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Kritik List

Table of Contents
Kritik List
Wendy Brown Kritik
Dada Kritik
Schlag Kritik
Gur-Zeev Kritik
Ehrenfeld Tech Kritik
Masses Framework
Blue Crayons
Vampiricism Kritik
Cruel Optimism
Strategy Kritik
Tuck and Yang Kritik


Wendy Brown Kritik

Identity politics are parasitically attached to the very oppression that they try to
overcome. Formulating politics in terms of identity and suffering turns their argument
because identity itself is ontologically and psychologically dependent on suffering and
evil. Politics becomes revenge against the agents of suffering rather than creating
political spaces in which suffering can be overcome.
Despite all aspirations to radicality, identity politics remains mired in a thoroughly
liberal, modernist conception of the subject: that the essence of one is basically free
and historical accident sometimes intrudes upon that freedom, that the Good derives
from actualizing this freedom, that this freedom is an exercise of our essential natures
rather than politically contingent accidents of power.
Debate exacerbates these problems: the ballot writes suffering into identity and
institutionalizes identity politics dependence on suffering. Because debate already
occurs against the backdrop of oppression, privilege, and suffering, the ballot can only
ever be a vehicle for revenge.
Brown 1995 Wendy, Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, States of Injury, pp. 66-74
Liberalism contains from its inception a generalized incitement to what Nietzsche terms
ressentiment, the
is reiterated in the investments of late modern democracys primary oppositional
political formations.

Dada Kritik
DADA is unDADA and Truth is unTruth only accepting DADA
can we accept and reject truth
Tzara 18 (Tristan, Dada Manifesto 1918, 1918, twice convicted sexual
"Philosophy is the question... fill the vessel"
Philosophy is the question: from which side shall we look at life, God, the idea or other phenomena. Everything one
looks at is false. I do not consider the relative result more important than the choice between cake and cherries after
dinner. The system of quickly looking at the other side of a thing in order to impose your opinion indirectly is called
dialectics, in other words, haggling over the spirit of fried potatoes while dancing method around it. If I cry out:
Ideal, ideal, ideal, Knowledge, knowledge, knowledge, Boomboom, boomboom, boomboom, I have given a pretty
faithful version of progress, law, morality and all other fine qualities that various highly intelligent men have
discussed in so many books, only to conclude that after all everyone dances to his own personal boomboom, and
that the writ er is entitled to his Tzara, Dada Manifesto 1918 boomboom: the satisfaction of pathological curiosity
a private bell for inexplicable needs; a bath; pecuniary difficulties; a stomach with repercussions in tile; the authority
of the mystic wand formulated as the bouquet of a phantom orchestra made up of silent fiddle bows greased with
filters made of chicken manure. With the blue eye-glasses of an angel they have excavated the inner life for a dimes
worth of unanimous gratitude. If all of them are right and if all pills are Pink Pills, let us try for once not to be right.
Some people think they can explain rationally, by thought, what they think. But that is extremely relative.
Psychoanalysis is a dangerous disease, it puts to sleep the anti-objective impulses of man and systematizes the
bourgeoisie. There is no ultimate Truth. The dialectic is an amusing mechanism which guides us / in a banal kind of
way / to the opinions we had in the first place. Does anyone think that, by a minute refinement of logic, he had
demonstrated the truth and established the correctness of these opinions? Logic imprisoned by the senses is an
organic disease. To this element philosophers always like to add: the power of observation. But actually this
magnificent quality of the mind is the proof of its impotence. We observe, we regard from one or more points of
view, we choose them among the millions that exist. Experience is also a product of chance and individual faculties.
Science disgusts me as soon as it becomes a speculative system, loses its character of utility that is so useless but is
at least individual. I detest greasy objectivity, and harmony, the science that finds everything in order. Carry on, my
children, humanity . . . Science says we are the servants of nature: everything is in order, make love and bash your
brains in. Carry on, my children, humanity, kind bourgeois and journalist virgins . . .I am against systems, the most
acceptable system is on principle to have none. To complete oneself, to perfect oneself in one's own littleness, to fill
the vessel


NEGATE THE RESOLUTION. We are the only side on your ballot
as the aff makes their speech time irrelevant. As the judge,
your only choice in this round is voting negative
Flake 19 (Otto, Thoughts, 1919, Otto can dance if he wants to, he can leave
his friends behind)
"The prerequisite for... are capable of."


COD 19 (Central Office of Dadaism, Put Your Money in DADA, 1919, the COD
knows the way of the universe)

"dada is the... money in Dada"

Imagining a different world is the key prerequisite to being able to effectively

change it Suesss permissive language and nonsense images disrupt containment
policies and Cold War paranoia by using imagination to break through dominant
systems of language and knowledge.
Nel 99 (Philip, PhD @ Vanderbilt, Prof @ Kansas State, Dada Knows Best: Growing
up "Surreal" with Dr. Seuss, Children's Literature, Volume 27, 1999, pgs. 150-184,
Given Seuss's challenges to common sense,wrote in a letter to Seuss, "Dr. Seuss,
you have an imagination with a long tail" (Cott 18).
This ability to imagine a happy ending in spite of an uncertain future is critical to
The Butter Battles questioning the logic of mutually assured destruction. Only by
using absurdity to reveal the irrationality of existing nuclear policies can we
encourage readers to create new solutions to the problem of nuclear arms
Nel 99 (Philip, PhD @ Vanderbilt, Prof @ Kansas State, Dada Knows Best: Growing
up "Surreal" with Dr. Seuss, Children's Literature, Volume 27, 1999, pgs. 150-184,
Although the Times reviewer was correct in saying that The Butter Battleusing
their imaginations as a source of strength.

Schlag Kritik
There is no reason to vote affirmative: They cannot articulate any linkage between
their prescriptions and practical, worldly effects
Schlag 90
(Professor of Law at University of Colorade, 1990, Pireer, Stanford Law Review,
November, Page Lexis)
In fact... advice into effect.
Their conception of communication is normative - the affirmative view language as
a neutral conduit for thought, which neglects that much of language is ineffective
Schlag 90
(Professor of Law at University of Colorade, 1990, Pireer, Stanford Law Review,
November, Page Lexis)
One answer is... in constructing communication.
Their description of the status quo presupposes a rational, autonomous subject that
not only describes the bureaucracy, but also our agency to act as empowered
cartersian egos - in reality, these subject positions do not exist
Schlag 91
(Pierre, Colorado Law Professor, 139 U. PA REV. 801, April)
For these legal thinkers... the legal academy practice.
Their rhetorical performance shields us for responsibility for our own contributions
to material pain and suffering
Delgado 91
(Richard, Colorado Law Professor, 139 PA L. REV. 933 April)
But what is the cash value... has been faced with subsistence claims

Gur-Zeev Kritik
Their framework for debate is mired in totalitarian ideologythe privileging of
oppressed voices over and against that of oppressors buys into a dangerously
homogenizing world view which authorizes genocidal violence against all world
views that are not sufficiently liberatory.
Gur-Zeev 98 (Ilan, EducationHaifa University, 1998 Toward a Non-Repressive
Critical Pedagogy, http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html)
Freires Critical Pedagogy did not grow out of mere principles but out of his direct
American colleges so as to be successful in the present order of things.
Their elevation of personal experience as intrinsically valid is a dangerous political
gesture their notion of liberation is an illusion which works to stave of real change
Gur-Zeev 98 (Ilan, EducationHaifa University, 1998 Toward a Non-Repressive
Critical Pedagogy, http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html)
From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in
an effort to transcend reality and the present realm of self-evidence.
Their view of power and white privilege as norms that are possessed ignores the
process of the constitution of identity. There is no coherent way for non-blacks to
participate in their movement because they cant just take off their knapsack of
McWhorter 5 (Ladelle McWhorter, University of Richmond, Where do white
people come from? A Foucaultian critique of Whiteness Studies, Philosophy Social
Criticism, 31: 533)
It is true then that, as the Whiteness Studies theorists so often say,
is testament to how deeply and profoundly stuck race theorists typically still are.
Vote negative to affirm the countering of violence of the oppressed from a individual
Vote to negate their strategically oriented praxis. Your ballot can be used as form of
counter-education which is able to challenge their dangerous utopianism while
mounting a more effective challenge to dominant knowledge production regimes
precisely because it refuses to ascribe normative standards for what makes a
strategy emancipatory.
Gur-Zeev 98 (Ilan, EducationHaifa University, 1998 Toward a Non-Repressive
Critical Pedagogy, http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html)
Critical Theory is committed to universal emancipation, in the sense I have
only non-repressive form of hope possible in such an educational project.

AT: Not our Critical Pedagogy
They still linktheir project is still beholden to utopianismonly our strategy of
counter-education which explicitly abandons the normalizing constraints of their
framework can make possible meaningful social change.
Gur-Zeev 98 (Ilan Gur-Zeev, EducationHaifa University, 1998

Toward a Non-Repressive Critical Pedagogy,

Critical Pedagogy has many versions today, as does critical theory.(
to oppose the dogmas and illusions of the hegemonic versions of Critical Pedagogy.
AT Perm
Counter education is mutually exclusive with their projectwe refuse their attempt
to ground our pedagogy in one particular liberatory frameworkthe alternative is
less than the aff.

Biesta 98 (Gert J. J. Biesta, Educational SciencesUtrecht, 1998


FUTURE OF CRITICAL PEDAGOGY, Educational Theory 48:4)
Negative utopianism provides the starting point for Cur-Zeevs nonrepressive form
of critical pedagogy
will be able to stand up and confront the forgetfulness of being.

Ehrenfeld Tech Kritik

The affs worship of a technological solution to the worlds problems creates a view
of humanity as useless and incomplete and makes their solution inevitably fail
Ehrenfeld, prof of biology at Rutgers, 81
[David, professor of biology at Rutgers University, studied at Harvard, Ph.D in
Zoology from University of Florida, known author, The Arrogance of Humanism, Ch.
3 Pg. 84-86]
Here we see a remarkable aberration of perspective. During most of the story,
parents for permission to have their limbs amputated and replaced by bionic
The worship of technology legitimizes violence that culminates in nuclear extinction
Ehrenfeld, prof of biology at Rutgers, 81
[David, professor of biology at Rutgers University, studied at Harvard, Ph.D in
Zoology from University of Florida, known author, The Arrogance of Humanism, Ch.
3 Pg. 103-104]
Despite the prevalence of the machine cult, machines are not particularly easy to
punishment that makes the anger of a righteous God seem welcome by
Thats the only way the atrocities of humanism can be solved
Ehrenfeld, prof of biology at Rutgers, 81
[David, professor of biology at Rutgers University, studied at Harvard, Ph.D in
Zoology from University of Florida, known author, The Arrogance of Humanism, Ch.
7 Pg. 261-262]
To understand that we are not steering this planet in its orbit does not mean
is the best that we can hope for, and it is enough.

Masses Framework
A. Interpretation: The affirmative must defend instrumental passage of a topical policy
B. Violation: The 1AC lacks definitive policy course of action through affirmation of the
C. Reasons to prefer:
1. Preservation of debate
Most real world
Baudrillard 1983 (Jean, In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities or The End of the
Social and Other Essays. Pages 30-48)
The mass realizes that the for any useless and absurd purpose.
Voters for the reasons above

Blue Crayons
Code Blue!
Politics are dead!
Baudrillard 1993 (Transparency of Evil, pages 39-40)
Once upon a time there was much , to the interests of statistical disorder.
Hence, the affs methodology is mistaken in assuming that their emphasis on local
experience can translate into political change. Their aff merely establishes political
redistributions onto others, thus maintaining the system.
Adam Katz, English Instructor at Onodaga Community College. 2000. Postmodernism
and the Politics of Culture. Pg. 146-147
Habermass understanding of undistorted of the cultural studies public intellectual.
In fact, today no one can be expected to be entirely responsible for their own life,
answerable to every aspect of their current situation or social location this is a utopian
hoax! Yet the affirmative continues to call for such impossibility, chaining all under its
method to a truly unheard of form of self-servitude and management
Baudrillard 1993 (Jean, The Transparency of evil: essays on extreme phenomena / Jean
Baudrillard; translated by James Benedict. London: New York: Verso, 1993 Page 165)
We live in a culture nerves or thought: a truly unheard of servitude.
Their over totalizing criticism we must refuse meaning by becoming the masses to
escape the glass coffin the affirmative places around us
Robinson 12 (Andrew, political theorist and activist based in the UK, "Jean Baudrillard:
The Masses" Oct, 26, 2012, ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-12/, Date
Accessed: Apr 16, 2014) IB
The masses arent mystified. It isnt that they economic management, rendering
consumption unmanageable.
The masses are key resistance method we must reject their hipster bullshit to increase
survivability only the sovereign mass can neutralize the system present within the 1AC
Robinson 12 (Andrew, political theorist and activist based in the UK, "Jean Baudrillard:
The Masses" Oct, 26, 2012, ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-12/, Date
Accessed: Apr 16, 2014) IB
In discussing resistance from below, Baudrillards main . as a subject in struggle; and
sometimes as acting unconsciously, without knowing it.
The 1AC attempt at criticism reifies the same systems of the status quo that attempt to
universalize itself. This inevitably fails and does nothing but uphold current dominate
structures. Criticizing the system while trying to make it better only allows for a politic
of self congratulation, we never then change anything about ourselves thus politics
remains the same. Only political passivity spurs actions in these spaces
Baudrillard 05 (The Intelligence of Evil)
It is the secret failing of politics that it is no compete to take power, but that they
should not want it.

Vampiricism Kritik
A) Link - The aff feeds on the suffering of victims, driving the
overly hegemonic forces which underpin the violence that
creates the conditions for their critique in the first place.
B) Impact - The value of those forms of oppression become
their vampiric sustenance
Berlant 1999 (Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of
English, University of Chicago, The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and
Politics in Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat &
Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54)
Ravaged wages and ravaged bodies ... ethically uncontestable legitimating
devices for sustaining the hegemonic field.9

Cruel Optimism
A) Link The affirmatives attachment to a better form of debate
is an object of desire. Even in our calls to change the system,
we always maintain the optimistic thought that things will
change as we get more ballots. This is a relationship of cruel
optimism, hiding the violence done within a debate space
that we continue to see as safe.
B) Impact - Productivity is a fantasy -- the promise of debate
keeps us working within a liberal institution, wasting our time
in this place that cant change the world. The more we think
debate can do something for us, the more the fantasy grows
and the crueler the relationship of optimism will be.
Berlant 2007 Lauren Berlant Cruel Optimism: On Marx, Loss and the Sense 33-36
When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of
promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible
for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a
text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea - whatever. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises
is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an

proximity to the object means proximity

to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so
much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic . That does not mean that
they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration
of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the
object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form . In
optimism, the subject leans toward promises contained within the present moment of the
encounter with their object.'
'Cruel optimism' names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of
possibility whose realisation is discovered either to be impossible , sheer fantasy,
or too possible, and toxic. What's cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that
the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object
or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being,
because whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of the form of it
provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of what it means to
keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a
explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as

condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an

Cruel optimism is the condition of

maintaining an attachment to a problematic object. One more thing: the cruelty of
an optimistic attachment is, I think, usually something an analyst observes about
someone's or some group's attachment to x, since usually that attachment exists without being an
event, or even better, seems to lighten the load for someone /some group.^ But if the cruelty of an
attachment is experienced by someone/some group, even in disavowed fashion, the fear is that the
loss of the object/scene of promising itself will defeat the capacity to have any hope about
object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity.

anything. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to
manage startling situations, as we will see below.
One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less
about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered
whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just

scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others: where cruel optimism
operates, the very vitalising or animating potency of an object/ scene of desire contributes
to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work
of attachment in the first place . This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to
obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about
the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep
one in proximity to the scene of desire /attrition.
as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But

This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as
though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to

To understand
cruel optimism, therefore, one must embark on an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as a way of
thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into an enabling object that
is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect
be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer.

discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other

in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains

superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made
possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I
am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my
transference with her thought.
ones so that,

In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of
apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a
foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head
the entire scene is happening.' But the condition of projected possibility , of a hearing that cannot take place in
the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining)

creates a fake present moment of intersubjectivity in which, nonetheless, a

performance of address can take place. The present moment is made possible by
the fantasy of you, laden with the x qualities I can project onto you, given your convenient absence.
Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but it is actually a
turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something
happen now that realises something in the speaker , makes the speaker more or differently possible,
because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under the condition, and
illusion, that the two is really (in) one.
Apostrophe is thus an indirect, unstable, physically impossible but
phenomenologically vitalising movement of rhetorical animation that permits
subjects to suspend themselves in the optimism of a potential occupation of the
same psychic space of others, the objects of desire who make you possible (by having
some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of

the conditions of
the lush submerging of one consciousness into another require a double
negation: of the speaker's boundaries, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire;
and of the spoken of, who is more or less a powerful mute placeholder providing an
opportunity for the speaker's imagination of her/his/their flourishing.
Of course psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible . It is a
wish, a desire, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot that marks the
indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition - recognition
the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that

a transaction that affirms you without, again, necessarily

feeling good or accurate (it might idealise, it might affirm your monstrosity, it might mirror your desire to
is the misrecognition you can bear,

be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of
impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving
- spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some
traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the
circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson
reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse
performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a
different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work
such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may
have not to become significantly different." In short,

Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism

of attachment, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended
intersubjectivity demand from the reader.
What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal
position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics,

Political depression persists in affective judgments

of the world's intractability - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on - modes of
what might be called detachment that are really not detached at all but
constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" The politically depressed
position is manifested in the problem of the difficulty of detaching from
life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work,
and which indeed make obstacles to the desires that animate them; my archive
aesthetics, and projections of political depression.

tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not
traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast."

Cruel optimism is, then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as an analytic
lever it is an incitement to inhabit and to track the affective attachment to what we call 'the
good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who
nonetheless, and at the same time, find their conditions of possibility within it. My
assumption is that the conditions of ordinary life in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US,
are conditions of the attrition or the wearing out of the subject, and that the irony - that the labour of
reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about
the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later

Cruel optimism is in this sense a concept pointing toward

a mode of lived imminence, one that grows from a perception about the reasons people are not
Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but choose to ride the wave of the
system of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held
in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat
by it. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, and to misrecognise
that promise as an achievement. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles
to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^

Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the
promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and

these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the

time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides
assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can
enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or
otherwise being worn out by the promises that they have attached to in this world.
provide tools for suggesting why

C) Alt - Vote negative. Reject the notion that we are going to

change and take the risk of opting out of the entire system.
There is always a cruel desire for you to think you can help
despite. Vote neg to recognize and reject that desire or we
only rebuild the optimism
Berlant 11

Lauren Berlant, the George M. Pullman Professor of English at the University of Chicago, Ph.D. from
Cornell University, Cruel Optimism p.169-174
This is a way of describing the specificity of the experience of ordinarinessof, as Thomas Dumm writes, ordinary life, the life-world,

The ordinary,
in La Promesse and Rosetta, is organized around the solicitation of children to the reproduction of
what we should call not the good life but the bad life this is, a life dedicated to moving toward
the good lifes normative/utopian zone but actually stuck in what we might call survival time, the time
of struggling, drowning, holding onto the ledge, treading water the time of notthe everyday, the quotidian, the low, the common, the private, the personal in its visceral temporality today.

The Dardennes draw the Belgium of the 1990s as a colony of globalization with its legal citizens trying to maintain a grip on the
waning shards of liberty, sovereignty, and economic hegemony: its a world of intensified economic and social volatility, a mainly
deindustrialized, small business economy where impersonality and intimacy are enmeshed in a renewed regime of sweatshops and
domestic labor. This world is visually and physically crowded, both overwhelming and underwhelming in its assault, allowing little
time to luxuriate in its sounds, tastes, and smells. As Achille Mbembe and Janet Roitman put it, about the African context, this
suggests that it is in everyday life that the crisis as a limitless experience and a field dramatizing particular forms of subjectivity is
authored, receives its translations, is institutionalized, loses its exceptional character and in the end, [appears] as a normal,
ordinary and banal phenomenon.
Mbembe and Roitman see crisis ordinariness as the condition for the production of revolutionary consciousness. But the Dardennes
scenario puts forth no hint of that, nor of the potentiality or revolutionary possibility that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri attribute

the citizens
dissatisfaction leads to reinvestment in the normative promises of capital and
intimacy under capital. The quality of that reinvestment is not political in any of the normative senses,
thoughits a feeling of aspirational normalcy , the desire to feel normal, and to feel
normalcy as a ground of dependable life, a life that does not have to keep being
reinvented. That feeling does not require any particular forms of living to stimulate it;
nor does it depend on the flourishing of the forms of living to which it attaches. Optimism
attaches to their mere existence. The will to feel that feeling again becomes the first
order object of desire. But this puts pressure on the infrastructure of the social world to be
maintained despite its distributions of violence and negation.
to the activity of immaterial labor in their analysis of the contemporary global mode of production. In these films,

A nearly comic, silent movie-style example from La Promesse plays out this activity beautifully, pointing additionally to whats
singular about globalizations sensual flesh. It is Igors job to white out the immigrant passports, making their bearers seem already
legal. Yet when he arrives at Assitas papers and sees the contrast of her dark skin and her white teeth, erasing working-class
staining and emphasizing his racial whiteness as a homage to her smile and also to her blotted-out identity. It is also clear that he
doesnt get it: his racial location, his privilege of citizenship, his dependency on her familial labor. Nothing happens from this
moment of play, whose gestures are ordinary, forgettable, forgotten. In fact, in these films play itself is a momentary privilege
crowded out constantly by risk, which is play with life-denting consequences. Both play and risk are shaped by the pressures of

Play allows
a sense of normalcy, though, while risk tries to make some headway in the impasse: play is the
performance of an interruption without risk . Yet it takes place as barely enjoyed comic
relief from the risk that must be borne.
Thus, how to talk about the need to maintain binding to the normal in the context of crisis is a theoretical
and political problem of more than consciousness . The Dardennes represent consciousness
under present systemic economic, political, and intimate conditions as absorbed in regimes of
bargaining with movement amid the slow train wreck that is always coming in the catastrophic
time of capitalism, where if youre lucky you get to be exploited , and if youre lucky you can
contemporary labor, with its demands for survival and incitement to fantasy without a scaffold, a net, or a retreat.

avoid one more day being the focus of a scene that hails and ejects you when it is your time to again become worthless. This is why

exploitation is not what the children cast as the enemy. They want to be
exploited, they enter the proletarian economy in the crummy service-sector jobs it
is all too easy to disdain as the proof of someones loserdom or tragedy. The risk

would be opting out of the game. One does not necessarily require families or nations to secure this
feeling; any reciprocal form will dofriendship, collegiality, a project, the state, a union, whatever has the capacity to deliver an
affective, transpersonal sense of unconflictedness, belonging, and worth.

The history of sentimentality around children that sees them as the reason to have optimismfor if nothing else,
their lives are not already ruinedthus takes on an ethical, political, and aesthetic purchase in
these films. The audience is obligated to side with the childs will not to be
defeated, even if the difference between defeat and all its others is the capacity
to attach optimism for a less bad future to a blighted field of possibility . We are
incited to have compassion for fruitless and even self-underminingcrueldesires. In
La Promesse, the promise of post-Fordist citizenship marks out agency not as that which changes the world but as that which
bargains with it by developing affective bonds or promise within the regime of production that extends everywhere, as everyone is
on the make. In Rosetta, belonging isnt an a priori but something that must be purchased by participation in the everyday economy.
Community and civil society from this class perspective are not seen as resources for building anything, neither fantasy nor an

Attachments are as brittle as the economic system that

hails and then bails on its reserve army of workers.
ordinary life that can be trusted, rested in.

Strategy Kritik
In order to change status quo politics, the affirmative needs to explain how to change
things, including specific mechanisms and steps that can be taken. All successful
historical movements had specific goals and strategies
Reed 09 Adolph Reed Jr. is a professor of political science at the University of
Pennsylvania. The limits of anti-racism
Antiracism is a favorite about what counts as racism.
The affs performance of care of the self privileges ethics over democratic politics.
Survival strategies and self-elaboration are incontestable but self-determination
becomes narcissism.
Ella MYERS Poli Sci @ Utah 8 Resisting Foucauldian Ethics: Associative Politics and the
Limits of the Care of the Self Contemporary Political Theory 7 p. 134-138
Ethics as the Care of the Self Foucaults of solipsism remains close at hand (1997b,
To transform the world, we need to be strategists. While the affirmative sets a goal, this
is not a strategy. While they all wanted to end racism, their process of getting there was
very different
Lewis 13 Civil Rights and the Changing World HOW HISTORY WAS MADE AND HOW IT'S
BEING WRITTEN. By Earl Lewis | HUMANITIES, January/February 2013 | Volume 34,
Number 1.5
If the participants can be seen as strategists, they came to see themselves as part of
an African diaspora.25
That means the affirmative could easily endorse racist policies. Plenty of things that are
said to be anti-racist can end up being more racist than the status quo. The main the
issue is that we are unsure which tactics will be successful.
Fine 12 Michelle Fine, Distinguished Professor, Graduate Center, CUNY Notes on
Whiteness and Healthhttp://www.racismreview.com/blog/2012/12/15/whiteness-andhealth/
Finally, I was struck by the ironies of anti-racist they were presumably designed to
Instead, we endorse a discussion focused on the question of strategy. This can make
sure that our methods move away from oppression and dont get coopted. Of course,
there are numerous strategies and advantages and disadvantages to every single one.
Thus, in order to decide which method to use, we must debate them. This is the only
way to achieve the benefits of the affirmative
Lewis 13 Civil Rights and the Changing World HOW HISTORY WAS MADE AND HOW IT'S
BEING WRITTEN. By Earl Lewis | HUMANITIES, January/February 2013 | Volume 34,
Number 1.5
Longtime social and civil rights activist, parallels the entire history of racial
subjugation and the struggle for opportunity in the United States.3

Tuck and Yang Kritik

The debate-academy is a terminally flawed institution for engaging subaltern identity.
The aff must be REFUSED: they trade stories of pain for ballots, betting that the judge
will be complicit in assigning symbolic purchase to oppression. This self-congradulatory
exercise conflates the subaltern with the intellectual, perpetuating SETTLER
COLONIALISM and accelerating their libidinal attraction for OPPRESSION-TOURISM.
TUCK & YANG professors 2014 (Eve, associate professor of educational foundations and
coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz,
and K. Wayne, assistant professor ethic studies a UC San Diego, R-Words: Refusing
Research in D. Paris & M.T. Winn (Eds.) Humanizing Research: Decolonizing Qualitative
Inquiry With Youth and Communities, p. 224-229, note://// indicates par. breaks)AR VT14
Under coloniality, Descartes formulation, cognito ergo sum (I think, therefore I
, and not the origins of the disciplines that we attend to now.
There is no radical affirmative knowledge production they legitimize the zombie
politics within the university system, which churns out meaninglessness even in
instances of supposedly liberal, well-meaning politics.
OCCUPIED UC BERKELEY 2010 (Anonymous grad student, The University, Social Death,
and the Inside Joke Feb 20,http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?
story=20100220181610620, note://// indicates par. breaks)AR VT14
Universities may serve as seem progressive sites of inquiry in some cases,
every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."56
The alternative is a refusal of their affirmation, which is not a sheer negativity and which
is productive by virtue of its act of deflection and redirection. Yes we still stand here as
negative debaters giving speeches in a hollowed-out activity, but only the affirmative
has advanced subaltern representations within the activity. The negative is the artistic
performance of the failure of debate the skeletal structure remains so that the judge
can orient their refusal. The negative must be understood in the manner of GonzalesDays Erased Lynchings photographs. We are not the people in the picture but rather
the project of Gonzales-Days artistic reconstructions, realized in debate. We PIC out of
the aff but leave in the bare structural shell of debate, performing its absurdity so that
you can know you cannot vote affirmative.
TUCK & YANG professors 2014 (Eve, associate professor of educational foundations and
coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz,
and K. Wayne, assistant professor ethic studies a UC San Diego, R-Words: Refusing
Research in D. Paris & M.T. Winn (Eds.) Humanizing Research: Decolonizing Qualitative
Inquiry With Youth and Communities, p. 239-242, note://// indicates par. breaks)AR VT14

For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw
about refusal connects our conversation back to desire as a counterlogic to settler
Our argument still links to their indigenous appeal in this debate space they are not a
material struggle for indigenous sovereignty, but only the METAPHORIZATION of that
struggle in the esoteric context of a debate space
TUCK & YANG professors 2014 (Eve, associate professor of educational foundations and
coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz,
and K. Wayne, assistant professor ethic studies a UC San Diego, R-Words: Refusing

Research in D. Paris & M.T. Winn (Eds.) Humanizing Research: Decolonizing Qualitative
Inquiry With Youth and Communities, p. 243, note://// indicates par. breaks)AR VT14
At this juncture, we dont intend to offer a general framework for refusal,
researched are, and how the historical/ representational context for research matters.
It is a PRIOR QUESTION of whether the debate community deserves to hear your voice.
Our argument is that debate replicates the structures of the academy. It is a not a site
for justice but just for the stockpiling of evidence. Introducing stories into the debate
space only exposes you to the violence of academic colonialism.
TUCK & YANG professors 2014 (Eve, associate professor of educational foundations and
coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz,
and K. Wayne, assistant professor ethic studies a UC San Diego, R-Words: Refusing
Research in D. Paris & M.T. Winn (Eds.) Humanizing Research: Decolonizing Qualitative
Inquiry With Youth and Communities, p. 232-234, note://// indicates par. breaks)AR VT14
One might ask what is meant by the academy, and by the academy being
with the strategies of producing legitimated knowledge based on the colonization of
Refusal is beneficial it interrupts the destructive march of the academy
TUCK & YANG professors 2014 (Eve, associate professor of educational foundations and
coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz,
and K. Wayne, assistant professor ethic studies a UC San Diego, R-Words: Refusing
Research in D. Paris & M.T. Winn (Eds.) Humanizing Research: Decolonizing Qualitative
Inquiry With Youth and Communities, p. 237-238, note://// indicates par. breaks)AR VT14
In this final section, our task is to engage in a more tentative,
things differently. Refusal, taken seriously, is about humanizing the researcher.

Tomorrow Today Kritik

The affirmative is pathologically consumed with injury from the past, which infinitely
defers the work of generating a guide for the future. This is a BAD METHOD 1) it locks
in identity along categories of EXCLUSION, and 2) it overdetermines their identity with
RESENTMENT. They manipulate the divide as a forever-stasis where they make islands
of their own identity and are foreclosed-in-advance from any criticism. Their self-serving
insulation from criticism is perverse narcissism, and at its core is anti-debate. It does
nothing for charting future possibilities.
BHAMBRA and MARGEE 2010 (Gurminder, prof of Sociology U of Warwick, and Victoria,
U Brighton, Identity Politics and the Need for a Tomorrow, Economic and Policy
Weekly, April 10, retrieved

We wish to turn now to a related problem within identity politics that can be best described as the
problem of the reification of politicised identities. Brown (1995) positions herself within the
debate about identity politics by seeking to elaborate on the wounded character of politicised
identitys desire (ibid: 55); that is, the problem of wounded attachments whereby a claim to
identity becomes over-invested in its own historical suffering and perpetuates its injury through
its refusal to give up its identity claim. Browns argument is that where politicised identity is
founded upon an experience of exclusion, for example, exclusion itself becomes perversely
valorised in the continuance of that identity. In such cases, group activity operates to maintain
and reproduce the identity created by injury (exclusion) rather than and indeed, often in
opposition to resolving the injurious social relations that generated claims around that identity
in the first place. If things have to have a history in order to have a future, then the problem
becomes that of how history is con- structed in order to make the future. To the extent that, for
Brown, identity is associated primarily with (historical) injury, the future for that identity is then
already determined by the injury as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach
to the present which embodies that history (ibid 1995: 73). Browns sug- gestion that as it is not
possible to undo the past, the focus back- wards entraps the identity in reactionary practices, is,
we believe, too stark and we will pursue this later in the article.
Politicised identity, Brown maintains, emerges and obtains its unifying coherence through the
politicisation of exclusion from an ostensible universal, as a protest against exclusion (ibid: 65).
Its continuing existence requires both a belief in the legitimacy of the universal ideal (for
example, ideals of opportunity, and re- ward in proportion to effort) and enduring exclusion from
those ideals. Brown draws upon Nietzsche in arguing that such identi- ties, produced in reaction
to conditions of disempowerment and inequality, then become invested in their own impotence
through practices of, for example, reproach, complaint, and revenge. These are reactions in the
Nietzschean sense since they are substitutes for actions or can be seen as negative forms of
action. Rather than acting to remove the cause(s) of suffering, that suf- fering is instead
ameliorated (to some extent) through the estab- lishment of suffering as the measure of social
virtue (ibid 1995: 70), and is compensated for by the vengeful pleasures of recrimi- nation.
Such practices, she argues, stand in sharp distinction to in fact, provide obstacles to practices
that would seek to dispel the conditions of exclusion.

Brown casts the dilemma discussed above in terms of a choice between past and future, and
adapting Nietzsche, exhorts the adoption of a (collective) will that would become the redeemer
of history (ibid: 72) through its focus on the possibilities of creat- ing different futures. As
Brown reads Nietzsche, the one thing that the will cannot exert its power over is the past, the it
was. Confronted with its impotence with respect to the events of the past, the will is threatened
with becoming simply an angry spec- tator mired in bitter recognition of its own helplessness.
The one hope for the will is that it may, instead, achieve a kind of mastery over that past such
that, although what has happened cannot be altered, the past can be denied the power of
continuing to de- termine the present and future. It is only this focus on the future, Brown
continues, and the capacity to make a future in the face of human frailties and injustices that
spares us from a rancorous decline into despair. Identity politics structured by ressentiment that
is, by suffering caused by past events can only break out of the cycle of slave morality by
remaking the present against the terms of the past, a remaking that requires a forgetting of that
past. An act of liberation, of self-affirmation, this forgetting of the past requires an
overcoming of the past that offers iden- tity in relationship to suffering, in favour of a future in
which identity is to be defined differently.
In arguing thus, Browns work becomes aligned with a posi- tion that sees the way forward for
emancipatory politics as re- siding in a movement away from a politics of memory (Kilby
2002: 203) that is committed to articulating past injustices and suffering. While we agree that
investment in identities prem- ised upon suffering can function as an obstacle to alleviating the
causes of that suffering, we believe that Browns argument as outlined is problematic. First,
following Kilby (2002), we share a concern about any turn to the future that is figured as a
complete abandonment of the past. This is because for those who have suffered oppression and
exclusion, the injunction to give up articulating a pain that is still felt may seem cruel and
impossible to meet. We would argue instead that the turn to the future that theorists such as
Brown and Grosz call for, to revitalise feminism and other emancipatory politics, need not be
conceived of as a brute rejection of the past.
Indeed, Brown herself recognises the problems involved here, stating that
[since] erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves such integral elements of the pain
inscribed in most subjugated identities [then] the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructed
Nietzschean form, seems inappropriate if not cruel (1995: 74).

She implies, in fact, that the demand exerted by those in pain may be no more than the demand
to exorcise that pain through recognition: all that such pain may long for more than revenge
is the chance to be heard into a certain release, recognised into self-overcoming, incited into
possibilities for triumphing over, and hence, losing itself (1995: 74-75). Brown wishes to
establish the political importance of remembering painful historical events but with a crucial
caveat: that the purpose of remembering pain is to enable its release. The challenge then,
according to her, is to create a political culture in which this project does not mutate into one of
remembering pain for its own sake.
Indeed, if Brown feels that this may be a pass where we ought to part with Nietzsche (1995:
74), then Freud may be a more suit- able companion. Since his early work with Breuer, Freuds
writ- ings have suggested the (only apparent) paradox that remember- ing is often a condition of

forgetting. The hysterical patient, who is doomed to repeat in symptoms and compulsive actions
a past she cannot adequately recall, is helped to remember that trau- matic past in order then to
move beyond it: she must remember in order to forget and to forget in order to be able to live in
the present.7 This model seems to us to be particularly helpful for the dilemma articulated by
both Brown (1995) and Kilby (2002), insisting as it does that forgetting (at least, loosening the
hold of the past, in order to enable the future) cannot be achieved without first remembering the
traumatic past. Indeed, this would seem to be similar to the message of Beloved, whose central
motif of haunting (is the adult woman, Beloved, Sethes murdered child returned in spectral
form?) dramatises the tendency of the unanalysed traumatic past to keep on returning,
constraining, as it does so, the present to be like the past, and thereby, disallow- ing the
possibility of a future different from that past.
As Sarah Ahmed argues in her response to Brown, in order to break the seal of the past, in order
to move away from attach- ments that are hurtful, we must first bring them into the realm of
political action (2004: 33). We would add that the task of analys- ing the traumatic past, and
thus opening up the possibility of political action, is unlikely to be achievable by individuals on
their own, but that this, instead, requires a community of par- ticipants dedicated to the serious
epistemic work of remembering and interpreting the objective social conditions that made up that
past and continue in the present. The pain of historical injury is not simply an individual
psychological issue, but stems from objective social conditions which perpetuate, for the most
part, forms of injustice and inequality into the present.
In sum, Brown presents too stark a choice between past and future. In the example of Beloved
with which we began this article, Paul Ds acceptance of Sethes experiences of slavery as
distinct from his own, enable them both to arrive at new under- standings of their experience.
Such understanding is a way of partially undoing the (effects of) the past and coming to terms
with the locatedness of ones being in the world (Mohanty 1995). As this example shows,
opening up a future, and attending to the ongoing effects of a traumatic past, are only incorrectly
under- stood as alternatives.
A second set of problems with Browns critique of identity poli- tics emerge from what we
regard as her tendency to individualise social problems as problems that are the possession and
the responsibility of the wounded group. Brown suggests that the problems associated with
identity politics can be overcome through a shift in the character of political expression and
politi- cal claims common to much politicised identity (1995: 75). She defines this shift as one
in which identity would be expressed in terms of desire rather than of ontology by supplanting
the lan- guage of I am with the language of I want this for us (1995: 75). Such a
reconfiguration, she argues, would create an opportu- nity to rehabilitate the memory of desire
within identificatory processes...prior to [their] wounding (1995: 75). It would fur- ther refocus
attention on the future possibilities present in the identity as opposed to the identity being
foreclosed through its attention to past-based grievances.

( ) The ALTERNATIVE is tomorrow today, reconceptualizing identity NOW through shared

practices and conceptual frameworks of contingent identity formation. We should
endorse community knowledge production in the present as a way to advance and not
defer politics. The negative is an interruption of their feedback loop of their

pathologically repeated grievances, which maybe has produced some ballots, but it is
not productive for dynamic self-understanding and politics.
BHAMBRA and MARGEE 2010 (Gurminder, prof of Sociology U of Warwick, and Victoria,
U Brighton, Identity Politics and the Need for a Tomorrow, Economic and Policy
Weekly, April 10, retrieved

We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put
forward by essentialist theories, and that these are offered by the work of two theorists, Satya
Mohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohantys ([1993] 2000) post-positivist, realist
theorisation of identity suggests a way through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the
excesses of the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as a proposed alternative to
identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993] 2000), identities must be understood as theoretical
constructions that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such, substantial claims
about identity are, in fact, implicit explana- tions of the social world and its constitutive relations
of power. Experience that from which identity is usually thought to derive is not something
that simply occurs, or announces its meaning and significance in a self-evident fashion: rather,
experience is always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced (Scott 1991).
Mohantys work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), who similarly insists upon the communal
nature of meaning or knowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of knowledge and
the postmodern alternative which announces the death of the subject and the impossibility of
epistemology, Nelson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are the agents of
epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possible for an individual to know something that
another individual could not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to make sense of the
world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworks and practices. Thus, it is the community that
is the generator and repository of knowledge. Bringing Mohantys work on identity as theoretical
construction together with Nelsons work on episte- mological communities therefore suggests
that, identity is one of the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individu- als in
the context of the communities within which they exist.
The post-positivist reformulation of experience is necessary here as it privileges
understandings that emerge through the processing of experience in the context of negotiated
premises about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident knowledge (self-evident,
however, only to the one who has had the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not
the expe- rience of, for example, sexual discrimination that makes one a feminist, but rather,
the paradigm through which one attempts to understand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is
not necessary to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make the identification
feminist. If being a feminist is not a given fact of a particular social (and/or biological)
location that is, being designated female but is, in Mohantys terms, an achieve- ment
that is, something worked towards through a process of analysis and interpretation then two
implications follow. First, that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is some- thing
that is achievable by men.3
While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical or conceptual constructs which
can be transferred from one person to another with transparency, we think that there is some-

thing politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only understand an experience (or
then comment upon it) if one has actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to
privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, or then on claims of authenticity,
can lead to a narrow identity poli- tics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or
organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to understand an experience one
has not had, then what point is there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view
seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of disadvantaged ones, or, we
would add, to place exclusive respon- sibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed
themselves. Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experi- ence of others has
led to an assumption on the part of some white feminists that confronting racism is the sole
responsibility of black feminists, just as today issues of caste become the sole responsibility of
the dalit womens organisations (Rege 1998). Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then,
is not made in terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call for others to
educate themselves about the histories, the pre- ferred social relations and utopias and the
struggles of the marginalised (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows their cause to become
our cause, not as a form of appropriation of their struggle, but through the transformation of
subjectivities that enables a recognition that their struggle is also our struggle. Following
Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus
making those experi- ences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while recognising
that they are not equally available or powerful for all subjects.

Chess Game Kritik

There are always two chess games going on. One is on the top of the table, the
other is below the table. The latter is the one that counts, but the Americans don't
know how to play that game." When you play a game you should understand the
plan and the ideas that are hidden in the position. There are many general concepts
and plans to be learned which can be applied in your games later on. Study
standard plans and positional ideas to be able to use them. When you play without
a plan you are going to lose. Your pieces are going aimlessly here and there and are
not working together like a unit to achieve a common goal. Often the pawn
structure can show you where you should play, at the kingside or at the queenside.
However, there are many chess strategies you should learn to become a good
player. And it takes time too. So be patient. You don't become a master overnight.
This game is a chess game. Just like the United States chess game in the Middle
East. Where they are willing to give up a few pawns but they really want is pieces,
they are willing trade some lame duck presidents. Because, what they really want
the main characters out the building.
Theyre willing to trade the pawn which says individuals right to privacy, dont need
that. The other guy who used to be a player, Mubarak, became a pawn. They want
the queen Iran, thats the big prize. So they move the rook Syria so they can strike
against the queen. We need to think ahead of the game. Dont think they are not
playing that here too. We need to not only think about the next move, but the
reaction to our reactionary move. We must be ahead of the game. Sometimes these
should not be done in public, honestly were not the only ones watching these
Chess with its spaces of closed off potential is the game of the state and the game
of the aff, the neg takes a relational approach with Go, we arrange ourself in open
space, holding the space and having no specific point of departure or arrival
Leach 2011 (Neil Leach, professor of Archaeology at the University of Southern
California, The War Machine vs. The State Apparatus | An analysis of Urban Growth
and Practices , July 1st 2011, http://nicfriend.com/the-war-machine-vs-the-stateapparatus-an-analysis-of-urban-growth-and-practices/)
Deleuze describes the State Apparatus and the War Machine in terms of Game
be obeying pure reason, in other words, yourself 6
The affs political theatre is a chessboard every piece over-identified with its own
specific purpose
Bacevich 02 (Andrew, American Empire The Realities and Consequences of U.S.
Diplomacy, Andrew J. Bacevich, Sr. is a professor of international relations at
Boston University and a retired career officer in the United States Army. He is a

former director of Boston University's Center for International Relations (from 1998
to 2005), and author of several books, Harvard University Press, 2002)
Few scholars specializing in American diplomatic history today accept such an
outline of twentieth century
common vision and conform in practice to a strategic consensus of long standing.
They treat geopolitics as an infinite game of chess. We should not fear possible
extinction in pursuing these lines of flight, the ballot should rather embrace these
moments of zero-intensity inside extinction for the possibility of a new intensity to
Aima 09 (Rahel Aima is a student at Columbia University and writer/blogger, In the
beginning was the language, and the language was
gravity, http://killingdenouement.wordpress.com/2009/04/13/in-the-beginning-wasthe-language-and-the-language-was-gravity/, April 13, 2009)
In the beginning was the language, and the language was gravity. Before the
primordial prison, we are finally irrational, ex-tinctual and free.?
We have to stop playing Chess completely failure to do so causes non-redemptive
Robinson 8(Andre Robinson, political theorist and writer for Crossfire an online
magazine, In Theory Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical
transformation, September 10th 2010, ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-deleuzewar-machine/)
So what, in Deleuzian theory, is the alternative to the state? Deleuze
social movements are forced into conflict by the states drive to repress difference.
The alternative is to blowup the chessboard with the queer war machine
Tuhkanen 08 Queer Guerrillas: on Richard Wright's and Frantz Fanon's dissembling
revolutionaries The Mississippi Quarterly 0026-637X Tuhkanen, Mikko yr:2008 vol:61
iss:4 pg:615 -642
If Bigger momentarily circulates in the white economy as something of a
territory, perfectly visible yet unreadable to the colonizers' gaze. (10)

Ahmed Kritik (Race/Performance Affs)

Your anti-racist performance is not action and only obscures material conditions of white
Ahmed 04
Sara Ahmed, Visiting Professor at the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies
and Associate Editor of International Journal of Cultural Studies. Declarations of
Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism. Borderlands, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004.50.
"This might sound like an argument about the performativity of race....
... and indeed the claim that saying is doing can bypass that ways in which saying is not
sufficient for an action, and can even be a substitute for action."
Your anti-racist speeches create a fantasy of transcendence that replicates white
Ahmed 04
Sara Ahmed, Visiting Professor at the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies
and Associate Editor of International Journal of Cultural Studies. Declarations of
Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism. Borderlands, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004.
"52. My concern with the non-performativity of anti-racism has hence been to examine
how sayings are not always doings, or to put it more strongly, to show how the
investment in saying as if saying was doing can actually extend rather than challenge
racism. ...
... Or we could even say that anti-racist speech in a racist world is an unhappy
performative: the conditions are not in place that would allow such saying to do what
it says."
Declarations claiming to transcend whiteness and racism only obscure it
Ahmed 04
Sara Ahmed, Visiting Professor at the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies
and Associate Editor of International Journal of Cultural Studies. Declarations of
Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism. Borderlands, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004.
"This paper examines six different modes for declaring whiteness used within academic
writing, public culture and government policy, arguing that such declarations are nonperformative: they do not do what they say. ...
... Declarations of whiteness could be described as ''unhappy performatives', the
conditions are not in place that would allow such declarations to do what they say. "
Ahmed 04
Sara Ahmed, Visiting Professor at the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies
and Associate Editor of International Journal of Cultural Studies. Declarations of
Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism. Borderlands, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004.
"My commentary on the risks of whiteness studies will involve an analysis of how
whiteness gets reproduced through being declared, within academic texts, as well
public culture. ...
... As Mike Hill suggests: I cannot know in advance whether white critique will prove
politically worthwhile, whether in the end it will be a friendlier ghost than before or will
display the same stealth narcissism that feminists of color labeled a white problem in
the late 1970s (1997, 10). "

Churchill Kritik
The affirmative has chosen to utilize the federal government and framed their 1AC to
focus on issues that can be resolved by strengthening tempered sovereignty. This
continues the non-transgressive tradition of hear no evil, see no evil. Their failure to
commit to unflinching Native struggle reproduces the colonial order and Native
destruction. We should reject the aff and commit to Native land rights and absolute
sovereignty as a First Priority
CHURCHILL 96 Ward; Creek and enrolled Keetoowah Band Cherokee; Former professor of
Ethnic Studies @ the University of Colorado; From a Native Son: Selected Essays on
Indigenism, 1985-1995; pp. 519-521
Leaving aside questions concerning the validity of various treaties, the beginning point
for any
first priority for everyone seriously committed to accomplishing positive change in North
And, elaborating Indigenous struggle through the rubric of government policy
strengthens colonial society and weakens Indigenous struggle only unflinching praxis
Wilderson 10 Frank B. III, Ph.D., Associate Professor at UC Irvine, former ANC member,
Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pages 167-168,

Clearly, Deloria draws here largely from the specificity of his own La-kota
(the Slave), though there are essential differences between the two rubrics.