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Outline

1. Description of Foreign Exchange Trading


2. The Dealers Perspective
3. The Customers Perspective
1. Importers / Exporters
2. International Investors

4. The Policy Makers Perspective

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

4. The Policy Makers Perspective_____________________________________________________

4 The Policy Makers Perspective


4.1 The performance of FX markets
4.2 FX market indicators
4.3 FX market intervention

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

4.2 FX market indicators______________________________________________________________

4.2 FX market indicators


4.2.1 Harmonized competitiveness indicators
4.2.2 Capital market indicators
4.2.3 FX futures open positions

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

Starting point
In recent years news on foreign exchange markets
have been analyzed on the grounds of whether a
change of a fundamental increases or decreases
interest rates.
For example, Inflationary pressure in the US
appreciates the US dollar, because agents expect US
dollar interest rates to go up.
Of course, standard macro would expect a decrease of
the US dollar as inflation is bad news!
Clarida and Waldman (2007):
IS BAD NEWS ABOUT INFLATION GOOD NEWS
FOR THE EXCHANGE RATE?
Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

Starting point
The logic of this relationship is based on the empirical
failure of UIP, which implies that selling low-yielding
currencies in order to buy high-yielding currencies is
profitable Currency carry trades
If this is true there is some risk of destabilizing
speculation:
Handelsblatt (02.11.06) Wette gegen den Franken
Spekulanten bringen den Kurs der Schweizer Whrung
unter Druck
Policy makers are interested in the importance of
destabilizing speculation in FX markets
Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

Data availability
In general, there is very little data on carry trades
available
FX trading of banks is not exposed to government
disclosure regulation
Moreover, carry trade strategy may be implemented
using a large variety of instruments
Exception:
Exchange-traded futures on Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME)

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

Data availability
Data is made available by the commodities futures
trading commission (CFTC) on a weekly basis
Commitments of Traders Report
Traders are categorized as

Commercial
Non-commercial (which means financial)

Financial are suggested to act as speculators


Long contracts mean:
Buy foreign currency against USD for delivery 3 month
ahead

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

CFTC data
Profit from selling at time t+3:

g t +3 = st + 3 f t ,t +3

= st + 3 (st (it* it ) )

Buying means that traders expect

st + 3 st > (it it* )


An open short contract in a low yielding currency
implies that the trader expect the currency to
appreciate by less than the interest differential, or, even
*
better, to depreciate: st + 3 st < (it it )
Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

CFTC data
Due to this logic it is suggested that the market
speculates on a future depreciation of a currency if
number of short contracts > number of long contracts

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

Commitments of traders report (www.cftc.gov)

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

10

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

CFTC data
Due to this logic it is suggested that the market
speculates on a future depreciation of a currency if
number of short contracts > number of long contracts
or net long positions negative

Are exchange rates correlated with net long positions?

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

11

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

0,88

20000

0,86

10000

0,84

0
-10000

CHF/US-$

0,82

-20000
0,8
-30000
0,78
-40000
0,76

-50000
-60000

0,72

-70000

0,7

-80000

Ja

n.
Fe 0 5
b.
M 05
rz
.
A p 05
r.
M 05
ai
.
J u 05
n
Au . 05
g.
Se 05
p.
O 05
kt
.
No 0 5
v
De . 0 5
z.
Ja 05
n.
Fe 0 6
b.
A p 06
r.
M 06
ai
.
J u 06
n.
Ju 06
l.
A u 06
g.
Se 06
p.
O 06
kt
.0
6

0,74

Netto-Longkontrakte

CHF/USD exchange rate and net long pos. in CHF

Red line: Exchange rate ; blue line: net long positions


Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

12

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

CFTC data
Correlation coefficient quite large
Are exchange rates cointegrated with net long
positions?

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

13

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

Cointegration relationship?
Euro

Kontraktvolumen

Yen

Pfund

Schweizer
Franken

125.000

12.500.000

62.500

125.000

Max. Eigen Statistik

29.15

31.77

27.11

46.04

Trace Statistik

30.40

37.13

27.58

46.48

0,59

131,21

1.57

0.38

0,30
(2.92)***

0,34
(6.28)***

0,15
(5.33)***

0,23
(6.34)***

0,41
(6.78)***

Lags (AIC, SIC)

Konstante
Trend

Netto-Longkontrakte

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

14

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

Error correction model?

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

15

4.2.3 FX futures open positions_______________________________________________________

Conclusions
Correlation between exchange rates and CME net long
positions quite large
Confirmed by cointegration relationship
Error correction model shows, however, that net long
positions do adjust, not exchange rates!
It seems that net open position do not granger cause
exchange rates
Note, however, that

Prof. Reitz

This is based on weekly data


CME covers only a very small fraction of FX market

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

16

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

4.3 FX market intervention


4.3.1 Definition and technicalities
4.3.2 Reasons for intervention
4.3.3 Transmission channels

Lit.: Sarno und Taylor (2002), 208 244.

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Definition
Official exchange rate intervention in the foreign
exchange market occurs when the authorities buy or
sell foreign exchange, normally against their own
currency and in order to affect the exchange rate.
Sarno/Taylor (2001), Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange
Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work?,
Journal of Economic Literature.

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Types of intervention
Unilateral vs. coordinated intervention
Motives for coordination:
Strengthening of the policy signal
Increased credibility
Increased impact on exchange rates

Target vs. leaning against the wind-intervention


Depending on the reasons for intervention
(see following discussion)

Sterilised vs. non-sterilised intervention


Changing the monetary basis?

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Sterilised vs. non-sterilised intervention


Buying and selling of forreign currency against domestic does change the
monetary basis in the first place (M). This may or may not be corrected!

M due to intervention

M remains
non-sterilised

M corrected
sterilised

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Sterilised vs. non-sterilised intervention


Balance sheet transactions of the central bank

Assets

Liabilities

Net foreign Assets (NFA)


- Gold

Monetary Base
- Money in circulation

- Currency reserves

- Reserve holdings of banks

Net domestic assets (NDA)


- Government bonds
- Commercial bank bonds

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Sterilised vs. non-sterilised intervention


Intervention in order to support the domestic currency
Example: ECB in 2000
Sell USD against Euro

Assets

Liabilities

Net foreign Assets (NFA)


- Gold

Monetary Base
- Money in circulation

- Currency reserves

- Reserve holdings of banks

Net domestic assets (NDA)


- Government bonds
- Commercial bank bonds

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Sterilised vs. non-sterilised intervention


Offsetting measure: expansionary open market transaction

Assets

Liabilities

Net foreign Assets (NFA)


- Gold

Monetary Base
- Money in circulation

- Currency reserves

- Reserve holdings of banks

Net domestic assets (NDA)


- Government bonds
- Commercial bank bonds

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Sterilised vs. non-sterilised intervention


Result:
Monetary basis unchanged
However: Changes in the structure of central banks assets

Assets

Liabilities

Net foreign Assets (NFA)


- Gold

Monetary Base
- Money in circulation

- Currency reserves

- Reserve holdings of banks

Net domestic assets (NDA)


- Government bonds
- Commercial bank bonds

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

4.3 Central bank intervention


4.3.1 Definition and technicalities
4.3.2 Reasons for intervention
4.3.3 Transmission channels

Lit.: Sarno und Taylor (2002), 208 244.

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

4.3.2 Reasons for intervening in FX markets


Correcting misalignments
Target intervention
Plaza accord 1985

INTt = f S* St 1

Counter excess volatility

Leaning against the wind INTt = f (St 1 St 2 )


Louvre accord 1987

Support other central banks in their FX activity

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

4.3.3 Transmission channels


Non-sterilised intervention alter the monetary basis and
works like standard monetary policy
B Ms P S (via KKP)
How do sterilized intervention change the exchange
rate?

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

4.3.3 Transmission channels


Portfolio-Balance-Channel
Dominguez und Frankel (1993)

Signaling Channel
Mussa (1981)

Coordination channel
Reitz und Taylor (2008)

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Portfolio Balance Channel


Assumptions:
Domestic and foreign assets are no perfect substitutes
Risk averse agents

Intervention alter the structure of outstanding assets


Changing risk premium influence exchange rates

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Portfolio Balance Channel


Example:
Central bank sells reserves to support domestic currency
NFA and NDA in CB balance sheet (sterilisation)
Which means
NFA and NDA in private portfolios
Exchange rate risk , because the fraction of NFA in the
portfolio goes up!
Risk premium = (NFA/NDA)

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Portfolio Balance Channel


Influence on the exchange rate:
UIP:
se = i ia + or

se + ia = i +

Means: Return on foreign assets must be higher than the


return on domestic assets
If then se (se = se s)
Given an exogenous long-run equilibrium value this is
possible only by a decrease of s!

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Portfolio Balance Channel


Exchange rate goes down, because increased holdings
of NFA also increases the demanded risk premium
Problem:
The risk premium theory does not work empirically
Portfolio balance channel theoretically convincing, but
not empirically

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

4.2.3 Transmission channels


Portfolio-Balance-Channel
Dominguez und Frankel (1993)

Signalling Channel
Mussa (1981)

Coordination channel
Reitz und Taylor (2008)

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Signalling Channel
Foundation: Asset market approach of exchange rate
1
st =
1+


1 +
i =0

Et [ zt +i ]

Exchange rate as the sum of actual and future expected


discounted fundamentals
Expected changes of fundamentals like Ms alter todays
exchange rate
Intervention may signal a change in future monetary
policy!

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Signalling Channel
Why is a simple announcement insufficient?
Mussa (1981):
.. monetary authorities follow a policy of putting their
money where their mouth is and stand ready to act on
the intervention signal.
Credibility problem enforce the central bank to put
money at stake
Central bank is betting on her own strategy change!

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

Signalling Channel
Empirical issue:
Have intervention been able to predict future policy
measures?
Empirical studies: Mixed evidence
(See survey in Sarno and Taylor 2002, pp. 226!)

4.3 FX market intervention_________________________________________________________

4.2.3 Transmission channels


Portfolio-Balance-Channel
Dominguez und Frankel (1993)

Signalling Channel
Mussa (1981)

Coordination channel
Reitz and Taylor (2008)

Prof. Reitz

FX markets - Theory and Empirics

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