1. MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners, vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT, et.

al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 206510

September 16, 2014

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the
US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of
the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left
Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel
in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next
port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting
the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured
in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage
of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras,
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by
USSGuardian.
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:
First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question. Specifically, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case
where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being
challenged, and calls for more than just a generalized grievance. However, the
rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public
right of citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We
declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in
the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1wphi1 Such right
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in
Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue
for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of
their own and future generations.
Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding

officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and
its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the
USS Guardianon the TRNP was committed while they were performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials
will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the
suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took
the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef
system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art.
31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to

comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latters internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to

enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave
the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government
shipoperated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with
the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30
and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other
government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warships
unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the
US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as
a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by
customary international rules on the traditional uses of the oceans as codified in
UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,
pointing out that such has nothing to do with its the US acceptance of
customary international rules on navigation.

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to
bear international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the
USS Guardiangrounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been
actively supporting the countrys efforts to preserve our vital marine resources,
would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship
while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS
directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve
the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis,
directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and
elaboratinginternational rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of
the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond
dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latters territorial sea, the flag
States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws
and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by
their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.
Third issue: NO.
The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance
of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules
that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental
law is to be filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or nonapplication of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be
found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and
beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether
such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot
grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The
Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative

fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with
the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

2. Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan

G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012
FACTS:
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future,
respondent Province of Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay
Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Thus, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito
Marquez to file an application with respondentPhilippine Reclamation Authority
(PRA) to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year,
the Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed
reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the
utilization of its resources.
After PRAs approval,on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI
(DENR-EMB RVI) issued to the Province Environmental Compliance Certificate-R61003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the
extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty
port.
On May 17, 2010, the Province finallyentered into a MOA with PRA which
stated that the land use development of the reclamation project shall be for
commercial, recreational and institutional and other applicable uses.It was at this
point that the Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public
consultation meetings.
On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Malayand petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an
organization composed of some 160 businessmen and residents in Boracay,
expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation project on environmental,
socio-economic and legal grounds.
Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued
a notice to the contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction
of the project. Thus, on June 1, 2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant
Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of
Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file their respective
comments to the petition.

The Petition was premised on the following grounds, among others:

a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU
concerned;
b) the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as
required by the Local Government Code (LGC).
The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the
requirements of DENR-EMB RVI and PRA that led to the approval of the reclamation
project by the said government agencies, as well as the recent enactments of the
Barangay Council of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Malay favorably endorsing the said project, had categorically addressed all the
issues raised by the BFI in its Petition. It also considered the Petition to
bepremature for lack of cause of action due to the failure of BFI to fully exhaust the
available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.

ISSUES:
WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing this case?
WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project?

RULING:
On the issue of prematurity due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies
The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust
administrative remedies and to observe the hierarchy of courts as claimed by the
respondents.
The Court reiterated their ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals where they
clarified that the rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard
and fast rule. It is not applicable where, among others, there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention such as in the instant case. The rule
may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy or where the protestant has no other recourse.
Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 096-8-SC, provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus,
which is a special civil action that may be availed of to compel the performance of
an act specifically enjoined by law and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO
as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.

The writ of continuing mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified

petition in the proper court when any government agency or instrumentality or
officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the enforcement or violation of
an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Such proper
court may be the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where
the actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme
Court.
Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to determine the questions of unique national
and local importance raised that pertain to laws and rules for environmental
protection.
Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain
jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the
reliefs mandated under the courts decision and, in order to do this, the court may
compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government
agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision.

On the issue of whether or notthere was proper, timely, and sufficient public
consultation for the project
The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public
consultation for the project.
The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national
government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance and requires them
to secure prior public consultations and approval of local government units. In
Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized that, under the Local
Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects
the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: (1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and (2)
prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.The absence of either of
such mandatory requirements will render the projects implementation as illegal.
Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities. In one
ruling, the Court noted that such national projects mentioned in Section 27 of the
LGC include those that may cause pollution and bring about climate change, among
others, such as the reclamation project in this case.

Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents should initiate
public consultations early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns
of stakeholders are taken into consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of
the management plan.
Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRAs power to
reclaim land in this case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval.
However, the information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had
already been issued was insufficient to comply with the requirements under the
LGC.
Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and approval is not
corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the
Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan in 2012, which were
both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of the Province.

3. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents

of Manila Bay
G. R. No. 171947-48
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila
Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and
that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class
B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water

Quality. Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s
state will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the
quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter
to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own
expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned
shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities
responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and
cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution
incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state
will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general application
and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the
Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to
draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.

While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a
decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing
what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as
continuing mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances,
issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be
set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is

institutionalized in the rules of procedure for environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order