common towards the end of the nineteenth century.

The heat death refers to the pre

diction that eventually,
because of random mixing and shuffling of molecules, the temperature of the univ
erse would become
uniform, and therefore, at least on the large scale, nothing could happen, so th
at the universe would be
dead . However, long before this comes about, it is evidently quite possible and in
deed very likely that
qualitatively new developments reflecting the inexhaustible and infinite charact
er of the universal process
of becoming will have invalidated predictions of the type described above. For e
xample, just as there may
have been a time before molecules, atoms, electrons, and protons existed, the fu
rther evolution of the
universe could also lead to a new time in which they cease to exist, and are rep
laced by something else
again. And new sources of energy coming from the infinite process of becoming ma
y be made available
even if atoms, molecules, etc., continue to exist. Thus, in the last century onl
y mechanical, chemical,
thermal electrical, luminous, and gravitational energy were known. Now we know o
f nuclear energy, which
constitutes a much larger reservoir. But the infinite substructure of matter ver
y probably contains energies
that are as far beyond nuclear energies as nuclear energies are beyond chemical
energies. Indeed, there is
already some evidence in favour of this idea. Thus, if one computes the zero poin
t energy due to quantummechanical fluctuations in even one cubic centimetre of sp
ace, one comes out with something of the order of
1038 ergs, which is equal to that which would be liberated by the fission of abo
ut 1010 tons of uranium.* Of
course, this energy provides a constant background that is not available at our
level under present
conditions. But as the conditions in the universe change, a part of it might be
made available at our level.
Not only is the qualitatively and quantitatively infinite universal process of b
ecoming too complex even
to reverse itself or to come to some kind of final equilibrism, but it also cann
ot go in a cycle. For even if the
laws applying in certain contexts and conditions should be consistent with a cyc
lical universe, such laws
will always leave out an infinity of new kinds of factors, which will in the lon
g run become important as
conditions change sufficiently. Unless these new factors are exactly coordinated
with those already existing
in more limited contexts and sets of conditions, they will eventually break the
cycle and bring in
fundamental qualitative changes. But because of their relative and approximate a
utonomy, these factors
* Of course, this may not be the only reason or even the main reason for the obs
erved irreversibility in nature, but in any
case, for this reason alone, irreversibility would follow.
MORE GENERAL CONCEPT OF NATURAL LAW 111
would not in general be coordinated in such a way. Hence a cyclical behaviour wo
uld also be inconsistent with
the character of the universe that we have been grooming here.
In conclusion, then, the notion of the qualitative infinity of nature implies th
at the development of the
universe in time will lead to an inexhaustible diversity of new things.
12.

ABSOLUTE VERSUS RELATIVE TRUTH THE NATURE OF OBJECTIVE

REALITY
We shall now sum up the ideas developed in this chapter, and indeed throughout t
he whole book in terms of
a treatment of the implications of the nature of the qualitative infinity of nat
ure, with regard to the problems
of the absolute v. the relative character of truth, and of what, in the framewor
k of this point of view, is meant
by the concept of objective reality.
To begin with, let us recall that we are led to understand nature in terms of an
inexhaustible diversity and
multiplicity of things, all of them reciprocally related and all of them necessa
rily taking part in the process
of becoming, in which exist an unlimited number of relatively autonomous and con
tradictory kinds of
motions. As a result no particular kind of thing can be more than an abstraction
from this process, an
abstraction that is valid within a certain degree of approximation, in definite
ranges of conditions, within a
limited context, and over a characteristic period of time. Such an abstraction e
vidently cannot represent an
absolute truth; for to do this it would have to be valid without approximation,
unconditionally, in all
possible contexts, and for all time. Hence, any particular theory will constitut
e an approximate, conditional,
and relative truth.
We may then ask the question, Does the fact that any given theory can only be app
roximately,
conditionally, and relatively true mean that there is no objective reality? To s
ee that this is not so, it is only
necessary to ask the further question of whether the behaviour of things is arbi
trary. For example, would it
be possible for us to choose the natural laws holding within a given degree of a
pproximation and in a
particular set of conditions at will, in accordance with our tastes, or with wha
t we feel would be helpful for
us in the solution of various kinds of practical problems? The fact that we cann
ot actually do this shows that
these laws have an objective content, in the sense that they represent some kind
of necessity that is
independent of our wills and of the way in which we think about things. This doe
s not mean that we cannot,
in general, make our own choices as to what we will or will not do. But unless t
hese choices are guided by
concepts that correctly reflect the necessary relationships that exist in nature
, the consequences of our
actions will not in general be what we chose, but rather something different, an
d something that is quite
often what we would have chosen not to aim for if only we had known what was rea
lly going to come out
of our actions.*
It is true, of course, that the same natural laws can often be treated with the
aid of a series of very
different kinds of conceptual abstractions. Thus, in the domain of classical phy
sics, we could equally well work
with the abstractions that are appropriate to classical mechanics (e.g. particle
s following orbits denned by
definite laws), or we could ut