Wills 7th Assignment

67. Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties

Inc vs Rodriguez
Facts:
The respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner
Ramon
Ching
and
certain
corporations. The complaint sought to nullify
an extrajudicial settlement of estate which
adjudicated solely to Ramon the entire estate
of the deceased Antonio Ching, as well as other
remedies. The respondents claimed that
Ramon murdered Antonio Ching (A criminal
case against Ramon was pending, with Ramon
at large. His wife was the one managing
Antonios estate.), hence, he should be
deemed legally disinherited and prohibited
from receiving any share from the estate of
Antonio.
The respondents prayed for the following:
a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

f)

Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who

murdered his father ANTONIO CHING disqualified
as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his
father;
Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON
CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land
from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his
name covered by TCT No. x x x;
Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and
WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x
x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral,
invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;
Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares
of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the names of
ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the
defendant ANTONIOCHING's name for having been
illegally procured through the falsification of their
signatures in the document purporting the transfer
thereof;
Declaring the nullity and to have no force and
effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being
contrary to law and existing jurisprudence;
Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic)
executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2)
parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC
BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel
of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for
having illegally procured the ownership and titles
of the above properties;

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, claiming

that the respondents cause of action should be
a subject of a special proceeding since the case
involved the alleged disinheritance of Ramon
among others.
The RTC and CA ruled in
respondents. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether
jurisdiction.

or

not

the

favor
court

of
has

Held: Yes. Under Article 916 of the NCC,

disinheritance can be effected only through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and
the CA that while the respondents in their
Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the
disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any
instrument supposedly effecting the disposition
of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned.
Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's
disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does
not partake of the nature.
68. Pecson vs Mediavillo (1914)
Facts:
In 1910, the will of Florencio Pecson was
presented to the CFI of Albay for probate. On
the 18th day of September, 1910, the said
Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo
and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion
alleging that Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin
Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the
deceased Teresa Pecson. Teresa was a
daughter of the testator; that the said
granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson,
was disinherited by her grandfather, the
testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3
of the will, because she failed to show him due
respect and on a certain occasion raised her
hand against him.
In his will, Florencio Pecson stated that he
disinherited Rosario Mediavillo "because she
was grossly disrespectful to me and because
on one occasion, when it was I do not
remember, she raised her hand against me.
Therefore it is my will that she, the said Rosario
Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
Lorayes contended that Rosario should not
have been disinherited, because she did not
commit such an act of disrespect, and if
perhaps she did, it was due to the
derangement of her mental faculties.
The trial court ruled that the clause
disinheriting Rosario was void for being
contrary to law.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the court may
inquire to the cause of the disinheritance and
decide whether disinheritance is proper; (2)
Whether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of
Joaquin Mediavillo, is the latters heir by
representation.

Held: Yes, the Civil Code (art. 848) provides

that disinheritance shall only take place for one
of the causes expressly fixed by law. In
accordance with the provisions of that article
(848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide
the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in
other words, the cases or causes in which the
ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs.
Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that
the disinheritance can only be effected by the
testament, in which shall be mentioned the
legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance.
If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only
by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil
Code, it would seen to follow that the courts
might
properly
inquire
whether
the
disinheritance has been made properly and for
the causes provided for by law.
The right of the courts to inquire into the
causes and whether there was sufficient cause
for the disinheritance or not, seems to be
supported by express provisions of the Civil
Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of
the
truthfulness
of
the
reason
for
disinheritance shall be established by the heirs
of the testator, should the disinherited person
deny it." It would appear then that if the person
disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the
cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted
to support his allegation by proof. The right of
the court to inquire whether or not the
disinheritance was made for just cause is also
sustained by the provisions of article 851,
which in part provides that: Disinheritance
made without statement of the reason, or for a
cause the truth of which, if contradicted,
should not be proven . . . shall annul the
designation of heirship, in so far as it
prejudices the person disinherited.
With reference to the second assignment of
error, The Supreme Court held that the right of
representation shall always take place in the
direct descending line, but never in the
ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place
only in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters, whether they be of the whole or half
blood. It will be remembered that the whole
argument of the appellants with reference to
the first assignment of error was that Rosario
Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court
evidently believed that there were no
"legitimate children, descendants of the
deceased, surviving," and that therefore the
father or mother of said legitimate children
would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch,

however, as there was a descendant in the

direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not
ascend, and for the reason the lower court
committed an error in declaring that Basiliso
Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of
the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and
for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment
of the lower court nullifying and setting aside
paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and
that art of said judgment which decrees to
Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of
Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson
and which would have been given to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby
revoked.
69. Testate Estate of Vicente Singson
Pablo vs De Lim (1943)
Facts:
Don Vicente Singson Pablo died, leaving a
will which contained a clause, which provides:
All of my properties not disposed of otherwise
in this testament shall be distributed in equal
parts to all who are entitled thereto. The
widow, as administratrix, presented a project of
partition in which the properties not disposed
of were adjudicated to Vicentes four brothers
and four nieces. The brothers objected, saying
that pursuant to the aforesaid clause above,
the nieces are not entitled to anything. They
invoked Art. 751 of the Old Civil Code, which
provides that a disposition made in general
terms in favor of the testators relatives shall
be understood as made in favor of those
nearest in degree. The trial court ruled against
the brothers.
Issue: Whether or not the brothers contention
is meritorious.
Held: No. The testator, by referring to all who
are entitled thereto instead of relatives
precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty of the
interpretation of Art. 751 and to indicate his
wish that the residue of his estate be
distributed in equal parts to all who would have
been entitled to inherit from him had he dies
intestate. (Note: Perhaps the Court considered
the fact that Don Vicente was a lawyer who
probably knew what he was doing when he
made the will.)
70. Dorotheo vs CA (1999)
Facts:

Private respondents were the legitimate

children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her
estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Petitioner Lourdes Dorotheo filed a petition for
the provate of Alejandros will. Private
respondents then filed a motion to declare the
will intrinsically void, which the trial court
granted on Jan. 30, 1986. The trial court
declared in that order that petitioner is not the
legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his
three legitimate children (petitioners herein).
Lourdes appealed to the CA, which dismissed
the appeal. The dismissal became final and
executory on Feb. 3, 1989.
A writ of execution was issued by the trial
court to implement the CA order. However,
Lourdes refused to surrender to private
respondents the TCTs covering the properties
of the late Alejandro. Thus, private respondents
filed a motion for cancellation of the titles and
for the issuance of new titles in their names. An
Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by
Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and
executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as
well as the Order directing the issuance of the
writ of execution, on the ground that the order
was merely interlocutory, hence not final in
character (According to petitioner, an order
merely declaring who are heirs and the shares
to which set of heirs is entitled cant be the
basis of execution). The court added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even
directs the distribution of the estate of the
deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied in
an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders
dated November 29, 1990 and February 1,
1991.
Petitioner instituted a petition for review
arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals was a
petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner contends that in issuing the two
assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to
have no jurisdiction because he was
particularly designated to hear the case.
Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the
Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the
January 30, 1986 Order which declared the
intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was
earlier admitted to probate.
Issue: Whether or not a will that was admitted
to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still
be given effect.

Held: No. It has been consistently held that if

no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment
or order of the trial court, the same attains
finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order
allowing the will became final and the question
determined by the court in such order can no
longer be raised anew, either in the same
proceedings or in a different motion. The
matters of due execution of the will and the
capacity of the testator acquired the character
of res judicata and cannot again be brought
into question, all juridical questions in
connection therewith being for once and
forever closed. Such final order makes the will
conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution.
It
should
be
noted
that
probate
proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated,
particularly on three aspects: (1) whether the
will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will
and testament; (2) compliance with the
prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
(3) the testamentary capacity of the testator;
and the due execution of the last will and
testament.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and
questions regarding the same may still be
raised even after the will has been
authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily
follow that an extrinsically valid last will and
testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if
the will was validly executed, if the testator
provides for dispositions that deprives or
impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or
rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions
thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially
so when the courts had already determined in
a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having
attained that character of finality is binding on
this Court which will no longer be disturbed.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of
the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights
that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But
before there could be testate distribution, the
will must pass the scrutinizing test and
safeguards provided by law considering that
the deceased testator is no longer available to
prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside
from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur donare.
No intestate distribution of the estate can be
done until and unless the will had failed to pass
both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will
is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply
regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is

extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine

its intrinsic validity that is whether the
provisions of the will are valid according to the
laws of succession. In this case, the court had
ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically
valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were
void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as
correctly held by the trial court. Furthermore,
Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged
share in the conjugal properties of his late
spouse, whom he described as his only beloved
wife, is not a valid reason to reverse a final and
executory order. Testamentary dispositions of
properties not belonging exclusively to the
testator or properties which are part of the
conjugal regime cannot be given effect.
Matters with respect to who owns the
properties that were disposed of by Alejandro
in the void will may still be properly ventilated
and determined in the intestate proceedings
for the settlement of his and that of his late
spouses estate.
71. Dorotheo vs CA (1999)
Facts:
Agatonica Arreza is the offspring of Pedro
Arreza and Ursula Tubil. The Private respondent
Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica.
Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married
Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another
daughter,
the
decedent
Justa.
Private
respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the
nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Domingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan
Arnaldo. Domingo and his wife Catalina
Azarcon had a daughter, Primitiva Arnaldo.
Primitiva then married Conrado Uriarte who
had children, one of whom was Pascasio
Uriarte. The widow and daughters of Pascasio
are the petitioners in his case. Petitioners are
thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth
degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin
Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte. The other petitioners
are the children of Primitiva and those of her
brother Gregorio. The children of Primitiva by
Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are
Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and
Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of
Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta
Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino
and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus
grandchildren and relatives within the fifth
degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins
Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo. Private
respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this
case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition
of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The
land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been

acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by

inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and
Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase.
Private respondent claimed to be the sole
surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the
latter died without issue. He complained that
Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the
land as Justa's tenant, refused to give him
(private respondent) his share of the harvest.
He contended that Pascasio had no right to the
entire land of Justa but could claim only onehalf of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had
inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and
Ursula Tubil. Pascasio died during the pendency
of the case and was substituted by his heirs. In
their answer, the heirs denied they were mere
tenants of Justa but the latter's heirs entitled to
her entire land. They claimed that the entire
land, subject of the case, was originally owned
by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great granduncle. It
was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan
Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic
will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. Domingo
was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan,
one-third. The heirs claimed that the land had
always been in their possession and that in her
lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right
over the property but only received her share
of the harvest from it. They alleged that private
respondent did not have any right to the
property because he was not an heir of
Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the
property.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners,
whereas the CA reversed and ruled in favor of
respondents. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not a nephew is considered
a collateral relative who may inherit if no
descendant, ascendant or spouse survive the
decedent.
Held: Yes. Petitioners misappreciate the
relationship between Justa and private
respondent.
As
already
stated,
private
respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister
Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A
nephew is considered a collateral relative who
may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or
spouse survive the decedent. That private
respondent is only a half-blood relative is
immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him
from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of
Appeals
correctly
pointed
out,
"The
determination of whether the relationship is of
the full or half blood is important only to

determine the extent of the share of the

survivors.
72. Sayson vs CA (1992)
Facts:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five
children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died in 1952, and
Rafaela in 1976. Teodoro, who had married
Isabel Bautista, died in 1972. His wife died nine
years later in 1981. Their properties were left in
the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel,
all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their
children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for
partition and accounting of the intestate estate
of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was
resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel
Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedent's lawful
descendants.
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own
complaint, this time for the accounting and
partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four
surviving children. The complainants asserted
the defense that Delia and Edmundo were the
adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As
such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's
share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.
The RTC ruled that Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel are entitled to inherit, and the CA
affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the adopted children of
Teodoro (Delia and Edmundo) are entitled to
inherit
Teodoros
share
by
right
of
representation.
Held: No. There is no question that as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel
has a right to represent her deceased father in
the distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted
above, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived,
which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached
in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is

true that the adopted child shall be deemed to

be a legitimate child and have the same right
as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship
created by the adoption is between only the
adopting parents and the adopted child and
does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party.
73. Bagunu vs Piedad (1987)
Facts:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia
Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in
Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the
matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the
Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of
Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of
the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad,
petitioner assailed the finality of the order of
the trial court awarding the entire estate to
respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the
proceedings were tainted with procedural
infirmities,
including
an
incomplete
publications of the notice of hearing, lack of
personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and
irregularity in the disbursements of allowances
and withdrawals by the administrator of the
estate.
Issue: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of
the fifth civil degree, can inherit alongside
respondent, a collateral relative of the third
civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of
proximity
in
intestate
succession
find
application among collateral relatives?
Held: No. Augusto H. Piedad died without any
direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent
is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a thirddegree relative of the decedent, while
petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of
the deceased, or a fifthdegree relative of the
decedent. The right of representation does not
apply to "others collateral relatives within the
fifth civil degree" (to which group both
petitioner and respondent belong) who are
sixth in the order of preference following,
firstly,
the
legitimate
children
and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents
and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate
children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent.
Among collateral relatives, except only in the
case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule
of proximity, expressed in Article 962,
aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In
determining the degree of relationship of the

collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966

of the Civil Code gives direction. Respondent,
being a relative within the third civil degree, of
the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner,
a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding
an intestato to the estate of the decedent.
74. Castro vs CA (1989)
Facts:
Petitioners Juan and Feliciana Castro are the
siblings of the deceased Eustaquio Castro,
while private respondent Benita Castro-Naval is
the only child of Eustaquio. The petitioners filed
an action for partition of properties against
Beinta, alleging that they are the compulsory
heirs of Pedro Castro (the father of Eustaquio
Castro). This complaint was amended into an
action for quieting of title. In the pre-trial, the
parties agreed that the sole issue to resolve is
whether or not Benita is the acknowledged
natural child of Eustaquio.
It was revealed that Pricola Maregment, the
natural mother of Benita, was wedded to Felix
de Maya against her wishes. While the wedding
celebration was ongoing, she escaped and
went to her true sweetheart, Eustaquio. The
two of them eventually lived as husbands and
wives. As a result of their cohabitation, Benita
was born. After the death of Pricola, Benita
continued to live with Eustaquio. And when
Benita got married, it was Eustaquio who gaver
her away in marriage. Even after Benitas
marriage, Eustaquio still took care of her. :)
The RTC and the CA both ruled that Benita is
the acknowledged and recognized child of
Eustaquio and is therefore entitled to
participate in the partition of the properties left
by him.
Issue: Whether or not Benita is the
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child
of Eustaquio.
Held: Yes. There is no question that the private
respondent is an illegitimate child of Eustaquio
Castro. Her father Eustaquio was a widower
when Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went to
live with him. The two could not validly enter
into a marriage because when Pricola fled from
her own wedding party on May 23, 1913, the
wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already
been solemnized. In other words, the marriage
was celebrated although it could not be
consummated because the bride hurriedly ran
away to join the man she really loved. Since

Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita

was conceived, Benita is a natural child.
Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of
acknowledgment voluntary and compulsory.
The provisions on acknowledgement are
applied to natural as well as spurious children.
We apply the more liberal provisions of the
new Family Code considering the facts and
equities of this case.1
First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably
the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro who
was qualified to legally marry when she was
conceived and born. From her birth on March
27, 1919 until the father's death on August 22,
1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with her
father and enjoyed the love and care that a
parent bestows on an only child. The private
respondents, themselves, admitted in their
complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 that Benita is
a forced heir of Eustaquio Castro. Second, the
rule on separating the legitimate from the
illegitimate family is of no special relevance
here because Benita and her mother Pricola
Maregmen were the only immediate family of
Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children
born of a legitimate wife contesting the
inheritance of Benita. Third, it was Eustaquio
himself who had the birth of Benita reported
and registered. There is no indication in the
records that Eustaquio should have known in
1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a
child, he should also have signed the certificate
and seen to it that it was preserved for 60
years. Or that he should have taken all legal
steps including judicial action to establish her
status as his recognized natural child during
the reglementary period to do so. Fourth, it was
Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her
wedding to Cipriano Naval. The couple
continued to live with the father even after the
wedding and until the latter's death. Fifth, the
certificate of baptism and the picture of the
Castro family during the wake for Eustaquio
may not be sufficient proof of recognition
under the Civil Code.
Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and
Filiation there are only two classes of children

1 This is a special case, because under normal

circumstances, the retroactive application of the
Family Code would have been improper (considering
that there are those whose rights would be
prejudiced). But the Court nevertheless allowed a
retroactive application, considering the peculiar facts
in this case and for equity considerations.

 legitimate and illegitimate. The fine

distinctions among various types of illegitimate
children have been eliminated. Article 175
provides that "Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children."
There can be no dispute that Benita Castro
enjoyed the open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio
Castro and that the action of Benita in
defending her status in this case is similar to
an "action to claim legitimacy" brought during
her lifetime.

75. Gonzales vs CA (1998)

Facts:
Petitioners are the siblings of Ricardo de Mesa.
Claiming they were the only heirs of Ricardo,
they sought the settlement of his intestate
estate with the CFI of Manila. Meanwhile,
private respondents Honoria, Cecilia and
Marian (all surnamed Empaynado) filed a
motion to set aside the proceedings and for
leave to file opposition. They claim that
Honoria had been the common-law wife of
Ricardo, while Cecilia and Marian are their
children. Private respondents also disclosed the
existence of Rosemarie, a child allegedly
fathered by Ricardo with another woman.
The CFI declared Cecilia, Marian and
Rosemarie as acknowledged natural children of
Ricardo entitled to succeed to the entire estate
of Ricardo. The CA affirmed. Hence, this
petition.
The petitioners contended that Jose
Libuanao, the deceased husband of Honoria,
was actually alive when Cecilia and Marian
were born in 1948 and 1954 respectively.
Petitioners presented an enrolment form of
Angelita Libunao accomplished in 1956 which
states that his father was Jose Libunao.
According to petitioners, if it were true that
Jose was already dead in 1943, then it would
have said so in that enrolment form. Lastly,
petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro
Arenas, Ricardo Abads physician, declaring that
in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and
found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and
that the latter had become sterile as a
consequence thereof.

Issue: Whether or not C, M and R are

acknowledged natural children of Ricardo and
thus entitled to succeed to the entire estate of
Ricardo.
Held: Yup. The Supreme Court did not believe
petitioners insane theories and proceeded to
apply Art. 988 of the Civil Code, which provides
that In the absence of legitimate descendants
or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
76. Diaz, the Guardian vs IAC (1990)
Facts:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated
January 23, 1976 with the CFI of Cavite in a
special proceeding "In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero," praying among other things, that
the corresponding letters of Administration be
issued in her favor and that she be appointed
as special Administratrix of the properties of
the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married Simon
Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during
infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the
widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of
Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero
and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Pascual Santero died in 1970, while Pablo
Santero died in 1973 and Simona Santero died
in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death
was survived by his mother Simona Santero
and his six minor natural children to wit: four
minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
In 1976, the court declared Felisa Pamuti
Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4
interrelated cases filed to wit: Petition for the
Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate
of Pablo Santero; Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of
Pascual Santero; Petition for Guardianship over
the properties of an incompetent Person,
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; and Petition

for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of

Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene
was allowed to intervene in the intestate
estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero
by Order of the Court in 1977. Petitioner
Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor
children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti from further taking part
or intervening in the settlement of the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as
well as in the intestate estate of Pascual
Santero and Pablo Santero. Felixberta Pacursa
guardian for her minor children.
In 1980, the court issued an order excluding
Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as
well as in the intestate estates of Pascual
Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to
be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero."
Felisa
Jardin
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration, and it was denied by the trial
court. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate
Court reversed the decision of the trial court
and declaring the Felisa Jardin as the sole heir
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering
oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the
proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Issue: Whether petitioners as illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero could inherit from
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero
who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda,
de Santero.
Held: No. Since the hereditary conflict refers
solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother
of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the
provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which
reads as follows: An illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not
an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the
oppositors
(petitioners
herein)
are
the
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a

barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of
said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism
and
incompatibility.
The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life;
the law does no more than recognize this truth,
by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Pablo Santero in the succession of the
letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate
mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for under Art.
992 of the New Civil Code.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the
New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother"
includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the
word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of. The record shows that from
the commencement of this case the only
parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs
of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are
Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural
or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since
petitioners herein are barred by the provisions
of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in
holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
77. Corpuz vs Administrator (1978)
Di ko maintindihan. Basahain na lang full
text.
78. De la Puerta vs CA (1990)
Facts:
The testator, Dominga Revuelta died on July
3, 1966, at the age of 92, leaving her
properties to her three surviving children,
Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given

the free portion in addition to her legitime and

was appointed executrix of the will. Vicente
and Alfredo opposed the petition for the
probate of the will filed by Isabel. The two
claimed that their mother was already senile at
the time of the execution of the will and did not
fully comprehend its meaning, that the
properties listed in the inventory of her estate
belonged
to
them
exclusively.
Alfredo
subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone
oppositor. Vicente de la Puerta filed with the
CFI of Quezon, a petition to adopt Carmelita de
la Puerta, which was thereafter granted. Isabel
appealed the said decision to the CA. Vicente
died during the pendency of the appeal,
prompting her to move for the dismissal of the
case. Carmelita filed a motion for the payment
to her of a monthly allowance as the
acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta. The said motion was granted by the
probate court granted the motion, declaring
that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de
la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts
claimed for her support. CA affirmed this order
of the lower court. Hence, this petition wherein
the petitioner's main argument is that
Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente
de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de
la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until
his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are
Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Carmelita.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON respondent Carmelita de la
Puerta, can claim successional rights to the
estate of her alleged grandmother.
Held: The Court held that Vicente de la Puerta
did not predecease his mother and Carmelita is
a spurious child. It is settled that in
testamentary
succession,
the
right
of
representation can take place only in the
following cases: first, when the person
represented dies before the testator; second,
when the person represented is incapable of
succeeding the testator; and third, when the
person represented is disinherited by the
testator. In all of these cases, since there is a
vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the
children or descendants of thefiliation of
private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who
claims successional rights to the estate of her
alleged grandmother. person represented to
succeed by right of representation.
The law is clear that there is representation
only when relatives of a deceased person try to

succeed him in his rights which he would have

had if still living.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta,
her son Vicente had the right to inherit from
her directly or in his own right. No right of
representation was involved, nor could it be
invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death,
which came after his own mother's death. It
would have been different if Vicente was
already dead when Dominga Revuelta died.
Carmelita could then have inherited from her in
representation of her father Vicente, assuming
the private respondent was a lawful heir. As a
spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred
from inheriting from Dominga because of
Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down
the barrier between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. This article provides quite
clearly: Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.
Even as an adopted child, Carmelita would
still be barred from inheriting from Dominga
Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred
ties between them and consequently, no legal
ties to bind them either. Carmelita, as the
spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has
successional rights to the intestate estate of
her father but not to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta. Her claims for support and
inheritance should therefore be filed in the
proceedings for the settlement of her own
father's estate and cannot be considered in the
probate of Dominga Revuelta's will.
79. Pascual vs Pascual (1992)
Facts:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed
Pascual are the acknowledged natural children
of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the
full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual. Don Andres Pascual died intestate on
October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
children. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the
surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), a Special Proceeding for administration
of the intestate estate of her late husband. On
October 16, 1985, all the heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement
objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S.
Pascual
and
Hermes
S.
Pascual
The

Compromise Agreement had been entered into

despite the Manifestation/Motion of the
petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their
uncle. On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed
their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and
the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
reiterate Hereditary Rights. Both the RTC and
CA dismissed the submitted Motions as well as
Motions for reconsideration reiterating the
hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Art. 992 excludes
recognized natural children from inheritance of
the deceased.
Held: The Court dismissed the instant petition
for lack of merit and affirmed the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals. It
cited the previous decided case of Diaz v. IAC,
where such Court ruled that Article 992 of the
Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother of said legitimate child. They may
have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family
is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life;
the law does no more than recognize this truth,
by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but
petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the doctrine, respondent IAC did not
err in holding that petitioners herein cannot
represent their father Eligio Pascual in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate
of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
brother of their father.
80. Manuel vs Ferrer (1995)
Facts:
The property involved in this petition for review
on certiorari is the inheritance left by an
illegitimate child who died intestate without

any surviving descendant or ascendant.

Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses
Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, filed this
suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio
had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista.
From this relationship, a child named Juan
Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate
son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation
propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an
area of 2,700 sqm was executed in favor of
Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other
parcels of land, were later bought by Juan and
registered in his name. The couple were not
blessed with a child that is why they took
private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar
into their fold and so raised her as their own
"daughter." On June 3, 1980, Juan Manuel
executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed
of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2)
portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate
on February 21, 1990. Two years later,
Esperanza Gamba also passed away. A month
after the death of Esperanza, Modesta
executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication
claiming for herself the three parcels of land.
Following the registration of the document of
adjudication with the Office of the Register of
Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan
Manuel were canceled and new titles, were
issued in the name of Modesta ManuelBaltazar. Modesta executed in favor of her corespondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Renunciation
and
Quitclaim
over
the
unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land
that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel
under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de
Retro. The petitioners filed a complaint filed
before the RTC Lingayen, Pangasinan, seeking
the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
instruments. The trial court dismissed the
complaint holding that petitioners, not being
heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother
Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-ininterest to institute the suit. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners was
denied by the trial court. Hence, this Petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON the petitioners are entitled to
inherit in the intestate estate of their
illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel.
Held: The Court ruled that the petitioners are
not entitled to inherit from the intestate estate
of their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel under
ARTICLE 992, an illegitimate child has no right
to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father or mother;

nor shall such children or relative inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child. The
principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family
wherein such doctrine rejects succession ab
intestato in the collateral line between
legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and
illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it
does not totally disavow such succession in the
direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the
presumed will of the decedent, it has no
application,
however,
on
testamentary
dispositions. A barrier dividing members of the
illegitimate family from members of the

legitimate family wherein the legitimate

brothers and sisters as well as the children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such
brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the
illegitimate child. Admittedly in her answer,
Modesta is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel.
A ward, without the benefit of formal/judicial
adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal
heir. Nevertheless, the complaint of petitioners
seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication executed by Modesta, the three
TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed
of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by
the trial court.