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RULE 69

G.R. No. 129017

CA: rendered the assailed decision denying due course and dismissing the
petition for certiorari. Hence, the present case. I

August 20, 2002


ISSUE:

CONCEPCION
V.
VDA,
DE
DAFFON,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES OSMEA VDA, DE DAFFON,
AILEEN DAFFON, JOSELITO DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA DAFFON, LEILA
DAFFON and SUZETTE DAFFON, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner was married to the late Amado Daffon and they had one son
(Joselito)
Joselito married Respondent Lourdes Osmena and they bore six children.
Amado passed away on January 21, 1982 while his son Joselito died on
October 25, 1990.
On January 21, 1994, respondents Lourdes Osmea Vda. De Daffon,
together with her six minor children, instituted an action for partition
against petitioner Concepcion Villamor Vda. de Daffon, before the
RTC Danao City Br 25. Respondents alleged that:
o

o
o

Amado left several real and personal properties which formed part
of his conjugal partnership with petitioner.
Joselito being a forced heir of Amado was entitled to at
least one half of Amado's estate, consisting of his share in the
said conjugal properties but the same were never partitioned.
Thus, respondents prayed that the conjugal properties of
Amado Daffon and petitioner be partitioned and that the
one-half share of Amado be further partitioned between petitioner,
on one hand, and the respondents as heirs of Joselito Daffon, on
the other hand.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of (1) lack of


jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (2) failure of the complaint
to state a cause of action; and (3) waiver, abandonment and
extinguishment of the obligation.2
o

She argued that the trial court cannot take cognizance of the
action for partition considering her claim of absolute
ownership over the properties; and that respondents
themselves admitted that petitioner has repudiated the coownership.

WON petitioners contention, that her repudiation of the co-ownership


deprived the TC to take cognizance of the partition case, is meritorious.
HELD: No.

There is no merit in the petition.

It should be stressed that in the determination of whether a complaint fails


to state a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be
properly considered.9
Moreover, a defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the averments thereof.
In the case at bar, the complaint sufficiently alleged that "defendant (i.e.,
petitioner herein) was married to Amado Quiros Daffon" and that "they
begot an only son in Joselito Daffon." 11 The complaint further alleged that
"Joselito Daffon later got married to herein plaintiff Lourdes Osmea and
before the former died on October 25, 1990 he sired the six (6) children
who are now plaintiffs with their mother." 12
This, to our mind, was sufficient allegation that Joselito Daffon was
a legitimate son of the spouses Amado and Concepcion Daffon; and
that plaintiffs (i.e., respondents herein) were likewise legitimate
heirs of Joselito Daffon. Admitting the truth of these averments,
there was, therefore, no need to inquire whether respondent minor
children were duly acknowledged by the deceased Amado Daffon.
RE PARTITION:
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the fact that she repudiated the coownership between her and respondents did not deprive the trial
court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition.
In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration
that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the
conveyance of his lawful shares.16 As the Court of Appeals correctly
held, an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of
co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved.
If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for
partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case
and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the
court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed
of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to
partition. If, on the other hand, the court after trial should find the
existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should
order the partition of the properties in the same action .17

NOTE: 2 PHASES OF PARTITION

RTC: denied the Motion to Dismiss. Thereafter, Petitioner filed an MR which


was also denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

An action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for


partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact

exists, and whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision


confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties
or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may
be.

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up


with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in
fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made
by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to
have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand,
with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents
and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order.
In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree,
make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so
agreed upon.18
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 35536 is AFFIRMED.

RULE 70
SPOUSES AGOSTO MUOZ AND ROSARIO MUOZ, SPS. JESSIE (JESUS)
CAGUIOA AND EMMA FUMAR, SPS. RICARDO LOPEZ AND APOLONIA FABIAN,
ZACARIA MARCELINO, MR. CRISANTO CLARIN, MR. HONORIO YUMUL, MR.
EDUARDO YUMUL, MRS. VICTORIA CAYANAN, MR. ALEXANDER FABIAN AND
MR. DIOSDADO SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
NICOLAS P. GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS:

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against herein petitioners


by Respondent Nicolas P. Garcia before the MCTC Masantol-Macabebe,
Masantol, Pampanga. The complaint alleged that:

ISSUE: WON the complaint filed by Nicolas Garcia before MCTC was for the
summary proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer

he is a co-owner of an agricultural land situated in the Barrio of


Caduang Tete (Saplad David) of the same municipality; that he and
his co-owners acquired the lot by succession from their deceased
father, Pedro B. Garcia who died on April 6, 1939; that the said lot
is tenanted by Loreto Garcia; that the defendants (herein
petitioners) constructed their houses on a portion of the
lot without the knowledge and consent of the owners; that
he sent letters of demand on June 6, 1988 asking the
defendants to remove their houses from the lot within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letters and that despite the
demands made by him, the defendants refused to vacate
their houses
In their answer, the defendants denied the allegations of Nicolas
Garcia and alleged that the tenant, Loreto Garcia is already
deemed the owner of the land pursuant to P.D. 27.
o
The answering defendants also invoked the following alternative
defenses, among others: xxx (1) lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the Municipal Trial Court, the case being an accion
publiciana which is exclusively cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court (2)xxxx;

HELD: The complaint is characterized as one for FORCIBLE ENTRY

MCTC: rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Nicolas Garcia


(respondent herein) whereby it ordered the defendants (petitioners
herein) to remove their houses from the disputed lot and to
surrender the same to Nicolas Garcia.
o
the Municipal Court also held that since the issue involved in
the case is mere possession and the defendants did not
claim ownership, therefore, unlawful detainer is the proper
action for plaintiff's recovery of possession.
RTC: (upon appeal of the respondents) RTC reversed the decision of the
municipal court and dismissed the complaint. The Regional Trial Court held
that plaintiff-appellee fails to establish his proof of prior physical
possession over the land subject matter of this case where the
respective houses of the defendants-appellants were erected, considering
that the case at bar only deals with possession de facto and not possession
de jure. The Court also believes that the subject matter of this
Court is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
CA: (Nicolas Garcia filed a petition for review with CA)reversed and set
aside the RTC decision and reinstated MCTC decision.
Hence, this petition.
PETITIONERS are of the view that the with the allegations in the complaint,
the same was an accion publiciana and not one for unlawful detainer as he
respondent had captioned it. An accion publiciana is exclusively cognizable
by the RTC and not by the Municipal Court.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT, however, alleged that the action which he filed
before the municipal court was an action for unlawful detainer. The demand
to vacate dated June 6, 1988 which was served upon the petitioners was
well within the one (1) year period required by the rules for the filing of the
summary action for unlawful detainer the jurisdiction of which belongs to
the municipal trial court.

POINT OF DISTINCTION

Possession

Necessity of demand to
vacate

Reqt of prior physical


possession

One-year
requirement

period

FORCBILE ENTRY
the possession of the land
by
the
defendant
is
unlawful
from
the
beginning as he acquires
possession
thereof
by
force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth
the law does not require a
previous demand for the
defendant to vacate the
premises
the plaintiff must prove
that he was in prior
physical possession of the
premises until he was
deprived thereof by the
defendant
the one-year period is
generally counted from
the date of actual entry
on the land

UNLWFUL DETAINER
the possession of the
defendant is inceptively
lawful but it becomes
illegal by reason of the
termination of his right to
the possession of the
property
under
his
contract with the plaintiff
the plaintiff must first
make such demand, which
is jurisdictional in nature
the plaintiff need not have
been in prior physical
possession

the one-year period is


generally counted from
from the date of last
demand or last letter of
demand

The complaint subject of this case was captioned as "unlawful


detainer." However, the private respondent alleged therein that
from the start, the possession of the petitioner was unlawful as it
was stated that the defendants have constructed their houses on
the questioned premises stealthily, that is, without the knowledge
and consent of his co-owners.
This allegation clearly characterized the complaint as one for
forcible entry and not for unlawful detainer.
The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are: First, who
had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the
possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint
by force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the
restoration of his possession?
There was no mention in the complaint nor in the position paper of
the private respondent that he or his co-owners were in prior
possession of the property. There was an allegation that the
property "is presently tenanted" but did not state when the tenant
started to possess the property.
While it is true that possession of the tenant is possession of the owner ,
the complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior
possession of the property at the time of entry by the petitioners.
And, while the complaint stated that the petitioners obtained possession of
the premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this entry was
accomplished or when the private respondent learned of such

entry. The failure of the private respondent to allege the time


when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal because this will
determine the start of the counting of the one year period for the
filing of the summary action of forcible entry.
The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is
one for unlawful detainer.
It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry, possession is
illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer, possession is legal until
demand is made to recover such possession or until the possessor does or
fails to do an act which makes his continued possession of the premises
illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the private respondent for the
petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot change the nature of the
latter's possession of the property and convert the former's action from
forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer.
The main issue in an action for forcible entry and detainer is one of
priority of possession. If the plaintiff can prove prior possession in
himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner. This
rule however has no application in this case.
It is true that the private respondent in this case claimed that he is
one of the co-owners of the lot in question. However, he has not
presented any evidence in support of such claim of ownership by
virtue of which he is entitled to its possession. Moreover, he had not
shown nor claimed in his complaint that he was in prior possession of the
property. On the contrary, it is the petitioners who claimed possession of
the property for more than twelve years.
If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and
that possession thereof was deprived from him for more than
twelve years, he should present his claim before the Regional Trial
Court in an accion publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria and not
before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of
unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if he is the owner,
possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been
in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary
action for ejectment.
DISPOSITIVE: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Macabebe, Pampanga is REINSTATED.

RULE 70

[G.R. No. L-20330. December 22, 1966.]

ADOLFO RACAZA, petitioner, vs. SUSANA REALTY INC., respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the lessee of a portion of a piece of land located at San


Juan St., Pasay City, and owned by respondent corporation.

He started renting this portion of the lot in 1952 when his wife,
Evarista P. Racaza, bought an unfinished house that had been built on it.

On assurance of respondent that petitioner's family could stay on the land


by paying a monthly rent of P15, petitioner finished the construction
of the house and he and his family lived in it.

(FIRST DEMAND) On December 16, 1955, however, petitioner was


asked to vacate the land because respondent needed it. The
demand was followed by the filing on February 10, 1956 of a complaint
for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Pasay City. Petitioner and his
family remained in the premises as the case was dismissed for failure of
respondent to proceed to trial.

(SECOND DEMAND) On December 17, 1957, petitioner received


another letter from respondent demanding anew the surrender of
the premises. On February 19, 1958, another ejectment suit was filed
against him, the complaint alleging that respondent needed the lot "for
the purpose of constructing improvements thereon and for other uses," but
that despite repeated demands petitioner refused to leave the premises.

CA: ruled that the one-year period should not be counted from July, 1955
because the parties had stipulated that petitioner was up to date in the
payment of rents. Neither should it be reckoned from November 23, 1956 2
when the first demand to vacate was made because it was respondent's
privilege, as lessor, to waive the right to bring an action based on the first
demand. Rather, the starting point should be December 17, 1958
when the second demand to quit was made by respondent

Still not satisfied, petitioner asked the appellate court to reconsider


its decision. When his motion was denied, he appealed to this
Court.

ISSUE: WON demand is necessary in this case


HELD: No

It is contended that respondent's complaint is defective and did not vest


jurisdiction on the municipal court because it does not state the date when
the alleged unlawful detainer started so as to afford a basis for determining
whether the case was filed within a year from the accrual of the cause of
action.

In this connection, it is claimed that, according to the evidence, petitioner


stopped paying rents in July, 1955 and that it should be from this date that
the one-year period should be counted.

This case was brought not on the theory that petitioner, as lessee, failed to
pay rents, but on the theory that the lease had expired and that respondent
had asked petitioner to vacate the land.

Thus, the complaint states that respondent needs the land but that despite
his demands petitioner refused to vacate it.

Petitioner appealed to CFI Pasay City. He asked for the


dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the municipal court to try it, claiming that the complaint was filed
more than one year after the alleged unlawful detainer. 1
According to petitioner, the first complaint for ejectment was
dismissed on November 23, 1956, while the complaint in this case
was not filed until February 19, 1958.

The averment that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is equivalent


to an allegation that the lease expired at the end of every month. 3

It is therefore immaterial that rents had not been paid since July,
1955, since what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the
expiration of the lease. This being the case, demand to vacate was
unnecessary.

RTC: Again, petitioner was ordered evicted; his counterclaim was


thrown out for lack of jurisdiction. It was held that petitioner's illegal
possession should be deemed to have started on December 17, 1957,
when the second demand to vacate was made on him, because the
complaint in this case was not intended to revive the one previously
dismissed for lack of prosecution. Since the complaint was filed on February
19, 1958, jurisdiction over the case was properly acquired by the municipal
court.

As this Court explained in Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 672 (1946),


Rule 70, section 2 requires previous demand only when the action
is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of
his lease." Where the action is to terminate the lease because of
the expiration of its term, no such demand is necessary.

In the latter case, upon the expiration of the term of the lease, the landlord
may go into the property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate
the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought

In his answer, petitioner denied that the lease was on a month-tomonth basis and claimed that his understanding with respondent
was that he would be allowed to stay on the premises as long as
he paid a monthly rent of P15. As counterclaim, petitioner demanded
the payment of P12,000 which he said he had spent to finish the
construction of his house.
MUNICIPAL COURT: ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and
pay P15 a month until he had done so, even as it dismissed his
counterclaim for lack of merit.
o

Petitioner appealed to CA contending that Mun.Court did not have


jurisdiction because by respondents own evidence rents had not
been paid since July 1955 and it should be from this date that the
one-year period should be counted. He also claimed that instead
of dismissing his counterclaim, the LC should have assumed orig
jurisdiction over it, considering that evidence to support the
counterclaim had been allowed w/o objection from the respondent.

against him even before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided
in Rule 70, section 2.

Accordingly, upon the expiration of the lease in this case,


petitioner became a deforciant unlawfully withholding possession
of the property. There was no need for a demand to be served on
him, except to negate any inference that respondent, as lessor,
had agreed to an extension of the term of the lease under article
1687 of the Civil Code.

This brings us to petitioner's next point. As earlier stated, petitioner was


twice asked to quit the premises.

The first was on December 16, 1955, but as pointed out in the beginning,
the complaint filed afterwards was dismissed for non-suit. The second time
he was asked to move out was on December 17, 1957, followed by a
complaint filed on February 19, 1958. Petitioner insists that respondent's
cause of action must be deemed to have accrued on December 16, 1955.

But, as already stated, respondent's action is not based on nonpayment of rent coupled with a demand; its action is based on the
expiration of the term of the lease and the demand made by it to
vacate the premises merely evidences its determination not to
extend the lease.

Moreover, even if the action were based on non-payment of rent,


the one-year period should be reckoned from the second notice, on
the theory that respondent has the right to waive his action based
on the first demand and to let the lessee remain in the premises.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with


costs against petitioner.

apartment but couldnt get inside because it was locked. He then


caused the cutting off of the electrical and water service connections and
the following day, he posted at the main door of the apartment a
notice of termination of the lease, on the ground of abandonment
and failure to pay rentals in accordance with the contract.
RULE 70

In the first week of January, 1986, De Asis returned to the apartment and
noted that the termination notice he had posted at the door was
no longer there. He posted another notice, this time announcing
that he would repossess the place after five (5) days in order to
secure it from fire, repair it to preserve its value, and inventory
such of the lessee's things as were inside which

On January 5, 1986, as announced, and in the presence of the barangay


authorities, De Asis had the door of the apartment opened by a
carpenter, and hauled to his residence the things found inside
after making an inventory of them. Thereafter, he made repairs on the
apartment at a cost of P13,108.00, and then leased it to Cresencio C.
Viray. 5

Thereafter, an action for forcible entry was instituted in the MeTC against
De Asis and his new lessee, Viray, by Roldan Victor in behalf and in the
name of his father, Rustico.

MeTC: rendered judgment against the defendants (petitioners herein)


and ordered the said defendants to restore plaintiff to the
possession and enjoyment of the leased premises

[G.R. No. 81015. July 4, 1991.]


CRESENCIO VIRAY and BENJAMIN D. DE ASIS, petitioners, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and RUSTICO VICTOR, respondents.
FACTS:

A lease agreement, involving residential premises (Apartment A) in Sta


Cruz Manila, was entered into by and between Benjamin de Asis
(owner of the place) and Rustico Victor (lessee). The agreement
included stipulations1 (a) fixing the term of the lease and (b) governing the
lessors right of possession.
Sometime in October, 1983, Victor and his wife left for Ontario,
Canada and did not return to the Philippines until February, 1985.
They left the apartment in the care of their son, Ramon.
Believing that the Victor spouses had abandoned the apartment
they having been away for more than a year, and the place being occupied
by Ramon Victor, an unauthorized stranger De Asis brought suit in
the Metropolitan Trial Court in December, 1984 to evict the latter
but the same was dismissed because spouses on their
representation said that they did not mean to give up the
apartment.
However, that Rustico Victor did not re-occupy the apartment but
continued to leave it in the care of his son, Ramon. Later, in the
second week of October 1985, Ramon himself left for Canada. He
asked his brother, Roldan, to look after the place. But Roldan
Victor did not actually move into the apartment; all he did was to
install a padlock at the main door, visit the place once a week, and
sleep there occasionally.

Metropolitan Trial Court ruled that Rustico Victor could not be


deemed to have abandoned the premises, and even if he had, the
apartment could not be repossessed without judicial action, the
stipulation authorizing the lessor to do so being void as "against
public policy and existing precedents."

De Asis and Viray appealed to the RTC

RTC: affirmed the MeTC decision. It adopted "by reference the


findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . in the Decision appealed
from and directed "the court of origin to issue a writ of possession
immediately in favor of the plaintiff and family, and to issue an
order directing the immediate return of the personal belongings of
plaintiff taken by defendant Benjamin De Asis

CA: upon appeal of petitioners, rendered judgment


decision. Hence, the present case.

When De Asis learned of this, he went to the place to see for


himself if it was true, there he saw there was nobody in the

(a. Term of Lease)


"2.The term of this lease shall he for a period of three (3) months and shall be impliedly renewable from month to month under the
same terms and conditions, unless revised by the parties in writing with previous notice to each other of at least fifteen (15) days."
(b. Repossession by Lessor)
"7.Upon failure of the Lessee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of this lease, as well as such other terms and conditions
which may be imposed by the Lessor prior to and/or upon renewal of this lease agreement as provided in par. 2 above, then the Lessor
shall have the right, upon five (5) days written notice to the Lessee or in his absence, upon written notice posted at the entrance of the
premises leased, to enter and take possession of the said premises holding in his trust and custody and such possessions and
belongings of the Lessee found therein after an inventory of the same in the presence of a witness, all these acts being hereby agreed
to by the Lessee as tantamount to his voluntary vacation of the leased premises without the necessity of suit in court."

by affirming RTC

ISSUE:
WON the posting in the premises of notice of termination of the lease had
legally caused its cessation or extinguishment.

HELD: YES

It is indisputable that the parties' written agreement created a lease on a


month-to-month basis. Such a lease, therefore, must be construed, by
established doctrine, as providing a definite period and as terminable by
notice at the end of any given month.

It appears undisputed, too, that the lessor had posted a notice of


termination of the lease at the doorway of the leased apartment
and that notice had subsequently been noted and removed by the
lessee's representative.

The giving of notice of termination in this manner is explicitly


authorized by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which
pertinently provides that a demand by a landlord for payment of
rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate the
premises may inter alia be made "by posting such notice on the
premises if no persons be found thereon."

The lease having thus been licitly terminated, the lessee, Rustico
Victor and his sons became obliged to surrender the leased
apartment to the lessor. They did not. They stayed away from the
place and did not show up during the repossession undertaken by
the lessor, announced in advance through the posting of another
notice on the door of the apartment.

What the Victors eventually did was to bring a forcible entry suit
against De Asis on the theory that the stipulation in the lease
contract authorizing repossession by the lessor without court
action was void as contrary to public policy, and De Asis had
perpetrated the legally proscribed act of taking the law into his
own hands.

Since the lessor (De Asis) had licitly and efficaciously terminated the
month-to-month lease by notice, and had therefore acquired an affirmative
right of action to judicially eject the lessee after giving notice to vacate, the
existence of such an affirmative right of action constitutes a valid defense
against, and is fatal to any action by the tenant who has been ousted
otherwise than judicially to recover possession. So has this Court had
occasion to rule, with unassailable logic, it might be added.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of


November 27, 1987 in CA-G.R. SP No. 12280, subject of the appeal, is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and another rendered DISMISSING Civil Case
No. 115635-CV of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch 6). Costs
against private respondent.

DUMLAO, in his Answer, admitted the encroachment but alleged, in


the main, that the present suit is barred by res judicata by virtue
of the Decision of the Municipal Court, which had become final and
executory.
RTC: finds and holds that the 34 square meters subject of this litigation is
part and parcel of Lot 685 of which the plaintiff is owner and such plaintiff
is entitled to possess the same.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA
claims that the Decision of the Municipal Court was null and void
ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of
possession, whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an
encumbrance on real property, may only be rendered by Courts of
First Instance.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is correct in saying that the Mun. Court decision is
not valid
HELD: Yes
RULE 70

[G.R. No. L-57348. May 16, 1985.]


FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendantappellant.
Roberto D. Dineros for plaintiff-appellee.
Neil D. Hechanova for defendant-appellant.
FACTS:

Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land (8,870 sqm) known


as Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo.

Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an adjoining lot,


designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq.
ms.

Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot,


the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four (34)
square meters of DEPRA's property.

After the encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of


DEPRA's lot made on November 2, 1972, his mother, Beatriz Derla,
after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back from
his encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February
6, 1973 against DUMLAO in the Municipal Court of Dumangas

MUN. COURT: found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith. It also
ordered a FORCED LEASE between the parties over the disputed portion
with an area of 34 sqms.
o
From the foregoing judgment, neither party appealed so that,
if it were a valid judgment, it would have ordinarily lapsed
into finality, but even then, DEPRA did not accept payment of
rentals so that DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal
Court.

On July 15, 1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title


against DUMLAO before CFI Iloilo Branch IV, involving the very same
34 square meters, which was the bone of contention in the Municipal Court.

Addressing ourselves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the Municipal


Court, we hold the same to be null and void.
The judgment in a detainer case is effective in respect of
possession only (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). 1
The Municipal Court overstepped its bounds when it imposed upon the
parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-ownership" is not
favored in law.
Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which
belongs to Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. 44(b),
Judiciary Act of 1948; 2 Sec. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).
Since the Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null
and void and cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for
Queting of Title. Besides, even if the Decision were valid, the rule on res
judicata would not apply due to difference in cause of action.
In the Municipal Court, the cause of action was the deprivation of
possession, while in the action to quiet title, the cause of action was based
on ownership.
Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that
judgment in a detainer case "shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land."

Failure of the defendant to pay any rent on or before the due date
spelled out herein shall entitle the plaintiff to the issuance of a
Writ of Execution for ejectment and collection of rent.
o

In the meantime, in view of the lessee's adamant refusal to pay the


increased rates, the City (without filing any supersedeas bond), asked for
immediate execution of the City Court s judgment pending appeal.

The lessee opposed this execution on the theory that the judgment
was a conditional one; that, there must first be a hearing or a new
action for ejectment to determine whether or not the lessee's
refusal to pay was justified; and that there can be no execution
pending appeal because the City had not filed any supersedeas
bond.

CFI granted the writ of execution prayed for.

CA: On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate tribunal reversed


the CFI and set aside the writ of execution, explaining that Sec. 8,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (execution pending appeal in
ejectment cases) does not apply for said provision operates only
when it is the lessee (not the lessor) who appeals, for in such a
case, it is the lessee who is supposed to file a supersedeas bond
and to deposit the monthly rentals in court, as said rentals fall due
citing the decision in CRUZ, ET AL. vs. FERNANDO JUGO, ET AL., 77 Phil. 1821; as authority for the ruling.

The appellate court further ruled that the proper provision to apply
is section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which ordains that
generally execution can issue only after a judgment becomes final
(not during the pendency of the appeal), unless a special reason
therefor exists.

RULE 70
CITY OF MANILA and HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, CFI Judge of Manila and the
CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and AUGUSTO SANTOS, respondents.
FACTS:

This case involves a contract of lease between the City of Manila and the
respondent as lessee

It appears that after the expiration of its contract of lease involving


two market stalls (owned by the City of Manila) in the Lacson Underpass
in Quiapo, Manila, the lessor-City wanted to increase the lease
rentals.

Despite the refusal of the lessee (herein private respondent) to


agree to the increased rates, it refused to vacate the premises,
prompting the City to file ejectment proceedings against it.

CITY COURT rendered a decision ordering the defendant to pay for


the premises referred to in the complaint. Thus the Court fixed new
rental rates and allowed the eventual ejectment of the lessee in
case of non-compliance. It also ordered that failure of the defendant to
pay any rent on or before the due date shall entitle the plaintiff to the
issuance of a Writ of Execution for ejectment and collection of
rent.

The City of Manila, as lessor of the stalls appealed to the


Court of First Instance (CFI) because it was not satisfied
with the increased rentals granted by the City Court.

ISSUE: WON CA is correct in saying that Sec 8, Rule 70 does not apply in
this case
HELD: No.

We rule that Sec. 8 of Rule 70 can apply even if it is the lessor who
appeals in the sense that in such a case, if the lessee desires to
prevent execution pending appeal, he (the lessee) must still file
the supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing rentals.

Our doctrine in CRUZ, ET AL. vs. FERNANDO JUGO, ET AL. (supra) is


reversed insofar as it conflicts with the present case. The rationale for Our
ruling is simple: why should the lessee continue occupying the premises
without filing the supersedeas bond and making the necessary deposit for

ensuing rentals (particularly when, by his failure to appeal, the lessee does
not question said accrued and incoming rents)?

And even if We were to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the


very circumstances referred to in the preceding paragraph
(continued stay on the premises, and acquiescence to the new
rates) would constitute "special reasons" for authorizing an
execution pending appeal.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, We hereby SET ASIDE the assailed decision


and reinstate the writ of execution issued, and We hereby render a new
decision ordering the lessee to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals
fixed by the City Court from the time the complaint was filed until the
premises are vacated and full payment is made, with twelve (12%) per cent
interest yearly. No pronouncement as to costs.

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