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CA: rendered the assailed decision denying due course and dismissing the
petition for certiorari. Hence, the present case. I
CONCEPCION
V.
VDA,
DE
DAFFON,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES OSMEA VDA, DE DAFFON,
AILEEN DAFFON, JOSELITO DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA DAFFON, LEILA
DAFFON and SUZETTE DAFFON, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was married to the late Amado Daffon and they had one son
(Joselito)
Joselito married Respondent Lourdes Osmena and they bore six children.
Amado passed away on January 21, 1982 while his son Joselito died on
October 25, 1990.
On January 21, 1994, respondents Lourdes Osmea Vda. De Daffon,
together with her six minor children, instituted an action for partition
against petitioner Concepcion Villamor Vda. de Daffon, before the
RTC Danao City Br 25. Respondents alleged that:
o
o
o
Amado left several real and personal properties which formed part
of his conjugal partnership with petitioner.
Joselito being a forced heir of Amado was entitled to at
least one half of Amado's estate, consisting of his share in the
said conjugal properties but the same were never partitioned.
Thus, respondents prayed that the conjugal properties of
Amado Daffon and petitioner be partitioned and that the
one-half share of Amado be further partitioned between petitioner,
on one hand, and the respondents as heirs of Joselito Daffon, on
the other hand.
She argued that the trial court cannot take cognizance of the
action for partition considering her claim of absolute
ownership over the properties; and that respondents
themselves admitted that petitioner has repudiated the coownership.
RULE 70
SPOUSES AGOSTO MUOZ AND ROSARIO MUOZ, SPS. JESSIE (JESUS)
CAGUIOA AND EMMA FUMAR, SPS. RICARDO LOPEZ AND APOLONIA FABIAN,
ZACARIA MARCELINO, MR. CRISANTO CLARIN, MR. HONORIO YUMUL, MR.
EDUARDO YUMUL, MRS. VICTORIA CAYANAN, MR. ALEXANDER FABIAN AND
MR. DIOSDADO SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
NICOLAS P. GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS:
ISSUE: WON the complaint filed by Nicolas Garcia before MCTC was for the
summary proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer
POINT OF DISTINCTION
Possession
Necessity of demand to
vacate
One-year
requirement
period
FORCBILE ENTRY
the possession of the land
by
the
defendant
is
unlawful
from
the
beginning as he acquires
possession
thereof
by
force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth
the law does not require a
previous demand for the
defendant to vacate the
premises
the plaintiff must prove
that he was in prior
physical possession of the
premises until he was
deprived thereof by the
defendant
the one-year period is
generally counted from
the date of actual entry
on the land
UNLWFUL DETAINER
the possession of the
defendant is inceptively
lawful but it becomes
illegal by reason of the
termination of his right to
the possession of the
property
under
his
contract with the plaintiff
the plaintiff must first
make such demand, which
is jurisdictional in nature
the plaintiff need not have
been in prior physical
possession
RULE 70
FACTS:
He started renting this portion of the lot in 1952 when his wife,
Evarista P. Racaza, bought an unfinished house that had been built on it.
CA: ruled that the one-year period should not be counted from July, 1955
because the parties had stipulated that petitioner was up to date in the
payment of rents. Neither should it be reckoned from November 23, 1956 2
when the first demand to vacate was made because it was respondent's
privilege, as lessor, to waive the right to bring an action based on the first
demand. Rather, the starting point should be December 17, 1958
when the second demand to quit was made by respondent
This case was brought not on the theory that petitioner, as lessee, failed to
pay rents, but on the theory that the lease had expired and that respondent
had asked petitioner to vacate the land.
Thus, the complaint states that respondent needs the land but that despite
his demands petitioner refused to vacate it.
It is therefore immaterial that rents had not been paid since July,
1955, since what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the
expiration of the lease. This being the case, demand to vacate was
unnecessary.
In the latter case, upon the expiration of the term of the lease, the landlord
may go into the property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate
the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought
In his answer, petitioner denied that the lease was on a month-tomonth basis and claimed that his understanding with respondent
was that he would be allowed to stay on the premises as long as
he paid a monthly rent of P15. As counterclaim, petitioner demanded
the payment of P12,000 which he said he had spent to finish the
construction of his house.
MUNICIPAL COURT: ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and
pay P15 a month until he had done so, even as it dismissed his
counterclaim for lack of merit.
o
against him even before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided
in Rule 70, section 2.
The first was on December 16, 1955, but as pointed out in the beginning,
the complaint filed afterwards was dismissed for non-suit. The second time
he was asked to move out was on December 17, 1957, followed by a
complaint filed on February 19, 1958. Petitioner insists that respondent's
cause of action must be deemed to have accrued on December 16, 1955.
But, as already stated, respondent's action is not based on nonpayment of rent coupled with a demand; its action is based on the
expiration of the term of the lease and the demand made by it to
vacate the premises merely evidences its determination not to
extend the lease.
In the first week of January, 1986, De Asis returned to the apartment and
noted that the termination notice he had posted at the door was
no longer there. He posted another notice, this time announcing
that he would repossess the place after five (5) days in order to
secure it from fire, repair it to preserve its value, and inventory
such of the lessee's things as were inside which
Thereafter, an action for forcible entry was instituted in the MeTC against
De Asis and his new lessee, Viray, by Roldan Victor in behalf and in the
name of his father, Rustico.
by affirming RTC
ISSUE:
WON the posting in the premises of notice of termination of the lease had
legally caused its cessation or extinguishment.
HELD: YES
The lease having thus been licitly terminated, the lessee, Rustico
Victor and his sons became obliged to surrender the leased
apartment to the lessor. They did not. They stayed away from the
place and did not show up during the repossession undertaken by
the lessor, announced in advance through the posting of another
notice on the door of the apartment.
What the Victors eventually did was to bring a forcible entry suit
against De Asis on the theory that the stipulation in the lease
contract authorizing repossession by the lessor without court
action was void as contrary to public policy, and De Asis had
perpetrated the legally proscribed act of taking the law into his
own hands.
Since the lessor (De Asis) had licitly and efficaciously terminated the
month-to-month lease by notice, and had therefore acquired an affirmative
right of action to judicially eject the lessee after giving notice to vacate, the
existence of such an affirmative right of action constitutes a valid defense
against, and is fatal to any action by the tenant who has been ousted
otherwise than judicially to recover possession. So has this Court had
occasion to rule, with unassailable logic, it might be added.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is correct in saying that the Mun. Court decision is
not valid
HELD: Yes
RULE 70
MUN. COURT: found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith. It also
ordered a FORCED LEASE between the parties over the disputed portion
with an area of 34 sqms.
o
From the foregoing judgment, neither party appealed so that,
if it were a valid judgment, it would have ordinarily lapsed
into finality, but even then, DEPRA did not accept payment of
rentals so that DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal
Court.
Failure of the defendant to pay any rent on or before the due date
spelled out herein shall entitle the plaintiff to the issuance of a
Writ of Execution for ejectment and collection of rent.
o
The lessee opposed this execution on the theory that the judgment
was a conditional one; that, there must first be a hearing or a new
action for ejectment to determine whether or not the lessee's
refusal to pay was justified; and that there can be no execution
pending appeal because the City had not filed any supersedeas
bond.
The appellate court further ruled that the proper provision to apply
is section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which ordains that
generally execution can issue only after a judgment becomes final
(not during the pendency of the appeal), unless a special reason
therefor exists.
RULE 70
CITY OF MANILA and HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, CFI Judge of Manila and the
CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and AUGUSTO SANTOS, respondents.
FACTS:
This case involves a contract of lease between the City of Manila and the
respondent as lessee
ISSUE: WON CA is correct in saying that Sec 8, Rule 70 does not apply in
this case
HELD: No.
We rule that Sec. 8 of Rule 70 can apply even if it is the lessor who
appeals in the sense that in such a case, if the lessee desires to
prevent execution pending appeal, he (the lessee) must still file
the supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing rentals.
ensuing rentals (particularly when, by his failure to appeal, the lessee does
not question said accrued and incoming rents)?