PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintif-appellee, vs.

EFREN MENDOZA y SALVADOR, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 133382
March 9, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.
RPC ARTICLE 14
1.FACTS

"At around 7:00 p.m. of July 14, 1993, in Barangay Manlucugan, Vinzons,
Camarines Norte, Anchito Nano and Marianito Rafael passed by Efren Mendozas
house and asked for a drink from his wife, Emily Mendoza. Anchito began talking
with Emily and they were about four arms-length from Marianito when Mendoza
suddenly appeared. Mendoza hacked Anchito on the nape, which prompted
Marianito to flee out of fear for his life.
Later that night, appellant surrendered to Senior Police Officer Leonardo Almadrones
who promptly turned him over to Chief Investigator Joel Guinto for the requisite
investigation. During investigation, appellant claimed that Anchito ransacked his
house and hacked his seven (7) year old son Ernie Mendoza.
Two days later, Mendozas wife and son went to the police station to blotter Ernie
Mendozas wound. Investigator Guinto interviewed Ernie Mendoza and concluded
that Ernies wound was made by somebody other than the victim since the said
wound was not deep enough. Also, when he questioned the child about the wound,
the latter answered that when he woke up, he already had a wound.
2. HOW IT WAS ELEVATED TO SC
The court ruled rejecting appellants self defense. This court finds that the accused
was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to defend
himself by means which appeared unreasonable by using a long bolo is
unjustifiable. Hence this appeal.
3. ISSUE
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE ESPOUSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SAME.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
4.SC DECISION
First Issue: Self-Defense and Defense of a Relative
Requisites of Self-Defense and Defense of Relative

Because the accused raises self-defense and defense of a relative, it is incumbent

upon him to prove the presence of the following requisites: unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim, lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and reasonable
necessity of the means he used to repel the aggression.[15] It is settled that the
accused who invokes self-defense or defense of a relative must present clear and
convincing evidence. Such person cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution,
for even if it is weak, it cannot be disbelieved because the former has admitted the
killing.
Unlawful Aggression Not Proven
Several circumstances belie appellants claim of self-defense and defense of a
relative. First, investigators found the deceased in a kneeling position with five
wounds - three on the nape, and two at the back. Thus, the nature and the location
of such wounds debunked appellants claim that Nano was about to attack him.
Second, the bolo which Nano had allegedly used in his attack was not found within
the vicinity of the crime scene and was not presented in court. This point was
established by SPO4 Silverio Rafaels testimony and the photographs depicting the
actual crime scene.
Third, granting that Ernie Mendoza was injured, the appellant and his witnesses
were not able to prove adequately that such injury was caused by Nano, because
there were inconsistencies and improbabilities in their testimonies. Ernie claimed
that he had lost consciousness after being struck with a bolo by Nano. However,
appellant asserts that he heard his child cry, "Ama, tinaga ako!" while the former
was about to subdue the assailant. Moreover, appellant admits that he did not see
Nano hit his son.
Second Issue: Crime and Punishment
We agree with the trial court that the killing of Anchito Nano was qualified
by treachery, as alleged in the Information. The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person attacked. Treachery exists when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure
its execution, without risk arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.
In the present case, the victim's lack of awareness of the attack can be
gleaned from the nature, the number and the location of his wounds.
Furthermore, the testimony of Marianito Rafael, against whom no ill
motive was imputed by the appellant, likewise established this fact.
Voluntary Surrender
Appellant argues that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should be appreciated in his favor, because he immediately went to the
Municipal Hall and surrendered to the police on the night of the incident.
Sc
We agree. To establish this mitigating circumstance, the following three
requisites must be shown: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested;

(2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's

agent; and (c) the surrender is voluntary. The defense must show intent to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because of an
acknowledgement of guilt or because of a wish to spare them the trouble
and the expense concomitant to the search and the capture of the
accused. In this case, all these requisites were proven. He readily
admitted that he had hacked the victim and subsequently put himself
under police custody.
Furthermore, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that voluntary
surrender was "offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery." The
court a quo failed to appreciate the distinction between a generic
aggravating circumstance and a qualifying one.
A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime. A generic
aggravating circumstance, on the other hand, does not affect the
designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic
aggravating circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a
qualifying circumstance may not.
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating
circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it
cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it
cannot offset voluntary surrender.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED
with the modification that appellant is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day ofprision mayor (maximum)
to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal (maximum). All
other awards are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
4.PENALTIES
When the crime was committed on July 14, 1993, the penalty for murder
was reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. At the time,
however, RA 7659 which reimposed the death penalty was not yet in
effect. In any event, the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender impels the imposition of the minimum period of the
applicable penalty, reclusion temporal (maximum). Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should be sentenced to prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal also in its maximum
period.