PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986)
If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes
effect on the said date, subject to the requirement of
publication. The clause unless otherwise provided refers
to the date of effectivity and not the to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. v. RAMOS,
G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004
While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require
its publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation since
the Constitution, being the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, is deemed written in the law.
Hence, the due process clause, which, so Taada held,
mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8
of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which
provides for publication either in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, finds
suppletory application. It is significant to note that E.O. No.
279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on August
3, 1987.
Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988
The term laws do not include decisions of the Supreme
Court because lawyers in the active practice must keep
abreast of decisions, particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated and published in advanced
reports and the SCRA.
Ty v. Cam G.R. NO. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000
The two marriages involved in this case was entered during
the effectivity of the New Civil Code. The Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested
rights.
Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp.,G.R. 30642, April 30,
1985
The application or interpretation placed by the Supreme
Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of its
enactment since the courts application or interpretation
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8, 1985
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657 (1986)

Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging

that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not
only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
embarrassment and affected his business as well as because
other people have come to know of said defamatory words.
There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner
in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message
sent to Dionela.
Gashme Shookat Baksh vs CA,219 SCRA115 (1993)
Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes
the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to article 21 of the
new civil code not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter.
University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7,
2000
A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a
failing grade but was later on prohibited by the said school
to take the bar exams. The negligent act of a professor who
fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not
promptly submitting a students grade, is not only
imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being
his employer.
SPOUSES HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. G.R. No.
179736. June 26, 2013
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of
the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he has the right
to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase
prying into the privacy of anothers residence, therefore,
covers places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on
his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to
residences.
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. JESICHRIS
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014
The concept of unfair competition under Article 28 is very
much broader than that covered by intellectual property
laws. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that unfair
competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right
of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 1

Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961

It is unquestionable that the appellants act in provoking
the abortion of appellees wife, without medical necessity to
warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act,
that cannot be to severely condemned; and the consent of
the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But
the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on record,
have no factual or legal basis.
Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132 (1970)
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable
to it, as explicitly provided under article 40 of the civil code.
Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529 , Feb. 02, 2001 351
SCRA 127
Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the nonexistence of marriage license is enough to prove nonissuance thereof. The records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license.
Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007
531 SCRA 446
Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality
or city to a non-resident invalidates the license. Issuance of
a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance
of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication
are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
validity of the marriage
Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage,
it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day because their cohabitation is not exclusive.
The Court ruled that the cohabitation contemplated under
said provisions must be in the nature of a perfect union
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by
the absence of the marriage contract and characterized by
exclusivity meaning nothird party was involved at anytime
within the 5 years andcontinuity that is unbroken.
Soriano v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958
The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for
exemption from the marriage license. Even if there is failure
on the part of the solemnizing officer to execute the
necessary affidavit, such irregularity will not invalidate the
marriage for the affidavit is not being required of the
parties.
Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 200

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears

no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot
be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he
first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, G.R.
No. 196049, June 26, 2013
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS,
G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013
A marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship is NOT void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent
is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same
Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite
shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2,
for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely
given consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent
must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45
and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30,
2011 646 SCRA 637
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda
was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was
the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989
Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint. The person who initiates the adultery case must
be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001
Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be
recognized in the Philippines. Before a foreign divorce
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 2

decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading

it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005
Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE where his,her spouse is
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having
legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995)
The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic
requirements of psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of the marriage: (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 324 (1997)
In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties
since their marriage on May 22, 1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or
for almost a year. The senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties of sexual cooperation for the procreation
of children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640
SCRA 517
In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex
partner of many military officials. In view of the foregoing,
the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e.,
her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be
convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage
to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO O. DE
GRACIA G.R. No. 171577, February 12, 2014
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less
than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68

of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual

obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 157649,Nov 12, 2012 685
SCRA 16
Here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological
profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of
his psychological incapacity because said expert did not
examine Dominic in person before completing her report
but simply relied on other peoples recollection and opinion
for that purpose. Expert evidence submitted here did not
establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological
incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the
psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the
marriage.
Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000
If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.
VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ G.R. No.
166357, January 14, 2015
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that,
as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Tenebro v. CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA
272
Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of PI is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy. The
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity.
Nollora v. People, G.R. NO.191425 , Sept. 7, 2011 657
SCRA 330
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
states that [i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 3

Executive Order NO. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the

Philippines] shall apply. Thus, regardless of his professed
religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for
the crime of bigamy.
Rep. v. Nolasco, G.R. NO. 94053 , Mar. 17, 1993 220 SCRA
20
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parkers whereabouts is too sketchy
to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that
she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monicas departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British
Embassy, he secured another seamans contract and went
to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to
look for her there.
Valdez v. Republic, G.R. NO.180863 , Sept. 08, 2009 598
SCRA 646
Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh
year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting
October 1982. To retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit well-founded
belief will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her
second marriage, which was valid at the time it was
celebrated.
Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA
560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal
can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code
CELERINA J. SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS, G.R. No.
187061, 08 OCTOBER 2014
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the
judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper
remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has
never been absent.
Ong v. Ong, G.R. NO. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76
Also without merit is the argument of William that since
Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal
separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4)
of the Family Code which provides that legal separation
shall be denied when both parties have given ground for
legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231
SCRA 321

Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent

in a legal separation case amounts to grave abuse of
discretion. In case of non- appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If
there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370
SCRA 414
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of
evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable
conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor
of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647
SCRA 483
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the
name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption.
BOBBY TAN, v. GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL. v. BOBBY TAN,
G.R. No. 172017 / G.R. No. 171904 August 7, 2013
The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code,
that property acquired during marriage is conjugal, does
not apply where there is no showing as to when the
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The
presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved. Moreover, when the property is registered in the
name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when
the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said
spouse. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only
with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence.
There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one
of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
Villegas v. Lingan G.R. NO. 153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526
SCRA 63
Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired
ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the
judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the
right of redemption. And where the redemption is made
under a property regime governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code
provides that property acquired by right of redemption is
the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the
property.
Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508
SCRA 570
The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom
ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 4

obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in

case the property is sold by the owner- spouse.

acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both

the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.

Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201,Dec. 10,

2012 687 SCRA 414
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows
payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife,
Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are
liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have
been covered. No prior liquidation of those assets is
required.

Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996
260 SCRA 221
Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles
102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of
the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared
void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason
of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. The rules set
up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled),
are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses.

MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547

SCRA 246
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso
facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership. While the
declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia
severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal
partnership, the character of the properties acquired before
such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties
until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership.
Espinosa v. Omaa, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1
Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled
that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration
of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation
of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.
The Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is
against public policy.
Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA
178
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
JUAN SEVILLA, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, G.R. No.
202370, September 23, 2013
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as in this case. Under this property regime, property
acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couples joint efforts and
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present case,
Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case
where the ground for nullity of marriage was also
psychological incapacity, we held that the properties

Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351

SCRA 127
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license
San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514
SCRA 294
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil
Code
SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA vs. AURORA MENDOZA
FERMIN G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014
As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in
1985, the applicable provision governing the property
relations of the spouses is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which states that the wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husbands consent. In
Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, a case decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court had the
occasion to rule that the sale of a land belonging to the
conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent
of the husband is voidable. The Supreme Court further ruled
that the view that the disposal by the wife of their conjugal
property without the husbands consent is voidable is
supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that
contracts entered by the husband without the consent of
the wife when such consent is required are annullable at her
instance during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned. In the present case, the fictitious
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 22, 1986,
one month after or specifically on November 25, 1986,
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 5

Leonardo died. Aurora as one of the heirs and the duly

appointed administratrix of Leonardos estate, had the right
therefore to seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale as it
deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their
hereditary rights.
Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542
SCRA 666
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the
scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure
in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it
stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as
well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it
stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the
deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back
Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.
There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family
home as contemplated by law
Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012
663 SCRA 40
The family homes exemption from execution must be set
up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property
at public auction. The petitioners now are barred from
raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later
claiming the said exemption.
Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57 (1997)
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code.
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT, G.R. No.
200169, January 28, 2015
As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form
E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the
Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371
SCRA 360
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not
conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in
an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has
been paid and the amount thereof.
Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009
599 SCRA 58

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the

putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar
has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate
child on the information of a third person.
DE LA CRUZ v. GRACIA, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 200
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone
piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should
be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent
as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, G.R. No.
206248. February 18, 2014
An illegitimate child may use the surname of his father if the
latter has expressly recognized their filiation. However, the
child is under no compulsion to use his fathers surname.
When Antonio recognized Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick
as his sons, the two children had the right to use the
surname of Antonio. However, they were under no
compulsion or mandate to use the same. The law uses the
word may, which dictates that it is merely permissive.
Tonog vs. CA, G.R. NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376 SCRA
523
In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the
said minor as the controlling factor, the appellate court did
not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not
be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust
into a strange environment away from the people and
places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716, Oct. 25,
1995 249 SCRA 447
Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who
have a legal impediment to marry each other, can be
legitimated. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to
know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla,
these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way
be considered legitimate since at the time they were born,
there was an existing valid marriage between respondent
and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA
CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. MARIA SOCORRO M.
CASTRO AND JAYROSE M. CASTRO vs JOSE MARIA JED
LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA
GREGORIO
G.R. NO. 188801, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION
(Leonen, J.)
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was
required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 6

summons should have been effected on the spouse and all

legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights
are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice
as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities
cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim G.R.
NO.168992-93, May 21, 2009 588 SCRA 98
The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to
a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is
a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being
the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required.
Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA
357
A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory
despite pendency of appeal.
De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA
176
Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation
of the child and the putative father, made by the mother, is
valid. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation
and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant
and the parent, however, paternity and filiation or the lack
of the same is a relationship that must be judicially
established and it is for the court to declare its existence or
absence.
Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. NO. 144763, Sept. 3, 2002
388 SCRA 296
It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and
should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the
whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not
be subject to the parents say-so or mutual agreement alone.
Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in
fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody
the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by
law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this
matter, becomes imperative.
St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. NO. 143363, Feb.
6, 2002 376 SCRA 473
The liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St.
Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10,
2012 683 SCRA 253
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the
property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or
any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child,

exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or

mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber
the property of the latter.
FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE
D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA
ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, AND
LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO
G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014, EN BANC (Mendoza J.)
The law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife
of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from
her husband and was in the United States when he died has
no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in
effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her
right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her
deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, except
upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
free and voluntary intent to that end.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is
outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes
that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for
the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the
intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest
in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of
those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes
them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of
burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even
transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead
may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right.
There can be no doubt that persons having this right may
recover the corpse from third persons.
FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, G.R.
No. 175540, 14 April 2014
There can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable
means to disseminate notifications intended to reach the
relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains
pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for notices to
reach the relatives of the deceased.
PROPERTY
Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. NO. 155076, Jan. 13, 2009
International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient
Card holders, the telecommunication services provided by
PLDT and its business of providing said services are not
personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code. The construction by the respondents of Article 308 of
the said Code to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid
international telephone calls, telecommunication services
and business is contrary to the letter and intent of the law.
Tsai vs. CA, 366 SCRA 324
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 7

In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract

styled as Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage,
instead of just Real Estate Mortgage if indeed their
intention is to treat all properties included therein as
immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate
LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT. These facts, taken
together, evince the conclusion that the parties intention is
to treat these units of machinery as chattels.
Caltex Phils., Inc., vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982
SC held that the said equipment and machinery, as
appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by
Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which
fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for
without them the gas station would be useless, and which
have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas
station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements
and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law
and the Real Property Tax Code.
MERALCO vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982
While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land,
they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on
the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the
oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been
installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles
for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for
its operations.
Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514
Properties of public dominion is not susceptible to private
appropriation and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription and thus they cannot be registered under the
Land Registration Law and be the subject of a torrents title.
Manila International Airport Authority vs CA, 495 SCRA
591
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not
subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public
or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for
being contrary to public policy.
German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA
495 (1989)
The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time
of actual or threatened dispossession, and not when
possession has already been lost.
Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM NO. P072399, Jun. 18,
2008
When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or
mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he
acquires physical custody only and does not become vested
with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder
is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its
owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his superior
or his officemates that he found something.

Mercado v. CA, 162 SCRA 75, 85 1988

To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a
person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e., it is
essential that he be a possessor in concept of owner and
that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243, 252 (2005)
The right of retention is considered as one of the measures
devised by the law for the protection of builders in good
faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt
reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain
in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the
person who defeated him in the case for possession of the
property) for those necessary expenses and useful
improvements made by him on the things possessed.
BPI v. SANCHEZES, G.R. No. 179518, November 11, 2014
The Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the
property with the townhouses and other buildings and
improvements that may be thereon without indemnifying
TSEI or the intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the
intervenors to demolish what has been built on the
property at the expense of TSEI or the intervenors; or (3)
ask the intervenors to pay the price of the land. As such, the
Sanchezes must choose from among these options within
thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision. Should the
Sanchezes opt to ask from the intervenors the value of the
land, the case shall be remanded to the RTC for the sole
purpose of determining the fair market value of the lot at
the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988.
Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814 May 26,
1995
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the
case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision
therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy
considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid
a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties,
including the two courts below, in the main agree that
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and
indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they
differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996)
Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping
of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion was
man-made, hence, Art. 457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject
land is part of the public domain.
Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989)
The accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person
through prescription.
Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)
There need be no act on their part to subject the old river
bed to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from
the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident,
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 8

without need of any formal act of acquisition. Such

abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private ownership of
the owner of the land through which the new river bed
passes even without any formal act of his will and any
unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a
trespasser.

the exclusion of the seller/co-owner A party who is not the

co-owner of a land subject of a compromise agreement
cannot claim that he was defrauded when the parties in the
compromise agreement entered into the same. As a third
party to the agreement, he is not indispensable for the
agreement to materialize.

Bahais v. Pascual, G.R. 169272,July 11, 2012

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2)
indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1)
that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is
claimed to be casting cloud on his title. In this case, an action
to quiet title is not the proper remedy because petitioner no
longer had any legal or equitable title to or interest in the
lots. The petitioners status as possessor and owner of the
lots had been settled in the final and executory December 4,
1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR
Secretary and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the
petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership
of the lots.

Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006

One whose interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere
tenant, agent or usufructuary, is not qualified to become a
possessor builder in good faith.

Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20,

2003
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a
trustee for the others, hence, the relationship of such coowner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
attribute.
Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, G.R. NO. 151016, Aug. 06, 2008
Any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way,
prejudice the heirs who did not join, even if such case was
actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an
action for recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent
action by a co- heir who did not join the earlier case should
not be barred by prior judgment.
Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron,
G.R. No. 179011. April 15, 2013
In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties
in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil
Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may
bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of coowned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of
the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They
are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
afforded in the suit even without their participation, since
the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all
co-owners.
VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y.
GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y.
GOCHAN v. CHARLES MANCAO, G.R. No. 182314,
November 13, 2013
Only the redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the
indispensable parties in an action for legal redemption, to

Bunyi v. Factor, G.R. NO. 172547, Jun. 30, 2009 591 SCRA
350
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have
actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the
property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only
by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right,
possession can be acquired by juridical acts.
EDCA Publ. V. Santos, G.R. NO. 80298, Apr. 26, 1990 184
SCRA 614
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz
acquired ownership over the books which he could then
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between
him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books.
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON
DUMADAG, ET. AL., G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013
Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded
upon. The length of time that they may have physically
occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have
entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their
possession is presumed to have retained the same character
throughout their occupancy.
Quintanilla v. Abangan, G.R. NO. 160613, Feb.12, 2008
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of
strong materials to provide ingress and egress to a public
highway and another right of way which although longer
will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second
alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis
for setting up a compulsory easement.
Reyes v. Ramos, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should not be
imposed.
Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, et. al, G.R. No. L-3422
Jun. 13, 1952
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 9

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract

children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of
drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed
so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger;
and if the owner of private property creates an artificial
pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of
nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable
because of having created an attractive nuisance.
Gancayco v. Quezon City, G.R. NO. 177807,Oct 11, 2011
The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely
affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an
ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not
necessarily make that structure a nuisance.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. ARSENIO ALDECOA,
ET. AL., G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in
themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive
to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and
property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the
complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions
in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be
deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The
determining factor when noise alone is the cause of
complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise
is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort
and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities,
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.
If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and
unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of
fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions.
There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise
constitutes a nuisance.
Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18,
2000
The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or (b) where the formal notice
of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is either
not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation,
and in the separate acceptance.
Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804,
January 24, 2011
When the donor used the words that the gift does not pass
title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true
owner of the two aforementioned parcels] the donor
meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the
possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her
death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of
them freely.
Quijada vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126444, Dec. 4, 1998
Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must
the donee comply with the condition, the latter remains the
owner so long as he has tried to comply with the condition
within a reasonable period. Only then when the nonfulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought to the

donors knowledge that ownership of the donated

property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic
reversion clause of the deed of donation.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Legarda vs. Saleeby, G.R. NO. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to
quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of
the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at
the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto.
Sta. Lucia vs. Pasig, G.R.NO. 166838, June 15, 2011
While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership
and location, this does not preclude the filing of an action
for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein.
Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not
suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject
properties locations if both the stated and described
locations point to the same area.
Republic vs. Santos, G.R.NO. 180027, July 18, 2012
Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original
proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of
all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims
of private title to land, save those acquired from native title,
must be traced from some grant, whether express or
implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land
had been let into private ownership through the States
imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State.
SPOUSES BERNADETTE AND RODULFO VILBAR v.
ANGELITO L. OPINION, G.R. No. 176043. January 15,
2014
Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. Since the spouses Vilbar did not cause the
transfer of the certificate title in their name, or at the very
least, annotate or register such sale in the original title in
the name of Dulos Realty, have no indefeasible and
incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their claim.
LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200894, 10 November 2014
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further
clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of
title on the basis of possession, while the latter entitles the
applicant to the registration of his property on the basis of
prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended
under the aegis of the P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act
(PLA) while under the second mode is made available both
by P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil Code. Moreover, under
Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No.
1472, the 30-year period is in relation to possession
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 10

without regard to the Civil Code, while under Section 14(2)

of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113
in relation to Article 1137.
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds 79 Phil 461
Aliens mat not acquire private or public agricultural lands.
Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals G.R. NO. 113472, Dec.
20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent
upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. Private land may be transferred or only to
individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the
public domain.
Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465
A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and
Acme, 146 SCRA 509
The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is
qualified is the time the right to own it is acquired and not
the time to register ownership.
Tan vs. Republic April 16, 2012
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it
to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMETERIA G.
LUALHATI G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not,
by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Spouses Vallido v. Spouses Pono, et al., G.R. No. 200173.
April 15, 2013

It is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a

registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it
is also a firmly settled rule that where there are
circumstances which would put a party on guard and
prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being
sold to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants
thereon, it is expected from the purchaser of a valued piece
of land to inquire first into the status or nature of
possession of the occupants. The burden of proving good
faith lies with the second buyer (petitioners herein) which
is not discharged by simply invoking the ordinary
presumption of good faith. After an assiduous assessment
of the evidentiary records, this Court holds that the
petitioners are NOT buyers in good faith as they failed to
discharge their burden of proof.
SPOUSE PERALTA v. ABALON, G.R. No. 183448, June 30,
2014
The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null
and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to
Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the
registration of titles from the forger to the innocent
purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is that
there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This
means that all the transfers starting from the original
rightful owner to the innocent holder for value and that
includes the transfer to the forger must be duly registered,
and the title must be properly issued to the transferee.
Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
public domain begin to run.
Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 606 SCRA 444
Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of petitioner
private persons or entities.
Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 193443 G.R. No. 193443, April
16, 2012
There must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that
the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without
such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription.
For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up
acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial
that the status of the property as patrimonial be first
established. Furthermore, the period of possession
preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial
cannot be considered in determining the completion of the
prescriptive period.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. SPOUSES JOSE
AND MAGDALENA YBAEZ G.R. No. 161380, 21 April
2014
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 11

Although a deed or instrument affecting unregistered lands

would be valid only between the parties thereto, third
parties would also be affected by the registered deed or
instrument on the theory of constructive notice once it was
further registered in accordance with Section 194, i.e., the
deed or instrument was written or inscribed in the day book
and the register book for unregistered lands in the Office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
realty was located.
The only exception to the rule on constructive notice by
registration of the deed or instrument affecting
unregistered realty exists in favor of a third party with a
better right. This exception is provided in Section 194, as
amended by Act No. 3344, to the effect that the registration
shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party
with a better right; and in paragraph (b) of Section 113 of
P.D. No. 1529, to the effect that any recording made under
this section shall be without prejudice to a third party with
a better right.
WILLS AND SUCCESSION
In the matter of the Testate Estate of Edward
Christensen, G.R. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Whether or not, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
disposition should be governed by Philippine Law, when
the national law of the testator refers back to the Philippine
Law. Edward is domiciled in the Philippines hence,
Philippine court must apply its own laws which makes
natural children legally acknowledge as forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.
Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.NO. 82027, Mar. 29, 1990
183 SCRA 755
A will has been defined as a personal, solemn, revocable
and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his
property and rights and declares or complies with duties to
take effect after his death.
Cayatenao vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 524
The law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law of
Pennsylvania, USA which is the national law of the
decedent. It is settled that as regards to the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the wills as provided for by article 16
and 1039 of the New Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply.
Parish Priest of Victoria vs. Rigor, 89 SCRA 483
The issue in this case is whether or not a male relative
referred in the will should include those who are born after
the testators death. To construe it as referring to the
nearest male relative at any time after his death would
render the provisions difficult to apply and create
uncertainty as to the disposition of the estate.
De Borja vs De Borja, G.R. No, L-28040, August 18, 1972
There is no legal bar to a successor to dispose his or her
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent

of such share is not determined until the subsequent

liquidation of the estate. The effect of such alienation is to
be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the
vendor heir.
Bonilla vs Leon Barcena, G.R. L-41715, June 18, 1976
The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests
in them even before the judicial declaration of their being
declared as heirs. When Fortunata died, her claim or right
to the parcel of land in litigation in civil case number 856
was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to
her heirs upon her death.
Borromeo-Herrera vs Borromeo, 152 SCRA 171
The properties included in an existing inheritance cannot
be the subject of a contract. The heirs acquire a right to
succession from the moment of death of the decedent. In
this case, the purported waiver of hereditary rights
cannot be considered effective.
Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R.NO. 174489, April, 11, 2012
It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be
disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare
against its due execution; neither does it have to be
necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses
declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that
the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily
from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify,
that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner
required by law.
Echavez vs. Dozen Cons., G.R.NO. 192916, Oct. 11, 2010
An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph
of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required
avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause
can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the
Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Lopez v. Lopez, G.R.NO. 189984, Nov. 12, 2012
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number
of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose
of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages.
Azuela v. CA, 487 SCRA 119
The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify,
among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page
they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand,
the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the
attestation clause itself.
Lee v. Tambago, 544 SCRA 393
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a
deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the
notary public that the same is his or her own free act and
deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 12

purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his

demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in
the manner that he intends it to be done.
Suroza vs. Honrado, 110 SCRA 388
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that
English was a language understood and known to the
testatrix but in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that
the will was read to the testatrix and translated into
Filipino language. That could only mean that the will was
written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix
and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision
of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
Garcia vs. Vasquez, 32 SCRA 489
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to
the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will
himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if
they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of
the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are
properly communicated to and understood by the
handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of
his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will
should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two
different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within
the range of his (the testators) other senses.
Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr., 226 SCRA 348
This Court has held in a number of occasions that
substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of
the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended
to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery
but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to
destroy the testamentary privilege.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testators will
and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three
instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and
subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being
asked, that the contents read corresponded with his
instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and
petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will
and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect
to the Huling Habilin, the day of the execution was not the
first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and
authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted
testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already
acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with
his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when
Atty. Rino went to the testators residence precisely for the
purpose of securing his conformity to the draft.
Javellana vs. Ledesma GR. No. L-7179, 97 Phil 258

The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his

certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by
the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment
itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate
execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her
witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments
should be completed without interruption.
Cruz vs. Villasor NO.L-32213, 54 SCRA 31
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness
since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will. This cannot be done because he cannot split
his personality into two so that one will appear before the
other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the
will.
Caneda vs. CA, 222 SCRA 781
The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be
revoked or relied on by respondents since it presupposes
that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or
supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters
apparent therefrom which would provide the data not
expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may
necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not
stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually
complied within the execution of the will.
Lopez v. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209
The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written cannot be deemed
substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages
including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through
the presentation of evidence aliunde.
Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394
The issue in this case whether the will acknowledged by
the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary
public acting outside the place of his commission satisfies
the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power to
perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any
notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force
and effect.
Celada v. Abena, 556 SCRA 569
While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the
will, error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the
attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject
will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is
consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a
sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of
some of the pages.
Rodelas vs. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16
The photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 13

authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be

determined by the probate court.
Codoy vs. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333
The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have
ruled that shall in a statute commonly denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall,
when used in a statute is mandatory.
Ajero vs. CA, 236 SCRA 488
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations
or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will
or on testators signature, their presence does not
invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only
result in disallowance of such changes.
Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237
To state that the Will as first written should be given
efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the
testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required
by law by affixing her full signature.
Roxas vs. De Jesus, 134 SCRA 245
As a general rule, the date in a holographic Will should
include the day, month, and year of its execution. However,
when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud,
bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the
authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date FEB.,61 appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of
the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
Labrador vs. CA, 184 SCRA 170
The law does not specify a particular location where the
date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are
that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of
the testator.
Seangio v. Reyes, 508 SCRA 172
Holographic wills being usually prepared by one who is not
learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should
be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator.
Palaganas v. Palaganas, 2011 640 SCRA 538
A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from
that probate where the will is presented for the first time
before a competent court.
Vda.De Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills
either for the testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit
of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818).

In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed

separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the
same provisions and pertain to property which in all
probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations
dictate their joint probate.
Casiano vs CA 158 SCRA 451
Revocation under this condition to be effective must have
complied with the two requirements: the overt act as
mentioned under the law; the intent to revoke on the part
of the testator. The document or paper burned by one of the
witnesses was not satisfactorily established to be the will at
all, much less the will of Adriana.
Adriana Maloto vs. CA, 158 SCRA 451
For one, the document or papers burned by Adrianas maid,
Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at
all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the
burning was not proven to have been done under the
express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not
in her presence.
Gago vs. Mamuyac NO. L-26317, 49 Phil 902
Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been
in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the
presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence,
that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had
ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his
death. It will not be presumed that such will has been
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or
authority of the testator.
Seangio v. Reyes, 2006 508 SCRA 172
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code
requires that the same must be effected through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were
stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that
the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the
matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of
a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Molo vs. Molo NO. L- 2538, 90 Phil 37
The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose
validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the nonfulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence prevents
the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make
at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not
render the destruction conditional.
Gan vs Yap, 104 Phil. 509
The loss of the holographic will entail the loss of the only
medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing
witnesses are available to authenticate. In case of
holographic will if oral testimony were admissible only one
man could engineer the fraud this way.
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 14

Rodelas vs Aranza 119 SCRA 16

If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no
other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because
the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the
testator. But a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can
be made with the standard writings of the testator.
Azaola vs Singson 109 Phil. 102
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the
appellant is not required to produce more than one witness.
Even if the genuiness of the holographic will were
contested, article 811 cannot be interpreted as to require
the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify
the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having
denied the probate.
Codoy vs Calugay, 312 SCRA 333
We cannot eliminate the possibility that if the will is
contested, the law requires that three witnesses to declare
that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. A visual
examination of the holographic will convince us that the
strokes are different when compared with other documents
written by the testator.
Gallanosa vs Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to
the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.
It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be
interposed as res judicata with respect to private
respondents complaint.
Roberts vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33
It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the
intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should hearing the two cases.
Nepomuceno vs CA, 139 SCRA 206
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts
area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution
of the extrinsic validity of the will. Where practically
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue.
Aznar vs. Duncan, 17 SCRA 590
To constitute preterition, the omission must be total and
complete, such that nothing must be given to the
compulsory heir.
Acain vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 100
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance.
The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the
legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand
valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.

Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrixs
parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names
altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs
suffer from preterition.
Seangio v. Reyes G.R.NO. 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006 508
SCRA 172
The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as
the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a
witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.
Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso, 354 SCRA 112
Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the
property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his
legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent
respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful
share in said property.
Capitle v. Elbambuena, 509 SCRA 444
Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata
remained his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not
being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving
spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN, ET. AL. v. THE HEIRS OF
SIMEON A.B. MAAMO, SR., G.R. No. 174844, March 20,
2013
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to
assure the return of a reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into
and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. The
reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such
title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable
property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The
transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of
the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked upon the
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the
reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor.
Sienes vs. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was,
therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would
definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation,
only if the vendor died without being survived by any
person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much
as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive,
the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale
made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal
effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 15

Gonzales vs. CFI, 104 SCRA 479

Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her
sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she
had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
Vizconde v. CA, 286 SCRA 217
Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael, in fact,
it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more
than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even
assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated
collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela
property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael.
Palacios vs Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704
The word degree means generation and the present code
has obviously followed this interpretation by providing that
the substitution shall not go beyond one degree from the
heir originally instituted. The code thus clearly indicates
that the second heir must be related to and one generation
from the first heir.
Crisologo vs Singzon, 49 SCRA 491
In fideicommissary substitution clearly impose an
obligation upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to
another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him,
upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event.
Rosales vs Rosales, 148 SCRA 69
The daughter-in-law is not an intestate heir of her spouses
parents. There is no provision in the civil code which states
that a widow is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.
Delos Santos vs Dela Cruz, 37 SCRA 555
In an intestate succession, a grandniece of the deceased
cannot participate in the inheritance with the surviving
nieces and nephews because the existence of the latter
excluded the more distant relatives. In the collateral line,
the right of representation does not go beyond the children
of brothers and sisters.
Corpuz vs Corpuz, 85 SCRA 567
Since, Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child or was
illegitimate and since Juanita was the legitimate child of
Tomas, himself was a legitimate child, appellant Tomas has
no cause of action to recovery of the supposed hereditary
share of his daughter, Juanita as a legal heir, in Yangcos
estate.
Santillon vs Mirandan, 14 SCRA 563
If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the
spouse since they shall equally, one-half of the estate goes
to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse.
Although the law refers to children or descendants, the rule
in the statutory construction that the plural can be
understood to include the singular.

Bacayo vs Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986

A decedents uncle and aunt may not succeed intestate so
long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are
willing and qualified to succeed. In this case, the nephews
and nieces were not inheriting by right of representation
because they only do so if they concur with the brothers and
sisters of the decedent.
Bagunu vs. Piedad, 347 SCRA 571
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives
nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more
distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. In the collateral line, the right of
representation may only take place in favor of the children
of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children
survive with their uncles or aunts.
Sayson vs. CA, 205 SCRA 321
The relationship created by the adoption is between only
the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party.
Corpus vs. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567
In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated
children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and
sisters in accordance with the rules established for
legitimate brothers and sisters. Hence, Teodoro R.
Yangcos half brothers on the Corpus side, who were
legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the
rules of intestacy.
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 621 SCRA 142
Petitioners argument that the successional bar between the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent does not
apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate
the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the
decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her
husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated
and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally
adopted by decedents husband, the original oppositor to
respondents petition for letters of administration.
Diaz vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 645
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code
that the phrase legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
as the word relative includes all the kindred of the person
spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement
of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate
heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa
Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero.
Diaz vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 427
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code,
is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons
of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have
PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 16

a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a

general one.
Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA, 284 SCRA 511
A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may
inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the
decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood
relative is immaterial.
Delos Santos vs Ferraris-Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986
Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation unless concurring with the brothers or
sisters of the deceased which is provided in article 975
when children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive with their uncles and aunts but if they
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 17