#TiggyNotes

Iloilo Dock and Engineering Co. v. WCC

Workmen's Compensation Act; When compensation may be granted; Injuries sustained off the
premise; When "assault" may be considered as an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act; Resume' of governing principles.In resum:
1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out
of and in the course of employment.
2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak
and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak.
Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be shown to
exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of
employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the
injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be,
and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of
work, is not of the employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premise, but while in
close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The
reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that
there is a causal connection between the work and the hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature
or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading the assault.
The question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the
employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact.

Where employment extends.Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where
the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied
consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those
of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's
premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it
had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other
words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of
space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule,
'employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's
premises where the work is to be done; "but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to
include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express
or implied consent of the employer

Assault by third persons; Case at bar.The ruling in Kelty v. Travellers Insurance Company, 391 SW
2d 558, is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close
proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employee's
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of the road
bears "so intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the
IDECO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses if extensively in pursuit
of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or
contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely
because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place
safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein,
one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security
measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo
resulting in his death.

#TiggyNotes
Belarmino v. ECC

Employees Compensation Commission; Government Service Insurance System; Benefits;

Septicemia post partum is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease; Oania Belarminos
death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her
employment contributed to its development.The illness, septicemia post partum, which resulted
in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular
line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that
ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment
contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip
and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains
which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her.
Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the
development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the
proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her
demise.

The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately
and naturally resulting from a compensable injury.Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372,
this Court ruled: x x x. Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease
supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur.
132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result
of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or misconduct (I
Larson Workmens Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences
and sequels that flow from the primary injury are compensable

Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a
classroom teacher.Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her
employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her
recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum, and
death, are compensable.

Argument that the cause of decedents post partum septicemia was the infected vaginal lacerations
resulting from the decedents delivery of her child at home unmeritorious.There is no merit in the
public respondents argument that the cause of the decedents post partum septicemia was the
infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedents delivery of her child at home for the
incident in school could not have caused septicemia post partum, x x x if the necessary precautions
to avoid infection during or after labor were (not) taken.

Hinoguin v. ECC

Death Benefits; Work-Connected Injuries; The work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury
and death was not precluded by the fact that he was on an overnight pass at the time he was
accidentally shot by a fellow soldier.Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was
performing official functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been
pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion
Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred in line of duty.
It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day
official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject
to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when
he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not). Thus, we think that the workconnected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple
circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under
his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing official functions because
he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldiers home for a few hours for a meal and some
drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of performance of official
functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he

#TiggyNotes
is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g.,
going on an approved vacation leave. Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be
preterminated by superior orders.

From the very nature of his occupation, a soldier assumes the risk of being accidentally shot or fired
upon by his fellow soldiers.More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain
risks, for instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That
is not, of course, the only risk that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or
profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed
Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier must also assume the risk of being
accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk
inherent in his employment as a soldier.

The death of Sgt. Hinoguin which resulted from the accidental discharge of his fellow soldiers
firearm, is work-connected and therefore, compensable.We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt.
Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in
the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on
active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.

Labor Code provisions must be given interpretation most likely to effectuate their beneficient and
humanitarian purposes.It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of
performance of official functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the
context of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the
compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is commonplace
that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the interpretation most likely to
effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the Labor Code.

GSIS v. CA & Alegre

Employees Compensation; Employees Compensation Commission; Guidelines of the ECC with

respect to claims for death benefits: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work
requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c)
that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer.As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees Compensation Commission case, although he
was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong Police
Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he
was attending to at the time that he was attacked and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the
police station to answer for a crime, a basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to
perform.

The 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing
the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are
nonetheless basically police service in character.Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent
guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must
be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been
performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee
must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2
Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre
was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was
intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or
permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin
and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died
even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt.
Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC
guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be
on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the
conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to
exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out

#TiggyNotes
that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to
policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them
within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that
may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly
applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which,
although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character.
Valeriano v. ECC

An injury or accident is said to arise in the course of employment when it takes place within the
period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is
fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.In Iloilo Dock &
Engineering Co. v. Workmens Compensation Commission, the Court explained the phrase arising
out of and in the course of employment in this wise: The two components of the coverage formula
arising out of and in the course of employmentare said to be separate tests which must be
independently satisfied; however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation
coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, work-connection, because an
uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test
can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. The words arising out of refer to the
origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words in the course
of refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. As a matter of
general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise in the course of employment when it
takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably x
x x be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

The injury and the resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable
regardless of the place where the injury occurred, if it can be proven that at the time of the injury,
the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and performing an act
reasonably necessary or incidental thereto.For injury to be compensable, the standard of work
connection must be substantially satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability sustained by
reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injury occurred, if it can
be proven that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or her
employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto.

24-hour-Duty Doctrine; Firemen; The 24-hour-duty doctrine is inapplicable where the employee, a
fireman, was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he
met an accident and, more importantly, he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a
firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries.We recognize
the importance and laud the efforts of firemen in our society. Indeed, the nature of their job requires
them to be always on alert, like soldiers and police officers, and to respond to fire alarms which may
occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the circumstances in the present case do not call for
the application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty
doctrine cannot be applied to petitioners case, because he was neither at his assigned work place
nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important
justification for the Courts stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a
firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We cannot
find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver.

Alano v. ECC

Compensability of claim; When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate

to the place at her work while going to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out
of and in the course of her employment.This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the
earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (96 SCRA 260, 263-264)
which has a similar factual background, this Court held: "It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on
March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular
accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the

#TiggyNotes
accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve
of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point
reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is
deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment."

Case at bar.In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work,
She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she
was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school
principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her
to be there.

Lazo v. ECC

Central Bank security guard, who was granted permission to leave his post so he could bring home
a sack of rice and who met an accident along the way, is entitled to workmens compensation
under P.D. 626.In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank
several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioners was
asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence
on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions
occurred in the journey. While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under
the Workmens Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been
abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in
favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice
guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should
adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially
where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident.

Enao v. ECC
Workmens Compensation; A schoolteacher who was ambushed along the way on a Friday, which
was made officially as an off-day, where her purpose was to buy office supplies, is entitled to
workmens compensation.The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which
is a Friday, from her station at the Municipality of Sergio Osmea, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte,
intended to procure supplies and other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with
her services as a school teacher et the Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. The
companions of the Petitioner at the time of the ambush and who appear to be co-teachers of the
Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, have attested in their respective
affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at that time on their way to Dipolog City for the
purpose of securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for the furtherance of
their services as school teachers. There is no mention at all in the decision of the Employees
Compensation Commission that this particular assertion has been at all contradicted or
controverted by any evidence whatsoever submitted to the Commission by the GSIS.

Evidence; Affidavits of claimants companions regarding purpose of the latter in going to Dipolog
Cityto buy office suppliesshould not be considered by E.C.C. as self-serving in the absence of
controverting evidence.We find no basis at all for the findings made by the Employees
Compensation Commission in its decision that the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are
merely self-serving declarations because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or
support such a conclusion. As a matter of fact, the decision appealed from accepts the fact that the
statements given by Petitioner-Appellants witnesses constitute prima facie evidence of the matter
sought to be established Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of
appellants witnesses would suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries
sustained by appellant and which caused for confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial
Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975 for removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the
Dipolog Medical Center from September 1 to 12, 1975, are definitely work-connected

That Dipolog City happened to be the place of residence of claimant should not be considered as
negating the reason that she travelled thereto from Zamboanga del Norte to buy school supplies.
She was ambushed along the way.Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of

#TiggyNotes
the Petitioner does not at all, by this singular circumstance, render untrue or false the dear
evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City
at the time to purchase needed supplies and other training and school aids. That Dipolog City
happened to be also the Petitioners place of residence, in this instance, becomes simply incidental
and/or purely coincidental.

Where claimant was performing official functions it hard-ly matters that she was injured outside
regular working hours and beyond her place of work.As it can be rightfully ruled that the
Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official functions, it hardly matters then
whether such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or discharging, happened outside the
regular working hours and not in the Petitioners place of work. It is rather obvious that in
proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave
the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is significant
and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are workconnected, which the Court f inds to be so.

Davao Gulf Lumber v. Del Rosario

COMPENSABLE ACCIDENTS.Accidents which are caused by the worn-out condition of the motor
vehicles, are compensable.

NON-REGISTRATION OF VEHICLE, IMMATERIAL.Nonregistration of the truck in the Motor Vehicle

Office is not the concern of the driver.

NOTORIOUS NEGLIGENCE; PRESENCE OF MEMBERS OF DRIVER'S FAMILY IN VEHICLE.Although in

violation of the company's regulations, the driver cannot be considered negligent by having the
members of his family in the vehicle, where it is not certain that such presence caused the
accident. As his wife and children were present, the driver must have been extremely careful, not
reckless.

Menez v. ECC

Occupational disease defined.An occupational disease is one which results from the nature of the
employment, and by nature is meant conditions to which all employees of a class are subject and
which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that
occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the
hazard attending the employment in general

To be occupational, the disease must be one due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal
and constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things which
science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the
same industry is alike constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational
disease

Rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are occupational diseases of public high school teachers.
From the foregoing definitions of occupational diseases or ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis can be considered as such occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like
herein petitioner, admittedly the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government,
are subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers,
especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or non-academic
assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very
demanding superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact
that the high school in which she teaches is situated in a tough area-Binondo district, which is
inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and
congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like
herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public
school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet, for they can ill-afford nutritious food.

Orate v. CA

#TiggyNotes

Employees Compensation; The law as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing
that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by
the working conditions. It discarded, among others, the concepts of presumption of
compensability and aggravation and substituted a system based on social security principles.

Nature of the Employees Compensation Scheme and the State Insurance Fund.In Sarmiento v.
Employees Compensation Commission, et al., we explained the nature of the new employees
compensation scheme and the State Insurance Fund, as followsThe new law establishes a state
insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees.
The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his
claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a
claim with a new neutral Employees Compensation Commission which then determines on the
basis of the employees supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may
be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of
death benefits has also been doubled. On the other hand, the employers duty is only to pay the
regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden
demands. for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does
not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims. The new law applies the
social security principle in the handling of workmens compensation. The Commission administers
and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the
compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open
ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering
from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. Since there is no employer opposing or
fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion
cease to have importance.

In workmens compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date when the claimant
contracted the disease. An injury or illness which intervened prior to January 1, 1975, the effectivity
date of P.D. No. 626, shall be governed by the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, while
those contracted on or after January 1, 1975 shall be governed by the Labor Code, as amended by
P.D. No. 626. Corollarily, where the claim for compensation benefit was filed after the effectivity of
P.D. No. 626 without any showing as to when the disease intervened, the presumption is that the
disease was contracted after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626. In the case at bar, petitioner was found
to be positive for breast cancer on March 22, 1995. No evidence, however, was presented as to
when she contracted said ailment. Hence, the presumption is that her illness intervened when P.D.
No. 626 was already the governing law.

The presumption of compensability and aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act
cannot be applied to a workers claim for compensation benefit arising from breast cancer under a
claim made pursuant to P.D. No. 626.Clearly therefore, the presumption of compensability and
aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act cannot be applied to petitioners claim for
compensation benefit arising from breast cancer. We are not experts in this field to rule that the
onset of her breast carcinoma occurred prior to January 1, 1975, or almost twenty years ago.
Hence, the provisions of the Labor Code govern. For breast carcinoma and resulting disability to be
compensable, the claimant must prove, by substantial evidence, either of two things: (a) that the
sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules on
Employees Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the
disease was increased by the claimants working conditions. There is no dispute that cancer of the
breast is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex A of the Rules on Employees
Compensation. As such, petitioner has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the causal
relationship between her illness and her working conditions.

NFD International Manning Agents v. Illescas

Where the injury resulted from the performance of a duty, like carrying heavy basketful of fire
hydrant caps, it cannot be said to be the result of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap,
occurrence, or fortuitous eventit is common knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause
back injury.The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondent was not an accident, but an

#TiggyNotes
injury sustained by respondent from carrying the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which injury
resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the result of an accident, that is, an
unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted from the
performance of a duty. Although respondent may not have expected the injury, yet, it is common
knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause back injury, as what happened in this case.
Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous
with the term accident as defined above.

A claimant may dispute the company-designated physicians report by seasonably consulting

another doctor. In such a case, the medical report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the
labor tribunal and the court based on its inherent merit.

Vda. De Inguillo v. ECC

In workmens compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date on which the
claimant contracted his illness.Considering, however, that the deceased was confined in the
hospital from 24 February 1978 to 5 June 1978, and that he later died on 20 June 1978, and absent
any evidence as to when his ailment was contracted, it is the new Labor Code that becomes the
governing law. As specifically provided in Article 208 of said Code, its provisions cover injury,
sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975.

Cancer ailments, not com-pensable unless shown to have been caused by specific working
conditions.Definitely, esophageal edenocarcinoma with bone and cervical metastasis can not be
considered as an occupational disease since it is not one of those listed under Annex A of the
mentioned Rules. It was held that cancer ailments, except for a specified few, are not compensable.
It is a disease that strikes people in general.

Quisora v. Denholm Crew Management

Disability Benefits; Granting that the provisions of the 2000 Philippine Overseas and Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) apply, the disputable presumption
provision in Section 20 (B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to
present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of the illness.

Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be entitled to disability
compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have
existed during the term of his employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of
proof belongs to respondent company.

GSIS v. Calumpiano

Employees Compensation; Court Personnel; Stenographers; Glaucoma; Contrary to petitioners

submissions, there appears to be a link between blood pressure and the development of glaucoma,
which leads the Supreme Court (SC) to conclude that respondents glaucoma developed as a result
of her hypertension.Respondent served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the ECC
itself said, [h]er duties were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her
ailment, hypertension which is a listed occupational disease, contrary to the CAs
pronouncement that it is not. And because it is a listed occupational disease, the increased risk
theory does not apply again, contrary to the CAs declaration; no proof of causation is required.
It can also be said that given respondents age at the time, and taking into account the nature,
working conditions, and pressures of her work as court stenographer which requires her to
faithfully record each and every day virtually all of the courts proceedings; transcribe these notes
immediately in order to make them available to the court or the parties who require them; take
down dictations by the judge, and transcribe them; and type in final form the judges decisions,
which activities extend beyond office hours and without additional compensation or overtime pay
all these contributed to the development of her hypertension or hypertensive cardiovascular
disease, as petitioner would call it. Consequently, her age, work, and hypertension caused the
impairment of vision in both eyes due to advanced to late stage glaucoma, which rendered her

#TiggyNotes
legally blind. Contrary to petitioners submissions, there appears to be a link between blood
pressure and the development of glaucoma, which leads the Court to conclude that respondents
glaucoma developed as a result of her hypertension.

Probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases; that the primordial and
paramount consideration is the employees welfare; that the strict rules of evidence need not be
observed in claims for compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician may be
received in evidence and used as proof of the facts in dispute; that in any determination of
compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw medical findings
and a claimants personal and social history; that where the primary injury is shown to have arisen
in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises
out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to
claimants own negligence or misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application of the law
on employees compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.

GSIS v. Jum Angel

Employees Compensation; Requisites for an injury and the resulting death to be compensable.
Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following: 1) the employee must have been injured at the place where his work
requires him to be; 2) the employee must have been performing his official functions; and 3) if the
injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

The requirement that the injury must arise out of and in the course of employment proceeds from
the limiting premise that the injury must be the result of an accident.

Accident; Definition of an Accident.The term accident has been defined in an insurance case.
We find the definition applicable to the present case. Thus: The words accident and accidental
have never acquired any technical signification in law, and when used in an insurance contract are
to be construed and considered according to the ordinary understanding and common usage and
speech of people generally. In substance, the courts are practically agreed that the words
accident and accidental mean that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention
or design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. The definition that has usually been
adopted by the courts is that an accident is an event that takes place without ones foresight or
expectationan event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known
case, and therefore not expected. An accident is an event which happens without any human
agency or, if happening through human agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is
unusual to and not expected by the person to whom it happens. It has also been defined as an
injury which happens by reason of some violence or casualty to the insured without his design,
consent, or voluntary cooperation.

Death in line of duty is not equivalent to a finding that the death resulted from an accident and was
not occasioned by the sergeants willful intention to kill himself. It is not enough, as erroneously
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, that there is evidence to support the conclusion that the
sergeant died while in the performance of his duties since he was not arrested but was merely
invited to shed light on the investigation which was part of x x x official duties to cooperate with
the inquiry being conducted by the Philippine Army. There must be evidence that the sergeant did
not take his own life considering the fact that he was found hanging inside his cell with an electric
cord tied around his neck.