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C. S. GILCHRIST vs. E. A. CUDDY, ET AL.

, JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO and


MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA,
G.R. No. 9356. February 18, 1915.
By: A. Halina

FACTS:
Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar and that on the 24th of April he rented it to C.
S. Gilchrist for a week for P125, and it was to be delivered on the 26th of May, the week
beginning that day. A few days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist,
which he had forwarded to him in Manila, saying that he had made other arrangements
with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to these defendants Espejo and his
partner for P350 for the week and the injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these
parties from showing it for the week beginning the 26th of May.
From the findings of fact it is clear that Cuddy, a resident of Manila, was the owner of
the "Zigomar;" that Gilchrist was the owner of a cinematograph theater in Iloilo; that in
accordance with the terms of the contract entered into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the
former leased to the latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his (Gilchrist's) theater for the
week beginning May 26, 1913; and that Cuddy willfully violated his contract in order that
he might accept the appellants' offer of P350 for the film for the same period.
Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He received a letter
from his agents in Manila dated April 26, assuring him that he could not get the film for
about six weeks. The arrangements between Cuddy and the appellants for the
exhibition of the film by the latter on the 26th of May were perfected after April 26, 90
that the six weeks would include and extend beyond May 26. The appellants must
necessarily have known at the time they made their offer to Cuddy that the latter had
booked or contracted the film for six weeks from April 26.
Gilchrist thereupon resorted to the Court of First Instance for the issuance of preliminary
injunction against appellants.
CFI produced an injunction restraining the defendants from exhibiting the film in
question in their theater during the period specified in the contract of Cuddy with
Gilchrist
ISSUES:
1) Whether the injunction was properly granted
2) Whether Cuddy is liable for damages to Gilchrist
HELD:

1) Yes. It is of the opinion that the circumstances justified the issuance of that
injunction in the discretion of the court.
Ratio:
Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact
that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had counted
upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to estimate with any degree of accuracy
the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would be quite
difficult if not impossible. If he allowed the appellants to exhibit the film in Iloilo, it would
be useless for him to exhibit it again, as the desire of the public to witness the
production would have been already satisfied. In this extremity, the appellee applied for
and was granted, as we have indicated, a mandatory injunction against Cuddy requiring
him to deliver the Zigomar to Gilchrist, and a preliminary injunction against the
appellants restraining them from exhibiting that film in their theater during the week he
(Gilchrist) had a right to exhibit it. These injunctions saved the plaintiff harmless from
damages due to the unwarranted interference of the defendants, as well as the difficult
task which would have been set for the court of estimating them in case the appellants
had been allowed to carry out their illegal plans. As to whether or not the mandatory
injunction should have been issued, we are not, as we have said, called upon to
determine.
2) Yes. Cuddy is liable for damages to Gilchrist.
Ratio:
Although the defendants did not, at the time their contract was made, know the identity
of the plaintiff as the person holding the prior contract but did know of the existence of a
contract in favor of someone. In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with
the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit
by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this
fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and
causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they were
liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from
such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the
original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.
Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes
damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair
the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition
precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a
person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is
found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the injured
party may recover for the damage suffered.

One who buys something which he knows has been sold to some other person can be
restrained from using that thing to the prejudice of the person having the prior and better
right.
Chief Justice Wells:"Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of
his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be free from
malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or
loss comes as a result of competition or the exercise of like rights by others, it is
damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is
interfered with
"One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between others, and, for the purpose
of gain to himself induces one of the parties to break it, is liable to the party
injured thereby; and his continued interference may be ground for an injunction
where the injuries resulting will be irreparable."

UE vs. JADER
By: A. Halina
FACTS:
"Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the
first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits '2',
also Exhibit 'H'). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student (Exhibit
'A') and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete
grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits 'H-2', also Exhibit '2') which was
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the
examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted
his grade. It was a grade of five (5).
"In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to
deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The
plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the
Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the
following annotation:
"JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws - x-1-87-88, Practice Court I - Inc., 1-87-88. C-1 to submit
transcript with S.O.
"The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of
Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in
the invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the
candidates. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared
however the following annotation:
'This is a tentative list. Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit 'B-7-A').
"The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E.,
Recto Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was
called, escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the
Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by
Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His
relatives took pictures of the occasion.
"He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and
relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were
pictures taken too during the blow-out.

"He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence
without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit 'G') and
enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Having learned of the
deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination."
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from
the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages,
unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification. The CA awarded moral
damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not
having to take the bar exam.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not UE is liable for the negligence of its professors in its failure to
promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the
latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements of the course
2. Can he claim moral damages?
HELD:
1. YES.
Ratio:
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic
program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and
student services. He must see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of
their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the
latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for
instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the
professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. Considering further, that the
institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education,
it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle
of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Article 19 was
intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide
specifically in statutory law. In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others
will do them no intended injury that others will commit no internal aggressions upon
them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the

ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with
whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith.
The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of
civilized society. Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be
indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless. Educational institutions
are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter
to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a
claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled
with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would
make the erring party liable.
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent
will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern
after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably.
Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a student has to
comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of
requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly
inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into
believing that he had satisfied all requirements of the course. Petitioner cannot pass on
its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of
information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through
whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not
illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury
caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is,
when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse..
2. NO.
Ratio:
While petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's
actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral
damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered
shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not
be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to
verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for
the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his
academic achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how
respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites,
enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon

himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school
records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations do not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are
also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the
prospective examinee must meet.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per
annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The
award of moral damages is DELETED.

CONRADO MAGBANUA and ROSEMARIE MAGBANUA-TABORADA vs. PILAR S.


JUNSAY and JUANITO JACELA
G.R. No. 132659. February 12, 2007
By: A. Halina
FACTS:
Petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in the residence of
complainant and herein respondent Pilar S. Junsay was charged as a co-accused with
the crime of Robbery before the RTC, Branch XLI of Bacolod City by virtue of an
Information, which recites, thus:
That on or about the 18th day of July, 1982, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and with the use of
force upon things by then and there making a hole on the lower portion of the kitchen's
door of the house of the herein offended party, Dra. Pilar S. Junsay, situated at Bata
Subdivision, Bacolod City, through which opening made (sic) them, said accused gained
entrance thereto and once inside the said house, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, rob and carry away with them, assorted jewelries and cash, valued
all in all in the amount of P29,624.00, Pesos, Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the herein offended party in the aforementioned amount. 3
Only petitioner Rosemarie was tried in Criminal Case No. 28. Her co-accused, Ernesto
Fernandez and a certain Gudo, remain at large.
The case for the prosecution relied on an alleged confession made by petitioner
Rosemarie, admitting her participation in the crime of Robbery. The defense contested
the admissibility of the confession, and averred that the same was made under duress.
RTC rendered a Decision acquitting petitioner Rosemarie of the crime of Robbery on
the ground of inadmissibility of the accused confession upon finding that Medical
Certificate and the testimony of the attending physician as well as the Decision of the
NAPOLCOM finding the investigating officers guilty has clearly establish (sic) the fact
that accused was physically maltreated by the investigating officers in an attempt to
force her to confess her participation in the robbery.
Petitioner Rosemarie, assisted by Artemio Taborada, and together with co-petitioner
Conrado Magbanua (Rosemarie's father) filed with the RTC, Bacolod City, a Complaint
for Damages against respondent Pilar, assisted by her husband Vicente Junsay, Ibarra
Lopez, and Juanito Jacela. Respondent Pilar was the employer of petitioner Rosemarie,
while respondents Ibarra and Juanito were members of the police force of Bacolod City,
and assigned at the Police Station in Taculing, Bacolod City alleging that by reason of
respondents' false, malicious, and illegal actuations in filing Criminal Case No. 28 for
Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie, the latter suffered untold pain, shame,

humiliation, worry, and mental anguish, which if assessed in monetary terms will not be
less than P200,000.00. Further, they alleged therein that Conrado, Rosemarie's father,
lost his job and his entire family suffered. They sought moral and exemplary damages,
including attorney's fees and litigation expenses, as well as loss of earnings and
expenses incurred in connection with Rosemarie's defense in Criminal Case No. 28 for
Robbery and for payment of the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the instant
case.
Respondent Pilar filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by the Statute of Limitations, as crystallized in Article 1146 14 of the Civil Code.
From the time the cause of action arose to the filing of the Complaint, four years and
eight months had already lapsed.
RTC issued an Order denying respondents' Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. It found
that the cause of action of petitioners' Complaint was based on malicious prosecution;
hence, the prescriptive period shall be counted from the date of petitioner Rosemarie's
acquittal.
Respondent Pilar filed before the RTC an Answer. Petitioners filed a Reply and Answer
to Counterclaim reiterating the allegation in the Complaint, that respondent Pilar actually
participated in the maltreatment of petitioner Rosemarie, and she cannot deny her
participation as she was always present in the police station during the investigation.
Trial, thereafter, ensued.
The RTC rendered judgment declaring that the prosecution was not prompted by
sinister design to vex and humiliate petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua. The Court of
Appeals similarly found the appeal without merit.
Hence, petitioners come to the succor of this Court via the instant Appeal by Certiorari
to assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC,
that there was no malicious prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether the filing of a criminal case for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie
constituted malicious prosecution and corollary thereto, whether petitioners are entitled
to damages for malicious prosecution.
HELD: NO.
Ratio:
In this jurisdiction, the term "malicious prosecution" has been defined as "an action for
damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein." 38 While generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has
been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the
defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.

The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in
the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly
Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To constitute malicious
prosecution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere
act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution.
This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover
damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to
prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the
defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the
criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor
acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice
an improper or a sinister motive. 41 The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the
filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of
an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.
We shall proceed to determine whether in the prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie for
the crime of Robbery, all four elements were in attendance.
It is not disputed that the first and second elements are present.
The prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of robbery did occur, and
respondents Pilar, Ibarra and Juanito instigated its commencement. On 20 December
1985, the RTC, Branch XLI, Bacolod City, rendered a Decision acquitting Rosemarie
Magbanua on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
On the question of probable cause, this Court has ruled that for purposes of malicious
prosecution, "probable cause" means "such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted." 43 It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. 45
However, anent the question of whether the prosecutor acted without probable cause in
bringing the action against petitioner Rosemarie, we find no reason to depart from the
conclusions reached by the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the filing of Case No. 28
for Robbery was not without probable cause.
The inadmissibility of the aforesaid
admission on the ground that the same was extracted under duress was an evidentiary
matter, which does not detract from the fact that based on petitioner Rosemarie's
admission, there was reason for the respondents to believe that the suit was not
unfounded, and that the crime was committed.
Finally, in an action to recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be
established that the prosecution was impelled by legal malice. There is necessity of

proof that the suit was so patently malicious as to warrant the award of damages under
Articles 19 to 21, 48 of the Civil Code, or that the suit was grounded on malice or bad
faith. Moreover, it is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution, for the law would not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate.
Applying the rule to the case at bar, we affirm the findings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that there was no proof of a sinister design on the part of the respondents to
vex or humiliate petitioner Rosemarie by instituting the criminal case against her and
her co-accused. Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her valuable belongings can only
be expected to bring the matter to the authorities. There can be no evil motive that
should be attributed to one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal
proceedings. The proscription against the imposition of penalty on the right to litigate
must not be violated. Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious
prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. There was no other explanation or motive as to why
respondents would institute baseless prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie. No evidence
was shown that there was bad blood between respondent Pilar and petitioner
Rosemarie prior to the supposed robbery.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The Decision, dated 26 January 1998, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51750, which affirmed in toto the Decision, dated
25 July 1995, of the RTC, Branch 51, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 4361, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

CARMEN L. MADEJA vs. HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON


G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
By: A. Halina

FACTS:
In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR.
EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of
Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the
deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen
L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages.The criminal
case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case
No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross
negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
reads:
"Sec. 3.
Other civil action arising from offenses. In all case not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
(a)
Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." . . .
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New
Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action."
Hence, the instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge
granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action against Dr. Japson may proceed independently
of the criminal action against her.

HELD: YES.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the
applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:
"Sec. 2.
Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely

separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of
Court.)
"Art. 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Civil Code.)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting,
namely:
1.
The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is
manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal
prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code Commission,
thus:
"The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to
enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State
attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative to
habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication of their own
private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a
criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is the
complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned
because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation
for the wrong which peculiarly affects him."
And Tolentino says:
"The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a
criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can
be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is
defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the
injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not
given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended
until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus
independent of the result of the criminal action."
2.
The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries
by consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
"The Article in question uses the words defamation', fraud' and physical injuries.'
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific

provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined
therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic
sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms physical
injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the
Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have
used terms in the same article some in their general and another in its technical
sense. In other words, the term physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily
injury not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are
general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for
physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law,
and this recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when it
approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil
action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for
assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether
the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted
homicide, or even death."
Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not
authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them
merely concurred in the result.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.

CANDANO SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. FLORENTINA J. SUGATA-ON,


respondent.
G.R. No. 163212. March 13, 2007
FACTS:
On March 27, 1996, M/V David Jr., owned by Candano Shipping Lines, sank together
with its cargo in Surigao del Sur. Melquiades Sugata-on employed by Candano
Shipping Lines as third marine engineer in the cargo vessel was one of those missing.
Florentina Sugata-on (respondent and widow of Melquiades Sugata-on), went to the
office of Candano Shipping in Manila to claim the death benefits of her husband but it
refused to pay. Thus, Florentina filed an action before the RTC of Manila. She prayed
that actual, moral, and exemplary damages including attorney's fees, be awarded in her
favor in view of the provision of Art. 1711 NCC.
The RTC decided in favor of Florentina. Candano Shipping filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied.
It then elevated the RTC decision to the CA which affirmed with modification the
judgment of RTC. The award for actual damages was reduced from P998,400 to
P608,400, while the awards for moral and exemplary damages including attorney's fees
were deleted for lack of sufficient basis for their allowance.
In arriving at the sum of P608,400, the CA applied the standard prescribed by Art. 194
of the Labor Code. It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Candano
Shipping in a resolution issued on April 1, 2004. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the formula for fixing the amount of death compensation in Art. 194 of the Labor
Code applies in determining the compensation claimed by the heir of the deceased
employee against the employer under Art. 1711 of the civil code

HELD:
Yes. Petition is denied. CA is affirmed.
The remedy availed by Florentina in filing the claim under the New Civil Code has been
validly recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence. Floresca v. Philex Mining Company
declared that the employees may invoke either the Workmen's Compensation Act or the
provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy

will exclude the other and that the acceptance of the compensation under the remedy
chosen will exclude the other remedy except on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. This doctrinal rule is rooted
on theory that the basis of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is
separate and distinct from the award of damages under the Civil Code.
In this case, Florentina instituted a civil suit for indemnity under the New Civil Code. The
employer shall be liable for the death of personal injury of its employees in the course of
employment as sanctioned by Art. 1711 of the Civil Code. The liability of the employer
for death or personal injury of his employees arose from the contract of employment
entered into between the employer and his employee which is likely imbued with public
interest. Accordingly, when the employee died or was injured in the occasion of
employment, the obligation of the employer automatically attaches. The indemnity may
partake in the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages, as the case may be.
The provisions on damages of the New Civil Code must be transformed into a more
tangible and practical mathematical form, so that the purpose of the law to indemnify the
employee or his heirs for his death or injury occasioned by his employment under article
1711 may be realized. In regard to this, the formula for loss of earning capacity
enunciated in the case of Villa Rey v. Court of Appeals, in computing the amount of
actual damages to be awarded to the claimant under article 1711 of the New Civil Code
is adopted in this case.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED


and the Decision dated 23 May 2003 as well as the Resolution dated 1 April 2004,
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70410, are hereby PARTIALLY
AFFIRMED in so far as it finds petitioner liable to respondent for damages.
Pursuant to the appropriate provisions of the New Civil Code and the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter, petitioner Candano Shipping Lines, Inc., is ORDERED to
pay the amount of P748,800.00, as actual damages, plus 10% of the amount awarded
as attorney's fee plus cost of the suit.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUANITO APATTAD


G.R. No. 193188. August 10, 2011
By: A. Halina

FACTS:
Accused was charged in four (4) separate informations of raping his 10 year-old
daughter, AAA in Cagayan. AAA testified that sometime in 2001, while she was sleeping
with her sisters, the accused pulled and positioned her just below the feet of her
siblings, and right then and there, succeeded in molesting her. AAA was just seven (7)
years old then. It was repeated in 2003 where the accused also threatened to kill her if
she reports the incident to her mother. When AAA finally told her mother on June 13,
2003 that she was being abused by her own father, her mother whipped her for not
telling her about it immediately. Thereafter, they went to the DSWD office in
Peablanca, Cagayan, where AAA was interviewed by DSWD personnel. Afterwards,
they proceeded to the police station where AAA executed a sworn statement narrating
what happened. Dr. Simangan subsequently conducted a physical examination on AAA
and discovered that the latter had a healed hymen laceration at 4 and 7 oclock
positions, and that her vagina admitted the tip of the fifth finger easily. She stated that
the laceration could have been caused by a blunt object.
The accused denied the accusation of rape hurled against him and claimed that his wife
was the one who initiated the criminal complaint against him because she thinks that he
has a mistress.
The trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and rendered its decision
finding the accused guilty of three (3) counts of rape and imposed the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA for each case. Apattad was further ordered to pay AAA the
amount of P150,000.00 Pesos as civil indemnity. Accused is acquitted in one of the
criminal cases for lack of sufficient evidence. The CA affirmed the judgment of
conviction by the trial court with the modification that the civil indemnity awarded should
be P75,000.00 for each count of rape. In addition, moral damages and exemplary
damages in the amounts of P75,000.00 and Php25,000.00 respectively, for each count
of rape were awarded.

ISSUE with regard to DAMAGES: WON the C.A. GRAVELY ERRED IN MODIFYING
THE DAMAGES IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
HELD: NO. As modified, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA for each count of
rape, PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as
exemplary damages.
RATIO: In rape cases, when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim, the imposable
penalty is death. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death
penalty is now prohibited. In lieu of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the RPC.
Consequently, courts can no longer impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to
impose reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the principal consideration for the award of
damages is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its
heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the
penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity for the crime of
rape should be PhP 75,000 racionating that this is not only a reaction to the apathetic
societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity.
Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000 is warranted
without need of pleading or proving them. In rape cases, it is recognized that the
victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape
to warrant per se the award of moral damages.
Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000,
despite the lack of any aggravating circumstances, to deter others from committing
similar acts or for correction for the public good.

MAIN ISSUE: WON THE C.A. GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APATTAD GUILTY
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD: S.C. sustained accused-appellants conviction. The appeal is DENIED. The CA


Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

RATIO: Accused-appellants defenses of alibi and denial cannot prosper. Alibis and
denials are inherently weak defenses. This is understandably so because said defenses
can be easily fabricated by an accused in order to escape criminal liability. An alibi is
evidence negative in nature and self-serving, and, thus, cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
evidence. In the present case, AAA positively identified accused-appellant in her
testimony as the very perpetrator of the crime of rape committed against her. As
correctly observed by the trial court, a distance of three (3) kilometers does not make it
physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed. Calimag himself admitted during cross-examination that the house of
accused-appellant may be reached by jeepney in an hour. Significantly, even if
accused-appellant indeed stayed in Calimags house on the dates that he committed
rape, it was still not physically impossible for accused-appellant to go home and commit
the said crime at the time it was said to have been committed.

After a careful examination of the records of this case, the S.C. is satisfied that
the prosecutions evidence established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. AAA was below twelve (12) years old when the crime was
committed. A copy of AAAs birth certificate to prove her age was duly presented
in evidence by the prosecution, indicating that she was indeed born on October
14, 1994. When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed
narration of how she was sexually molested by her father, which narration is
difficult, if not improbable, for a 10-year-old girl to concoct.
Pertinently, it is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child-victim is given full
weight and credence, considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. The
medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued is veritable
corroborative evidence, which strongly bolster AAAs testimony.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated August
28, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03173 finding accused-appellant Juanito Apattad
guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant
is ordered to pay AAA for each count of rape, PhP75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP75,000
as moral damages, and PhP30,000 as exemplary damages.

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