PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC.

,
petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
(SIXTH DIVISION) and HONOR MOSLARES,
respondents. G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31,
1984
FACTS:
Nicolai Drepin died testate on August 23, 1972.
He left behind three (3) parcels of titled land. Since the
filing of the petition for probate of the Drepins will nine
(9) offers had been made for the purchase of the
Drepin lands, among them, that of GM Management
Phils through its President Honor P. Moslares. Moslares
alleged that on October 9, 1970, Drepin executed a
deed of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent
in his favor. He also alleged that on June 25, 1971,
Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture
Agreement" where it was agreed that Drepin shall be
the registered "owner" of the lots and denominated
Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting the
lands into a residential subdivision.
But
before
the
agreement
could
be
implemented, Nicolai Drepin died. Upon learning of the
existence of Special Proceedings, Moslares informed
the Judicial Administrator that he is already the owner
of the properties made subject matter of the Special
Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay
the balance on the sale with mortgage in accordance
with the terms of his written proposal.
On September 25,1979, with the courts
permission, a Deed of Undertaking was entered into by
respondent Moslares and the Administrator to
implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such
deed provided for the mode of payment which
Moslares was to follow. Moslares failed to pay as
agreed. Thus, the administrator reported the matter to
the probate court which approved the sale of the
property to Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. The deed of sale
was duly registered. Mosrales filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was not acted by the
probate court.
Under the theory of Moslares, it is insisted that
the probate court has no authority to cancel his
unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding the fact that he
failed miserably to comply with the terms of his own
offer to buy. On May 18, 1981, Pio Barreto Realty filed
Civil Case No. 41287 before the CFI of Rizal to
determine title and ownership over the Drepin lands. A
petition for certiorari was filed by respondent Moslares
before the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1. Can the Court of Appeals act upon the issue
of exclusion of properties in the estate when it is not
passed upon by the court a quo?
2. Can the probate court order the execution of
the deed of sale with Pio Barreto?
Held:
As to the first issue: No. The question of
whether the properties sold by Drepin to Petitioner
should be excluded from the probate proceedings
below, can not be determined with finality by the
Supreme Court in this case, because in this petition We
are merely reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as
a probate court. Any ruling by the probate court to
include those properties "is only provisional in
character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a

separate action on the issue of title or ownership"

(Sebial v. Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA
385). Consequently, in reviewing the exercise of such
limited probate jurisdiction, We cannot order an
unqualified and final exclusion of the properties
involved, as prayed for; to do so would expand the
probate court's jurisdiction beyond the perimeters set
by law and jurisprudence. It is fitting and proper that
this issue be ventilated and finally resolved in the
already instituted Civil Case No. 41287, even as We
hold that respondent court's act of not excluding the
lots involved did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. In view of this limitation, We need not
resolve the issue of whether there was novation of the
Deed of Sale with Mortgage, or not.
As to the Second Issue: Yes. Actions of the
probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the
adjudication of rights under the contract entered into
by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted
that the dealings of the respondent with the court
arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its
authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
property of the estate to pay or settle against the
estate. Thus, by estoppel, respondent bound himself
under an agreement with the court separate and
distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In
rescinding such contract, the court merely seeks to
enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which
had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is
well within the power of the probate court. We cannot
allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin
estate will never be settled and liquidated because
even if Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price
of the Drepin lands, still the probate court can no
longer sell the lands to other prospective buyers. It is
also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's
contract of sale with decedent that had been
invalidated but rather the administrator's authority to
sell to respondent. Moreover, the respondent is not
without remedy if truly his claim of ownership is proper
and meritorious. Since the probate court has no
jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of
the properties, the respondents may bring a separate
action if they wish to question the petitioner's titles
and ownership.
Jimenez v. Jimenez
Facts: The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and
Consolacion Ungson produced four (4) children,
namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles.
During the existence of the marriage, Lino Jimenez
acquired five (5) parcels of land in Salomague,
Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married
Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot the seven
petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio,
Amadeo, Modesto and Virginia, all surnamed Jimenez.
Lino Jimenez died on August 11, 1951 while Genoveva
Caolboy died on November 21, 1978.
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a
petition before the Court of First to be appointed as
administratrix of the properties of the deceased
spouses Lino and Genoveva (1st case).

Thereafter, private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr.,

son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the
exclusion of his father's name and those of those his
uncles and aunts because they have already received
their inheritance consisting of five (5) parcels of lands
in Pangasinan.
However, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed
administrator . On May 21, 1981, she filed an inventory
of the estate wherein she included the five (5) parcels
of land Pangasinan. As a consequence, Leonardo
Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties
from the inventory on the ground that these had
already been adjudicated to his uncles and aunts. On
September 29, 1981, the probate court ordered the
exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land from the
inventory on the basis of the evidence of private
respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr.
Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended
complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
to recover possession/ownership of the subject five (5)
parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez
and Genoveva Caolboy and to order private
respondents to render an accounting of the produce
therefrom(2nd case/ separate case/present action).
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by
prior judgment on the 1st case mentioned.

the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a

separate action. 12
All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is a
dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties
and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do so. 13
The provisional character of the inclusion in the
inventory of a contested property was again reiterated
in the following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 14 Junquera vs. Borromeo, 15
Borromeo vs. Canonoy, 16 Recto vs. de la Rosa. 17 It
has also been held that in a special proceeding for the
probate of a will, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality. 18 This pronouncement no doubt
applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as
in the case at bar.

RULING:
1) Petitioners' present action for recovery of
possession and ownership is appropriately filed
because as a general rule, a probate court can only
pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the
probate, court's findings are not conclusive being
prima facie, a separate proceeding is necessary to
establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.

2) Res judicata does not exist because of the

difference in the causes of actions. Specifically in S.P.
No. 5346, the action was for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy
while Civil Case No. 16111 was an action for the
recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5)
parcels of land. Moreover, while admittedly, the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V in S.P. No.
5346 had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited
jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court as to
title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in a
separate proceeding. Civil Case No. 16111, on the
other hand. was lodged before the Regional Trial Court
of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the exercise of the
court's general jurisdiction. It was, in fact, such
"separate or ordinary proceedings" contemplated by
the rules for a final determination of the issue of
ownership of the disputed properties. To repeat, since
the determination of the question of title to the subject
properties in S.P. 5346 was merely provisional,
petitioners are not barred from instituting the
appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.

The patent reason is the probate court's limited

jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from

Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents

in their motion to dismiss do not appear to be
indubitable.

ISSUES:
1) whether in a settlement proceeding
(testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to
settle questions of ownership. NO
2) whether res judicata exists as to bar
petitioners' present action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of
land. NO