not believe it would have been difficult to do so,
considering that she had been a resident of this country for more than 40 years and had been absent for
only about six years and that her return was imperative on account of a court action against her property
which required her personal presence. But even if this were impossible, oppositor Pizarro would not be left
without any other remedy. He could have arranged for the taking of her deposition in Hongkong by means
of letters rogatory under Sections 11 and 12, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court, in the same manner
that, according to him, he arranged their meeting in the Crown Colony sometime in 1966.

The unexplained failure of oppositor Pizarro to take advantage of any of these remedies available to him
heavily tilts the scale against the credibility of his claim.
(pp. 30-31, Rollo.)

These factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on Us. They may not be disturbed in this
petition for review where only legal questions may be raised
(Sec. 2, Rule 45).

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51786-R,
the petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, December 05, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 143483

January 31, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband
ROMEO SOLANO, respondents.

BELLOSILLO , J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify two (2) Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 12
November 1998 and 4 May 2000 giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment filed by
private respondent Amada H. Solano on 3 February 1997 and denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano served as the
all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During

Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent Solano was her
faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs.

In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2)
deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of
Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be
found.

While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of
Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.1 During the proceedings, a motion for
intervention was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but on
24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show
valid claim or right to the properties in question."2 Since it was established that there were no known heirs
and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the
decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807
and 7808 and issued new ones, TCT Nos. 129551 and 129552, both in the name of Pasay City.

In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she had
been looking for a long time. In view of this development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January
1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower court's decision alleging, among
other, that3 -

13.1. The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject properties to the petitioner in 1983
(for TCT No. 7807) and 1984 (for TCT No. 7808), these properties did not and could not form part of her
estate when she died on September 20, 1985. Consequently, they could not validly be escheated to the
Pasay City Government;

13.2. Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject of escheat proceedings, the decision
is still legally infirm for escheating the properties to an entity, the Pasay City Government, which is not
authorized by law to be the recipient thereof. The property should have been escheated in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines under Rule 91, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court x x x x

On 17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public respondents RTC and the
Register of Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack
of jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the statute of
limitations.

Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for annulment, the Court of Appeals
issued on 12 November 1998 the first of its assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition for
annulment of judgment and setting the date for trial on the merits. In upholding the theory of respondent
Solano, the Appeals Court ruled that -

Herein petitioner invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the part of respondent RTC to
entertain the escheat proceedings x x x because the parcels of land have been earlier donated to herein
petitioner in 1983 and 1984 prior to the death of said Hankins; and therefore, respondent court could not
have ordered the escheat of said properties in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, assign them to
respondent Pasay City government, order the cancellation of the old titles in the name of Hankins and
order the properties registered in the name of respondent Pasay City x x x x The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically laid down the grounds of annulment filed before this Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and this jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint
determine the nature of the action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus whether or not the
properties in question are no longer part of the estate of the deceased Hankins at the time of her death;
and, whether or not the alleged donations are valid are issues in the present petition for annulment which
can be resolved only after a full blown trial x x x x

It is for the same reason that respondents espousal of the statute of limitations against herein petition
for annulment cannot prosper at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 91 of the Revised
Rules of Court expressly provides that a person entitled to the estate must file his claim with the court a
quo within five (5) years from the date of said judgment. However, it is clear to this Court that herein
petitioner is not claiming anything from the estate of the deceased at the time of her death on September
20, 1985; rather she is claiming that the subject parcels of land should not have been included as part of
the estate of the said decedent as she is the owner thereof by virtue of the deeds of donation in her favor.

In effect, herein petitioner, who alleges to be in possession of the premises in question, is claiming
ownership of the properties in question and the consequent reconveyance thereof in her favor which cause
of action prescribes ten (10) years after the issuance of title in favor of respondent Pasay City on August 7,
1990. Herein petition was seasonably filed on February 3, 1997 under Article 1144, to wit:

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.

And Article 1456, to wit:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.4

In its Resolution of 4 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public
respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay City and the Presiding judge of the lower court and set the trial on
the merits for June 15 and 16, 2000.

In its effort to nullify the Resolutions herein before mentioned, petitioner points out that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (a) in denying

petitioner's affirmative defenses set forth in its answer and motion for reconsideration, and in setting the
case for trial and reception of evidence; and, (b) in giving due course to private respondent's petition for
annulment of decision despite the palpable setting-in of the 5-year statute of limitations within which to
file claims before the court a quo set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court and Art. 1014 of the
Civil Code.

Petitioner argues that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the properties in question in
favor of the city government and the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of
subsequent discovery of the deeds of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on the
matter. It further contends that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only provides for two (2)
grounds for the annulment of judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. As such the
discovery of the deeds of donation seven (7) years after the finality of the escheat proceedings is an
extraneous matter which is clearly not an instance of extrinsic fraud nor a ground to oust the lower court of
its jurisdiction.

Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation in favor of private
respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court a quo as set forth
in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court has set in.

The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land purportedly donated to
private respondent which will ultimately determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the
same escheated in favor of the state.

We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the
state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies
intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an
open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."5 Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty,
the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such
property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally
prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought.

In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the
date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the
municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim
not made shall be barred forever."6 The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to
defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be
punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment.

Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir but allegedly
a donee, have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules
of Court? In this regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal Council of San
Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,7 is applicable at least insofar as it concerns the Court's
discussion on who is an "interested party" in an escheat proceeding -

In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and
exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to
be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the
present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest
in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the
hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with
the former (underscoring supplied).

In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June
1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent
decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated
properties militates against recovery.

A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive

against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies
thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown,8 "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified
by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent
to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice
having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably
lost her right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to
nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.

In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that the
escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to
escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously donated.
We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for failure to show "valid
claim or right to the properties in question."9 Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a
claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property and his right to intervene. A
fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the decedent indicating
that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased during her
lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had
been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least before the
escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise. The
Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part
of the decedent's estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the strength of a belated
allegation that the same had previously been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only
after a close scrutiny of every piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and
unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations, conjectures and
unsubstantiated assertions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 12
November 1998 giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment, and its Resolution dated 4
May 2000 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC-Br. 114,
Pasay City, dated 27 June 1989, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena J., no part for being a co-signee of res. in question.

Footnotes

1 Raffled to Br. 114, Judge Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding.

2 CA Records, p. 234.

3 Id., p. 5.

4 CA decision; Rollo, pp. 34-35.

5 Re Thompsons Estate, 192 F2d 451.

6 Sec. 4, Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court.

7 No. L-45460, 25 February 1938.

8 161 US 256.

9 CA Records, p. 20.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND division

rizal commercial banking corporation,

Petitioner,

versus

hi-tri development corporation and luz r. bakunawa,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 192413

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 13, 2012

x--------------------------------------------------x

Decision

SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) against respondents Hi-Tri Development Corporation (Hi-Tri) and Luz R. Bakunawa
(Bakunawa). Petitioner seeks to appeal from the 26 November 2009 Decision and 27 May 2010 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA),[1] which reversed and set aside the 19 May 2008 Decision and 3 November
2008 Order of the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 06-244.[2] The case before the
RTC involved the Complaint for Escheat filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pursuant to Act
No. 3936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 679 (P.D. 679), against certain deposits, credits, and
unclaimed balances held by the branches of various banks in the Philippines. The trial court declared the
amounts, subject of the special proceedings, escheated to the Republic and ordered them deposited with
the Treasurer of the Philippines (Treasurer) and credited in favor of the Republic.[3] The assailed RTC
judgments included an unclaimed balance in the amount of 1,019,514.29, maintained by RCBC in its
Ermita Business Center branch.

We quote the narration of facts of the CA[4] as follows:

x x x Luz [R.] Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased (Spouses Bakunawa) are registered
owners of six (6) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 324985 and 324986 of the Quezon City Register of
Deeds, and TCT Nos. 103724, 98827, 98828 and 98829 of the Marikina Register of Deeds. These lots were
sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government [(PCGG)].

Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan (Millan), through her representative, Jerry Montemayor, offered
to buy said lots for 6,724,085.71, with the promise that she will take care of clearing whatever
preliminary obstacles there may[]be to effect a completion of the sale. The Spouses Bakunawa gave to
Millan the Owners Copies of said TCTs and in turn, Millan made a down[]payment of 1,019,514.29 for the
intended purchase. However, for one reason or another, Millan was not able to clear said obstacles. As a
result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and offered to return to Millan her down[]payment of
1,019,514.29. However, Millan refused to accept back the 1,019,514.29 down[]payment. Consequently,
the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri Development Corporation (Hi-Tri) took out on
October 28, 1991, a Managers Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of 1,019,514.29, payable to Millans
company Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation (Rosmil) c/o Teresita Millan and used this as one of
their basis for a complaint against Millan and Montemayor which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 99, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10719 [in 1991], praying that:

1.
That the defendants Teresita Mil[l]an and Jerry Montemayor may be ordered to return to plaintiffs
spouses the Owners Copies of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 324985, 324986, 103724, 98827, 98828
and 98829;

2.
That the defendant Teresita Mil[l]an be correspondingly ordered to receive the amount of One Million
Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Fourteen Pesos and Twenty Nine Centavos (1,019,514.29);

3.
That the defendants be ordered to pay to plaintiffs spouses moral damages in the amount of
2,000,000.00; and

4.

That the defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the amount of 50,000.00.

Being part and parcel of said complaint, and consistent with their prayer in Civil Case No. Q-91-10719 that
Teresita Mil[l]an be correspondingly ordered to receive the amount of One Million Nineteen Thousand Five
Hundred Fourteen Pesos and Twenty Nine [Centavos] (1,019,514.29)[], the Spouses Bakunawa, upon
advice of their counsel, retained custody of RCBC Managers Check No. ER 034469 and refrained from
canceling or negotiating it.

All throughout the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-91-10719, especially during negotiations for a possible
settlement of the case, Millan was informed that the Managers Check was available for her withdrawal, she
being the payee.

On January 31, 2003, during the pendency of the abovementioned case and without the knowledge of [HiTri and Spouses Bakunawa], x x x RCBC reported the 1,019,514.29-credit existing in favor of Rosmil to the
Bureau of Treasury as among its unclaimed balances as of January 31, 2003. Allegedly, a copy of the Sworn
Statement executed by Florentino N. Mendoza, Manager and Head of RCBCs Asset Management,
Disbursement & Sundry Department (AMDSD) was posted within the premises of RCBC-Ermita.

On December 14, 2006, x x x Republic, through the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)], filed with the
RTC the action below for Escheat [(Civil Case No. 06-244)].

On April 30, 2008, [Spouses Bakunawa] settled amicably their dispute with Rosmil and Millan. Instead of
only the amount of 1,019,514.29, [Spouses Bakunawa] agreed to pay Rosmil and Millan the amount of
3,000,000.00, [which is] inclusive [of] the amount of []1,019,514.29. But during negotiations and
evidently prior to said settlement, [Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri] inquired from RCBC-Ermita the
availability of the 1,019,514.29 under RCBC Managers Check No. ER 034469. [Hi-Tri and Spouses
Bakunawa] were however dismayed when they were informed that the amount was already subject of the
escheat proceedings before the RTC.

On April 17, 2008, [Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri] wrote x x x RCBC, viz:

We understand that the deposit corresponding to the amount of Php 1,019,514.29 stated in the Managers
Check is currently the subject of escheat proceedings pending before Branch 150 of the Makati Regional
Trial Court.

Please note that it was our impression that the deposit would be taken from [Hi-Tris] RCBC bank account
once an order to debit is issued upon the payees presentation of the Managers Check. Since the payee
rejected the negotiated Managers Check, presentation of the Managers Check was never made.

Consequently, the deposit that was supposed to be allocated for the payment of the Managers Check was
supposed to remain part of the Corporation[s] RCBC bank account, which, thereafter, continued to be
actively maintained and operated. For this reason, We hereby demand your confirmation that the amount
of Php 1,019,514.29 continues to form part of the funds in the Corporations RCBC bank account, since payout of said amount was never ordered. We wish to point out that if there was any attempt on the part of
RCBC to consider the amount indicated in the Managers Check separate from the Corporations bank
account, RCBC would have issued a statement to that effect, and repeatedly reminded the Corporation that
the deposit would be considered dormant absent any fund movement. Since the Corporation never
received any statements of account from RCBC to that effect, and more importantly, never received any
single letter from RCBC noting the absence of fund movement and advising the Corporation that the
deposit would be treated as dormant.

On April 28, 2008, [Manuel Bakunawa] sent another letter to x x x RCBC reiterating their position as abovequoted.

In a letter dated May 19, 2008, x x x RCBC replied and informed [Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa] that:

The Banks Ermita BC informed Hi-Tri and/or its principals regarding the inclusion of Managers Check No.
ER034469 in the escheat proceedings docketed as Civil Case No. 06-244, as well as the status thereof,
between 28 January 2008 and 1 February 2008.

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to what Hi-Tri hopes for, the funds covered by the Managers Check No. ER034469 does not form
part of the Banks own account. By simple operation of law, the funds covered by the managers check in
issue became a deposit/credit susceptible for inclusion in the escheat case initiated by the OSG and/or
Bureau of Treasury.

xxx xxx xxx

Granting arguendo that the Bank was duty-bound to make good the check, the Banks obligation to do so
prescribed as early as October 2001.

(Emphases, citations, and annotations were omitted.)

The RTC Ruling

The escheat proceedings before the Makati City RTC continued. On 19 May 2008, the trial court rendered
its assailed Decision declaring the deposits, credits, and unclaimed balances subject of Civil Case No. 06244 escheated to the Republic. Among those included in the order of forfeiture was the amount of
1,019,514.29 held by RCBC as allocated funds intended for the payment of the Managers Check issued in
favor of Rosmil. The trial court ordered the deposit of the escheated balances with the Treasurer and
credited in favor of the Republic. Respondents claim that they were not able to participate in the trial, as
they were not informed of the ongoing escheat proceedings.

Consequently, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion dated 11 June 2008, seeking the partial
reconsideration of the RTC Decision insofar as it escheated the fund allocated for the payment of the
Managers Check. They asked that they be included as party-defendants or, in the alternative, allowed to
intervene in the case and their motion considered as an answer-in-intervention. Respondents argued that
they had meritorious grounds to ask reconsideration of the Decision or, alternatively, to seek intervention
in the case. They alleged that the deposit was subject of an ongoing dispute (Civil Case No. Q-91-10719)
between them and Rosmil since 1991, and that they were interested parties to that case.[5]

On 3 November 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of respondents. The trial court
explained that the Republic had proven compliance with the requirements of publication and notice, which
served as notice to all those who may be affected and prejudiced by the Complaint for Escheat. The RTC
also found that the motion failed to point out the findings and conclusions that were not supported by the
law or the evidence presented, as required by Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Finally, it ruled that the
alternative prayer to intervene was filed out of time.

The CA Ruling

On 26 November 2009, the CA issued its assailed Decision reversing the 19 May 2008 Decision and 3
November 2008 Order of the RTC. According to the appellate court,[6] RCBC failed to prove that the latter
had communicated with the purchaser of the Managers Check (Hi-Tri and/or Spouses Bakunawa) or the
designated payee (Rosmil) immediately before the bank filed its Sworn Statement on the dormant
accounts held therein. The CA ruled that the banks failure to notify respondents deprived them of an
opportunity to intervene in the escheat proceedings and to present evidence to substantiate their claim, in
violation of their right to due process. Furthermore, the CA pronounced that the Makati City RTC Clerk of
Court failed to issue individual notices directed to all persons claiming interest in the unclaimed balances,
as well as to require them to appear after publication and show cause why the unclaimed balances should
not be deposited with the Treasurer of the Philippines. It explained that the jurisdictional requirement of

individual notice by personal service was distinct from the requirement of notice by publication.
Consequently, the CA held that the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for want of jurisdiction.

Issue

After a perusal of the arguments presented by the parties, we cull the main issues as follows:

I.
Whether the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for failure to send separate notices to
respondents by personal service

II.
Whether petitioner had the obligation to notify respondents immediately before it filed its
Sworn Statement with the Treasurer

III.

Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic

Discussion

Petitioner bank assails[7] the CA judgments insofar as they ruled that notice by personal service upon
respondents is a jurisdictional requirement in escheat proceedings. Petitioner contends that respondents
were not the owners of the unclaimed balances and were thus not entitled to notice from the RTC Clerk of
Court. It hinges its claim on the theory that the funds represented by the Managers Check were deemed
transferred to the credit of the payee or holder upon its issuance.

We quote the pertinent provision of Act No. 3936, as amended, on the rule on service of processes, to wit:

Sec. 3. Whenever the Solicitor General shall be informed of such unclaimed balances, he shall commence
an action or actions in the name of the People of the Republic of the Philippines in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the bank, building and loan association or trust corporation is
located, in which shall be joined as parties the bank, building and loan association or trust corporation and
all such creditors or depositors. All or any of such creditors or depositors or banks, building and loan
association or trust corporations may be included in one action. Service of process in such action or actions
shall be made by delivery of a copy of the complaint and summons to the president, cashier, or managing
officer of each defendant bank, building and loan association or trust corporation and by publication of a
copy of such summons in a newspaper of general circulation, either in English, in Filipino, or in a local
dialect, published in the locality where the bank, building and loan association or trust corporation is
situated, if there be any, and in case there is none, in the City of Manila, at such time as the court may
order. Upon the trial, the court must hear all parties who have appeared therein, and if it be determined
that such unclaimed balances in any defendant bank, building and loan association or trust corporation are
unclaimed as hereinbefore stated, then the court shall render judgment in favor of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, declaring that said unclaimed balances have escheated to the Government of

the Republic of the Philippines and commanding said bank, building and loan association or trust
corporation to forthwith deposit the same with the Treasurer of the Philippines to credit of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines to be used as the National Assembly may direct.

At the time of issuing summons in the action above provided for, the clerk of court shall also issue a notice
signed by him, giving the title and number of said action, and referring to the complaint therein, and
directed to all persons, other than those named as defendants therein, claiming any interest in any
unclaimed balance mentioned in said complaint, and requiring them to appear within sixty days after the
publication or first publication, if there are several, of such summons, and show cause, if they have any,
why the unclaimed balances involved in said action should not be deposited with the Treasurer of the
Philippines as in this Act provided and notifying them that if they do not appear and show cause, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines will apply to the court for the relief demanded in the
complaint. A copy of said notice shall be attached to, and published with the copy of, said summons
required to be published as above, and at the end of the copy of such notice so published, there shall be a
statement of the date of publication, or first publication, if there are several, of said summons and notice.
Any person interested may appear in said action and become a party thereto. Upon the publication or the
completion of the publication, if there are several, of the summons and notice, and the service of the
summons on the defendant banks, building and loan associations or trust corporations, the court shall
have full and complete jurisdiction in the Republic of the Philippines over the said unclaimed balances and
over the persons having or claiming any interest in the said unclaimed balances, or any of them, and shall
have full and complete jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues herein, and render the appropriate
judgment thereon. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, insofar as banks are concerned, service of processes is made by delivery of a copy of the complaint
and summons upon the president, cashier, or managing officer of the defendant bank.[8] On the other
hand, as to depositors or other claimants of the unclaimed balances, service is made by publication of a
copy of the summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality where the institution is situated.
[9] A notice about the forthcoming escheat proceedings must also be issued and published, directing and
requiring all persons who may claim any interest in the unclaimed balances to appear before the court and
show cause why the dormant accounts should not be deposited with the Treasurer.

Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon
respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered
the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem,
[10] whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead of the person.[11] Thus, an action may
be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other claimants.[12]
Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res.[13] Consequently, a judgment of escheat is
conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and constructive
notice to all persons interested.[14]

Nevertheless, we find sufficient grounds to affirm the CA on the exclusion of the funds allocated for the
payment of the Managers Check in the escheat proceedings.

Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in
and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without there being an interested person having
a legal claim thereto.[15] In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the status, custody, and
ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine whether the inactivity was brought about by the fact of
death or absence of or abandonment by the depositor.[16] If after the proceedings the property remains
without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be reverted to the state to forestall an open
invitation to self-service by the first comers.[17] However, if interested parties have come forward and lain

claim to the property, the courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit should pass to the claimants
or be forfeited in favor of the state.[18] We emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize
depositors for failing to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby the state
compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is substantial ground for a belief
that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or without an owner.[19]

Act No. 3936, as amended, outlines the proper procedure to be followed by banks and other similar
institutions in filing a sworn statement with the Treasurer concerning dormant accounts:

Sec. 2. Immediately after the taking effect of this Act and within the month of January of every odd year,
all banks, building and loan associations, and trust corporations shall forward to the Treasurer of the
Philippines a statement, under oath, of their respective managing officers, of all credits and deposits held
by them in favor of persons known to be dead, or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals
during the preceding ten years or more, arranged in alphabetical order according to the names of creditors
and depositors, and showing:

(a)
The names and last known place of residence or post office addresses of the persons in whose favor
such unclaimed balances stand;

(b)
The amount and the date of the outstanding unclaimed balance and whether the same is in money
or in security, and if the latter, the nature of the same;

(c)
The date when the person in whose favor the unclaimed balance stands died, if known, or the date
when he made his last deposit or withdrawal; and

(d)

The interest due on such unclaimed balance, if any, and the amount thereof.

A copy of the above sworn statement shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the premises of the bank,
building and loan association, or trust corporation concerned for at least sixty days from the date of filing
thereof: Provided, That immediately before filing the above sworn statement, the bank, building and loan
association, and trust corporation shall communicate with the person in whose favor the unclaimed
balance stands at his last known place of residence or post office address.

It shall be the duty of the Treasurer of the Philippines to inform the Solicitor General from time to time the
existence of unclaimed balances held by banks, building and loan associations, and trust corporations.
(Emphasis supplied.)

As seen in the afore-quoted provision, the law sets a detailed system for notifying depositors of unclaimed
balances. This notification is meant to inform them that their deposit could be escheated if left unclaimed.
Accordingly, before filing a sworn statement, banks and other similar institutions are under obligation to
communicate with owners of dormant accounts. The purpose of this initial notice is for a bank to determine
whether an inactive account has indeed been unclaimed, abandoned, forgotten, or left without an owner. If
the depositor simply does not wish to touch the funds in the meantime, but still asserts ownership and
dominion over the dormant account, then the bank is no longer obligated to include the account in its
sworn statement.[20] It is not the intent of the law to force depositors into unnecessary litigation and
defense of their rights, as the state is only interested in escheating balances that have been abandoned
and left without an owner.

In case the bank complies with the provisions of the law and the unclaimed balances are eventually
escheated to the Republic, the bank shall not thereafter be liable to any person for the same and any
action which may be brought by any person against in any bank xxx for unclaimed balances so deposited
xxx shall be defended by the Solicitor General without cost to such bank.[21] Otherwise, should it fail to
comply with the legally outlined procedure to the prejudice of the depositor, the bank may not raise the
defense provided under Section 5 of Act No. 3936, as amended.

Petitioner asserts[22] that the CA committed a reversible error when it required RCBC to send prior notices
to respondents about the forthcoming escheat proceedings involving the funds allocated for the payment
of the Managers Check. It explains that, pursuant to the law, only those whose favor such unclaimed
balances stand are entitled to receive notices. Petitioner argues that, since the funds represented by the
Managers Check were deemed transferred to the credit of the payee upon issuance of the check, the
proper party entitled to the notices was the payee Rosmil and not respondents. Petitioner then contends
that, in any event, it is not liable for failing to send a separate notice to the payee, because it did not have
the address of Rosmil. Petitioner avers that it was not under any obligation to record the address of the
payee of a Managers Check.

In contrast, respondents Hi-Tri and Bakunawa allege[23] that they have a legal interest in the fund
allocated for the payment of the Managers Check. They reason that, since the funds were part of the
Compromise Agreement between respondents and Rosmil in a separate civil case, the approval and
eventual execution of the agreement effectively reverted the fund to the credit of respondents.
Respondents further posit that their ownership of the funds was evidenced by their continued custody of
the Managers Check.

An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a bank (drawee),[24]
requesting the latter to pay a person named therein (payee) or to the order of the payee or to the bearer, a
named sum of money.[25] The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an assignment of any
part of the funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer.[26] Here, the bank becomes liable only after it
accepts or certifies the check.[27] After the check is accepted for payment, the bank would then debit the
amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the account of the depositor-drawer.

There are checks of a special type called managers or cashiers checks. These are bills of exchange drawn
by the banks manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank itself.[28] Typically, a
managers or a cashiers check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of funds to be
debited from the depositors account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank the value of the check
to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in its name, with itself as the drawee, the check is deemed
accepted in advance.[29] Ordinarily, the check becomes the primary obligation of the issuing bank and
constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand.[30]

Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a managers check does not ipso facto work as an automatic transfer of
funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the managers or cashiers check retains custody
of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an effective delivery, we find
the following provision on undelivered instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable:[31]

Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. Every contract on a negotiable instrument is
incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As
between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery,
in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing,
accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been
conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the
instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by
all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the
instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and
intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner acknowledges that the Managers Check was procured by respondents, and that the amount to
be paid for the check would be sourced from the deposit account of Hi-Tri.[32] When Rosmil did not accept
the Managers Check offered by respondents, the latter retained custody of the instrument instead of
cancelling it. As the Managers Check neither went to the hands of Rosmil nor was it further negotiated to
other persons, the instrument remained undelivered. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that respondents
retained custody of the instrument.[33]

Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur. An order to
debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the Managers Check
was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that the allocated fund is still
held by the bank.[34] As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri,
which procured the Managers Check. The doctrine that the deposit represented by a managers check
automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the instrument although accepted in advance
remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left
inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.

After a careful review of the RTC records, we find that it is no longer necessary to remand the case for
hearing to determine whether the claim of respondents was valid. There was no contention that they were
the procurers of the Managers Check. It is undisputed that there was no effective delivery of the check,
rendering the instrument incomplete. In addition, we have already settled that respondents retained
ownership of the funds. As it is obvious from their foregoing actions that they have not abandoned their
claim over the fund, we rule that the allocated deposit, subject of the Managers Check, should be excluded
from the escheat proceedings. We reiterate our pronouncement that the objective of escheat proceedings
is state forfeiture of unclaimed balances. We further note that there is nothing in the records that would
show that the OSG appealed the assailed CA judgments. We take this failure to appeal as an indication of
disinterest in pursuing the escheat proceedings in favor of the Republic.

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED. The 26 November 2009 Decision and 27 May 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107261 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

[1] The Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 107261 were penned by CA Associate Justice Vicente
S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.

[2] The Decision and Order in Civil Case No. 06-244 (for Escheat) was penned by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.

[3] CA Decision at 1-2 (Hi-Tri Development Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, CA-G.R. SP No.
107261, 26 November 2009), rollo, pp. 61-62; RTC Decision at the 18th to the 19th pp. (unpaged)
(Republic of the Philippines v. Allied Banking Corporation, Civil Case No. 06-244, 19 May 2008), rollo, pp.
210-211.

[4] CA Decision at 2-7, supra, rollo, pp. 62-67.

[5] Omnibus Motion at 3-7 (Republic of the Philippines v. Allied Banking Corporation, Civil Case No. 06-244,
decided on 19 May 2008), rollo, pp. 217-221. See also RTC Judgment (Bakunawa v. Milan, Civil Case No. Q91-10719, 17 June 2008), rollo, pp. 287-289.

[6] CA Decision at 14-16, supra note 3, rollo, pp. 74-76.

[7] Petition for Review on Certiorari of RCBC at 41-49, rollo, pp. 43-51.

[8] Act No. 3936, as amended by P.D. 679, Sec. 3; see also Security Savings Bank v. State of California, 263
U.S. 282 (1923).

[9] Id.

[10] Republic v. Court of First Instance, 247-A Phil. 85 (1988).

[11] See Ramos v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144294, 11 March 2003, 399 SCRA 43.

[12] See Grey v. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49 (1910).

[13] Id.

[14] Id. (citing Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896)).

[15] Blacks Law Dictionary 545 (6th ed. 1990); Act No. 3936, as amended by P.D. 679, Secs. 1 and 3. See
generally Republic v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 177 (2002) and Roth v. Delano, 338 U.S. 226 (1949).

[16] See Act No. 3936, as amended by P.D. 679, Sec. 1 and Security Savings Bank v. State of California,
supra note 8. See generally Roth v. Delano, supra.

[17] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15, at 183-184.

[18] See generally Roth v. Delano, supra note 15.

[19] See also Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944), cited in American Express Travel
Related Services Co., Inc. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685 (6th Circ. 2011) (U.S.).

[20] See generally Security Savings Bank v. State of California, supra note 8.

[21] Act No. 3936, as amended by P.D. 679 (1975), Sec. 5.

[22] Petition for Review on Certiorari of RCBC at 41-49, rollo, pp. 43-51.

[23] Comment of Respondents at 7-8, rollo, pp. 651-652.

[24] Act No. 2031 (1911), otherwise known as the Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 185.

[25] Moran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105836, 7 March 1994, 230 SCRA 799.

[26] Act No. 2031 (1911), otherwise known as the Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 189.

[27] Id. at Sec. 127.

[28] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Roxas, G.R. No. 157833, 15 October 2007, 536 SCRA 168;
International Corporate Bank v. Gueco, 404 Phil. 353 (2001).

[29] International Corporate Bank v. Gueco, supra.

[30] Id.; Republic v. Philippine National Bank, 113 Phil. 828 (1961). A managers or a cashiers check may be
treated as a promissory note and is the substantial equivalent of a certified check (Id.; Equitable PCI Bank
v. Ong, 533 Phil. 415 (2006); New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. v. Seneris, 189 Phil. 517 (1980)).
Certification signifies that the instrument was drawn upon sufficient funds; that funds have been set apart
or assigned for the satisfaction of the check in favor of the payee; and that the funds shall be so applied
when the check is presented for payment (Id.). Here, the deposit represented by the check is transferred
from the credit of the maker to that of the payee or holder (Id.). Thus, to all intents and purposes, the
payee or holder becomes the depositor of the drawee bank, with rights and duties of one in that situation
(Id.).

[31] Act No. 2031 (1911). See also Malloy v. Smith, 265 Md. 460, 290 A.2d 486, 57 A.L.R.3d 1076 (Md. Ct.
App. 1972)(U.S.) (citing Pikeville Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 150, 135 S.W.2d 426 (Ky Ct. App.
1939)(U.S.))

[32] Petition for Review on Certiorari of RCBC at 27-29, rollo, pp. 29-31.

[33] Id. at 53, rollo, p. 55.

[34] Letter of RCBC to Hi-Tri at 2, Petition for Review on Certiorari of RCBC, Annex N, rollo, p. 180.