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the
condition
except
because
of
the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)
According to the petitioner "the events of fire,
panic and stampede were independent causes
with no causal connection at all with the
violation of the ordinance." The weakness in
the
argument
springs
from
a
faulty
juxtaposition of the events which formed a
chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that
the petitioner's non-compliance with the
ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to
the other events in point of time, in the sense
that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of
the building. But the violation was a continuing
one, since the ordinance was a measure of
safety designed to prevent a specific situation
which would pose a danger to the occupants of
the building. That situation was undue
overcrowding in case it should become
necessary to evacuate the building, which, it
could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to
happen under emergency conditions if there
was only one stairway available. It is true that
in this particular case there would have been
no overcrowding in the single stairway if there
had not been a fire in the neighborhood which
caused the students to panic and rush
headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But
it was precisely such contingencies or event
that the authors of the ordinance had in mind,
for under normal conditions one stairway would
be adequate for the occupants of the building.
Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence,
page 841: "The general principle is that the
violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by
the intervention of another agency if the
September 7,
9,
2002,
ERRED IN
QUALIFYING
November 19,
appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted jointly by Remigio
Rodrigueza and three others in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Albay to
recover a sum of money of the Manila Railroad
Company as damages resulting from a fire
kindled by sparks from a locomotive engine
under the circumstances set out below. Upon
hearing the cause upon the complaint, answer
and an agreed statement of facts, the trial
judge
rendered
judgment
against
the
defendant company in favor of the plaintiffs
and awarded to them the following sums
respectively as damages, to wit, (1) to Remigio
Rodrigueza, P3,000; (2) to Domingo Gonzaga,
P400; (3) to Cristina Luna, P300; and (4) to
Perfecta Losantas, P150; all with lawful interest
from March 21, 1919. From this judgment the
defendant appealed.
The facts as appearing from the agreed
statement, in relation with the complaint, are
to the effect that the defendant Railroad
Company operates a line through the district of
Daraga in the municipality of Albay; that on
January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed
over said line, a great quantity of sparks were
emitted
from
the
smokestack
of
the
locomotive,
and
fire
was
thereby
communicated
to
four
houses
nearby
belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively,
and the same were entirely consumed. All of
these houses were of light construction with
the exception of the house of Remigio
Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials,
though the roof was covered with nipa and
cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the
passage of the train, and a strong wind was
blowing at the time. It does not appear either
in the complaint or in the agreed statement
whose house caught fire first, though it is
stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was
first communicated to the house of Remigio
Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the
others.
In the fourth paragraph of the complaint
which is admitted to be true it is alleged that
the
defendant
Railroad
Company
was
conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin
of said fire, in the following respects, namely,
first, in failing to exercise proper supervision
over the employees in charge of the
locomotive;
secondly,
in
allowing
the
locomotive which emitted these sparks to be
operated without having the smokestack
protected by some device for arresting sparks;
thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this
occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known inferior
quality which, upon combustion, produces
sparks in great quantity.
The sole ground upon which the defense is
rested is that the house of Remigio Rodrigueza
stood partly within the limits of the land owned
by the defendant company, though exactly
how far away from the company's track does
not appear. It further appears that, after the
railroad track was laid, the company notified
Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the
company and to remove it from its exposed
position. Rodrigueza did not comply with this
After
the
protracted
hearings,
the
Commissioner eventually submitted his report
on September 25, 1970 with the findings that
while the damage sustained by the PBA
building was caused directly by the August 2,
1968 earthquake whose magnitude was
estimated at 7.3 they were also caused by the
defects in the plans and specifications
prepared by the third-party defendants'
architects, deviations from said plans and
specifications by the defendant contractors and
failure of the latter to observe the requisite
workmanship in the construction of the building
and of the contractors, architects and even the
owners to exercise the requisite degree of
supervision in the construction of subject
building.
All the parties registered their objections to
aforesaid findings which in turn were answered
by the Commissioner.
The trial court agreed with the findings of the
Commissioner except as to the holding that the
owner is charged with full nine supervision of
the construction. The Court sees no legal or
Objections,
Plaintiffs'
Reply
to
the
Commissioner's Answer, Defendants' Reply to
the Commissioner's Answer, Counter-Reply to
Defendants' Reply, and Third-Party Defendants'
Reply to the Commissioner's Report not to
mention the exhibits and the testimonies show
that the main arguments raised on appeal were
already raised during the trial and fully
considered by the lower Court. A reiteration of
these same arguments on appeal fails to
convince us that we should reverse or disturb
the lower Court's factual findings and its
conclusions drawn from the facts, among them:
The Commissioner also found merit in the
allegations of the defendants as to the physical
evidence before and after the earthquake
showing the inadequacy of design, to wit:
Physical evidence before the earthquake
providing (sic) inadequacy of design;
1. inadequate design was the cause of the
failure of the building.
2. Sun-baffles on the two sides and in front of
the building;
a. Increase the inertia forces that move the
building laterally toward the Manila Fire
Department.
b. Create another stiffness imbalance.
3. The embedded 4" diameter cast iron down
spout on all exterior columns reduces the
cross-sectional area of each of the columns and
the strength thereof.
4. Two front corners, A7 and D7 columns were
very much less reinforced.
Earthquake,
defective
placing
of
(8) Deliberate severance of spirals into semicircles in noted on Col. A-5, ground floor,
(9) Defective construction joints in Columns A3, C-7, D-7 and D-4, ground floor,
February 22,
Citibanks
broker-forwarder,
Melicia
International Services (MIS),3 transported the
gensets in separate container vans. It was
instructed by Citibank to deliver and haul one
genset to Makati City,4 where the latters office
was being constructed by the building
contractor, DMCI.
MIS was further instructed to place the 13-ton
genset5 at the top of Citibanks building. The
broker-forwarder declined, since it had no
power cranes.6 Thus, Citibank assigned the job
to private respondent DMCI, which accepted
the task.7
On 16 October 1993, DMCI lifted the genset
with a crane (Unic-K-2000) that had a hydraulic
telescopic boom and a loading capacity of 20
tons.8 During the lifting process, both the
cranes boom and the genset fell and got
damaged.9
The events leading to the fall, based mainly on
the signed statement10 of DMCIs crane
operator, Mr. Ariel Del Pilar, transpired as
follows:
The genset was lifted clear out of the open top
container by the crane. After clearing the
container van, the crane operator, Mr. Ariel del
Pilar, had to position the genset over the
vicinity of the storage area. To do this, the
boom of the crane carrying the generator set
had to be turned (swing) to face right and
stopped when it loomed over the storage area.
The genset was swinging as it came to a stop
following the right turn. The crane operator
waited for the genset to stop swinging for him
to perform the next maneuver. The boom had
to be raised three (3) degrees more from its
position at 75 degrees, up to 78 degrees. At 78
degrees the genset could be lowered straight
down to the delivery storage area.
WHEREFORE
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as against defendant ordering the
latter to pay plaintiff as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
20
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court ruled that the loss or damage to
the genset was due to the negligent operation
of the crane:
This Court finds that the loss or damage
brought about by the falling of the genset was
caused by negligence in the operation of the
crane in lifting the genset to as high as 9 feet
causing the boom to fall [sic], hitting the
Meralco line to ground, sustaining heavy
damage, which negligence was attributable to
the crane operator.21
DMCI appealed to the CA, which reversed and
set aside the RTCs Decision. The appellate
court ruled that the falling of the genset was a
clear case of accident and, hence, DMCI could
not be held responsible.
In this case, plaintiffs-appellees failed to
discharge the burden of proving negligence on
the part of the defendant-appellants crane
First, Del Pilar did not give any reason for his
act of raising the boom from 75 to 78 degrees
at the stage when the genset was already set
for lowering to the ground.28
Second, Del Pilars revving of the motor of the
boom "triggered the chain of events starting
with the jerk, then followed by the swinging of
the genset which was obviously violent as it
caused the body of the crane to tilt upward,
and ultimately, caused the boom with the
genset to fall."29
It would be a long stretch to construe these as
acts of negligence. Not all omissions can be
considered as negligent. The test of negligence
is as follows:
Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty
of the actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion
born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.30
Applying the test, the circumstances would
show that the acts of the crane operator were
rational and justified.
Addressing Philams first submission, this Court
finds that the records are replete with
explanations for why the boom of the crane
had to be raised from 75 to 78 degrees.
36
(Emphasis supplied.)
REGALADO, J.:
This case had its inception in an action for
damages instituted in the former Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental 1 by private
respondent
spouses
against
petitioner
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when
their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell
into an open trench, an excavation allegedly
undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. The complaint
alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed
to notice the open trench which was left
uncovered because of the creeping darkness
and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a
result of the accident, respondent Gloria
Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her
arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar
on her cheek, while the respondent husband
suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of
the jeep was shattered. 2
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the
contention that the injuries sustained by
respondent spouses were the result of their
own negligence and that the entity which
should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R.
Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an
independent contractor which undertook the
construction of the manhole and the conduit
system. 3 Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party
motion for
by
private
November 27,
RAMON
K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE
MANILA
BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse the
decision1 promulgated on January 28, 1999 by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47942,
affirming the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XV (now the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138) dismissing
Civil Case No. 43907, for damages.
The facts as summarized by the Court of
Appeals are as follows:
Petitioner is a prominent businessman who, at
the time material to this case, was the
Managing Director of Multinational Investment
Bancorporation and the Chairman and/or
President of several other corporations. He was
a depositor in good standing of respondent
bank, the Manila Banking Corporation, under
current Checking Account No. 06-09037-0. As
he was then running about 20 corporations,
and was going out of the country a number of
times, petitioner entrusted to his secretary,
Katherine2 E. Eugenio, his credit cards and his
checkbook with blank checks. It was also
Eugenio who verified and reconciled the
statements of said checking account.3
Between the dates September 5, 1980 and
January 23, 1981, Eugenio was able to encash
and deposit to her personal account about
seventeen (17) checks drawn against the
account of the petitioner at the respondent
bank,
with
an
aggregate
amount
issuance
and
likewise
put
things
in
the
proper
to
recommend
conjectures.
it
but
innuendos
and
PARAS, J.:
Sought to be reversed in this petition is the
Decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals'
First Division, setting aside the judgment of the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos
Norte, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
set aside and another rendered in its stead
whereby defendant is hereby sentenced to pay
plaintiffs actual damages of P30,229.45;
compensatory
damages
of
P50,000.00;
exemplary damages of P10,000.00; attorney's
fees of P3,000.00; plus the costs of suit in both
instances. (p. 27 Rollo)
Basically, this case involves a clash of evidence
whereby both patties strive for the recognition
of their respective versions of the scenario
from which the disputed claims originate. The
respondent Court of Appeals (CA) summarized
the evidence of the parties as follows:
From the evidence of plaintiffs it appears that
in the evening of June 28 until the early
morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by
the
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated March
31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete
City, and awarding damages instead to private
respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in
an action for breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23,
1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G.
Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in
Physical Education at the Siliman University,
took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney
was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers,
Sunga was given by the conductor an
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of
the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros
Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of
the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of
the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the
fracture, long leg circular casting, and case
September 1,
in
Laspias
driving
in
of
Chance
the
Respondents
Condor
Negligent
Pedrano
were
and
likewise
Liability
of
PPSII
PLAT
E
NO.
PBP724
SECTION 1/11
A. THIRD PARTY
LIABILITY
B.
PASSENGER
LIABILITY
*LIMITS
LIABILITY
P50,000.00
Per
Person
P12,00
0.00
OF
PREMI
UMS
PAID
P540.0
052
Per
Acciden
t
P50,000
MAKE
Isuzu
Forward
TYPE
OF
BODY
Bus
COLOR
blue
mixed
BLT
FILE
NO.
SERIAL/C
HASSIS
NO.
SER4501584124
MOTO
R NO.
67783
6
AUTHO
RIZED
CAPACI
TY
50
UNLAD
EN
WEIGH
8. It has attended to the claims of Vincent
T
6 Cyls. Canales, Asuncion Batiancila and Neptali Palces
who sustained injuries during the incident in
Kgs.
question. In fact, it settled financially their
to
be
is entitled to
of P50,000.00.67
indemnity
in
the
amount
Philippine National
Vizcara
G.R. No. 190022
DECISION
Railways
Corp
REYES, J.:
Nature of the Petition
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision[1] dated July 21, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021, which
affirmed with modification the Decision [2] dated
March 20, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),
Branch
40,
Palayan
City,
and
Resolution[3] dated October 26, 2009, which
denied
the
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration.
the
dispositive
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering defendants
Philippine National Railways
Corporation
(PNR),
Japhet
Estranas and Ben Saga to,
jointly and severally pay the
following amounts to:
1. a) PURIFICACION VIZCARA:
1)
P50,000.00,
as
indemnity for the death
of Reynaldo Vizcara;
2)
P35,000.00, for funeral expenses;
3)
P5,000.00
for
re-embalming
expenses;
4)
P40,000.00 for wake/interment
expenses;
5)
P300,000.00 as reimbursement
for the value of the jeepney with
license plate no. DTW-387;
6)
P200,000.00 as moral damages;
7)
P100,000.00
as
exemplary
damages; and
8)
P20,000.00 for Attorneys fees.
b) MARIVIC VIZCARA:
1)
P50,000.00, as indemnity for the
death of Cresencio Vizcara;
2)
P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3)
P100,000.00
as
exemplary
damages; and
4)
P20,000.00 for Attorneys fees.
c) HECTOR VIZCARA:
1)
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of Samuel Vizcara;
2)
P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3)
P100,000.00
as
exemplary
damages; and
4)
P20,000.00 for Attorneys fees.
d) CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD:
1)
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of Crispin Natividad;
2)
P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3)
P100,000.00
as
exemplary
damages; and
4)
P20,000.00 for Attorneys fees.
e) JOEL VIZCARA
1) P9,870.00 as reimbursement for his
actual expenses;
2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and
4) P10,000.00 for Attorneys fees.
f) DOMINADOR ANTONIO
1)
P63,427.00 as reimbursement for
his actual expenses;
2)
P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3)
P25,000.00
as
exemplary
damages; and
4)
P10,000.00 for Attorneys fees.
and
2. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
CRESENCIA
NATIVIDAD
is
hereby reduced from
P200,000.00
toP100,000.00 each
while
moral
damages awarded to JOEL VIZCARA
and
DOMINADOR
ANTONIO
are
likewise reduced from
P50,000.00
to P25,000.00;
(3)
The award
of
exemplary
damages to PURIFICACION VIZCARA,
MARIVIC VIZCARA, HECTOR VIZCARA
and CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD is hereby
reduced
from
P100,000.00
toP50,000.00 each while exemplary
damages awarded to JOEL VIZCARA
and
DOMINADOR
ANTONIO
are
likewise reduced from
P25,000.00
to P12,500.00; and
(4) The award for attorneys fees in
favor of the Appellees as well as the
award of P300,000.00 to Appellee
PURIFICACION
as reimbursement for
the value of the jeepney is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.[10]
consequences
arising
therefrom.
Stated
differently, the rule is that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude
recovery
of
damages
caused
by
the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had
the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence. [32] To
reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision
was the petitioners negligence in ensuring that