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G.R. No.
L-16806
December 22, 1961
SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
P. N. Stuart del Rosario for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio
del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal
possession of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day
to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of
P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, as well as a proportionate part of the costs. On
appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said
indeterminate penalty which was increased to 10 years, 8
months and 1 day of prision mayor. The case is before us
on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario.
It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del
Rosario the Philippine one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G
and the Philippine two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him
to believe that the same were counterfeit paper money
manufactured by them, although in fact they were genuine
treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the
digits of each of which had been altered and changed, the
aforementioned defendants had succeeded in obtaining
P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao, on
June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the
manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the
Philippines. The only question raised in this appeal is
whether the possession of said Exhibits C, E, G and H
constitutes a violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appellant maintains that, being genuine treasury
notes of our government, the possession thereof cannot be
illegal. We find no merit in this pretense.
It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial
No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had been erased and
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and

changes had been made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial
No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the last digit in Serial No.
D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No.
D-716329 of Exhibit H.
Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or
bank notes and other instruments of credit. - Unless the
act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of
the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use
or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the
false or falsified instruments referred to in this section,
shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed in said articles.
ART. 169. How forgery is committed. - The forgery referred
to in this section may be committed by any of the following
means;
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument
payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the
appearance of a true and genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by
any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained
therein.
It is clear from these provisions that the possession of
genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the
figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had
been erased and or altered, with knowledge of such notes,
as they were used by petitioner herein and his codefendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable
under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166,
subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs.
Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).
Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the
decision appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs
against petitioner Sergio del Rosario. It is so ordered.
chanrobles virtual law library
[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]

192 SCRA 521
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD

CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered by
Judge Manuel Castaeda on January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case
No. D-868 of the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and the
order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the
herein public respondent, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid order of dismissal.
Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera
and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land
located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan, registered in their
names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of
attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private
respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. On
February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with
the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said
special power of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of
P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power of
attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry
of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964.
After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage
account not having been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said
mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and Vileta Quinto
who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property.
In January, 1972, complainant allegedly discovered that their property
was already registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica when the
latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of the former from
the premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification
of a public document was filed against private respondent in the then
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of
Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a private
individual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No.
47682, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and
forge the signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney,
causing and making it appear that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA,
:- nad
signed and affixed his signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a
public document, when as a matter of fact and in truth, said MARIANO F.
CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor
gave his permission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification,
with intent of gain and by means of fraud and other deceits, the said
accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified public document
(Power of Attorney) did succeed in securing the loan from the People's
Bank and Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the
knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other
consequential damages." 2
After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case
proceeded to trial and the prosecution presented complainant Mariano F.
Carrera and one Melanio Esguig from the Office of the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez,
a handwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the same was not
continued as counsel for private respondent moved for and was granted
leave to file a motion to dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein it
was alleged that the crime charged would not lie due to the partial
testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect that he authorized
private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the land
owned by him and his brother. Said partial testimony of complainant was
quoted, with the emphasized portions, as follows:
(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that
there is no sufficient basis for the charge and this fact warrants the
dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more
than ten (10) years had elapsed from the time the crime was committed.
Since the information charges the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall be that for the
more serious crime which shall be applied in its maximum period, as
provided for by Article 48 of the Penal Code. The more serious crime in
the present case is the falsification of the public document which is
punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum period
and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. Prision correccional being a
correctional penalty, the same prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the
case merely alleged the date of the commission of the crime which was
February 5, 1964 and the information was filed only on March 29, 1974.
This being the case, private respondent claims that more than ten (10)
years has passed from the commission of the crime to the filing of the
information. No other allegation having been made as to the discovery of
the alleged crime, private respondent claimed that the period of

prescription commenced on the day on which the crime was committed.
He asserts that, from the date appearing in the transfer certificate of title
covering the land mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage documents
were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on
February 13, 1984, hence the alleged crime became public knowledge on
the same date. To support his theory, private respondent made the
following citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the
commission of the crime if it is known at the time of its commission.
"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered,
because the entire series of transactions was by public instruments, duly
recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connection with said
transaction was known to the offended party when it was committed and
the period of prescription commenced to run from the date of its
commission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised
Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp.
711-712)." 5
The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows
that what was intended was an authority to mortgage only the one-half
portion pertaining to his brother and he was only quoting what his
brother told him when he said that ". . . this is an authority to Federico
de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land
which belongs to me, my brother said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since
the date to be considered should not be the date of registration of the
alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964. It argued that the crime
was actually discovered only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica
filed an action to eject complainant from the premises, which fact was
not alleged in the information because it was considered by the
prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which would not be in accord
with the legal truism that an "information must allege only ultimate facts
and not evidentiary matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent,
petitioner submits that "(t)he same has only a persuasive effect and not
to be considered as an interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code as the same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castaeda of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on January
28, 1976 on the ground that the crime had prescribed. The People's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the succeeding Presiding Judge
Felicidad Carandang Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both
orders of the trial court. In a resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court
required the prosecution to file a petition for review on Certiorari in
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accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter, said petition for
review and the corresponding comment and reply of the parties having
been filed, on February 21, 1977 the Court resolved to treat said petition
as a special civil action and required petitioner and private respondent to
submit their respective memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution
of the following issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because
the private respondent would thereby be placed in double jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document
filed against the private respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law
and in fact; and,
3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is
already extinguished by prescription. 11
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As
enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after
arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or
information (Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the
prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial
court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made
upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the
dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence
or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by
the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant." 12
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public
document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the
affirmative. The falsification of a public document may be a means of
committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element
of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial documents.
The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by
the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public,
official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit
the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that
what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining
to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to complainant, otherwise
complainant would not have quoted his brother's words. The theory of
petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the
same. We agree that the offense charged does exist in fact and in law,
as explained in the findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of
complainant Mariano Carrera and of the record, as regards the first
ground, the court finds that the contention of the defense that the
authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not
sustained by the evidence because a cursory study of the answer made
by the witness complainant clearly shows that what was intended to be
mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo
Carrera, excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant. (T.S.N..
pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In other words, the alleged
authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank
on the half portion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera
only. This finding is based on the following quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization
to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of
the land which belongs to me, my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He
merely quoted his brother Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of
the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by Mariano Carrera, did not
use the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the
charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document, the resolution of
the issue on prescription is, however, determinative of the validity of the
impugned orders of public respondent.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a
complex crime is that for the most serious component offense, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. In the crime of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the
falsification which carries with it the correctional penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not more
than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes punishable
by correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article
90 of the Code, and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptive period
commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special
power of attorney registered in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on
February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent to mortgage a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to
secure a loan of P8,500.00 from the People's Bank and Trust Company.
The information for estafa thru falsification of a public document was
filed only on March 29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim that the ten: nad
year period commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the

crime in January, 1972 by reason of the ejectment suit against him.
People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that
registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record
is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of
what it contains. On these considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in
Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., 16 to the effect that in the crime of
falsification of a public document the prescriptive period commences
from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged
forgery after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds is
not without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting
the phrase "from the discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code
which authorizes annulment, in case of mistake or fraud, within four
years from the time of the discovery of the same, the Court also held
that the discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time
the document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar
rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world and this should
apply to both criminal and civil cases.
We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application
of said rule on constructive notice in the interpretation of Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to private
respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have
to be reckoned with earlier, that is, from the time the questioned
documents were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was
registered on February 13, 1964. The criminal information against
private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974, or more
than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with which private respondent
was charged has indubitably prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
challenged orders of public respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
: nad
G.R. No. L-7447

January 2, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICASIO CAPULE, defendant-appellant.
Luciano de la Rosa, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction rendered in this case
by the Honorable Vicente Jocson, judge.
On September 2, 1903, Nicasio Capule, for the purpose of appropriating to

himself a tract of coconut land, situated in the town of San Pablo, Laguna,
without the knowledge or consent of the owners thereof, the married couple
Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, by agreement and cooperation with the
notary public, Inocente Martinez, who later died, prepared and drew up a
document setting forth the sale in his favor of the said land, pretending that it
was made and executed by the said owners of the tract, stating in the
document that they had made the declaration that they had sold said land for
the sum of 550 pesos paid at the time of the sale to the vendors, and Jacinto
Peaflor and Jorge Tolentino appear in said document as witnesses of the
execution thereof; and Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia as the signers of the
deed of sale, because the alleged vendors did not know how to do so.
Recorded at the bottom of the document was their ratification of its contents
in the presence of said notary, before whom the said married couple
appeared. The defendant Capule exhibited said document later, although he
had been assured that it was false, in a trial before the justice of the peace of
that town in the attempt to sustain his alleged right to the said piece of land.
For this reason a complaint was filed on February 3, 1910, by the provincial
fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, charging Nicasio Capule with
the crimes of falsification of a public document and estafa. After due trial the
judge rendered judgment therein on March 21, 1911, sentencing Nicasio
Capule to the penalty of eight years of presidio mayor, to payment of a fine of
2,000 pesetas, the accessories, and the costs; from which judgment the
defendant appealed.
The document whose falsification is here in question, Exhibit A, the original
whereof appears at pages 17 and 148 of the file exhibits and has been
attached to the complaint, seems to have been executed on September 2,
1903, by Aniceto Maghirang y Espiritu and Isabel Pili y Emnaceno, of legal
age, residents of San Pablo, who declare therein that they have agreed with
the accused Capule on the real and absolute sale of a piece of land planted
with 42 fruit-bearing coconut trees and approximately 300 not bearing fruit, for
the sum of P550, which the purchaser has paid them to their entire
satisfaction, which land is located in the place called Quinayoan, barrio of
Dolores of the said town, with its boundaries and situation stated; and further
setting forth that the land is the property of Isabel Pili, who acquired it by
inheritance from her deceased niece, Claudia Reyes, according to a certified
copy of some affidavit proceedings; that the land described had not been
sold, ceded or encumbered in favor of any person other than Nicasio Capule,
to whom then and thenceforth they delivered the possession and usufruct of
said land as its legitimate owner, with right to alienate it, they being
responsible to Capule, his heirs and successors in interest for the ownership,
and agreeing to defend him against any just claims that might be presented;
and Nicasio Capule y Capitulo, informed of the contents of the document by
the vendor married couple, accepted it on his part; and as the vendors do not
know how to sign Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia do so at their request, as
does also the purchaser, who signs the document in duplicate and to the
same effect in the town hall of San Pablo, and there furthermore appear
therein the signatures of Jacinto Peaflor and Jorge Tolentino as witnesses.
On the same date appears the certificate of the notary public, whose
commission extended to January 1, 1905, wherein it is recorded that
personally appeared before him the married couple Maghirang and Pili, whom
he knew as the executors of the foregoing document and they ratified it as
executed of their own free will, the husband, as well as the purchaser,
exhibiting his cedula, but not the woman because she was exempt from
payment thereof.
It likewise appears from the evidence adduced in this case that said married
couple Maghirang and Pili were the owners of said land, which they
possessed and had the usufruct of and for which they paid to the Government
the corresponding land tax; that on January 31, 1904, said married couple
sold a portion of said land with 150 coconut trees to Esteban Reyes and his
wife Elisea Maghirang for 250 pesos, according to Exhibit B, and since then
Reyes has possessed and had the usufruct of the portion of land he had
bought, and made declaration before the land-tax board in May, 1906, as of
land belonging to him, according to Exhibit E, which sale was ratified by the
vendors in favor of Reyes before the notary Segundo Abrera on May 2, 1908,
Exhibit C.
On May 2, 1908, the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili
likewise sold the remaining portion of the said land with its coconut trees to
Melecio Brias for the sum of 650 pesos, before the notary public Segundo
Abrera, according to Exhibit J, and since then Brias has possessed and had
the usufruct of the land purchased, although in the tax list the tract continues
in the name of the vendor, who had made declaration in May, 1906, Exhibit K,
and had been paying the tax from 1903, Exhibit P, although Reyes, the owner
of one part which he had bought in 1904, appears to have paid the tax up to
1910, Exhibit F.
Although Esteban Reyes was in lawful possession of a portion of the land he
had purchased, on February 2, 1909, Nicasio Capule filed a complaint before
the justice of the peace of San Pablo accusing him of the theft of coconuts
from the land he possessed and of which Reyes was the owner; but the court
dismissed the case for lack of evidence of the right alleged by the plaintiff,
with the costs against him, Exhibit D, page 17 of the record.
On April 16, 1909, Nicasio Capule, claiming to be the owner of the coconut
land situated in Dolores, the subject matter of an alleged sale, accused the
married couple Maghirang and Pili and Eusebio Soriano of theft, and in spite
of the fact that he exhibited the document marked "Exhibit A", setting forth the
said sale made in his favor by that married couple, the justice of the peace
acquitted the accused of the crime of theft, Exhibit 1, page 67; and on June 4,
1909, according to Exhibit I, page 107 of said record, Aniceto Maghirang and
Guadalupe Javier were also acquitted of the crime of coercion with which
they were accused.
On October 21, 1909, Nicasio Capule and his wife were accused by Nemesio
Brias of the crime of theft in the justice of the peace court of San Pablo and
upon trial were sentenced to two months of arresto mayor and payment of
P14.25 with the costs, from which judgment they appealed to the Court of
First Instance, page 54 of the record, although at the request of the fiscal the
case was dismissed, because the action exercised by the complainant had to
be settled in a civil suit.
Although Capule presented, in some of the said hearings before the justice of
the peace court of San Pablo, the deed of sale, Exhibit A, for the purpose of
proving that he was the owner of the land in question, yet in the judgments
rendered therein said instrument was held to be false and no probative value
whatever was attached to it.
Aniceto Maghirang denies that he sold the said land to Nicasio Capule or that
he executed in his favor any document of sale, stating that he had conferred
a power of attorney upon him so that he might represent himself and his wife,
who later died, in a suit they had with Maximino Reyes, because of the
absolute confidence they had in the defendant, just as it was the latter himself
who drew up the document that was later signed in his stead by Eulogio
Ortega, because he could not read or write; but he denied that he or his wife
had ever been in the house of the notary Inocente Martinez to execute or
ratify any document or that he and his wife Isabel Pili, when she was alive,
had told the defendant Capule that they wished to sell the said land and that
he had offered to buy it.
Nicasio Capule avers that the said document, Exhibit A, was drawn up in his
own house in the presence of the married couple, Aniceto Maghirang and
Isabel Pili, for whom he had to translate the contents of the document into
Tagalog, and they then signified their agreement; and as they could not sign,
Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia did so in their stead, and at that time
Jacinto Peaflor and Jorge Tolentino, also signed it as witnesses; and that on
the afternoon of that day the married couple Maghirang and Pili appeared in
the house of the notary Martinez and ratified before him the said document in
the presence of the witness testifying; all of which Aniceto Maghirang denies,
asserting that he did not execute said document, or ratify it before the notary
Martinez, for he had never been in the latter's house nor had he ever seen
the document, Exhibit `A. His wife, Isabel Pili, did not testify, for she had died
in the meantime.
Let us examine the statements of the persons who appear to have signed the
document, impugned as false, in place of the married couple executing it, and
one of the witnesses to the execution of the said document, for it does not
appear that the other, Jorge Tolentino, testified.
Upon making his statement and after having been informed of the contents of
the document, Exhibit A, Doroteo Guia denied that he had been present in the
drawing up and execution thereof, or that he had ever known that the married
couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili had sold any land to the defendant,
Nicasio Capule, although he remembered that on a certain occasion said
married couple had asked him to sign for them in the defendant Capules's
house a document of power of attorney made out in Capule's favor, so that
the latter might represent them in a suit they were prosecuting against
Maximino Reyes, and believing that it was in fact a question of a power of
attorney, as they had assured him, went to the defendant's house and without
informing himself of the contents of the document that Capule spread out on
a table, signed it, but he denies that Eulogio Ortega, Jacinto Peaflor, and
Jorge Tolentino with whom he was acquainted, were present in that house.
Eulogio Ortega likewise denied that he signed any document of sale of land
or that he had ever been informed that the married couple Maghirang and Pili
had sold any land to the defendant Nicasio Capule, although he remembers
that one day about seven years ago Nicasio Capule and Isabel Pili came to
his house and the latter told him that as she did not know how to write she
begged him to do the favor of signing in her stead a power of attorney,
whereupon the defendant told him that as he did not know Spanish the
contents of said document would be translated to him so that he might
understand them, stating at the same time that a power of attorney was
conferred upon him, Capule, by Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili in the suit
against Maximino Reyes, the attorney thus authorized responding for its
result, without the necessity for the intervention of the married couple granting
the power; and that after being informed of the of the contents of the
document presented to him he signed it, and he asserts that said document is
Exhibit A; that on that occasion Doroteo Guia, Jacinto Peaflor, and Jorge
Tolentino were not present; and that one Sunday, when he was passing a
tienda with Jorge Tolentino and Domingo Capuno, the defendant Capule, who
was there, called to him and after offering them wine told him that they should
understand each other for that document which he, Capule, had said was a
power of attorney was really a deed of sale executed in his favor by Aniceto
Maghirang and in case of winning the suit Capule would give him P200.
Jacinto Peaflor, who figures in said document as a witness, having the same
before him, stated that the signature which appears therein with his name and
surname looks like his, but he could not assert definitely whether such
signature was his or not, for he does not remember having signed such a
document in the presence of the married couple Maghirang and Pili and the
individuals Eulogio Ortega, Doroteo Guia, and Jorge Tolentino, setting forth
the sale of a tract of lands to Nicasio Capule, and that he did not recognize
the signatures of Doroteo Guia and Eulogio Ortega.
From the result of taking these statements and the conduct of the accused
together, it is logically inferred that after preparing the document, Exhibit A, he
tried by all the means he thought expedient to assert his ownership of the
land which, under an alleged title of acquisition, had come to be his property
and to that end he tried to dispose of the products of the young trees that
there were on the tract, even daring to trample upon the legitimate rights of its
original owners and of the new ones who had later acquired it, up to the point
of accusing them as perpetrators of crimes directed against his pretended
and false right of ownership, which he claimed to have acquired through the
said false instrument.
Believing that with the document, Exhibit A, he could get the courts to
override the true owners of the land, which he pretended its original owners
had sold, in the various complaints he presented before the justice of the
peace of San Pablo against the offended alleged owners and one of the new
owners who acquired part of the land in question, as well as when he was
accused of theft by the owner of the remaining part of the tract, the defendant
dared to assert that he was the owner thereof and of the coconut trees
growing thereon, even to the point of exhibiting said false instrument, but in
spite of his allegations and his documentary evidence the persons accused
by him were acquitted, while Capule himself was convicted of theft of
coconuts on a complaint of one of the owners of said land. The notary,
Inocente Martinez, was not examined, for he had died in the meantime.
It therefore appears to be plainly proven that the crime of falsification of a
document has been committed, and while it may not be public still it is of an
official or notarial character, provided for and penalized in articles 300 and
301, because the defendant executed upon said notarial document of an
official character acts constituting falsification, by counterfeiting therein the
intervention of the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, to whom
he ascribed statements different from what they had made to him and by
perverting the truth in the narration of facts, getting two persons to sign in the
name of said married couple through deceit, after giving them to understand
that the document contained a commission or power of attorney, when in fact
it was a deed of sale of a piece of land, the legitimate owners whereof had
never intended or consented to its alienation.
None of the persons who appear to have signed said document and seem to
have been present at its execution were informed of its true contents,
because they all confided with the greatest good faith in the false and
deceitful statements of the defendant, believing what he said to the effect that
said instrument was a commission voluntarily conferred upon him by the
couple executing it, who never intended to execute any document of sale of
their property to the defendant, who went to the extreme of getting a notary to
certify to its ratification before him, made apparently by the alleged vendors in
the contents of the said false document.
The fact that the married couple Maghirang and Pili did not know how to read
and write certainly reveals great ignorance and lack of culture in them, but
when they got to be landowners and acquired property of some value, they
cannot be absolutely denied the ability to distinguish a deed of sale from a
power of attorney, because they have demonstrated well enough that they
understood their purpose to be that the defendant should represent them in a
suit pending in a court and that they had never intended or executed any fact
for the alienation of a tract of land belonging to them in favor of the defendant,
and it is therefore unquestionable that he took advantage of the opportunity
when he was to have executed a document or instrument of power of
attorney, which the married couple desired, to draw up maliciously and

deceitfully a deed of sale in his favor, deceiving the alleged vendors and the
two persons who signed for them and making them believe that the document
executed was a power of attorney or commission, when it fact it was a deed
of sale and is the Exhibit A, wherein, if he did not forge the signatures of the
two witnesses Peaflor and Tolentino, he must have obtained them in an
equally deceitful way.
If it were true that the vendors had really alienated their coconut land to the
defendant, their continuing to pay the land tax is unexplained. In January,
1904, a part of said land with its coconut trees was sold to Esteban Reyes
and in May, 1908, the rest of the tract was sold to Melecio Brias. Persons so
simple, even ignorant and of little culture, as the offended parties, would not
have dared to sell successively to two of their neighbors in two portions the
said land, if it had been in fact already sold to the defendant Capule; while the
latter, by profession a clerk and acting as such for the notary Martinez, who
made sworn statements before the assessment board and paid the land tax
for the year 1906, never complied with these obligations of landowner in
connection with the land which, according to Exhibit A, he had acquired on
September 2, 1903, yet on the other hand it does not appear why he did not
enter in possession of the tract if he had really bought it in September of that
year, which indicates that although he dared to draw up a false document with
the connivance of the notary, his boldness did not prevail to the extent of
depriving in a frank and open manner its legitimate owners of the possession
of the land by appealing to the courts to assert his right, provided he was sure
that it was legitimate.
Although under article 535 of the Penal Code those who commit fraud by
causing another to subscribe a document by the use of deceit, as the
defendant has done, incur, according to paragraph 7 thereof, the penalties set
forth in the preceding article; still when as in the present case the crime of
falsification was committed for the purpose of getting a piece of real property,
which is the profit its perpetrator sought to obtain, he is regarded as duly
punished as guilty of falsification of a notarial document, in which crime fraud
or estafa is held to be included, with the penalties indicated in said article 301
of the Code.
The defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged that the married couple
Maghirang and Pili had positively sold him the land to which Exhibit A refers
for the sum of P500 which he forthwith delivered to them, Eulogio Ortega and
Doroteo Guia and two other eyewitnesses to the execution of the document
having signed the instrument which he drew up in his house in the presence
of all of them, and that it was he who drew up the certificate of ratification
authorized by the notary and interpreted the contents of the document with its
ratification before the notary to the vendors, who really did not know or
understand Spanish, on the afternoon of the same date on which said
instrument was drawn up; further stating that immediately afterwards he took
possession, in the same month of September, 1903, of the land he had
bought and from that time on picked the fruit the coconut trees produced,
although he was disturbed in his possession by the vendors themselves and
the neighbors Esteban Reyes and Melecio Brias; that it was true that he had
not in 1906 made any declaration of ownership of said land, as is ordered for
the purposes of assessment, but he paid the land tax for that time by
delivering the money to Isabel Pili, although he did not know whether the
receipts had been made out in her name. The defendant, who is a person of
more education and knowledge than the offended parties, even alleged other
defenses which were in like manner as those stated completely unsupported.
He tried to prove that in January, 1906, he sold said land under pacto de retro
for two years to Andres Borja, who possessed it during those two years,
although the alleged purchaser Borja said that only a private document was
made out for the sale nor did he require of the defendant any previous
document of ownership to evidence the defendant's right to the land sold,
which private document was not exhibited in the case and no proof was
adduced to show Borja's possession of the land sold to him; and what is
stranger still is that in the declaration of ownership of the land, Exhibit K, page
116, presented by the offended party Aniceto Maghirang in May of the same
year, 1906, the alleged Andres Borja appears to have signed as a witness,
attesting that the land was Aniceto Maghirang's and thus Andres Borja signs
at page 87 of his statement, in spite of the alleged previous purchase, nor
does it appear that the defendant redeemed the tract.
An attempt was also made to prove that in November, 1908, the defendant
Capule sold the same land absolutely to Marcelino Capiria with another
tract, which is set forth in the document, Exhibit B, ratified before a notary, for
the sum of P2,500, and the purchaser forthwith took possession of the lands
sold. If this absolute sale is true it is incomprehensible why the purchaser
Capiria did not ever attempt to enter into possession of the land in question
sold to him in November, 1908, on which date the original owners, Maghirang
and Pili, had already got rid of said land, having sold a part thereof to Esteban
Reyes on January 31, 1904, and the remainder on May 2, 1908, to Melecio
Brias. These new owners took possession from that time on of the
respective portions of the land they had acquired, nor does it all appear in the
case that the purchaser Capiria asked the alleged vendor to make delivery
of the land sold to him, or that he ever appealed in any way to the courts.
Moreover, in presenting his complaints years later against the married couple
Maghirang and Pili and others, the defendant Capule did so in the capacity of
owner of that very land, so it is not true that he had previously sold it to the
said Capiria.
These two alleged sales to Borja and Capiria were ways and means chosen
by the defendant to see if he could effectually deprive the married couple
Maghirang and Pili of their right to the land in question, since at that time he
did not yet dare to exhibit the false instrument he had maliciously and
fraudulently drawn up and he did not secure from said document the results
he expected and intended to become the owner of the land by means of a

false instrument.
Likewise the alleged transaction that he says Eulogio Ortega proposed to him
to allow rescission of the alleged sale in the document, Exhibit A, through
return of the price by the vendors, a transaction proposed, according to the
accused and his witness Silvestre Capiria, one day in the month of July,
1909, is in every way unlikely to have been made in the name of Aniceto
Maghirang, because the land had already been sold some years before to
Esteban Reyes and Melecio Brias, and therefore the offended party could
not get Ortega to talk with the defendant to propose said transaction for the
return of a piece of land that had never been sold to him but to the said
Reyes and Brias in 1904 and 1908, and in 1909 he no longer had any
interest or right in the land in question, aside from the fact that he has not
proved that the offended party Maghirang ever intrusted such a commission
to Eulogio Ortega or authorized him to make the proposition. Eulogio Ortega
denied having interviewed the defendant Capule on behalf of Aniceto
Maghirang. Such allegations are nothing more than ingenious quibbles and
tricks invented by the defendant's counsel to save him from the punishment
he deserves as the proven perpetrator of the crime of falsification.
Starting from the hypothesis that the defendant really obtained in a fraudulent
and deceitful manner the consent of the married couple Maghirang and Pili to
the execution of said false instrument, his counsel argues that still he was not
guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document, in accordance with the
finding of this court in the decision of the case against Geronimo Milla (4 Phil.
Rep., 391), wherein the following principle was laid down:
The fact that one's consent to a contract may be obtained by mistake,
violence, intimidation, or fraud does not make the contract a false contract,
and therefore a person who has obtained such contract by those means,
whatever be the crime he may be guilty of, is not guilty of the crime of
falsification either of a public or of a private document.
This was the question of a contract wherein the offended parties gave their
consent to the execution of the document that was later impugned as false,
although this consent was obtained through intimidation which the defendants
in that case, Juan Cardona and Geronimo Milla, had used upon them, and for
this reason the court, in view of the fact that the contracting parties consented
to the terms of the instrument, could not find that there was falsification in the
statement of the facts, according to article 300 of the Penal Code, merely
because the consent had been secured through intimidation.
As has been seen, there was no contract in the present case, nor any
consent to the contract pretended to have been stipulated in the instrument,
Exhibit A, wherein the defendant entered statements ascribed to the alleged
vendors, who proposed and intended to execute an instrument of commission
or power of attorney in favor of the defendant, but not a deed of sale, as in
bad faith and with evident perverseness the defendant did, perverting the
truth in the statement of facts and ascribing to the offended parties
statements different from those they made to him in the counterfeited

document, since the statements set forth therein were not characteristic and
constitutive of an instrument of power of attorney in his favor in order that he
might represent them in a suit against Maximino Reyes.
Finally, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Weems vs. U.S. (217 U.S., 349) is vainly invoked, for Nicasio Capule is not a
public officer and, moreover, as he is accused of the crime of falsification of a
notarial document of official character equivalent to a public document the
principle laid down in said decision is totally inapplicable in his favor. The
defendant Capule does not come within the purview of article 300 of the
Penal Code, but of 301, which fixes the penalty, not of cadena temporal but of
presidio mayor; further keeping in mind that the act of falsification of a public
document in itself constitutes a crime, morally and legally punishable, even
though to date the penal law with respect to falsification of a public document
committed by public officers, in lieu of said article 300 of the code, has not yet
been promulgated; but article 301, applicable to the present case, has not
been repealed and subsists in all its force.
The concurrence of neither extenuating nor aggravating circumstances can
be found in the commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty fixed in
said article 301 of the code must be imposed in its medium degree.
For these reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed
from are found to be refuted, we hold that it should be affirmed; provided,
however, that Nicasio Capule be sentenced to the penalty of eight years and
one day of presidio mayor, to the accessories fixed in article 57 of the code,
to the payment of a fine of 5,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, according to article 51; and to the costs in the case. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-38948

November 18, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PlaintiffAppellee, vs. TOMAS MANANSALA, ET AL., defendants.
GALICANO ALON and RICARDO CABRALES, appellants.
Roman Gesmundo for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
The appellants Galicano Alon ( alias Grego), and Ricardo
Cabrales ( alias Maning), together with Tomas Manansala,
Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza, were prosecuted in
the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of estafa,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February, 1932, in the
municipalities of Pasay and Caloocan, Province of Rizal,
within two and a half miles from the city limits and within
the jurisdiction of this court, and in the City of Manila
proper, Philippine Islands, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud one
Perfecto Abordo in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused by means of false and fraudulent representations
which may made to the said Perfecto Abordo to the effect
that they had for sale six hundred (600) tins of opium, a
prohibited drug, and that they would deliver the same to
him upon paying them P600 in advance and by means of
other similar deceit, induced the said Perfecto Abordo to
give and deliver to them, as in fact he gave and delivered
to them, the said sum of P600, in consideration of which
the accused gave him a gasoline can which they
represented to contain the 600 tins of opium, when in truth
and in fact, as the said accused well knew, the said can
contained only six small tin cans containing a black
substance which was not opium, the accused thereby
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defrauding the said
Perfecto Abordo in the sum of P600 to his damage and
prejudice in said amount.
That the accused Tomas Manansala y Velasco and Galicano
Alon y Ponce ( alias Grego) have each once been convicted
of the crime of estafa; and the accused Ricardo Cabrales y
Pelorina ( alias Maning) and Isidro Mendoza y Santos Sollo
are habitual delinquents, the first having been convicted
once for robbery, once for theft and three times for estafa,
having served his last sentence on February 4, 1927, and
the second having been convicted one of estafa and once
of robbery, having served his last sentenced on October
30, 1922, all of said convictions having been rendered by
virtue of final judgments of competent courts.
After the prosecution had rested, the information was
dismissed as to the defendants Tomas Manansala,
Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza for lack of evidence
to show that they had taken part in the commission of the
crime. Upon the termination of the trial, Judge Pedro
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Concepcion found the defendants Galicano Alon and

Ricardo Cabrales guilty of estafa, in accordance with the
provisions of article 354, No. 2, of the Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 3244, and sentenced each of them to
suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the
offended party, Perfecto Abordo, in the sum of P600, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the proportionate part of the costs.
The trial judge's findings as to the facts as follows:
With respect to the other accused, Galicano Alon and
Ricardo Cabrales, the evidence for the prosecution
sufficiently shows that about a week prior to February 19,
1932, the former who gave his name as "Grego" and the
latter known by the name of "Maning" in company with
another person whom they called "Pepe" offered to sell
Attorney Perfecto Abordo 17,000 tins of opium at P1.50
each telling him that he could sell them for P10 a tin.
Tempted with the prospect of an enormous profit, Mr.
Perfecto Abordo agreed to buy the merchandise, and the
accused agreed to sell it to him in lots of 1,000 tins at
P600 lot. It was agreed that the delivery of P1,000 tins
would take place at P5.30 p. m., at the corner of Taft
Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz within the jurisdiction of
this city. Attorney Perfecto Abordo accordingly went to the
place indicated with the money, and there waited for them.
The accused Galicano Alon arrived alone in an automobile
and invited Abordo to go with him to the place where the
1,00 tins of opium were kept. trusting Gallicano Alon, who
always called Abordo "brother" because he claimed to be a
Mason like Mr. Abordo, the latter went with him in his
automobile to the rotunda of Rizal Avenue Extension.
Chauffeur Jose Jonsay was at the wheel. It was already
twilight when they arrived at the rotunda, and there they
met Maning, or the accused Ricardo Cabrales, who, in
company with others, was waiting for Abordo in another
automobile. The accused Cabrales alighted and shortly
thereafter appeared Pepe who was ordered by Cabrales to
get the tins of opium. Pepe got from a lot nearby the can
Exhibit A, the top of which was ordered by Cabrales in
order to show Abordo the six tins of opium contained in a
wooden box, Exhibit B, which Abordo saw when the top of
said Exhibit A was opened. Finding that said tins really
contained opium, Abordo believed that the rest of the
contents of the can also consisted of tins of opium. He
handed the six hundred pesos to Maning, who, after
receiving the money, immediately went to the automobile
where his companions were waiting. At the same time
Abordo returned to his car with the accused Galicano Alon
and the person named Pepe, carrying the can. While
proceeding towards Taft Avenue Extension Abordo noticed
that the accused Cabrales was following in his automobile,
and that when they were nearing the corner of Taft Avenue
Extension and Vito Cruz the car in which Cabrales was
riding attempted to block Abordo's way, while Galicano
Alon told Attorney Abordo that those in the other
automobile were constabulary men and it would be better
to get rid of the can Exhibit A. The accused Cabrales,
whom Attorney Abordo was able to recognize very well,
and the companions of the former whom Abordo was not
able to identify because it was already dark, approached
his car saying that they were constabulary agents and told
Abordo that he was under arrest. Knowing that they were
not constabulary agents and that their purpose was to get
possession of the can Exhibit A, Abordo drew his revolver
and ordered his chauffeur to proceed. Cabrales and his
companions again followed him in their car and for the
second time tried to head off Abordo somewhere before
the intersection of F. B. Harrison and Vito Cruz streets, but
Abordo proceeded until he arrived at his house. There he
opened the can Exhibit A and inside he found the wooden
box Exhibit B, but the rest of the contents of the can was
sand. He bore a hole in one of the tins and found that it
only contained molasses.
The accused tried to give, by their testimony and that of
Miguel Rosales, who had been convicted twelve times of
estafa, a long story to the effect that Abordo engaged the

accused Cabrales, through the intervention of Miguel
Rosales, to prepare 1,000 tins of molasses resembling tins
of opium, that on the afternoon agreed upon for the
payment of the value of said tins, Abordo refused to deliver
the money on the pretext that the purchaser of said tins
had not arrived, and invited the accused to his house in
Pasay in order to make the payment inasmuch as they
insisted upon collecting from him; but before arriving in
Pasay Cabrales stopped Abordo's automobile and required
the latter to hand over the money, at the same time
placing at the side of Abordo's automobile a sack which he
said contained the 1,000 tins of molasses asked for by
Abordo.
It is hardly necessary to state that this story is a sheer
fabrication.
The attorney for the appellants makes the following
assignments of error:
I. El Juzgado incurrio en error al declarar que las pruebas
demuestran que Ricardo Cabrales y Galicano Alon, en
compaia de otro individuo llamado "Pepe", vendieron al
abogado Perfecto Abordo mil latas de opio falsificado por el
precio de P600.
II. El Juzgado incurrio en eror al no declarar que el
supuesto ofendido, Perfecto Abordo, por medio de Miguel
Rosales, encomendo a Ricardo Cabrales la confeccion de
mil latas de opio al precio de P0.60 cada lata poniendo
como contenido melaza, para venderlas como opio
legitimo.
III. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no declarar que aun en
el supuesto de que realidad Ricardo Cabrales vendio a
Perfecto Abordo dichas mil latas de opio por el precio de
P600, el acusado Galicano Alon nada tiene que ver con
dicha venta.
IV. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no absolver a los
acusados apelantes, apreciando cuando menos en favor de
los mismos y sobre todo en favor del apelante Galicano
Alon, el beneficio de la duda racional.
The assignments of error raise only questions of fact,

depending on the credibility of the witnesses. No reason
has been adduced that would justify us in disturbing the
findings of the trial judge. As to the contention of the
appellants, the trial judge found it to be a mere fabrication
and worthy of no credit. The witnesses for the defense
were Miguel Rosales and the appellants themselves. The
evidence shows that Miguel Rosales had been convicted of
the falsification of commercial documents in twelve cases.
The appellant Galicano Alon had been convicted of estafa,
and the other appellant, Ricardo Cabrales, had been
convicted once of robbery, once of theft, and three times of
estafa. The trial judge was fully justified in disbelieving the
improbable story of said witnesses.
The crime committed by the appellants is that of estafa as
defined in article 315, paragraph 1 ( a) of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides that any person who shall
defraud another through unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence by altering the substance, quantity, or quality of
anything of value which the offender shall deliver by virtue
of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be
based on an immoral or illegal consideration. The amount
of the fraud being P600, the penalty applicable is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prison correccional in its
minimum period, and it appearing that the appellant
Galicano Alon has already been convicted of estafa, he is
therefore a recidivist, and the penalty applicable to him
should be imposed in the maximum degree.
It was alleged in the information that Ricardo Cabrales was
a habitual delinquent because he had been convicted once
of robbery, once of theft, and three times of estafa, and
that the last penalty for estafa was extinguished by him on
February 4, 1927. These prior convictions were admitted
by him in open court. He is therefore a habitual delinquent,
but his prior convictions can not be taken into
consideration also as an aggravating circumstance for the
purpose of increasing the principal penalty, which should
therefore be imposed in the medium degree.
As the additional penalty, the Solicitor-General

recommends the medium degree of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, or from six years and one
day to seven years and four months. This is erroneous. It
is apparently based upon the mistaken idea that only the
prior convictions of this appellant for estafa are to be taken
into account. The correct interpretation of the law is that
all prior convictions of any of the crimes of theft, robbery,
estafa, or falsification should be taken into account when a
person is convicted of any one of these crimes and of being
habitual delinquent. To hold otherwise, a person might be
twice convicted of each of these four crimes, and still not
be a habitual delinquent.
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant Galicano Alon is
sentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and one day of
prision correccional, and the appellant Ricardo Cabrales is
sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision
correccional, and said defendants are jointly and severally
sentenced to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P600, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. The appellant Ricardo Cabrales having
been previously convicted five times of theft, robbery, or
estafa, he is sentenced as a habitual delinquent to suffer
an additional penalty of eleven years, six months, and
twenty-one days of prision mayor.
As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
with the costs against the appellants.
[G.R. No. 2829. September 19, 1906. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PIO CASTILLO, DefendantAppellant.
T. L. Hartigan, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General, Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. FORGERY; EVIDENCE; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. The unexplained fact that the
accused uttered a forged check is strong evidence tending to prove that the accused
either forged the check himself or caused it to be forged, and when accompanied by
proof of other facts, which render it difficult to understand how the check could have
been forged without the intervention of the accused, it is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for forgery.
DECISION
CARSON, J. :
It was proven at the trial of the case on the morning of the 2d of December, 1905, the
appellant Pio Castillo, presented a check for the sum of 56 pesos, Philippine currency,
to Chinese merchant named Lim Ponso; that the said check was made payable to
bearer and purported to be drawn by one James J. Watkins; that the amount of the
check was paid to Pio Castillo; that the signature of the drawer upon said check was a
forgery made in imitation of the genuine signature of James J. Watkins, sheriff of the
city of Iloilo, and that, in fact, the said James J. Watkins never signed or issued the
said check; that the blank upon which the check was written was stolen from a book
of blank checks between the hours of 12 noon on the 1st of December, 1903, and 11
a. m. on the 2d of December, 1903, when the check was presented for payment; that
this blank check book was kept in a drawer in the office of the said James J. Watkins,
and that Pio Castillo was one of three clerks employed by Watkins in the office; that
Castillo was in the office on the evening of December 1 and early in the morning of
December 2, and that he was the last person let alone in the office on the evening of
December 1, he having locked the office after all the other clerks had gone.
Castillo went on the witness stand in his own behalf and swore that he had never seen
the forged check prior to the trial; that he was not at the business place of the
Chinese merchant, Lim Ponso, on the 2d of December, 1903; and that he never
received the money which it is alleged was paid him upon the check; but the falsity of
all these statements, in every particular, was conclusively established by the
testimony of a number of disinterested witnesses for the prosecution.
Upon this evidence the trial court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the
charge of falsification, but found the accused guilty of the crime of knowingly using
with intent to gain a falsified mercantile document as defined and penalized in article
302 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to five months imprisonment (arresto
mayor) with the accessory penalties.
We think the evidence in the case was sufficient to sustain a finding that the accused
was guilty of the crime of falsification as charged. The question involved is stated as
follows in Whartons Criminal Law (vol. 1, par. 726):
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Does the uttering of a forged instruments by the particular person justify a jury in
convicting such a person of forgery? The question, if nakedly put, must, like the
kindred one as to the proof of larceny by evidence of possession of stolen goods, be
answered in the negative. The defendant is presumed to be innocent until otherwise
proved. In larceny this presumption is overcome by proof that the possession is so
recent that it becomes difficult to conceive how the defendant could have got the
property without being in some way concerned in the stealing. So it is with uttering.
The uttering may be so closely connection with the forgers that it becomes when so
accomplished, probable proof of complicity in the forgery."
cralaw virtua1aw library
See, as the main substantiating this view, U. S. v. Britton (2 Mason, 464, 1826);
Spencer v. Com. (2 Leigh, 751, 1830); State v. Morgan (2 Dev. & Bat., 348, 1837);
State v. Outs (30 La. An., Pt. II, 1155, 1878); Cohn v. People [(Colo.) 2 West Coast
Rep., 528, 1884].
In Massachusetts, wherein it has been held that the mere fact of uttering is not proof
of forgery (Com. v. Parmenter, 5 Pick., 279, 1827), it has been decided, nevertheless,
that "possession of a forged instrument by a person claiming under it is strong
evidence tending to prove that he forged it or caused it to be forged." (Com. v. Talbot,
84 Mass. (2 Allen), 161.) In several jurisdiction it has been held that one found in the
possession of a forged order issued in his own favor is presumed either to have forged
it or procured it to be forged. (Hobbs v. State, 75 Ala., 1; State v. Britt, 14 N. C. (3
Div.) , 122.)
For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to hold, and we do not hold, that the
mere fact that the accused uttered the check in question is proof of the fact that he
also forged it or caused it to be forged, but we do hold that the utterance of such an
instrument, when unexplained, is strong evidence tending to establish the fact that
the utterer either himself forged the instrument or caused it to be forged, and that
this evidence, taken together with the further evidence set out above and brought out
on the trial of the case, establishes the guilt of the accused of the crime with which he
was charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is urged on appeal that the information filed in this case is fatally deficient because
it charges the accused with falsification and further alleges that he received the sum
of money realized as a result of said falsification, and it is contended that the accused
was thus charged as principal and as accessory after the fact. It is sufficient answer to
this connection to say no objection was raised on this ground at the trial; and it is
further to be observed that this allegation was not in fact or intention a charge against
the accused as accessory after the fact, and appears to have been set out in the
information merely to fix the civil responsibility upon which the court is required to
pass, under the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code.
The trial court was of opinion that the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and
abuse of confidence should be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty to be
imposed, but we agree with the Solicitor-General that premeditation is inherently
involved in crimes of this nature, and since it does not appear that the check book
was under the control or intrusted to the care of the accused, the crime can not be
said to have been committed with "abuse of confidence" within the meaning of
circumstance 10 of article 10 of the Penal Code.
We therefore reverse the judgment and sentence of the trial court and find the
accused, Pio Castillo, guilty of the crime of "falsification of a mercantile instrument,"
as charged, and it appearing that the accused, at the time of the commission of the
crime, was less than 18 though more than 15 years old, we impose upon him the
penalty immediately inferior to that prescribed for that offense, and there being no
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, we sentence the said Pio Castillo to four
years imprisonment (presidio correccional) with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law, and to the payment of the costs in both instance and the indemnification of the
injured party in the sum of 56 pesos, Philippine currency.
After the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and
at the proper time let the case be remanded to the court below for proper action. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
KV. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner Michael T. Dava, then holder of nonprofessional driver's license No. 1474427 1 with official receipt No. 7023037, 2
bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing
death to former and physical injuries to the latter.
As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to Mandaluyong Police

headquarters where his driver's license was confiscated by Cpl. Daniel
Severino who later submitted Dava's driver's license to the fiscal's office in
Pasig, Rizal. license was thereafter presented as prosecution evidence in
criminal case for homicide and serious physical injuries reckless imprudence
filed against Dava in the then Court First Instance of Rizal in Pasig. 3
On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of
Dolores, saw Dava driving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car with plate
No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in
court and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to Dava, Roxas
sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in
apprehending Dava for driving without a license. 4 The Ministry of Defense later
indorsed Roxas' request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group
(CHPG).
At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/
Sgt. Arturo Viduya of the CHPG saw the maroon Volkswagen car described
by Roxas parked in front of the Uniwide Department Store near the then
Nation theater in Cubao, Quezon City. When the driver and his companion
arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted them and asked the driver for his
license. They were shown non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 5
with official receipt No. 0605870 6 issued by Agency 2L Pampanga in the name of
Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava informed them
that his officemate had secured it for him.
Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame, Quezon
City for questioning. Dava refused to give a statement upon the advice of his
lawyer. Lising then submitted a spot report to Col. Maristela stating therein
that "subject had violated Section 31 of RA 4136 for false representation in
the application of a driver's license intended to be used as a legal license." 7
In his affidavit of apprehension dated November 16, 1978, Lising stated that he was
'about to book him for violation of Section 31 of Rep. Act 4136, when subsequent
investigation revealed that the Driver's License above-mentioned is a Fake and a

Falsity' and therefore a case for falsification and use of falsified documents under
Section 172 of the Revised Penal Code should be filed against Dava. 8 Lising
concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he compared it with
the xerox copy of Dava's license which was attached to the record of the criminal
case in Pasig, the signatures and the dates of birth indicated in the two licenses did
"not tally." 9
Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document was filed

against Dava in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon
City. 10 One of the prosecution witnesses was Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City
branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT). He testified that hen was then
the registrar of the said office when Dava's driver' license was brought to him by
lawyer Jose Francisco who was interested in knowing whether it was genuine or
fake and if was issued by the Angeles City agency of the BLT. He examine it and
found out that it was "fake or illegally issued" because form No. 2706887 was one
of the fifty (50) forms which had been reported missing from their office sometime in
November, 1976 and that it was never issued to any applicant for a license. 11 He
added that any license that was not included their office index card was considered
as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally issued by any agency." 12
Vinluan stated that although the form used for the license was genuine, 13 the
signature of the issuing official was fake. 14 He "believed" certain persons had been
apprehended for "plasticization" of licenses outside their office 15 and that sometime
November, 1976, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation raided the house of
a certain person who had in his possession some of the forms which had been
missing from office. 16 He concluded that the license was fake because the form
was issued by the central office to the Angeles agency, the license appeared on its
face to have been issued the San Fernando, Pampanga agency. 17
Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then Court of

Appeals 18 which affirmed the lower court's decision on January 29, 1982. Dava
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to try the case. On April 27, 1982, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside its decision and issued a resolution the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered and set

aside, and another judgment shall be entered annulling the proceedings in
the court a quo without prejudice to the refiling of the charges with the proper
court. (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)
Consequently, the case was refiled with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, Branch 47 at San Fernando as Criminal Case No. 2422. The
information for falsification of a public document reads as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and for sometime prior thereto,
in the municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
MICHAEL T. DAVA, a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified, a Non-Professional Driver's
license with Serial No. 2706887 covered by Official Receipt No. 0605870,
dated January 24, 1978, a public document, by making it appear that the
signatories therein who are officials of the Pampanga LTC Agency

participated in the preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact they did not
so participate and the accused made use of the same knowing it to be
falsified.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio Roxas who testified on how he
saw Dava driving a car and that, knowing that Dava's license had been
confiscated as a result of the filing of the homicide and serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence case, he thereafter sought the
assistance of then Minister Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a
license. 19 For his part, Domingo Lising, who apprehended Dava, narrated in court
how he first saw Daya driving a car along Banahaw and N. Domingo Sts. in Quezon
City until he finally confronted Dava at the vicinity of the Araneta Coliseum and
confiscated his driver's license. As earlier stated, he conclude that the driver's
license shown to him by Dava was fake because he noticed that, when compared
with the license attached to record of the criminal case filed against Dava, the
license confiscated bore a different signature and date of birth. 20
Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that he

investigated the traffic incident along Shaw Boulevard on October 19, 1975
which involved Dava and the two relatives of Antonio Roxas. He himself
confiscated Dava's no professional driver's license No. 1474427 which he
later turn over to the fiscal's office. 21
In the course of Severino's testimony, the defense counsel informed the court
that, upon a resolution of the Court of Appeals, Dava was allowed by the
lower court having jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 16474 to withdraw his
driver's license 1474427 from the records of said case. 22 When confronted by
the court, Dava volunteered that he withdrew said license in December, 1982 and
surrendered it to the BLT Western District Office so that he could renew his license.
23 Hence, the evidence presented before the Court was a mere xerox copy of said
license 24 which also bears a notation that Dava received original driver's license
and its receipt on December 15, 1982. 25
Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San Fernando Pampanga
branch of the BLT and whose name appears registrar thereof in official receipt
No. 0605870 which was supposed to be attached to Dava's driver's license
No. 270688 admitted that the form of the said license was genuine although
he could not tell whether its contents were likewise genuine because it was
"opened" and "spliced." 26 He asserted, however, that since the said form "did not
emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed" over his name, said
license was "not OK". 27
Martin said that he was informed by the property section of the BLT regional
office that the number in the license was one of "the numbers requisitioned by
(the) Angeles City agency." 28 He affirmed that drivers license No. 2706887 "was
not issued by (their) agency" 29 although when recalled to the stand, he admitted
that the "2L" filled in the space for "Agency Code No." on the face of license No.
2706887 referred to the San Fernando agency. 30 Martin also confirmed the
genuineness of official receipt No. 0605870 although it was his assistant who
signed it for him 31 and affirmed that the amount of P10.00 indicated therein had
been collected and received by his office. 32
Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to the Angeles City office of the
BLT to see its chief and inquire about the number of driver's license issued to
Dava and whether said office had indeed issued them. According to him, the
head of the office, Caroline Vinluan, advised him to verify from the index card
in the possession of the License Division head whether the Angeles City
agency had indeed issued Dava's license. 33 Thereafter, the officer-in-charge of
the License Division of the BLT in East Avenue, Quezon City, Leonardo R. Medina,
issued a certification dated December 24, 1979 to the effect that non-professional
drivers license No. 2706887 in the name of Dava was "not registered in (their)
Index Card." 34
Francisco also informed the court that Carolino Vinluan, the former head of
the Angeles City BLT agency, had died on May 12, 1980. 35 He offered in
evidence Vinluan's death certificate as Exh. J.
Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript of

stenographic notes of the testimony of Carolino Vinluan which was taken on
January 8, 1980 at the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-10759 before the then
Court of First Instance Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. It was marked as Exh.
K said exhibit was part of the record of Criminal Case No. 10759 which was
transmitted to the Regional Trial Court Pampanga. 36
The defense presented only one witness: Felizardo Manalili. A friend of Dava
and his former co-trainee at the Sandoz Philippines, a pharmaceutical firm,
Manalili testified that Dava quested him to secure a driver's license for him
because he had none. Manalili went to the San Fernando office of the Land
Transportation Commission (LTC) where he used to secure own license. At
the LTC branch office, he was "approached" 37 the fixers who roamed around
the compound. When he as them how much it would cost to secure a driver's
license, he told that it would amount to P70 .00. 38 He agreed to pay amount and
gave the fixers the personal data of Dava. 39
After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the license which was inside a plastic
jacket. (Manalili identified the license as Exh. B.) He examined it and found
out that it looked "like a genuine and authentic driver's license" to him. The
license, which opened and unsealed, bore a signature in the portion which
showed the name Romeo Edu and contained all the personal data of Dava.
Because it did not bear the signature of Dava Manalili immediately gave the
license to Dava and told him to sign it immediately. Dava did so in Manalili's
presence. 40
On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a decision 41 finding that the
license in question was "fake or spurious", that was not duly issued by any proper
government licensing age and that the accused directly participated in the
commission of the falsification or caused said falsification. The court took into
account the facts that Dava was "in dire need' of a license because of his work as a
detailman; that he received his genuine license from the court only on December
15, 1982, and that Dava himself personally requested his friend, Manalili, to secure
the license for him. It arrived at the conclusion that since Dava was the possessor
or user of the fake license, he himself was the forger or the one who caused its
forgery or falsification. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Michael T. Dava
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the came of Falsification of a
Public Document, as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences him under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision correecional as minimum, to four (4)
years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum;
and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, plus the costs of this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dava appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, 42 which on
September 30, 1985 affirmed in in toto the decision of the trial court. On February
27, 1986, the appellate court denied Dava's motion for the reconsideration of said
decision finding that no new grounds had been raised therein. Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the courts below on the testimony of
Carolino Vinluan on the ground that being a part of the annulled proceedings
in Criminal Case No. Q-10759, it may not be considered as admissible in
evidence as it cannot qualify as a "testimony at a former trial" under the
provisions of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious. The resolution of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR, expressly annulled
the proceedings had in Criminal Case No. Q-10759 for lack of jurisdiction of
the Quezon City court over the case. That ruling is founded on solid
jurisprudence. We had time and again held that in the absence of proof that
the party raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by estoppel, 43 a
decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is a total nullity. 44 Being worthless
in itself, all the proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. 45 Hence, the
testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in evidence but may well be
considered as totally nonexistent.
With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan out of the way, is there
sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of petitioner for the crime
charged?
The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear
in his driver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of the Pampanga LTC
agency participated" in in-preparation and with having used the said driver's
license knowing that it was falsified. The charges therefore are found on the
provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any
private individual who shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article
171 specifically paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing it to
appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any act proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava
with having knowingly used a false document under the last paragraph of
Article 172.
The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no
driver's license, asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him. Sometime in
November, 1976, Manalili, who used to get his own driver's license in San
Fernando, Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's driver's license No.
2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) agency
in said locality. 46 On January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his license at the said
office by paying the amount of P10.00 for which he was issued official receipt No.
0605870. 47
In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an
official receipt showing that at the previous year the licensee had paid for his
driver's license to any agency of the LTC, and to pay the renewal fee. As long
as the transaction did not involve the issuance of "another form," a driver did
not have to fill up an application form for the renewal of a license. The said
agency would then issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of the
license but the driver's license itself would not be changed. 48
Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with
official receipt No. 864321 49 were presented to the San Fernando LTC agency,
the personnel therein issued official-receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner.
Although the receipt was not personally signed by office registrar Victor Martin but
by his assistant, the receipt 50 was genuine and the amount indicated therein was
actually paid to and collected by the San Fernando agency. 51 The driver's license
itself may not have been issued by said agency 52 but its form was likewise
genuine. However, according to Martin, it was 'not OK' because it "did not emanate"
from his office and "a facsimile was not printed over" his name therein. 53 Moreover,
according to the officer-in-charge of the license Division of the Bureau of Land
Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, non-professional driver's license No.
2706887 in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa "is not registered" in their index card.
54
Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a
spurious one, the evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the actual falsifier.
Unfortunately, however, there are pieces of evidence which prove beyond
reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification and made use of the falsified
driver's license knowing it to be so.
The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other
than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of
Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified
by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any
of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such document (not in
judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage
to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage. 55 Except
for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason doubt in this case.
It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get
him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been
issued a driver's license. 56 Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing on
Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver's license the shortest
time possible to enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was
able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in
securing the subject driver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could
obtain a drivers license in so short a without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as
petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere
desire to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he knew were
not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for the license even if the legal
fee then was only P15.00. 57 As it was in truth petitioner who induced and left
Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and
not petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the
charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in
the commission of said crime.
Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second

driver's license No. 2706887. Having already obtained a driver's license, he
knew that it was not legally possible for him to secure another one.
Otherwise, there would have been no need for him to misrepresent to his
friend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license. But even
with this misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe that
Manalili would be able to secure a driver's license through legal means in
about an hour's time. 58 The patent irregularity in obtaining driver's license No.
2706887 was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious
and prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified
that he himself was surprised when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the
driver's license of Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hours after he had
sought the fixer's assistance. 59 In those days, all plastic jackets emanated from the
LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay in the release of the license
applied for. Under these circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded man" would
say that petitioner did not know that his license was a fake. 60
A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and
172. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document the
moment it is accomplished. 61 Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled
up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of the region of the San
Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the
driver's license became a public document.
The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that
when petitioner was apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in his
possession and it was what he presented Lising to show that he had a
license. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it
is probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12,
1978, petitioner used driver's license No. 2706887.
The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of
damage caused to another person or at least an intent to cause such damage
has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the
principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth proclaimed therein. 62
In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in

People vs. Sendaydiego, 63 should be applied in his favor:
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he
made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the
presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is
especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven
to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection
with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery (U.S. vs. Castillo,
6 Phil. 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 PMI. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil.
28: People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession
of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger
(Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688;
People vs. Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the
Sendaydiego case is not absolute as it is subject to the exception that the
accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in possession of a
false document. 64 His explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly
in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could
not have acted on his own accord without the prodding of petitioner.
We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in

government agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who could do
things fast for the right amount. He is "not necessarily involved in the
commission of forgery or falsification of official documents" and he shares his
fees with "insiders." 65
Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing
agencies. Why they proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our
bureaucracy but also on our own people. While not all fixers are engaged in
illegal activities for some simple serve as "facilitators," they nonetheless
provide sources for exploitation of the unknowing common people who
transact business with the government and for corruption of the gullible
government employees. Their unwanted presence must be dealt with
accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our government agencies
the better for all of us.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby
affirmed. Let a copy of this decision be served on that Department of
Transportation and Communication. Cost against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

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changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and

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[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD

the alleged crime, private respondent claimed that the period of

year period commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the

G.R. No. L-7447

On September 2, 1903, Nicasio Capule, for the purpose of appropriating to

attorney, which the married couple desired, to draw up maliciously and

he expected and intended to become the owner of the land by means of a

statements different from those they made to him in the counterfeited

G.R. No. L-38948

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Concepcion found the defendants Galicano Alon and

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estafa, a long story to the effect that Abordo engaged the

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The assignments of error raise only questions of fact,

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As the additional penalty, the Solicitor-General

chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library

[G.R. No. 2829. September 19, 1906. ]

G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to Mandaluyong Police

investigation revealed that the Driver's License above-mentioned is a Fake and a

Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document was filed

Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then Court of

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered and set

signatories therein who are officials of the Pampanga LTC Agency

Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that he

Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript of

Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second

In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in

We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in

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